

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 2 April 1972

MISSION NUMBER: A-3-028/2

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Blue Ghost 28

DECLASSIFIED

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 67

LOCATION: Approximately 1647N 10719E

SAVES: 2 Combat Saves

1. Summary of SAR Actions: At 0730Z Jolly Green 67 and 65 were scrambled on a feet wet SAR (Nail 81, OV-10). At 0735Z JG 67 and 65 were airborne and proceeding feet wet toward Quang Tri. Weather for take off was 1000 feet overcast and visibility 4 to 6 miles and haze. No difficulty was encountered enroute. At 0745Z we were advised that a US Navy destroyer had picked up Nail 81, but we were to remain on scene for a possible extraction of US Advisers at Quang Tri. During this time Bat 21 (EB-66) was reported down 11 NM Northwest of Quang Tri and a SAR was initiated. At approximately 1050Z we heard Blue Ghost 28 (AH-1G) report over guard frequency that he was hit and wing man Blue Ghost 39 was going down. Blue Ghost 28 reported he had lost tail rotor control and also was losing main transmission oil. As he came out of the mouth of the Qua Viet river I joined in formation with him. He reported he was losing his flight controls and was going to land on the beach approximately 2 miles south of the river. He landed in a marshy area approximately 100 yards inland. I also landed in the marsh and the two survivors were on board within 15 seconds. At 1100Z I was airborne again and holding feet wet. At 1115Z I proceeded to Phu Bai to refuel and drop off the survivors. By the time refueling was complete it was dark and the Bat 21 survivor had been bedded down for the night. At approximately 1200Z Jolly Green 67 and 65 returned to DaNang.

2. Call Sign Sorties Hours

JG 67	1	5.5
JG 65	1	6.0

3. Unknown

4. Unknown

5. Jolly Green 67

Jolly Green

AC - Capt Rodney S. Griffith
CP - Capt Douglas A. Peck
HM - TSgt Roy D. Prater
RS - Sgt Robert L. La Pointe
RS - ALC Michael A. Aillet

AC - Major Gerald J. Lange
CP - Capt Gary A. Dake
HM - SSgt William A. Simm
RS - TSgt Allen J. Avery
RS - ALC William R. Pearson

Rodney S. Griffith
RODNEY S. GRIFFITH, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander, Jolly Green 67

Classified by
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 78

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 2 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

DOC A4

ground forces. Contact was lost with Covey 282 on 18 April after he had evaded capture for 11 days. BAT21B spent 11 days on the ground and Nail 388 spent 8 days on the ground. After initial pickup attempts failed the Sandys made several madden kit drops to the survivors and passed coded movement instructions to the survivors.

While the SARs south of the DMZ continued, Bengal 505A (Navy A-6) was shot down east of Tchepone. Despite bad weather and a lack of air resources Bengal 505A was rescued after four days.

On 10 April Musket 01 (F-4) was downed northwest of the "Catcher's Mitt." Both survivors were quickly rescued when the SAR forces encountered no opposition in the area.

On 23 April contact was made with Cosmic 16B (RF-4) west of Dong Hoi. The aircraft had been downed by a SAM three days earlier and 16B had spent the time moving to a safe area. After four days delay because of bad weather and despite a lack of air resources, the Sandys led the Jolly Greens in for a successful pickup from deep in North Vietnam. At least two SAMs were fired at the rescue forces during the pickup but excellent planning thwarted all enemy defenses.

On 29 April Scorpion 115 (VNAF A-37) was shot down south of Quang Tri (300/31/69). During the search for the VNAF survivor two Army helicopters were shot down in the same area. After directing the rescue of eight Army crewmen from both helicopters the Sandys resumed the SAR for the VNAF pilot. Due to a lack of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOC A⁵

resources the area could not be made safe for the Jolly Greens but a pickup was attempted with VNAF helicopters. Contact with the survivor, who was wounded in the stomach, was lost several hours before the VNAF helicopters made their rescue attempt. They hovered over the chute for 20 seconds and departed the area when no survivor was seen. ARVN ground troops with tanks within 200 meters of the survivor refused to attempt a rescue. Rescue attempts were called off the next morning when contact could not be regained with the survivor.

For the first time since last dry season, survivors were not rescued after radio contact was established. The location of the unlucky survivors, in the middle of 3 enemy divisions, and the lack of air resources caused the rescue attempts to be unsuccessful.

The FOL at Ubon was closed and one at Dien Hoa with two Sandys was opened during April. During the latter part of April, A-1 strike missions were sent to strike around Quang Tri with turn arounds at Da Nang. Up to 10 aircrafts staged out of Da Nang on some days. Targets ranged from tanks and APC's to bridges.

On 3 April seven Sandys and two Jolly Greens took battle damage on rescue attempts for BAT 21B. One aircraft flown by Capt Morse had a wing fire causing a loss of hydraulic pressure. Capt Morse made a successful, night, gear-up landing but the aircraft was declared class 26.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~DOC D''

contact was lost with 38A within 12 hours. A tremendous SAR effort was mounted by all units involved. The enemy had moved into the area and was well fortified. Several attempts were made for rescue, each driven off by heavy ground fire. One CH-53 and crew was lost on one attempt. On 11 April, rescue of 38B was accomplished by a team composed of ARVN Rangers and US Marine advisors. Nail 38A is listed as missing in action.

2. (S) On 25 May, 1972, Rustic 124 (Lt James W. Twaddle, III, and Lt Jack W. Shaw) was downed by a SA-7 SAM southeast of Quang Tri in South Vietnam. Both crewmen were ejected successfully and were picked up immediately by ARVN helicopters operating in the area.

3. (S) On 30 June, 1972, Nail 37 (Lt Erwin Steincamp) was downed by a SA-7 SAM due south of Quang Tri in South Vietnam. Ejection was successful and crewmember was on the ground about 90 minutes. He evaded imminent capture and was picked up by a US Army helicopter. One helicopter crewmember suffered a serious wound and the helicopter sustained light damage.

F. (C) During the past quarter the 23rd TASS participated in many rescue and rescue attempts.

1. (S) On 2 April, 1972, Nail 31 (EB-66) was downed by a SA-2 SAM just south of the DMZ in South Vietnam. Contact was established with Nail 31 only. As the SAR progressed, BLUE GHOST 03 (UH-1) also went down with no survivors. The next day (3 April) NAIL 38 (Lt William J. Anderson and Lt Mark N. Clark) was downed by another SA-2 SAM in the immediate vicinity. Contact was established with both crewmembers, however after 12 hours contact with 38A was lost.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOC D¹²

10.
As the SAR progressed into the 10th of April, CONVEY 282 (CV-10) was also downed. Contact was maintained for 11 days and then lost. Crewmember presumed captured. The enemy had pushed its battle line farther southward by this time and all survivors were located behind enemy lines. Several attempts for rescue were made, each driven off by intense ground fire. One Jolly Green was lost with the entire crew on one attempt. Madding Kites were employed, as well as area denial ordnance. Rescue of NAIL 12 was effected by an ARVN Bright Light team on 11 April. BAT 21B was picked up by the same team within the next few days. Losses included one CH-53 with crew, and several aircraft damaged by ground fire.

1. (S) On 4 April, 1972, EMPIRE 46 (QU-22B) suffered an engine failure and the pilot was forced to bail out east of Dong Hene in southern Laos. Nail 12 (Capt Robert H. Willis) was vectored by ground radar to the survivor's immediate vicinity at 1845L. Nail 12 then turned on his aircraft exterior lights and was immediately spotted by the survivor. The search light was used for the pickup, but due to the low altitude of the rescue forces Nail 12 had to vector the helicopter towards the survivor. When the helicopter was close, the survivor popped a smoke flare for final acquisition. Pickup was completed by 1915L without opposition. No losses/damages sustained.

2. (S) At 1200L on 9 April, 1972, BENGAL 505 (A-6) was downed by enemy fire 6000 northeast of Vientiane in southern Laos. Nail 12 (Capt Robert H. Willis and Capt Lynn Staincamp) located the survivor's position at first light on the 10th. Nail 12 took a direct hit in the cockpit which caused the aircraft to burst into flames.

~~SECRET~~

MISSION NARRATIVES

This quarter the 37th ARRSq was involved in nine successful combat SAR's. The squadron picked up 143 people in these nine SAR's. One aircraft and crew were lost due to intense enemy ground fire.

SAR activity began on 2 Apr 72 when an EB-66, call sign Bat 21, was downed just north of Cam Lo, RVN. Radio contact was established with one survivor and the SAR for Bat 21B began. On 3 April Jolly Green 65 and 66 attempted a pick up, but due to intense ground fire in which they sustained major battle damage, they were unable to rescue the downed pilot. Again on 6 April another pick up was attempted by Jolly Green 67 and on this attempted pick up Jolly Green 67 was downed by heavy enemy ground-fire. All six crewmembers were listed as killed in action. The crewmembers were AC Captain Peter H. Chapman II, CP First Lieutenant John H. Call III, Pararescue Specialists Sergeant William R. Pearson, and Technical Sergeant Allen J. Avery. A combat photographer Sergeant James H. Alley was also on board. Bat 21B was later picked up by other resources.

The first successful SAR of the quarter also began on 2 Apr 72. Jolly Green 67 flown by Captain Rodney S. Griffith and Jolly Green 65 flown by Major Gerald J. Lange were scrambled on a feet wet SAR. Fifteen minutes after 67 and 65 were airborne they were advised that a U.S. Navy destroyer had picked up the Nail 81 survivors. While airborne for the feet wet pickup Bat 21 was shot down and the two alpha birds remained airborne as a SAR was ini-

~~SECRET~~

87

DECLASSIFIED

sorties per day. The situation in Quang Tri Province was critical and the Americans used a large assortment of fire-power. The Nails worked with Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine flyers, plus spotting for US Navy ships firing from the Gulf of Tonkin. Nail crews supported many SARs during this time and their roles will be discussed in the SAR section of this chapter.¹⁰²

(S) Enemy missiles accounted for the three combat losses. Early in the quarter, a SA-2 shot down Nail 38 while the aircraft was participating in the BAT 21B SAR. BAT 21B and Nail 38B walked out from the midst of three enemy divisions after more than a week on the ground. The pilot of Nail 38, 1Lt William J. Henderson was listed as MIA as the quarter ended. This SAR received worldwide coverage in the news media and will be discussed in greater detail in the SAR section of this chapter.¹⁰³ The other two OV-10A losses were shootdowns by the SA-7 Strella. All crewmembers were recovered from these two losses.

102. Ibid.

103. See SAR for Bat 21B and Nail 38B, this chapter, page 108.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by William J. Henderson
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1980

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BAT 21B - NAIL 38B¹²³

(C) Bat 21 (an EB-66) was downed by SAMs just South of the DMZ on 2 April; Easter Sunday of 1972. This was the beginning of one of the most unsuccessful and costly SARs of the Southeast Asian conflict. Though the tradeoff in lives and aircraft had a negative balance for this SAR, this fact is hindsight. The reason for the failure was simply overwhelming opposition. It was not learned until later that the SAR force was facing the full thrust of the 1972 NVA invasion of South Vietnam. Not only were there three enemy divisions in the immediate area of the SAR objective, but the enemy had brought with him a vast assortment of anti-aircraft weapons.

(C) The SAR started when a FAC, Bilk 34, heard an emergency beeper and contacted the survivor on the ground. It was Bat 21B, the lone survivor of a crew of six. Two airborne Sandys heard the transmissions and headed for the area. Ground fire was heavy and the Sandys sustained battle damage while expending ordnance around the survivor. Bilk 34 pulled off and returned with three Army Cobra helicopters for a quick pickup attempt. Two of these helicopters were immediately shot down. One helicopter exploded in the air but the crew of the other was immediately rescued. Though darkness was approaching, the

123. 1st SOS and 23rd TASS Historical Data Reports. Also, see SARCO Reports for Bat 21B, 2 Apr 72, (Doc 23)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by *William P. Bourne*
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1974

~~SECRET~~

other pickup attempt was planned. No one had heard ground fire for quite some time and the FACs reported the area to be very quiet. The first Jolly Green was brought in from the South and headed toward Bat 21B's position. The helicopter began taking ground fire and so began a wide turn to the right, heading Eastward toward a village that had been the source of previous ground fire. The Jolly Green was told repeatedly to turn away from the village. It was thought that these transmissions were not received because Sandys could hear the Jolly Green pilot breathing over the radios. He was inadvertently holding down his microphone button. This proved to be fatal, because by the time he received the frantic calls from the Sandys he was over the village. An engine was hit and parts began falling from the helicopter. The aircraft struck the ground on its left side and burst into flames. No survivors were observed. Ground fire was well disciplined and the enemy fired only when he was quite sure of getting the Jolly Green. With this catastrophe, all attempts to rescue Bat 21B and Nail 38B from the air stopped.

(S) The next day, Covey 282 was shot down behind enemy lines. Coded messages were passed to the survivors telling them that they must walk out and how they were to do it. On 11 April, Nail 38B reached a team of ARVN Rangers and US Marines on the South bank of the Cau Viet River. Two days later,

~~SECRET~~

Classified by William P. Baume
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3
DECLASSIFY ON INDEFINITE

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

A special problem on clearances to fire occurred when 7AF initiated a large scale Search and Rescue (SAR) effort, code named Bat 21, in the Cam Lo area. An EB-66 had been downed by an SA-2 missile. At first, 7AF set up a "no-fire" zone 27 KM in radius which virtually encompassed the entire area of operation (AO). With enemy divisions, including heavy artillery striking in the AO, the 3d ARVN were unable to return fire or request TACAIR in the area. Eventually, some specific targets were struck by air and ground artillery, but only after considerable delay in obtaining clearance. Although the "no-fire" zone was later reduced, the area covered the center of the main NVA offensive thrust. It was through this area that the enemy moved large concentrations of artillery, tanks, and infantry. Still, the advantage to which the enemy used the fire restriction can only be estimated. It is worth noting that extensive SAR fire support was directed against enemy targets in the restricted area. ^{45/}

The SAR mission was faced with new problems as a result of the NVA offensive. Because of the enemy environment, the normal SAR team could not operate effectively. As demonstrated in the Bat 21 mission, enemy artillery and weapon fire were serious threats to the slow-moving HH-53 Jolly Green helicopters, A-1 Sandy escort aircraft, and the OV-10 FACs. During the 11-day SAR effort (2 April to 13 April), SA-2 missiles downed two OV-10 FACs, and ground fire caused the loss of a Jolly Green and its entire crew. ^{46/} The enemy in the SAR area now numbered in the thousands. High caliber automatic weapons and even artillery replaced the normal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The U.S. Marine advisors shared this opinion and asserted that the USAF requirement to impose a "no-fire" zone around the downed aircraft resulted in "a critical restriction upon the defensive fire support plan all along the Cam Lo River and Mai Loc Combat Base line."^{48/} DECLASSIFIED

In another instance, a SAR "no-fire" zone was established near FSB C-1 and Route 1, about 8 KM north of the Cua Viet River. This route was being heavily used by NVA tanks moving toward Dong Ha. U.S. advisors on the bridge at Dong Ha could observe the tanks moving south but were unable to fire into the zone. After 7AF lifted the restriction, the enemy was already south of the area in strength.^{49/}

Another type of "no-fire" restriction was applied when short rounds or even possible short round reports were received. On 4 April, there was a reported short round striking a Vietnamese naval station located at the mouth of the Cua Viet River. A FAC had directed naval gunfire and subsequently TACAIR against seven enemy tanks fording a river. Four tanks were destroyed and three forced into retreat to the north. I-DASC called off the strikes when it somehow received word that friendly troops were being hit. The 3d Division TACP checked with the sector TACP and RF/PF forces in the area, and learned that only one man was wounded in the engagement and that the probable cause of the casualty was from NVA tank or artillery fire. Neither the 3d Division nor territorial force command was concerned about the incident.^{50/} It is easy to see how confusion could occur concerning short rounds during the beginning of the offensive. The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Accomplishments (U)

(C) From 1 April 1972 to 30 June 1973, SAR forces in SEA were credited with 365 combat saves and 120 non-combat saves. ¹⁰⁹ Since 1966, SEA rescue forces have been credited with 2,713 combat saves and 1,253 non-combat saves. This is a combined total of almost 4,000 saves.

(U) The story of SAR is a complicated one as evidenced by the many organizations and types of equipment involved. To best show the interaction of these diverse elements and to demonstrate the important aspects and developments in SAR between 1 April 1972 and 30 June 1973, a number of SAR missions are summarized in the following mission narratives.

Mission Narratives (U)

(C) Bat 21. On 30 March 1972, the NVA began a major invasion of SVN. Three days after this invasion began, an SA-2 SAM downed Bat 21 (an EB-66) in Military Region I. Seventh Air Force established a "no fire zone" 27 kilometers in radius encompassing most of the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) area of operation (AO) and launched a massive SAR effort. ¹¹⁰

(C) This immense SAR effort, involving many different organizations, lasted from 2 April to 13 April 1972 and employed as many as 90 aircraft per day. During the SAR mission, two OV-10 FACs were lost to SA-2 missiles, and heavy small arms fire destroyed Jolly Green 65 of the 37th ARRSq, killing all six crewmembers. ¹¹¹

(C) After the 11-day SAR effort, the Bat 21 crewmember was rescued by a U.S. Marine team which arranged to secure the crewmember while he

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

CHECK
SFA
SAR

1 APR 72 - 30 JUN 73

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) I believe that it is a definite morale factor that every person that flew over here felt that if he was to go down that there was some chance he would be rescued. However, I feel also that there was a tendency on the part of the aircrews to expect that they must be rescued above the requirements of the battle situation at any one time and as airmen or soldiers or sailors we should expect that there are times when as one person we must be sacrificed for the overall.

(C) Part of this controversy suggested that survivors must accept additional burdens during extended SAR missions. Maximum use of E&E procedures was a must. Downed crewmembers could not expect to be rescued in a short period of time if they were in a hostile environment. They would have to employ the techniques taught in survival school. 116

(U) Oyster 01. Flying an F-4 (call sign Oyster 01) on 10 May 1972, Major Robert A. Lodge and Captain Robert C. Locher shot down their third MIG. Shortly thereafter, they were shot down by another MIG approximately 40 miles west of Hanoi. Although the pilot, Major Lodge, was never recovered, Captain Locher, the weapons system operator, was rescued after 23 days of E&E in North Vietnam. During the E&E, Captain Locher subsisted on fruits, nuts, berries, and an ample supply of water. Captain Locher stated: 117

(U) One day I eyed a banana tree all day. It didn't have any bananas on it, but remembered I could get water out of it. Just before evening I stuck a hole in it and got myself three pints of good banana water.

He was also able to obtain various vegetables by raiding native gardens. Captain Locher continually changed his position in search of cover, food, and water. He moved a total of 15 miles, but he was unable to make contact with any U.S. aircraft. On 1 June, Captain Locher heard U.S. airplanes conducting bombing missions. He knew that when the bombing ended, the

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

108

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BAT 21B - NAIL 38B¹²³

(C) Bat 21 (an ES-66) was downed by an SA-2 just South of the DMZ on 2 April; Easter Sunday of 1972. This was the beginning of one of the most unsuccessful and costly SARs of the Southeast Asian conflict. Though the tradeoff in lives and aircraft had a negative balance for this SAR, this fact is hindsight. The reason for the failure was simply overwhelming opposition. It was not learned until later that the SAR force was facing the full thrust of the 1972 NVA invasion of South Vietnam. Not only were there three enemy divisions in the immediate area of the SAR objective, but the enemy had brought with him a vast assortment of anti-aircraft weapons.

(C) The SAR started when a FAC, Bilk 34, heard an emergency beeper and contacted the survivor on the ground. It was Bat 21B, the lone survivor of a crew of six. Two airborne Sandys heard the transmissions and headed for the area. Ground fire was heavy and the Sandys sustained battle damage while expending ordnance around the survivor. Bilk 34 pulled off and returned with three Army Cobra helicopters for a quick pickup attempt. Two of these helicopters were immediately shot down. One helicopter exploded in the air but the crew of the other was immediately rescued. Though darkness was approaching, the

123. 1st SOS and 23rd TASS Historical Data Reports. Also, see SARCO Reports for Bat 21B, 2 Apr 72, (Doc 23)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by *William P. Bruns*
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULES AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1990

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

109

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sandys continued to isolate the survivor. They finally win-
chestered and RTBod to Da Nang. Thus ended Day 1 of the Bat
21B SAR.

(C) While working above the survivor on the morning of
the second day, Nail 38 was also downed by an SA-2. However,
ground fire in the immediate vicinity of the survivors (Nail
38B was only 650 meters from Bat 21B) was very light. It was
decided to attempt another pickup using Jolly Greens. The
first Jolly Green received hits from ground fire so a dif-
ferent approach direction was planned. When the second he-
licopter also suffered battle damage it was decided to RTB
to Da Nang for further planning. A well diciplined enemy,
intent on shooting down a helicopter, was on the ground. The
SAR force still did not know the enemy's true strength.

(C) During the night contact with Nail 38A was lost.
Solid contact remained with Bat 21B and Nail 38B. Back at
Da Nang, it was decided to thoroughly suppress the ground
fire before committing the helicopters again. The next two
days were spent sterilizing the area with B-52, fast mover,
and Sandy strikes. On the first day of this sterilization
process two Sandys receive serious battle damage. One made
a gear up night landing at Da Nang, but the aircraft had to
be salvaged.

(C) On Day 5, after two days of pounding the area, an-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by *William J. Brown*
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1974

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

110

other pickup attempt was planned. No one had received ground fire for quite some time and the FACs reported the area to be very quiet. The first Jolly Green was brought in from the South and headed toward Bat 21B's position. The helicopter began taking ground fire and so began a wide turn to the right, heading Eastward toward a village that had been the source of previous ground fire. The Jolly Green was told repeatedly to turn away from the village. It was thought that these transmissions were not received because Sandys could hear the Jolly Green pilot breathing over the radios. He was inadvertently holding down his microphone button. This proved to be fatal, because by the time he received the frantic calls from the Sandys he was over the village. An engine was hit and parts began falling from the helicopter. The aircraft struck the ground on its left side and burst into flames. No survivors were observed. Ground fire was well disciplined and the enemy fired only when he was quite sure of getting the Jolly Green. With this catastrophe, all attempts to rescue Bat 21B and Nail 38B from the air stopped.

(S) The next day, Covey 282 was shot down behind enemy lines. Coded messages were passed to the survivors telling them that they must walk out and how they were to do it. On 11 April, Nail 38B reached a team of ARVN Rangers and US Marines on the South bank of the Cau Viet River. Two days later,

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

Classified by *William P. Barmuch*
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
EXEMPTION CODE: 25X 1-1-82
DECLASSIFY ON: INDEFINITE

5 APR

4/2230	B	Sgt Barrell To duty
5/0130	LY	JG 30 + 60 1 TO CH 69.
0345	LY	JG 30 + 60 ↓ FM CH 69
5/0754	RH	JG 32 ↑ CH 77 FOR CH 69
5/1010	gA	JG 32 ↓ CH 77

6 APR

05/2230 Z	B	Sgt Barrell To duty
2250 Z	B	3 ITEM REPORT TO JOKER
06/0155 Z	B	JG 60 ↑ TO HUE
06/0355 Z	gA	JG 65 ↓ fm CH 69
06/0705 Z	gA	JG 67 & 66 ↑ SAR
06/0705 Z	gA	SANDIES 1 & 2 ↑
06/0720 Z	gA	SANDIES 5 & 6 ↑
0800 Z	gA	JG 60 & 32 ↑ SAR
0807 Z	gA	Sandies putting in strikes
0809 Z	gA	Sandy 2 contacted 21B
0809 Z	gA	Sandy 1 moving in the area.
0810 Z	gA	JG 71 ↑ FCF
0820 Z	gA	38B reports no movement in his area. 21B reports some movement but knows not what it is. Sandy reports no ground fire but sees people digging foxholes.
0822 Z	gA	21B reports noise may have been case package dropped to him
0830 Z	gA	JG 67 & 66 moving to initial holding point.

A-3-030

0845Z gH JG 71 ↓ FCF
0845Z gH Sandies briefing / both survivors
checked in.
0855Z gH Sandies finished briefing
0902Z gH Sandies asked for two passes
of ordnance and then go in
for pick-up.
0911Z gH Sandies talking to ZIB trying to
raise 38 B, then going in.
0912Z gH Sandy 1 moving JGs up to
friendly tank area.
0923Z gH JG 67 going in for pick up.
0924Z gH JG 67 going in after 38 B
0925Z gH JG 67 picking up ground fire.
0926Z gH JG 67 DOWN / exploded on impact.
0939Z gH ALL Sandies & JGs RTB.
0950Z gH JGs ETA CH 77 1000Z
1015Z gH JGs 66, 60, 32 ↓ CH 77

On April 2, 1972, an EB-66 from Korat Air Base, Thailand, was on an electronic countermeasure mission over North Vietnam. At approximately 0850 hours an F-105 pilot in the area observed a surface to air missile fired from the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam which hit the EB-66, code name Bat 21. The EB-66 was then seen to be trailing flames from both wings and crash into Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam. No one was seen to eject from the aircraft but a single beeper was heard.

Later, voice contact was established with Lieutenant Colonel Iceal E. Hambleton, the lone survivor, and he was rescued 12 days later. He had no information that any other crewmen had survived. He described how the surface to air missile struck below and behind the navigator in the area of the aircraft's forward compartment. He saw Major Bolte after the hit but did not know if he was able to eject. All other crewmen were declared missing in action.