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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
39TH AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96318



REPORT TO
ATTN: P

Major George E. Eldridge, RCC Crown 6, 5 Oct 68

7 OCT 68

SUBJECT

Mission Narrative #1-3-102-8279

1. Crown 6 on Golf orbit received call at 0620Z from FAC Covey 216(0-2) requesting a JG for pick-up of seven Army personnel, (4 wounded) who were under fire. Position was given as 220 degrees 30NM off CH 69. Queen was notified and Crown 6 proceeded towards area. Covey 216, On Scene Commander, was aided by Covey 258 and was directing strikes by Spads at the time. Spad 11/12 scrambled from Danang and arrived in the area. Spad 11 said Jolly's were usable int the area in a response to a Queen question and JG 28/10 arrived at 0730Z from Danang. They were escorted by Army Gun Ships, Hostage 1-0 and 1-4. At 0747Z, JG 28 made an attempted landing on the LZ. He received ground fire from enemy troops in the grass 30 feet from their landing point. JG 28 reported heavy fuel leaks in the acft and departed the area escorted by JG 10 and Spad 11. Spad 12 remained on scene. Hostage flt expended their ordnance on the scene and RTB after JG 28. At 0749Z, JG 32/25 reported 20 minutes out from the scene. (They did not arrive in 20 minutes due to time lost in escorting JG 28 as he passed). Covey 216 used Spads 12/03/04 in continued strikes around the landing zone. JG 10 returned to the area and gun ships Hair 1 and 2 arrived at 0810Z, JG 10 started in for a pickup. At 0811Z, JG 10 took ground fire and crashed. Spad 12 stated he through all been killed. The crash site burned for the next 2 hours. At 0817Z, Covey 216 made voice contact with the PJ from JG 10. He relayed there was one other survivor of the crash. Covey 216 RTB due to low fuel and Covey 258 became OSC. Spad 11 (back on scene) stated another pick up attempt at the LZ was impossible. Tracers had been sighted during JG10's attempt. Est 50 cal. nothing that large had been noticed before. At 0827Z, the ground party was told to move away from the landing zone and into the draw at the crash site and to attempt contact with the survivors. The movement was very slow due to the wounded. After the ground party was 50 meters away from the LZ, fast movers were put in the area (Gunfighters 7/8). At 1000Z, Covey 258 stated he thought that both party's had made contact. He also stated fog was moving into the area. With approaching darkness plus the fog, it was decided that an attempt had to be made shortly IRL if the survivors were to be extracted prior to night fall. Smoke was obscuring the LZ area from the known enemy positions. Spad 11 became OSC for the pickup attempt at 1003Z. It is not known just how many HHLA-1's were present for the third try. Spad's 01/02/03/04/29/30/31 and 32 plus Sandy's 1/2/7 and 8 were all on the scene in the last hour. Gun ships Hostage 68/69 also returned for the final portion. Crown 2 was diverted and arrived in the area as a tanker since JG 32/25 had reported a bingo time of 1015Z. Crown 2 arrived on scene at 1002Z. The A-1's set up their Daisy chain on the sides of the draw and at 1004Z, JG 32 made an attempt with JG 25 high and JG 21 in reserve. At 1005Z, JG 32 backed into a tree top. No reported damage. At 1006Z, JG 32 reported in hover. At 1008Z, he reported 2 survivors on board, 2 on the hoist and 2 approaching. No ground fire reported. At 1013Z, JG 32 reported he had max power and had to pull out due to weight. JG 25 replaced JG 32 in hover and at 1015Z, reported no contact. At 1017Z, JG 32 reported 6 survivors on board and that they had stated all others were dead. Covey 258 requested confirmation. Stated there

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DOWNGRADING AND
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
37TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96337



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 370

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-102-8270)

Classified by (U) 10 OCT 1968
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1974

4/31

TO: 37C
JSARC
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1967.

2. (C) On 5 Oct 68, JG 28 and JG 10 were scrambled at 0655Z with instructions to proceed to the 270/34/77 for rendezvous with a two ship flight of Army UH-1F Gunships. JG's 28 and 10 had been briefed prior to departure that at approximately 0100Z a 9 man ground party had been air-lifted to an LZ at approximately the 270/53 of CH77. After unloading, the H-34 which carried them had been shot down exiting the LZ area. The ground party had then come under heavy ground attack from grenade, mortar and automatic weapons fire in close proximity to the LZ. Airstrikes had been conducted to suppress the enemy throughout the AM, but due to the weather conditions, the results were questionable. JG's 28 and 10 arrived at the rendezvous point at approximately 0720Z and the gunship escort five minutes thereafter. Enroute the JG's contacted Covey 216, the O.S.C., and were briefed on the survivors' situation. An Army ground party of 9 men were located on a helicopter landing zone on the 270/51/77, further refined to the 215/31/69. There were at that time, Spads 11 and 12, 13 and 14 on the scene plus several Huey Gunships. The JG's were advised that due to a stratus type cloud deck which lay approximately 1000' above the LZ, thorough suppression could not be accomplished. After the gunship flight arrived at the rendezvous point, the JG's proceeded to the rescue site. After holding in the immediate area for approximately 15 minutes until the ground party reported there was very light gunfire in the vicinity, Covey 216, still the O.S.C., advised that JG 28 could go in for a pickup attempt with the gunship flight to escort and provide ground suppression during the approach, landing and exit. The LZ was circular clearing of approximately 25 meters in diameter and was situated at the base of a ridge which ran approximately on a SW to NE heading and rising approximately 2000 feet above the LZ. To the south of the LZ a steeply sloped hill rose to almost the height of the ridge and formed more or less a NW extension from the ridge itself. To the east of the valley in which the LZ was located was a ridge line running NS at the SE end of the A Chau Valley. The effect of the topography formed a closed or boxed canyon restricting entry and exit routes and also maneuvering room in proximity of the LZ. JG 28 began the approach from approximately 4000' descending below the cloud deck on a SSE heading direct to the LZ. The ground party had spread a panel on the SE side of the LZ and the crew of JG 28 could see 4 or 5 team members around the panel. The RCC brought JG 28 to a hover at the north side of the LZ and simultaneously began a hovering right turn so as to align the aircraft on the exit heading of NE. Upon completing the turn, in

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intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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a hover at approximately 10 feet above the center of the LZ with the cargo door facing the previously observed survivors, the RCCP observed movement on the SW side of the LZ (at the 9 o'clock position of JG 28) and the RS saw 3 or 4 individuals stand up. Both crewmembers initially determined them to be the other half of the ground party to be extracted since they too were on the edge of the LZ opposite the first group observed. However immediately after standing erect, the latter group began firing automatic weapons into the left side of JG 28. The RS called out "gunfire" and the FE simultaneously announced over ICS that JG 28 had taken numerous hits and the main fuel line had been severed causing a massive fuel leak. The FE and RS were immediately drenched with fuel and were temporarily blinded. Upon hearing the gunfire and the warnings from the FE and RS the RCC immediately started withdrawing from the LZ while the RCCP returned fire through his cockpit window. As JG 28 left the LZ and attained forward flight there were 2 to 3 inches of fuel in the cargo compartment and fuel spray was being blown into the cockpit. The cockpit windows were closed alleviating the fuel spray problem. Cockpit indications after exiting the LZ were all engine and transmission indicators normal, "master caution" light on, both "aft tank boost pump failure" lights on and "aft fuel bypass" caution light on. With the quantity of fuel inside the aircraft the RCC was hesitant to activate any electrical switch or to transmit on ICS or other communication systems. After clearing the hostile area and gaining altitude however, JG 28 reported to the O.S.C. its condition and the situation at the LZ. JG 28 reported that it had received heavy automatic weapons fire from the perimeter of the LZ. Next, in an effort to reduce or stem the flow of fuel into the cargo compartment the two aft boost pumps were secured. This completely stopped the leakage. JG 10 during this time had been orbiting the general area to provide emergency cover for JG 28. JG 28, escorted by Spad 11, then proceeded toward CH 77 maintaining radio silence and without further change to the aircraft configuration. At 0735Z, JG 32 and JG 25, manned with make up crews, scrambled from CH 77 at Queens request and proceeded to the holding point at 270/34/77. Enroute to the holding point, JG's 32 and 25 were notified by Spad 11 that JG 28 had received hits and had a bad fuel leak inside the helicopter. Spad 11 requested that JG 32 or JG 25 intercept JG 28 and provide escort for his return to CH 77. Spad 11 conducted the intercept between JG 25 and JG 28 and then joined up with JG 32 for escort to the LZ pickup area. JG 25 escorted JG 28 to the vicinity of CH 77 and then returned to an orbit point approximately 1 mile SW of the LZ at 9000' MSL. After JG 28 had pulled out because of taking hits the Covey FAC directed Huey Rocket Ships to expend ordnance and called for another JG pickup attempt. As JG 32 arrived at 215/30/69 at approximately 0835Z, JG 10 commenced the approach to the LZ. JG 10's approach path was similar to JG 28's. As JG 10 reached a hover over the LZ intense ground fire was received from the SW side of the LZ. The PJ noted a large hole, approximately 6" in diameter, in the cabin floor. The RCC made a right banking turn of approximately 180 degrees and proceeded to egress. Both engine fire warning lights came on. The other aircraft on scene observed JG 10 burning as it proceeded away from the LZ. The engines and cabin were in flames. The PJ and FE manned and fired the M-60's as JG 10 exited. The RCC was able to control the aircraft, and performed a crash landing 200 to 300 yards from the LZ at approximately YG 592 700, WTM grid. Immediately after the crash, JG 32 made a low pass over the crash site and observed an extremely large, bright fire consuming JG 10. Approximately 15 minutes after the crash, voice contact was established with the JG 10 PJ. Several minutes later, voice contact was established with another JG survivor. When the JG 10 PJ came up on voice again, he was notified by Covey 258 of the second survivor's location. Carrot Top, the call sign of the ground party, was told to evacuate the LZ,

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intervals; Declassified
after 10 years

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


move down the ravine to the JG 10 crash site and join with the two JG 10 survivors. At this time there were 7 survivors of the ground party remaining. Once Carrot Top vacated the LZ, numerous Spads and Gunfighter airstrikes were directed upon the area around the LZ. JG 25 returned from escort of JG 28 to CH 77 at approximately 0905Z. The crew of JG 28, upon landing at CH 77, obtained a replacement aircraft, JG 21, and after briefing the 37th ARRS Commander and Operations Duty Officer on the situation, launched in JG 21 and returned to the SAR scene at approximately 0930Z. The Spad and Gunfighter airstrikes continued until the two JG 10 survivors joined, and past the time that Carrot Top had estimated his team's arrival at the crash site. The cloud layer confronted by JG 28 and JG 10 on their approaches was replaced with a smoke layer from the airstrikes that obscured the LZ from the crash site. As the smoke layer was hindering the effectiveness of additional airstrikes and darkness was approaching Spad 11 determined that a rescue attempt be made even though Carrot Top had not accomplished their join-up with the JG 10 survivor's. The JG 10 survivor's had been notified to expect indigenous persons among the team led by American advisors. The JG 10 survivors and Carrot Top were notified to come up on the penetrator in groups of 2 or 3. The eight Spads and Sandy's on scene at this time formed a daisy chain around JG 32 as JG 32 dumped fuel to 1400 pounds. At this time (1000Z) JG 25 (high bird) descended from high orbit position and established a low orbit approximately 1000' AGL 1 mile SE of the pickup area on the opposite side of the ridge line where Spads were making their airstrikes and JG 32 was making the pickup. JG 32 established voice contact with a JG 10 survivor and flew and hovered to the crash site. The indicated altitude was 2400 feet with a 22 degree C temperature. The JG 10 survivors reported hearing JG 32 and popped a smoke flare which was observed by the JG 32 PJ hoist operator. The other JG 32 PJ sighted the men and directed the RCC over the survivors. JG 32 was hovering with the main rotor blades between two layers of branches of a 100 foot tree, at the 12 o'clock position. There was another tree to the 9 o'clock position just outside the rotor tips. JG 32 had previously attempted to accomplish the pickup with the nose pointed down the ravine to allow an exit route, but clipped small branches with the tail rotor without being far enough up slope to hover over the JG 10 survivors. While the two JG 10 survivors were being hoisted, the JG 32 pilot observed men coming down a path at 1 o'clock position and proceeding toward the 3 o'clock position on the right (West) side of the stream. After JG 10 crewmen were aboard, JG 32 backed and slid right and down to a 20 to 30 foot hover to pickup 3 members of Carrot Top. This group initially removed the penetrator from the hoist cable, but then replaced it and were hoisted as a group of 3. As they entered the door, they unplugged the PJ hoist operator's headset. The JG 10 PJ who was firing one M-60, reconnected the JG 32 hoist operator's plug and adjusted his boom mike. As 3 more of the Carrot Top team arrived, JG 32 believed it was receiving incoming ground fire, but with the Spads continuing to strafe and rocket in the immediate area and the JG 32 M-60's and M-16's being manned by the JG 32 PJ, JG 10 survivors, and on-board Carrot Top personnel, JG 32 remained in a hover. The PJ hoist operator lowered the penetrator again. As he raised the 3 men from the ground, he noticed that one of the indigenous team members had a vine wrapped around him. The hoist operator lowered the penetrator and allowed the man to untangle himself. The 3 man group was hoisted with the one man hanging in the strap as he did not regain his seat after untangling himself from the vine. As this group was brought into the cabin, the hoist operator's headset was unplugged again. The hover power required at this time was 103% Q on each engine. JG 32 announced on UHF Guard that it was at maximum power and was withdrawing. JG 32 backed and turned, gained airspeed and climbed out. Fifteen minutes passed from approach to exit time. Spad 11 requested to know the number of survivors on board and the number

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 10 years





remaining on the ground. JG 32 had to ask Spad 11 to stand by because ICS contact had not been reestablished with the Guys-in-Back. The PJ was attending the survivors who needed attention; the hoist operator (also a PJ) was firing a weapon unaware that his headset was again unplugged. The pilots of JG 32 couldn't make themselves heard by shouting or with the crew alarm bell. The RCGP was finally able to attract the crews attention and on ICS directed the JG 32 PJ and hoist operator to question each man to determine the number of survivors on the ground. Both JG 10 survivors reported that no other JG 10 crewmembers were alive and all the Carrot Top team reported no other Carrot Top people alive. Of the 7 carrot Top members who departed the LZ, the wounded one was killed by AK-47 fire as they approached the JG crash site. He was killed while he was being carried by two of the team. JG 32 reported that no more survivors existed approximately 5 minutes after Spad 11 requested the information. Because JG 32's radio call that JG 32 was departing due to maximum power requirement implied that more survivors were on the ground, Spad 11 committed JG 25 to approach the pickup scene while attempting to confirm via radio the number of remaining survivors. The eight Spads were continuing the "Daisy Chain" expending ordnance in the area and directed JG 25 to the JG 10 crash site. JG 25 jettisoned tip tanks and dumped fuel to 1400 lbs. As the Spads would make a firing pass near the LZ and JG 10 crash site, each one would take over directing JG 25 to the pickup area. JG 25 arrived over the crash site and established a hover approximately 50' above the tree tops. Several calls were made by JG 25 and Spad on UHF Guard for any additional survivors to pop smoke or give a call on their radio. The JG 25 crew did not observe any smoke or survivors in the area around the crash site or the pickup point of the other survivors so they departed the area. Approximately 1 minute after JG 25 departed the crash site (1018Z) JG 32 advised all SAR forces that there were no more survivors on the ground. Twenty four A-1 sorties occurred. JG 21, 25, and 32 returned to CH 77 arriving at approximately 1045Z. During JG 32's spiraling descent from 6000' to the CH 77 traffic pattern, the PJ announced that the four indigenous troops on board were experiencing ear pains. A climb to 2000' and ear block clearing techniques taught by the PJs alleviated the problem. It is recommended that standard tactics for extraction of any survivors pinned down by adjacent hostile forces include the attempt of the survivors to move prior to the commitment of a JG. It is also recommended that the headset cord of the hoist operator be attached to the right side of his helmet and the cord extend to the aft of the cabin door rather than across the entrance way and the modified helmet plug-in be strong. It is also recommended that JP-5 be considered for use instead of JP-4. Radar altimeters are still needed by this unit.

3- (C) The survivors were: JG 10 Major Vernon R. Granier, Casbeer, AF18731219. Carrot Top: 2 Americans and 4 indigenous.

SSgt. Earnest D.

- 4- (U) Other aircraft assisting:
- Spad 11: Maj D. Dineen
 - 03: Maj J. Wheeler
 - 29: Maj Deportier
 - 31a: Maj J. Gaffney
 - 01: Maj W. Parkham
 - 35: LC Learnard
 - 12: LC V. Cole
 - 04: Maj J. Egbert
 - 30: Maj D. Pierce
 - 32: Menke
 - 02: Capt D. Hinson
 - 36: Maj Teskey



FR00PP - check out about recommendation - get 3 GP thoughts col R

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Sandys 01, 02, 07, 08
FAC's Covey 216 and Covey 258
Helo Ordnance Support Hostage and Scarface
Rescap Gunfighters 7, 8

5. (U) Crews of the Jolly Greens were:

JOLLY GREEN 28/21
RCC LCDR Lonnie L. Mixon
RCCP Capt Vincent A. Ziccardi
FE Sgt Duane I. Beland
RS TSgt Nathaniel Smith JR

JOLLY GREEN 10
RCC Granier, Vernon R. ✓
RCCP Maj Albert D. Wester *
FE Sgt Gregory P. Lawrence *
RS SSgt Earnest D. Gasbeer ✓

SHOT DOWN

JOLLY GREEN 32
RCC Maj Don P. Olsen
RCCP LtCol James H. Grady
FE AIC Neusbaum
RS AIC Allen J. Avery

JOLLY GREEN 25
RCC Capt Gerald W. Moore
RCCP Capt Don W. Wiegard
RS Sgt Norman C. Kohlstrand
ES AIC Sammie J. Thompson

Don P. Olsen
DON P. OLSEN, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 10 years

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 1

15.

Summary Report 1-3-102-8279, 5 Oct 68

(C) On 5 Oct 68, Jolly Green 28 and Jolly Green 10 were scrambled at 0655Z with instructions to proceed to the 270/34/77 for rendezvous with a two ship flight of Army UH-1F gunships. JG's 28 and 10 had been briefed prior to departure that approximately at 0100Z a nine man party had been air-lifted to an LZ at approximately the 270/53 of CH 77. After unloading, the H-34 which carried them had been shot down exiting the LZ area. The ground party had then come under heavy ground attack from grenade, mortar and automatic weapons fire in close proximity to the LZ. Airstrikes had been conducted to suppress the enemy throughout the a.m., but due to the weather conditions, the results were questionable. JG's 28 and 10 arrived at the rendezvous point at approximately 0720Z and the gunship escort five minutes thereafter. Enroute the JG's contacted Covey 216, the On Scene Commander, and were briefed on the survivor's condition. An Army ground party of nine men were located on a helicopter landing zone on the 270/51/77, further refined to the 215/31/69. There were, at that time, Spads 11, 12, 13 and 14 (A1-H) on the scene plus several Huey gunships. The JG's were advised that due to a stratus cloud deck which lay approximately 1000' above the LZ, thorough suppression could not be accomplished. After the gunship flight arrived at the rendezvous point, the JG's proceeded to the rescue site. After holding in the immediate area for approximately 15 minutes until the ground party reported there was very light gunfire in the vicinity, Covey 216, still the O.S.C. advised that JG 28 could go in for a pickup attempt with the gunship flight to escort and provide ground suppression during the approach, landing and exit. The LZ was a circular clearing of approximately 25 meters in diameter and was situated at the base of a ridge which ran approximately on a SW to NE heading and rising approximately 2000' above the LZ. To the south of the LZ a steeply sloped hill rose to almost the height of the ridge and formed more or less a NW extension from the ridge itself. To the east of the valley in which the LZ was located was a ridge line running NS at the SE end of the A Shau Valley. The effect of the topography formed a closed or boxed canyon restricting entry and exit routes and also maneuvering room in proximity of the LZ. JG 28 began the approach from approximately 4000' descending below the cloud deck on a SSE heading to the LZ. The ground party had spread a panel on the SE side of the LZ and the crew of JG 28 could see four or five team members by the panel. The RCC brought JG 28 to a hover at the north side of the LZ and simultaneously began a hovering right turn so as to align the aircraft with the exit heading. Upon completing the turn in a hover at approximately 10 feet above the center of the LZ with the cargo door facing the previously observed survivors, the RCCP observed movement on the SW side of the LZ (at the 9 o'clock position of JG 28) and the RS saw three or four individuals stand up. Both crewmembers initially determined them to be the other half of the ground party to be extracted since they too were on the edge of the LZ opposite from the

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first group observed. However, immediately after standing erect, the latter group began firing automatic weapons into the left side of JG 28. The RS called out "gunfire" and the FE simultaneously announced over ICS that JG 28 had taken numerous hits and the main fuel line had been severed causing a massive fuel leak. The FE and RS were immediately drenched with fuel and were temporarily blinded. Upon hearing the gunfire and the warnings from the FE and RS the RCC immediately started withdrawing from the LZ while the RCCP returned fire thru his cockpit window. As JG 28 left the LZ and attained forward flight there were 2 to 3 inches of fuel in the cargo compartment and fuel spray was being blown into the cockpit. The cockpit windows were closed alleviating the fuel spray problem. Cockpit indications after exiting the LZ were all engine and transmission indicators normal, "Master caution" light, both "aft tank boost pump failure" lights on and "aft fuel bypass" caution light on. With the quantity of fuel inside the aircraft the RCC was hesitant to activate any electrical switch or to transmit on ICS or other communications systems. After clearing the hostile area and gaining altitude however, JG 28 reported to the O.S.C. its condition and the situation at the LZ. JG 28 reported that it had received heavy automatic weapons fire from the perimeter of the LZ. Next, in an effort to reduce or stem the flow of fuel into the cargo compartment the two aft boost pumps were secured. This completely stopped the leakage. JG 10 during this time had been orbiting the general area to provide emergency cover for JG 28. JG 28, escorted by Spad 11, then proceeded toward CH 77 maintaining radio silence and without further change to the aircraft configuration. At 0735Z, JG 32 and JG 25, manned with make up crews, scrambled from CH 77 at Queen's request and proceeded to the holding point at 270/34/77. Enroute to the holding point, JG's 32 and 25 were notified by Spad 11 that JG 28 had received hits and had a bad fuel leak inside the helicopter. Spad 11 requested that JG 32 or JG 25 intercept JG 28 and provide escort for his return to CH 77. Spad 11 conducted the intercept between JG 25 and JG 28 and then joined up with JG 32 for escort to the LZ pickup area. JG 25 escorted JG 28 to the vicinity of CH 77 and then returned to an orbit point approximately 1 mile SW of the LZ at 9000' MSL. After JG 28 had pulled out because of taking hits the Covey FAC directed Huey Rocket Ships to expend ordinance and called for another JG pickup attempt. As JG 32 arrived at 215/30/69 at approximately 0835Z, JG 10 commenced the approach to the LZ. JG 10's approach path was similar to JG 28's. As JG 10 reached a hover over the LZ intense ground fire was received from the SW side of the LZ. The PJ noted a large hole, approximately 6" in diameter, in the cabin floor. The RCC made a right banking turn of approximately 180 degrees and proceeded to egress. Both engine fire warning lights came on. The other aircraft on scene observed JG 10 burning as it proceeded away from the LZ. The engines and cabin were in flames. The PJ and FE manned and fired the M-60's as JG 10 exited. The RCC was able to control the aircraft, and performed a crash landing 200 to 300 yards from the LZ

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at approximately YC 592 700, UTM grid. Immediately after the crash, JG 32 made a low pass over the crash site and observed an extremely large, bright fire consuming JG 10. Approximately 15 minutes after the crash, voice contact was established with the JG 10 PJ. Several minutes later, voice contact was established with another JG survivor. When the JG 10 PJ came up on voice again, he was notified by Covey 258 of the second survivor's location. Carrot Top, the call sign of the ground party, was told to evacuate the LZ, move down the ravine to the JG 10 crash site and join with the two JG 10 survivors. At this time there were 7 survivors of the ground party remaining. Once Carrot Top vacated the LZ, numerous Spads and Gunfighter airstrikes were directed upon the area around the LZ. JG 25 returned from escort of JG 28 to CH 77 at approximately 0905Z. The crew of JG 28, upon landing at CH 77, obtained a replacement aircraft, JG 21, and after briefing the 37 ARRSq Commander and Operations Duty Officer on the situation, launched in JG 21 and returned to the SAR scene at approximately 0930Z. The Spad and Gunfighter airstrikes continued until the two JG 10 survivors joined, and past the time that Carrot Top had estimated his team's arrival at the crash site. The cloud layer confronted by JG 10 on their approaches was replaced with a smoke layer from the airstrikes that obscured the LZ from the crash site. As the smoke layer was hindering the effectiveness of additional airstrikes and darkness was approaching Spad 11 determined that a rescue attempt should be made even though Carrot Top had not accomplished their join-up with the JG 10 survivors. The JG 10 survivors had been notified to expect indigenous persons among the team led by American advisors. The JG 10 survivors and Carrot Top were notified to come up on the penetrator in groups of 2 or 3. The 8 Spads and Dandys on the scene at this time formed a daisy chain around JG 32 as JG 32 dumped fuel to 1400 pounds. At this time (1000Z) JG 25 (high bird) descended from high orbit position and established a low orbit approximately 1000' AGL 1 mile SE of the pickup area on the opposite side of the ridgeline where Spads were making their airstrikes and JG 32 was making the pickup. JG 32 established voice contact with a JG 10 survivor and flew and hovered to the crash site. The indicated altitude was 2400 feet with a 22 degree C. temperature. The survivors reported hearing JG 32 and popped a smoke flare which was observed by the JG 32 PJ hoist operator. The other JG 32 PJ sighted the men and directed the RCC over the survivors. JG 32 was hovering with the main rotor blades between two layers of branches of a 100' tree, at the 12 o'clock position. There was another tree to the 9 o'clock position just outside the rotor tips. JG 32 had previously attempted to accomplish the pickup with the nose pointed down the ravine to allow an exit route, but clipped small branches with the rail rotor without being far enough up slope to hover over the JG 10 survivors. While the two JG 10 survivors were being hoisted, the JG 32 pilot observed men coming down a path at 1 o'clock position and proceeding toward the 3 o'clock position on the right (west) side of the stream. After JG 10 crewmen were aboard, JG 32

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18.

backed and slid right and down to a 20 to 30 foot hover to pickup 3 members of Carrot Top. This group initially removed the penetrator from the hoist cable, but then replaced it and were hoisted as a group of 3. As they entered the door, they unplugged the PJ hoist operator's headset. The JG 10 PJ who was firing one M-60, reconnected the JG 32 hoist operator's plug and adjusted his boom mike. As three more of the Carrot Top team arrived, JG 32 believed it was receiving incoming ground fire, but with the Spads continuing to strafe and rocket the immediate area and the JG 32 M-60's and M-16's being manned by the JG 32 PJ, JG 10 survivors, and on board Carrot Top personnel, JG 32 remained in a hover. The PJ hoist operator lowered the penetrator again. As he raised the 3 men from the ground, he noticed that one of the indigenous team members had a vine wrapped around him. The hoist operator lowered the penetrator and allowed the man to untangle himself. The 3 man group was hoisted with the one man hanging in the strap as he did not regain his seat after untangling himself from the vine. As this group was brought into the cabin, the hoist operator's headset was unplugged again. The hover power required at this time was 103Q on each engine. JG announced on UHF Guard that it was at maximum power and was withdrawing. JG 32 backed and turned, gained airspeed and climbed out. Fifteen minutes passed from approach to exit time. Spad 11 requested to know the number of survivors on board and the number remaining on the ground. JG 32 had to ask Spad 11 to stand by because ICS contact had not been reestablished with the "Guys-in-back." The PJ was attending the survivors who needed attention; the hoist operator (also a PJ) was firing a weapon unaware that his headset was again unplugged. The pilots of JG 32 couldn't make themselves heard by shouting or with the crew alarm bell. The RCCP was finally able to attract the crew's attention and on ICS directed the JG 32 PJ and hoist operator to question each man to determine the number of survivors on the ground. Both JG 10 survivors reported that no other JG crewmembers were alive and all the Carrot Top team reported no other Carrot Top people alive. Of the 7 Carrot Top members who departed the LZ, the wounded one was killed by AK-47 fire as they approached the JG crash site. He was killed while he was being carried by two of the team. JG 32 reported that no more survivors existed approximately 5 minutes after Spad 11 requested the information. Because of JG 32's radio call that JG 32 was departing due to maximum power requirement implied that more survivors were on the ground, Spad 11 committed JG 25 to approach the pickup scene while attempting to confirm via radio the number of remaining survivors. The eight Spads were continuing the "Daisy Chain" expending ordinance in the area and directed JG 25 to the JG 10 crash site. JG 25 jettisoned tip tanks and dumped to 1400 lbs. As the Spads would make a firing pass near the LZ and JG 10 crash site, each one would take over directing JG 25 to the pickup area. JG 25 arrived over the crash site and established a hover approximately 50' above the tree tops. Several calls were made by JG 25 and Spad on UHF Guard for any additional survivors to pop smoke or give a call on their radio. The JG 25 crew did not

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observe any smoke or survivors in the area around the crash site or the pickup point of the other survivors so they departed the area. Approximately 1 minute after JG 25 departed the crash site (1018Z) JG 32 advised all SAR forces that there were no more survivors on the ground. Twenty-four A-1 sorties occurred. JG 21, 25, and 32 returned to CH 77 arriving at approximately 1045Z. During JG 32's spiraling descent from 6000' to the CH 77 traffic patters, the PJ announced that the four indigenous troops on board were experiencing ear pains. A climb to 2000' and ear blocking techniques taught by the PJ's alleviated the problem. It is recommended that standard tactics for extraction of any survivors pinned down by adjacent hostile forces include the attempt of the survivors to move prior to the commitment of a JG. It is also recommended that the headset cord of the hoist operator be attached to the right side of his helmet and the cord extend to the aft of the cabin door rather than across the entrance way and the modified helmet plug-in be strong. It is also recommended that JP-5 be considered for use instead of JP-4. Radar altimeters are still needed by this unit.

(C) The survivors were: JG 10 - Major Vernon R. Granier,
and Sgt Earnest D. Casbeer, Carrot Top: Two Americans
and four indigenous.

(U) Other aircraft assisting:

Spad 11: Maj D. Dineen	Spad 03: Maj J. Wheeler	Sandys 01, 02,
Spad 29: Maj Deportier	Spad 31: Maj J. Gaffney	07, 08; Fac's:
Spad 01: Maj W. Parkham	Spad 35: LTC Learnard	Covey 216, 258;
Spad 12: LTC V. Cole	Spad 04: Maj J. Egbert	Helo Ordinance
Spad 30: Maj D. Pierce	Spad 32: Monke	Support: Hostage
Spad 02: Capt D. Hinson	Spad 36: Maj Teskey	and Scarface.
		Rescap: Gunfighters
		7 and 8.

(U) Crews of the Jolly Greens were:

JOLLY GREEN 28/21

RCC LCDR Lonnie L. Mixon, USCG
RCCP Capt Vincent A. Ziccardi
FE Sgt Duane I. Beland
RS TSgt Nathaniel Smith Jr.

JOLLY GREEN 32

RCC Maj Don P. Olsen
RCCP LTC James H. Grady
RS ALC John D. Musbaum
RS SSg Allen J. Avery

JOLLY GREEN 10

RCC Maj Vernon R. Granier
RCCP Maj Albert D. Wester
FE Sgt Gregory P. Lawrence
RS Sgt Earnest D. Casbeer

JOLLY GREEN 25

RCC Capt Gerald W. Moore
RCCP Capt Don W. Wiegard
RS Sgt Norman C. Kohlstrand
RS ALC Sammie J. Thompson

DON P. OLSEN, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

37 ARRSq, History, Oct - Dec 1968

4.

14 Nov - General Joseph I. Nazzaro, Commander, PACAF, and his staff.

- Major General Milton B. Adams, Commander, Hq Command.

- Brigadier General John O. Moench, PACAF.

15 Nov - Major General Charles G. Chandler, Jr., DCS Materiel, PACAF.

- Brigadier General Frank K. Everst, Jr.

20 Nov - Senator Jack R. Miller, Republican - Iowa.

- Lieutenant General Robert G. Ruegg, DCS Systems and Logistics.

25 Nov - General Howell M. Estes, Jr., Commander, MAC.

25 Dec - Brigadier General Robert L. Petit, Chief of Staff, 7 AF.

8. MISSIONS

(1)(U) 1-3-102, 5 Oct 1968. Two Jolly Greens were scrambled from Da Nang to extract a ground party in the vicinity of A Shau Valley. During the course of the mission, Jolly Green 28 was disabled and had to return to Da Nang and Jolly Green 10 was shot down and destroyed. A total of five Jolly Green helicopters were used to recover eight survivors including two survivors of Jolly Green 10. Two members of the 37th ARRSq were lost during this mission. (Ref. Supporting Document 1, page 15.)

(2)(U) 1-3-103, 16 Oct 1968. Jolly Green 24, enroute to his orbit position, experienced loss of transmission fluid and Jolly Greens 27 and 21 were sent to his location to render assistance. Because the aircraft had gone down in the vicinity of enemy controlled Tiger island, it was necessary to recover the crew immediately and later on recovery of the aircraft was not feasible. (Ref. Supporting Document 2, page 20.)

Supporting Documents# 16

57

<u>SAVE NO</u>	<u>SURVIVOR'S NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
377	B.F. Rose	1/Lt-M	0103189	28 Aug 68	1-3-94
378	Melvin Hickson	Sgt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
379	Paul Stankiewicz	Capt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
380	Raymond E. Headlee	Capt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
381	John J. Shelby	Capt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
382	Thomas Brown	TSgt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
383	Oscar Perez	Sgt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
384	Joe L. Longlois	Sgt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
385	Roger E. Wells	Sgt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
386	Norman E. Goldblatt	Sgt	UNK	1 Sep 68	1-3-96
387	Larry E. Bustle	Maj-AF	UNK	11 Sep 68	1-3-97
388	Urbin Reinhart	Lt-A	UNK	27 Sep 68	1-3-100
389	Billy Wingfield	Maj-AF	UNK	27 Sep 68	1-3-100
390	Watson Burnfield	Maj-AF		27 Sep 68	1-3-100
391	Duane I. Beland	Sgt-AF		27 Sep 68	1-3-100
392	Allen J. Avery	SSgt-AF	UNK	27 Sep 68	1-3-100
393	Vernon R. Granier	Maj-AF		5 Oct 68	1-3-102
394	Ernest D. Casbeer	SSgt-AF		5 Oct 68	1-3-102
395-396	UNK	UNK-A	UNK	5 Oct 68	1-3-102
397-400	UNK ARVN	UNK	UNK	5 Oct 68	1-3-102
401	Richard D. Griffiths	Capt-AF		15 Oct 68	1-3-103
402	Harry W. Hagen Jr.	Capt-AF		15 Oct 68	1-3-103

recovery took place at night with Crown 7 providing flares for illumination.

One of the JGs hovered over the tanker and a pararescueman went down and brought up the sick men. A doctor was aboard and treated the men while en route to a hospital in Vietnam.^{9/}

On another occasion, in the spring of 1968, a Buff recovered a Thai woman who was in the process of having triplets, and in severe pain. The woman was taken from a small isolated village and delivered to a hospital.^{10/} There were numerous episodes that included dedicated effort by all concerned, and particularly by the pararescuemen. (PJ). On 29 March 1969, after a long approach through intense hostile fire, a pararescueman went down on the penetrator to a survivor who was located on top of a karst that was quite inaccessible from the ground. The survivor was in severe shock and suffering from a broken leg and a broken arm. The PJ assisted the man for a number of minutes, while four Sandys worked the surrounding area over continuously. He was finally able to get the survivor on the hoist and carried him up into the JG. Still under intense fire, the JG egressed safely and took the badly injured man to the hospital ship Repose.^{11/} On another occasion in April 1969, a PJ was on the ground for more than 30 minutes in the midst of an extremely hot area to recover the body of a pilot who had received fatal brain damage during ejection. A complete report could be written about these pararescuemen in SEA.^{12/}

A different kind of rescue took place on 5 October 1968, when Crown 6, on orbit over the Tonkin Gulf, received a call from a Forward Air Controller that an Army Ground Recon Team was under intense enemy fire and desperately

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5 OCT 62

needed assistance. A classic SAR effort developed with 14 A-1E Sandys and Spads and numerous Army helicopter gunships being used to suppress the ground fire of the hostile forces. JG 28 was cleared in to attempt a landing to pick up the survivors, but in the process it received numerous hits from enemy ground fire and was forced to leave the scene. Shortly thereafter, JG 10 started in for the pickup and received intense ground fire from the enemy below and eventually crashed and burned. The crew of JG 10 were feared lost, until contact was later made with the PJ and the aircraft commander who was injured. After sortie upon sortie was employed to silence the ground fire, JG 32 moved in for a hovering pickup, while JGs 25 and 21 stood by as backup. JG 32 managed to successfully recover the four survivors of the ground team plus two crewmembers of JG 10.^{13/}

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Later the same month, a dramatic rescue of an unusual nature was made of two aircrewmen who had successfully ejected and were in the water northeast of Tiger Island. JG 29 went in to attempt a pickup of the survivors and received intense ground fire from Tiger Island, causing it to crash into the water within 500 meters of the two survivors. The four crewmembers of JG 29 abandoned the aircraft and deployed their life rafts. Heavy ground fire was still coming from the enemy on Tiger Island, so many fast movers were called in to suppress the ground fire, while two A-1Es, Spads 11 and 12, laid down a smoke screen to provide cover for JGs 31 and 33 who moved in and successfully picked up all six survivors.^{14/}

While water pickups generally were preferred because of the lower likelihood of enemy fire, this case turned out to be one of the hottest of missions.

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PT 0065
ZTTCZYUW RUMSCMV5480 2800000-CCCC--RUCIEUA.
ZNY CCCCC
DE RUMHPD 036 2791845
ZNY CCCCC
Z O 051707Z OCT 68

6 OCT 68 03 14

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FM DL 1 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
TO RUMUFKA/3ARRGP/JSARC/TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
RUCIEUA/HQ ARRS SCOTT AFB TIL
RUHHABA/PACARRC/PROCP/HICKAM AFB HAWAII
RUEFHQA/HQ USAF/AFXOPFH
RUEFHQA/CSAF/AFCP/AFXOFH
INFO RUCIEUA/MAC/MCP/MADCOA
RUKKAAA/TAC/DOOS TR/LANGELY AFB VA
RDNWTFJA/USAFMPC/AFPMSC/RANDOLPH AFB TEXAS
RUHEAA/CINCPACAF/CC
RUDEAAA/HQ USAF ATTERNATE CP MAXWELL AFB ALA
RUMSAL/7AF/DO70/DO/DP/DI/BDPMP/CP/TACCS/TSN AB RVN
RUEBEAA/ARDC/ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND MARYLAND
RUMHAW/1ST MAW DANANG AB RVN
RHMSMVA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUMLDNA/VMD 2 MAG 16 MARBLE MOUNTAIN MCAS RVN
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HAWAII
RUMLEPKK/HML 367 MAG 36 HUE PHU BAI MCAS RVN
RUMFSAA/COM SEVENTH FLT

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ARRS
P/W

STAFF	ACT	INFO
ARCCO		
ARODC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
ARPDC		
ARBDC		
ARMDC		
ARDAS		
ARXDC		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ARFOI		
AMIG		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ARASG		

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RUMFSAA/ALL SEVENTH FLT CVA TG CRDS
RUYSYC/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
RUMFSAA/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO PT ONE
RUMFSAA/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO PT TWO
RUMSRA/OL 2 3ARRGP UDORN RTAFB THAILAND
RUMLJHA/39ARRS TUY HOA AB RVN
RUMHPB/37ARRS DANANG AB RVN
RUMNTB/6 SOS PLEIKU AB RVN
RUMBPN/602 SOS NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAILAND
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/JOPREP JIFFY RESCUE/OL-1, 3ARRGP/OCT 68.

SUBJ: (U) RESCUE INFORMATION REPORT.

1. RESCUE OPENING/CLOSING REPORT
2. 1-3-102-8279
3. A. GROUND PARTY EXTRACTION
B. S/E
C. GROUND PARTY AND CAMOUFLAGED/782/HH-37/JOLLY GREEN 10.
D. USA
E. GROUND PARTY: COMMAND AND CONTROL, NORTH JOLLY GREEN 10; USAF, 37ARRS

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS

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F. JOLLY GREEN 10 RCC: MAJ GRANIER, VERNON R.

G. NUMBER OF GROUND PERSONNEL: 7
JOLLY GREEN 10: 4 POB

4. COVEY 216, 05/0622Z

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AT 12 YEARS

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AT 12 YEARS

FLASH

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- 5. S/E
- 6. 1/HC-130P/0622Z, 2/A-1H/0623Z, 2/HH-3E/0623Z.
- 7. DIVERTED CROWN 6 FROM NORMAL ORBIT 0624Z, SPAD 11 AND 12 LAUNCHED AT 0633Z.
- 8. 1601.5N - 107.21E
- 9. A. NOT A FACTOR.
B. 2000 BROKEN, SMOKE IN AREA RESTRICTING VISIBILITY, WIND LIGHT.
- 10. OL-1, 3ARRGP, MAJOR JOE B. MARSHALL JR; TSGT WILLIAM11. TACC-NS, PANAMA (GCI), WATERBOY (GCI), 1ST MAW (TADC), MAG 16, MAG 36.
- 12. COVEY 216, 0622Z/1601.5N - 107.21E.
- 13. 37ARRS/HH-3E/PENETRATOR/1014Z
- 14. 11/11/B/B/0/3.
- 15. TAKEN TO DANANG AB, RVN.
- 16. 2/5PLUS00/HC-130P/39ARRS; 7/15PLUS10/HH-3E/37ARRS;

PAGE 4 RUMHPD 036 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 4/7PLUS00/A-1E/60250S;
- 14/25PLUS30/A-1H/650S; 4/5PLUS00/UH-1/VM02 MAG 16; 6/7PLUS 30/UH-1/HML 367, MAG 36;
- 2/2PLUS00/F4C/366TFW; 2/2PLUS00/F100/31TFW; 1/0PLUS30/HH43E/ DET 7, 3BARRS; 2/7PLUS30/02A/20TASS.
- 17. 0/0/0/0/UNK/0/UNK/UNK
- 18. A. RCC MAJ OLSEN, D.P.; RCCP LCOL GRADY, J.H.; PJ SGT NUSBAUM, J.D.;
PJ SSGT AVERY, A.J., ALL OF 37ARRS.
B. MAJ GRANIER, V.R.; SGT CASBEER, E.D., BOTH OF 37ARRS.
ENGELNE, S.D.; BLACK, L.M.; SGT THO; 0-2 KHANH; 0-2 KUANG; 0-2 DU; ALL OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, NORTH.
- 19. A. VICINITY OF 6QYPQMTN - 107.21E, 100 PER CENT EFFECTIVE.
B. ALL PERSONNEL FOUND.
C. S/E
D. S/E
H. EIGHT ARRS COMBAT SAVES, INCLUDING TWO USAF CREWMEN, TWO USA SPECIAL FORCES NON-CREWMEN, FOUR RVN NON-CREWMEN/NO AIR REFUELINGS/JOLLY GREEN 10 DOWNED DUE TO HOSTILE ACTION/NO PJ DEPLOYMENTS. COVEY 216 (FAC) INITIALLY NOTIFIED CROWN 6 ABOUT

PAGE 5 RUMHPD 036 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SOME PROBLEM EXISTING IN HIS AREA, BUT GARBLED RADIOS PREVENTED FULL INFORMATION ON INITIAL CONTACT. CROWN 6 SOON DETERMINED THAT A SEVEN MAN GROUND PARTY WAS SURROUNDED BY THE ENEMY, FOUR MEMBERS OF THE UNIT WERE WOUNDED, AND AMMUNITION WAS RUNNING LOW. JSARC WAS ADVISED OF THEIR REQUEST FOR EXTRACTION AND APPROVAL WAS RECEIVED. TWO SPADS (A-1'S) WERE LAUNCHED FROM DANANG AB TO JOIN THE FOUR SPADS ALREADY WORKING THE AREA. JOLLY GREENS 28 AND 10 WERE LAUNCHED FROM DANANG TO PROCEED TO THE AREA. ALSO, HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS WERE REQUESTED FROM 1ST MAW TADC. HELO DIRECTOR, CAPT HOFFER. CAPT HOFFER SUPPLIED FOUR GUNSHIPS INITIALLY AND CONTINUED TO SUPPLY GUNSHIPS AS THE ONES ON SCENE RETURNED FOR FUEL. AFTER A PERIOD OF SUPPRESSION,

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JOLLY GREEN 28 ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THE RECOVERY, BUT HAD TO PULL OUT BECAUSE OF A FUEL LEAK. IT WAS LEARNED LATER THAT THE FUEL LEAK WAS CAUSED BY HOSTILE GROUND FIRE. AFTER FURTHER SUPPRESSION ATTEMPTS, THE AREA WAS DEEMED WORKABLE FOR THE JOLLY GREEN BY AIRCRAFT ON SCENE AND JOLLY GREEN 10 ATTEMPTED THE RECOVERY. JOLLY GREEN 10 TOOK GROUND FIRE HITS AND CRASHED 100 METERS FROM THE GROUND PARTY. TWO CREW MEMBERS OF JOLLY 10 SURVIVED THE CRASH. AN EXTENSIVE SUPPRESSION OF THE AREA WAS MADE WHILE THE

PAGE 6 RUMHPD 0365C O N F I D E N T I A L

GROUND PARTY MOVED TO JOIN THE SURVIVORS OF JOLLY GREEN 10. AFTER THIS SUPPRESSION ATTEMPT, THE AREA WAS AGAIN CONSIDERED WORKABLE FOR JOLLY GREENS AND JOLLY GREEN 32 SUCCESSFULLY MADE A HOIST RECOVERY OF SIX GROUND PARTY PERSONNEL AND THE TWO JOLLY GREEN 10 SURVIVORS. ALTHOUGH SUPPRESSION WAS CONTINUOUS DURING THE RECOVERY. JOLLY GREEN 32 ALSO TOOK GROUND FIRE HITS. ALL SURVIVORS WERE TAKEN TO DANANG AB. GP-4.

BT

AEE SS

NNNN#

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