

GEN. SAUNDERS OPENING REMARKS

PARARESCUE COMBAT READINESS CONFERENCE

SCOTT AFB IL 21-25 JUN 76

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ARRS PARARESCUE COMBAT SAR READINESS CONFERENCE

SINCE SEA, SEVERAL TECHNICAL ADVANCES IN ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES AND RADAR CONTROLLED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS HAVE OCCURRED THAT REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF TACTICS TRAINING TO MEET OUR MISSION AS THE PRIMARY U.S. MILITARY COMBAT RESCUE FORCE. RED FLAG HAS DEMONSTRATED THE LIMITATIONS OF SLOW-MOVING RESCUE VEHICLES IN A HIGH THREAT AREA. THIS RESTRICTION IS ESPECIALLY APPARENT WHEN WE CONSIDER THAT THE CURRENT MASS PRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED HAND-HELD SURFACE-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES BY THE USSR AND THEIR SHIPMENT TO SATELLITE COUNTRIES WILL EVENTUALLY MAKE THEM NEARLY AS COMMONPLACE AS THE AK-47. WE CAN EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER SUCH WEAPONS IN ANY AREA THAT SMALL ARMS RESISTANCE IS PRESENT. SINCE CURRENT TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT DO NOT PROVIDE OUR HELICOPTERS, REGARDLESS OF TYPE, ARMOR, OR FIRE POWER, SUFFICIENT PROTECTION AGAINST THIS THREAT, RESCUE BY HELICOPTER CAN ONLY BE PROVIDED WHERE THE ENEMY THREAT IS KNOWN TO BE MINIMAL. OBVIOUSLY, THIS LIMITS OUR HELICOPTER RESCUE CAPABILITY AND REQUIRES US TO MODIFY THE SEA RESCUE CONCEPT AND DEVELOP OTHER TACTICS MORE CLANDESTINE IN NATURE.

ADDITIONALLY, IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE VIETNAM WAR, ARRS FORCES, IN PARTICULAR PARARESCUEMEN, HAVE BEEN EXERCISED PRIMARILY IN THE PEACETIME SAR EFFORT. BECAUSE OF YOUR DESIRE TO DO THE BEST JOB POSSIBLE, AND BECAUSE PEACETIME SAR IS CURRENTLY WHERE THE ACTION IS, WE HAVE DIRECTED MUCH OF OUR TRAINING TOWARD THIS END. RESULTS OF A RECENT IG INSPECTION INDICATE THAT WE MAY HAVE PLACED COMBAT SAR TRAINING IN A SECONDARY ROLE. EMPHASIS ON PEACETIME SAR,

COMBINED WITH OUR COMBAT SAR TRAINING, IS TAXING THE PARARESCUE FORCES TO THE POINT THAT WE MUST READDRESS OUR EFFORTS TO INSURE THAT PRIORITIES ARE GIVEN TO THE COMBAT ROLE.

WITH THIS IN MIND, LET ME DISCUSS THE PARARESCUE COMBAT ROLE. AS I STATED EARLIER, THE SEA TYPE RESCUE SCENARIO IS NOT PRESENTLY A VIABLE CONCEPT DUE TO THE HAND-HELD IR THREAT. IN CASES WHERE THE SURVIVOR IS DOWN IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, HE MAY HAVE TO E AND E TO AN APPROPRIATE AREA WHERE RESCUE CAN BE EFFECTED. IF THE SURVIVOR IS INJURED OR UNAWARE OF THE PICKUP COORDINATES, IT WILL BE THE PARARESCUEMAN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO LOCATE THE SURVIVOR AND PROVIDE ESCORT OR TRANSPORT HIM TO THE DESIRED LOCATION. THE PARARESCUEMAN WILL BE DEPLOYED BY ANY MEANS AVAILABLE WHERE HE WILL E AND E TO THE DESIGNATED AREA AND CONTACT THE SURVIVOR AND SHEPHERD HIM TO A SAFE AREA FOR PICKUP. WHILE BEING AIRLIFTED INTO AND OUT OF THESE AREAS, THE PARARESCUEMAN WILL PERFORM NORMAL AIRCREW DUTIES.

AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE PARARESCUEMAN WILL BE TO PROVIDE OPEN SEA RESCUE OF DOWNED AIRCREW MEMBERS. THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE RESCUE OF TRANSOCEANIC AIRCRAFT FERRY CREWS, AS WELL AS AIRCREWS DOWNED OFF THE COAST OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS KOREA, WHERE HOSTILITIES MAY BE OCCURRING.

BASED ON THIS CHARTER, I TASK THIS PARARESCUE COMBAT READINESS CONFERENCE TO PROVIDE TO ME INPUTS OF ALL TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. THE FOLLOWING AREAS WILL BE STRESSED:

A.. MEDICAL: YOU MUST NOT ONLY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE SURVIVOR WITH TEMPORARY MEDICAL TREATMENT BUT ALSO SUSTAIN HIM FOR SEVERAL DAYS WHILE TRANSPORTING THE PATIENT TO THE PICKUP AREA. EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON FIELD MEDICINE.

B. E AND E: THIS TRAINING WILL STRESS NAVIGATION USING A MAP AND COMPASS TO CROSS VARIOUS TYPES OF TERRAIN UNDER A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT.

C. RUGGED TERRAIN EVACUATION: PARARESCUEMEN NEED TO BE CAPABLE OF EVACUATING SURVIVORS FROM RUGGED TERRAIN, AS WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OR KOREA.

D. WEAPONRY: YOU WILL MAINTAIN CURRENCY ON UNIT AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, AS WELL AS THE AR-16 AND 38 REVOLVER.

E. STATIC LINE JUMPING: THIS WILL INCLUDE BOTH DAY/NIGHT LAND AND SEA.

F. COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS: TO INCLUDE VECTORING AND USE OF CODE.

ADDITIONALLY, A NUMBER OF OUR PARARESCUE FORCE MUST BE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

A. HALO AND POP-UP CARP. HALO WOULD EMPHASIZE MAXIMUM "TRACKING" CAPABILITY.

B. SNOW AND ICE RESCUE.

THE PRIME FACTORS THAT WILL BE CONSIDERED AS YOU DEVELOP INDIVIDUAL UNIT TRAINING AND PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS WILL BE THAT UNIT'S LOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT AREA. IT SHOULD BE APPARENT THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE RESCUE SUPPORT FOR ALL POSSIBLE SCENARIOS BUT MUST DIRECT OUR TRAINING TOWARD THOSE AREAS THAT WILL BE MOST PRODUCTIVE.

IN CLOSING, I AGAIN WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT MUST BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR COMBAT ROLE. OUR PEACETIME SAR MUST AND WILL BE REGULATED TO A SECONDARY POSITION.

INITIAL PARARESCUE COMBAT SAR READINESS
CONFERENCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A highly trained/qualified pararescue force, capable of penetrating the high threat areas associated with our combat contingencies, is mandatory to allow ARRS to effect the combat mission. Training for this mission must develop the unique ability to maintain a strong sense of purpose under conditions of stress associated with the combat environment. Additionally, a totally flexible approach of all rescue aircraft in the employment of the pararescue force must be maintained.

2. Initial recommendations of the Pararescue Conference are presented in the following order:

a. Combat role of pararescue

b. Pararescue mission on:

(1) LL helo

(2) HL helo

(3) Fixed wing aircraft

c. Requirements of pararescue to achieve and maintain combat readiness.

d. Requirements to maintain a humanitarian/peacetime capability.

The following factors must be evaluated to meet combat requirements.

PROBLEM

The Reserve/ANG force is not being fully utilized in a manner that will compliment a combat contingency.

DISCUSSION

The AFRES/ANG units now work as a unit and perform support for the active force as a separate element. This does not fully allow them the opportunity to integrate into the normal, active duty force structure. In a combat contingency, speed into action and ability to rapidly mold into the active force are vital to the success of total force integration.

Problem: The current fixed wing role in combat rescue does not provide for use of the HC-130 in aircraft recovery of survivors/ pararescuemen.

Discussion: The SEA conflict scenario places the HC-130 in a role of command and control along with that of air refueling. A combat environment presents the potential for forward site extraction of land rescue teams and/or seriously injured survivors. It also alludes to extraction by unconventional means from a pre-determined safe haven. The role of the HC-130 should explore the possibility of short field remote area landings to evacuate injured personnel. The fulton recovery system should be reevaluated for its combat potential to effect a recovery from unprepared areas. This concept has been successfully employed by other commands which continue to use this system.

Recommendation: The HC-130 role in combat rescue should be expanded to include at least the following:

1. Fulton Recovery - The aircraft now in use by other commands have the capability to effect a Fulton Recovery. It is conceivable that rescue could inherit this role and provide total rescue capability. A pararescue team could be trained to gain access to a safe haven, intel provide safe route for aircraft, and a fulton extraction be made.

2. Air Evacuation from Remote Site - The HC-130 crew should be fully qualified to make short field landings/ takeoffs to provide rescue capability from forward sites.

DOJ (Lt Col Campbell, 4651)

23 June 1976

PJ Combat Readiness Conference
(Your Memo, 23 Jan 76)

DOQ/SMSGt Fernandez

1. The following comments are provided concerning the initial findings and recommendations of subject conference:

a. Problem - The current fixed wing role in combat rescue does not provide for use of the HC-130 in aircraft recovery of survivors.

1) Fulton Recovery - Concur in part. Agree that this method of extraction would provide a means of recovery; however, the system has not been tested on an injured individual. Percentages of injury or shock were high in SEA bailouts, so, if individuals were then exposed to rigors of Fulton Recovery, we would certainly need to speed the patient to a medical facility.

2) Air Evacuation from Remote Site: Concur in full. HC-130's however are not equipped to penetrate the sophisticated enemy environment we would find in most areas. Until they are, or until we can insure that we will have air superiority, we might be unnecessarily exposing these forces.

b. Problem - The ARRS fixed wing aircraft is not being used to its fullest capability in a combat rescue role.

1) Concur that role of HC-130 could be expanded for combat.

2) Do not fully concur that peacetime training is burdensome and that a realignment of priorities is needed. Unless we are involved in combat operations, 100% of our missions are in support of peacetime SAR. Since combat does not occur often, we must insure that we can fully support our secondary mission. ~~We cannot justify the size and composition of our forces on combat.~~ While I realize that combat SAR is our primary mission, along with weather RECON, I also realize that the mission we are accomplishing today is the important thing, as much as the mission we might perform next week. Instead of realigning priorities, perhaps we should expand our combat SAR training. This has been the objective of the Contingency/Exercise Division since mid-1975.

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3) Do not concur with using HALO procedures in sophisticated enemy environment. HC-130 can be seen with radar and is well within enemy AAA and SAM range. Pop up CARP has potential if ARRS fixed wing aircraft has capability to penetrate the enemy environment at low altitude.

c. Problem - New specialized tactics need to be employed in support of combat pararescue ground operations. Concur in full.

d. Problem - Small teams should normally be used in combat operations. Concur; however, number comprising what we consider to be a small team should be held in abeyance pending further study. "Small" could be 25 PJ's.

e. Problem - The current method of deploying equipment from fixed wing aircraft is unacceptable in a combat environment. Concur in full if ARRS aircraft are to be used. This might better be done by tactical C-130 or at best by using their procedures.

f. Problem - A combat mission is not clearly defined for pararescue in LLH nor for the LLH itself. Concur in part. I think a ROC is in being to update combat capability of LLH but am unsure of its priority. Concur with recommendation to pursue authorization of 2 PJ's per H-1 during combat.

g. Problem - Some circumstances of a combat environment may prohibit the utilization of aircraft to affect a rescue from behind enemy lines. Do not concur. We're bordering on Army UW (E&E) activities which they guard very closely. If we can get the mission - fine, but don't feel they'll let it go. Other approach is to join their effort - Augment it.

h. Problem - AFM 39-1 - Pararescue job description must be updated to define the pararescue combat role. Concur in full.

i. Problem - The Reserve/ANG force is not being used in a manner that will compliment a combat contingency. Do not concur. This is totally inaccurate. Reserve units have played in exercises for the past year in preparing them for the integration with active forces. So far no major problems have arisen. This is the main objective of the Total Force Program which we fully support. ANG forces will begin exercises with active forces as soon as they are capable - even before they are fully operational. It must be remembered that Reserve and ANG units will probably not be mobilized on small contingencies, but most likely on those bordering on major conflict.

2. All recommendations must be fully staffed before a firm course of action is taken.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bruce M. Purvine". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

BRUCE M. PURVINE, Lt Col, USAF
Director, Tactical Operations