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39th ARRSq History, Oct - Dec 69

DATE: 24 OCT 69

Supporting Document 5

29 October 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 1-3-079-24 OCT 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 6

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Misty 11 (Crew of Two)

LOCATION: 055/25/72

SAVES: 2 Misty crew plus 1 PJ

1. (S) This King 6 crew was given background information relative to this mission at the 31st Wing Intelligence briefing at 1100L and a further, more current briefing by Stoker 2 in the 39th ARRS. King 4 was, at the time, controlling the SAR effort in an attempt to effect a pick-up of Misty 11 Alpha, Misty 11 Bravo, and the PJ from Jolly Green 28 who had been left with 11 Alpha when JG 28 got hit and was forced to exit the area before crash-landing. We were briefed by Stoker 2 to monitor SAR frequencies after take-off and during climb-out with the probability of reliving King 4 if the mission wasn't completed by the time we reached our Gulf orbit point.
2. (S) At 0515Z we proceeded to the approximate location of the SAR effort (0550/25miles/TACAN channel 72), received and up-to-date briefing by King 4 and assumed control at 0538Z. At this time Sandy 1, with Sandy 4 as wing man, was the On-Scene Commander (OSC) and was working Spads 05 and 06, JG 76 (Low), JG 72 (High) and "Salad" aircraft 40 through 44. Misty aircraft 31 and 41 were also on the scene standing by as necessary, as was Stormy 3.
3. (S) As we assumed control, Sandy 1 was directing a strafing of ridges on either side of the SAR point by the Spads and the laying down of CBU 19 by Salad 40 through 44. JG 76 and 72 were orbiting nearby in readiness for a pick-up attempt of Misty 11 Alpha and the PJ with him. We all concurred that Misty 11 Bravo should be second for pick-up since Alpha was reported as having a broken leg and needing medical attention; Bravo had reported himself on his emergency radio as being uninjured.
4. (S) At 0610Z Sandy 1 directed JG 76/72 to start moving in for pick-up of Alpha and his PJ and kept the CBU-19 and Spad A-1E's in a daisy-chain operation supporting/protecting them. A fairly large rainstorm was approaching from the east and the winds had increased considerably, which was blowing the CBU-19 away almost as fast as it was laid. Sandy 1 remarked on this and asked JG 76 (the designated "pick-up" helicopter) to hurry as much as possible as the smoke wasn't laying nor remaining too well or long. JG 76 reacted quickly and moved in for the recovery effort.

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39th Air Wing History, Oct - Dec 69 - Supporting Document 5

87

5. (S) No visible ground fire was reported and none was reported being received by JG 76 until he began to hover preparatory to lowering his hoist. At this point he was struck by several rounds of ground fire and was forced to pull out and proceed to Lima 44 near Channel 72 for an emergency landing. He reported loss of his first stage system, his utility hydraulic system, and JG 72 (who pulled out with him, and escorted him to safety at Lima 44) confirmed also that JG 76 had had part of his rudder shot away. He was also escorted by Sandys 1 and 4 and by King 3, who was orbiting a few miles NW of the SAR point. The JG 76 aircraft was left at L 44 and JG 72 transported the crew to Channel 72.

6. (S) At this time, we had Salad 44 through 47 (CBU-19 a/c) inbound (ETA about 20 minutes away) and JG 15 and 21, who had been previously dispatched by Queen out of Channel 77 and was holding "at the fence," had been called in as back-ups to JG 76 and 72. They were holding SW of the SAR point but JG 21 was preparing to proceed westward towards Channel 72 for air-refueling with King 3 (NOTE: King 3 at this point was proceeding back towards Channel 72 with JG 09 and 19 in tow from Channel 89, refueling them enroute to save time and to help prepare them for back-up to JG 15 and 21, if needed.

7. (S) When JG 76 departed, Sandys 1 and 4 were at Bingo fuel so they escorted JG 76 and 72 to L 44 enroute to RTB to Channel 89. On-scene command was transferred to Spad 05. Also, Sandys 5 and 6 were estimating arrival at 0547Z and Sandys 3 and 7 at 0555Z, all with full SAR load. Since these estimated arrival times correlated with the ETA's on Salads 44 - 47, a new effort was organized by Spad 05 but was then delayed because of the threatening storm (rain had started falling). During the wait, Sandy 3 was named OSC and Spade 05 and 06 RTB to channel 77 for fuel. At approximately 0710Z, during a sudden break in the storm, Sandy 3 organized a quick "hosing" of the ridge areas by the Sandys and Salads and alerted JG 15 for a pick-up run as soon as the Salads could lay their smoke. While this was being done, JG 76 called me on SAR VHF and said to caution the OSC and JG 15 that "No more PJ's are needed on the ground, but the three individuals on the ground are all unarmed and do need arms, if possible. Also, be advised that I received no ground fire from anywhere while moving in, but as I started my hover, I started taking hits."

8. (S) While we were waiting for the weather to subside, King 4 relayed from Queen a request that the SAR forces take a look at JG 28 (the crash-landed helicopter) before the day was over to determine if it could be recovered by a "crane" or should it be destroyed by the fast movers. We acknowledged but delayed this action until an appropriate time to discuss it with the A-1H drivers.

9. (S) At approximately 0738Z JG 15 started moving in and, at 0745Z, effected a successful recovery of M101 11 Alpha and the PJ. He received sporadic ground fire and his aircraft was hit during the pick-up, so he moved on out of the immediate proximity to check his damage. Finding no evidence of real serious damage, he reacted favorably to the OSC's request to "let's go in and get Bravo now!" One

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39th AERS History, Oct - Dec 69 Supporting Document 5
 attempt was made but was discontinued due to the loss of his hoist during a burst of heavy ground fire. He returned to Channel 77 to deliver 11 Alpha to the hospital for treatment; Sandy's 3 and 7 followed shortly thereafter and escorted him home, after turning the on-scene command over to Spad 09 (wingman: Spad 10), who had arrived on-scene during the attempt by JG 15 to pick-up Misty 11 Bravo. Sandy's 11 and 10 also arrived with him. (All were carrying full SAR loads.)

10. Spad 09 readied JG 21 for a recovery run, but almost simultaneously Queen called and relayed instructions from "Pot-belly" that JG 21 was not to attempt a pick-up without a "high" rescue helicopter covering him. We roger-ed this and suggested to Spad 09 that JG 09 and 19, who were now in the proximity, be called in for high cover. He and all JG's agreed, but before further SAR action could be initiated, the weather again deteriorated and the mission was delayed about 30 more minutes.

11. During this time, JG 21 developed mechanical problems and was forced to abort, proceeding to Lima Site 171 for an emergency landing. (NOTE: King 3, again orbiting about 20 miles west to assist as necessary if needed, reacted quickly to this sudden development and escorted JG 21 to his landing point. They remained in the area of LS 171 while JG 21 effected a temporary repair and even "air-dropped" some badly needed transmission fluid to help them get their aircraft flyable again. They then escorted JG 21 to Channel 89, refueling them (for the second time that day) on the way.)

12. Four more Salad A-1E's (50-53) had arrived on-scene about 0720Z, had expended their CBU 19 during the readying of JG 21 for his try at a pick-up of Bravo, and were forced to RTB at 0820Z, along with Salads 44-47, for refueling. Salads 54 - 57 replaced them at 0815Z and Queen called and advised us that Spads 07, 08, 13 and 14 were being loaded with more "Salad" at Channel 107 and were estimating departure at 0825Z.

13. Around 0830Z the storm started moving out, so Spads 09 and 10 started hosing down the ridge on one side of the survivor and Sandys 10 and 11 concentrated on the opposite ridge. The four Salad aircraft followed right in behind them to complete the daisy-chain and, after several passes, Spad 09 called in JG 09 (Low) and JG 19 (High) for the pick-up attempt. With the passing of the storm, the winds became relatively calm and the smoke pretty much enveloped the whole area, obliterating the rescue helicopters' visibility and making it even more difficult to locate 11 Bravo. Fortunately, the survivor's emergency radio was working well and he knew how to use it. By coordinated voice guidance on the radio from Misty 11 Bravo on the ground and Spad 09 (circling overhead), after two unsuccessful attempts by JG 09 to locate the survivor, on the third attempt they succeeded and Misty 11 Bravo was hoisted aboard at 0910Z and hurried on his way to Channel 89. He confirmed that he was OK and we relayed this information to Queen and to Misty 11 Alpha, still enroute to Channel 77 on JG 15.

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89

39th AFRSg History, Oct - Dec 69

Supporting Document 5

14. (C) During this final SAR effort to save 11 Bravo, Queen called me and stated that we were now instructed to destroy JG 28 before all forces left the scene. I reminded them that we hadn't yet been able to have anyone check the aircraft out for possible crane recovery, but they stated that it had been decided it was too risky for a ground team to attempt to recover the damaged helicopter and we were to have it destroyed. I relayed this to Spad 09 and the remaining SAR forces (including Misty 31, 41, 51 and 61 and a Litter flight, plus the Spads, Sandys and Salads) complied.

15. (C) Immediately after the "save" of Misty 11 Bravo, JG 09 called for a quick refueling as he was extremely low on fuel, so we descended for an enroute intercept and rendezvous and refueled them as they progressed towards Channel 89. At 0918Z we proceeded to our assigned Gulf orbit point to the north of Channel 77 and entered a normal orbit posture at 0930Z.

16. (C) Comments:

a. We noticed that every time a Jolly Green pick-up attempt was started (as the helicopter started moving in for a possible recovery), a chute beeper started transmitting. This happened during efforts with both Alpha and Bravo. At first we (on King 6) thought it was Bravo, trying to help us locate him. But, after Alpha was recovered, and during save efforts with Bravo, the same thing happened, each time, but it was determined not to be Bravo because he was talking to Spad 09 at the same time the beeper was being heard. Luckily, the beeper was far enough removed from Bravo that it didn't block Bravo's voice transmission, and Bravo's battery was strong enough to drive through the beeper. Opinion: The beeper was being used by someone among the enemy forces, and one who was close enough either visually observing the entire SAR operation or was able to hear all the conversations on UHF guard and understood them.

b. Panama Controller 14, who worked with us continuously, from our entry into the effort until its completion, and who had worked similarly with King 4 while they were handling the mission, is deserving of a special pat on the back for his untiring and devoted efforts. The way he handled our rescue forces as they were cycled to us and his professionalism throughout the day speak very highly for Panama and their dependability. We among King wish to especially commend Panama 14.

c. Not to slight any of the SAR forces working with King 6, we feel everyone associated with the effort performed outstandingly. The "Jollys", Roads, Sandys and "Salads" worked beautifully together. And the Mistys, Stormys and Litters, being somewhat especially concerned over a couple of their own kind, gave us superb backup support. Hillsboro, Batcat, Kings 1, 3 and 2, and Queen, our RCC, backed us up completely when needed, and usually without a call from us. To everyone who participated, thanks for their help, cooperation and efforts.

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50-41

91

39th ARRSq History, Oct - Dec 69

Supporting Document 6

DATE: 24 OCT 69

27 October 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 1-3-079 24 OCT 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 4

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Misty 11, F-100F

LOCATION: 055/25/72

SAVES: 2 and 4 (2 Misty & 4 Jolly Greens)

1. (S) As King 4, we were on normal orbit north of Ch 77 with the radios set up in the standard configuration. The crew heard Nail 07 call Hillsboro at 0120Z and reported that he had heard a Mayday from Misty 11. Misty 11 had indicated in the call that he had a flame out. The time of the distress call was 0115Z. We immediately called Hillsboro for a possible position. They gave us Delta 45 and we immediately started for the area. Nail 07 was appointed On Scene Commander and started organizing available aircraft to search for the downed crew.

2. (S) At 0121Z we requested that the Jollys and Spads be scrambled from Ch 77 and sent to 220/42/103. Queen advised that Jolly Green 04 & 28 were launched from 103 and the Spads from Ch 77 at 0126Z. ETA to SAR area 0239Z. Nail 07 and King 4 conducted an electronic search in the area of D-45.

3. (S) At 0146Z Misty 31 came back from tanker and said that he had last seen Misty 11 in the D-43 area. The SAR effort moved to that area, 150/50/103. Nail 07 made voice contact with the survivors at 0150Z. Misty 11A had a broken leg, but Misty 11B was OK. Bravo indicated that he heard the enemy about 25 meters NW of his position. He was located on the side of a ridge in heavy jungle. Alpha was about 75 meters east of his position. Both were located on the slope between the crest and ravine. Nail 07 proceeded to locate both pilots exactly so ordnance could be put in on the enemy.

4. (S) Fast movers were available from 0200Z, and every 20 minutes thereafter but were not used. Stormy 02 and Misty 31 attacked the suspected positions with 20mm. Subsequent passes by Nail 07 drew no ground fire. Spad 11 arrived, and after a briefing by Nail 07, became On Scene Commander at 0255Z. He had smoke laid on both ridge tops and across the western end of the ravine at 0309Z. After the smoke was down Jolly Green (JG) 28 started in for the pick up. Misty 11 Alpha was told to pop his smoke.

5. (S) At 0313Z JG 28 put a P8 down to aid 4 into the helicopter. JG 28 took ground fire in the transmission area at 0315Z and had to leave because of heavy oil loss. He exited east trailing heavy smoke for approximately 2 miles and crash landed at 0318Z. JG 04 landed

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92

92

39th AFB History, Oct - Dec 69

Supporting Document 6

beside 28 and picked up the crew; he received slight rotor damage from trees during this maneuver. JG 04 RTB to Ch 77 accompanied by Couey 297. JG 21 and 15 launched from Ch 77 for escort. JG 72 and 76L accompanied by Sandy 01 & 04 had arrived in the area at 0305Z. After JG 28 exited the area Spad 11, 12 and 01 struck the possible ground fire sites with napalm, CBU, and 20mm guided by the survivors on the ground.

6. (U) Salad 40, 41, 42 and 43 arrived at 0345Z and dropped their ordnance at 0400Z. Sandy 01 relieved Spad 11 as On Scene Commander at 0412Z. He brought JG 76 in for a pick up and advised Alpha to pop his smoke. At 0420Z JG 76 called that he was taking ground fire with hits in his underside and external tanks. He pulled off immediately. Sandy 01 reoriented himself on the exact position of both A & B in preparation for a CBU attack. Sandy 01 and 04 expended CBU and 20mm. The Salad birds were also used to expend 20mm on the tree line along the ridges.

7. (U) At 0447Z JG 76 went back in to attempt a pick up of the PJ and A with the A-1s forming a daisy chain around the helicopter. The PJ and A were advised to pop smoke at 0453Z. JG 76 took more hits and pulled off at 0445Z. Sandy 01 continued to sanitize the area. Stormy 02 & 03 also expended 20mm. Sandy 01 requested more salad and was advised that it was on the way. Salad 44 & 45 were airborne Ch 89 at 0449Z. King 6 arrived and was briefed. He took over the mission at 0535Z. The following aircraft were involved in the SAR from origin to 0535Z:

NAIL 07	SPAD 11, 12, 01, 5 & 6
STORMY 01, 02 & 03	SALAD 40, 41, 42 & 43
PLAYBOY 12	JOLLY GREEN 04, 28, 76, 72, 15 & 21
MISTY 31 & 41	(JOLLY GREEN 09 & 19 - NOV ORBIT)

8. (U) Jolly Green 76 was refueled by King 1 at 0500Z.

9. (U) No problems encountered.

10. (U) Crewmembers:

AMC MAJ ABBOTT	RO TSG RUSSELL
AC MAJ RICHARDS	FE MSG GRIFFIN
CP COL FRAZEE	FE SGT CARVER
NN CPT BAKER	LM SGT PEARSON

Fred F. Abbott
FRED F. ABBOTT, Major, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander

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SD-4 84

8.

39th ARPSq History, Oct - Dec 69

DATE: 5 Nov 69

Supporting document 4

7 November 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 1-03-079-24 Oct 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 3

DISTRIBUDED AIRCRAFT: Misty 11

LOCATION: 055/25/72

SAVES: 2 Misty crew plus 1 PJ

1. (U) This is a supplemental narrative regarding King 3 activities in support of Mission # 1-03-079, 24 Oct 69, controlled by King 4 & 6.
2. (U) King 3 was launched by Jack at 0404Z 24 Oct 69 and instructed to proceed to Tacan channel 72 and orbit, pending possible air refueling of helicopters supporting SAR mission.
3. (U) At 0615Z King 3 overheard Jolly Green 76 advise he had been hit by groundfire and was experiencing hydraulic failures and controllability problems. King 3 proceeded to intercept Jolly Green 76, called for landing clearance at LS 44 and relayed frequency and status information to Jolly Green 76.
4. (U) At 0656Z King 3 coordinated refueling with inbound helicopters Jolly Greens 19 & 09. After rendezvous and hook up a track from 30 miles northwest of channel 72 on the 325 radial, inbound to the SAR site 25 NM east of channel 72 on the 065 radial was chosen to provide best separation from known AAA locations although it was over areas containing concentrations of unfriendly ground forces. A location near the SAR site for termination of refueling JG 09 & 19 was desirable to rendezvous with JG 21 who was on scene as high helicopter at that point in the mission. JG 21 stated he was running about one half hour less fuel than his low partner, JG 15. The on scene commander released JG 21 to refuel. At the moment JG 09 disconnected and the flight JG 19 & 09 cleared King 3, JG 21 was in a five mile at 10 o'clock position and with a single turn an immediate rendezvous and join up was accomplished in the vicinity of channel 72. Refueling was conducted inbound to the SAR scene commencing at 0703Z.
5. (U) When JG 21 disconnected and cleared from refueling JG 15 was maneuvering to pick up survivor Misty 11A. When JG 15 was disabled by groundfire attempting the Misty 11B pickup, King 3 maneuvered to intercept outbound from the SAR scene for escort and refueling. This refueling was conducted entirely between channel 72 and the SAR scene, again over a briefed hostile area. Because of battle damage JG 15 could not attain the minimum refueling speed of 105 knots. Due to previous off loads King 3 was lighter than normal and speed was reduced to 100 knots for the refueling. JG 15, after careful assessment of battle damage, advised King 3 that he did not require escort by King 2.

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unless indicated after 15 years.

39th ARRSq History, Oct. - Dec 69

Supporting Document 4

6. (C) Upon termination of refueling with JG 15, King 3 monitored as JG 21, while maneuvering to pick up Misty 112, announced mechanical difficulty due to an in flight access panel release and necessity for an immediate landing. King 3 proceeded to intercept, calling for landing clearance at LS 171. After JG 21 had shut down at LS 171 and corrected his mechanical difficulty, it was discovered that he was critically short of transmission fluid. A quick check of Mil Specifications revealed the type oil required by JG 21 was the same type carried by King 3 for spare engine oil, Mil Spec 7808. Aerial delivery of the spare engine oil from King 3 was decided upon, in spite of the necessity to maneuver over known hostile territory at 300 ft and 130 knots to effect the delivery, due to the favorable prospects of immediately recovering JG 21. The initial drop of engine oil was unsuccessful due to inflight disintegration of the delivery package. A second drop was successful with the oil encased in a wooden box normally used by King 3 to store airborne spares. JG 21 was able to return to channel 89 after another refueling and under the escort of King 3.

7. (U) Air Refueling Accomplished:

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| a. JG 04 2300 lbs | d. JG 15 2000 lbs |
| b. JG 19 2500 lbs | e. JG 21 2130 lbs |
| c. JG 21 3100 lbs | |

8. Problem Areas: Lack of proper delivery equipment for an aerial supply delivery hampered the dropping of transmission fluid to Jolly Green 21. Recommend a minimum quantity of cargo slings or straps such as the A-7 cargo sling be procured and stored on each airplane for use with the cargo type parachute presently carried on board.

9. (U) Crewmembers:

AMC MAJ BREWER	10. A1C GUNDEL
AC CPT ADLICH	11. TSG BROWN
CP 1LT FRIMLEY	12. TSG LARSEN
N CPT RAY	13. SSG HARRING

ALTON P. H. BREWER JR., Major, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander

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61

440 [Captain Almonzar/2687]

29 October 1969

Mission Narrative Report #1-3-079-24 Oct 69

3ARRCP [JBARC]
APO 96307

1. [U] This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSW 55-2/
3ARRCP Sup 1, dated 11 July 1968.

61

2. [S] Jolly Green 76 and 72 were alerted for scramble at Ch 89 at 0155Z, 24 Oct 69. SAR objectives Misty 11 reported down at 055/25/72. JG 76 and 72 airborne 0216Z and proceeded to the SAR area with Sandy escort. Upon arrival King 4 advised JG 28 was shot down and JG 76 and 72 were now the primary force. JG 76 was advised there were now three survivors on the ground. One was the PJ from JG 28 who was left with Misty 11a. JG 76 and 72 set up orbit 5 miles south at 8500 feet. The weather remained scattered all day and was no factor. Spad 11 was advised JG 76 was ready to attempt a pickup. Spad 12 escorted JG 76 into the SAR area. CBU-19 was expended and JG 76 went in to attempt a pickup at 0416Z. The survivors expended a smoke and were easily spotted. JG 76 came to a hover and made a 180° turn to bring the aft ramp gun to bear on a small hill where hostile forces had been reported. The survivor's position was in a small valley formed by two ridges about 100 meters long oriented north to south. At the north end where the ridges joined a road was cut 20 meters from the top of a hill. Misty 11a and JG 28 PJ were on the east side of the valley 80 meters from the road. Misty 11b was on the west side 20 meters from the road. During the flare to a hover JG 76 received ground fire from both ridges and the hill. An attempt was made to deploy a PJ but heavy ground fire prevented his deployment. Sandy 1 observed heavy ground fire and recommended JG 76 withdraw. Battle damage to JG 76 included several hits by small arms causing loss of the copilot attitude indicator. Misty 11b had been forced to move his position twice due to enemy troops moving within 15 meters. Misty 11a also reported enemy troops near his position. The Sandy's and Spads continued to sanitize the area and CBU-19 was expended. JG 76 was called in again at 0454Z. At 1/4 mile from the survivor JG 76 again received ground fire but continued to a hover. Again JG 76 received intense ground fire and returned fire and was forced to withdraw. Battle damage was received mainly on the right side of the aircraft and in the right auxiliary tank. JG 76 and 72 escorted by Sandy 1 and 2 left the area at 0500Z, to rendezvous with King 1 to refuel.

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At 0540Z rendezvous and refueling was completed. At 0555Z JG 76 and 72 were back in holding position ready for another pickup attempt. CHU-10 was again expended over the whole area. At 0612Z JG 76 made a third pickup attempt. The Sandys and Floods strafed the ridge lines as JG 76 went in. No ground fire was received. JG 76 came to a hover and stated to deploy a PJ to assist the injured Misty 11a. As the PJ descended on the hoist, approximately 10 feet, intense ground fire was again received. At this time the caution panel in JG 76 indicated the loss of first stage hydraulic system. The first stage pressure dropped to zero. The system was turned off. At the same time the utility hydraulic system pressure began to fluctuate, dropping to 1000 psi. Complete loss of the utility system would cause loss of tail rotor control. Specific damage to the hydraulic system could not be immediately determined as hydraulic fluid was seeping all over the interior of the aircraft. With the pending control failure, JG 76 was again forced to withdraw, with the PJ still suspended approximately 10 feet beneath the aircraft. The PJ assisted by the flight engineer managed to climb back inside the aircraft. At 0619Z, JG 76 joined Sandy one and JG 72 and proceeded west. Sandy one victored the JG's around some known 37mm gun positions. Upon reaching a position about three miles from the SAR area JG 76 attempted to jettison the leaking auxiliary tanks to prepare for bailout. The right auxiliary tank was successfully jettisoned. The left auxiliary tank would not release. The battle damage and the loss of the first stage hydraulic system and the impending failure of the utility system dictated that JG 76 land as soon as possible. The status of Saravane, the nearest suitable landing field, was requested through SAR channels. Saravane was reported as safe for an emergency landing. JG 76 and 72 landed at Saravane at 0625Z. The crew of JG 76 transferred to JG 72 and departed the area at 0628Z. JG 72 with both crews returned to Ch 99.

3. [U] There were no survivors.

4. [U] The rescue crews were:

JOLLY GREEN 76 [LOW]

AC: ALMANZAR, DONALD H., Captain.

CP: PERKE, PETER L., Captain.

FE: RAILLY, HAROLD H., SSgt, FR

PJ: MCFARR, ANTHONY J., Sgt, FR

PJ: CROWDER, DOUGLAS W., Sgt, FR

AP: ANDERSON, GREGORY L., Sgt, 4FR

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7

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #3

45

MISSION NARRATIVE 1-3-79 24 Oct 69

(S) At 0120Z Jolly Green (JG) 28 and JG 04 were scrambled from the forward operating base of Quang Tri, Channel 103. The SAR effort was initiated in response to a Mayday call from Misty 11, who declared he had experienced an engine flameout and that the two crew members aboard were bailing out. King 4 vectored the Jolly Greens to a rendezvous with Spads 11 and 12 at 070 degrees for 68 miles from Channel 72. Meanwhile, the on scene commander, Nail 07 was relaying information from the area of interest. It was ascertained, Nail 07 had established radio contact with both survivors and that Misty 11A had sustained a broken leg while Misty 11B was uninjured. At 0240Z JG 28 and JG 04 arrived at the position of 055 degrees for 35 miles from Channel 72 along with the Spad aircraft. At this time Spad 11 assumed on scene command and both Spad 11 and 12 began trolling the survivor's position at approximately 055 degrees for 23 miles from Channel 72 for hostile forces. The Jollys were briefed by Spad 11 and after repeated passes during which no hostile fire was received, Spad 11 layed smoke to the northwest of the survivors' position along a road. At 0305Z JG 28 was cleared in for the rescue attempt with the Spads escorting and JG 04 acting as high aircraft. JG 28 arrived over, Misty 11A at 0315Z. The Rescue Specialist (RS) was deployed and immediately secured the survivor to the forest penetrator. Within less than one minute both men were being hoisted aboard JG 28. When the forest penetrator was approximately 10 to 15 feet off the ground JG 28 was subjected to intense hostile fire. The hoist assembly was shot from its mounting, falling into the main cargo door, striking the Flight Engineer (FE) who had been operating the hoist from the open doorway, knocking him across the aircraft. He immediately recovered, ascertained the hoist was inoperative and sheared the hoist, thus providing the RS and survivor a chance of survival in case JG 28 had crashed in the immediate area. The FE called for a pull off and JG 28 commenced a departure from the area at which time the transmission oil pressure fluctuated and the dropped to zero. JG 04 observed JG 28 to be smoking and spraying fluid from the transmission area and advised JG 28 to land his aircraft. As there were no suitable landing areas JG 28 attempted to exit the area, after flying approximately one and one half miles, a marshy area overgrown with elephant grass was sighted and used as an emergency landing area. Meanwhile, JG 04, jettisoned his external tanks, performed a rapid descent and pulled into a very low hover as near as possible to JG 28. The three remaining crew members of JG 28 were uninjured and exited the downed aircraft expeditiously. Approximately 0320Z, JG 04 completed individual hoisting of the three survivors and initiated a maximum performance climb to depart the immediate area. At this time JG 04 requested and was denied permission to attempt the recovery of the other three survivors, now on the ground. JG 04 was directed to return to Channel 77 and enroute at 0355Z was met by JG 15 and 21 who then

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after 12 years~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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46

escorted JG 04 the remaining distance, arriving Channel 77 at 0420Z. At 0445Z, JG 15 and 21 were again launched from Channel 77 and proceeded to an orbit point, of 045 degrees for 60 miles from Channel 72. In the interim, JG 76 from Channel 89 attempted three times to recover Misty 11A and JG 28D, the Rescue Specialist. Each time hostile fire forced JG 76 to withdraw, the last time at 0615Z with extensive damage. At 0624Z, JG 15 and 21 departed their orbit for the area of interest arriving at 0630Z. While enroute to the scene JG 15 and 21 were given a comprehensive briefing of the situation by the on scene aircraft. At approximately 1705Z, JG 21 departed the immediate area to effect rendezvous and air refueling with King 3, returning at 0735Z. At this time JG 15 was cleared by Sandy 03 to attempt the rescue and immediately commenced an approach to the survivors. The approach was aborted due to the approach angle and heavy ground fire. Immediately, another attempt was initiated and at 0737Z, JG 15 had established a hover over the survivors. By 0738Z, Misty 11A and JG 28D had been hoisted aboard JG 15. During the hoisting operation sporadic ground fire was received. As JG 15 started to exit the area, heavy automatic weapons fire raked JG 15. At 0742Z, JG 15 commenced an approach to Misty 11B, however, again heavy automatic weapons fire was received and the attempt aborted. Immediately, a second approach was attempted but, discontinued due to poor visibility caused by heavy smoke in the area. A third effort was made and while hover taxiing in an attempt to locate Misty 11B, intense automatic weapons fire raked JG 15 rendering the hoist control and intercom system for the FE and RS inoperative. JG 15 immediately departed the area, notified Sandy 03 that he would be unable to remain in the area and commenced rendezvous for air refueling with King 3 after which he returned to Channel 77 at 0935Z. Meanwhile, JG 21 received moderate automatic weapons fire. The rescue effort was next delayed by rain showers in the area and while orbiting, waiting for the visibility to improve, an inspection platform on the transmission deck of JG 21 came open, necessitating an immediate departure from the area at 0810Z. JG 21 landed safely at Lima 171 where King 3 delivered oil by air drop. After securing the inspection platform, reservicing the oil and a thorough inspection, it was decided to relocate at Channel 89, which was completed at 1200Z. Meanwhile JG 19 and 09 from Channel 89 proceeded to the area and at 0911Z JG 19 recovered Misty 11B and took him to Channel 89.

(U) Survivors:

Recovered by JG 04:

Maj Charles W. Bond
Capt Charles D. Langham
SSgt James E. Smith

JG 28B
JG 28A
JG 28C

37 ARRS
37 ARRS
37 ARRS

Recovered by JG 15:

1/Lt Alvin D. Muller
TSgt Donald G. Smith

Misty 11A
JG 28D

416 TFS
37 ARRS

GROUP 4

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Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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Recovered by JG 19:

Capt J. K. Clapper

Misty 11B

416 TFS

47

(U) Jolly Green Crews:

JOLLY GREEN 28

AC Capt Charles D. Langham
CP Maj Charles W. Bond
FE SSgt James E. Smith
RS TSgt Donald G. Smith

JOLLY GREEN 04

AC Lt Richard V. Butchka (USCG)
CP Capt John K. Coder
FE Sgt Joseph Vai
RS A1C George P. Hoffman III

JOLLY GREEN 15

AC Lt(JG) Robert Ritchie(USCG)
CP Lt Col Sidney A. Sosnow
FE TSgt Frank Gaydos Jr.
RS SSgt Jon K. Hoberg
RS Sgt Edward K. Rendle

JOLLY GREEN 21

AC Capt Robert W. Packer
CP Capt Gerald L. Keyser Jr.
FE Sgt Harvey A. Lyons
RS Sgt John H. Bullock Jr.
RS A1C George P. Hoffman III

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36

7

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

Jolly Green 17 (Low)

AC Capt Marshall B. Nash
CP Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Brian W. Murray
RS TSgt Lehman L. Booher
RS SSgt Roy D. Bloebaum

Jolly Green 37 (High)

AC Capt Leonard D. Fialko
CP Capt Joseph R. Brown Jr.
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Robert J. Sully
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) An F-100, Misty 11, was shot down in Southern Laos on 24 Oct. HH-3E's were launched out of the 37th ARRS at Da Nang RVN to rescue the two downed pilots. One of the pilots had a broken leg and a pararescue man was lowered to help retrieve him. At this time the 37th ARRS Jolly Green received many hits and had to depart, only to be forced by the damage he had received to crash land about a mile away. His high helicopter was right there to pick up the crew except for the pararescue man they put down with the pilot with the broken leg. He was left on the ground when his helicopter was forced away. The crew was returned to Da Nang and the crashed helicopter was destroyed to prevent it falling into enemy hands. HH-53's from the 40th ARRS at Udorn attempted a rescue, but were damaged and driven off by hostile ground fire. Two more HH-3E's from the 37th ARRS had arrived on the scene and one of them was able to pick up the pararescue man and the pilot with the broken leg, but was driven off by ground fire before he could get to the other pilot. Weather was moving through the area and caused a delay in the proceedings. The 37th HH-3E that was high aircraft attempted a rescue of the second pilot of Misty 11 but was driven off by ground fire. After considerable smoke was put in, Major Smith in Jolly Green 19 was next. Fortunately he did not receive any ground fire, as a considerable amount of hover time was required to locate the second Misty 11 pilot, Capt Jack K. Clapper, 351-30-1226. He was rescued without further incident and the SAR was terminated.

Jolly Green 19 (Low)

AC Maj Ted L. Smith
CP Maj Edward B. Robbins
FE SSgt Robert E. Hunt
RS MSgt Paul L. Jenkins
RS Sgt Leland H. Sorensen

Jolly Green 09 (High)

AC Capt Phillip O. Pfanschmidt
CP Capt David M. Barbert+
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) Jolly Green 17 and 19 were flying local training missions on 1 Nov. We are allowed to use our alert aircraft for training on days that we back-up the HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn. A Mayday call was heard and the position where Firefly 27 had bailed out was given by his wingman, Firefly 26. This was in northern Laos near the Thailand border. Firefly 26 came to meet Jolly Green 17 and lead him to the survivor. The survivor, Maj Peter D. Williams, 873-36-4779, 602nd SOS, was located after a few minutes and hoisted on board Jolly Green 17.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn

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PROJECT CORONA
DO NOT DESTROY
0221814
No

CATALOGED

Sandy Coordinator

SAR Effort Report (Misty 11A and B, Pararescueman from Jolly Green 28) (U)

56 SpOpWg (DCO)

1. (S) A successful rescue was conducted on 24 October 1969 for Misty 11 Alpha, Misty 11 Bravo, and a pararescueman from Jolly Green 28. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.
2. (S) Misty 11, an F-100 FAC, abandoned his aircraft after experiencing engine failure. The pararescueman from Jolly Green 28 was abandoned when Jolly Green 28 was forced to exit the area during an initial rescue attempt.
3. (S) At approximately 0855, Sandys 01 and 02 were launched to escort Jolly Greens 76 and 72 on November orbit and to act as a back-up SAR force for the Spads and the Jolly Greens from Danang who were operating in Southern Laos. Sandys 01 and 02 were airborne at 0915 and immediately rendezvoused with Jolly Greens 76 and 72. An aircraft malfunction forced Sandy 02 to abort. Sandy 04 replaced Sandy 02. King 02 instructed Sandy 01 to escort Jolly Green 76 and 72 to the 350/15 of Channel 72; Sandy 04 was airborne at 0945. Sandys 03, 07, 05 and 06 were launched at 1130. Their initial holding fix was the 045/20 of Channel 72.
4. (S) The terrain in the SAR area was rolling foothills with elevations varying from 1500 ft MSL in the ravines to 2500 ft MSL on the hilltops. The vegetation on these hills varied from dense triple layered canopy jungles to open areas with tall jungle grass. The entire immediate area of the SAR was defended by heavy small arms and automatic weapons located as close as 15 meters to the survivors. There were scattered variable broken cumulus build-ups in the area with tops about 9500 ft MSL and bases varying from 2000 ft to 3000 ft AGL. Visibility below the clouds was excellent. A thunderstorm later moved through the area temporarily delaying the rescue.
5. (S) While the Sandys and Jolly Greens 76 and 72 were enroute to the holding area, Spads 11 and 12 and Jolly Green 28 were attempting a pick-up. King 04 advised that Jolly Green 28 had been downed and that the crew had been picked up by Jolly Green 04 and they were RTBing to Danang. King instructed Sandy 01 to divert immediately to the SAR area. On reaching the SAR area, Spad 11, the "on-scene commander", instructed Sandy 01 and Jolly 76 to rendezvous with his wingman, Spad 12, in preparation for another pick-up attempt. At this time, a Stormy FAC was

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directing Spad 01 and 02 in the target area. When their ordnance had been expended, Spad 11 directed Salads 40, 41, 42, and 43 to drop their CBU-19 in the recovery area. Spad 11 then directed Sandy 01, Spad 12, and Jolly Green 76 to attempt a pick-up. Due to a five to ten minute delay between the placement of the CBU-19 and the recovery attempt, the CBU-19 was largely dissipated. This attempt was aborted due to ground fire. At this time, approximately 1125, Spad 11 turned "on-scene command" over to Sandy 01. Spad 11 RTBed due to low fuel.

6. (S) By this time, Sandy 04 had joined Sandy 01. Since neither Sandy 01 or 04 had a definite fix on the survivors, the next few minutes were devoted to locating the survivors on the ground. Although Misty 11B's chute was visible, he was in the underbrush. He advised that he was 25 meters down the hill from his chute. By use of a signal mirror, Misty 11A and the pararescueman were located 100 meters to the northeast of Misty 11B's position. Based on directions provided by the survivors, Sandy 01 and 04 sanitized the area with 7.62 miniguns, 2.75 rockets, CBU-14s, and 20mm cannons. Ordnance was delivered within 50 feet of the survivors. After approximately 20 minutes, Sandy 01 trolled the area. The survivors reported no ground fire. Another rescue was attempted. After Misty 11 Alpha had deployed his smoke and Jolly Green 76 had started to hover, ground fire again forced a termination of the rescue attempt. Sandy 01 advised King that additional CBU-19 would be required before another rescue could be attempted. Since King estimated 40 minutes for arrival of CBU-19, Sandy 01 advised Jolly Green 76 to refuel if necessary. Jolly Green 76 refueled. Sandy 01 and 04 continued their sanitation. The survivors directed this effort. After 80 percent of their ordnance was expended, Sandy 01 decided to conserve the remainder of his ordnance. Misty 41 and Stormy 02 were directed to provide suppressive 20mm support. Their hard ordnance could not be used because of the proximity of the survivors. Spad 05 and 06 then arrived with SAR loads. Sandy 01 directed them to rendezvous with Jolly Green 76 and 72 for the next pick-up attempt. Covey 283 and Misty 41 were used to mark targets for Salad 44, 45, 46, and 47 when they arrived. Their CBU-19 covered the entire area. Jolly Green 76, Spad 05 and Spad 06 then attempted another recovery. As Jolly Green 76 reached a hover within 30 feet of Misty 11 Alpha and the pararescueman, he began to lose his utility hydraulic system and control of his tail rotor servos. He could no longer control the helicopter in a hover and made an emergency exit. Sandy 01 and 04 covered Jolly Green 76 as he proceeded to Channel 72. Spad 05 became the "on-scene commander" at approximately 1335. Sandy 01 and 04 were now below minimum fuel. They RTBed to Channel 89. Sandys 03, 07, 05, and 06 arrived in the recovery area just before Jolly Green 76's last attempt at recovery. They held high. After another 30 minutes, Spad 05 reached minimum fuel and RTBed. Sandy 03 became "on-scene commander". By 1430, Salad 48, 49, 50, and 51 arrived with more CBU-19. Although the weather was deteriorating, Sandy 03 initiated a new recovery effort.

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7. (S) After CBU-19 was dropped, Sandy 05 and 06 escorted Jolly Green 15 into the rescue area. They then joined in a daisy chain providing protective fire. Despite heavy ground fire, Jolly Green 15 extracted Misty 11 Alpha and the pararescuer. An approaching thunderstorm aborted an attempt to recover Misty 11 Bravo. The storm prevented recovery from approximately 1500 to 1530. By the time the storm passed, the Sandys were becoming low on fuel. They expended their remaining ordnance and RTBed. Spad 03 became "on-scene commander". Sandy 05 and 06 landed at Channel 93 due to low fuel. Spad 09 and Jolly Green 19 successfully recovered Misty 11 Bravo. Sandy 11 and 12 assisted in their pick-up.

8. (S) The following difficulties were encountered:

a. The proximity of hostile forces to the survivors severely restricted the type of ordnance which could be delivered.

b. The enemy's tactics of holding fire until the helicopters were in their most vulnerable position complicated the recovery.

c. The strong surface wind limited the effectiveness of the CBU-19.

9. (S) Based on the experience gained in this recovery, the following recommendations are made:

a. Only restricted types of ordnance can be used when hostiles are in close proximity to survivors. Napalm might help in restricting small arms fire since it can be accurately delivered and should have a demoralizing effect.

b. Wind conditions have a definite effect in CBU-19 effectiveness. Wind conditions must be considered when initiating the recovery.

10. (U) The Sandy forces who participated in the effort were as follows:

Sandy 01	1st Lt Huntsman
Sandy 04	Lt Col Michaud
Sandy 03	Maj Moffatt
Sandy 07	1st Lt Frisbie
Sandy 05	Capt Crowder
Sandy 06	Capt Dyer
Sandy 11	Capt Hudson
Sandy 12	Lt Col Miller

JOHN M. VARGO, Lt Colonel, USAF
Sandy Coordinator

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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0525Z - JG 27+25 ABN

0830Z REQUESTED AMBULANCE MEET JG 15 AT 0920Z
(Sgt THOMAS F5) (ONE)

0930Z HH3, 66-13281 DESTROYED @ BIG DAY!

25 OCT

BY AIR STRIKE

2200Z CAPT COVER HERE.

2255 JG 27 ABN FOR CH 103.

2310 JG 35 ABN FOR CH 103.

0930 JG 31 ABN LOCAL TRNG

0140 JG 03 ABN LOCAL TRNG

0200 JG 07 ABN F.F

0300 JG 21 ABN FROM CH. 89, ESTIMATES ARRIVAL
AT CH. 77 AT 0545Z.

CAPT. CODER OFF DUTY

0330 JG 31 + 03 LANDED AT CH. 77

0510 JG 31 along ch 77 For ch 103 to put
Alert for JG 35! JG 35 will take the
Orlist!

0600Z Late Entry! JG 21 went back into CH 89/NK
with Transmission Problems. Will call Jolly
Green ops when they land at (NK)?

0600Z SET. Clay (Joker) To coordinate escort
for JG 25 0730/26 OCT 69. → U Bon

0620Z JG 22 along ch 77 (F.C.F. flight)

0625 JG 31 on the deck ch 103

0810 JG 31 on the deck ch 77

~~JG~~ JG 07 ABN F.F

0850Z DAAK TO TSARC

0900Z AIC Marino off duty!

26 OCT 69

Technical Sergeant Donald E. Smith

Incident date: 24 October 1969

Aircraft position: Pararescue Technician

Place of incident: Laos

Unit: 37 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron

Location of unit: Da Nang AB, Republic of Vietnam. On alert,
Quang Tri, Republic of Vietnam

Synopsis: Technical Sergeant Smith's "Jolly Green" launched on 24 October 1969, to attempt the rescue of two downed crew-men from "Misty 11." The forward air control aircraft, "Nail 07," radioed that both survivors were in contact and that "Misty 11A" (pilot) had a broken leg. "Jolly Green 28" arrived over "Misty 11A" and deployed TSgt Smith via hoist. TSgt Smith immediately secured the downed crewman to the forest penetrator (three seat rescue device) and gave the up cable signal. Within one minute both men were being hoisted up. When the forest penetrator was approximately 10-15 feet off the ground, a burst of automatic gunfire hit the external hoist mount dislodging it. The hoist assembly fell into the main cabin door knocking the Flight Engineer across the aircraft. Realizing the hoist was now inoperative, the flight engineer sheared the hoist cable. This would give the pararescueman and survivor a chance for survival in the event of a crash. "Jolly 28" lost all of its transmission oil pressure, a critical situation. The aircraft

was able to make it to a marshy area where it landed. "Jolly 04" immediately hoisted the remaining crew-members from "Jolly 28" aboard. "Jolly 04" was denied a request to attempt another rescue attempt on "Misty 11A" and TSgt Smith. "Jolly 04" returned to base. "Jolly Green 76" attempted three other times to recover TSgt Smith and his survivor. All three times they were shot up, receiving extensive battle damage. "Jolly Green 15" and "21" arrived on scene. "Jolly 15" was able to establish a hover over TSgt Smith and "Misty 11A." They were successfully hoisted aboard. "Jolly 15" then made several attempts to recover "Misty 11B," but to no avail. Each time they were raked with automatic weapons fire, finally disabling the hoist and Flight Engineer and Pararescueman's intercom system. "Jolly 15" departed the area to aerial refuel with "King 03." Another Jolly aircraft was finally able to recover "Misty 11B." (16:--)

Master Sergeant (retired) Donald G. Smith received the Air Force Cross for his heroics that long day. Despite his own injuries received during the fall during the first attempt, Sergeant Smith cared for the survivor, directed air assaults against enemy attackers, and repelled enemy probes. (4:--)
See TABs I and L for reference material

TSgt Smith, a pararescueman, started out to rescue a downed pilot on October 24, 1969, but due to changing circumstances he ended up saving most of his helicopter crew as well. He and his crew were in their helicopter when they located the pilot, who'd been shot down over the Vietnamese jungle. TSgt Smith was lowered to the ground where he attached himself and the pilot to the hoist. As they were being lifted up to the rescue aircraft, hostile fire severed the cable and sent them hurtling to the ground. Shaken, but unhurt, TSgt Smith watched in horror as his chopper was shot down. He made his way to the crash site and guided and guided the survivors to an area where he directed support fighters to ward off the enemy until they were rescued by another helicopter.



TSgt. Donald Smith stands with Brig. Gen. Frank K. Everest Jr. at the medal presentation.

TSgt. Donald G. Smith

On Oct. 24, 1969, the crew of the 37th ARRS HH-3 Jolly Green 28, including pararescueman TSgt. Donald G. Smith, set out to retrieve two F-100 crewmen. When they located the fighter crew in the jungle, Smith was lowered to the ground, where he attached himself and the pilot, who had a broken leg, to the hoist. As they were being lifted, hostile fire damaged the external hoist mount, forcing the flight engineer to sever the cable, sending Smith and the pilot hurtling to the ground. Jolly 28 was forced to make an emergency landing about 1.5 miles away in a marshy area. The chopper's remaining crew members were immediately picked up by a companion HH-3. Despite injury, Smith cared for the fighter crew, directed air assaults against the enemy, and repelled enemy probes for several hours, until another rescue chopper successfully extracted him and the pilot.



Maj Charles W. Bond, Jolly Green Save Number 500
(Second from right)

Remember Misty 11?

24 Oct 69

24Oct70.jpg

AF Museum Photo

24 OCT 69
69



Above: Capt C. Langham is about to receive a handshake after the safe return of his crew. They were shot down in Oct 69.

Langham.jpg
AF Museum Photo

Above: Capt C. Langham is about to receive a handshake after the safe return of his crew. They were shot down in Oct 69.



Langham c.jpg
AF Museum Photo