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ground forces. Contact was lost with Covey 282 on 18 April after he had evaded capture for 11 days. BAT21B spent 11 days on the ground and Nail 38B spent 8 days on the ground. After initial pickup attempts failed the Sandys made several madden kit drops to the survivors and passed coded movement instructions to the survivors.

While the SARs south of the DMZ continued, Bengal 505A (Navy A-6) was shot down east of Tchepone. Despite bad weather and a lack of air resources Bengal 505A was rescued after four days.

On 10 April Musket 01 (F-4) was downed northwest of the "Catcher's Mitt." Both survivors were quickly rescued when the SAR forces encountered no opposition in the area.

On 23 April contact was made with Cosmic 16B (RF-4) west of Dong Hoi. The aircraft had been downed by a SAM three days earlier and 16B had spent the time moving to a safe area. After four days delay because of bad weather and despite a lack of air resources, the Sandys led the Jolly Greens in for a successful pickup from deep in North Vietnam. At least two SAMs were fired at the rescue forces during the pickup but excellent planning thwarted all enemy defenses.

On 29 April Scorpion 115 (VNAF A-37) was shot down south of Quang Tri (300/31/69). During the search for the VNAF survivor two Army helicopters were shot down in the same area. After directing the rescue of eight Army crewmen from both helicopters the Sandys resumed the SAR for the VNAF pilot. Due to a lack of

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highway. I immediately spotted the chopper about 3.3 miles south of the 1st chopper about 100m from the road. Coachman 22 reported that they were taking heavy fire and that he was in a ditch east of the helicopter. I spotted 3 survivors in the ditch and Coachman 22 reported that there were now 8 survivors with 3 wounded which I passed to King.

6. Coachman 22 reported the enemy closing in from the west north west and that they were at the helicopter so I strafed the helicopter and began putting down strafe and CBU 25 to the west-north west. Sandy 08 joined me (1) after about 3 passes the fire had subsided slightly and 3 more army helicopters (2 Hueys/1 Cobra) arrived and announced they had the burning helicopter in sight and were in for the pick-up.

7. I told the army choppers to hold because I would lay a smoke screen to the west of the survivors to in front of the enemy. I put the smoke down and informed Coachman 22 to pop his marker flare while the Hueys headed in. A purple smoke came up first from about 500m south on the road apparently from Arun who had abandoned about 100 trucks on highway 1 to the north of the survivors, the Hueys headed for the purple smoke but I directed them north in front of our smoke screen and the red smoke from the flare finally came up. About 30 seconds were lost while the smoke screen was blowing away to the south east, the 2 Hueys landed and took off (about 20 sec on ground) but they reported one survivor had fallen off back into the ditch. The cobra and Sandys 07/08 continually made CBU 25 strafe and rocket passes on the sources of enemy fire to the west-northwest. While one Huey went back and got the last survivor. We had used all of our smoke, (CBU 32, M-47/CBU 25). Sandy 08 had attempted to drop his M-47s but on landing later they had not released. I instructed the rescue helicopters to make a lead count and all they could find was 6 survivors. The Cobra and I made several passes on the ditch but no one was in it. We decided that every one was picked up and the army confirmed this about 15 minutes later. The army choppers went to Camp Evans about 10 miles south.

8. After coachman had reported the enemy at the helicopter and I strafed it I lost radio contact with coachman. After a couple of passes I heard someone say try an FM frequency which I tried, then another FM frequency but I couldn't talk to the survivors on FM. They finally came up guard again and I determined that they had only FM or guard so we ran the rest of the rescue on guard. The problem with FM was probably that my FM radio was very weak both sending and receiving.

9. At this time there was some confusion since Sandy 08 still thought there was one survivor on the ground. So he obtained an A-7 strike flight and began putting them in on the enemy positions to the west. I headed north again to search for Scorpion 115. I finally contacted Sandy 08 had turned off his guard sometime during the pick-ups.

10. At this time Scorpion 55 (UNAF A-37) was on scene and he was talking to the UNAF survivor, Sandy 08 lead me to the chute and by talking to Scorpion 55 it was determined that Scorpion 115 was wounded in the stomach, that he was in a tree line 50m east of the chute and that the VC were 50m-500m west of the chute. I had Scorpion 55 attack the enemy positions before he ran out of gas and had to leave. I then began to put in fast mover strikes around the survivor to the west, north, and east.

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Helix 02 began putting in the strikes (he was the FAC with the Vietnamese didn't speak english). I advised King that we would need a smoke flight before we could make the pickup and due to the location of the survivor. King advised that no smoke would be available at all so I advised King that I would not use the Jollys for the pickup without a smoke screen. King said 2 UNAF helicopter were available and I requested them immediately but they were at Da Nang. Eagle 16/17 were launched from Da Nang while Helix 02 continued to put in strikes around the survivor.

11. At this time I observed several tanks and trucks at the bridge 200m to the east of the survivor. Sandy 08 determined through trail control that the tanks were friendly and Helix 02 attempted to get the Arun to use their tanks to rescue Scorpion 115. While Helix 02 talked to the ground forces I faced the fast mover strikes. The ground forces refused to make the rescue even though a road ran within 50m of the survivor's location and we were thoroughly sterilizing the area. The Eagle helicopters would not come up on the radio and talk to anyone. They got within about 2 miles of the survivor and turned around and went to Camp Evans for fuel. It was now about 1830 getting darker, and Sandy 08 was running low on fuel. Helix 02 RTB'ed and I tried to contact the Eagles and to come north again. At 1900 another Scorpion flight arrived and the Eagle's got airborne again. I talked to the Eagles through the Scorpion who spoke better english and gave the Eagle's the survivors location and told them to land in the field by the chute. They were told the survivor was wounded, possibly unconscious in the trees 50m east of the chute. The Eagles arrived on scene at about 1910 and began circling. I had already made numerous passes over the area trying to draw fire while Helix 02 was on scene but none was seen. I also tried to contact the survivor on guard without response. Sandy 08 had RTB'ed for fuel at 1845 and I was running low too. The Eagle spent the next 20 minutes circling the chute from 4000 to 500 ft. The Scorpion and I were trying to coax him down. It was now getting very dark and the Eagle began to fire into the ground in all directions. The only ground fire he was able to induce was from A 23 or 37mm several 1000 meters to the west which both the Scorpion and I attacked and silenced after only 3 rounds were fired. The Eagle now came to a hover at tree top level for about 10-20 sec over .

12. The parachute and then departed the area. The Scorpion reported that the Eagle saw no survivor and was going home. I also departed the area with 1200 lbs. As it was completely dark. I decided not to use the BLU 52 because of darkness and the near by friendly forces. Upon landing both Sandy 07/08 had battle damage.

13. The rescue effort the next morning was abandoned when the survivors could not be contacted on the radio by Scorpions and friendly ground forces again refused to search the area around the chute although they were only 200m east.

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Sandy 07

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DOC 28'

S T A T E M E N T

29-30 April 1972

SUBJECT: Sandys 07 and 08(Scorpion 115/VNAF A-37)

1. At 1445L we were informed by Queen that a VNAF A-37 (Scorpion/115) was down on the 305/31/69 with one survivor. Sandy 07/08 immediately scrambled and were Airborn at 1500. I immediately contacted King 25 and requested BLU-52 to be up loaded on ground alert and ordered slow mover smoke. I informed King that the slow mover smoke would be available from NKP. I also requested a FAC with Vietnamese interpter.
2. King 25 advised that another VNAF A-37 was on scene talking to the survivor (Scorpion 125?) We arrived on scene at about 1530 and instructed the Jollys to hold feet wet and low in case of possible SAMs. I obtained contact with Scorpion 125 on 2828 and he had the survivors parachute in sight and he attempted to direct me to the parachute but coachman 22 (army helicopter in the area) informed me that he had the chute in sight. I spotted coachman almost immediately flying at approximately 10ft back and forth across the area. He lead me to a chute and marked it with red smoke but the VNAF said it was the wrong chute (it was all white a flare chute). Coachman 22 then said that he then know where the real chute was and attempted to lead me to it again.
3. The VNAF A-37 was talking to the survivor who was reported in a house near his chute and that VC were near the chute very close to him. Sandy 08 spotted the chute but at the same time Coachman 22 took some hits, reported he was ok and made another pass through the area and took more hits and reported he would have to land.
4. I advised Coachman to head either east to feet wet or south along highway 1 but he moved about 2000m south and 2000m west and landed in the middle of a very large flat area which appeared uninhabited and away from all action. I decided to attempt an immediate pickup before the enemy could spot Coachman 22. I sent Sandy 08 out to get the Jollys and requested they be brought in above small arms range at 3000 ft. only small arms or possible 51 cal was reported in the area. Before the Jollys could be brought in Red Coach (another army helicopter reported he was in the area and on the way in for the pick-up. I marked the downed chopper with a WP rocket and began to strafe the area to the west while Red coach made the pick up. Coachman 22 was on the ground about 2 minutes maximum and as Red coach departed the area southeast I called out he was taking fire from his 6 o'clock. He acknowledged this call but reported no hits and continued south parallel to highway, apparently ok. I turned back north to look for the VNAF survivor again and informed Sandy 08 that the Jollys should so back feet wet.
5. King then called to inform he that Red coach was going down. I had heard no radio calls from Red coach but I headed south along highway 1 to search for the helicopter. I made contact with Coachman 22 again on guard and he reported that they were down 100m to west of the

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