

DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ground forces.

STINGER 41B/D/E/F/G/H/I¹³²

(C) Bien Hoa Sandys directed a quick pickup of the seven survivors of Stinger 41. US Army and Jolly Green helicopters were used. Though the opposition was considered light, two of the rescue helicopters received battle damage.

MUSKET 03A/B¹³³

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132. 1st SOS Historical Data Reports. Also see 18th SOS Historical Data Reports, Apr-Jun 72, Appendix VI, Tab B.

133. 1st SOS Historical Data Reports. Also, see SARCO Report for Musket 03A/B, 5 May 72, (Doc 29).

Classified by *William E. Brown*
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1974

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CLASSIFIED

DOC 291

S T A T E M E N T

SM 44

7 May 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 7 and 8 (SAR Musket 03A/B)

1. On 5 May 1972 Sandy 7 and 8 launched from Da Nang on what was reported to be a "feet wet" SAR for Musket 03, an F-4 FAC out of Ubon. We launched at 0440Z and shortly after becoming airborne King 25 passed encoded coordinates which placed the survivors slightly north of finger lake. He also passed a radial/DME fix (293/33/69) and the two positions were approximately 20 NM apart. I asked him to verify the encoded position and to authenticate his wheel. The authentication was incorrect and King discovered he had the wrong days AKAC wheel. We later received the correct position from Covey 124, the on-scene commander.
2. Sandy 7 and 8 were directed to hold feet wet as Covey 124 was putting in fast-mover strikes, forming a one Klic square around the survivors. Both A and B were up on Delta channel and were in excellent condition. No ground fire was observed and neither survivor had heard any movement in their immediate area.
3. At approximately 0600Z Covey 124 reached Bingo fuel and, after requesting release from orbit, Sandy 7 and 8 proceeded to the SAR area and assumed on-scene command. Bilk 25 and Covey 123 were both in the area. Bilk 25 was in an OV-10, with speed comparable to the Jolly Greens, and he was very familiar with the area. I decided to utilize him to lead the Jolly Greens from the initial holding point (Camp Evans, 291/21/69) to the final holding point (2 miles south of the survivors) if and when we elected to attempt a pick up. I briefed Covey 123 on where to put fast mover ordnance, and that fast mover smoke would be available for the pick-up attempt. I put down Willy Pete rockets where I wanted the smoke screen and told Queen to hand the smoke flight directly to Covey 123.
4. Sandy 7 and 8 trolled the survivors area for approximately 30 minutes, using ordnance sparingly, and received no reaction at all. Fast mover strikes were going in continually along the road to the east and the ridgeline to the north. A large rainstorm was developing to the south so I directed Sandy 8 to start Jolly 65 from the initial hold, utilizing the clouds and rain as cover. Sandy 8 briefed Bilk 25 on the ingress and departed the SAR area to escort the Jolly.
5. While Sandy 8 and Bilk 25 were bringing the Jolly inbound I briefed the survivors on use of the flares, how to hold their survival radios, how to give vectors, and in what sequence they were to be picked up, first Bravo and then Alpha. Both acknowledged instructions. When the Jolly arrived at the final hold I instructed Covey 123 to put in the fast-mover smoke as prebriefed, which he did immediately. The entire smoke screen looked like 3 Willy Pete rockets spaced about 100 meters apart, and did absolutely no good, so I told Covey 123 to continue putting in ordnance in the same location throughout the pickup. I put down a too far mark and Sandy 8 led the Jolly directly to the survivors. As the Jolly

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Both Alpha and Bravo complied. I tried to vector the Jolly to Bravos position but the tailgunner saw Alpha's smoke and the Jolly turned around and went to Alpha's position. They were in the hover only 2 to 3 minutes getting Alpha on board and I told them to head 060 degree to Bravo. I had Bravo pop his other smoke and the Jolly moved almost directly to him. The Jolly couldn't visually acquire Bravo even though they were within 20 meters of his position. They were in the hover 3-4 minutes with Bravo vectoring them continuously, but were still unable to find him. Throughout this time Sandy 7 and 8 were in a daisy chain around the Jolly, but expending very little ordnance. At this time the Jolly called off ground fire from his 6 o'clock position and pulled out. Sandy 8 instructed him to return to the final hold while we put in ordnance on the gun position. (Both Sandy 7 and 8 were in position to roll in immediately upon hearing the ground fire call, and neither of us saw any indication of fire) As I pulled off my second pass on the suspected gun position I saw the Jolly heading south and climbing. He had elected to proceed, unescorted, back to feet wet. Since we only had one more Jolly at the initial hold I told Queen to get another launched from channel 77 ASAP. I put down Willy Pete rockets and had Covey 123 put in fast movers with strafe along the ridgeline where the ground fire was reported. They worked the area over very thoroughly for about 15 minutes, then Sandy 7 and 8 trolled the area for reaction, we received none. Both Sandy 7 and 8 were approaching Bingo fuel so as soon as Queen notified me that another Jolly was airborne from Da Nang I instructed Bilk 25 to bring Jolly 21 to the final hold. I was having trouble talking to the survivor so Sandy 8 rebriefed him, again pinpointed his position, and told him to turn on his strobe light. As soon as Jolly Green 21 reached the final hold I rejoined with him and led him to the survivor. Sandy 8 gave him final vectors and positioned him directly over Bravo. The pickup was made in approximately two minutes (the PJ saw the strobe light) and all SAR forces departed the area at 0830Z. RTB to Da Nang was uneventful. *I discussed the capabilities and limitations of fast mover smoke with Major Hall, an ordnance specialist flying with the gunfighters. It was his impression that the smoke flight had bombed off their canisters instead of dispensing them. I recommend a thorough study of fast-mover smoke capabilities, as our experiences during the past week have ruled out the use of A-1 slow mover smoke in the area north of Da Nang.

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 GEORGE E. THROCKMORTON, Captain, USAF
 Sandy 7

Carl D. Blevins Jr / Lt
 CARL D. BLEVINS, JR., 1Lt, USAF
 Sandy 8

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SECRET

DOC A12

SA-7 hit in the engine and ~~blended~~ ~~set~~ ~~wet~~. The aircraft continued to run with the engine on fire until the oil pressure went to zero. Lt Seitz extracted about five miles off shore and was picked up by an Army helicopter within 30 seconds. The SAR was turned over to Hobo 42/43 by Sandy 07 but Hobo 42 (Lt Rick Fossum) was immediately hit by another SA-7. He stamped out the fire in the cockpit with his feet and the engine kept running allowing an emergency landing at Da Nang.

The next morning Hobo 20/21 Maj Harding and Capt Screws entered the SAR area but they too were shot down by SA-7 missiles. Both were rescued by Army helicopters but Capt Screws had sustained a broken shoulder during extraction. Bilk 34 was subsequently rescued by ground forces as all A-1's were ordered out of the area after the loss of three in less than 24 hours.

On 5 May Musket 03 (F-4) was downed at 293/33/69 with two survivor. The Sandys 07/08 (Capt Throckmorton, Lt Blevins) proceeded directly to the area and began trolling for ground fire. None was observed so the Jollys were brought in for a quick pick-up. Musket 03A was rescued first but ground fire drove the Jolly off before Bravo could be picked-up. The Sandys suppressed the ground fire and brought in another Jolly to rescue Bravo.

On 7 May Bootleg 51 (F-4) was downed at 295/50/69 with one survivor. Sandys 07/08 (Maj Encinas, Lt L. L. Smith) arrived on scene at 1705L and began trolling for ground fire. Several 23mm and 37mm guns were ~~shot~~ ~~down~~ ~~and~~ ~~neutralized~~ with fast mover

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DOC 291

STATEMENT

SM 44

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2. Sandy 7 and 8 were directed to hold feet wet as Covey 124 was putting in fast-mover strikes, forming a one Klic square around the survivors. Both A and B were up on Delta channel and were in excellent condition. No ground fire was observed and neither survivor had heard any movement in their immediate area.
3. At approximately 0600Z Covey 124 reached Bingo fuel and, after requesting release from orbit, Sandy 7 and 8 proceeded to the SAR area and assumed on-scene command. Bilk 25 and Covey 123 were both in the area. Bilk 25 was in an OV-10, with speed comparable to the Jolly Greens, and he was very familiar with the area. I decided to utilize him to lead the Jolly Greens from the initial holding point (Camp Evans, 291/21/69) to the final holding point (2 miles south of the survivors) if and when we elected to attempt a pick up. I briefed Covey 123 on where to put fast mover ordnance, and that fast mover smoke would be available for the pick-up attempt. I put down Willy Pete rockets where I wanted the smoke screen and told Queen to hand the smoke flight directly to Covey 123.
4. Sandy 7 and 8 trolled the survivors area for approximately 30 minutes, using ordnance sparingly, and received no reaction at all. Fast mover strikes were going in continually along the road to the east and the ridgeline to the north. A large rainstorm was developing to the south so I directed Sandy 8 to start Jolly 65 from the initial hold, utilizing the clouds and rain as cover. Sandy 8 briefed Bilk 25 on the ingress and departed the SAR area to escort the Jolly.
5. While Sandy 8 and Bilk 25 were bringing the Jolly inbound I briefed the survivors on use of the flares, how to hold their survival radios, how to give vectors, and in what sequence they were to be picked up, first Bravo and then Alpha. Both acknowledged instructions. When the Jolly arrived at the final hold I instructed Covey 123 to put in the fast-mover smoke as prebriefed, which he did immediately. The entire smoke screen looked like 3 Willy Pete rockets spaced about 100 meters apart, and did absolutely no good, so I told Covey 123 to continue putting in ordnance in the same location throughout the pickup. I put down a too far mark and Sandy 8 led the Jolly directly to the survivors. As the Jolly

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Both Alpha and Bravo complied. I tried to vector the Jolly to Bravos position but the tailgunner saw Alpha's smoke and the Jolly turned around and went to Alpha's position. They were in the hover only 2 to 3 minutes getting Alpha on board and I told them to head 060 degree to Bravo. I had Bravo pop his other smoke and the Jolly moved almost directly to him. The Jolly couldn't visually acquire Bravo even though they were within 20 meters of his position. They were in the hover 3-4 minutes with Bravo vectoring them continuously, but were still unable to find him. Throughout this time Sandy 7 and 8 were in a daisy chain around the Jolly, but expending very little ordnance. At this time the Jolly called off ground fire from his 6 o'clock position and pulled out. Sandy 8 instructed him to return to the final hold while we put in ordnance on the gun position. (Both Sandy 7 and 8 were in position to roll in immediately upon hearing the ground fire call, and neither of us saw any indication of fire) As I pulled off my second pass on the suspected gun position I saw the Jolly heading south and climbing. He had elected to proceed, unescorted, back to feet wet. Since we only had one more Jolly at the initial hold I told Queen to get another launched from channel 77 ASAP. I put down Willy Pete rockets and had Covey 123 put in fast movers with strafe along the ridgeline where the ground fire was reported. They worked the area over very thoroughly for about 15 minutes, then Sandy 7 and 8 trolled the area for reaction, we received none. Both Sandy 7 and 8 were approaching Bingo fuel so as soon as Queen notified me that another Jolly was airborne from Da Nang I instructed Bilk 25 to bring Jolly 21 to the final hold. I was having trouble talking to the survivor so Sandy 8 rebriefed him, again pinpointed his position, and told him to turn on his strobe light. As soon as Jolly Green 21 reached the final hold I rejoined with him and led him to the survivor. Sandy 8 gave him final vectors and positioned him directly over Bravo. The pickup was made in approximately two minutes (the PJ saw the strobe light) and all SAR forces departed the area at 0830Z. RTB to Da Nang was uneventful. *I discussed the capabilities and limitations of fast mover smoke with Major Hall, an ordnance specialist flying with the gunfighters. It was his impression that the smoke flight had bombed off their canisters instead of dispensing them. I recommend a thorough study of fast-mover smoke capabilities, as our experiences during the past week have ruled out the use of A-1 slow mover smoke in the area north of Da Nang.

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GEORGE E. THROCKMORTON, Captain, USAF
Sandy 7

Carl D. Blewins Jr / Lt
CARL D. BLEVINS, JR., 1Lt, USAF
Sandy 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0755	Zy	JG 21 & 65 ETR 0825 BOTH A-1
0823	Zy	JG 21 & 65 ↓
0930	Zy	JG 60 & FM TNC. JG 72 ↑ FCF.
05 MAY 72		
0930	Zy	Sgt Hall & Bunell to duty.
0930	Zy	Item Report to Queen
0930	Zy	ITEM-11 - CT KBLR-VWSP
0940	Zy	QUEEN ADVISED MUSKET 03 ↓ 2 GOOD CHUTES. ALPHAS SCRAMBLED. A-3-049
0920	Zy	JG 5 10 min FM SAR AREA AND HOLDING (W)
0923	Zy	SMOKE PUT INTO AREA
0926	Zy	JG 65 GETTING INTO POSITION.
0933	Zy	JG 65 PICKED UP "A" MAN.
0944	Zy	JG 65 LOW ON FUEL. SCRAMBLED BRAVO BIRDS: JG 72 & 71
0952	Zy	JG 72 & 71 ↑
0956	Zy	SANDIES TALKING WITH 03B.
0800	Zy	HARD & SOFT ORDNANCE ON ITS WAY.
0800	Zy	03B MOVING SE OF HIS POSITION.
0808	Zy	JG 21 IN FOR PICKUP OF 03B.
0811	Zy	JG 21 GOING IN FOR PICKUP.
0814	Zy	JG 21 PICKED UP "B" MAN.
0815	Zy	ALL JG'S ATR.
0815	Zy	JG 21-65-72-71 ↓
UNCLASSIFIED		

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STATEMENT

SM 47

DOC 291

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF
THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(SECOND OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

CRAIG A. MARSCH

Airman First Class Craig A. Marsch distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as a Pararescue Specialist of an HH-53C Rescue Helicopter near Quang Tri, Republic of Vietnam, on 5 May 1972. On that date, Airman Marsch's outstanding airmanship and sound technical skill, displayed under extremely hazardous conditions, contributed significantly to the rescue of a United States Navy aircrewman from certain death or capture by hostile armed forces. With total disregard for his own personal safety, Airman Marsch exposed himself to hostile fire in order to man his gun position throughout the rescue. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Airman Marsch reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.



SURVIVOR -
NAME, RANK
SSAN, ORIG.

MAY 72

DATE	CREW	JG #	SAVE #		SAVE LOCATION	TYPE SAV
05 MAY 72	MAJ GATES	65	838	CAPT PETER	10 N. 11, SOUTH	ONE COMB
	CAPT CAKE			KULZER	WEST OF CH 103,	
	SSGT GARCIA			XXXXXXXXXX		
	SGT WAGNER			334 T.F.S.		
	SGT HARECH					
	MAJ GILBERT			CAPT ROBERT		ONE COMB
	CAPT KILGUS	21	839	COM STOCK		
	CAPT KINTSON			XXXXXXXXXX		
	SSGT SIMM			334 T.F.S.		
	SSGT PANNING					
	SGT MCQUOID					
01 MAY 72	MAJOR SCOTT	709	709	NAMES	QUANG TRI	132 T2
	CAPT MILLER	71	THRU	ON LIST	CITADEL	132 T2
	SGT BLACKWELL		745	IN THIS		COMB
	SGT YOUNG			BOOK		SAVE
	SGT LAPORTE					
01 MAY 72	CAPT GRIFFITH	65	746	ATTACHED		
	MAJOR GATES		THRU	TO BACK OF		
	SSGT GARCIA		790	BOOK.		
	SSGT PANNING					
	SGT MCQUOID					
01 MAY 72	CAPT WEIMER	21	791	↑	↑	↑
	CAPT DARE		THRU			
	SSGT SIMM		837			
	PLC ALLET					
	SGT STEEN					

'Doc' field tests new cold water suit



DR. (LT. COL.) G. KRESS LOCHRIDGE grasps a life raft after jumping into Lake St. Clair during a successful field test of a new diving suit designed to protect pararescuemen in extremely cold water and air existent in the Arctic.

In two days three active duty and one reserve pararescuemen made approximately 25 scuba equipped parachute jumps from a 305th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron HC-97 Stratocruiser into the icy waters of Lake St. Clair in Michigan.

The pararescuemen successfully field tested a new diving suit, the unisuit, made in Sweden designed to protect pararescuemen who will conduct combat, space (Skylab) and humanitarian rescue and recovery in the extremely cold water and air existent in the Arctic.

The field test culminated three years of work performed by Dr. (Lt. Col.) G. Kress Lochridge, who is pararescue qualified and a specialist in aerospace medicine. The doctor was the ARRS staff surgeon until recently.

Dr. Lochridge explained the program, "Prior to this time ARRS has been limited in performing our world-wide rescue mission in the Arctic locales nor could we properly support the Skylab project programmed for next year, because present diving and exposure suits do not provide prolonged thermal protection in the unique conditions faced by pararescuemen."

Jumping with Dr. Lochridge, were MSGT. George X. Hefferon, NCOIC of the 305th pararescue section; Capt. Russel T. Jones, pararescue qualified nurse anesthetist, 39th ARRWg, Eglin AFB, Fla.; and MSGT. John Stemple, Hq ARRS.

5 MAY 72

Super Jolly Green Giant saves F-4 crew

DA NANG AFLD, RVN -- An Air Force F-4 Phantom crew surrounded by communists was pulled to safety by HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giants from the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron.

Captains Peter G. Kulzer and Robert W. Comstock were forced to parachute into enemy-held territory near Hue after a surface-to-air missile downed their F-4.

"The area didn't look good," stated Maj. Anthony A. Gates, commander of one of the four rescue helicopters involved in the mission.

The mission plan called for Captain Comstock to be picked up first, but a smoke signal released too soon dissipated before the helicopters arrived on the scene.

"While we were waiting for another signal from Captain Comstock," Major

Gates continued, "Captain Kulzer came up with a signal. We were halfway between them so we went after the good signal."

A jungle penetrator was lowered on a hoist to Captain Kulzer who had moved into a clearing. Within three minutes the rescue team pulled him on board their helicopter.

"Then we moved over to Captain Comstock," Major Gates explained. "We found him and the hoist was going down when ground fire opened up on us."

Capt. Gary A. Date, copilot on Major Gates' helicopter, added, "Once you pick up ground fire like that you've got to go out and wait until they clean it up."

After air strikes pounded the area, a second helicopter commanded by Maj. Jerry J. Gilbert, moved in for the rescue.

"We spent two or three minutes going back and forth over the area looking for him, then one of my crew members shouted, 'I've got him in sight.'"

Thick jungle approximately 40 feet high hampered the operation for only a moment while the hoist was being lowered for the rescue.

"As soon as I saw him grab hold of the penetrator, I started him up," SSgt. William A. Simm, flight engineer, explained. "He got dragged through some trees but he got out."

Also on Major Gates' crew were SSgt.

David Garcia, flight engineer; and Sergeants Michael L. Wagner and Craig A. Marsh, pararescuemen.

Major Gilbert's crew included Capt. Darrel R. Knutson, copilot; and Sergeants Cole E. Panning and Charles B. McQuod II, pararescuemen.