By -14 DATE: 10 Dec 72 MICSION NUMBER: 40-121 FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 01 (Low) and Jolly Green 02 (High)

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Rescue and recovery of downed $\underline{F-4}$ Crewmembers call sign Kansas 018.

ADDITIONAL SAR SORCES: King 21, King 22, and Sandy 01 thru 08.

SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS: (3) is were launched at 2345 (0645L), 10 Dec 72, to aid in the recovery of Kansas O1B, a backseater of a F-4 reconnaisance aircraft. Voice contact had been established and the SAR forces were directed to the area. He proceeded direct to point Bravo with Jolly 02 to rendevous with King 22 for an aerial refueling. At the completion of the A/R we continued on to point Hike arriving at 0105Z (0805L). We held for a short period prior to moving on to point Lima, arriving there at 01202 (08201.). We headed back to point Mike after it became obvious we would need to refuel prior to starting our run in. This was due to the fuel situation of the Sandy plus the fact that Jolly 03, our back-up bird had developed maintenance problems. After completing this A/R we returned to point Lima at 0235Z (0935L). We subsequently departed Lina arriving at point X-ray at 0300Z (1000L). Again we entered an orbit awaiting further instructions from Sandy and King. We were met by Sandy eight who advised he would lead us in with all the Sandys with the exception of Sandys four and five who were to remain with Jolly 02 at point X-ray. I was instructed to take up a heading of 160° and to remain at altitude until the undercast dissapated. At that time I was told to take it down on the deck, which I did. The Sandys initially set up an excellent

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cover on the low level run in. They gented to set a wider pattern as the run in continued, to the point at time where we had no cover at all. In fact they had to relocate me on three separate occasions during the run-in. After much confusion and vectoring I was told to head 090° and asked if I saw the smoke at the survivor. I answered in the affirmative. Belleving the smoke that I saw was the smoke mark near the survivors, but in fact it was smoke laid down by the Sandy's to cover my run in. In retrospect I believe I went into a hover approximately 4 to 5 kilometers to the south of the survivors true position. The physical layout matched that of the description given by the Sandys. That is a bowl shaped valley running north and south marked by smoke to the west of the survivor. I entered a hover at 0340Z (1040L) over what I thought was the survivors position. I made numerous attempts to contact the survivor on guard and SAR delta two different times Kansas O1B answered by calling "Jolly Green O1 this is Kansas O1B". I could not get him to give directions or pop his smoke. Again in retrospect I believe his refusal was due to the fact I was no where near him. He in fact probably could neither hear or see me. Again looking back It seems the two times he answered me was only when I pulled up high enough for my radio transmissions to clear the ridge. I hover taxied over the entire bowl area, this taking about twenty minutes. Several times the survivor case up on beeper. Utilizing my ADF/UHF I found the survivor to be due north of my position. Each time I hovered to the north rim of the bowl in an attempt to locate him I was unsuccessful regardless of every attempt made to hover slow and low over the area. One of the Sandys said the survivor was just to the east edge of the smoke, so I proceeded to hover to the extreme right edge of the smoke hoping to






get a visual on the survivor. It was here we referre the the first ground fire wounding the co-pilot. I immediately called out the ground the number one gunner opened fire. The enemy appeared to be both below us and on the side of the bowl above us. The round that hit Capt Boyd, my co-pilly. was fired almost horizontal at us from the hill. He started bleeding profus-1y and was instructed by me to apply a tourniquet to the thigh. He was unable to reach his tourniquet on his survival vest due to his chest armor plating being in the way. I called for a PJ to assist Capt Boyd from his seat and administered first aid. By this time the cockpit was covered with blood. As Capt Boyd was climbing out of his seat, in fact almost as soon as he was hit I initiated a right turn away from the hill and started my egress from the area. The time was 0400Z (1100L) although I called ground fire on the UHF radio to the best of my knowledge I received no support from the Sandys. Again, this leads me to believe they were working in another area. After climbing over the north-south ridge I requested vectors to egress the area. I do not now remember the heading, but I believe it to be 270°. The Sandys immediately started laying down ordnance and marking my route with white phosphorous rockets, which worked extremely well for route identification. The only problem that I really had was that due to my low altitude (25-50ft) I was unable to detect villages or populated areas until I was directly over them and it was too late to take evasive action. Only once or twice was I directed to turn left or turn right to avoid personnel. On the run out I received extensive small arms fire, taking 29 rounds or fragments through the aircraft. It was also during the run out that one of my pararescuemen. Sgt Morgan, was wounded in the right upper arm. During the run out a 37MM round exploded near the left side of the ramp, p-ppering the aircraft with holes.



Sgt Walsh, my flight mechanic, climbed into the oc s seat in an attempt to assist me in the handling of the aircraft. He provided immeasurable assistance and encouragement during this most critical phase of low level egress. With two wounded and one PJ assisting them this left the entire security of the aircraft in the hands of the combat photographer, Sgt Cockerill. His superior skill and expertise with the mini-gun more than once suppressed small arms ground fire around us. Again on the run out, as on the run in, we were lost to the Sandys due to the terrain and low visibility of the helicopter. At one time I was progressing due north unaccompanied for over ten minutes. I was in fairly rough terrain and had no problem with ground fire. However, I did come out of the Karst and broke out into a large open valley which appeared to be populated from side to side. So populated in fact that I could not avoid the towns. I ended up flying down what appeared to be a main street. I then started calling for Sandy assistance and for vectors out of the area. I made it to the other side of the valley and into the Karst after receiving intense ground fire. I was successful in obtaining assistance from the Sandys after giving them three DF steers to my position. I ended up arriving at point X-ray from the north when I should have been arriving from the south. Arrival time at X-ray was 04302 (1130L), I re-joined with Jolly 02 and proceeded to NKP via points Lima and Mike. During our egress we discovered that number one engine was leaking oil badly and eventually it did fail due to oil starvation and caught fire during our flight home. Jolly 02 flow in close formation with us and determined that both tip tanks were leaking fuel and the right outboard tire was deflated due to battle damage. Our utility hydralics



failed also due to battle damage. We arrived at NKP at 05302 (12502) and the after shut down we discovered that one of the main rotor blades had been damaged through the main spar. Both persons wounded were air evaced to Udorn AB, Thailand and are in satisfactory condition.

COMMENTS: I feel that the most significant contributing factor to the confusion that resulted in the unsuccessful attempt to recover the downed crewmember is the low visibility of a HH-53C helicopter. A method needs to be devised that will give better visibility. I propose a extremely brilliant strobe located on top the horizontal stabilizer than can be controlled from the cockpit. The possibility of introducing oil into the engine to produce smoke should also be considered. But most important of all is the fact that something needs to be done now, not tomorrow. Contributing factors to the confusion was too much chatter on the SAR primary, That freq should be reserved for the survivor, Sandy 01, Jolly 01, and the Sandy leading the Jolly. All others should be on Fl. Another factor was too many Sanlys on the run in and out causing the pattern around the Jolly to be too big and unwieldy. I appreciate the cover and the desire of all to participate, but I believe the Sandys could have been better utilized in flights of four. This would keep the size of the pattern down and make the extra Sandys available for big gun suppression. Additional training and co-ordination in needed with the Sandys and the Jolly Greens.

LOUIS E. CAMPBELL, Aircraft Commander

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MERCHAN CREAMENBERS INVOLVED (JOLLY 01) Capt Campbell, Louis E Aircraft Commander Capt Boyd, Stephen D. Co-pilot Sgt Walsh, James F. Flight Engineer S5gt Goodlett, Donald H. Jr. Pararescue Specialist Sgt Morgan, Dale W. Pararescue Specialist Sgt Cockerill, James W Photographer AIRCRAFT INVOLVED King 21 King 22 Sandys 01 thru 08 Jolly Green 01 Jolly Green 02 CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED (JOLLY 02) Capt Bradley, Roger C Aircraft Commander Lt Rovito, Gilbert A. Co-pilot SSgt Bryant, Tommie K Jr Flight Engineer TSgt Salome, Charles F. Pararescue Specialist SSgt Musnicki, Kenneth J. Pararescue Specialist A1C Baumgardner, Melvin A. Jr Photographer



MISSION NARRATIVE (RCS: V-6)

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DATE: 10 Dec 72

MISSION NUMBER:

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FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 04

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Rescue & Recovery of Kansas O1 Bravo At 0050Z, 10 Dec 72, Jolly Green 04 launched with Jolly Green 03 in support of Kansas O1B SAR. We proceeded to holding point Mike for aerial refueling and backup orbit. Refueling was initiated at 02002 and at the termination of aerial refueling, Jolly Green 03 experienced a main transmission chip light. This aircraft then proceeded to channel 89 and Jolly Green 05 was launched to replace 03. At point Mike, Jolly Green 04 monitored the progress of Jolly Green 01 while making his run in; hover, and egress. While in a hover searching for the survivor, Jolly Green 01 received extensive battle damage and small arm wounds to two crewmembers. At that time Jolly Green 01 egressed the area and, escorted by Jolly 02, proceeded to channel 89. The egress of Jolly Green 01 started about 0330Z. Jolly Green 05 arrived at point Bravo at 0330Z and refueling was accomplished for Jolly Green 04 and 05 at 0345Z. As Jolly Green 04 was making a disconnect at the end of refueling, we received ground fire from a point five miles South of point Mike. This hostile fire, in the opinion of TSgt Young the #3 P.J. was two unguided rockets. They exploded at altitude behind us and had white smoke upon detonation. This fire was reported by TSgt Young. Breakaway from the tanker was expedited and evassive action was taken. Refueling continued with Jolly Green 05 as we returned to point Bravo. Around 0600Z, the decision was made to attempt another run-in for the survivor. Jolly Green 04 and 05 accomplished refueling at that time in preparation for another try for the survivor. Refueling terminated at 06302. For the next 14

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hours, the Sandys refined the position of the survivor and called for strikes in that proximity. The ingress of Jolly Green 04 began at 0810Z from point Lima and was made at low level, high speed. It had been determined earlier during test fire, that one of the miniguns was inoperative. The operative guns had been positioned at the #1 and #3 positions and these guns were used by the P.J.'s to surpress ground fire on the ingress. Jolly Green 04 was further supported by 3 A-7's, Slam Flight. Slam Flight did a good job of protection and leading the helicopter to the area of the objective. They prepared the ingress route with ordinance and used the terrain to effectively mask the position of the helicopter. A couple of major problems were encountered on the ingress. During the morning the pilot had been experiencing intermitt-nt UHF and FM reception and during the low level ingress this problem worsened by a great extent. During this critical phase of the rescue attempt, the copilot, Capt Bouterse, although this was only his first alert tour, gave invaluable assistance to the pilot by relaying instructions from the A-7's. Occassionally Capt Bouterse got on the controls to expedite the urgent vectors of Slam Flight when there was not enough time to relay the instructions to the pilot. Once in the area of the survivor and during egress, the pilot's receiver was functional. Another problem encountered during ingress was loss of visual contact with the Jolly Green by the A-7's. On several occassions the Jolly was completely unescorted due to Slam Flight losing sight of us. This problem was partially alleviated by TSgt Young firing a flare from the ramp when the A-7's lost sight of the helicppter. During the ingress, Jolly Green 04 followed the vectors of the A-7's until we were in the area of the survivor. We overshot the location by about ½ mile due to some radio confusion of the Sandys. We held on the North

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side of the ridge that the survivor was on until the Sandy marked the survivor's approximate location with a marker rocket. At this time we proceeded to the marker smoke while the Sandy was calling for the survivor to pop his marker smoke. As soon as we got to the Sandy's marker rocket smoke I could see the survivor's smoke at my two o'clock position about 30 to 50 yards from the helicopter. I hovered to that location and the flight engineer deployed the penetrator to within five feet of the survivor. According to accounts of the flight engineer, Sgt Smith and the photographer, TSgt Looper, the man on the ground was sitting up, on the ground with his knees up to his chest and his head on his knees. He never made any move toward the penetrator nor did he ever look up at the helicopter. Immediately upon establishing a hover we started taking intense ground fire. The Sandys set up a protective "Daisy Chai-" and were expending their ordinance around the helicopter. Due to the close proximity of some of the ground fire, all of it could not be silenced. The survivor was located on the side of a hill and we were taking ground fire from the hill above us from 6 to about 10 o'clock, from directly beneath the helicopter and from 12 jto about 4 o'clock down the slope. One round severed an electric wire bundle making the #1 mini-gun completely inoperative. The severed wires also gave cockpit indications of loss of utility hydraulic pressure as well as loss of other equipment wuch as RHAW gear. etc. WHen the #1 gun was rendered inoperative by the ground fire, the #3 mini-gun jammed due to a bent round. This left us with three mini-guns completely inoperative in the hover over the objective. TSgt Young and Sgt Gonzales, the P.J's, immediately started firing their CAR-15 rifles to afford as much protection as possible for the helicopter. In addition, TSgt Looper manned the M-60 machine gun at the #2 3

door to provide protection for Sgt Smith while he was operating the hoist. After about one minute and 15 seconds in the hover, we took a small arm round that penetrated the fuel filter on #2 engine and created a fire one that engine. We stayed in a hover for approximately 10 seconds longer trying to afford the survivor as much af an opportunity as possible to get on the penetrator. After Sgt Smith had reported the fire twice, I instructed him to shear the hoist cable as the survivor was not on the penetrator. This was accomplished and departure from the area was initiated. By this time the Sandys reported the engine fire or Jolly Green 04. After attaining some forward speed, Capt Bouterse was instructed to shut down #2 engine. Shutdown was complicated by the fact that the #2 engine instruments were frozen indicating normal operation although the #2 engine caution lights were illuminted on the caution panel. Capt Bouterse moved #2 throttle to idle slowly and, ascertaining no additional power loss, completed engine shutdown. A single engine egress was initiated following the vecotors of the Sandys and the egress route was approximately the same as the ingress route. About three minutes into the egress TSgt Looper received a superficial wound from a small arms round. The round broke the skin of his right side beneath his arm. TSgt Young rendered aid to TSgt Looper. The Sandy flight covering us on the egress did a fantastic job. They never lost sight of the helicopter and they were expending their ordinance in advance of us. The egress continued to point lima where Jolly Green 04 and 05 rejoined. Grom Lima we proceeded to point Mike and Jolly Green 04 joined with King 23 for a single engine refueling. Refueling started at 13302 and lasted five minutes. Jolly Green 04, 05, 06 and 07 returned to channel 89

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and landed at 1445Z. We terminated the mission with a single engine landing. Each member of the crew is to be commended for the fine job performed by each as mentioned. Perhaps more important was the part each played in making it such a co-ordinated effort. Each man realized his area of responsibility and responded to each task in the highest tradition of Rescue and the United States Air Force. Special commendation goes to Capt Bouterse who aided the pilot immeasurably by flying the aircraft when necessary during critical phases of the rescue attempt and by relaying vital communications to the pilot during ingress. Capt Bouterse did this with a minimum of confusion at critical times. Special commendation also goes to TSgt Looper and TSgt Young. In complete disregard for his own safety, TSgt Looper chose to discard his camera for an M-60 machine gun which he put to good use covering Sgt Smith who was operating the hoist during the rescue attempt. As a result of his gallent actions, TSrt Looper was wounded on the egress. TSgt Young, in addition to surpressing ground fire on the ingress, fired flares each time the Sandys lost sight of the helicopter. When his gun jammed in the hover, TSgt Young immediately started firing his CAR-15 rifle to afford all the protection he could. As soon as egress was initiated he used his knife to extract the bent round which had jammed his gun. This provided him with a functional gun once more. When TSgt Looper was wounded, TSgt Young immediately wnet to his aid and made him lie down. Upon determing the wound to be superficial, TSgt Young made TSgt Looper comfortable and wnet back to his mini-gun for ground fire surpression during the remaineder of the egress. Sgt Smith is to be commended for exposing himself to the intense ground fire during hover while searching for the survivor's location from the personnel door. Sgt Smith and Sgt Gonzales displayed maturity well above their experience level. They both performed their jobs with coolness

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and precision and their efforts added greatly to the over all co-ordination of the mission. This was the first mission for Capt Rish, Capt Bouterse, Sgt Smith and Sgt Gonzales.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. We recommend some device that can be controlled in the cockpit that would assure visual sighting of the helicopter by the Sandys. This could be in the form of a smoke generator, high intensity strobe light or a method of producing smoke from the engines.

2. This is another mission which proves that electronic location finder (ELF) is essential to any rescue. If ELF had been available, the survivors exact location could have been determined on the first attempt increasing the possibility of success and possibly eliminating the need for the second try.
3. We recommend that the Sandys expend ordinance in the area of the survivor as soon as they see the survivor's smoke. Its not necessary to wait for the Jolly to call ground fire because, as in our case, the ground fire was from all quadrants and it incapicated the helicopter after one to one and one half

WYMAN N. RISH, Capt, USAF Aircraft Commander

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