

K318. 222-3F

3 APRR/JRCC

JOKER LOG BOOK PR 75

10/0840Z	JH	Any more on any SAR's or Medevacs pass crew duty start times AND EXPIRATION time to 41st. 16 km for King, 12 hrs for Jolies & Pedro.
10/0845	BJ	CAPT JONES ON DUTY / CAPT PSOTA OFF
10/1655	CE	Capt Jones off duty, Capt E Thredge on duty. EAGLE PULL INITIATED
10/1855 EP	CE	Lt Col Trapp call saying he had received a call instituting an "Eagle Pull recall". He asked me to check with Warlock. They had nothing. Lt Col Trapp then said the call came from B/C. I checked with B/C (Capt Hess) and he said he had called Lt Col Trapp and wanted him to come to B/C. No unit recall was instituted.
10/1926 EP	CE	Maj. Dupre can be reached at Hanger #9, Phone 3740.
10/1932 EP 0232Z	CE	Lt Col Trapp wants Lt Col Forrester and Maj. Raymond to go to B/C. Maj. Raymond is to pick up Eagle Pull package. Forrester and Raymond WX.
10/2005 EP 0305Z	BB	COL TRAPP HAS NX COL HALL TO WAKE UP HIS TROOPS ABOUT 2050Z AND ^{FOR HIM} TO REPORT TO JOKER WHEN POSSIBLE - TROOPS TO BE KEPT ON A LOW KEY POSTURE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.
10/2019 EP	CE	Lt Col Trapp says relax. Have Lt Col Hall call when he arrives.
10/2035 EP	BB	SPOKE TO JOF (CAPT. SHEFFIELD) - HE GAVE EXT 2561 TO REACH HIM - TOLD HIM TO HOLD FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE TAKING FURTHER ACTION
10/2040 EP	BB	DELAYED ENTRY - Lt Col Hall alerted his troops APP 2020Z for an early breakfast and preparations for a possible 0430Z GO.

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(1845Z)

10/2045	BB	"R" HOUR EST OFFS FOR PRE DEPLOYMENT
EP		
10/2050	BB	FIRST JG LAUNCH 0545Z (2245Z)
EP		
10/2051	BB	ADVISED BY COL ANDERS THAT SG SOW FLOW PLAN WOULD GO AS WRITTEN
EP		
10/2052	BB	REQUESTED INFO ON KORAT LAUNCHES - WAS TOLD TO ALERT CREW AND HAVE THEM STAND BY FOR FURTHER INFO.
EP		
10/2058	BB	CONTACTED SGT LITTLE/KORAT - HE INFORMED US CREWS HAD BEEN ALERTED; WOULD GIVE US A CALL WHEN THEY REACH ALERT FACILITY
EP		
10/2106	BB	ESTABLISH MRS RAYMOND TIMES IN FLOW PLAN WILL BE 35 MINS LATER THAN PUBLISHED AS FLOW PLAN SET TO 0102Z R HR
EP		
10/2111	BB	SPOKE CAPT GILBERT/KORAT JG - ADVISED HIM TO PREPARE TO GO FOR STANDING BY FOR WORD FROM US.
EP		
10/2112	BB	NOTIFICATION REQ NOT WITH MRS RAYMOND TO LOAD 1 ST TWO JGS
EP		
10/2114	BB	MRS RAYMOND SAID GO WITH LAST PLAN, TO GO TO FOL
EP		
10/2115	BB	DELETED ENTRY - NCTMO CALLED 2110Z TO PX RADIO MX STANDBY TO RUN PM1 ON RADIOS
EP		
10/2120	BB	ADV MRS RAYMOND MSG ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AT KRT - LAUNCH NECESSARY
EP		
10/2121	BB	DELETED ENTRY - C 130 OFF NKP AT 2119Z
EP		
10/2123	BB	TAPL #35 ON; PAPER MARK IN TAPL 2123Z #36 ON DECK.
EP		
10/2125	BB	CALL SIGNS C 130s KLONG 914 OFF 2121Z KLONG 915 OFF 2128Z KLONG 913 OFF 2140Z
EP		
10/2132	BB	RECEIVED PERMISSION LAUNCH ALERT BIRDS KORAT; NX LT MASON 2133Z TO LAUNCH
EP		

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10/2134 EP	BB	RE CONFIRMED WITH LT MASON AUTHORITY TO LAUNCH KORAT JGS
10/2137 EP	BB	REQUEST MOVE LAUNCH ^{NHS} AT 2230Z TO ATTEMPT AND BRING 12 HOUR CLOSER TO ORIGINAL PLAN, WITH MRS RAYMOND
10/2140 EP	BB	COLINGRAM/B/C APPROVES 15 MIN EARLY LAUNCH ATT; NX COL HALL
10/2150 EP	BB	NX COL GENM2 OF JG/KORAT SCRAMBLE - TOLD HIM TO STAND READY - "HANG LOOSE" BUT TAKE NO ACTION ATT
10/2153 EP	BB	JG-62 OFF ATT; NX B/C - PASSED BY MILDEW
10/2206 EP	BB	JG-62 PASSED TO MILDEW OFF AT 2152Z; JG-71 ETD APP 3 MINS. - 62 ETD ^{APP} 2300Z
10/2208 EP	BB	CALLED TACTICAL FLT PLNS INTO B/SE OPS ATT
10/2211 EP	BB	PRESSED WAVE 4197 TO MRS RAYMOND ATT
10/2215 EP	BB	JG-71 HAS <u>NOT</u> TAXIED ATT - PARKING BRAKES ON ACFT LOCKED - NO ETC ATT - PER SGT SWEET /MILDEW - NX B/C, 40th
10/2223 EP	BB	JG-71 - 2 CASES OF HYDRAULIC FLUID, 2 CASES OF T.F.O.S 2 TOOL BOXES, 6 POB - PER MILDEW - PASSED TO 40th
10/2224 EP	BB	ACFT POB: 793-10 POB; 786-6 POB; 785-15 POB; 794-19 POB; 364-19 POB; 792-6 POB; 784-6 POB
10/2225 EP	BB	FIRST FLT OF JGS OFF AT 2223Z; NX B/C, 40th ETD 2353Z
10/2229 EP	BB	CAPT BUCKLEY, 40 MX, ADVISED JG-71 TO HOVER & DEPART KRT WITH LOCKED BRAKES; MX CAN REPAIR ACFT AT UBON.

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10/2230	BB	JG 71 OFF ATT; PER MILDEN
EP		
10/2234	BB	RECOMMEND 2nd WAVE JG LAUNCH AT 2315Z
EP		TO ADJUST TO SCHEDULE; NX B/C; SOF
10/2235	BB	RADIO CHECK ATT; Y-SBY; HA-SBY
EP		
10/2239	BB	JG 71 REPORTS A-1 ATT, OFF AT 2230Z
EP		
10/2256	BB	JG 63 REPORTS 28 MALFUNCTION - REQUESTS
EP		ASSISTANCE AT UBON
10/2302	BB	JG 60 CRANKING UP, WILL ATTEMPT ECF - IF
EP		SUCCESSFUL, WILL PROCEED TO UBON; PER 40 MX
10/2304	BB	B/C REQUESTS COL OEHME CALL B/C ON SECURE ATT
EP		
10/2308	BB	JG 52 AND JG 66 OFF AT <u>2303Z</u> ETA ^{0013Z} NX B/C
EP		PLS NX UBON
10/2325	BB	QUESTION INVOLVING CLASSIFICATION OF RS MESSAGES
EP		BROUGHT UP BY COL TRAPP - CHECKING UP ON IT - ^{MAY CLASSIFY} FUTURE MSGS
10/2325	BB	^{DELAYED ENTRY} CALLED COL BLOCK/4 th HE HAS RECEIVED 2 RS 1's - TOLD
EP		HIM JGS LAUNCHED TO FOL; AT 2328Z - KET LAND
		AND AWAIT FURTHER WORD - SO ON ALL R STATUS AT KORAT
10/2335	BB	JG 62 IN PATTERN FOR UBON ATT; PER MAJ DUPE
EP		
10/2338	BB	^{DELAYED ENTRY} - CLARIL REPORTED 60219 ETIC
EP		0400Z THAT (AT 2250Z)
10/2340	BB	^{SECURE} 41 st PACAF COMMAND CENTER 6275 / JRCC ^{SECURE} 6259
EP		COL HARRINGTON TO SPEAK TO COL TRAPP
10/2348	BB	^{DELAYED ENTRY} - SANDIES COCKED BACK ON AT 2330Z
		30-5F
10/2349	BB	HC PRIMARY FREQ ATT
EP		
10/2350	BB	JG 62 DOWN UBON 2335 / 1.7 / 1/A-1
EP		JG 32 DOWN UBON 2350 / 1.5 / 1/A-1
		J 63 DOWN UBON 2351 / 1.5 / 1/A-1
		J 30 DOWN UBON 2350 / 1.5 / 1/A-1
10/2359	BB	LOG CLOSED ATT

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11/0001	BB	LOG OPENED
11/0010 EP	BB	DETERMINED THAT FUTURE SERIES OF RS MSGS WOULD BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL TO PRECLUDE A SECURITY VIOLATION.
11/0025 EP	BB	COL MCGHEE, ARS DC, BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION - SECURE LINE MACCP SCOTT; DROP/02-03
11/0032 EP	BB	²⁴⁵¹ EXT 2815 - URBON FOL
11/0035	BB	COL TUCKER/USSAG-LG/ROAS PASSED CURRENT MX STATUS
11/0039 EP	BB	DELATED ENTRY - SPOKE COL PENNELL 0025Z AND WAS TOLD SECOND WAVE ARRIVED 2350-0015Z, AND ONE JG HAD AN INTERPHONE PROBLEM - PASSED TO B/C - AWAITING CALL MAJ DUPRE.
11/0045 EP	BB	JG 52 DOWN URBON 0035 / 1.5 / A-1 JG 66 DOWN URBON 0030 / 1.5 / A-1 JG 71 DOWN URBON 2355 / 1.4 / A-1 B/C NX; 40 NX - MAJ DUPRE SAID ATT <u>NO</u> JG HAS ANY MX PROBLEM
11/0107 EP	BB	CHECKED INTO WHETHER POSSIBLE UTILIZATION OF CLARK AFB MAY OCCUR - MAJ RAYMOND SAID COL TRAPP HAD TOLD COL HARRINGTON NO UTILIZATION APPEARED NECESSARY ATT
11/0140 EP	D	Tape #36 on 2 HOURS TAPED Ho ⁴ Notified of Landing Times.
11/0200	RM	NOTIFIED TEL. MANTH THAT LITAPAO H.L. IS OUT OF COMMISSION ie. CONTIN. RING.
11/0210 EP	RM	B/C FRAG SHOP #15 ^{EXT} 3488
11/0241	RM	DET 5 WILL FLY MEDCAP AND BDF AT 0615Z + 1300Z RESPECTIVELY.

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11/0310	RM	ACFT 219 WILL BE DEPARTING CLARK APPROX 0430Z
11/0340	RA	JG-60 ETIC 0704Z PASSED TO B/C
11/0630	RM	DETS EX. MAINT. PROBLEMS MEDCAP & BDF POSTPONED TILL FURTHER NOTICE.
11/0730	RM	DETS NOTIFIED US THAT P-34 AIRBOURNE ON MEDCAP 0730. 41ST JRCC NOTIFIED
11/0845	RB	CAPT PSOTA ON DUTY / MAJ DAVIS OFF
11/0900	RB	FLASH MESS ON EP RECEIVED. ULTRAP EP L/C FORRESTER & MAJ. RAYMOND NIX.
11/0925	RA	ACFT 219 DEPARTED CLK 0850Z ETC 5+30.
11/1150	RA	Pedro 34 down AT 1130Z from MEDCAP mission. Pedro 33 off Alert due to DSAS problems Pedro 34 on ALERT, ALSO P-34 WILL FLY BDF 1300Z. 41st Sgt Hughes notified
11/1249	RB	P-34 off ON BDF AT 1245Z for 1.5 41st Sgt Hughes
12/1255	RB	COL MAGEE CALLED ON OUR STATUS ON EP E.P. HAT UBON. RELAYED STATUS OF ALL AIRCRAFT.
11/1430Z	RA	P-34 down from BDF AT 1415Z. 41st Not.
11/1700	CV	CAPT ETHRIDGE AIC VANWORTH ON DUTY
11/1715	CV	NOTIFIED BY COMM CENTER OF SECRET FLASH EP AT COMM CENTER. ALL WHO CAN ^(SIGN) ACCOUNT FOR MESSAGE ARE IN CREW REST OR GONE SOUTH. SDF WAS NOT ON LIST. SGT HERRON NOTIFIED TO PICK UP MESSAGE.

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11/1830 EP	CV	CAPT ETHRIDGE CALLED CAPT MURPHY J2 BLUE CHIP AND HAD HIM ADD THE 3R TO THE INTEL MESSAGES WHICH HAVE BE COMING OUT.
11/1910 EP	CV	COL HARRINGTON CALLED FROM SCOTT FOR COL TRAPP ASKING IF WE NEEDED ANY C-130 AID COL T. SAID NO. COL H. INTERPER. FRAG THINK WE WOULD NEED HELP COL T. STATED AGAIN NO. COL H. ASKED CAPT ETHRIDGE WHAT LTC MENT CONSIGNING J.G. CAPT E STATED HE WOULD FIND OUT AND CALL BACK.
DEL. ENT. 11/1845 EP	CV	MAJ. CAMPBELL MAC CP CALLED WANTING THE MOST CURRENT INFO FOR E.P. FOR BRIEF FOR MAC.
11/2030 EP	CV	CAPT ETHRIDGE STATES THAT HE CALLED MAJ. RAYMOND FOR HIS W/A wakeup.
11/2250 EP	CV	NOTIFIED BY BLUE CHIP MAJ RAYMOND THAT EVERYTHING IN RELATIONSHIP TO E.P GOES IN INSECURE AS OF 0200Z.
11/2310	CV	NCMO NOTIFIED THAT UNIFORM FREQ. WAS OUT.
11/2320	CV	SANDYS COCKED 0230Z.
11/2330 EP	CV	FIRST EP LAUNCH FOR PP K 21-2309 ET 016 Pt K 22-2311 ET AREQ Kings OF AND ESTIM. TIME ON STATION.
11/3235 EP	CV	JOLLY HOLD PT MOVED TO 8020 NOTIFIED URBON / NOTIFIED KORAT FOR 3AA AREQ Southern Pt. Reful Track is moved TO 1220N-10445E ALSO PASSED TO M3J Dupree URBON.

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11/2357	CV	SGT CLEAR PASSED THE NEW
EP		POSITION TO K21-K22 AFTER THE
		SECOND RE FUELING. THEY ARE TO
		MOVE TO THE SOUTHERN MOST PART OF
		TRACK.
11/2358		11 FLT OFF AT 2352Z.
EP		
12 APRIL		
12/0001	CV	MAJ DUPREE STATED THAT THE NEW
EP		HOLD PT HAD BEEN PASSED TO THE J.G.'S
12/0015	CV	17-1 ETA THE FENCE ^{FENCE} AT 0023. (J.G.)
EP		
12/0020	CV	K-21 on orbit at 00 ¹⁵ 20 . FLT 180
EP		BINGO 0015
12/0021	CV	K-22 on Station 2355Z. K BINGO 1030
EP		9 SOULS ON BOARD.
12/0025	CV	K-21 BINGO 1015 11 SOULS ON BOARD -
EP		K-22 1111 1000
12/0028	CV	WEATHER CLEAR - SLIGHT HAZE VIS - 5-7 MILES.
EP		REPORT K-21
12/0030	CV	CAPT. ETH. PASSED TO CAPT FAGAN AT UBON
EP		TO PASS TO MAJ Dupree, to change the J.G.
		CALL SIGNS TO PER PER MESSAGE 11/0421Z.
12/0035	CV	QUIRED FROM BLUE CHIP ABOUT AFT Gun
EP		ON JOLLY. - GUNS ARE MOUNTED.
12/0039	CV	K-21 REQUESTING INTEL ON SECTOR A.
EP		INTEL NOTIFIED.
12/0040	CV	K-22 IN TRAIL WITH K K22 ATT.
EP		FOR FUEL

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12/0040 EP	CV	Question from P.C. - ARE OF TIMES being passed to CRICKET? K-21 ANSWERED YES.
12/0041 EP	CV	NAIL - 01 SECTOR B → ^{ETA} 0130 BINGO 0830 2. POB
12/0046 EP	CV	K-21 - JOKER PASSED MESSAGE NO ADD INTEL
12/0048 EP	CV	SPECTER 51-52 - 0130 → ESTIMATED TIME IN WORKING AREA.
12/0050 EP	CV	████ → Col Mgee. Mac HQ. CALLED CAPT ETHRIDGE PASSED THE ACFT FLYING, TALKED AL TO LICKAMHOOT AND CAPT RUCHANAN.
12/0055 EP INTEL	CV	INTEL ADVISES THAT THE TACAN CAN POSSIBLY be USED FOR NAV. ASSIST IF NEEDED. It may be unmonitored use. EXTREME CAUTION.
12/0102 EP	CV	1-7 FIRST TWO J.G. FUELED ATT.
12/0105 EP	CV	VISUAL CONFORM. FROM WSON THAT ALL ^{Helicopter} FLTS. ARE AIRBORN. 1050Z.
12/0106 EP	CV	FLT. 1-7 FULLY REFUELED - ESTIMATE ²⁸ ORBIT POINT AT 0128
12/0100 EP	CV	2ND J.G. FLT OFF AT 0100 K22 BINGO 0830 Z.
12/0115 EP	CV	1-1 / 0145 ARE DUE AT THERE HOLD PT. AT. 1-2 / 0200
02/0117 EP	CV	K-21 STATES KNIFE 1-5 OFF 0045Z KN. 1-6 0055Z.
12/0125 EP	CV	BINGO TIME FOR 1-7 0225
12/0130 EP	CV	0125 SPACE 1-1 AT EST. OSCAR 0135 - 30 SOULS ON 3 ACFT 90 TOTAL

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12/0130 EP	CV	SPACE 1-1 IS AT POINT OSCAR ATT. BINGO TIME 0230
12/0135 EP	CV	1-7 AT HOLD POINT ^{ATT.} 0132. 1-7
12/0137 EP	CV	SPACE 1-2 EST OSCAR. 0200
12/0140 EP	CV	KING 21 IS IN CONTACT WITH 1-8 ATT.
12/0148 EP	CV	AT 0145 J.G. 1-7 egressed ^{? check.} NORTHERN PART OF CITY CATCHING GROUND Ground Fire. NO HITS ON JG's
12/0150 EP	CV	Ground Fire coming from North SIDE OF RIVER
12/0153 EP	CV	1-2 ESTM. OSCAR. 0210
12/0158 EP	CV	1-1 ON HOTEL ATT - 0150 ^{CV}
12/0157 EP	CV	1-2-1 HOLDING AT Pt. OSCAR ATT GSF ON BOARD.
12/0158 EP	CV	1-1 OF HOTEL EXPECT HOLDING PT AT 0205.
12/0201 EP	CV	1-3 ETA OSCAR 0210 90 GSF ON BOARD ACFT.
12/0204 EP	CV	1-3 AT OSCAR ATT.
12/0210 EP	CV	REFUELING WITH 1-8 COMPLETED ATT.
12/0211	CV	FLT 1-2 CLEARED TO LZ. ATT.

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12/0215	CV	FLT 01-4 DUE OSCAR 0225
EP		
12/0218	CV	K22 IS PROCEEDING TO NEW ORBIT ^{POINT} TIME
EP		REFUELING FINISHED ATT
12/0220	CV	^{SPACE} 0221 1-2 ON GROUND H ZONE ATT
EP		
12/0221	CV	1-4 AT OSCAR AT 0221, BINGO AT 0325
EP		
12/0222	CV	K-22 is briefing 1-7 ATT.
EP		
12/0225	CV	1-1 IS GOING OVER TO CRICKET.
EP	CV	123 PEOPLE OUT ON FIRST PULL.
12/0228	CV	0229 1-5 ETA MIKE 0230
12/0229	CV	TAPE ENDED NEW TAPE 38
EP		39 ON BOTTOM.
12/0232	CV	1-9 IS AT 30 MILE RAD: ATT.
EP		
12/0236	CV	SECOND WAVE IS IN OUT ATT.
EP		FIRST 2. 68 FOR PEOPLE TOTAL.
12/0240	CV	13-1 ON THE WAY INTO THE LZ ATT.
EP		
12/0242	CV	1-10 IS approaching 30 MILE AREA
EP		
12/0245	CV	12-1 + 2 heading For LPH. 0335
EP		
12/0248	CV	13-1 on HOTEL AT 0247Z
EP		
12/0249	CV	1-8 AT 5 MILES OUTSIDE Holding Pt.
EP		
12/0251	CV	NOTIFIED 56 TRAJ SPRING TO LAUNCH K-23
EP		
12/0255	CV	K-23 IS TO RELIEF 1-8 WHEN K-23 AOS.
EP		
12/0258	CV	¹⁻³ 3-1 BINGO AT 0430 (AT HOLDING POINT "M" ^{PRESENTLY})
EP		

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12/0300	RA	1-4 IN LZ" 1-3 IS OUT,
EP		
12/0301	RA	SPACE K23 AT BINGO EXT TO 0315
EP		
12/0303	RA	1-9 & 1-10 HOLDING AT "0"
EP		
12/0305	RA	1-3-2 BINGO - RTB
EP		
12/0310	RA	1-10 BINGO 0555
EP		
12/0311	RA	1-3 OFF 0247 NO ETA AT THIS TIME
EP		
12/0312	RA	1-9 & 1-10 AT HOLDING POINT
EP		1-7-3 MAIN GEAR BOX ^{chip} ELIMINATED RTB ATT
12/0314	RA	K-23 OF AT 0313,
EP		
12/0315	RA	4. McMonigle REQUESTED JG-60 REPLACE ^{CE should be JG-30} JG-63 AS
EP		1-7-3.
12/0317	RA	1-41 HAS CODE 2 ON BOARD 1-4-7 HAS CODE 6.
EP		
12/0319	RA	K-23 K-23 ^{K22} ON AT SOUTH END OF REFUELING TRACK
EP		
12/0321	RA	MAIL-59 ESCORTING 1-7-3-JG60.
EP		
12/0322	RA	JG-62 REPLACE ^{JG-30} JG-60 AS 1-7-3
EP		
12/0325	RA	K-23 ON REFUELING TRACK IN 45 MIN.
EP		
12/0332	RA	1-10 LIFTING OFF OF LZ. ATT
EP		
12/0335	RA	PALADIN PLUG HOLE FOR FROM FROM K-23 - A P/F-11 /code 6
EP		YF14.
12/0337	RA	G2 OFF LBN AT 0334Z, GO DOWN 0317Z
EP		
12/0340	RA	1-9 OFF LZ 9-1 30 PERSON 9-2 30 per 9-3 28 per
EP		+2 NON-COMBATONS, ETA 0425Z

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12/0345 EP	RT.	1-10 ETA 0430Z
12/0350 EP	RT.	1-7-3 ETA CHN 93 0400 0356
12/0351 EP	RT.	K-23 GIVING 1-8 MARGINAL TOP-OFF ATT
12/0352 EP	RT.	"H" IS PICKING UP ROCKETS ATT NO HITS 1-10-3 STILL IN AREA. ATT.
12/0352 EP	RT.	INVERT ADVISES 1-7-3 IN AREA HAS NOT DECLARED EMERG.
12/0355 EP	RT.	1-5 RTB DID NOT PIX UP PAX.
12/0357 EP	RT.	1-11 & 1-12 IN AREA OF K-21
12/0400 EP	RT.	1-10 ^{ALL GSF} DEPARTED AREA WITH PAX ETA 0425Z.
12/0402 EP	RT.	11-1 & 12-1 GOING INTO "LZ" SHORTLY.
12/0405 EP	RT.	APPROX 17 GSF LZ ATT.
12/0407 EP	RT.	1-7 INBOUND TO "H" FLT OF TWO JOLLIES NOTIFIED B/C
12/0413 EP	RT.	^{should be 30} JG-63 ON FINAL ATT (INVERT)
12/0414 EP	RT.	K-22 DEPART STATION 0412Z ETA CHAN 121 0454.
12/0417 EP	RT.	1-7 picked-up 15 pax ALL GSF.
12/0420 EP	RT.	ALL PERSON'S PICKED UP AT THIS TIME
12/0423 EP	RT.	1-6 RTB 0615Z 3-1 RTB 0625Z.
12/0425 RP	RT.	1-8 HOLDING AT POINT "M"
12/0432 EP	RT.	JG-62 & 71 WILL GO BACK TO KRT ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT THAT SAW RTB N.K.P. WILL (FROM L/CTRAPP)
12/0440 EP	RT.	CHANGE - ALL AIRCRAFT RTB LIBON. (FROM L/CTRAPP)

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12/0441 EP	200	TOTAL NO. OF EVACUATED PERSONS IS 349 NOT INCLUDING GSF. TO B/C. Authon/MAJ GL CATES USMC
12/0450 EP	200	K-21 RTB ATT.
12/0459 EP	200	PASSED TO 41 ST HOMELINE ON JG 30. ALL AIRCRAFT RTB ATT. NO AIRCRAFT REPORTED DAMAGE. JOLLY GREENS WERE FIRST AIRCRAFT IN AND LAST AIRCRAFT OUT. OI STORY WILL FOLLOW.
12/0510 EP	200	(DELAYED ENTRY) AT 0150Z JG-32 INSERTED CCT.
12/0515 EP	200	(DELAYED ENTRY) PASSED TO COL. MCGEE AT 0150 TO 0200 - SECURE, JG'S 32, 30, 63 OFF AT 2352Z. JG'S 52, 71, 66 OFF AT 0100Z. WILL INSERT CCT AT 0200Z. AB SAR ALERT APPROX 25NM NORTH PHNOM PENH. JG 60, 62 GROUND SAR ALERT AT URBON.
12/0515 EP	200	K-21 TO B/C, OPREP-7 THE CORRECT EVAC. FIGURES FOR OPREP-6 IS 258 VISE 349, FIGURES ARE TENTATIVE AS ALL EVAC'S DID NOT HAVE TAGS SUSPECT ACTUAL FIGURES ARE SLIGHTLY HIGHER.
12/0535 EP	200	JG-52 ¹⁰⁰ REPORT SLIGHT VIBRATIONS, 62 MILES SOUTH OF CAN 93. PASSED TO B/C & 40 TH PROBLEM SEEM'S TO BE TAIL ROTAR. 1-8-2 WILL ESCORT HIM IN. HOMELINE TO 41 ST 0550Z.
12/0556 EP	200	PASSED TO K-21 BEST AREA FOR JG TO SET DOWN LONG. 104.40 ON WEST SIDE. K-21 RELAYS JG-52 BELIEVE'S HE CAN MAKE URBON.
12/0604 EP	200	JG-52 ETA 0610Z.
12/0615 EP	200	JG-52 DOWN URBON 0610Z.

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12/0700 EP	D	Confirmed by Backlund that he took a small caliber .30 ⁰ hit approaching the landing zone (Hotel) no damage except small hole in sheet metal. Right side, just forward of ramp hinge. J.G. will RON U BON.
12/0725 EP	D	Message 12/0700 passed as Hotline to 4/05 TRCC
12/0745	RAA	WARLOCK NOTIFIED TO SEND OPREP-3 PINNACLE (SEE LOG ITEM 12/0700)
12/0845	RB	CAPT PsoTA ON DUTY / MAJ DAVIS OFF.
12/1335	RB	COL LATAMIER FROM RESCUE Comm. POST CALLED. REQUESTED MESSAGE BE SENT DECLASSIFYING RS MESS. TOLD HIM MESS. ALREADY SENT. HE ADVISED IF WE HAD TO SEND MORE CLASS. RS MESS. TO ROUTE THEM TO RUC PAAB.
12/1700	CE	Capt PsoTa OFF duty; Capt Ethredge ON duty
12/2155	CE	Maj Tarbet, Buffalo Hunter, requests a JG to aid in p/k of drone at 172/56 off channel 89. Has been there since yesterday. Request rendezvous at 0100Z, JG will act as cover and p/k ground personnel; 7 Thai guards, 2 USAF, Maj Tarbet and Sgt Watch.
12/2215	CE	L/c Hall NX of request. JG 52 is departing at 0000Z for NKP and can be used. He will call back.
12/2220	CE	Ground party will be on 282.8 HF, VHF, freqs given to Buffalo Hunter. They will depart here at 2330Z in workshop 22. Workshop 01 will be ground party call sign.
12/2221	CE	L/c Lanier (RC) NX of request.

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 3RD AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96310



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: CC

5 JAN 1983

DEC 15 1973

SUBJECT: Project CORONA HARVEST End-of-Tour Report (U)

TO: 3825 (HOA)
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112

The following End-of-Tour Report is submitted in support of project CORONA HARVEST and the USAF Historical Program.

Part A. (U) Biographical Information.

Name: Herbert R. Zehnder Rank: Colonel
Duty Stations in SEA: Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN
Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand
Job Title: Commander, 3ARRGp (MAC) Duty AFSC: E0000
Inclusive Tour Dates in SEA: 9 Jan 73 to 15 Dec 73
Current ZI Address: Vice Commander
39 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing (AW)
Eglin AFB, Fla 32542
Name and DEROS of Replacement: Col Richard F. Burdett
10 December 1974

AFSIRC MAXWELL AFB AL 36112	RETURN TO
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19 SEP 1980

SMC

Part B. (U) Resume of Duties and Activities:

Commander, 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, and 7th Air Force (7AF) Director of Rescue (DOR) from 9 January 1973 through 15 December 1973. Exercised operational control of all USAF Rescue units in South Vietnam and Thailand. As 7AF/DOR I was advisor to the Commander, 7AF, on all matters associated with Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Southeast Asia theater of operations.

Part C. (S) Brief Discussion of Major Tasks.

I. (U) As 3ARRGp Commander/7AF DOR, I accomplished the following major tasks:

- Provided the Commander, 7AF, advice on matters pertaining to SAR requirements and procedures.
- Exercised operational control of all Rescue forces in the Southeast Asia subregion in accordance with policies established by the Commander, 7AF, and/or Commander, 41ARRWg, (the next higher unit in ARRS chain of command).

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CLASSIFIED BY 7AF/DO
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1981

3-8478-A

NOTE: Eagle Pull was the evacuation of Cambodia. Frequent Wind was the evacuation of Saigon, Vietnam

d. (S) "EAGLE PULL"

(1) (S) By early April 1973, the military situation in the Khmer Republic had deteriorated to such a point that the protection and evacuation of U.S. non-combatants became a distinct possibility. Although the Secretary of State had overall responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens in the Khmer Republic, COMUSMACV/7AF had to be prepared to take appropriate actions to assist the Department of State in discharging this responsibility in the event imminent or actual hostilities made noncombatant status there untenable. USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060C (short title: EAGLE PULL) provided the required military support to assist the Department of State in the event NEMVAC (Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation) operations became necessary. In the event the enemy captured or otherwise denied use of Pochientong Airport, the 3ARRGp was tasked to provide helicopter (UH-53) airlift for evacuating 500-600 designated personnel from specific landing zones in Phnom Penh. Fixed wing aircraft or helicopters would be used to evacuate personnel from Battambang, Ream/Kampong Som, and other areas in the Khmer Republic. All evacuees would be taken to designated safe havens, primarily Ubon Rata AFB and U-Tapao RTAFB, in Thailand. Third ARRGp was not only tasked to provide helicopter airlift from its own resources, but was also directed to coordinate the entire helicopter evacuation phase, which in reality was a large and complex combined operation involving U.S. Marine, Navy and USAF helicopters. This task was further complicated by the fact that in the event designated landing zone areas became threatened by hostile elements, GSF (Ground Security Forces) composed of one Marine Infantry battalion and two rifle companies would have to be airlifted into the zones by the NEMVAC helicopters. This, of course, literally doubled the number of personnel to be airlifted out of the embattled areas. In addition, Rescue HH-130's (56ARRSq) were tasked to provide airborne command, control, coordination and refueling for the entire operation.

[REDACTED]

(2) (S) My staff and I immediately set up working groups, attended Joint Service Conferences, and developed flexible communications procedures and flow plans for the entire operation. A realistic HC-130 simulator program, designed to train crewmembers in NEMVAC operations, was initiated at Korat. Checklists with accompanying maps and flow charts were issued and all HH-53 and HC-130 crewmembers were thoroughly briefed on their specific duties tasked by the plan.

(3) (S) By early August 1973, the military situation around Phnom Penh became very critical. I was directed by COMUSMACV to place our crews on immediate alert and restrict all HH-53 flying activities to the Nakhon Phanom local area. The probability of the operation being implemented was enhanced even more after 15 August 1973 when U.S. combat involvement in the Khmer Republic was terminated by Congressional action. The HC-130 orbit over Lake Tonle Sap was stopped and the FOL for HH-53's at Ubon PTAFB was closed down, further increasing our critical operating range in this NEMVAC operation. Fortunately, by mid-September, due to the hardening resistance of Khmer Government forces, the enemy pressure on Phnom Penh and other provincial centers in that country relaxed. However, on 10 Oct 73 the FOL at Ubon was reinstated primarily for SAR coverage of EC-47s flying over the Khmer Republic. As of the time of this report, rescue forces in SEA are still committed to EAGLE FULL, though the possibility of its execution becomes more remote daily.

1975Mar-
Jun 75

ARRS personnel assisted in the recovery of bodies and equipment from the crash of a C-141 in the Olympic Mountains, Washington, on 21 March 1975.

12 Apr 75

Eagle Pull. Eight HH-53s and three HC-130s from the 40th and 56th ARR Squadrons, respectively, participated in Eagle Pull, the evacuation of United States personnel from Phnom Penh, Cambodia. One HH-53 inserted a combat control team prior to the evacuation and two HH-53s removed the last 15 military personnel from Phnom Penh following the completion of the evacuation. The Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) operated by the 3d ARR Group at Nakhon Phanom, exercised operational control of rescue forces. There were no ARRS injuries or casualties although two HH-53s incurred hits from small caliber ground fire.

29 Apr 75

Frequent Wind. Eight HH-53s and three HC-130s of the 40th and 56th Squadrons, respectively, participated in Frequent Wind, the evacuation of United States personnel from Saigon, Vietnam. Two of the HH-53s airlifted 362 evacuees from Saigon to the USS *Midway*. Both aircraft returned enemy ground fire. The HC-130s provided command and control communications and aerial refueling. The 3d ARR Group coordinated rescue operations. No ARRS personnel were injured.



Evacuees from Saigon aboard USS Midway.

13 May-
15 May 75

Mayaguez Incident and Assault on Koh Tang Island. In response to the capture of the SS *Mayaguez* and her crew at sea on 13 May, and after diplomatic measures had been ineffective, President Ford initiated military action. ARRS provided seven HH-53s and

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to respond immediately to this order. Shortly after receiving the order, they were ready to deploy with all necessary personnel and equipment.

Between 7 April and 11 April, daily briefings were conducted to insure aircrews were constantly aware of current weather, new intelligence, and any changes to the mission requirements of the EAGLE PULL Operations Plan. All aircraft were preflighted daily and prepared for immediate take off.

At 0342, 11 April 1975, EAGLE PULL deployment was executed. Eight HH-53C helicopters, call sign JOLLY GREEN, of the 40 ARRS, along with the CH-53C helicopters, call sign KNIFE, and OV-10, forward air control aircraft, both of the 56 SOW, were directed to deploy to Ubon. The 56 SOW provided the mission commander, who was directly assisted at Ubon by personnel from the 3 ARRG. Upon arrival at the forward operating location, all aircraft were refueled, armed, and readied for immediate launch. In less than four hours, all equipment, supplies, personnel, and aircraft were in place and ready for employment.

EMPLOYMENT

On the morning of 12 April 1975, the aircrews received their final briefing at Ubon. Although the number of potential evacuees had fallen below 1000, the concept remained the same. At 0750, the first helicopters departed for Phnom Penh, which was now encircled by hostile troops and artillery. Three JOLLY GREENs were in the first group of nine helicopters. The lead JOLLY GREEN, the first aircraft to land at Phnom Penh, inserted the Air Force Combat Control Team prior to the arrival of the Marine GSF. After making the offload, this aircraft sustained minor damage from hostile small arms, but exercised restraint and did not return fire. After the insertion was completed, the three JOLLY GREENs withdrew to maintain airborne search and rescue alert north of the city.

The second flight of three JOLLY GREEN helicopters departed Ubon an hour later to provide additional resources on-scene. The remaining rescue helicopters at Ubon stood ground alert, ready to launch at a moment's notice. When one JOLLY GREEN air aborted for maintenance problems, it was immediately replaced in orbit by a ground spare.

Prior to the first helicopter arrival at Phnom Penh, KING 21, the HC-130 helicopter controller, had established an orbit over the Khmer Capital. The second HC-130 from Korat, KING 22, had launched simultaneously and intercepted the JOLLY GREENs and KNIFEs en route to escort them to the city. After insertion of the Air Force Combat

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Control Team, KING 21 returned the helicopters to KING 22 for search and rescue operations.

KING 23 was prepared for immediate launch to serve as an additional tanker. A fourth HC-130 was on alert to respond to any contingency which might develop. The availability of the KINGS allowed the JOLLY GREENs to remain airborne throughout the entire operation.

Later in the operation, a second JOLLY GREEN was hit by ground fire, developed severe control problems, and was immediately escorted by KING 22 to Ubon for a safe recovery. Exceptional skill by the pilot and crew saved a valuable aircraft.

United States Marine Corps CH-53s conducted the evacuation under the control of KING 21. Early in the mission, it became apparent that the EFD at the USSAG/7AF Command Center was not receiving information in a timely manner. KING 21 began relaying to JOKER this vital information, which included the numbers and locations of the Marine GSF, positions of enemy ground fire, an accurate account of the number of evacuees on board each outbound helicopter, and the final extraction of Marines. JOKER relayed the information, through its representatives at the USSAG/7AF Command Center, to the EFD. On many occasions, this information was not available from any other source. This communication arrangement allowed the EFD to pass vital real time information to the highest levels of national command interest. This quickly became the most efficient and fastest means of communication to and from the scene. This technique proved invaluable and was incorporated in future operations plans.

Early in the afternoon, the lead JOLLY GREEN again landed at Phnom Penh and removed the GSF Commander with the last 15 American Marines from the embattled capital. This was the last evacuation aircraft to land in Cambodia. All Americans, except for those who chose to remain, had been successfully flown to safety. The 287 evacuees, including Ambassador John Gunther Dean and 83 Americans, were airlifted from Phnom Penh.

TERMINATION

All aircraft returned safely to their respective bases and at 1342, 12 April 1975, the employment phase of EAGLE PULL was terminated. The 40 ARRS flew a total of seven helicopters for 35.6 hours and nine sorties, including the only USAF aircraft to land in Phnom Penh. The three KINGS flew 18 hours, and during the operation, KING 22 and KING 23 conducted twelve aerial refuelings with the JOLLY GREENs, transferring 33,000 pounds of fuel.

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CEASE-FIRE TO MAYAGUEZ

down of the war in Laos, and the cessation of bombing in Cambodia, Air Force planners began working on contingency plans for the evacuation of Americans and selected foreigners from those countries. On June 27, 1973, the United States Support Activities Group/Seventh Air Force published Contingency Plan 5060C, "Eagle Pull", concerning the evacuation of Phnom Penh. Even while the bombing of Cambodia continued, in the spring of 1973, Phnom Penh seemed in danger of falling to the Khmer Rouge. They surrounded the city in April and pushed the troops of the Forces Armées National Khmer back into the suburbs. Unlike Vietnam, the American bombing ended in Cambodia with no reciprocal "ceasefire" from the enemy. To many it seemed that Cambodia would fall after the last American bomb fell.

Rescue units received the first edition of CONPLAN 5060C in late June. The immediate response was to put an HC-130P on three-hour alert twenty-four hours a day.²⁷ Operations officers in all the rescue units became familiar with the plan and its options. King crews began working in the simulator.

CONPLAN 5060C had three options. Under Option I, American embassy personnel and their families, U.S. Government workers, and all other American citizens as well as certain designated Cambodian nationals would use scheduled airlines or chartered flights from Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport to fly to whatever country the State Department designated. Of course, any Cambodian who could afford the price of an airline ticket also could flee, so under Option I, the number of people to be evacuated was indefinite.

According to Option II, if enemy action caused the cancellation of regularly scheduled airline flights into Pochentong, American military planes were to be used for evacuation. Tactical air support would be available if needed. Air Force C-130 turboprops and C-141 jet transports would be used to evacuate most of the designated people, with HH-53 and CH-53 helicopters available if needed. Air Force Security Police from the 56th Security Police Squadron at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, would be flown in on two CH-53s to provide security around the airport. About 600 people would be evacuated under Option II, mostly Americans and their families along with a limited number of Cambodians.

Option III was the most complicated of the three alternatives. It was to be used if enemy forces closed Pochentong. This option provided for the use of helicopters to evacuate people from designated landing zones in Phnom Penh as well as in Battambang, Kompong Som and other major towns as needed. As in Option II, tactical air support was to be available. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service HC-130Ps were designated as controllers for the 21st Special Operations Squadron CH-53s and the HH-53s of the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron. A ground security force of security police would protect the landing zones. The plan called for

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the use of fourteen CH/HH-53s to evacuate up to 600 people and still provide four helicopters in reserve.²⁸ The 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group was specifically tasked to provide the HH-53s, the rescue control aircraft (HC-130Ps), and the four backup helicopters.²⁹

When the bombing stopped on August 15, 1973, the fate of the Khmer Republic rested with its army, a force officially estimated at 200,000 men but which may have contained up to 150,000 payroll-padding phantom troops and part-time, fair-weather soldiers. The Khmer Air Force consisted of about forty T-28s and a few Fairchild AU-23 single-engine and twin-engine AC-47 gunships.³⁰ On a good day, if the Khmer Air Force got every T-28 into the air, they could deliver the bomb load of two B-52s. And Cambodia's airmen had very few good days.

Unexpectedly, Cambodian government forces held outside Phnom Penh and defended their major cities. The Khmer Rouge withdrew to the countryside in the autumn of 1973 and spent 1974 extending their control throughout rural Cambodia. By late 1974, as the Khmer Rouge consolidated their gains in the countryside and isolated the forces of the republic in their larger towns and cities, the inevitable became discernible. Accordingly, USSAG/7AF changed Eagle Pull to meet the evolving circumstances. A change issued on November 1, 1974, updated Option III of the basic plan by establishing a complicated priority system to classify non-combatant evacuees according to citizenship, sex, age, and physical condition. For instance, a priority code of "I" was assigned an American citizen with documents, "II" was given to an alien member of an American family, "III" to alien employees of the embassy, and "IV" to other aliens. Minor categories of A to E were assigned, with nine-month pregnant American-born wives getting an "A" priority and able-bodied 18-year-old Cambodian males an "E".³¹

A further change to Eagle Pull was circulated on February 24, 1975. This change to Option III provided for U.S. Marine Corps helicopters to be used along with Air Force choppers. Also a 234-man ground security force of Marines replaced the security police in the plan. Additionally, because the Khmer Rouge either threatened or had isolated many of the provincial towns previously designated as alternative evacuation sites, all helicopter landing zones were to be near the American Embassy in Phnom Penh.³²

By the first of March 1975, Eagle Pull was ready. Rescue forces in Thailand stood at their authorized strength of eleven HH-53s and six HC-130Ps. On March 1 all Air Force Eagle Pull forces were ordered to be ready to respond within twenty-four hours.³³ As the battlefield situation in Cambodia deteriorated, on March 27 USSAG/7AF issued a detailed, twenty-five section special instruction. It was based on the third option, helicopter evacuation, and directed the 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group to prepare eight HH-53s for the transfer to Ubon when so ordered. Two HC-

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130Ps, call signs King 21 and King 22, were designated as rescue controllers.³⁴

The C-130 airborne command and control center from the 7th Air Command and Control Squadron at Udorn, was designated overall airborne controller for Eagle Pull. It would coordinate the air armada up to the outskirts of Phnom Penh. At that point King 21 became the primary controller to coordinate helicopters coming into and leaving the landing zone. King 22, meanwhile, was tasked to refuel the rescue choppers, and if any aircraft went down would become the rescue mission controller. Another HC-130P, King 23, was to be placed on fifteen-minute alert at Korat ready to perform any or all of these tasks.³⁵

The final version of CONPLAN 5060C did not neglect the remainder of the search and rescue task force. Four A-7s were scheduled for search and rescue combat air patrol. The plan included use of the AC-130 gunships and tasked the 16th Special Operations Squadron with providing four AC-130s to fly in orbit ready to bring their array of guns to bear upon any concentration of enemy troops that might oppose the operation, or to act as forward air controllers if the operation occurred at night or in bad weather.³⁶

While these plans circulated, the military situation worsened. The Khmer Rouge sealed off all land routes between Phnom Penh and the other cities of Cambodia. Mekong River convoys made their way to and from Phnom Penh at the greatest peril. An emergency American-sponsored airlift brought in food and ammunition, but the Cambodian Army continued to disintegrate. When the Khmer Rouge overran the naval base at Neak-Luong, just south of Phnom Penh, on April 1, President Lon Nol fled into exile.

On April 3, CINCPAC ordered all Eagle Pull forces to assume a six-hour alert. At Korat the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing put twelve A-7s and four AC-130s on alert for the six-hour response.³⁷ Across the base, three HC-130Ps stood ready. Also, the same day, at the request of American Ambassador to Cambodia John Gunther Dean, an HH-53 flew an eleven-man command element of the Marine ground support force into Phnom Penh to organize the evacuees and make final preparations for the arrival of helicopters. The day after reaching the beleaguered city, the Marines selected a soccer field behind an apartment house only a quarter mile from the embassy. They called it "Landing Zone (LZ) Hotel".³⁸

Meanwhile, the number of Americans in Phnom Penh dropped as nonessential personnel at the embassy, businessmen, and some journalists began leaving on the remaining available airline flights and on returning airlift planes.³⁹ By April 6 all but about fifty members of the ambassador's staff had flown to Thailand. Ambassador Dean then began sending the embassy's 294 Cambodian employees to safety.⁴⁰ Events began to move more rapidly and, on April 7, CINCPAC ordered the USS *Hancock*, an assault

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carrier with sixteen U.S. Marine CH-53 and sixteen CH-46 helicopters aboard, from Subic Bay in the Philippines to the Gulf of Thailand. There it joined the assault ship *Okinawa* carrying the Marine ground security force.⁴¹

Through the first week of April and into the second the Khmer Rouge tightened its noose around Phnom Penh. By April 10 Ambassador Dean knew the city would soon be in enemy hands. He requested that Eagle Pull, Option III, be executed on April 12. Accordingly, USSAG/7AF issued the execute order on April 11. The first helicopters would reach LZ Hotel by 9:00 the following morning.⁴²

When the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron received the execute message it sent seven HH-53s to Ubon where they were fueled and armed for the next day's work. Before dawn on the 12th, an eighth rescue chopper arrived from Nakhon Phanom. Just at sunrise, according to the plan, an HH-53 left for Phnom Penh with a four-man Air Force combat control team, an elite team of forward air guides trained to direct air operations from the middle of a battlefield. They landed promptly at 8:50 A.M. Three minutes later the first U.S. Marine CH-53 spiraled onto the soccer field to disgorge the first element of the Marine security force. The leathernecks fanned out across the field, bayonet-tipped rifles at the ready, to be greeted by a crowd of curious, laughing, waving Cambodians.⁴³

While Marine helicopters carried 276 people, including 82 Americans, 159 Cambodians, and 35 foreign nationals to the assault carriers in the Gulf of Thailand, three HH-53s orbited just north of the city, ready to dash to the aid of any helicopters that might be shot down. Overhead, one HC-130P controlled the rescue forces while another worked with the airborne command and control center coordinating the Marine choppers at Landing Zone Hotel. At 10:00 three more HH-53s arrived from Ubon, refueled and flew to the landing zone. As the last Marine helicopter pulled up with its load of civilians, one Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service HH-53 swooped onto the soccer field. Khmer Rouge gunners across the Mekong had just found the range on the evacuation site and the friendly crowd scattered as the mortar rounds exploded. The first rescue chopper in picked up the members of the combat control team. Three minutes later, at 11:15, a second helicopter sat down on the field to take out the remaining troops in the ground security force. A rocket hit nearby throwing up a geyser of dirt from the soccer field as the last helicopter from Phnom Penh climbed for safety in the sky. Before it was out of range, a 12.7-mm heavy machine gun round found its tail rotor. Escorted by the backup Jolly Green, the badly vibrating helicopter managed to make it to Ubon.⁴⁴

Later in the day the Marines transferred the people taken to the ships to Utapao Royal Thai Naval Air Base, Thailand. A total of 291 people were brought out of Phnom Penh, including 276 evacuees, the combat control team, and the advance element of the ground security force. There were no

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casualties. Two rescue service choppers, the last two at Landing Zone Hotel, were hit by small arms fire, including the one that had the 12.7-mm round in its tail.⁴⁵

Before the evacuation began, Cambodian President Sokham Koy, who replaced Lon Nol on April 3, said, "The United States led Cambodia into this war, but when the war became difficult, the United States pulled out."⁴⁶ President Sokham Koy came out on a Marine helicopter. The war was over and for the rescue people in Thailand there was nothing left to do but accept the letters of congratulations for a job well done in Eagle Pull.⁴⁷

Even as Phnom Penh fell, Saigon's days were numbered. Not even the Politburo in Hanoi realized how short the time would be before North Vietnamese tanks would break down the gates of President Nguyen Van Thieu's palace.⁴⁸ The North Vietnamese mapped out their 1975 offensive to take the central highlands and, if possible, cut South Vietnam in two. On March 14, when they overran Ban Me Thuot, a key provincial capital in the highlands, President Thieu, realizing his army was spread too thinly, ordered it to draw back to defend the cities, especially Da Nang, Hue, and Saigon.⁴⁹ Within two weeks the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had collapsed as a cohesive fighting force. North Vietnamese forces moved east from their sanctuaries near Khe Sanh and south across the demilitarized zone. By the end of March they were poised at the outskirts of Da Nang.

The evacuation of Da Nang brought the dimensions of the debacle into focus. As the North Vietnamese closed in on the city, a number of Americans remained there. These included members of the U.S. consulate, U.S. Agency for International Development, Central Intelligence Agency operatives, journalists, teachers, private citizens working for the United States or South Vietnamese governments under contract, a handful of retired military men, and deserters who chose to live in the city. The U.S. Embassy in Saigon had a basic evacuation plan which included plans for each of the consulates. At Da Nang the plan called for evacuation by sea.⁵⁰ When, at the end of March, the Americans started to leave Da Nang, they had to fight their way aboard the ships, planes and helicopters sent to get them out. The American public, watching the horror unfold on the evening television news, saw South Vietnamese soldiers force their way onto the last plane from Da Nang, a World Airways 727, flown into the city to carry out women and children.⁵¹

The disaster at Da Nang demonstrated the need for more precise planning to get the five thousand or so remaining Americans out of Vietnam. Official U.S. policy was that the Republic of Vietnam would survive. Even when there had been a large number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, there was no evacuation plan. During the North Vietnamese offensive of 1972, MACV headquarters ordered a planning board to convene to draw up such a plan. The planner soon decided that U.S. forces could not leave the country en masse if the enemy forces proved successful. They thought that if

Twenty-five years ago this month, the Vietnam War came to an end with bewildering speed.

The Fall of

By Walter J. Boyne

On April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese troops accepted the surrender of Saigon and thus snuffed out the Republic of Vietnam, humiliating Washington in the process. Saigon, within 24 hours, had become Ho Chi Minh City. The surrender of the capital and its prompt renaming—25 years ago this month—became the ultimate symbol of the failure of US policy in Southeast Asia.

For Americans, that day forever will be remembered for the spectacle of overcrowded US helicopters fleeing in a badly timed but well-executed evacuation, their flight to safety contrasting with the terror that gripped thousands of loyal South Vietnamese left to their fates. The media presented hundreds of wrenching scenes—tiny boats overcrowded with soldiers and family members, people trying to force their way onto the US Embassy grounds, Vietnamese babies being passed over barbed wire to waiting hands and an unknown future.

Saigon fell with bewildering speed. After 21 years of struggle against the Communist forces, the South Vietnamese army collapsed in just weeks into a disorganized mass, unable to slow, much less halt, forces from the North.

In nearly 30 years of war, Hanoi had defeated France and South Vietnam on the battlefield and the US at the negotiating table. The Communist regime was expert in manipulating US opinion. For example, Hanoi had converted its debilitating defeat in the 1968 Tet Offensive into a stunning propaganda victory, one that ultimately drove the United States out of the war.

Still, North Vietnam had suffered about 50,000 casualties in Tet and

was similarly mauled in its spring 1972 offensive against the South. The People's Army of Vietnam needed time to recuperate.

Thieu's Gambit

South Vietnam's president, Nguyen Van Thieu, took advantage of Hanoi's decision to refit and re-equip, extending the South Vietnamese hold on territory wherever possible. The result was that the South Vietnamese army was spread out over a large area and by late 1974 was ripe for an attack. Its condition was worsened by the drying up of US assistance, a drastic increase in inflation, and, as always, flagrant corruption.

The January 1973 Paris peace accords led to a near-total withdrawal of US forces in early 1973. In fall 1974, leaders in Hanoi had decided upon a two-year program to conquer the South and unite the two countries under Communist rule. Called "General Offensive, General Uprising," the program was designed so that a series of major military offensives in 1975 would bring the South Vietnamese population to the point of revolution and permit a conclusive victory in 1976.

North Vietnam was well aware of the disarray in American politics since President Richard M. Nixon's August 1974 resignation, and it decided to test the waters. In January 1975, it conquered Phuoc Long province on the border with Cambodia. North Vietnamese regular units, supplemented by local guerrillas, routed the South Vietnamese army in a mere three weeks. More than 3,000 South Vietnamese troops were killed or captured, and supplies worth millions were lost to the invaders. Although Phuoc Long was not particularly important in either military

After more than two decades of fighting the Communists, the South Vietnamese army collapsed quickly in early 1975, setting in motion chaotic evacuations like this one from a rooftop in Saigon.



South Vietnamese President Thieu withdrew his forces from the Central Highlands after Ban Me Thuot fell March 12. The North Vietnamese then moved to take over Pleiku, triggering this exodus of soldiers and civilians.

or economic terms, it was the first province the North Vietnamese had taken since 1972—and it was only 80 miles from Saigon.

This absolutely crucial event was scarcely noted in the American news media. Washington had pledged to “respond with decisive military force” to any North Vietnamese violation of the 1973 accords. In the end, however, the US did nothing at all. Hanoi doubtless was encouraged to continue.

Oddly enough, Thieu was not discouraged. That is because he continued to believe in Nixon’s promises, even after Nixon had been forced to resign, and he would continue to believe in those promises almost to the end, frequently musing about “when the B-52s would return.”

March 1975 saw Hanoi make its next seriously aggressive move. In the preceding two years, North Vietnam’s army patiently moved into the South enormous quantities of Soviet artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and armored vehicles, along with 100,000 fresh troops. The Paris accords allowed more than 80,000 North Vietnamese regular troops to remain in the South, and their numbers had already increased to more than 200,000.

North Vietnamese regular and guerrilla forces now numbered some 1 million, despite the heavy losses of the previous decade. North Vietnam’s army units, created by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, were weapons-intensive, with few logistics or support personnel. In contrast, South

Vietnam’s army was modeled on the US Army. It had about 750,000 troops, of which only about 150,000 were combat troops. They were well-equipped but poorly supported, despite the Army’s huge logistics tail.

Giap in 1973 had become ill with Hodgkin’s disease, and power passed to his protégé, Van Tien Dung, North Vietnam’s only other four-star general. Dung, a short, square-faced peasant who had worked his way up through the ranks, carefully infiltrated his forces so that he was able to set up his headquarters at Loc Ninh, only 75 miles north of Saigon. The elaborate preparations included construction of an oil pipeline and telephone grid that was impervious to electronic countermeasures.

Dung dictated tactics designed to minimize casualties from the massed firepower upon which South Vietnam’s army had been trained to rely. Unfortunately for the South Vietnamese, their supplies of ammunition were badly depleted by rampant inflation and severe reductions in American aid.

Final Battle Begins

Dung arrived at Loc Ninh via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, now expanded from foot paths to include paved, two-lane highways with extensions that reached within 30 miles of Saigon. His first target was Ban Me Thuot, a city in the Central Highlands and the capital of Darlac province. It was the absolutely vital link

in the South Vietnamese army’s defenses. If it were lost, Communist forces could easily cut South Vietnam in half.

North Vietnam disguised its real assault by mounting pinprick attacks in the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. Minor though they were, they triggered a panic flight of more than 50,000 refugees that would have immense effect on battles soon to come.

Northern forces isolated Ban Me Thuot by cutting off or blocking the main highways to it. On March 10, 1975, three North Vietnamese army divisions, well-equipped with tanks, assaulted the city, which was defended by two reinforced regiments of the 23rd Division. Despite a barrage of 122 mm artillery fire, the South Vietnamese army, commanded by Maj. Gen. Pham Van Phu, fought well. However, they were worn down and, by March 12, Dung had essentially captured the city.

It was at Ban Me Thuot that there first occurred a phenomenon that would increasingly undermine the South’s morale. Many of its army officers used helicopters to pick up their families and flee to the south with them. Phu himself fled when the time came.

South Vietnamese hordes then began to flee the countryside, crowding the main roads and the pathways in a mass exodus for the coast, where they ultimately jammed seaports seeking transport to the south. The refugees included not only those civilians who had helped the South’s army or the Americans, but also a great mass who had no reason to expect bad treatment from North Vietnam’s army. They were simply fleeing in the general panic.

The refugee crowd had another characteristic, one that would prove to have a disastrous effect upon South Vietnamese resistance. South Vietnamese soldiers were leaving the line of battle to find their families and escort them to safety. It was a natural response to the war, but it accelerated the dissolution of the South’s capability to resist.

Fatal Error

Thieu had believed the target of Dung’s attack would be Pleiku. He panicked on learning of the fall of Ban Me Thuot and on March 14 secretly ordered the withdrawal of the

South's forces from the Central Highlands. It was a monumental error, for no plans for the withdrawal had been drawn up, and the orders to leave simply plunged the remaining troops into a mass of refugees whose agonizing journey came to be called "the convoy of tears."

This flight of refugees was unlike those seen in World War II. Those fleeing the Communists in Vietnam resorted to each and every kind of conveyance: buses, tanks, trucks, armored personnel carriers, private cars. Anything with wheels was pressed nose to tail along Route 7B. The vehicles were jammed with soldiers and overloaded with family members—from babes in arms to aged grandparents—packed on top or clinging to the side, like jitney riders. Many of those who fell off were crushed by the vehicle behind.

Thousands more fled on foot, carrying their pathetic belongings with them. For 15 hot days and cold nights there was no food or water available, and the route was littered with abandoned people—children, the elderly, the infirm.

North Vietnamese army troops of the 320th Division pounced on the disorganized mob trying to get to the coast and kept them under constant attack, killing thousands of civilians. North Vietnamese artillery would destroy one vehicle after another at near point-blank range, throwing body parts into trees and drenching the ground with blood.

It was a different kind of slaughter. Unlike Kosovo where long-standing ethnic hatred led to the killing of a few thousands, the slaughter here was between people of the same blood. As many as 40,000 died on the road. The situation worsened when renegade South Vietnamese army troops also began firing on the refugee columns.

Compounding this sad spectacle was the fact that, when the exhausted survivors finally made it to a seaport, they were exploited by fellow countrymen who charged exorbitant prices for food and sold water for \$2 a glass. Here the South Vietnamese army turned into an armed mob, preying on civilians and looting whatever could be found.

Dung swiftly swung north and on March 18 occupied Kontum and Pleiku, putting the invasion weeks ahead of schedule. It was a South Vietnamese debacle, with the southern army managing to lose the war faster than North Vietnam's army could win it.

Thieu's hasty and ill-advised surrender of the Central Highlands had cost South Vietnam six provinces and two regular army divisions. More than a billion dollars in materiel was abandoned.

Improvisation and Delusion

The South Vietnamese leader now began to improvise an enclave policy. His forces would concentrate on holding certain coastal cities, including

Da Nang, along with Saigon and the Delta region. Thieu, a tough politician, had an almost childlike belief that holding these areas would give the United States time to exert its military power and once again force the North Vietnamese to negotiate.

North Vietnamese forces unleashed attacks in Quang Tri province in late March, accelerating the flow of refugees. In Hue city, the citizens were alarmed. The city had suffered greatly in 1968 during the Communists' 25-day Tet occupation. It lost another 20,000 civilians during the North's 1972 offensive. Once again, soldiers and citizens merged to join the throng headed for Da Nang. By March 23, a combination of rumors, desertions, and North Vietnamese propaganda had made Hue indefensible. It fell on March 24.

As Communist artillery shelled Hue and all of the roads leading to and from it, other forces surrounded Da Nang, to which more than 1 million refugees had fled, leaving behind those killed by artillery, collisions, and mob stampedes. Thousands attempted to escape by sea, fleeing in anything that would float. Many drowned.

At Da Nang, a civilian airlift began, presaging the later confusion and terror at Saigon. Edward J. Daly, president of World Airways, defied US Ambassador Graham A. Martin and dispatched two Boeing 727s to Da Nang, flying on the first one himself. After landing, his airplane was mobbed by thousands of people, some 270 of whom were finally jammed on board. (All but a handful of these were armed soldiers—not the civilians that Daly had intended to evacuate.) The 727 took off amid gunfire and a grenade explosion that damaged the flaps. It hit a fence and a vehicle before staggering into the air. People had crowded into the wheel well, and one man was crushed as the gear came up and jammed.

Somehow the 727 made it back to Saigon, gear down and with split flaps, managing to land safely. The dreadful photos of the dead man's feet hanging from the gear doors told the miserable story. Ironically the one man's death saved four others who had also climbed into the wheel well, for his crushed body had prevented the gear from retracting all the way. Later, when the details of the overweight and damage-laden takeoff were sent to Boeing for analy-

UPI/Corbis-Bettmann



On a bridge in Saigon two days before the city fell to the Communists, a South Vietnamese soldier hangs on to a wounded comrade during an enemy attack April 28.



On foot and on anything with wheels, refugees evacuate ahead of Communist forces. Their numbers included civilians who had aided the South Vietnamese army or the Americans, as well as those simply fleeing in general panic.

sis, the response was that the 727 should not have been able to fly.

The seaborne disasters that occurred at Hue were repeated at Da Nang on a larger scale, as people were trampled to death by crowds fighting to board the larger ships. More than 2 million people were crowded into Da Nang, but only 50,000 would escape by sea. In what was now a familiar pattern, discipline broke down as Communist artillery fire raked the city and widespread looting began. Organized resistance crumbled, and fleeing civilians were caught in a murderous cross fire between North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese troops.

The Communist forces entered Da Nang on March 29. Qui Nhon fell on March 31 and Nha Trang on April 3. The battle for Nha Trang lasted only three hours. The rich resources of Cam Ranh Bay fell on the same day after only 30 minutes of fighting. These reverses soon were followed by the fall of other coastal towns. Phu Cat airport was captured with more than 60 flyable aircraft in place.

Lost in the melee was materiel valued at billions of dollars. Anyone who flew in or out of Da Nang or Cam Ranh during the Vietnam War will recall the thousands of acres of supplies stacked around the airfields. That gigantic supply stockpile fell into Communist hands.

Going for Broke

Now it was Hanoi's turn to impro-

vis. Shocked by the speed of its success, North Vietnam hastily proclaimed a new goal: the conquest of South Vietnam in time to celebrate the May 19 birth date of the late Ho Chi Minh. Dung termed his military action "the Ho Chi Minh Campaign" and gave his troops a new slogan: "Lightning speed, daring, and more daring."

They complied, and by early April, North Vietnam's forces had severed the roads around Saigon and had begun shelling Bien Hoa airfield. A battle began on April 9 at Xuan Loc, located on National Route 1 only 37 miles northeast of Saigon.

Southern forces fought well during the course of the bitter 15-day fight. This was particularly true of the 18th Division, an outfit that previously had a bad reputation. Here, it fought on after suffering 30 percent casualties. However, it received no reinforcements, and it faced North Vietnam's 4th Corps. During this battle, the remnant of South Vietnam's air force carried out its last effective operation, using cluster bombs, 15,000-pound daisy cutters, and even a CBU-55B asphyxiation bomb.

Elsewhere in the region, the United States on April 12 evacuated 276 Americans from Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in Operation Eagle Pull. The withdrawal sent Hanoi yet another signal that US intervention was not to be feared in South Vietnam. Unaccountably, Thieu for another nine days clung to the hope of US intervention. Then, on April 21, he resigned, turning the government over to aging and feeble Tran Van Huong.

South Vietnamese morale was not helped by rumors, which turned out to be true, that Thieu was sending personal goods and money out of the country. In short order, the man followed his valuables into exile in Taiwan and then Britain.

Xuan Loc fell on April 23, and there was now little to prevent or slow the Communist advance on Saigon. That same day, in an address at Tulane University, President Gerald Ford stated that the war



South Vietnamese civilians scale the wall of the US Embassy in Saigon on April 29 to reach evacuation helicopters that were using the embassy's courtyard and rooftop as landing pads.

in Vietnam "is finished as far as America is concerned." He got a standing ovation.

Huong, South Vietnam's new president, transferred power to Gen. Duong Van Minh. "Big Minh," as he was called, had planned the assassinations in 1963 of South Vietnam's president, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The South Vietnamese leadership was out of options and had come to the fantastic conclusion that the Communists might negotiate with Minh. This was far from reality: North Vietnamese regular army troops and tanks had by then surrounded Saigon, which became yet another city in panic.


On Life Support

South Vietnam's capital city was located some 45 miles from the coast of the South China Sea on the Saigon River. Long called the "Paris of the Orient," it had lost only part of its French-colonial beauty in the long war. It had, however, lost confidence in its government. Despite many officials who did their jobs well, there were far too many high-ranking people who were not only corrupt but incompetent. It was not a government to inspire its people to fight to the last, but it was the government to which the United States had obligations. It was also a government that the American Embassy had to keep functioning as long as possible in order to evacuate the maximum number of Americans and loyal South Vietnamese.

Martin, the US envoy, had tried to shore up Thieu, lobbying for additional US military and financial aid. His efforts were sincere but they delayed the implementation of plans to evacuate American and South Vietnamese supporters of the administration from Saigon until it was far too late.

Fortunately, two evacuation operations were already in action, and the execution of the third was in the hands of professionals. The first of these, Operation Babylift, had been conducted between April 4 and 14, and some 2,600 Vietnamese children were taken to the United States to be adopted. Babylift was marred by a tragic accident on the first flight of the operation, April 4, 1975.

A C-5A transport had taken off and climbed to 23,000 feet when an



During the last two days, more than 600 US military flights airlifted evacuees from Saigon to ships offshore. Air America also joined the effort. Above, civilians head for a helicopter at Tan Son Nhut.

explosive decompression blew out a huge section of the aft cargo door, cutting the control cables to the elevator and rudder. Capt. Dennis Traynor did a masterful job of flying the airplane, using power for pitch and ailerons for directional control. He managed to bring the aircraft back to within five miles of Tan Son Nhut, where he made a semicontrolled crash. Of the 382 people aboard, 206 were killed, most of them children.

All subsequent flights were made safely. The Babylift operation later came under criticism for its overt attempt to create good public relations and for some of the criteria used in selecting the children. In the end, Babylift could be evaluated as yet another good-hearted attempt by the United States to do the right thing under difficult circumstances.

The second evacuation had been going on quietly for many days, relying on standard civilian and military airlift and virtually anything that would float. Some 57,700 were flown out by fixed wing aircraft, and 73,000 left by sea. About 5,000 Americans were evacuated—everyone who wished to come—plus many foreigners. South Vietnamese who were airlifted out were for the most part people whose service to their government or to the United States made them candidates for execution by the Communists.

There were many instances of individual courage, as exemplified by Francis Terry McNamara, the US

consul general in Can Tho. McNamara, at great personal risk, commandeered landing craft to ferry hundreds of Vietnamese down the Bassac River to safety. Neither blinding rainstorms, South Vietnamese navy, nor North Vietnamese regulars stopped him.

Frequent Wind

Martin, who was perhaps too courageous for his own and for his people's good, was not persuaded to begin a formal evacuation until April 29. Tan Son Nhut had been hit by a small formation of Cessna A-37 aircraft, led by the renegade South Vietnamese pilot, Nguyen Thanh Trung, who previously bombed the presidential palace from his F-5. Then North Vietnamese rockets and 130 mm artillery shells began dropping on the airfield, while SA-7 missiles were being used successfully outside the perimeter.

Finally, after a personal visit, Martin became convinced that Tan Son Nhut was no longer suitable for use by fixed wing aircraft. He reluctantly initiated Operation Frequent Wind.

Frequent Wind turned out to be the helicopter evacuation of Saigon from the Defense Attaché's Office at Tan Son Nhut and from the embassy compound itself. Some 6,236 passengers were removed to safety, despite severe harassing fire. To some, however, it seemed that the DAO area and the evacuation pro-



US Navy personnel push a helicopter off USS Blue Ridge to make room for more evacuation flights out of Saigon. Below, Communist soldiers in a Russian-made tank wave the flag after taking over the presidential palace in Saigon on April 30.


cess itself were deliberately spared by the North Vietnamese.

At the embassy, large helicopters used the walled-in courtyard as a landing pad while small helicopters lifted people from the roof. Despite the lack of time and inadequate landing facilities, crews performed with remarkable precision.

On April 29 and 30, 662 US military airlift flights took place between Saigon and ships 80 miles away. Ten Air Force HH/CH-53s flew 82 missions, while 61 Marine Corps CH-46s and CH-53s flew 556 sorties. There were 325 support aircraft sorties by Marine, Navy, and USAF aircraft. Air America, the CIA proprietary airline, joined in, having flown 1,000 sorties in the previous month. Air America crews distinguished themselves with a selfless bravery not usually attributed to "mercenaries."

The end came on April 30. At 4:58 a.m., a CH-46 helicopter, call sign "Lady Ace 09," flown by Capt. Jerry Berry, transported Martin from the embassy roof to the waiting US fleet. At 7:53 a.m., the last helicopter lifted off, carrying Marine personnel who had been defending the embassy. It left behind many South Vietnamese (250 to 400, depending upon which source is consulted) who had been promised escape. They were simply abandoned. It was the last of a long series of US betrayals in Vietnam.

There were more evacuations to come, unplanned and totally chaotic.



UPI/Corbis-Bettmann

Every South Vietnamese helicopter was crammed with people and these were flown, like a swarm of bees, to the waiting ships of the 7th Fleet. The helicopters would land (sometimes on top of each other) and their occupants would be disarmed and led away. The helicopters would then be dumped over the side to make room for the next one incoming. At least 45 were disposed of like this; many more were stored for future use.

Fixed wing South Vietnamese aircraft fled to Thailand, landing pell-mell at various bases. Americans who were there at the time recall watching the arrival of flocks of overloaded aircraft of every type.

In Washington, State and Defense Department task forces were hastily assembled. Washington decision makers quickly set up refugee processing centers at Ft. Chaffee, Ark., Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa., and Eglin AFB, Fla. In the days and weeks following the fall of Saigon, 675,000 refugees were brought to the United States.

On April 30, a North Vietnamese tank bearing a huge white "843" smashed through the gates of the presidential palace. South Vietnam's last president, Minh, tried to surrender. He was told that he no longer

controlled anything that could be surrendered.

At 3:30 p.m., however, the North Vietnamese conquerors relented just a bit. Reconsidering, they allowed the last chief executive of South Vietnam to broadcast over the radio an abject, two-sentence speech of surrender. By then, a new darkness already had descended on the people of what once had been South Vietnam. ■

Walter J. Boyne, former director of the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, is a retired Air Force colonel and author. He has written more than 400 articles about aviation topics and 29 books, the most recent of which is Beyond the Horizons: The Lockheed Story. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, "The All-American Airman," appeared in the March 2000 issue.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE AIR MEDAL
(NINTH OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

JOSEPH S. STANALAND

Staff Sergeant Joseph S. Stanaland distinguished himself by meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 12 April 1975. On that date, Sergeant Stanaland aided in the successful withdrawal of the Ground Control Team from the helicopter landing zone after the extraction of the American Ambassador and his staff. The successful extraction was done despite the risk involved from enemy artillery and rocket fire on the landing zone. The professional skill and airmanship displayed by Sergeant Stanaland reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

TSGT, SSGT AND SGT PERFORMANCE REPORT

I. IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MI STANALAND, JOSEPH S.	2. SSAN FR263-94-9122	3. GRADE SSgt						
4. ORGANIZATION, LOCATION, AND COMMAND 40ARRS Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand (MAC)	5. RESERVE WARRANT OR COMMISSION GRADE AND SSAN None	6. REASON FOR REPORT ☐ NO REPORT 1 YEAR ☒ CHANGE OF REPORTING OFFICIAL ☐ NO REPORT 6 MONTHS ☐ DIRECTED BY _____						
7. PERIOD OF REPORT & SUPERVISION <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;">FROM</td> <td style="width: 33%;">THRU</td> <td style="width: 33%;">NR DAYS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13 Feb 75</td> <td>30 Jun 75</td> <td>91</td> </tr> </table>		FROM	THRU	NR DAYS	13 Feb 75	30 Jun 75	91	
FROM	THRU	NR DAYS						
13 Feb 75	30 Jun 75	91						

II. DUTIES: PAFSC A11570 DAFSC A11550 CAFSC A11550 CURRENT DUTY: SQ PARA RES RECVY SPEC
 Participates as pararescue crewmember in the HH-53C helicopter to effect the evacuation of friendly personnel and the recovery of downed aircrew members from hostile territory. Identifies and evaluates injuries sustained by recovered aircrew member/evacuees and renders emergency medical aid. Assists the aircraft commander in determining the best means of evacuation for injured personnel. Performs as aerial gunner on the HH-53C helicopter. Maintain currency in parachute deployment and as jumpmaster. Additional Duties: Assistant squadron Pararescue Standardization NCOIC.

III. PERSONAL QUALITIES

1. PERFORMANCE OF DUTY: Consider the quantity, quality, and timeliness of his work in the duties described in Section II.	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 15%;">REPORTING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">N/O</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">0</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">2</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">4</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">6</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>INDORSING OFFICIAL</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	REPORTING OFFICIAL	N/O	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	INDORSING OFFICIAL															
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2. WORKING RELATIONS: Consider how well he used his ability to communicate (oral and written) and to get along with others to improve his overall performance.	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>REPORTING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="text-align: center;">N/O</td> <td style="text-align: center;">0</td> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> <td style="text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4</td> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="text-align: center;">6</td> <td style="text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="text-align: center;">9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>INDORSING OFFICIAL</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	REPORTING OFFICIAL	N/O	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	INDORSING OFFICIAL															
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3. TRAINING: Consider how well he discharges his responsibilities as an OJT supervisor, trainer, or trainee and in other efforts to improve his technical knowledge and educational level.	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>REPORTING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="text-align: center;">N/O</td> <td style="text-align: center;">0</td> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> <td style="text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4</td> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="text-align: center;">6</td> <td style="text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="text-align: center;">9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>INDORSING OFFICIAL</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	REPORTING OFFICIAL	N/O	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	INDORSING OFFICIAL															
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4. SUPERVISION: Consider how well he supervises, leads, uses available resources, and maintains good order and discipline.	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>REPORTING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="text-align: center;">N/O</td> <td style="text-align: center;">0</td> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> <td style="text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4</td> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="text-align: center;">6</td> <td style="text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="text-align: center;">9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>INDORSING OFFICIAL</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	REPORTING OFFICIAL	N/O	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	INDORSING OFFICIAL															
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5. ACCEPTANCE OF NCO RESPONSIBILITY: Consider his acceptance of responsibility for his actions and those of his subordinates.	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>REPORTING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="text-align: center;">N/O</td> <td style="text-align: center;">0</td> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> <td style="text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4</td> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="text-align: center;">6</td> <td style="text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="text-align: center;">9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>INDORSING OFFICIAL</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	REPORTING OFFICIAL	N/O	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	INDORSING OFFICIAL															
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6. BEARING AND BEHAVIOR: Consider the degree to which his bearing and behavior on and off duty improve the image of Air Force NCOs.	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 15%;">REPORTING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">BR</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">BH</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">N/O</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">0</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">2</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">4</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">6</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>INDORSING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="text-align: center;">BR</td> <td style="text-align: center;">BH</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	REPORTING OFFICIAL	BR	BH	N/O	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	INDORSING OFFICIAL	BR	BH											
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
IV. OVERALL EVALUATION

How does he compare with others of his grade and Air Force specialty? Promotion potential is an essential consideration in this rating.	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 15%;">REPORTING OFFICIAL</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">0</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">2</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">3</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">4</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">5</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">6</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">7</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">8</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>INDORSING OFFICIAL</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	REPORTING OFFICIAL	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	INDORSING OFFICIAL										
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V. COMMENTS OF REPORTING OFFICIAL (Be factual and specific. Add any comments which increase the objectivity of the rating.)


FACTS AND SPECIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS: SSgt Stanaland is an exceptionally capable and experienced pararescuer with over 800 hours in the HH-53, and 3 previous SEA combat tours. His physical condition, military bearing, deportment, and professional knowledge all meet the highest standards. SSgt Stanaland served as #1 pararescuer on the first HH-53C committed in Operation Eagle Pull, inserting the USAF Combat Control Team to initiate the operation and extracting the USMC Command Group to close it. As #2 pararescuer of the primary recovery helicopter on the SS American Challenger mission, he participated in a non-stop flight of over 1,500 miles to evacuate a badly injured Marine. During the SS Mayaquez/Koh Tang operation SSgt Stanaland logged 16 hours of combat time in a single day performing impressively under hostile fire. As Standardization pararescuer, he administered 25 check-rides during the reporting period, demonstrating an impressive knowledge of all systems and applicable directives. His administrative duties are performed in a thorough, timely, and efficient manner. STRENGTHS: SSgt Stanaland's enthusiasm and willingness to accept responsibility and to take on the most dangerous and difficult missions are important areas of strength. SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENTS: SSgt Stanaland should be considered for assignment as a pararescue instructor at the 1550TTW, Hill AFB. OTHER COMMENTS: SSgt Stanaland actively supports the EOT program. SSgt Stanaland should be considered for promotion at the earliest opportunity.

VI. REPORTING OFFICIAL

NAME, GRADE AND ORGANIZATION JOHN F. GUILLMARTIN JR., MAJ 521-54-6911FR, 4OARRS (MAC)	DUTY TITLE Operations Officer	SIGNATURE  DATE 9 July 1975
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
VII. INITIAL INDORSING OFFICIAL

Concur. SSgt Stanaland's conduct in the SS Mayaquez/Koh Tang operation perfectly exemplifies his extraordinary effectiveness. During the critical final extraction of an isolated party of Marines and USAF crewmembers, SSgt Stanaland controlled on-loading across the ramp, physically manhandling fully loaded Marines on board while maintaining covering fire with his mini-gun. His aircraft commander demonstrated his confidence in SSgt Stanaland's ability by delegating to him the responsibility to order withdrawal. His confidence in SSgt Stanaland's judgement was fully warranted.

NAME, GRADE AND ORGANIZATION ELDON D. WOODWARD, Lt Col 513-32-1087FR, 4OARRS (MAC)	DUTY TITLE Commander	SIGNATURE  DATE 14 July 1975
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VIII. ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT

Concur. I am aware of the extraordinary record of accomplishment compiled by SSgt Stanaland. His actions in rendering emergency medical aid on the SS American Challenger mission as well as his accomplishments in combat exemplify the highest standards of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service. Promote now.

NAME, GRADE AND ORGANIZATION HAROLD W. WALLACE, JR., Colonel 252-26-5010FR, 41ARRW (MAC)	DUTY TITLE Wing Commander	SIGNATURE  DATE 29 July 1975
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IX. ADDITIONAL INDORSEMENT

NAME, GRADE AND ORGANIZATION	DUTY TITLE	SIGNATURE
		DATE