

IMMEDIATE

PT 00315

OTTSZYUW RHMAAA8894 3410358-SSSS--RUCIMAA

ZNY SSSSS

O 060345Z DEC 72

FM DET 14 40 ARRSQ TSN AB RVN

TO RUMOREA/40 ARRSQ NKP AFLD THAI/DP

ZEN/3RD ARRG TSN AB RVN/DO

RUHHABA/41 ARRWG HICKAM AFB HI/DO

RUCIMAA/HQ ARRS SCOTT AFB IL/DO

RUCIMAA/HQ ARRS SCOTT AFB IL/DOCP

INFO RUMORKA/56 ARRSQ KORAT RTAFB THAI

BT

SECRET

SUBJ: ARRS 55-1 REPORT NO. 2

A. GENERAL STATEMENT: 122MM ROCKET ATTACK ON DETACHMENT 14.

40 ARRSQ.

B. 0745L TO 0900L APPROXIMATELY.

C. TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN

3. DETAILS:

(1) NUMEROUS ROCKETS IMPOUNDED ON TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN.

(2) EFFECT ON UNIT: TWO AIRCRAFT WITH MAJOR DAMAGE. ONE TDY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL KILLED WHILE SEEKING COVER. ONE ASSIGNED MAINTENANCE INDIVIDUAL WOUNDED, SATISFACTORY CONDITION AT USAF HOSP-
PAGE 2 RHMAAA8894 SECRET

ITAL. TAN SON NHUT. DECEASED IS SSGT LOUIS R. TAYLOR.

TDY FROM 56 ARRSQ, KORAT RTAFB, THAILAND. INJURED IS

SSGT ROBERT M. LAIR. EXTENT OF INJURIES: FRAC-

TURED HIP AND NUMEROUS SCHRAPNELL WOUNDS. TWO AIRCRAFT DAMAGED:

HH-43F 63-9714 AND HH-43F 63-9716. NO FIRM REPAIR ESTIMATE

AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

(3) OTHER TWO POSSESSED HH-43'S (64-17559 AND 63-9717) UNDAMAGED.

64-17559 OR, 63-9717 NORM FROM LEFT ROTOR BLADE CHANGE. ETIC

FOR 63-9717 IS 1600L, 6 DEC 72. ALERT COVERAGE FOR BIEN HOA

AB, RVN UNINTERRUPTED. NO ALERT COVERAGE AT TAN SON NHUT AB,

RVN UNTIL 63-9717 IS OR.

(4) MINOR DAMAGE TO DET 14, 40 ARRSQ OPERATIONS/ALLERT FACILITY.

REPAIR IS IN PROGRESS.

E. COMMANDER ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: NEXT OF KIN OF

DECEASED HAS BEEN OR WILL BE NOTIFIED SOON. TWO AIRCRAFT DAN-

AGED SUSTAINED MAJOR DAMAGE. BOTH REQUIRE NEW ENGINES, TRANS-

MISSIONS, SHEET METAL WORK AMONG OTHER PARTS. MORE DETAILED

INSPECTION WILL BE COMPLETED WHEN DAMAGED PARTS ARE REMOVED

TO FACILITATE INSPECTION.

GDS-DEC 80

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MESSAGE NOTIFICATION

Individual
Contacted:

Local Time
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CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
Or Changed to *CONFIDENTIAL*
By Authority of *685*
By *7/16* *5/19/85*
09 *28/7/85*
10

DATE: 10 Dec 72

MISSION NUMBER: 40-121

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FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 01 (Low) and Jolly Green 02 (High)

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Rescue and recovery of downed F-4 Crewmembers call sign Kansas 01B.

ADDITIONAL SAR FORCES: King 21, King 22, and Sandy 01 thru 08.

SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS: (3) We were launched at 2345 (0645L), 10 Dec 72, to aid in the recovery of Kansas 01B, a backseater of a F-4 reconnaissance aircraft. Voice contact had been established and the SAR forces were directed to the area. We proceeded direct to point Bravo with Jolly 02 to rendezvous with King 22 for an aerial refueling. At the completion of the A/R we continued on to point Mike arriving at 0105Z (0805L). We held for a short period prior to moving on to point Lima, arriving there at 0120Z (0820L). We headed back to point Mike after it became obvious we would need to refuel prior to starting our run in. This was due to the fuel situation of the Sandy plus the fact that Jolly 03, our back-up bird had developed maintenance problems. After completing this A/R we returned to point Lima at 0235Z (0935L). We subsequently departed Lima arriving at point X-ray at 0300Z (1000L). Again we entered an orbit awaiting further instructions from Sandy and King. We were met by Sandy eight who advised he would lead us in with all the Sandys with the exception of Sandys four and five who were to remain with Jolly 02 at point X-ray. I was instructed to take up a heading of 160° and to remain at altitude until the undercast dissipated. At that time I was told to take it down on the deck, which I did. The Sandys initially set up an excellent

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Sanford's Guide
Classified by *10 SEN 003*
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON *14 Dec 81*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cover on the low level run in. They seemed to get a wider pattern as the run in continued, to the point at time where we had no cover at all. In fact they had to relocate me on three separate occasions during the run-in. After much confusion and vectoring I was told to head 090° and asked if I saw the smoke at the survivor. I answered in the affirmative. Believing the smoke that I saw was the smoke mark near the survivors, but in fact it was smoke laid down by the Sandys to cover my run in. In retrospect I believe I went into a hover approximately 4 to 5 kilometers to the south of the survivors true position. The physical layout matched that of the description given by the Sandys. That is a bowl shaped valley running north and south marked by smoke to the west of the survivor. I entered a hover at 0340Z (1040L) over what I thought was the survivors position. I made numerous attempts to contact the survivor on guard and SAR delta two different times Kansas 01B answered by calling "Jolly Green 01 this is Kansas 01B". I could not get him to give directions or pop his smoke. Again in retrospect I believe his refusal was due to the fact I was no where near him. He in fact probably could neither hear or see me. Again looking back it seems the two times he answered me was only when I pulled up high enough for my radio transmissions to clear the ridge. I hover taxied over the entire bowl area, this taking about twenty minutes. Several times the survivor came up on beeper. Utilizing my ADF/UEF I found the survivor to be due north of my position. Each time I hovered to the north rim of the bowl in an attempt to locate him I was unsuccessful regardless of every attempt made to hover slow and low over the area. One of the Sandys said the survivor was just to the east edge of the smoke, so I proceeded to hover to the extreme right edge of the smoke hoping to

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get a visual on the survivor. It was here we received our first ground fire wounding the co-pilot. I immediately called out the ground fire and the number one gunner opened fire. The enemy appeared to be both below us and on the side of the bowl above us. The round that hit Capt Boyd, my co-pilot, was fired almost horizontal at us from the hill. He started bleeding profusely and was instructed by me to apply a tourniquet to the thigh. He was unable to reach his tourniquet on his survival vest due to his chest armor plating being in the way. I called for a PJ to assist Capt Boyd from his seat and administered first aid. By this time the cockpit was covered with blood. As Capt Boyd was climbing out of his seat, in fact almost as soon as he was hit I initiated a right turn away from the hill and started my egress from the area. The time was 0400Z (1100L) although I called ground fire on the UHF radio to the best of my knowledge I received no support from the Sandys. Again, this leads me to believe they were working in another area. After climbing over the north-south ridge I requested vectors to egress the area. I do not now remember the heading, but I believe it to be 270°. The Sandys immediately started laying down ordnance and marking my route with white phosphorous rockets, which worked extremely well for route identification. The only problem that I really had was that due to my low altitude (25-50ft) I was unable to detect villages or populated areas until I was directly over them and it was too late to take evasive action. Only once or twice was I directed to turn left or turn right to avoid personnel. On the run out I received extensive small arms fire, taking 29 rounds or fragments through the aircraft. It was also during the run out that one of my pararescuemen, Sgt Morgan, was wounded in the right upper arm. During the run out a 37MM round exploded near the left side of the ramp, peppering the aircraft with holes.

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Sgt Walsh, my flight mechanic, climbed into the door seat in an attempt to assist me in the handling of the aircraft. He provided immeasurable assistance and encouragement during this most critical phase of low level egress. With two wounded and one PJ assisting them this left the entire security of the aircraft in the hands of the combat photographer, Sgt Cockerill. His superior skill and expertise with the mini-gun more than once suppressed small arms ground fire around us. Again on the run out, as on the run in, we were lost to the Sandys due to the terrain and low visibility of the helicopter. At one time I was progressing due north unaccompanied for over ten minutes. I was in fairly rough terrain and had no problem with ground fire. However, I did come out of the Karst and broke out into a large open valley which appeared to be populated from side to side. So populated in fact that I could not avoid the towns. I ended up flying down what appeared to be a main street. I then started calling for Sandy assistance and for vectors out of the area. I made it to the other side of the valley and into the Karst after receiving intense ground fire. I was successful in obtaining assistance from the Sandys after giving them three DF steers to my position. I ended up arriving at point X-ray from the north when I should have been arriving from the south. Arrival time at X-ray was 0430Z (1130L). I re-joined with Jolly 02 and proceeded to NKP via points Lima and Mike. During our egress we discovered that number one engine was leaking oil badly and eventually it did fail due to oil starvation and caught fire during our flight home. Jolly 02 flew in close formation with us and determined that both tip tanks were leaking fuel and the right outboard tire was deflated due to battle damage. Our utility hydraulics

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failed also due to battle damage. We arrived at NKP at 0530Z (1230L) after shut down we discovered that one of the main rotor blades had been damaged through the main spar. Both persons wounded were air evaced to Udorn AB, Thailand and are in satisfactory condition.

COMMENTS: I feel that the most significant contributing factor to the confusion that resulted in the unsuccessful attempt to recover the downed crewmember is the low visibility of a HH-53C helicopter. A method needs to be devised that will give better visibility. I propose a extremely brilliant strobe light located on top the horizontal stabilizer than can be controlled from the cockpit. The possibility of introducing oil into the engine to produce smoke should also be considered. But most important of all is the fact that something needs to be done now, not tomorrow. Contributing factors to the confusion was too much chatter on the SAR primary, That freq should be reserved for the survivor, Sandy 01, Jolly 01, and the Sandy leading the Jolly. All others should be on FM. Another factor was too many Sandys on the run in and out causing the pattern around the Jolly to be too big and unwieldy. I appreciate the cover and the desire of all to participate, but I believe the Sandys could have been better utilized in flights of four. This would keep the size of the pattern down and make the extra Sandys available for big gun suppression. Additional training and co-ordination is needed with the Sandys and the Jolly Greens.

Louis E. Campbell
LOUIS E. CAMPBELL, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander

Classification (category, change to) UNCLASSIFIED
effective on 10/5/86, by 10/5/86/14125
under the authority of M. J. JAMES

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CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED (JOLLY 01)

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Capt Campbell, Louis E Aircraft Commander
Capt Boyd, Stephen D. Co-pilot
Sgt Walsh, James F. Flight Engineer
SSgt Goodlett, Donald H. Jr. Pararescue Specialist
Sgt Morgan, Dale W. Pararescue Specialist
Sgt Cockerill, James W Photographer

AIRCRAFT INVOLVED

King 21
King 22
Sandys 01 thru 08
Jolly Green 01
Jolly Green 02

CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED (JOLLY 02)

Capt Bradley, Roger C Aircraft Commander
Lt Rovito, Gilbert A. Co-pilot
SSgt Bryant, Tommie K Jr Flight Engineer
TSgt Salome, Charles F. Pararescue Specialist
SSgt Kusnicki, Kenneth J. Pararescue Specialist
A1C Baumgardner, Melvin A. Jr Photographer

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MISSION NARRATIVE (RCS: V-6)

DATE: 10 Dec 72

MISSION NUMBER:

effective on 10 Dec 72, under the authority of
1013500000 by M. J. J. J.

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 04

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Rescue & Recovery of Kansas 01 Bravo

At 0050Z, 10 Dec 72, Jolly Green 04 launched with Jolly Green 03 in support of Kansas 01B SAR. We proceeded to holding point Mike for aerial refueling and backup orbit. Refueling was initiated at 0200Z and at the termination of aerial refueling, Jolly Green 03 experienced a main transmission chip light. This aircraft then proceeded to channel 89 and Jolly Green 05 was launched to replace 03. At point Mike, Jolly Green 04 monitored the progress of Jolly Green 01 while making his run in; hover, and egress. While in a hover searching for the survivor, Jolly Green 01 received extensive battle damage and small arm wounds to two crewmembers. At that time Jolly Green 01 egressed the area and, escorted by Jolly 02, proceeded to channel 89. The egress of Jolly Green 01 started about 0330Z. Jolly Green 05 arrived at point Bravo at 0330Z and refueling was accomplished for Jolly Green 04 and 05 at 0345Z. As Jolly Green 04 was making a disconnect at the end of refueling, we received ground fire from a point five miles South of point Mike. This hostile fire, in the opinion of TSgt Young the #3 P.J. was two unguided rockets. They exploded at altitude behind us and had white smoke upon detonation. This fire was reported by TSgt Young. Breakaway from the tanker was expedited and evasive action was taken. Refueling continued with Jolly Green 05 as we returned to point Bravo. Around 0600Z, the decision was made to attempt another run-in for the survivor. Jolly Green 04 and 05 accomplished refueling at that time in preparation for another try for the survivor. Refueling terminated at 0630Z. For the next 14

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hours, the Sandys refined the position of the survivor and called for strikes in that proximity. The ingress of Jolly Green 04 began at 0810Z from point Lima and was made at low level, high speed. It had been determined earlier during test fire, that one of the miniguns was inoperative. The operative guns had been positioned at the #1 and #3 positions and these guns were used by the P.J.'s to suppress ground fire on the ingress. Jolly Green 04 was further supported by 3 A-7's, Slam Flight. Slam Flight did a good job of protection and leading the helicopter to the area of the objective. They prepared the ingress route with ordinance and used the terrain to effectively mask the position of the helicopter. A couple of major problems were encountered on the ingress. During the morning the pilot had been experiencing intermittent UHF and FM reception and during the low level ingress this problem worsened to a great extent. During this critical phase of the rescue attempt, the copilot, Capt Bouterse, although this was only his first alert tour, gave invaluable assistance to the pilot by relaying instructions from the A-7's. Occasionally Capt Bouterse got on the controls to expedite the urgent vectors of Slam Flight when there was not enough time to relay the instructions to the pilot. Once in the area of the survivor and during egress, the pilot's receiver was functional. Another problem encountered during ingress was loss of visual contact with the Jolly Green by the A-7's. On several occasions the Jolly was completely unescorted due to Slam Flight losing sight of us. This problem was partially alleviated by TSgt Young firing a flare from the ramp when the A-7's lost sight of the helicopter. During the ingress, Jolly Green 04 followed the vectors of the A-7's until we were in the area of the survivor. We overshot the location by about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile due to some radio confusion of the Sandys. We held on the North

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[REDACTED]

side of the ridge that the survivor was on until the Sandy marked the survivor's approximate location with a marker rocket. At this time we proceeded to the marker smoke while the Sandy was calling for the survivor to pop his marker smoke. As soon as we got to the Sandy's marker rocket smoke I could see the survivor's smoke at my two o'clock position about 30 to 50 yards from the helicopter. I hovered to that location and the flight engineer deployed the penetrator to within five feet of the survivor. According to accounts of the flight engineer, Sgt Smith and the photographer, TSgt Looper, the man on the ground was sitting up, on the ground with his knees up to his chest and his head on his knees. He never made any move toward the penetrator nor did he ever look up at the helicopter. Immediately upon establishing a hover we started taking intense ground fire. The Sandys set up a protective "Daisy Chain" and were expending their ordinance around the helicopter. Due to the close proximity of some of the ground fire, all of it could not be silenced. The survivor was located on the side of a hill and we were taking ground fire from the hill above us from 6 to about 10 o'clock, from directly beneath the helicopter and from 12 jto about 4 o'clock down the slope. One round severed an electric wire bundle making the #1 mini-gun completely inoperative. The severed wires also gave cockpit indications of loss of utility hydraulic pressure as well as loss of other equipment such as RHAW gear, etc. When the #1 gun was rendered inoperative by the ground fire, the #3 mini-gun jammed due to a bent round. This left us with three mini-guns completely inoperative in the hover over the objective. TSgt Young and Sgt Gonzales, the P.J's, immediately started firing their CAR-15 rifles to afford as much protection as possible for the helicopter. In addition, TSgt Looper manned the M-60 machine gun at the #2

3

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door to provide protection for Sgt Smith while he was operating the hoist. After about one minute and 15 seconds in the hover, we took a small arm round that penetrated the fuel filter on #2 engine and created a fire on that engine. We stayed in a hover for approximately 10 seconds longer trying to afford the survivor as much of an opportunity as possible to get on the penetrator. After Sgt Smith had reported the fire twice, I instructed him to shear the hoist cable as the survivor was not on the penetrator. This was accomplished and departure from the area was initiated. By this time the Sandys reported the engine fire on Jolly Green 04. After attaining some forward speed, Capt Bouterse was instructed to shut down #2 engine. Shutdown was complicated by the fact that the #2 engine instruments were frozen indicating normal operation although the #2 engine caution lights were illuminated on the caution panel. Capt Bouterse moved #2 throttle to idle slowly and, ascertaining no additional power loss, completed engine shutdown. A single engine egress was initiated following the vectors of the Sandys and the egress route was approximately the same as the ingress route. About three minutes into the egress TSgt Looper received a superficial wound from a small arms round. The round broke the skin of his right side beneath his arm. TSgt Young rendered aid to TSgt Looper. The Sandy flight covering us on the egress did a fantastic job. They never lost sight of the helicopter and they were expending their ordinance in advance of us. The egress continued to point Lima where Jolly Green 04 and 05 rejoined. From Lima we proceeded to point Mike and Jolly Green 04 joined with King 23 for a single engine refueling. Refueling started at 1330Z and lasted five minutes. Jolly Green 04, 05, 06 and 07 returned to channel 89

[REDACTED]

and landed at 1445Z. We terminated the mission with a single engine landing. Each member of the crew is to be commended for the fine job performed by each as mentioned. Perhaps more important was the part each played in making it such a co-ordinated effort. Each man realized his area of responsibility and responded to each task in the highest tradition of Rescue and the United States Air Force. Special commendation goes to Capt Bouterse who aided the pilot immeasurably by flying the aircraft when necessary during critical phases of the rescue attempt and by relaying vital communications to the pilot during ingress. Capt Bouterse did this with a minimum of confusion at critical times. Special commendation also goes to TSgt Looper and TSgt Young. In complete disregard for his own safety, TSgt Looper chose to discard his camera for an M-60 machine gun which he put to good use covering Sgt Smith who was operating the hoist during the rescue attempt. As a result of his gallant actions, TSgt Looper was wounded on the egress. TSgt Young, in addition to suppressing ground fire on the ingress, fired flares each time the Sandys lost sight of the helicopter. When his gun jammed in the hover, TSgt Young immediately started firing his CAR-15 rifle to afford all the protection he could. As soon as egress was initiated he used his knife to extract the bent round which had jammed his gun. This provided him with a functional gun once more. When TSgt Looper was wounded, TSgt Young immediately went to his aid and made him lie down. Upon determining the wound to be superficial, TSgt Young made TSgt Looper comfortable and went back to his mini-gun for ground fire suppression during the remainder of the egress. Sgt Smith is to be commended for exposing himself to the intense ground fire during hover while searching for the survivor's location from the personnel door. Sgt Smith and Sgt Gonzales displayed maturity well above their experience level. They both performed their jobs with coolness

[REDACTED]

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and precision and their efforts added greatly to the over all co-ordination of the mission. This was the first mission for Capt Rish, Capt Bouterse, Sgt Smith and Sgt Gonzales.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. We recommend some device that can be controlled in the cockpit that would assure visual sighting of the helicopter by the Sandys. This could be in the form of a smoke generator, high intensity strobe light or a method of producing smoke from the engines.
2. This is another mission which proves that electronic location finder (ELF) is essential to any rescue. If ELF had been available, the survivors exact location could have been determined on the first attempt increasing the possibility of success and possibly eliminating the need for the second try.
3. We recommend that the Sandys expend ordinance in the area of the survivor as soon as they see the survivor's smoke. Its not necessary to wait for the Jolly to call ground fire because, as in our case, the ground fire was from all quadrants and it incapacitated the helicopter after one to one and one half

minutes in the hover.

Wyman M. Rish
WYMAN M. RISH, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander

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BOB

I don't know if any of this will help you, maybe you'll just enjoy reading it. I was on Capt. Rossi's acft.

AC Rossi

CP (Rocky) Revillo (Later lost in Laos)

FE Sanders

PI Walker

PI Musnicki

Photo Name unknown (He was TDY from the states)

Harry's acft.

AC

CP

FE

PI Werber

PI Natus

We were egressing across the Black River, we were second in the formation. Harry's acft was at our 1:00 about 400yds. We passed over a spot that we had used before, they had brought up a 9 level gunner. With just a couple burst he hit Harry's acft with one round and our ACFT

The round that hit Harry's acft passed through the right aux tank, then passed through the left acft wall, then hit Harry in the ass, he was at the left gun position. The .51 passed through him. Werber said that when he opened Harry's flight suit, to look for an exit wound, he found the round was just beneath the skin. The round that hit our acft did pass through the triple tach, exploding the glass into a fine mist. This caused some glass to get into Capt. Rossi's eye, (He had to go to the Philippines, his eye was taken out of its socket, the socket was cleaned out, eye popped back). When the round passed through the triple tach it hit the Photo in the helmet. It hit the center screw on his visor mount (The screw punched through and caused a 3" to 4" laceration on his scalp) The bullet ricocheted straight up it hit the throttle cables. This caused the engines to over speed. All I know about it is that the acft pitched straight up (Capt. Rossi had the pedal to the metal, we was booking), needless to say that, I was on the ramp so it got my attention quick. That was a sight that I will never forget, looking straight out the ramp and seeing the ground perpendicular to MEH.

I looked toward the front of the acft, the first thing that I saw was smoke (actually it was the glass from the exploded triple tach). The next thing that registered was Capt Rossi saying over intercom "We're going in" I thought to myself "nobody says 'We're going in' that calmly". I saw Sanders lean around, and look into the cockpit, he said "You got two good engines, keep flying". The Photo who had been standing & leaning into the cockpit, turned around and started to take his helmet off (the plastic helmet). (His head helmet was on the floor at his feet), by the time it was half way off there was blood down to his waist. "He is dead" I thought. Mike Walker started to treat him. While all this was going on, I was running around in little circles on the ramp, saying "Oh my god" multiple times. I was getting all the spare ammo that I could, in pockets around my neck in my teeth, I was taking anything I thought I would need on my run back to NKP. I went up to the front to see what I could do, I picked up the Photo's helmet, it had a hole clean through it. "Oh yeah, He is really dead" I said to myself. Once we got back to level flight, Harry's acft was passing on a sit rep, conditions of all acft & number & condition of the wounded, this is when we found out about Harry. It was determined that we would land at Lima site 16 to have Harry taken care of. Prior to landing lead acft once again passed the number of wounded, Capt Rossi passed that we had two wounded on our acft. Everyone on board kind of looked at each other to figure out who the other wounded was. It was only then that we found out

that Capt. Rossi was injured. He had flown over an hour without telling anyone.

Mike Walker informed Capt Rossi, that he was staying with Harry, period. We all shut down. Harry and our Photo were taken to the Hospital. I was talking to Werber & Nunus, and they told me that Harry was lying on the floor, literally bleeding to death, and he was still telling the pilots what to do about the fuel leak, and how to transfer.

Someone came out of the hospital, asking everyone what their blood type was. It seems that Harry was AB neg. Well no one was, so orders were that our acft was to fly to Udorn to pick some up there. The arrangements were being made by JSOC. Well Capt Rossi, Revito, Sanders & me, got cranked and were on our way to Udorn. We were told that everything was fixed up and that a truck would meet us on the ramp with the blood. Well we landed at Udorn and no truck, we called the tower and they told us that the hospital called to say that since we didn't have a Doctor on board, they couldn't release the blood to us. Capt. Rossi started bitching but the tower said that there was nothing they could do. Sanders told Capt Rossi to get some transportation, that we would go to the hospital and convince them. Sanders and I got out weapons, we were about to leave the acft, when we received a call on HF that a donor had been found for Harry. There was no thought about any consequences, our buddy was dying and some rear echelon MF's were worried about paper work.

The doctor at 16 remembered that one of the spooks in the hills, was Harry's blood type he called him in. The way they tell the story, that troop walked in the door, the doctor met him pushed up his sleeve with one hand, and punched the needle with the other hand. They said he had half a pint out of that guy before he was laid down.

To the best of my recollection this is what happened. "NO SHIT"

Kenneth J. Musnicki
60 Silva Dr.
Ft. Walton Beach, Fl.
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(850) 244-5581

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TH 4CARE SQ NKP RTAFB THAILAND

TO PAXAAA/TAF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN/DOY

TEL: 7RUHHABA/41AR2WC HICKAM AFB HAWAII/30

RHHXAAA/3A RRG P TAN SON NHUT RVN/DC

RUCIMAA/ARBS SCOTT AFB IL/DO

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SUBJ: COMBAT DAMAGE REPORT.

1. 1972 DEC 10.
2. KANSAS O1B SAR MISSION #40/121.
3. 4H-53C
4. 6905793 USAF
5. NKP 40 ARRSQ 41 ARRWG
6. HOVER SAR ORBIT POINT SMALL ARMS AND EGRESS AT 140K.
7. MAJOR-ENGINE CHANGE, SHEET METAL WORK, ROTOR BLADE CHANGE, AUX TANK CHANGE, WHEEL ASSEMBLY CHANGE AND ELECTRICAL WORK.
8. SMALL ARMS AND POSSIBLE 57MM.
9. HOVER SEARCH AND HIGH SPEED EGRESS FROM SAR AREA.
10. SAR SEARCH AREA.

PAGE 2 RUMOREA2337 C O N F I D E N T I A L

11. 50 FT AGL
12. 1916N 10528E
13. 0300Z
14. 6
15. CREW MEMBER NO 1 NO INJURIES.
16. CREW MEMBER NO 2 BULLET WOUND UPPER LEFT LEG.
17. CREW MEMBER NO 3 NO INJURIES.
18. CREW MEMBER NO 4 NO INJURIES.
19. CREW MEMBER NO 5 BULLET WOUND RIGHT ARM UPPER.
20. CREW MEMBER NO 6 NO INJURIES.

31 DEC 1980.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 3/10/78

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Deposited by D.M.
11 Dec 72
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Leaked 55-1 Report MSN: 40-121

Inventory 17 Jan 78

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54
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25

OTTELYUW RUMOREA2100 3450935-SSSC--FUCTFAA.

7NY 55555

01038507 REC 72

FM 404RPS BAKHON PHAMON RTAFB THAT
TO RUMHARA CTINCP/CAF/JRCC/HONOLU HI/DO

RUMHARA/AFB 07/0001 AFB IL/DOOP

RUMHARA/41 RRWG HICKAM AFB HI/SE

RUMHARA/3A RGP TEN AF RVN/DO

BT

SECRET 700

SUBJ: APRS 55-1, MISHAP REPORT NO. 54 (U)

A. JOLLY GREEN 01 INVOLVED IN SAR FOR KANSAS 01B RECEIVING BATTLE
DAMAGE WHILE IN HOVER NEAR SURVIVOR AND DURING EGRESS.

B. 10 DEC 72 APPROXIMATELY 0300Z

C. LOCATION: 1916N 10528E

D. DETAILS

(1) AFTER APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES OF HOVER SEARCHING FOR
THE SURVIVOR JOLLY GREEN 01 BEGAN TAKING EXTENSIVE SMALL ARMS
FIRE FROM RIDGE LINE AND THE COPILOT WAS WOUNDED IN THE LEFT LEG.
THE AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATELY EGRESSED THE AREA AND DURING THE RUN OUT
PILOT WAS WOUNDED.

(2) NONE

PAGE 2 RUMREAZ100 SECRET

(3) ENEMY SMALL ARMS FIRE.

(4) CREW OF JOLLY GREEN 01

(5) LOSS OF SAR CAPABILITY OF ONE AIRCRAFT AND 2 CREW MEMBERS
(1 PILOT, 1 PJ).

(6) N/A

(7) UNKNOWN-MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS.

(8) N/A

(9) AIRCRAFT INVOLVED

(A) HH-53C ONE HELICOPTER INVOLVED

(B) KANSAS 01B SAR

(C) 4905793

(D) CAPT CAMPBELL, LOUIS E.

(E) 6

(F) 2 WOUNDED: 4 NO INJURIES (CORCHIE BOND* PT, SGT MORGAN)

(G) VFR

(H) COPILOT SUSTAINED BULLET WOUND OF LEFT THIGH-COMPLET

PENETRATION NO FRACTURE. PJ SUSTAINED BULLET WOUND OF RIGHT
UPPER ARM COMPLETE PENETRATION NO FRACTURE.

(I) EMERGENCY AID RENDERED BY PARARESCUE SPECIALIST.

(J) N/A

PAGE 3 RUMREAZ100 SECRET

E. N/A

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By ~~W~~ (Date) 14/2/75

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1 Dec 72
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40-121

RF-4C / 2POB

IMMEDIATE

PMT 01163 345 106529
OTTSZYUW RUMOREA2031 3451015-SSSS--RUCPAAA.
ZNY SSSSS
O 101832Z DEC 72
FM 404005/RCC/NKP RTAFB THAI
TO ATC 7940
RUMOREA/14TBS UDORN RTAFB THAI
BT

Classification (cancelled) changed to UNCLASSIFIED
effective on 10/11/85 under the authority of
1350/10052 by 110/10052
110/10052

S E C R E T / JOPREP JIFFY/404005-RCC/RESCUE 300/101700Z DEC 72. SECT 1

1. (U) RESCUE PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER ONE.
2. (U) MISSION NUMBER: 40-121 OF DEC 72.
3. (S) SITUATION: KANSAS 01 (RF-4C) DOWNED BY SAM IN
ROUTE BACK TO NORTH VIETNAM. VOICE CONTACT ESTABLISHED
WITH BRAVO MAN AND LATER LOST.

C. PERSONNEL INFORMATION:

(1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED: 2 MISSING.
(2) LOCATING AGENCY:

(C) KANSAS 01 BRAVO LOCATED BY JOLLY GREEN 60
AT 100836Z COORDINATES APPROXIMATELY 1015N 10531E.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY THIS DATE:

(1) 404005 7 SORTIES FOR 37.3 HOURS.
(2) 554005 3 SORTIES FOR 27.0 HOURS.
(3) 354 TFW 33 SORTIES FOR 202.9 HOURS.
(4) AFW 16 SORTIES FOR 70.0 HOURS.
PAGE 2 RUMOREA2031 S E C R E T
(5) 432TRW 13 SORTIES FOR 69.8 HOURS.
(6) 42TFW 4 SORTIES FOR 20.2 HOURS.
(7) 552AEWC 2 SORTIES FOR 7.4 HOURS.
(8) 388TFW 17 SORTIES FOR 85.1 HOURS.

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By 110/10052 (Date) 28/5/85

F. SAVES DATA THIS DATE: NO SAVES.

G. FUTURE PLANS:

(1) ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH VOICE CONTACT WITH
SURVIVOR BY FAST FAC SCHEDULED TO CHECK THE AREA AT 1900Z
AND 2300Z. IF SURVIVORS ARE IDENTIFIED TOMORROW DENIAL
ORDNANCE WILL BE USED TO ISOLATE THE AREA DURING THE DAY.
A FORCE EQUIVALENT TO TODAY'S FORCE IS FRAGGED FOR QUICK
REACTION AS REQUIRED. WHEN THE AREA IS ADEQUATELY SURP-
RESSED ANOTHER ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE BY JOLLY GREENS. DUE
TO LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL ARMS IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE
A PICKUP IN DAYLIGHT SO PLANS ARE BEING MADE FOR A NIGHT
RECOVERY SYSTEM MISSION TOMORROW NIGHT. A PREREQUISITE OF
NRE ATTEMPT WILL BE TO KILL RADAR CONTROLLED GUNS NEAR THE
OBJECTIVE AREA.

(2) SAR FORCES AVAILABLE FOR 11 DEC 72.

(A) 4/HH-53 404005.

PAGE 3 RUMOREA2031 S E C R E T

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(2) 2/HO-170P 56 APPS.

(C) 1F/A-7 354TFW.

(D) NUMEROUS FAST MOVERS.

G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:

(1) CONTACT WAS LOST WITH KANSAS 01 BRAVO AFTER
0930Z 09 DEC 72. A DETAILED PLAN USING NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT
WAS PREPARED AND FRAGGED BY 7AF BASED UPON REESTABLISHING
CONTACT WITH THE SURVIVORS. NO CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED
THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, HOWEVER THE BRAVO MAN DID COME UP TO
TALK WITH WOLF 03 AT 092250Z. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS
ESTABLISHED BY USE OF ONE AUTHENTICATOR QUESTION WHICH WAS
ANSWERED PROPERLY. THE INITIAL SAR FORCES BEGAN LAUNCHING
AT 092234Z AND LAUNCHED IN INTERVALS TO PROVIDE A SMOOTH
FLOW TO THE SAR AREA. SAR FORCES INCLUDED 4 HH-53 JOLLY
GREEN, 23 A-7, AND OTHER SUPPORT AIRCRAFT THAT INCLUDED
FAC, STRIKE, SMOKE, MISCAP, IRONHAND, HUNTER KILLER, AEW
(DTSCG), ECM, AND TANKER SUPPORT. INITIALLY, UNTIL APPROX-
IMATELY 0200Z, THE FAC AND SANDY 1 (A-7) WERE ALONE IN THE
AREA TO LOCATE AND PINPOINT THE SURVIVOR. AT 0212Z SANDY 1
HAD A GOOD LOCATION AND JOLLY GREEN 32/52 FLIGHT WAS MOVED
PAGE 4 RUMORFA2031 S E C R E T
TO INITIAL HOLDING POINT FOR RUN IN. ENEMY ACTIVITY
INCREASED IMMEDIATELY AFTER AND SANDY 06 WAS APPOINTED ON
SCENE COMMANDER TO QUIET THIS ACTIVITY WHILE JOLLY GREEN 32/
52 AND SANDY 01 RETURNED TO TANKERS FOR FUEL. SANDY 06
DIRECTED IN AREA DENIAL ORDNANCE TO ATTEMPT TO QUIET BOGS
AND PEOPLE THE SURVIVOR REPORTED WITHIN 100 YARDS OF HIM.
AT 0250Z THE AREA WAS QUIET AGAIN AS SANDY 01 AND JOLLY
GREEN 32 RETURNED TO THE AREA FROM TANKERS. EXECUTE WAS
STARTED AT 0313Z. SANDY 06 LED JOLLY GREEN 32 TO THE AREA
WHILE OTHER SANDY AIRCRAFT AND A-7 AIRCRAFT WITH SMOKE
LOADS WERE EXPENDED ALONG THE ROUTE OF FLIGHT AND THE
SURVIVORS AREA. AT APPROXIMATELY 0333Z THE SURVIVOR WAS
REQUESTED TO POP HIS SMOKE MARKER. FOR SOME UNKNOWN REASON
THE SURVIVOR DID NOT ACCOMPLISH THIS AND JOLLY GREEN COULD
NOT LOCATE HIM. JOLLY GREEN 32 SEARCHED THE AREA FOR 20
MINUTES IN AN EFFORT TO LOCATE THE SURVIVOR WITH NEGATIVE
RESULTS. AFTER 20 MINUTES JOLLY GREEN 32 BEGAN TAKING HEAVY
SMALL ARMS FIRE AND SOME 37MM FIRE. THE COPILOT WAS SHOT
IN THE LEG AND ONE PJ WAS SHOT IN THE ARM. SANDY 01 LED
JOLLY GREEN 32 FROM THE AREA. THE FORCES RECEIVED HEAVY
PAGE 5 RUMORFA2031 S E C R E T
GROUND FIRE DURING EGRESS. JOLLY GREEN 32 FLIGHT RETURNED TO
NAKHON PHANOM LANDING AT 0545Z. THE INJURED PERSONNEL WERE
TREATED AND LATER EVACUATED TO THE USAF HOSPITAL AT UDORN
RTAFB. AFTER JOLLY GREEN 32 DEPARTED THE AREA, SANDY 02

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AND SANDY 03 INGRESSED BACK INTO THE AREA TO REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE SURVIVOR. AS CONTACT WAS SUCCESSFUL. ALL SAR FORCES REGROUPED WHILE THE DAMAGED JOLLY GREEN RETURNED.

JOLLY GREEN 60/73 REPLACED 72/52 AND MOVED TO INITIAL HOLDING POINT. EXPENDED AIRCRAFT WERE REPLACED WITH LOADED AIRCRAFT. VOICE CONTACT WITH KANSAS 01 BRAVO WAS VERIFIED BY ANOTHER AUTHENTICATOR QUESTION AT 0814Z. AT 0725Z JOLLY GREEN 60/73 WERE MOVED FORWARD TO THE ADVANCED HOLDING POINT WHILE BLUE 52, ORU 49 AND ORU 52 WERE LAID IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA. JOLLY GREEN 60 WAS ESCORTED INTO THE AREA ARRIVING AT 0832Z. SANDY LEAD MARKED THE SURVIVOR LOCATION WITH A WP (WHITE PHOSPHORUS) ROCKET WHICH THE SURVIVOR REPORTED TO BE 40 FEET AWAY. JOLLY GREEN 60 APPROACHED THE WP AND ASKED 01 BRAVO TO POP HIS SMOKE. SMOKE APPEARED APPROXIMATELY 20 YARDS AWAY. JOLLY MOVED TOWARD THE SMOKE AND FOUND A MAN IN A FLIGHT SUIT SQUATTING IN THE UNDER-PAGE 6 PUMORA2031 S E C R E T GROWTH WITH HIS HEAD DOWN. THE PENETRATOR WAS LOWERED TO THE GROUND APPROXIMATELY 5 FEET FROM THE SURVIVOR BUT HE MADE NO MOVE. NO RADIO OR FLARE CANNISTER WAS SCENE INFAIRY. DURING THE HOVER GROUND FIRE WAS BEING TAKEN FROM ALL QUAD-POINTS. THE LEFT MNT GUN WAS DISABLED BY THE GROUND FIRE AND THE PARASCUEMAN (PJ) RESUMED FIRE WITH 9 CLIPS THROUGH HIS AR15 RIFLE. AT 0839Z NR 2 ENGINE RECEIVED HEAVY DAMAGE AND OPERATED ONLY LONG ENOUGH FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO ESTABLISH FLYING SPEED. THE COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHER ALSO RECEIVED A MINOR WOUND DURING THE ENCOUNTER. ALL FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN AS JOLLY GREEN EXPRESSED; EXPENDED AIRCRAFT WERE RET'D. SANDY 13/16 RETURNED AT 0915Z BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH CONTACT. ALL FORCES WERE RET'D AT 0937Z EXCEPT KING 01 AMC. OWL 01 (F-4) MADE A COMMUNICATION SEARCH AT 1030Z USING BOTH ENGLISH AND SPANISH (THE SURVIVORS SECOND LANGUAGE) BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL. NO CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE WITH KANSAS 01 ALPHA. A DEBRIEF OF THE JOLLY GREEN 60 CREW REVEALED THAT THE CROUCHED MAN HAD BROWN HAIR, A BAD SUNBURN ON HIS NECK AND PROBABLY A COTTON FLIGHT SUIT WITHOUT SURVIVAL VEST; KANSAS 01 BRAVO HAS BLACK HAIR 005 31 DEC 83.

BT

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DEMT 01161 345 195425
DTTSZYIW RUMOREA2032 3451918-SSSS-2UOPAA6.
O 171832Z DEC 72
FM 40ARRS/RCC/NKP RTAFB THAI
TO AIG 7940
RUMOSRA/14TBS UDORN RTAFB THAI
BT
S F C D E T/JOPPER JIFFY/40ARRS-RCC/RESCUE 300/101700Z DEC 72. FINAL
SEC 2 OF 2
AND NOMEX FLIGHT SUIT.
(2) AREA SEARCHED: 10NM 1015N 10531E.
(3) KING 71 ASSUMED AMC AT 092240Z. NOTE: DISCO
ACTED AS COMMUNICATION RELAY PRIOR TO KING ASSUMING AMC.
(4) 16 AERIAL REFUELINGS WERE ACCOMPLISHED THIS
DATE IN SUPPORT OF MISSION.
(5) NO AUXILIARY SAP EQUIPMENT WAS USED THIS DATE
IN SUPPORT OF MISSION.
GDS 31 DEC 80.
BT
#2032
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CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
On Changed to CONFIDENTIAL
By LA5
By LA5 (Date) 28/9/15

Classification (change) changed to UNCLASS
effective on 11/10/15, under the authority of
CSA/NO 52 by MEJ 10/15-AP 25

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*Inventory
17 Jan 74*

WAC

01Z LYON RUMOREA2324 3401032-5555--RUCIMAA

7N 10555

0 100100Z DEC 72

FM 40ARRSQ NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAILAND

TO COMHABAF/SINOPACAF JCRC HONOLULU HAWAII/CC

FM 10AAA/ARSO SCOTT AFB IL/CC

FM 10ABA/41ARSO HICKAM AFB HAWAII/CC

FM 10AAA/3ARRSQ TAN SON NHUT AB VIETNAM/CC

BT

S E C R E T

SUBJ: ARSEN 55-1, MICHAEL REPORT NO 55 (U)

1. JOLLY GREEN 04 RECEIVED BATTLE DAMAGE WHILE TRYING TO EFFECT THE RESCUE OF KANSAS 01P.

2. 10 DECEMBER 1972 APPROXIMATELY 0815Z.

3. 1310N 10528E

4. DETAILS:

(1) DURING THE HOVER PHASE OF THE RESCUE ATTEMPT, JOLLY GREEN 04 STARTED TAKING SMALL ARMS FIRE. ONE ROUND SEVERED AN ELECTRICAL WIRE BUNDLE WHICH GAVE INDICATION OF UTILITY HYDRAULIC TATLUP. ABOUT 10 SECONDS LATER ANOTHER ROUND DESTROYED A FUEL FILTER IN NR 2 ENGINE CAUSING A FIRE ON THAT ENGINE. DECISION WAS MADE AT THAT TIME TO ABORT. THE RESCUE HOIST CABLE WAS CHECKED. FORCES PAGE 2 RUMOREA2324 S E C R E T WAS STARTED AND NR 2 ENGINE WAS SHUT DOWN. DURING EFFORT THE PHOTOGRAPHER WAS INJURED SLIGHTLY WHEN A ROUND SKIMMED HIS SIDE, BEARLY BREAKING THE SKIN.

(2) NONE

(3) GROUND FIRE FROM SMALL ARMS

(4) CREW OF JOLLY GREEN 04

(5) LOSS OF SAR CAPABILITY OF ONE AIRCRAFT

(6) N/A

(7) UNKNOWN - MAINTENANCE ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS

(8) N/A

(9) AIRCRAFT INVOLVED?

(A) ONE HH-52C HELICOPTER

(B) KANSAS 01P CAR

(C) BR-10353

(D) CAPT RICH, MYMAN W.

(E) E

(F) 2 WOUNDED 15 NO INJURIES

(G) VFR

(H) PHOTOGRAPHER SUSTAINED MINOR FLESH WOUND WHEN HE WAS GRATED HIS RIGHT SIDE REPLACING THE SKIN. AIRCRAFT

01Z 3 RUMOREA2324 S E C R E T

1. AT LEAST 8 ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE WHICH CAUSED FIRE

STATE

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By Authority of *6AS*
By *WAC* (Date) *26/5/75*

D.M.

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AND US FREQUENT SHUT DOWN - N NR 2 EN INF.
1) NO IE REQUIRE FOR PHOT TRACKER. NUM 1-2
ENGINE 3 SHUT DOWN TO CONTROL FI E.
2) N/A

C. 1/A
E. 27-4 REPORT WILL NOT FOLLOW.
GOT 7. DEC 1980
BT
#2304
NNNN

2/2

11 DEC 1972

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ACOSTA, HECTOR MICHAEL

Name: Hector Michael Acosta
Rank/Branch: O2/US Air Force
Unit: 14th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
Date of Birth: 01/12/49
Home City of Record: San Antonio TX
Date of Loss: 09 December 1972
Country of Loss: North Vietnam
Loss Coordinates: 191800N 1052700E (WG472339)
Status (in 1973): Released POW
Category:
Acft/Vehicle/Ground: RF4C
Missions: 92
Other Personnel in Incident: Billie J. Williams (remains returned)

Source: Compiled by Homecoming II Project 15 February 1991 from one or more of the following: raw data from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence with POW/MIA families, published sources, interviews.
Updated by the P.O.W. NETWORK

REMARKS: 730329 RELSD BY DRV

SYNOPSIS: Billie Joe Williams was the aircraft commander of an RF4C armed reconnaissance "Phantom" fighter/bomber from the 14th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. On December 9, 1972, Williams and four F4s were on a reconnaissance mission over North Vietnam for action planned for December 18th when his plane was struck by a surface-to-air missile (SAM) and downed just south of the city of Nghai Hung in Nghe An Province.

When the aircraft was hit, Hector Acosta, the navigator on the RF4C, ejected both seats, and two parachutes were observed by the F4s in the flight to leave the disabled aircraft. Acosta did not know his pilot's condition at that time, but feared that he was already dead. He had ejected the pilot's seat because he did not want his commander to go down with the plane.

When Acosta was taken prisoner by the Vietnamese on the following day, he did not see whether Williams was also captured, but thought the Vietnamese had left him where he was. Rescue teams the following day observed a body, apparently Williams, in the middle of a clearing. The rescue helicopter was fired on, and noted that the body did not move in spite of the close proximity to the gunfire. The Vietnamese had used the body as a decoy for the rescue chopper. They failed, but Williams' remains were not recovered.

Bill's wife Barbara says, "Bill loved to fly and loved the Air Force. I honestly believe Bill died the way he expressed a desire to. But he always cautioned me to not accept 'just anything.' I'll have to be very sure when the time comes his remains are returned. I have to do that for him."

On December 20, 1990, U.S. officials announced that remains had been returned by the Vietnamese which had been positively identified as those of Billie Joe Williams. After nearly 20 years, Billie Joe Williams was home.

SOURCE: WE CAME HOME copyright 1977
Captain and Mrs. Frederic A Wyatt (USNR Ret), Barbara Powers Wyatt, Editor
P.O.W. Publications, 10250 Moorpark St., Toluca Lake, CA 91602
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UPDATE - 09/95 by the P.O.W. NETWORK, Skidmore, MO

HECTOR MICHAEL ACOSTA
 1st Lieutenant - United States Air Force
 Shot Down: December 9, 1972
 Released: March 29, 1973

My name is Hector Michael Acosta, called "Mex" by my friends and fellow flyers in POW camp. I was born in San Antonio, Texas to my parents, Armando and Mary Acosta, on January 12, 1949. I studied for the Roman Catholic priesthood through my high school years and first two years of college. I graduated from St. Mary's University in San Antonio in 1970 and immediately entered the Air Force receiving my commission in August 1970. I went to "Navy Prep School" (pilot training) and was eliminated in November 1970. Still seeking my wings, I entered Navy School (joined by my Christmas season bride, Orphalinda) and began classes on my birthday, 1971. I received my wings in September and after survival schools and RTU was sent to Udorn RTAB, Thailand on the 4th of July 1972 as a Photo Systems Operator (G1B) RF4C, Phantom.

I was on a photo reconnaissance mission in North Vietnam (a few miles north of Vinh) when an unseen surface to air missile (SAM) sent my aircraft, piloted by Major Billy Joe Williams (currently MIA), plummeting in flames. I received multiple shrapnel wounds and burns on both arms and right leg in the SAM strike and ejected to safety (two good chutes). This occurred during the early afternoon of December 9, 1972, during, approximately, my ninetieth mission. An extensive rescue effort lasted through the late afternoon of the 10th.

No words can express my gratitude to the men who participated in these attempts. At one point after I had been wounded by my captor's gunfire (scalp wound to the top of my hard skull from an AK-47) and was being disarmed and stripped of survival gear, a rescue craft was passing directly overhead, braving intense ground fire on my behalf.

Four days later I arrived at the "Hanoi Hilton" a bit worse for wear. Within four days I was removed from solitary confinement and intense questioning to join two F4 crew members, Captain Jim Latham and 1st Lt. Rick Bates, both USAF, Wolf fastfacs, who cared for me during my days of recovery and to whom I owe a debt of unending gratitude. We were soon joined by Lt. Tom Wieland USN, an A-7 jock shot down on the 20th of December. By Christmas and through the intense bombings of those days and until my release, I had the privilege of the command and leadership of my group SRO (senior ranking officer) Lt. Col. William C. Breckner. By mid-January 1973, with hopes of peace strong in our hearts, our group was transferred to a camp of detention referred to as the "Zoo" and were detained there until our release on the 24th of March 1973.

Impressions? Yes, many: awe at the strength of the character, brotherhood, courage, and loyalty of the men with whom I was interred and those who had suffered the rigors of years of detention, who maintained the flame of courage and love of country as an inspiration to us all. Loyalty. Love of Country.

The people of America. Her systems of government. And, yes, Faith in God, without which we would not have had the strength necessary to endure; and undying devotion to our loved ones who suffered more than we from fear of the unknown and bore it all so bravely.

To all the People of America: Thank you, God love you and keep you! From me, a heartfelt "Keep smiling!" We have much to be thankful for--so very much.

My future plans are AFIT bound toward a Doctorate in Psychology with a firm grasp on my wings and the United States Air Force.

April 1998

Hector Acosta will retire from the active duty in the United States Air Force as a Lt. Colonel in August of 1998. He and his wife Orphalinda reside in Texas.

From: Louis Campbell <loucampbell@earthlink.net>
To: rlapointe@gci.net <rlapointe@gci.net>
Date: Sunday, August 08, 1999 7:12 PM
Subject: Kansas 01B Mission Dec 1972

Bob,

I was the Aircraft Commander on the Kansas 01B mission on December 9th and 10th. I was low bird both days. It was on the 10th or very late on the 9th that we actually received word that Captain(?) Hector M. Acosta was alive and still evading capture. We launched first light and picked up the A-7s for penetration into North Vietnam. The PJs spotted what appeared to be Kansas 01B and we went into a hover over the individual. We remained in the hover for approximately 18 minutes. I never saw the downed navigator. The penetrator was lowered and on numerous occasions touched the individual. It was relayed to me that every time he touched the penetrator, the ground force directed their fire from us and onto him. As soon as he scrunched back down they turned their attention to us. We received twenty-nine entry points and as you have indicated two wounded crewmembers. I was looking through the left chin window when Steve Boyd took the round through his left thigh. The bullet actually went through his left leg and bounced off his right leg and fell on the floor at his feet. We retrieved the round and presented it to him prior to being loaded on the ambulance at NKP. He subsequently lost the round at the hospital. Both crewmembers were not seriously wounded and were returned to duty.

We were subsequently told that Capt Acosta was captured and released back to the US before we even rotated. I suspect his short capture period and good health made him an excellent candidate.

I was also the Executive Officer for the 40th from May 1972 to May 1973. I spent a lot of time with the PJs. In fact, I even was allowed to feed the snake. I enjoyed it, I don't think the duck did. They were a great bunch of guys and I hope you have a chance to tell their story. There are no finer soldiers on the face of the earth. There is no else I would want beside me in time of war or peace.

Best wishes.

Lou Campbell

1-1T SAR A-7s FLEW

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

KENNETH J. MUSNICKI

Staff Sergeant Kenneth J. Musnicki distinguished himself by extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight as a Pararescue Specialist in Southeast Asia on 9 December 1972. On that date, Sergeant Musnicki's job knowledge, outstanding airmanship, and continuous professionalism, displayed under the constant threat of hostile fire and adverse weather conditions, immeasurably aided the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron in the accomplishment of the rescue mission. The professional competence, aerial skill, and devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Musnicki reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

9 December 1972

RF-4C 68-0597 14 TRS, 432 TRW, USAF, Udorn
Maj Billie Joe Williams (KIA)
1Lt Hector Michael Acosta (POW)

The last USAF casualty before the start of the Linebacker II offensive was a reconnaissance Phantom from Udorn that was shot down on a road reconnaissance mission north of the city of Vinh. Maj Williams and 1Lt Acosta were escorted by a flight of four Phantoms as they photographed targets in preparation for the new offensive but their aircraft was hit by a SAM near Nghai Hung, about 35 miles north of Vinh. 1Lt Acosta ejected himself and his pilot and two parachutes were observed by the other Phantom crews. However, the missile damaged the aircraft's cockpit and Acosta thought that Maj Williams might already have been dead or at least severely injured. The next day an HH-53 from the 40th ARRS was fired on as it hovered over a body, thought to be that of Maj Williams, as it lay in a clearing near the wreckage. Two HH-53s were damaged by ground fire and several crewmen wounded during the futile rescue attempt. Hector 'Mex' Acosta was badly injured and was captured but spent less than three months as a POW before being released on 29 March 1973. He had flown 92 missions and his pilot had flown 100 missions before they were shot down. On 20 December 1990 it was announced that the remains of Maj Williams had been returned and identified.

VFW

'INTO THE TEETH of the TIGER'

When the Paris peace talks collapsed in 1972, the mighty B-52s were unleashed in the largest bombing raid of the Vietnam War. It was called Operation Linebacker II and dubbed the "11-Day War."

By Al Hemingway



In October 1972, Henry Kissinger, the chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks, publicly declared to the American people: "Peace is at hand." However, Kissinger's counterpart, Le Duc Tho, head negotiator for the North Vietnamese Communists, relayed that peace was indeed at hand -- under their terms -- or there would be no peace at all.

Several weeks before Christmas in 1972, the North Vietnamese Communists made good their threat when they walked out of the negotiations. Furious, President Richard M. Nixon quickly dispatched an ultimatum to Hanoi demanding it return to the bargaining table or else. The North Vietnamese arrogantly refused. Unfortunately for Hanoi, Nixon was not bluffing. He had a bold plan to force Hanoi back to the talks.

Linebacker II Commences

On Dec. 17, 1972, a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was forwarded to all operational commanders in the 7th Air Force: "You are directed to commence at approximately 1200Z, 18 December 1972, a three-day maximum effort, repeat, maximum effort, of B52/TACAIR strikes in the Hanoi/Haiphong areas" Operation Linebacker II - the "11-Day War" -- had begun.

This was the first time the B-52 Stratofortress was allowed to go "downtown" (pilots' nickname for Hanoi) during the Vietnam War. Until now, the B-52s, or BUFs (Big Ugly Fellows) as they were called, were utilized primarily for ground support, hitting suspected enemy supply bases and supply routes in South Vietnam.

Pilots and crewmembers, for the most part, were excited about their new role and finally using the aircraft for its original purpose -- that of a strategic bomber. Lt. Gen. Gerald W. Johnson, commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) 8th Air Force on Guam, said: "We were finally called upon to go right into the teeth of the tiger and get the toughest targets in the toughest environment."

Linebacker II targets included storage and supply complexes, railroad yards, transshipment points, repair facilities along the northwest and northeast rail lines, communication installations and MiG airstrips.

Some 140 planes, 80 from the 43rd Strategic Wing, located at Andersen AFB on Guam, dubbed "The Rock," and another 60 from the 307th Strategic Wing, situated at U-Tapao AFB, Thailand, were poised and ready to commence the operation.

B-52s normally fly in cells of three with their call sign a different color. Due to the massive scope of the bombing, 43 various shades had to be used. "They'd gone clear down to peppermint and bronze," laughed one pilot.

Within hours the operation was under way. Ground crews hustled to ready the big birds. Aircraft mechanics had to check the engines and do whatever it took to get the massive planes airborne to complete their missions. Crewmen loaded 750-lb. and 500-lb. bombs -- 60,000 lbs. of additional ordnance in all.

With the added weight, the BUF's wings had a very pronounced droop. When the aircraft would return to base, and the wings were straight, everyone would know that it had successfully unloaded its ordnance.

Planners became increasingly concerned with the tough aerial defenses that the B-52s would encounter once they entered Hanoi's air space. The massive planes, already burdened with the extra weight from the bombs, would have a difficult time in maneuvering away from the SA-2 surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) the Communist gunners would be firing at them.

At an altitude of 30,000 feet, the BUFs would be flying at the SAMs optimum effective range. Also, they were ordered to fly an exact course to further the accuracy of their bombing runs.

To counter this, the BUFs did have their own radar jamming equipment on board. To further assist them, EB-66 and EA-6 Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) aircraft flew with the B-52s to confuse the SAMs. As an added measure, F-4 Phantoms dropped chaff (strips of metallic foil) to jam the NVA's radar.

BUFS Go Downtown

On Dec. 18, 1972, at 2:41 in the afternoon, 27 B-52s lifted off from Andersen AFB. Another 21 BUFs took off from U-Tapao and headed in an easterly direction to link up with the Guam-based planes. After this was accomplished, the 70-mile long string of BUFs began their flight to Hanoi.

F-111s, or Aardvarks, flew ahead of the B-52s and hit four MiG airstrips. Right behind them, F-4s sowed chaff corridors. However, a 100-knot wind blew the metal strips away prior to the arrival of the B-52s.

As the first cell of BUFs neared Hanoi, they were greeted with a salvo of 50 SAMs. One plane was damaged so bad from the flying shrapnel it was forced to abort its mission and fly back to base.

Two SAMs found their mark and sent one B-52 crashing to the earth. Fortunately, three crewmen escaped injury when they successfully ejected before the 150,000-lb. fuel tanks erupted into a gigantic fireball. This was the first Stratofortress to be lost to hostile fire and the second damaged in the entire Vietnam War. One pilot looked on in awe and remarked: "The valley [was] almost as bright as day."

At midnight, 30 more B-52s arrived over Hanoi. In all, 121 sorties were flown against Kinh No and Yen Vien complexes, three MiG airfields, railroad repair facilities at Gia Lam, and the Hanoi radio station, temporarily putting "Hanoi Hannah," the North Vietnamese "Tokyo Rose," off the air.

Another first was recorded that evening. Staff Sgt. Samuel Turner, a tail gunner, downed a MiG-21 with a burst from his .50-caliber machine gun. He was the first tail gunner since the Korean War to do so.

Relatively few MiGs were airborne that night. The real threat to the B-52s were the SAMs. In all, it was estimated over 200 SAMs were launched against the big targets. Three BUFs were shot down with another two sustaining serious damage.

From his lonely berth in the rear of the plane, Tech Sgt. Peter E. Whalen, the bombers' fire control operator, peered out. He described the scene later: "When the SAMs come up through the clouds, you can see a bright glow as the rocket fire reflects on the cloud. The clouds magnify the light and make the SAM look bigger than it really is."

'everyone was proud'

Despite the success of the first day, the pilots and crews started grumbling. The chaff support was woefully inadequate because of the strong prevailing winds. The sharp turns the pilots had to do were placing them straight at the 100 knot winds causing the bombers to lose considerable speed, enabling the enemy radar to find weak spots in their jamming barriers.

Also, the B-52s had to utilize a single point for a post-target turn. By doing this, NVA gunners could zero in on the first wave of B-52s when they finished their laborious turning maneuver.

Ignoring the pilot's complaints, Linebacker II proceeded on schedule. On day two, 93% of the aircraft struck their targets with only one bomber receiving minor damage. However, Day 3 was different. Two of the G model planes were hit while performing their post-target turn and sent earthbound. Also, a D model was hit but managed to limp back to U-Tapao before it could finish its run.

SAC headquarters was troubled when word reached it that the BUFs had been lost. In spite of the loss, the decision was reached to press forward with Linebacker II. Despite the initial euphoria over the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) reports, some were distressed. "Many people in Washington were worried that the Air Force would fail," said Maj. Gen. Harry N. Cordes, SAC chief of staff.

Dec. 20 saw another three B-52s lost in aerial combat over North Vietnam's capital city. Morale hit rock bottom. There was a notable increase in sick call from the crews. Imaginary mechanical problems suddenly arose. And one officer even refused to fly. One pilot referred to the 70-mile stretch of BUFs as a "baby elephant walk."

Continuing to neglect the pilots' concerns, 30 bombers headed toward Hanoi on Dec. 21. One pilot, flying in Blue Cell, said: "It looks like we'll walk on SAMs tonight." His premonition was correct. His aircraft was struck by two missiles which caused one of the wings to catch fire.

Another BUF in Scarlet Cell fell victim when a SAM scored a direct hit. Capt. Robert E. Wolff later commented: "We had a formation approximately 70 miles long of one aircraft behind the other lumbering toward North Vietnam all using the same route, altitude and heading. If 36 aircraft turned at a certain point to a certain heading, it does not require much of an educated guess to decide where to aim at number 37."

Although there was much vocal opposition to the strategy used during Linebacker II, the pilots and crews supported the bombing operation. "At last it seemed that we were going to attempt to end this war," said Wolff, "and everyone was proud to have some part in that operation."

'whispering death'

A 36-hour cease-fire was called on Christmas Eve. Planners immediately went to work to alter the strategy of the bombing runs. SAMs were the biggest obstacle to the vulnerable Stratofortresses and it was decided to eliminate as many SAM sites as possible.

To do this, the F-111 "Aardvark" was called upon. With its terrain-hugging capabilities, and its Mach 1 speed, it was virtually invisible to NVA radar. Soon, the F-111s were flying an average of 24 times a night over Hanoi, releasing their 500- and 700-lb. Snake-eye ordnance. The North Vietnamese referred to it as the "whispering death."

Meanwhile, during the daylight hours, attack aircraft were pounding other important targets in the city. Railway lines, supply depots, and the Doumer and Canal Rapide Bridges, were constantly bombed. Almost 100 sorties were flown daily that prompted one pilot to say: "[the aircraft] was sitting nose to tail all the way out."

Additional safety measures were employed to protect the BUFs as much as possible. The number of support aircraft was increased substantially to 113 with the chaff being released in cloud-like formations to confuse the NVA gunners. Also, the BUFs were given different altitudes to enter Hanoi's air space and leave by diverse routes. The G Model B-52 was assigned lightly defended targets because of its inferior jamming equipment.

When these changes were implemented, morale quickly improved. Now, the pilots and crews felt they had a chance against the dreaded SAMs.

Strategy is Successful

Dec. 26 saw the largest bombing raid of the Vietnam War. A meticulously planned and coordinated air assault was levied against Hanoi to bring the Communists back to the bargaining table. The air armada consisted of 120 Stratofortresses with seven waves of the big birds hammering 10 different targets in the city within 15 minutes.

Over 100 support planes accompanied the BUFs. The Aardvarks strafed airstrips while U.S. Navy A-6 Intruders struck SAM batteries near Haiphong. The massive bombers diverged on Hanoi from northwest and southwest through Laos. The other cells, aimed at Haiphong and Thai Nguyen, flew in from the northeast and southeast.

The new tactics paid off. Over 4,000 tons of ordnance were released, destroying their targets. However, several B-52s were lost to the seemingly endless barrage of SAMs. Ebony 2 suddenly erupted into flames when it was hit by one of the projectiles. Ash 1 crashed as it approached U-Tapao when it attempted to return to base after sustaining

serious hits.

Salvos of SAMs blasted up to meet them. One returning pilot was asked how many missiles he had spotted: "Hundreds," he said. Another pilot vividly described the way the missiles looked:

"Hold your hand at arm's length, fingers bunched and pointed towards your eyes," he said. "Now imagine that your fingertips are little points of light, and each one of those lights is a rocket motor on a missile. Now move your hand toward your face, fast, and spread your fingers. Those damned SAMs look like that going by."

Two days after Christmas, another 60 B-52s struck Hanoi. Several more planes were shot down. On the 28th and 29th, the mighty birds were on Hanoi's doorstep again with another bombing run. However, only a small number of SAMs greeted the attackers. It looked as if the NVA's aerial defenses were beginning to weaken. Right after that, the Communists sent word that they wanted to resume the peace talks. Line backer II was over.

Linebacker II lasted a mere 11 days, but in terms of firepower and destruction, it was awesome. In all, the B-52s flew over 700 sorties with the tactical aircraft logging over 1,000 missions. A total of 15,000 tons of ordnance was dropped, destroying or crippling 1,600 military installations, 372 pieces of rolling stock, 80% of Hanoi's electric generating power, 25% of its petroleum supply and numerous airfields and roads.

The NVA also had eight MiGs shot down -- two by B-52 tail gunners. Despite the magnitude of the bombing raids, civilian casualties were light: 1,318 in Hanoi and 306 in Haiphong.

The success of Linebacker II was not without losses on the U.S. side, though. Some 15 B-52s and 11 tactical aircraft were lost with an additional nine BUF's damaged. Of the 100 Air Force crewmen shot down, 35 were KIA; 26 rescued; and 39 captured and subsequently released. It was estimated that 1,000 SAMs were fired at U.S. planes during the 11-day war.

In the end, it was the devastation of U.S. airpower that brought the Communists to their knees. On Jan. 27, 1973, a month after Linebacker II ended, Le Duc Tho, and his negotiating team, signed the Paris Peace Accords.

Nevertheless, airmen who waged the bombing campaign were especially castigated by the anti-war movement. Yet as President Ronald Reagan put it: "Who can doubt that the cause for which our men fought was just? It was, however imperfectly pursued, the cause of freedom." As CBS's Dan Rather even later admitted, "Those Americans may have gone to the wrong war, but they went for the right reasons."

AL Hemingway *is a frequent contributor and well-known Vietnam War author.*

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
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
AIR FORCE

PUBLISHED BY THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION

MAGAZINE



Look Back





A B-52D leads a force of B-52Gs as the bombers start out from Andersen AFB, Guam, on the long flight west for Linebacker II. During the intensive 11-day campaign, B-52s flew more than 700 sorties against 34 key targets.

IN 1965, the Air Force entered direct combat in Vietnam, despite the fact that its leaders had always opposed involvement in Southeast Asia. It fought in an outstanding manner, though hampered by highly political rules of engagement that violated all principles of airpower. As it fought, the Air Force gathered the expertise it needed to combat an enemy whose strength grew year by year, fueled by virtually unlimited support from the Soviet Union and China.

In December 1972, 25 years ago next month, the intransigence of the tough and resilient North Vietnamese foe finally exposed the total failure of gradualist war policies set in motion years before by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. In fact, the North's thorough defeat of South Vietnam's forces convinced Hanoi that it need not seriously pursue peace negotiations with the United States in Paris. Military victory was within its grasp.

For Washington, the situation was inordinately bleak. The process of "Vietnamization" and US military force withdrawal had reduced the American ground presence to about 26,000 troops—too few to win a major battle but enough for a huge contingent of prisoners in an inglorious defeat. President Richard M. Nixon called upon the Air Force to save the situation. It did so with a powerful, 11-day bombing campaign,

Operation Linebacker II. The campaign unfolded over the 12-day period of December 18–29, 1972. Because there was a one-day stand-down on Christmas Day, the operation came to be known by many as "the 11-Day War."

Seven Years Late

When President Nixon gave the order the Air Force collectively saluted and went to work, pleased at last to be carrying out the strategy it had advocated from the start—concentrated, sustained air attack against the enemy heartland. In 1965, that enemy heartland had been virtually defenseless and could have been attacked at will. Now, after a huge buildup, it was shielded by the most extensive and strongest integrated air defense system in the world.

The size and strength of those defenses were so great that many believed the B-52 heavy bomber, backbone of the Air Force's long-range force, would not be able to survive encounters with it. By 1972, North Vietnam had amassed a defense that included 145 MiG fighters, 26 SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile sites (21 in the Hanoi–Haiphong area), a heavy concentration of anti-aircraft artillery, and a complex, overlapping radar network that served an efficient and many-times-redundant command-and-control system. In addition, the radar network secretly had been improved in recent times by introduction of a new fire-control

Targets Hit by B-52s

Target	Planned Sorties
Lang Dang railroad yard	86
Kinh No military complex	78
Yen Vien military complex	63
Gia Lam railroad yard	54
Thai Nguyen TPP*	42
Van Dien supply depot	39
Hanoi Radio	36
Thai Nguyen railroad yard	36
Bac Giang TSP*	33
Haiphong railroad siding	27
Phuc Yen SAM storage site	23
Hanoi POL storage site	21
Trai Ca SAM support facility	20
Phuc Yen SAM support facility	18
Giap Nhi railroad yard	18
Duc Noi railroad yard	18
Haiphong POL storage site	18
Haiphong transfer station	15
Hanoi Bac Mai storage site	12
Kep railroad yard	12
Trung Quan railroad yard	12
Duc Noi storage site	12
Kep airfield	9
Quang Te airfield	6
Hoa Lac airfield	6
Phuc Yen airfield	6
VN 549 SAM site	3
VN 234 SAM site	3
VN 243 SAM site	3
VN 266 SAM site	3
VN 158 SAM site	3
VN 537 SAM site	2
VN 660 SAM site	2
VN 563 SAM site	2

Total 741

Source: Pacific Air Forces

*TPP stands for Thermal Power Plant; TSP for Transshipment Point.

radar that improved the accuracy of the SA-2 weapons.

All previous air campaigns, including the initial Linebacker carried out in May–October 1972, were "limited," designed to interdict the overland routes by which the North resupplied its regular units and Viet Cong forces operating in South Vietnam. Linebacker II was to be different. The intent was to destroy all major target complexes in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, using two distinct types of efforts, both of which had to contend with the mon-

Day / Date	B-52 Attack	SEAD	CAP/Escort	Chaff	Total
1: Dec. 18	129	17	63	22	231
2: Dec. 19	93	19	61	24	197
3: Dec. 20	99	18	55	26	198
4: Dec. 21	30	13	23	9	75
5: Dec. 22	30	15	27	15	87
6: Dec. 23	30	13	12	3	58
7: Dec. 24	30	16	22	16	84
8: Dec. 26	120	18	34	23	195
9: Dec. 27	60	23	32	23	138
10: Dec. 28	60	7	28	23	118
11: Dec. 29	60	11	33	25	129
Totals	741	170	390	209	1,510

Of 741 planned B-52 sorties, 12 were aborted. The Air Force SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) mission was carried out by F-105, F-4C, and F-4E fighters. CAP (combat air patrol), escort, and chaff dispersal were carried out by numerous types. In addition, US Navy and US Marine aircraft flew a total of 277 night support sorties in A-6, A-7, and F-4 aircraft.

soon season. An all-weather force of heavy B-52s and smaller F-111 attack aircraft would bomb by night while tactical aircraft would continue to press daytime attacks.

Air Force officers carefully shaped the list of targets so that the bombers could avoid civilian collateral damage and, most particularly, avoid damaging installations housing American POWs. As it turned out, one of the valuable side effects of Linebacker II was the boost in morale it brought prisoners as they saw their Communist captors tremble at the explosions and realized that at long last, the United States was fighting the war as it always should have been fought.

The initial orders calling for the Linebacker II effort specified three days of intensive effort, with a strong prospect of continued bombing. Throughout the Pacific theater, Air Force headquarters, flight lines, supply depots, barracks, mess halls, and all the other elements of a fighting force throbbed with preparatory activity. The flight line at Andersen AFB, Guam, was jammed with an enormous force of 99 B-52Gs and 53 B-52Ds. The mission from Guam would run about 12 hours and require in-flight refueling. At U Tapao Royal Thai Airfield, Thailand, another 54 B-52Ds were available. The mission from U Tapao would take only about three to four hours and did not require in-flight refueling.

All of the D models of the BUFFs had received the latest electronic coun-

termasures modifications, while only half of the G models had been so modified. This would prove to be an unfortunate and at times fatal difference, because the unmodified G models turned out to be vulnerable to SAMs.

Double Duty

Air Force tactical air units were called upon for double duty. They were to fly in support of the nighttime bomber attacks then go on to conduct a vigorous attack effort in the daytime. In the course of the campaign's 11 days, tactical units flew 530 daytime sorties, including 126 for suppression of SAM

complexes, 273 for MiGCAP [MiG Combat Air Patrol] or escort, 85 for chaff dispersal, and 46 other types of missions. By night, tactical air units flew 769 sorties, including 170 SAM suppression, 390 MiGCAP/escort and 209 chaff.

The effectiveness of the US tactical force's precision guided munitions was greatly diminished by poor weather over the North. Still, when the campaign was over, Gen. John W. Vogt Jr., commander of 7th Air Force, would rate one precision guided weapon to be equal in worth to 100 "dumb bombs." The tactical air units also received excellent support from US Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.

As Linebacker II operations unfolded, a number of critical elements played a role in the execution of the attacks, including routes, spacing, altitudes, bomb loads, and basing. The routes to and from the targets were governed by many factors, including disposition of surface-to-air missile sites, the proximity of the Chinese border, and strength of the prevailing winds. Flight tactics called for formations of three B-52s, separated by 500 feet in altitude and one mile in horizontal distance.

Unlike bomber forces in the Korean War, the B-52s were under the command of Strategic Air Command, not "chopped" to the theater commander. SAC headquarters had ordered aircraft commanders not to take evasive action in the face of threats



Displaying a full internal bomb load, this B-52D was one of 54 marshaled at U Tapao Royal Thai Airfield, Thailand, during Linebacker II. In all, B-52s would drop 15,000 tons of bombs.

from either SAMs or MiGs during the long run in from the initial point to bombs away. The speed and direction of the turn after the bomb drop was designed to get the bombers out of SAM range as soon as possible. The tactics were needed primarily because SAC wanted to preserve electronic countermeasures integrity of the three-ship formations while making sure that only military targets were hit.


It took nearly two hours for 87 B-52s from Guam to taxi, take off, and become airborne on the afternoon of Dec. 18, 1972. They then were joined in the attack by 42 additional B-52s flying out of U Tapao, forming the largest attacking bomber force assembled since World War II. The B-52 targets on the first day were Kep airfield, Hoa Lac airfield, Phuc Yen airfield, Kinh No vehicle repair site, Yen Vien rail yards, Hanoi railroad repair facility, and the main Hanoi radio station. The F-111 force was assigned missions against nine targets.

The North Vietnamese leaders had expected a US air attack, but they were shocked by the intensity of the assault on Dec. 18. Reacting swiftly, the forces of the North used their SAMs effectively and quickly began to concentrate their efforts on the post-target turn.

SAM Dangers

This turn was the point of greatest B-52 vulnerability, for three reasons. First, it was here that the North Vietnamese radar had the greatest chance to "burn through" the B-52 cells' combined electronic countermeasures protection. Second, a banking B-52 presented a greater radar cross section to the defenders. Finally, the turn would reverse the benefits of the wind, transforming a 100-knot tailwind into a head wind that slowed down the enormous aircraft.

On Day 1 of the campaign, the Communist forces fired more than 200 SAMs, often sending them up in four- or six-weapon volleys. Once, the air was filled with more than 40 SAMs. On that day, the US lost three B-52s, two from Andersen and one from U Tapao, as well as one F-111. The losses were lighter than had been expected and were not considered unacceptably high. For the entire 11 bombing days, the BUFF crews up-



This U Tapao B-52D shows the distinctive black underside favored at the time for night missions. Clearly visible also is the left wing outboard pylon (at right in photo) loaded with extra bombs for Linebacker II missions.

held the Air Force tradition of never being turned back from an assigned mission, pressing on regardless of the ferocity of the enemy attack. On Day 1, SSgt. Samuel Turner, tail gunner on Brown 03, also shot down a MiG-21, the first in B-52 combat history.

Tactics were revised slightly on Day 2 of the attack, but routes remained the same. Bomber cell altitudes were lowered to 34,500 and 35,000 feet, the better to place the B-52s more securely within the chaff corridors being laid by the F-4s. Time separation between cells and between Times Over Target (TOTs) was increased to four minutes. Evasive action was authorized on both inbound and outbound routes. The results of the changes seemed to be positive. On Day 2, the North launched some 180 SAMs at the 93 attacking B-52s, but no losses occurred.

On Day 3, tragedy struck. Only 90 of 99 planned B-52s sorties were effective and six BUFFs were shot down. Two Gs and one D were lost in the first wave and an identical number were downed in the third wave. Three were struck prior to bomb release and three afterward; four went down near Hanoi while two made it out of North Vietnam. None of the lost B-52Gs had been modified to carry the new AN/ALT-22 ECM equipment. In the first three days of the campaign, five unmodified Gs and only one modified G had

been lost. Of the total of nine B-52s lost to date, five had been hit during their turn off the target.

This constituted an unacceptably high seven-percent loss rate. Even so, Gen. John C. Meyer, the commander in chief of SAC, made the tough decision to press on, calling for even heavier strikes on SAM sites and storage areas. His decision proved to be correct, for the enemy had been hurt, too, and now was rapidly expending SAMs.

Tactics were altered again, too; cell separation and TOTs were compressed to 90 and 120 seconds, respectively. The altitude separation between cells was increased, and withdrawal routes were changed, enabling some bomber streams to withdraw directly toward the Gulf of Tonkin. Electronic warfare officers received authorization to add an ALT-28 ECM transmitter to their system with the intent of jamming the SAM downlink frequency.

On Day 4 of the campaign, attacks were staged by only 30 heavy bombers, all D models from U Tapao. Planning was simplified and a total of 75 tactical aircraft were available for support. Two B-52s were lost to SAMs in an attack on Bac Mai airfield.

On each of the next three days—Days 5, 6, and 7—USAF carried out attacks with packages of 30 B-52s, losing none. The Air Force was making good use of its experience and new tactics (including altitude changes, multiple approach paths,

Hank Maros via Warren Thompson



North Vietnam fired some 1,240 SAMs, but tactical forces like this pair of USAF F-105Fs armed with AGM-45 Shrikes helped keep US losses low during Linebacker II.

and the selection of new targets outside the Hanoi-Haiphong area) to confuse the North Vietnamese defenders. On Dec. 24, the seventh day of the air campaign, A1C Albert Moore, a gunner on Ruby 03, shot down a MiG.

Wrong Signal

US bombing forces stood down on Christmas Day in order to give planners a chance to review events so far and give the crews some rest. Politically, the stand-down was like the previous bombing halts, a well intended "signal" that negotiations were in order. Once again the North Vietnamese interpreted the respite as a sign of American weakness, and they spent the day feverishly restocking their SAM sites with missiles.

The next day, Day 8, the bombing resumed. All of the previous experience gained was exploited in new tactics. Seventy-eight B-52s in four flights attacked Hanoi simultaneously from four different directions. At the same time, 42 aircraft in three other flights struck Haiphong, North Vietnam's principal harbor and transshipment point for military supplies.

The compressed nature of the attack intensified the difficulties of the 114 tactical support aircraft. However, they executed the mission flawlessly. The versatile USAF F-4 Phantom served as the MiGCAP and also dispensed the dense chaff blanket necessary to shield the B-52s

from enemy radar. Phantoms and the redoubtable Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs suppressed SAMs in the dangerous Wild Weasel mission.

Aging EB-66s were forced by the heavy SAM threat to operate farther than desired from the target area, but they nonetheless provided efficient ECM support. F-111s and Vought A-7s attacked northern airfields. KC-135 tankers furnished fuel to all types of aircraft, often moving well into a combat area to reach aircraft in trouble. The Air Force Linebacker II team was completed by C-130 search and res-

cue aircraft, HH-53 Jolly Green Giant helicopters, and EC-121s.


The Navy and Marines both supplied F-4 aircraft for the MiGCAP and BARCAP [Barrier Combat Air Patrol], while A-6s attacked designated targets. Even though there was still no centralized control of all air assets, the Navy and the Air Force worked together closely.

The attack on Day 8 went off with precision, although two B-52s were lost because of the heavy increase in SAM firings.

The United States Air Force had now established a clear ascendancy over the North Vietnamese defenders. Sixty B-52s were dispatched on each of the three remaining nights of the campaign, Days 9, 10, and 11. Two B-52s were shot down on Dec. 27, one going down in North Vietnam and the other making it back to Thailand, where the crew bailed out.

Under Siege

On the final day of the campaign, Day 11 on Dec. 29, USAF crews—both bomber and support—were at the peak of their form while the enemy was in obvious distress, able to fire only a total of 23 SAMs. Where once they had salvoed six SAMs at a time, they now were reduced to individual snap shots. They were almost out of SAMs, their MiGs were shut down, and their radar and communication links were disrupted. In short, they were at the mercy of the United States.



US tactical forces numbered 114, including USAF F-111s and A-7s, such as these shown here, primarily used to attack airfields. Tacair units flew support at night, but also pressed the attack during the day—flying 530 sorties in all.


The US had proved decisively that B-52s, supported by tactical air assets, were an effective force, able to meet and defeat the enemy. In the miserable prisons in which they were held, American prisoners of war experienced an unimaginable elation at seeing their brutal captors frightened and suddenly polite.

The result of Linebacker II was exactly what had been predicted by those who had advocated full application of airpower against North Vietnam: a military victory. The badly shaken North Vietnamese accepted that the war was at a stalemate, returned to the negotiating table in Paris, and signed the Paris Peace Accords on Jan. 27, 1973. Within 60 days of the signing, 591 American POWs were released and back in the United States.

In Linebacker II, SAC's B-52s had flown 729 sorties out of a total of 741 planned sorties and dropped 15,000 tons of bombs. North Vietnamese forces had fired about 1,240 SAMs. The Air Force lost 15 B-52 bombers, which amounted to a loss rate of less than two percent. Of 92 B-52 crew members involved in the losses, 26 were recovered, 25 came up missing in action, 33 became prisoners of war, and eight were either killed in action or later died of wounds. In addition, the US lost two F-111As, three F-4s, two A-7s, two A-6s, one EB-66, one HH-53, and one RA-5C.

As soon as Hanoi signaled it wished to resume peace negotiations, Linebacker II raids immediately ceased. Some in the Air Force argued that this was a mistake; if the United States continued the attacks, they maintained, North Vietnam would have to accept a military defeat. Instead, they secured at the peace table a political victory that they would in due course translate into a full-scale military conquest of South Vietnam.

Not long after the end of Linebacker II and the formal return of the US prisoners of war, United States forces at last formally disengaged from the war in Southeast Asia. There then followed what Henry Kissinger described as a "decent interval" of about two years, after which Hanoi, knowing that it no longer faced any realistic threat of another Linebacker II, invaded



Bruce Chavis via Warren Thompson

Date	Type	Call Sign	Target (Mission)	Cause
Dec. 18	F-111A	Snug 40	Hanoi Radio	unk.
Dec. 18	B-52G	Charcoal 01	Yen Vien complex	SA-2
Dec. 18	B-52G	Peach 02	Yen Vien complex	SA-2
Dec. 18	B-52D	Rose 01	Hanoi Radio	SA-2
Dec. 20	B-52D	Quilt 03	Yen Vien complex	SA-2
Dec. 20	B-52G	Brass 02	Yen Vien complex	SA-2
Dec. 20	B-52G	Orange 03	Yen Vien complex	SA-2
Dec. 20	B-52D	Straw 02	Gia Lam rail yard	SA-2
Dec. 20	B-52G	Olive 01	Kinh No complex	SA-2
Dec. 20	B-52G	Tan 03	Kinh No complex	SA-2
Dec. 21	B-52D	Scarlet 03	Bac Mai airfield	SA-2
Dec. 21	B-52D	Blue 01	Bac Mai airfield	SA-2
Dec. 22	F-111A	Jackle 33	Hanoi port facility	unk.
Dec. 23	EB-66C	Hunt 02	(non-combat)	engine out
Dec. 26	B-52D	Ebony 02	Giap Nhi rail yard	SA-2
Dec. 26	B-52D	Ash 01	Kinh No complex	SA-2
Dec. 27	F-4E	DeSoto 03	(strike escort)	MiG-21
Dec. 27	F-4E	Vega 02	(MiG CAP)	MiG-21
Dec. 27	HH-53	Jolly Green	(rescue)	small arms *
Dec. 27	B-52D	Ash 02	SAM site	SA-2
Dec. 27	B-52D	Cobalt 02	Truong Quan rail yard	SA-2

(15)
B-52's

Source: Pacific Air Forces

South Vietnam across a broad front. The Communist forces entered Saigon on April 30, 1975, and unified the two Vietnams under Hanoi's totalitarian control.

To Air Force observers, the events of 1975 pointed up a classic case of "what might have been." To them, full application of airpower in a Line-

backer II-type campaign in 1965, a decade earlier, would have achieved military victory, prevented the long and costly US involvement in Southeast Asia, saved South Vietnam as a nation, and allowed the US to escape the calamitous effects that the Vietnamese war has afflicted on America ever since. ■


Walter J. Boyne, former director of the National Air and Space Museum in Washington is a retired Air Force colonel and author. He has written more than 400 articles about aviation topics and 28 books, the most recent of which is *Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the United States Air Force, 1947-1997*. His most recent article for *Air Force Magazine*, "Hap," appeared in the September 1997 issue.

20 OCT 72

TO GET TO THE SURVIVORS,
THEY HAD TO COPE WITH DARKNESS, FOG,
LOW FUEL, AND ENEMY TROOPS, BUT . . .

THEY KEPT TRYING

by SSgt. MIKE ROBERTS
PLATTSBURGH AFB, N.Y.



Christmas was only five days away when *Straw 02*, a B-52 returning from a mission in Southeast Asia, was knocked out of the sky by a SAM. The crew bailed out on the border between northern Laos and North Vietnam and began what seemed to be a lifetime of waiting.

For the rescue and recovery crews of *Jolly Green One* and *Two* at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, dreams of Christmas dissolved in the early hours of December 20, 1972. The sun was somewhere on the other side of the world when the rescue crews got the scramble. They dashed through the dark for their HH-53C *Jolly Green* helicopters. Their mission would last more than four hours, and lead to Silver Stars for two crewmen and Distinguished Flying Crosses for the others. "Rocket!"

The warning brought instant action from Capt. Douglas F. Strahl, commanding *Jolly One*. Maneuvering briskly, he evaded the unguided rocket. The two helicopters continued on their mission to recover the downed airmen.

As they neared a forward orbit point, *Sandy One*, the on-scene commander flying an A-7, radioed instructions to the helicopters. The *Sandy* had heard from five survivors on the B-52's six-man crew. He identified them as *Straw 02 Alpha*, *Bravo*, *Delta*, *Echo*, and *Foxtrot*. *Straw 02 Charley*—the only man with a human code name—had not yet contacted the A-7 pilot.

"Proceed toward search and rescue area," *Sandy One* directed.

Although large concentrations of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops were reported to be along

the route to the search area, no hostile activity had been observed in the immediate area of the survivors.


Patches of low stratus clouds began to appear in the valleys as *Sandy One* joined the *Jollys* and began directing the recovery.

Jolly One went in after *Alpha* and *Jolly Two* headed for *Bravo*.

"I'm under the clouds on the side of a steep hill. I'm injured and unable to move through the terrain," *Jolly One's* man radioed. It was the cue that Sgt. Stephen L. Caldwell, a pararescue specialist, had been waiting for. Captain Strahl skimmed the tops of the clouds until the airman's location was pinpointed. He then began a spiral descent through what had now become dense fog. He watched as his radar altitude needle dropped from 1,000 to 150 feet during four 360 degree turns. A heavy fog still blanketed the *Jolly*, though, so Strahl ordered an abort, and the chopper pulled away.

They tried once more. No go. On their third descent, several holes started to appear in the cloud layer. Strahl flew into one of the breaks and began a hovering let-down. For 10 minutes, the *Jolly* slowly descended 350 feet into the fog. Suddenly, the clouds thickened and closed in around the helicopter. Again, they aborted the attempt.

"*Jolly One*, maybe you should try *Delta's* position. The weather and terrain may be better there," *Sandy One* radioed.



"Roger... Stand by *Alpha*. We have your location and will return."

Strahl and his crew headed for *Delta's* position, but found it covered with clouds also. About a mile away, however, the clouds ended. Captain Strahl maneuvered the helicopter through a narrow ravine with villages—possibly hostile—on either side. As they approached the edge of the clouds, ground fire laced upward from one of the villages. Immediately Strahl went into a descending 180-degree turn until he was below the overcast, using the clouds to hide from the enemy gunners.

Strahl headed back to where the downed airman waited. Occasionally, Strahl was forced to maneuver below the tree canopy on each side of the ravine. Finally he entered a hover just 50 feet west and 140 feet above *Delta*.

Sergeant Caldwell, lowering down through the dense jungle, found the airman about 15 minutes later, and helped get him aboard the helicopter.

Meanwhile, *Jolly Two* wasn't having any better time of it than *Jolly One* was. But *Echo* had heard the helicopter and contacted *Jolly Two*.

"*Jolly Two* this is *Echo*. I can hear you. I'm in the clear just above *Bravo's* position."

"Roger. Stand by *Bravo*. We have your location, but will pick up *Echo* first. *Echo*, vector us toward your position."

Echo was about halfway between the top of the ridge and the top of the cloud layer. He radioed when the helicopter was directly over him.

The radio crackled again as *Sandy One* came on the air. "Keep your heads up. You've got two small villages, one on top of the ridge and one on the outer side of a small hump in the ridge."

"Roger."

The scanners aboard *Jolly Two* soon spotted the survivor. As Capt.

Roger C. Bradley, *Jolly Two's* commander, jockeyed the helicopter into position, SSgt. Jimmie D. Victor, who was operating the hoist, got a full view of the survivor. With no difficulty *Echo* found the penetrator which had been dropped to him. In short order, he was hoisted above the jungle growth to safety.

Two B-52 crewmen up, four to go.

Captain Bradley headed back for *Bravo*. Just over the low clouds, *Jolly Two* went into a hover as the downed man reported the helicopter above him. Almost as soon as the rescue craft entered hover, *Bravo* began vectoring it to his location. Radar altimeter readings and reports from the scanners pinpointed him on the side of a very steep slope. Bradley tried a slow descending hover several times in an effort to make a hole for visual descent, but it was hopeless. Gray mist engulfed the helicopter and Captain Bradley began an immediate vertical instrument climb out.

After more than 40 minutes of hovering, fuel was rapidly becoming a factor in the recovery attempts.

"*Bravo*, we're running low on fuel. We'll return after refueling is accomplished," Bradley told the downed man.

Both helicopters headed for a refueling rendezvous. For a moment, Captain Strahl thought he might not make it. Flying lower than *Jolly Two*, he suddenly found himself taking ground fire.

"We've been hit by ground fire in the floor and right side," he reported, and immediately added, "No significant damage, though."

While the *Jollies* were refueling, *Sandy One* radioed that the clouds were dissipating.

"Another flight of *Jolly Greens* is an hour away. Return and pick up the remaining survivors while the weather is good," he ordered.

Jolly One, immediately went for

Alpha as *Jolly Two* headed for *Bravo*.

Captain Strahl's helicopter was too heavy to hover, so he began dumping fuel. It was then that TSgt. John K. Carlson, a pararescue technician, spotted 10 armed enemy troops about a quarter of a mile from *Alpha*.

"*Sandy One*, there are enemy troops about a quarter of a mile on the other side of the hill from *Alpha*!"

"Roger, *Jolly One*. We'll get 'em." The Sandys rolled in and quickly eliminated the enemy force.

Alpha was located about one quarter of the way up an extremely deep and narrow ravine. Making a steep downhill approach, Strahl brought the helicopter into a hover above the airman's position. Caldwell again volunteered to help the survivor on the ground. He was lowered and quickly located his man.

He and *Alpha* reported ground fire, but no one could identify the source. They concluded that the enemy was firing into the air for harassment.

Because of *Alpha's* injuries and the steep, rugged terrain, Caldwell had trouble moving him to the hoist. Finally, after 15 minutes of tense activity, both persons were pulled aboard the helicopter.

Three members of the crew had now been recovered.

While *Jolly One* was recovering *Alpha*, *Jolly Two* had located *Bravo* on a steep, heavily forested portion of the ridge. But before Bradley could make an attempt to recover *Bravo*, *Foxtrot* was on the radio, saying he had head injuries. Again, *Bravo* was to be disappointed, as the chopper moved to first recover the injured *Foxtrot*.

Another *Sandy* directed *Jolly Two* towards *Foxtrot's* location about two miles away. Moving towards the end of a small, dead-end slope in the valley, *Jolly Two* heard *Foxtrot* say he could hear

the helicopter approaching.

"Ignite a flare," Bradley radioed, and brought the helicopter into a hover while the crew scanned for smoke. They spotted it about 200 yards to the rear of the helicopter, just inside some trees on the edge of a clearing that contained several huts. Slowly, Bradley backed the helicopter along the ridge toward the village and the survivor. As the tail rotor moved over the edge of the clearing, *Foxtrot* reported the helicopter directly overhead.

Sergeant Victor sighted the airman and lowered the penetrator, threading it through the jungle growth. *Foxtrot*, apparently in shock, became disoriented and could not find the penetrator despite repeated instructions and the fact that it was only five yards away. TSgt. Charles Salome dropped a flare. It landed beside the penetrator, and *Foxtrot* finally climbed on. They hoisted him up through the trees onto the helicopter.

With SSgt. Hulen C. Hammock, Jr. manning the minigun and covering the village, *Jolly Two* left the area and returned to get *Bravo*, who popped a smoke flare as the helicopter approached his position. They made the pickup without incident.

Five members were now aboard the *Jollies*.

Sandy 12 had been searching for *Charley*, and discovered villages on top of the ridge. He suggested that *Jolly Two* remain low until he gained sufficient airspeed to execute a rapid climb.

Jolly One reported *Alpha* on the verge of deep shock.

"All guns have been stowed and doors closed in an effort to keep him warm," Captain Strahl told the rescue force. "We are heading for the medical facilities at Udorn."

"Roger, *Jolly One*."


"*Jolly Two*, this is *Sandy 12*. I'm receiving a very weak beeper along the ridge."

"Roger, *Sandy 12*."

The three survivors aboard *Jolly Two* told the crew that *Charley* had been seriously injured before he ejected, so he might not be able to use his survival radio. Replacement helicopters were still about 30 minutes away. Since the survivors aboard *Jolly Two* were in good condition, both they and the crew were all for helping *Sandy 12* investigate the beeper.

Once over the ridge, *Jolly Two* picked up the beeper signal, too. Bradley slowed his helicopter to a hover taxi about 500 feet below the ridge and established the point where the signal was strongest. Salome volunteered to go down

photo by Sgt. FRANK McINTYRE



TSgt. Charles F. Salome suits up for a pararescue mission with help from Sgt. Arthur F. Morrison.

and try to locate the signal and hopefully the missing *Charley*.

On the ground, Salome checked out two areas while the helicopter hovered above.

"Area one and two are both negative," he reported. "Wait a

minute! I see a maroon colored cloth in the brush. Carefully, Sergeant Salome approached the cloth. It was an air rescue and recovery beret, dropped by one of the crewmembers in the hovering chopper. Sergeant Salome put the beret in his pocket and continued the search, keeping a wary eye on the village at the top of the hill.

He found some footprints. "They're about three hours old," he told the men above. Salome decided to follow the prints, which led up and over the ridge.

Sandy 12 came on the radio again to warn the sergeant of the villages on the other side of the ridge. "Don't go over the top," he cautioned.

"Roger, *Sandy 12*. I'm already over the top and can see the villages above the elephant grass," Salome told him.

After more than 40 minutes on the ground, Sergeant Salome was relieved by two pararescuemen from the replacement helicopters that since had arrived. *Jolly Two* and the three survivors headed home.

All that the pararescuemen from the replacement chopper could find was a parachute, a helmet, and a survival radio. The survival radio was turned off, the weak beeper signal stopped. They believed the equipment was *Echo's*. There was no clue to *Charley's* whereabouts. The replacements headed home.

Jolly One and *Two* received the traditional wetdown when they arrived back at base.

Both Salome and Caldwell received the Silver Star for their assistance to the survivors and their efforts to recover them in a hostile region of Laos.

The rescue of all but one member of the crew under discouraging circumstances proved that while the rescue man's official motto is "That Others May Live," "We Keep Trying" would do just as well. ☐

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
	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>POB</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
(S)	5 Oct	Ranger 23	F-111	18N, 103E	2	2 MIA
(S)	6 Oct	Buick 03	F-4	Unknown	2	2 Saves
(U)	28 Oct	Unknown	Navy Ship	15N, 109E	1	1 Recovered (Deceased)
(S)	4 Nov	Sabre 73	Cobra	MR-1	2	2 Saves
(S)	4 Nov	Sabre 16	OH-1	MR-1	3	1 KIA 2 Saves
(S)	21 Nov	Joy Hop 1	F-4	Thailand	2	2 MIA
(U)	21 Nov	Baron 56	EC-47	NKP	10	2 KIA 8 Saves
(S)	22 Nov	Olive 02	B-52	Thailand	6	6 Saves
(S)	2 Dec	Hobo 01	A-7	19N, 104E	1	1 MIA
(S)	20 Dec	Brass 02	B-52	Hanoi	6	1 KIA 5 Saves
(S)	21 Dec	Spectre 17	AC-130	15N, 106E	16	2 Saves 14 MIA
(S)	27 Dec	ASH 02	B-52	NKP	6	6 Saves
(S)	28 Dec	NOY-2	T-28	17N, 105E	1	1 MIA

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PJ earns Silver Star

EGLIN AFB, FL—Sgt. Stephen L. Caldwell, a 55th ARRSq. PJ here, was recently awarded the Silver Star for his performance of duties in Southeast Asia. He was also presented the Air Medal and Distinguished Flying Cross.

According to the citations accompanying the awards, Sergeant Caldwell distinguished himself during military operations against an opposing armed force near Ban Ban, Laos Dec. 20, 1972. He descended on an HH-53 hoist to aid two injured American airmen. With hostile fire nearby, he gave emergency treatment to the survivors and helped them get to the rescue hoist.



Sergeant Caldwell

AIR RESCUE

VOL. 4, NO. 1

MAC/OIL, STOP 100D, SCOTT AFB, IL 62225

JANUARY, 1974

Hill airmen prove chivalry is yet alive

(Editor's Note: The following article was adapted from the Nov. 23, 1973 HILL TOP TIMES from Hill AFB, UT.)

Neal and Janice Larsen from Carson City, Nev., were returning to their home after a business trip in Utah. They were driving on the freeway near the Bonneville Salt Flats "when we arrived first on the scene of a nasty auto accident."

One car had tailgated another causing the second car to roll over a couple of times and land on its side in the mud and water. Two girls in the second car "Were very scared, wet, muddy, cold and shaken up, but luckily, not badly injured due to the fact their car had gone off into the soft mud and water on the side of the road. The driver of the other car seemed to be uninjured."

The Larsens stopped and offered assistance. About 10 minutes after, five or six men from Hill AFB came along.

"They immediately went to work. They had a medical kit and one of the men got in our car with the two girls as one girl had a cut on her hand. He took care of this immediately and then set about cleaning off their faces a little as they had been rolled in the mud."

"The men then moved the girls from our car into their two seated truck and wrapped them in warmer blankets. They then set about tromping through that knee-high mud to salvage what they could from the wrecked car."

"We didn't get all the names..but these men are very much a credit to the United States Air Force for their training and actions."

"They took over — there was a medic with them and he stayed with

the girls as they were quite shook up—mentally and physically."

"Two of the men proceeded to tromp through this knee-high mud and they just literally made everything smooth out. The commanding officer in charge of the group was extremely nice and helpful."

"All of the men were well mannered, self-assured, efficient and believe me, it restored our confidence and faith in the USAF. They were credits to the uniform and made us proud of the men in uniform. They can be relied upon but most of all, they were gentlemen."

The Larsens wrote a letter to Col. James M. Hall, Jr., Hill AFB commander.

Colonel Hall forwarded the Larsen's letter to Col. William E. Moore, 1550th Aircrew Training and Test Wing commander.

"It is a sincere pleasure for me to forward the attached letter from

Mr. and Mrs. Neal Larsen of Carson City, Nev.," Colonel Hall wrote.

"It was with considerable difficulty that I finally discovered 'the' Sergeant Fisher described as being MSgt. Udo C. J. Fisher of your organization."

"The others mentioned are CMSgt. Martin J. Juback, CMSgt. Harold E. Moak, TSgt. Wayne L. Fisk and Sgt. Daniel L. Herold, also of your organization."

"It was especially heartening to me to receive the Larsen's letter of praise for the humanitarian acts of your sergeants, in that in today's world, it is so easy to pass by people in distress, not wanting to get 'involved.'"

"Each of your sergeants is to be highly commended for his 'involvement;' not only did they aid and comfort the badly shaken accident victims, but their acts displayed great respect and confidence in the United States Air Force."



MOUNTAIN HOME AFB, ID — On his first day as aircraft commander, 1st Lt. Gary Perkins (holding bottle, right) was credited with two saves. SSgt. Mike Curtis holds the litter. See story of the rookie's missions on page two. (U.S. Air Force Photo)



HOMESTEAD AFB, FL — A woman and her newly born child are alive and well today thanks to the efforts of the above rescue crew from Detachment 1, 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing here. Det 1 was notified Nov. 13 by the Miami Coast Guard through the 301st ARRSq. of the need for medivac assistance of a pregnant woman with a ruptured uterus. Save 63, a UH-1N helicopter, was scrambled and landed near a football field where Mrs. Judith Stewart was transferred from an ambulance to the chopper. She was then flown to the

Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. As fate would have it, Dr. (Maj.) Richard C. Neilson was at Det. 1 to ride on a training flight for currency requirements. He offered to go along when the notification came for the emergency mission. The crew members included, left to right: Sgt. Thomas R. Gleisberg, pararescue specialist (now separated); Dr. Neilson; 1st Lt. Howard Stevens, pilot; and 1st Lt. Gwenn C. Nye, pilot. A crew member not shown was Sgt. Robert G. Pyle, flight mechanic. (U.S. Air Force Photo by TSgt. Paul Bauman)

Viet vet wins silver star medal

PLATTSBURGH AFB, NY — TSgt. Charles F. Salome, a pararescue/recovery technician with Detachment 18, 43rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron here, was presented the Silver Star medal and his twentieth oak leaf cluster to the Air Medal recently.

Sergeant Salome earned the medals for meritorious achievement and gallantry under combat conditions in Laos during 1972 and 1973.

He won the coveted Silver Star for "gallantry in connection with military operations...near Ban Ban,

Laos (Dec. 20, 1972)...Having participated in the rescue of three survivors, Sergeant Salome, with total disregard for his own safety volunteered to descend to the jungle floor...to search for a missing and seriously injured airman, even though hostile activity and ground fire had been encountered...Knowing the possibility of being left..., he continued his thorough search for over 40 minutes."

Sergeant Salome is serving as the NCO-in charge of Det. 18's pararescue section.

74-28717

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due to damage to the refueling probe. The pilot made an emergency landing in Laos and immediately received fire from nearby villagers. Jolly Green 03 recovered the Jolly Green 01 crew. Attempts to salvage equipment from Jolly Green 01 were unsuccessful due to enemy ground fire, and Sandy aircraft destroyed the downed helicopter.¹³²

(C) The Jackel 33 mission was a bitter disappointment because the Jolly Green had come so close to rescuing the survivor. Jolly Green 01 was the 3d ARRG's third and last aircraft loss in combat between 1 April 1972 and 30 June 1973. The other two were lost on the Bat 21 Mission and in a rocket attack at Da Nang.¹³³

(C) Spectre 17. On 21 December 1972, Spectre 17, an AC-130 Gunship, was downed over Laos. Because of enemy activity in the rescue area, the crew of Jolly Green 32 decided to attempt a night rescue using the NRS.

(C) After take-off, Jolly Green 32 contacted Spectre 07, who had voice contact with two survivors, and requested that the survivors have their strobe lights with IR covers, radios, and flares ready for immediate use. Using the LLLTV and illumination from the moon, Jolly Green 32 proceeded towards the survivors at 400 feet AGL. The Jolly Green crew detected a strobelight, and as the aircraft turned towards the survivors, the strobe was picked up on the LLLTV. Using the LLLTV, the pilot hovered the HH-53 near the first survivor who was then brought on board.

(C) The Jolly Green began the search for the second survivor. Five minutes later his strobe light was located. As Jolly Green 32 approached the second survivors, the radar altimeter picked up a large tree and the

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aircraft had to climb rapidly. Although the Jolly Green lost sight of the survivor, Spectre 07, using IR equipment, was able to vector the rescue aircraft to the survivor. After lowering a Pararescue Recovery Specialist to the ground to assist the second survivor, the Jolly Green completed the rescue and returned to NKP without incident.

134
135
(C) The Spectre 17 mission was the first combat SAR using NRS. The LLLTV helped the aircrew fly over the uneven terrain and was instrumental in locating the survivor's IR strobe. The excellent illumination from the moon and the assistance of Spectre 07 were also important to the successful recoveries. 136 The aircraft commander of Jolly Green 32, Captain Jerry W. Shipman, gave high praise to the help provided by Spectre 07. He stated in the mission report that: 137

(C) The use of the AC-130 aircraft will greatly increase the capability of the NRS aircraft. . . . The combination of an NRS equipped HH-53 and an AC-130 could play an increased role for night rescue operation if a limited training program could be developed.



NEWS RELEASE

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND

Directorate of Information, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

24 JAN 1974

62225



(618) 256-5309

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CAPTAIN SHIPMAN KEEPS GETTING MEDALS

23 JAN 1974

HQ. MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. -- Captain Jerry W. Shipman is still receiving medals for heroism as a rescue helicopter pilot in Southeast Asia.

In ceremonies at Scott Air Force Base, Ill., headquarters for the Military Airlift Command, the Silver Star (first oak leaf cluster), the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal (first, second and third oak leaf clusters) were pinned on Captain Shipman's chest by Lieutenant General Jay T. Robbins, MAC Vice Commander.

A native of Sand Springs, Okla., Captain Shipman was awarded the Silver Star (the cluster denotes the second award of this medal) for gallantry during a rescue operation in Laos in December 1972. On that day, the captain voluntarily flew his HH-53 rescue helicopter into hostile territory without protection to accomplish the first night recovery system rescue of two downed American airmen.

Captain Shipman, without the aid of lights, skillfully brought his vulnerable helicopter to within 150 feet of the rugged terrain and maintained a hover while the survivors were hoisted to safety.

MORE

Page 2 - Captain Shipman Keeps Getting Medals

This event took place only eight days after Captain Shipman had displayed his outstanding airmanship under the threat of hostile fire and adverse weather conditions to accomplish another rescue operation. This act earned him the Distinguished Flying Cross. These achievements were part of the 70 combat missions flown by Captain Shipman; 10 of them performed in North Vietnam.

The oak leaf clusters to the Air Medal are based on the number and type of missions flown.

Captain Shipman is presently serving as chief of the missile site security branch in Headquarters, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, also located at Scott Air Force Base. His military career began in 1966 when he graduated from the University of Oklahoma and received his commission through ROTC.

After completing pilot training at Vance Air Force Base, Okla., Captain Shipman became a KC-135 pilot and flew 70 combat refueling missions in Southeast Asia in support of B-52 operations. Upon return to the United States, he was assigned to Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., where he began flying UH-1 rescue helicopters in missile site support. In April 1972 he returned to Southeast Asia, this time as aircraft commander of an HH-53 rescue helicopter with the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, operating out of Thailand. He arrived at Scott Air Force Base and assumed his present duties in April 1973.

MORE

Page 3 - Captain Shipman Keeps Getting Medals

Captain Shipman is married to the former Linda K. Lunn of Oklahoma City, Okla., and they have a three-year old daughter, Jody. His parents, Mr. and Mrs. E. H. Shipman still reside in Sand Springs.

RP-14-74

-30-

1972 (cont)

- 1 May 72 Evacuation of Quang Tri. The 3d ARR Group evacuated 132 persons from the citadel in the besieged city of Quang Tri to Da Nang, Vietnam. Five HH-53s of the 37th ARR Squadron were used for this mission. No one was injured, despite the nearby presence of enemy forces. Staff Sergeant Robert L. LaPointe, a pararescue-man in the first HH-53, silenced enemy snipers with a mini-gun. When the plane landed, Sergeant LaPointe organized the evacuees and maintained ground control until the second HH-53 departed.
- 11 May 72 General John D. Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff, directed that the mission of ARRS be primarily oriented toward combat rescue operations.
- 1 Jun-
2 Jun 72 The 3d ARR Group, augmented by A-1s and other forces, rescued Captain Roger C. Locher, who had lost his F-4 over North Vietnam on 10 May and had evaded capture for 23 days. Captain Dale E. Stovall, 40th ARR Squadron, and his HH-53 crew successfully evacuated Captain Locher on 2 June. New electronic locator finder (ELF) equipment aided in the success of this operation.
- 27 Jun 72 Captain Stovall, 40th ARR Squadron, again flew deep into North Vietnam to rescue two downed airmen. After another HH-53 was forced to withdraw from the rescue site due to enemy fire, Captain Stovall's crew descended and retrieved the two survivors. The second HH-53 received more than 16 hits during the engagement, and several personnel aboard both HH-53s were wounded. Later, Captain Dale E. Stovall and Staff Sergeant Charles D. McGrath (pararescueman) were awarded the Air Force Cross.
- 6 Oct 72 General John D. Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff, ordered a sizeable reduction in the number of ARRS local base rescue elements and detachments during Fiscal Year 1973.
- Oct-
Nov 72 The 71st ARR Squadron joined with elements of other agencies in the search for House Majority Leader Hale Boggs, Congressman Nick Begich, and two other men, who disappeared in Alaska during a flight between Anchorage and Juneau. Despite a 40-day search, no trace was found.
- 2 Dec-
3 Dec 72 Three HC-130s and two HH-3s from the 31st ARR Squadron hoisted 29 Philippine sailors and one pet orangutan from lifeboats after their logging ship, the *San Martin*, sank about 500 miles east northeast from the Island of Luzon. Twenty-nine plus saves.
- 21 Dec 72 The 40th ARR Squadron performed its first night combat recovery in Southeast Asia by an HH-53 using a new Night Recovery System.

SEARCH AND RESCUE COME OF AGE

weather were almost impossible. SAOR 114 made several proposals to remedy this situation, with infrared detection as the most promising. This detection system worked by comparing body heat with the heat generated by objects in the background. The limiting factors included not being able to differentiate between body heat of a downed aircrew and that of enemy soldiers.⁵⁰

In March 1968, the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service issued a modified program directive to Aeronautic Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, providing for a limited night recovery system using low-light-level television. The resulting system incorporated a viewing device that had to be mounted in the starboard door under the hoist and in front of the minigun. Rescue crewmen did not like this arrangement, because it restricted the usefulness of the minigun and limited their defensive capabilities. Nevertheless, after testing at Eglin, the low-light-level television and the viewing device were installed in a Udorn-based HH-53B in November 1969. The system was so unreliable that rescue headquarters decided against installing this limited night recovery system in favor of a full night recovery system that would, supposedly, be much improved. However, it would not be ready until 1972.⁵¹ Even then the full night recovery system was not adequate. The only night recovery credited to the system occurred on December 21, 1972. The survivor was picked up from an isolated area in southern Laos. The recovery chopper met no enemy opposition, and the pilot was able to concentrate on using the system.

The HH-53B/C represented the best in rescue technology, yet there were some limitations in the system. Too large to be an ideal rescue helicopter, its size kept it from maneuvering in tight areas like karst valleys. Its large size and relatively slow speed made it an easy target for enemy gunners. At its top speed of 170-190 knots, the HH-53C was vulnerable to 14.5-mm heavy machinegun fire for more than half a minute. It remained within range of a 23-mm antiaircraft gun for almost a full minute while a 57-mm gunner could fire on it for nearly two and a half minutes.⁵²

Pilots complained about the limited field of view. The position of the rotor mast forced the pilot to maintain a five degree nose-up attitude during the hover, thus further restricting his view forward and down. Crew commanders were also concerned that during a hover the starboard side was not covered by the minigun because if one parajumper was on the jungle penetrator or helping the survivor aboard, and the other was working the winch, there was no one available to fire the minigun.⁵⁴

In spite of those shortcomings, the HH-53s were the finest rescue helicopters in the world. With subsequent modifications, and within the framework of the entire rescue effort, the HH-53s contributed to making successful aircrew rescue the norm rather than the exception for aircrews shot down in Southeast Asia.

The HH-53s, with increased speed and defensive armament, formed

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(1) the higher speed increased the survivability of this RESCORT aircraft, and (2) its navigation system was very effective in locating survivors¹²⁶ and leading the Jolly Greens to them.

(C) Jackel 33. On 22 December 1972, Jackel 33, an F-111 from Takhli¹²⁷ RTAFB, was downed by unknown causes¹²⁸ 17 miles southwest of Hanoi.

After several days delay due to weather, SAR forces attempted to rescue the Jackel 33 crew on 27 December during a LINEBACKER II mission. The task force consisted of 13 A-7 Sandys, four Jolly Greens, two HC-130 Kings, and¹²⁹ 32 F-4s.

(C) Upon reaching the objective area, Jolly Green 01 began ingress 18 miles from the survivor. With the aid of a smoke screen set up by two Sandys, the Jolly Green reached the rescue area without encountering enemy defenses. As the Jolly Green neared one survivor, enemy gunfire came from all directions. Using miniguns and automatic rifles to engage the enemy, the helicopter hovered over the survivor and dropped the penetrator. The survivor got within five feet of the penetrator but was blown off his feet¹³⁰ by the helicopter downwash.

(C) At this time, the copilot of the Jolly Green was wounded and five or six enemy soldiers attempted to run under the aircraft. The helicopter had been in a hover for over 60 seconds and the enemy was still firing from all directions. There was blood all over the cockpit from the copilot's¹³¹ wound. With the situation hopeless, the pilot left without the survivor.

(C) During egress, the aircraft experienced stability and control problems and was low on fuel. An attempt to refuel with King was unsuccessful

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due to damage to the refueling probe. The pilot made an emergency landing in Laos and immediately received fire from nearby villagers. Jolly Green 03 recovered the Jolly Green 01 crew. Attempts to salvage equipment from Jolly Green 01 were unsuccessful due to enemy ground fire, and Sandy air-
132
craft destroyed the downed helicopter.

(C) The Jackel 33 mission was a bitter disappointment because the Jolly Green had come so close to rescuing the survivor. Jolly Green 01 was the 3d ARRG's third and last aircraft loss in combat between 1 April 1972 and 30 June 1973. The other two were lost on the Bat 21 Mission and
133
in a rocket attack at Da Nang.

(C) Spectre 17. On 21 December 1972, Spectre 17, an AC-130 Gunship, was downed over Laos. Because of enemy activity in the rescue area, the crew of Jolly Green 32 decided to attempt a night rescue using the NRS.

(C) After take-off, Jolly Green 32 contacted Spectre 07, who had voice contact with two survivors, and requested that the survivors have their strobe lights with IR covers, radios, and flares ready for immediate use. Using the LLLTV and illumination from the moon, Jolly Green 32 proceeded towards the survivors at 400 feet AGL. The Jolly Green crew detected a strobelight, and as the aircraft turned towards the survivors, the strobe was picked up on the LLLTV. Using the LLLTV, the pilot hovered the HH-53 near the first survivor who was then brought on board.

(C) The Jolly Green began the search for the second survivor. Five minutes later his strobe light was located. As Jolly Green 32 approached the second survivors, the radar altimeter picked up a large tree and the

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Jackal 33 Bravo
An Overdue Briefing
by
Charles J. Rouhier

I was a Jolly Green Giant Flight Engineer (FE) participating in the failed rescue of Jackal 33 Alpha, Capt. Robert Sponcyberger, and Bravo, Lt. William W. Wilson December 23 - 27, 1972. In January 1973 I went TDY to Takhli for a conference with the 474th TFW F-111 unit. They asked me to present a briefing on the events of the 26 December 1972 rescue attempt of 33 Bravo at the end of the session. At the completion of the other briefings no one brought up my briefing and I did not volunteer. I believe there was a couple of reasons for this: First, I was a snot nosed kid of 20 at the time and had never spoken before a large crowd before. It scared the hell out of me. Second, it bothered me tremendously that we came so close to rescuing Wilson, but we just were not good enough. There was a lot of guilt over that mission and I did not feel like talking about it.

With the departure of the F-111's from the Air Force (A.F.) inventory it's time for this long overdue briefing. To the Aardvarks who were at Takhli in 1973 I apologize for shirking my duties at that conference.

Jackal 33, crippled by Triple-A over downtown Hanoi on the night of 22 December 1972 exited the target area on a single engine. The crew limped to the first ridge line west and ejected about 17 miles from the edge of Hanoi. I am still not sure of the exact location. If memory serves, 33 Alpha's capture was sometime on the 24th or 25th. On the 24th I was the FE on Jolly 2, Alpha High. Little did we know this mission foretold the events of coming days. The primary hydraulic flight control system failed shortly after crossing the border into North Vietnam (NVN) and a fire started in the left forward electronics bay when the Tacan failed. We aborted and RTBed to Nakhon Phanom (NKP). The remainder of the force continued, but could not penetrate due to weather. SAR forces were in the area again on the 25th, but weather again prevented a rescue.

The night of the 26th the weather cleared sufficiently to allow a rescue attempt on the 27th. We woke about 0300 for briefings and preparations. Include in the rescue package, as I recall, were four HH-53C's, two HC-130's and eight A-7D Corsairs. Additional support was provide by other units for MIGCAP, SAM suppression, tankers for the fast movers and AEW. I was the FE on Jolly 1, Alpha Low, on this day. Alpha High was Jolly 2, Bravo Low, Jolly 3 and Bravo High, Jolly 4.

The crew of Jolly 1 was:

- Capt. Richard D. Shapiro -- Pilot
- Capt. Miguel A. Pereira -- Copilot, "Bear" to those who knew and loved him.
- Sgt. Charles J. Rouhier -- Flight Engineer
- A1C Robert W. Jones -- Pararescuemen (PJ), Ramp
- TSgt. John R. Carlson -- Pararescuemen (PJ), Left window
- Combat Cameraman -- Sorry. I do not remember his name.

We departed NKP before first light and proceeded north past Udom. We crossed into Laos between Vientiane and Pak Sane and proceeded North East around the Plaine-des-Jarres to a holding point just west of the NVN/Laos border. Systems problems kept me busy and I am not sure of our exact route. Just after passing into Laos we test fired the miniguns. The window gun failed to operate and I spent the next several hours trying to fix the problem. I salvaged parts from the door weapon to repair it. Losing the door weapon is not a problem since the hoist precludes its use. Once we reached our holding point another problem manifested itself. The upper ramp door kept detaching itself and falling on the ramp PJ's head. Normally, FE's disable the ramp hydraulics during a combat mission and the up-locks keep the door in place. This time it did not work and hydraulic power remained on to the ramp. This is a risk since the utility hydraulic system supplies this and other non-essential systems. Disabling these systems mitigates the effects of battle damage.

Sandy's 1 (Lead), 2, 3, and 4 proceeded to the survivor's area to pinpoint his location and suppressed the ground fire. We spent considerable time orbiting waiting for the Sandy's to make the area safe enough for a rescue. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had at least two 51 cal's in the area and a considerable number of troops. We were confident the NVA knew the location of 33 Bravo and we were heading into a flak trap.

We refueled several times waiting for the call from Sandy Lead. If I remember right, about thirty minutes after our last refueling we got a call (we thought from Sandy Lead) to make the rescue. We turned east and crossed the border into North Vietnam at maximum speed and very low altitude. I believe two Sandy's escorted us while the other two stayed with the remaining Jollies in the holding area. We observed numerous bunkers being built into the sides of the mountains as we ingressed. At one point we passed a NVA truck barreling down a mountain road. The driver's surprise to see us lower than him almost caused him to drive off the cliff. To this day, I believe if I would have waved at him he would have. As we reached the Black River the Sandy's laid a smoke corridor across the river to screen us from a 57mm site to the North west. Several rounds of 57mm passed behind us as we crossed. Sandy 5 announced our arrival in the area to which Sandy Lead responded with something along the lines of "What the hell are you doing here?" We were setup and should have authenticated the call. Murphy was clearly along in spades on this mission. The North Vietnamese sucker us in with the call. Whoever he was, his English was very good.

We ended up passing over 33 Bravo's area at about 150 knots since Sandy Lead was not ready to pinpoint his location. We flew around the mountain and this put us briefly over the plains with Hanoi barely visible in the distance. We came back around the mountain from roughly south. From the time we entered 33 Bravo's area we were taking heavy small arms and 51 cal. At some point during this time the copilot took two small arms' rounds through the right elbow. Nobody was aware of this for sometime. One of the Sandy's also reported we were losing a lot of fuel from our left side. As we came back around the mountain Shapiro was trying to slow up the Jolly. The Sandy's were calling for Bravo to pop smoke, telling us to slow down, and trying to suppress the ground fire we were taking. We overshot the survivor again and had to perform a hovering turn to

get back into the area. Twice we passed directly over a 51 cal site. The second time over the ramp PJ silenced it. I never saw this weapon, which surprised Bob Jones at the debriefing. Locating 33 Bravo was more important to me than looking for bad guys. The smoke from Bravo's Mk13 had dissipated by the time we got into a hover over his general area. Locating him proved difficult due to the high, blowing elephant grass. I am not sure how long we were in a hover looking for him. It seemed like hours, but was probably only minutes. The whole time we were taking a lot of hits. We could see the NVA moving in on us the entire time. Only the ramp minigun was firing. At the debriefing Bob Jones reported NVA under the Jolly firing into the bottom of his gun tub. The window minigun was not firing and I was beginning to think Carlson was hit. I eventually heard him firing his CAR-15.

I finally spotted 33 Bravo about our 2 o'clock making his way to the Jolly. I directed the pilot over his position and set the penetrator down about three feet from him. He was reaching for the penetrator when our rotor wash knocked him backwards. He was getting up when the pilot pulled power and exited the area. Even though we were taking numerous hits I was not aware of any critical damage to the Jolly. I pulled the penetrator into the helo, turned and scanned the instruments. Everything appeared to be working, at least from the instruments not shattered by ground fire. There were many holes through the various cockpit windows. I asked Shapiro why we left. He said he had just then heard Bear report being hit. It was the first any of us knew of Bears injuries.

Our fuel state at this time was critical and fuel would not transfer from the drops even though everything appeared to be working electrically. The Sandy's were giving us directions to exit the area. I applied a tourniquet to Bear's arm and directed the closest PJ to attend the copilot. I manned Carlson's minigun only to discover it had failed again. That's why there was no firing from his side. With Bear out of the seat I jumped in to assist the pilot. All of this occurred prior to re-crossing the Black River. The Sandy's were a tad late laying the smoke and we were on the front edge of the screen as we crossed. No one noticed if the 57 fired at us or not.

One of the Kings (forget which) crossed into NVN to give us gas. We rendezvoused with King and Alpha High. The probe would not extend and we had to plug in to King with the probe retracted. This put us very close to the HC-130 with the drogue flying underneath the rotor blades. Turbulence from our abnormal closeness to the HC-130 caused us to disconnect once. The front of the probe had taken one or more hits and the fuel King was sending us went right into the slipstream. I do not think any of it made it to the tanks. I told the pilot we did not have any more time for this. The left main showed 0 pounds and the right about 250 pounds. I had no idea if they were accurate or damaged. Alpha High picked a landing site on a mountain top for us. I believe we had only reached the border at this time. We took more ground fire as we went in for a fast hard landing. I am not sure if the engines flamed out before or as I shut them down. Alpha High landed about fifty yards from us up the hill. We abandoned the Jolly and got into the High bird. We then left the area and headed home.

Due to the late hour the Sandy's put 33 Bravo to bed for the night. Jolly 3 and 4 along with several Sandy's stayed in the area of our helo for a while. I believe it was Bravo Low that went back in to see if the Jolly was salvageable. While the PJ's were inspecting the helo they came under ground fire from people moving up the mountain from a village in the valley. They abandon the Jolly and the Sandy's destroyed it.

We landed briefly at Udorn to drop Bear off at the hospital. He never came back to the 40th and went directly back to the States. We got back to NKP some thirteen or so hours after we took off, debriefed and went to the hooch. The bombing halted the next day and the Jollies did not attempt another rescue of Jackal 33 Bravo.

I believe Jackal 33 Bravo's capture occurred a couple of days later. I understand assets were directing him to a safer location or possibly into Laos at the time of his capture.

This concludes the briefing of the Jackal 33 Bravo mission. Please accept my sincerest apologies for its tardiness.

Postscript.

I talked to Bear after I got back to the States in April 73. The A. F. medically discharged him and he was pursuing a law degree in New York. He only had about 60% mobility in his right arm from the wounds. I heard in '81 or '82 he had gotten back in the A. F. as a JAG.

I have no idea what happened to Richard Shapiro, John Carlson or the Combat Cameraman. I had no contact with them after I got back.

Bob Jones joined me at the Rescue unit at Patrick AFB, FL for about a year until I separated from the A.F. I do not know what happened to him after that.

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3ARRGp History, Oct - Dec 1972

Chapter V

MISSION SUPPORT

5-1. (U) 3ARRGp Key Personnel:

Colonel Cecil N. Muirhead	CC
Lt Colonel James J. Krajicek	DO
Lt Colonel Anthony J. Pannella	JROC
Lt Colonel John W. Sniogowski	XP
Captain Andrew B. Comrie	SE
MSgt Robert C. Martin	1st Sgt

5-2. (S) Combat Loss: On 27 December 1972, an HH-53C of the 40ARRSq was destroyed by escort A-7 Sandies after being abandoned on a ridge in Laos. The aircraft had been badly damaged during a rescue attempt and was losing fuel and unable to refuel. Unable to reach a secure area, the aircraft was landed on a ridge and the crew extracted.

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From: Robert LaPointe <rlapointe@gci.net>
To: Rouhier, Chuck home <JollyFE@hotmail.com>; Rouhier, Chuck - work
<Chuck.Rouhier@wpafb.af.mil>
Date: Sunday, July 25, 1999 10:03 AM
Subject: Jackal 33 SAR

Another land mark was reached today as I completed inputting all material collected into files and databases. One of the last missions I cataloged was the Jackal 33 SAR. Attached are two documents relating to this SAR from the 3 ARRGp history records. I also have the copy of the briefing you prepared and would like your permission to use it and quote you.

I will be returning to Maxwell in the next four months to finish collecting research. The research phase of this project will terminate on 31 Dec 99. Effective Jan 2000 I will take a break from school and work for four months. During this period, the final draft will be produced and sent to the printers prior to June 2000.

Thanks for your help on this project.

Bob

Picture Attachments:

due to damage to the refu
in Laos and immediately
03 recovered the Jolly G
Jolly Green 01 were unsuc
craft destroyed the down

7/25/99



"Taking fire from everywhere"

By
1st Lt. David T. Rivard
67 ARRSq. Information Officer

"We were taking fire from everywhere and just when we thought we had him, he disappeared." This was the way TSgt. John R. Carlson, now assigned to the 67th ARRSq., RAF Bentwaters, England, recalled a rescue attempt which earned him and the crew of the Jolly Green the Silver Star.

The mission began at first light Dec. 27, 1972 from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand. The Jolly Green crew was scrambled to rescue a pilot who had been forced to bailout only 20 kilometers from Hanoi.

Although the mission began at first light, the actual rescue attempt did not take place until 3 p.m. The Jolly Green entered the rescue area across the Black River and flew down a corridor of smoke put down by the Sandys, who also were attacking the guns which protected the area and a MIG field just the other side of a nearby mountain.

The downed pilot was located on the side of a mountain. To make the rescue even more difficult, there were three 51-calibre machine guns located around him. The other para-rescueman with Carlson, A1C Robert W. Jones, took out one of the guns on the way in but then heavy ground fire

began from other enemy troops on the ground.

As the pilot, Capt. Richard D. Shapiro, began to maneuver for the pickup, the ground fire became more intense and accurate. "I remember the copilot, Capt. Miguel A. Pereira, shouting he was hit, but alright," said Sergeant Carlson. "At the same time my minigun malfunctioned and I was forced to use my automatic hand weapon."

Sergeant Carlson also recalled that when he was able to get to the cockpit, to attend to Captain Pereira's wounds, he found the wind screen was shattered from small arms hits; and that Captain Shapiro had small arms hits on both sides of the wall beside his head and on the floor.

Within a few seconds of Pereira being hit, the downed pilot was seen running for the Jolly Green. "We could see him coming and then he was gone. The rotor wash had swept him down the hillside and he was not sighted again. It was a tremendous let down to be so close and then to miss getting him out," Sergeant Carlson remarked.

Throughout this short time span of just three minutes, the Jolly Green had taken a tremendous amount of hits. After seeing the downed pilot disappear, Captain Shapiro decided to exit the area.

"With vital controls damaged, Captain Shapiro had to fly right down the side of the mountain to get up enough airspeed to reach altitude. It was as we were exiting at tree-top level that we discovered another problem - our fuel tanks had been hit," recalled Sergeant Carlson. Sergeant Carlson added that probably the most important factor in their getting out was flying directly into the sun; thereby becoming a poor target for the guns.

"Our problems didn't end there," said Sergeant Carlson. "We were losing fuel, and once out of the area we tried for a hookup with a refueler and found that our refueling probe would not extend. Captain Shapiro made several attempts to hookup without the extension, but to no avail. It was then we knew we had to abandon the aircraft."

A mountain top in Laos was chosen as the site to set the Jolly Green down. "As we approached the site," Sergeant Carlson remembered, "we began taking ground fire again. We managed to set the aircraft down and get onboard the backup Jolly Green with no further casualties, and headed for home."

"For their gallantry and devotion to duty" Sergeant Carlson and the crew of the Jolly Green were awarded the nation's second highest award, the Silver Star.

JACKAL 33 SAR

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE SILVER STAR

TO

CHARLES J. ROUHIER

Sergeant Charles J. Rouhier distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force near Hanoi, North Vietnam on 27 December 1972. On that date, Sergeant Rouhier, a Flight Engineer on an HH-53C Rescue Helicopter, voluntarily flew into a highly hostile and heavily defended area to attempt the rescue of a downed American airman. Despite intense groundfire being directed at his hovering helicopter, Sergeant Rouhier stood in the unprotected crewdoor in order to locate the survivor and then lowered the rescue device. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Sergeant Rouhier has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96353

SPECIAL ORDER
GB-1008

19 NOVEMBER 1973

BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, EACH OF THE FOLLOWING IS
AWARDED THE SILVER STAR FOR GALLANTRY WHILE SERVING WITH
FRIENDLY FOREIGN FORCES ENGAGED IN AN ARMED CONFLICT AGAINST
AN OPPOSING ARMED FORCE ON DATE INDICATED.

SSAN	NAME	DN	PAS
CAPTAIN			
583093312	PEREIRA MIGUEL A BASIC	721227	NAQKJS
291387999	SHAPIRO RICHARD C BASIC	721227	NAQKJS
TECHNICAL SERGEANT			
332342231	CARLSON JOHN R BASIC	721227	NAQKJS
SERGEANT			
285526112	ROUHIER CHARLES J BASIC	721227	NAQKJS
AIRMAN FIRST CLASS			
264022076	JONES ROBERT W BASIC	721227	NAQKJS

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

JESSIE [Signature] MAJOR USAF
ASST DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>SIGNIFICANT EVENT</u>
<u>Nov</u>		
21	(C)	EC-47, SN 43049771 went out of control following attempted landing at NKP and crashed. Two of ten crewmembers were fatally wounded.
22	(U)	21st SOS crew successfully recovered four B-52 crewmembers after ejecting from their battle damaged aircraft.
23	(C)	OV-10, SN 6714632 crashed near Da Nang after experiencing engine loss. Pilot recovered without injury.
27	(U)	OL-1, 361 TEWS was activated at Ubon RTAFB, Thailand.
27	(U)	Lt Gen William G. Moore, Commander, 13th Air Force, arrived for staff visit and mission update.
<u>Dec</u>		
7 - 9	(U)	Maj Gen George J. Keegan Jr., asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Hq USAF, arrived for mission tour.
15	(U)	First ^{1st} Special Operations Squadron was relocated at Kadena AB, Okinawa and assumed new mission.
20	(U)	21SOS crew recovered two B-52 crewmembers who had ejected near NKP after suffering battle damage over North Vietnam.
27	(U)	21st SOS crew recovered two B-52 crewmembers who had ejected near NKP after suffering battle damage over North Vietnam.

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Vietnam War Aircraft Losses

1569	28 Nov 1972	F-4D	SVN	Rockwood J. H.	Capt	MIA		Jones B. M.	Capt	MIA
1570	2 Dec 1972	A-7D	NVN	Shine A. C.	Capt	MIA				
1571	9 Dec 1972	RF-4C	NVN	Williams B. J.	Maj	KIA		Acosta H. M.	1Lt	POW (retur
1572	18 Dec 1972	B-52	THL	u	u	Rescued		u	u	Rescued
1573	18 Dec 1972	F-111A	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1574	18 Dec 1972	B-52	NVN	u	u	POW		u	u	POW
1575	18 Dec 1972	B-52D	NVN	u	u	u		u	u	u
1576	19 Dec 1972	OV-10A	SVN	u	u	KIA		u	u	Rescued
1577	20 Dec 1972	B-52D	THL	u	u	Rescued		u	u	Rescued
1578	20 Dec 1972	B-52D	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1579	20 Dec 1972	B-52	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1580	20 Dec 1972	B-52D	LAOS	Johnson	Capt	Rescued	USAF Helo	Rousseau	Capt	Rescued
1581	20 Dec 1972	B-52	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1582	20 Dec 1972	B-52	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1583	21 Dec 1972	AC-130A	LAOS	u	u	KIA		u	u	KIA
1584	21 Dec 1972	B-52D	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1585	21 Dec 1972	B-52D	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1586	22 Dec 1972	F-111A	NVN	Sponeybarger R. D.	Capt	POW (returned)		WiLaoson W. W.	1Lt	POW (retur
1587	24 Dec 1972	A-7D	LAOS	Reiss C. F.	Capt	Rescued				
1588	26 Dec 1972	B-52D	NVN	u	u	MIA		u	u	MIA
1589	26 Dec 1972	B-52D	THL	u	u	KIA		u	u	Rescued
1590	27 Dec 1972	F-4E	NVN	Jeffcoat C. H.	Maj	POW (returned)		Trimble J. R.	1Lt	POW (retur
1591	27 Dec 1972	F-4E	NVN	Anderson J. W.	Capt	POW (returned)		Ward B. H.	1Lt	POW (retur
1592	27 Dec 1972	B-52D	THL	u	u	Rescued		u	u	Rescued
1593	27 Dec 1972	B-52D	NVN	u	u	KIA		u	u	KIA