

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
37TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96337



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 370

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-102-8270)

Classified by (U) 10 OCT 1968
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1974

4/31

TO: 37C
JSARC
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1967.

2. (C) On 5 Oct 68, JG 28 and JG 10 were scrambled at 0655Z with instructions to proceed to the 270/34/77 for rendezvous with a two ship flight of Army UH-1F Gunships. JG's 28 and 10 had been briefed prior to departure that at approximately 0100Z a 9 man ground party had been air-lifted to an LZ at approximately the 270/53 of CH77. After unloading, the H-34 which carried them had been shot down exiting the LZ area. The ground party had then come under heavy ground attack from grenade, mortar and automatic weapons fire in close proximity to the LZ. Airstrikes had been conducted to suppress the enemy throughout the AM, but due to the weather conditions, the results were questionable. JG's 28 and 10 arrived at the rendezvous point at approximately 0720Z and the gunship escort five minutes thereafter. Enroute the JG's contacted Covey 216, the O.S.C., and were briefed on the survivors' situation. An Army ground party of 9 men were located on a helicopter landing zone on the 270/51/77, further refined to the 215/31/69. There were at that time, Spads 11 and 12, 13 and 14 on the scene plus several Huey Gunships. The JG's were advised that due to a stratus type cloud deck which lay approximately 1000' above the LZ, thorough suppression could not be accomplished. After the gunship flight arrived at the rendezvous point, the JG's proceeded to the rescue site. After holding in the immediate area for approximately 15 minutes until the ground party reported there was very light gunfire in the vicinity, Covey 216, still the O.S.C., advised that JG 28 could go in for a pickup attempt with the gunship flight to escort and provide ground suppression during the approach, landing and exit. The LZ was circular clearing of approximately 25 meters in diameter and was situated at the base of a ridge which ran approximately on a SW to NE heading and rising approximately 2000 feet above the LZ. To the south of the LZ a steeply sloped hill rose to almost the height of the ridge and formed more or less a NW extension from the ridge itself. To the east of the valley in which the LZ was located was a ridge line running NS at the SE end of the A Chau Valley. The effect of the topography formed a closed or boxed canyon restricting entry and exit routes and also maneuvering room in proximity of the LZ. JG 28 began the approach from approximately 4000' descending below the cloud deck on a SSE heading direct to the LZ. The ground party had spread a panel on the SE side of the LZ and the crew of JG 28 could see 4 or 5 team members around the panel. The RCC brought JG 28 to a hover at the north side of the LZ and simultaneously began a hovering right turn so as to align the aircraft on the exit heading of NE. Upon completing the turn, in

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED



a hover at approximately 10 feet above the center of the LZ with the cargo door facing the previously observed survivors, the RCCP observed movement on the SW side of the LZ (at the 9 o'clock position of JG 28) and the RS saw 3 or 4 individuals stand up. Both crewmembers initially determined them to be the other half of the ground party to be extracted since they too were on the edge of the LZ opposite the first group observed. However immediately after standing erect, the latter group began firing automatic weapons into the left side of JG 28. The RS called out "gunfire" and the FE simultaneously announced over ICS that JG 28 had taken numerous hits and the main fuel line had been severed causing a massive fuel leak. The FE and RS were immediately drenched with fuel and were temporarily blinded. Upon hearing the gunfire and the warnings from the FE and RS the RCC immediately started withdrawing from the LZ while the RCCP returned fire through his cockpit window. As JG 28 left the LZ and attained forward flight there were 2 to 3 inches of fuel in the cargo compartment and fuel spray was being blown into the cockpit. The cockpit windows were closed alleviating the fuel spray problem. Cockpit indications after exiting the LZ were all engine and transmission indicators normal, "master caution" light on, both "aft tank boost pump failure" lights on and "aft fuel bypass" caution light on. With the quantity of fuel inside the aircraft the RCC was hesitant to activate any electrical switch or to transmit on ICS or other communication systems. After clearing the hostile area and gaining altitude however, JG 28 reported to the O.S.C. its condition and the situation at the LZ. JG 28 reported that it had received heavy automatic weapons fire from the perimeter of the LZ. Next, in an effort to reduce or stem the flow of fuel into the cargo compartment the two aft boost pumps were secured. This completely stopped the leakage. JG 10 during this time had been orbiting the general area to provide emergency cover for JG 28. JG 28, escorted by Spad 11, then proceeded toward CH 77 maintaining radio silence and without further change to the aircraft configuration. At 0735Z, JG 32 and JG 25, manned with make up crews, scrambled from CH 77 at Queens request and proceeded to the holding point at 270/34/77. Enroute to the holding point, JG's 32 and 25 were notified by Spad 11 that JG 28 had received hits and had a bad fuel leak inside the helicopter. Spad 11 requested that JG 32 or JG 25 intercept JG 28 and provide escort for his return to CH 77. Spad 11 conducted the intercept between JG 25 and JG 28 and then joined up with JG 32 for escort to the LZ pickup area. JG 25 escorted JG 28 to the vicinity of CH 77 and then returned to an orbit point approximately 1 mile SW of the LZ at 9000' MSL. After JG 28 had pulled out because of taking hits the Covey FAC directed Huey Rocket Ships to expend ordnance and called for another JG pickup attempt. As JG 32 arrived at 215/30/69 at approximately 0835Z, JG 10 commenced the approach to the LZ. JG 10's approach path was similar to JG 28's. As JG 10 reached a hover over the LZ intense ground fire was received from the SW side of the LZ. The PJ noted a large hole, approximately 6" in diameter, in the cabin floor. The RCC made a right banking turn of approximately 180 degrees and proceeded to egress. Both engine fire warning lights came on. The other aircraft on scene observed JG 10 burning as it proceeded away from the LZ. The engines and cabin were in flames. The PJ and FE manned and fired the M-60's as JG 10 exited. The RCC was able to control the aircraft, and performed a crash landing 200 to 300 yards from the LZ at approximately YG 592 700, WTM grid. Immediately after the crash, JG 32 made a low pass over the crash site and observed an extremely large, bright fire consuming JG 10. Approximately 15 minutes after the crash, voice contact was established with the JG 10 PJ. Several minutes later, voice contact was established with another JG survivor. When the JG 10 PJ came up on voice again, he was notified by Covey 258 of the second survivor's location. Carrot Top, the call sign of the ground party, was told to evacuate the LZ,

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 5 year
intervals; Declassified
after 10 years

2.



DECLASSIFIED




move down the ravine to the JG 10 crash site and join with the two JG 10 survivors. At this time there were 7 survivors of the ground party remaining. Once Carrot Top vacated the LZ, numerous Spads and Gunfighter airstrikes were directed upon the area around the LZ. JG 25 returned from escort of JG 28 to CH 77 at approximately 0905Z. The crew of JG 28, upon landing at CH 77, obtained a replacement aircraft, JG 21, and after briefing the 37th ARRS Commander and Operations Duty Officer on the situation, launched in JG 21 and returned to the SAR scene at approximately 0930Z. The Spad and Gunfighter airstrikes continued until the two JG 10 survivors joined, and past the time that Carrot Top had estimated his team's arrival at the crash site. The cloud layer confronted by JG 28 and JG 10 on their approaches was replaced with a smoke layer from the airstrikes that obscured the LZ from the crash site. As the smoke layer was hindering the effectiveness of additional airstrikes and darkness was approaching Spad 11 determined that a rescue attempt be made even though Carrot Top had not accomplished their join-up with the JG 10 survivor's. The JG 10 survivor's had been notified to expect indigenous persons among the team led by American advisors. The JG 10 survivors and Carrot Top were notified to come up on the penetrator in groups of 2 or 3. The eight Spads and Sandy's on scene at this time formed a daisy chain around JG 32 as JG 32 dumped fuel to 1400 pounds. At this time (1000Z) JG 25 (high bird) descended from high orbit position and established a low orbit approximately 1000' AGL 1 mile SE of the pickup area on the opposite side of the ridge line where Spads were making their airstrikes and JG 32 was making the pickup. JG 32 established voice contact with a JG 10 survivor and flew and hovered to the crash site. The indicated altitude was 2400 feet with a 22 degree C temperature. The JG 10 survivors reported hearing JG 32 and popped a smoke flare which was observed by the JG 32 PJ hoist operator. The other JG 32 PJ sighted the men and directed the RCC over the survivors. JG 32 was hovering with the main rotor blades between two layers of branches of a 100 foot tree, at the 12 o'clock position. There was another tree to the 9 o'clock position just outside the rotor tips. JG 32 had previously attempted to accomplish the pickup with the nose pointed down the ravine to allow an exit route, but clipped small branches with the tail rotor without being far enough up slope to hover over the JG 10 survivors. While the two JG 10 survivors were being hoisted, the JG 32 pilot observed men coming down a path at 1 o'clock position and proceeding toward the 3 o'clock position on the right (West) side of the stream. After JG 10 crewmen were aboard, JG 32 backed and slid right and down to a 20 to 30 foot hover to pickup 3 members of Carrot Top. This group initially removed the penetrator from the hoist cable, but then replaced it and were hoisted as a group of 3. As they entered the door, they unplugged the PJ hoist operator's headset. The JG 10 PJ who was firing one M-60, reconnected the JG 32 hoist operator's plug and adjusted his boom mike. As 3 more of the Carrot Top team arrived, JG 32 believed it was receiving incoming ground fire, but with the Spads continuing to strafe and rocket in the immediate area and the JG 32 M-60's and M-16's being manned by the JG 32 PJ, JG 10 survivors, and on-board Carrot Top personnel, JG 32 remained in a hover. The PJ hoist operator lowered the penetrator again. As he raised the 3 men from the ground, he noticed that one of the indigenous team members had a vine wrapped around him. The hoist operator lowered the penetrator and allowed the man to untangle himself. The 3 man group was hoisted with the one man hanging in the strap as he did not regain his seat after untangling himself from the vine. As this group was brought into the cabin, the hoist operator's headset was unplugged again. The hover power required at this time was 103% Q on each engine. JG 32 announced on UHF Guard that it was at maximum power and was withdrawing. JG 32 backed and turned, gained airspeed and climbed out. Fifteen minutes passed from approach to exit time. Spad 11 requested to know the number of survivors on board and the number

GROUP 4

3.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 25 years





remaining on the ground. JG 32 had to ask Spad 11 to stand by because ICS contact had not been reestablished with the Guys-in-Back. The PJ was attending the survivors who needed attention; the hoist operator (also a PJ) was firing a weapon unaware that his headset was again unplugged. The pilots of JG 32 couldn't make themselves heard by shouting or with the crew alarm bell. The RCGP was finally able to attract the crews attention and on ICS directed the JG 32 PJ and hoist operator to question each man to determine the number of survivors on the ground. Both JG 10 survivors reported that no other JG 10 crewmembers were alive and all the Carrot Top team reported no other Carrot Top people alive. Of the 7 carrot Top members who departed the LZ, the wounded one was killed by AK-47 fire as they approached the JG crash site. He was killed while he was being carried by two of the team. JG 32 reported that no more survivors existed approximately 5 minutes after Spad 11 requested the information. Because JG 32's radio call that JG 32 was departing due to maximum power requirement implied that more survivors were on the ground, Spad 11 committed JG 25 to approach the pickup scene while attempting to confirm via radio the number of remaining survivors. The eight Spads were continuing the "Daisy Chain" expending ordnance in the area and directed JG 25 to the JG 10 crash site. JG 25 jettisoned tip tanks and dumped fuel to 1400 lbs. As the Spads would make a firing pass near the LZ and JG 10 crash site, each one would take over directing JG 25 to the pickup area. JG 25 arrived over the crash site and established a hover approximately 50' above the tree tops. Several calls were made by JG 25 and Spad on UHF Guard for any additional survivors to pop smoke or give a call on their radio. The JG 25 crew did not observe any smoke or survivors in the area around the crash site or the pickup point of the other survivors so they departed the area. Approximately 1 minute after JG 25 departed the crash site (1018Z) JG 32 advised all SAR forces that there were no more survivors on the ground. Twenty four A-1 sorties occurred. JG 21, 25, and 32 returned to GH 77 arriving at approximately 1045Z. During JG 32's spiraling descent from 6000' to the GH 77 traffic pattern, the PJ announced that the four indigenous troops on board were experiencing ear pains. A climb to 2000' and ear block clearing techniques taught by the PJs alleviated the problem. It is recommended that standard tactics for extraction of any survivors pinned down by adjacent hostile forces include the attempt of the survivors to move prior to the commitment of a JG. It is also recommended that the headset cord of the hoist operator be attached to the right side of his helmet and the cord extend to the aft of the cabin door rather than across the entrance way and the modified helmet plug-in be strong. It is also recommended that JP-5 be considered for use instead of JP-4. Radar altimeters are still needed by this unit.

3. (C) The survivors were: JG 10 Major Vernon R. Granier, Casbeer, AF18731219. Carrot Top: 2 Americans and 4 indigenous.

SSgt. Earnest D.

4. (U) Other aircraft assisting:
- Spad 11: Maj D. Dineen
 - 03: Maj J. Wheeler
 - 29: Maj Deportier
 - 31a: Maj J. Gaffney
 - 01: Maj W. Parkham
 - 35: LC Learnard
 - 12: LC V. Cole
 - 04: Maj J. Egbert
 - 30: Maj D. Pierce
 - 32: Menke
 - 02: Capt D. Hinson
 - 36: Maj Teskey



PROPP - check out about recommendation - get 3 GP thoughts col R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sandys 01, 02, 07, 08
FAC's Covey 216 and Covey 258
Helo Ordnance Support Hostage and Scarface
Rescap Gunfighters 7, 8

5. (U) Crews of the Jolly Greens were:

JOLLY GREEN 28/21
RCC LCDR Lonnie L. Mixon
RCCP Capt Vincent A. Ziccardi
FE Sgt Duane I. Beland
RS TSgt Nathaniel Smith JR

JOLLY GREEN 10
RCC Granier, Vernon R. ✓
RCCP Maj Albert D. Wester *
FE Sgt Gregory P. Lawrence *
RS SSgt Earnest D. Gasbeer ✓

SHOT DOWN

JOLLY GREEN 32
RCC Maj Don P. Olsen
RCCP LtCol James H. Grady
FE AIC Neusbaum
RS AIC Allen J. Avery

JOLLY GREEN 25
RCC Capt Gerald W. Moore
RCCP Capt Don W. Wiegard
RS Sgt Norman C. Kohlstrand
ES AIC Sammie J. Thompson

Don P. Olsen
DON P. OLSEN, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 10 years