

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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COVEY 219

(C) Jack declared a SAR for Covey 219, an OV-10A out of DaNang, at 1630L on 2 March 1972. The approximate location of the survivor was 062/95/93. At 1642L, Jack launched Sandys 05/06 and two Jolly Greens from Ubon. Sandys 01/02 scrambled from NKP and from DaNang Sandys 07/08 and two more Jolly Greens. At 1740L, Sandys 03/04 and two LNRS equipped Jolly Greens took off from NKP.¹⁴⁵

(C) Enroute to the objective area Sandys 05/06 learned from King 22 that the Sandys and Jolly Greens out of DaNang were also enroute. Sandy 05 decided to hold this flight East of the route structure for the time being so as to avoid their crossing the high threat unnecessarily. Meanwhile, Coveys 291 and 206 had diverted to the survivor's area and were in radio contact with him. Covey 291 had positively identified Covey 219's voice. Covey 219 had run about 1½ miles up a hill and into the jungle to avoid capture. He was obviously in good condition.¹⁴⁶

(C) Sandys 05/06 arrived in the area at 1757L, and after a briefing, assumed on-scene command of the SAR. Though a Pave Nail had been diverted to the area it was not needed as Covey 291 and 206 had done their jobs well. Their initial efforts

145. SARCO Report for Covey 219, 7 Mar 72, (Doc 65).

146. Ibid.

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greatly aided the SAR force. Covey 206 directed Sandy 05 to the survivor's location. Sandy 05 made several probing passes to ferret ground fire but none came up. Sandy 06 was sent to direct Sandys 01/02 and the Jolly Greens to the holding point about two miles from the survivor. As the SAR force ingressed over the valleys from the West it received some 57mm fire. At 1800L, the force executed the pickup phase. As Jolly Green 57 went into hover the escorting Sandys expended various types of ordnance as a protective measure.¹⁴⁷

(C) At 1805L, just three minutes before sunset, Jolly Green 57 reported that the survivor was aboard. The egress route toward the West was over the valleys and again enemy AAA attacked the SAR force. These firings were by several 37mm guns. The Sandys attacked these guns and though none were believed destroyed they were silenced.¹⁴⁸

(C) It was never necessary to bring the DaNang force across the route structure and they were released to fly back to DaNang. Sandys 05/06 returned to Ubon and the remaining SAR aircraft landed at NKP after a quickly executed SAR.¹⁴⁹

(C) Sandy pilots believed the relative ease of this SAR in a heavily defended area was because of the quick response by the SAR forces. They felt that SARs that involved a lot of ground

^{147.} Ibid.
^{148.} Ibid.
^{149.} Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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planning and control allowed too much time for the enemy to
organize his defenses and, thus, sometimes unnecessarily jeop-
ardized the SAR force and the survivors.¹⁵⁰

150. Intvw, Wing Historian with Capt R. F. Burke, Pilot,
1st SOW, 6 May 72.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: 2 Mar 72

Mission Number: B-3-015

Aircraft Designation: King 22

Mission Objective: Covey 219

Location: XC 4466

Saves: 1

At 0913Z Covey 219 working in Steel Tiger took ground fire and called May Day on guard frequency. King 22 established contact and requested 219's position. 219 stated, after some confusion, he thought he was between route 23 and 994. Covey 206 and Raven 44 also heard May Day call and Raven 44 said he thought he heard Covey 219's last position was route 233. Coordinants XC 527615 were given as a mid-point of route 233 by Raven 44. Raven 44 returned to base due to fuel, and Covey 206 was appointed on scene commander. Four Covey aircraft and fast FACs were ordered from ABCCC. By direction from King, Covey 206 set up a search along route 233 using Seafox 3, Gunsmoke 05, Covey 233 & 235. Covey 291 was inbound to the area. Seafox 3 picked up a beeper on 243.0, guard, and moments later voice contact was established. Covey 291 then picked up voice with 219 and was appointed on scene commander, time 0940Z. Position was established as XC 4466. Jolly's 57/56 were directed from channel 93; time 0925Z. Two more Jolley's were ordered along with 4 Sandies; 2 from CH 89, and 2 from CH 77. Covey 291 put survivor on Delta frequency and all SAR support were directed to come up 282.8 UHF, time 0944Z. Covey 291 stated the area was permissive and the survivor in good shape.

Sandy 5/6 flight arrived approximately 1030Z, and after briefing assumed on scene. After trolling for ground fire and locating survivors exact position (225/66/103), phase Alpha commenced, time 1053Z; Jolly 57 was low bird, 56 high. Covey 291 spotted an enemy mover approximately 8 kilometers SW of the survivor, and was cleared to use Falcon 46 flight to stop the truck. Phase Bravo commenced at 1100Z, and survivor was on board Jolly 57 at 1105Z.

Some ground fire was received upon egress by Sandy 5 & 6, but was silenced.

King 22 Crewmembers

AMC Capt Robert J. Waldren
CP 1Lt Thomas I. Parks
N Maj James W. Rust
FE MSgt Roy E. Thompson
FE TSgt Edward L. Pike
RO SSgt Earl C. Ray
RO TSgt Jimmy N. Freeman
LM SSgt Rex D. Stephens

Forces Used

Covey 206, 219, 233, 235
Seafox 03, Gunsmoke 05.
Falcon 46
Gunfighter 22 was held but not used.



ROBERT J. WALDREN, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

GROUP-4

Revised at 3 year intervals.
Revised later 11

40th ARSg History, 1 January - 31 March 1972

Saves

Combat Saves

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>SURVIVOR</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
136	Capt John S. Murphy	11 Feb 72	Sea Fox
137	1Lt Thomas W. Dobson	11 Feb 72	Sea Fox
138	SSgt William S. Silva	17 Feb 72	Sum Dog 12
139	Capt Malon H. Long, III	02 Mar 72	Covey 219
140	1Lt David G. Breakman	19 Mar 72	Nail 31
141	Capt Stephen Bortosky	19 Mar 72	Nail 31
142	Lt Col O. F. Lentz	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
143	Capt R. Cardoso	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
144	Maj D. C. Dixon	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
145	Sgt C. Davis	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
146	MSgt M. D. Frost	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
147	MSgt J. R. Thrasher	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
148	Sgt D. Tiaron	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
149	Sgt M. Tesch	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
150	Capt C. C. Johnson, Jr.	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
151	SSgt A. Denoi	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
152	Capt R. Rayburn	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
153	Sgt S. R. Reeves	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
154	Capt W. D. Fulk	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOC 652

SAR Report Covey 219

2 March 1972

Sandy 5 - Capt Ronald E. Smith
Sandy 6 - 1st Lt Carl D. Blevins, Jr.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. At 1620L Sandy 5 and 6 were scrambled by Wolfpack. Sandy 5 and 6 were airborne at 1635 and told to proceed to XC and contact King 22.
2. Jolly Green 57 advised Sandy 5 that King did not have a VHF radio and that they were monitoring 316.0 UHF for the SAR. Sandy 5 contacted King 22 on UHF and was advised that Covey 219 with one crewmember was down at XC 527615. Covey 291 and 206 were on scene trying to pinpoint the survivor. After determining the survivor's approximate location, Sandy 5 directed Jolly 57 to proceed to, and hold over a 4056 feet mountain about 10NM west of the survivor.
3. Sandy 1 and 2 were advised of the Jolly holding point and directed to proceed there to escort the Jollys.
4. King 22 advised Sandy 5 that Sandys 7 and 8 and another flight of Jolly Greens were enroute from Da Nang. Sandy 5 decided to hold them east of the trail to avoid having them cross a high threat area unnecessarily.
5. Covey 291 was in radio contact with the survivor and positively identified his voice.
6. Sandy 5 flight arrived on scene at about 1715 and Covey 206 directed Sandy 5 to the survivor's location.
7. The survivor had evaded capture by running about 1½ miles up a hill and into the jungle. He had already been directed to go to 282.8 UHF and he was in good condition. The initial on scene commander duties performed by Covey 291 and 206 greatly aided the rescue forces. Sandy 5 took on scene command at 1720L.
8. Another Covey was sent by Sandy 5 to V.R. the roads to the west and south of the survivor for movement. One truck was observed moving toward the survivor by the Covey and was destroyed by a flight of F-4's.
9. The survivor was hidden in the jungle and Sandy 5 could only fix his position to within 40 to 50 meters. Initially the survivor reported that he had seen and heard nothing to indicate enemy troops in the area. Sandy 5 made several low passes over the area and encountered no ground fire. Covey 219 then stated that he may have heard movement southwest of his position in the direction of the aircraft wreckage. Sandy 5 made several more passes in this area shooting 20MM, 7.62, and CBU-25. No fire was returned and nothing more was heard by Covey 219.

GROUP 4

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOC 65³

10. Sandy 6 was sent to direct Sandy 1 and 2 and Jolly 50 flight to the final holding point about 2NM from the survivor. During the ingress across the valley west of the survivor, the Jollys took 57MM fire but were not hit.

11. Sandy 5 briefed the SAR forces on VHF 123.1 after they arrived at the final holding point. An armed M-47 was dropped by Sandy 5 for the IP and Sandy 5 and 6 used CBU-22 for a smoke screen southwest of the survivor. At about 1800 the SAR forces executed the pickup phase. After Jolly 57 went into a hover, Sandys 1, 2 and 6 covered him with various types of ordnance. Sandy 5 remained over the survivor to relay radio transmissions and call out any ground fire observed. No ground fire was observed during the pickup.

12. At approximately 1810, Jolly 57 reported the survivor on board and an egress was begun to the west. Approximately 5NM west of the survivor's location the first of several 37MM AAA guns began shooting at the SAR forces. All four Sandye attacked these gun positions to enable the Jolly Greens to exit the area. Although none of the guns were believed destroyed, none of them returned fire after being attacked by the Sandys. The SAR forces departed the high threat area at approximately 1820 and Sandy 5 and 6 RTB to Ubon landing at 1850L. Ordnance expended by Sandy 5 and 6 included: 1 M-47, 4 CBU-22, 1 CBU-25, 4 LAU-3, 2 LAU-68, 3,000 rounds 7.62MM, and 1,000 rounds 20MM.

Paul Smith

RONALD E. SMITH, Cspt, USAF
Sandy 5

2000

CARL D. BLEVINS, JR, 1st Lt, USAF
Sandy 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOC 65'

1st SOS (Maj Miller 2010)

7 March 1972

SARCO Report, Covey 219

56 SOW (DO)

1. At 1630L, 2 March 1972, Jack declared a SAR for Covey ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ an OV-10 with one person on board. The approximate location was 062/95/93. Sandy 05 & 06 and two Jolly Greens were launched by Jack from Ubon and were airborne at 1642L.

2. Sandy 01 & 02 were scrambled from NKP to assist, and in the meantime Sandy 07 & 08 were launched from DaNang to escort two Jolly Greens also from DaNang to the area.

3. A Pavenail was requested and was sent to the area. The Pavenail airborne at the time had to RTB for fuel, and one from NKP was diverted to the SAR.

4. Sandy 05 was on-scene commander after his arrival in the survivor's area. After establishing radio contact and making passes to determine any ground reaction the Jolly Greens and Sandy 01 & 02 were brought in from their holding point.

5. Two LNRS equipped Jolly Greens were launched by Jack at 1740L with Sandy 03 & 04 to escort them.

6. The pick-up was completed at 1805L, sunset in the area was to occur at 1808L. On egressing from the area the SAR forces encountered numerous AAA firings on the exit route.

A

7. All SAR forces then RTB'd. Sandy 07 & 08 and the DaNang Jolly Greens did not cross the route structure to the east of the survivors location and they RTB'd to DaNang. Sandy 05 & 06 RTB'd to Ubon, and Sandy 01, 02, 03 & 04 and all the remaining Jolly Greens RTB'd to NKP.

8. SAR successfully terminated.

C. V. Miller
CRAIG V. MILLER, Major
SARCO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 2-1
Downgraded at 3 year interval
Declassified after 12/1/77

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
No 0581030

~~SECRET~~

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Feb

- 2 (U) General George S. Brown, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, visited TFA and the 56th SOW for mission briefings.
- 8 (U) M/Gen James O. Frankosky, Vice Commander, 13th Air Force, visited TFA and the 56th SOW for mission briefings.
- 10 (C) Search and Recovery mission for Seafox Ø1 downed in Southern Laos successful.
- 16 (C) Search and Recovery mission for Musket Ø1 downed just above the DMZ in North Vietnam unsuccessful. No objective.
- 17 (C) Search and Recovery mission for Junior Ø2 downed just above the DMZ in the Gulf of Tonkin unsuccessful. No objective.
- 17 (C) M/Gen Eugene Hudson, Special Assistant, DCS/Ops 7th Air Force, visited TFA and the 56th SOW for mission briefings. He also flew with the Stingers.
- 28 (C) M/Gen Ernest T. Cragg, Assistant DCS/Programs and Resources, received briefings from TFA and NKP Security Services.

Mar

- 2 (C) Search and Recovery mission for Covey 219 downed in Steel Tiger successful.
- 3 (C) General John. C. Meyer, Vice Chief of Staff, visited TFA and the 56th SOW for mission update briefings. He received briefings from individual Squadron Commanders, toured the flight line, and talked to crew members.
- 3 (C) L/Gen Jimmie M. Philpott, Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, received TFA, TUOC, and Security Services briefings.

~~SECRET~~

IH-95-GW-K
Jan - Mar 72 vol. 1
56 SOW

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~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

[illegible]

Grand Canyon, JOHN ST (KNO)

Capt Robert L. Paul (AS)
 Capt John E. Cleveland (OF)
 1st Lt James R. Lindberg (AS)
 Capt John H. Young (AS)
 Capt Paul C. Perry (AS)

CHRYSLER, JUNE 55 (PAGE)

Sgt James W McIntyre (AC)
 Lt Col Phillip A Campos (OF)
 Sgt Walter J Jurek (MS)
 Sgt Colin A Lane (MS)
 Sgt Michael A Walker (MS)

Robert Paul

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a copy of the original, and is signed by the President.

~~SECRET~~

2 MAR 72

01/2230Z	RH	SSGT HARVEY TO DUTY
01/2245	RH	MX STATUS & SAR POSTURE TO QUEEN
01/2330Z	RH	ITEM REPORT TO JOKER
02/0350	RH	JG 73 ↑ FCF
02/0300	RH	JG 72 ↑ ORBIT
02/0304	RH	JG 64 ↑ ORBIT
02/0440	JY	JG 21 ↑ TNG
02/0515	JY	JG 73 ↓ FCF LATE ENTRY
02/0525	JY	JG 21 ↓ TNG
02/0528	JY	NOTIFIED JOKER OF JG 72's MGRB CHIP-LITE. SGT RUFF.
02/0534	JY	QUEEN CALLED AND SAID JOKER SAYS NEGATIVE ON 55-1 WRITTEN REPORT.
02/0555	JY	JG 72 & JG 64 ↓ ORBIT
02/0513Z	B	JG 73 ↑ FCF
2/0930	JY	QUEEN PUT ALPHA'S ON COCKPIT ALERT. CONVEY/21 ↓ AT 270/128/77 - APPROXIMATELY.
2/0935	JY	JOLLIES LAUNCH QUEEN ADVISED.
2/0940	JY	ALPHA'S IN THE AIR ON A SCRAMBLE.
2/1005	JY	VOICE CONTACT.
2/1035	JY	SANDY'S OSC GETTING READY FOR PHASE ALPHA.
2/1059	JY	PHASE ALPHA BEGINS.
2/1900Z	JY	PHASE BRAVO.
2/1902Z	JY	JOLLY IN FOR PICKUP (NKP JOLLY)
2/1904Z	JY	SURVIVOR PICKED UP ⁵⁰⁵⁷ IN GOOD CONDITION. SOME GROUND FIRE. SURVIVOR RETURNED TO NKP.
2/1905Z	JY	JG 71/64 RTB TO CH 77.
2/1905Z	JY	JG 71/64 ↓ ^{FROM} SCRAMBLE.

02 MAR 72

0001 Z LOG OPENED / CONF. MSG - 011152 IN 13C
 0700 Z PASSED DIR TO JOKER
 0730 Z SGT DIVISION OFF DUTY, SGT POSICE ON DUTY
 0900 Z PR1270 ADVISED 42 OUT OF COMMISSION THIS TIME, FOR SERVIC
 STRUTS, ETIC 1.0 HRS // J ALK, TP, COMM, CREW.
 0934 Z PR1270 BACK IN COMMISSION // J ALK, TP, COMM
 1405 Z JG-607 CH89 LCL // J ALK + TP // REPLACED JG-32
 1715 H JG-607 CH89 // J ALK + TP
 1620 Z COVEY 219 TOOK HIT // PSN UNKN, GENERAL AREA CH82
 JG-57/56 DEVERTED TO AREA
 1625 Z ADU BY JACK // HOLD HOME ALERT ACFT HERE
 1626 Z ADU - LAUNCH HOME ALERT
 1635 Z JG-30/52 ON COCKPIT ALERT
 1650 Z JG-57/56 HEADING 020/30/82
 1707 Z DANANG HOLDING 270/80/77
 1710 Z COVEY 219 HAS VOICE Q50 WITH 219 SOB NOT CONFIRMED
 1718 Z COVEY 219 HAS 1 SOUL ON BOARD
 1721 Z COVEY 219 SAY RECOGNIZE SOB VOICE
 1727 Z LAUNCH JG-52/30 // MX 4 CREW NX
 1730 Z SURVIVOR IN GOOD SHAPE / SANDIES ON SCENE + KING 22
 1738 Z JG-71/64 WILL RECOVER AT CH89 AFTER MSN
 1741 Z JG-52/30 ↑ CH89 // JACK-TIP
 1756 Z GOING INTO PHASE "B"
 1802 Z JG-57 PICKED UP SURVIVOR // RTB CH89
 1820 Z MSN # B-5-015
 1850 Z JG-57 HAS MAIN GEAR BOX CH12 LITE / MX-SAFETY-CODE-NK
 1920 Z JG-52/57 ↓ CH89 // JACK-TIP
 1930 Z JG-30/56 ↓ CH89 // JACK-TIP
 2100 Z PASSED DAAR & FORSTAT TEST TO JOKER
 2400 Z LOG CLOSED

03 MAR 72

Ernest receives AVCO AWA Trophy

Maj. Kenneth E. Ernest, 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, has received the sixth annual Helicopter Heroism Award at the 1972 convention of the Aviation/Space Writers Association in New York City.

Major Ernest was selected among submitted nominees to recognize a pilot, crew-member or other individual for an outstanding act of heroism involving the use of a helicopter.

Major Ernest won the AVCO/AWA Trophy with the rescue of a downed and seriously injured Air Force F-105 Thunderchief pilot on Dec. 11, 1971, near the Mu Gia Pass.

Supported by a hand-picked crew, he pressed his HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant into almost totally inaccessible terrain to finally effect the airman's rescue despite intense flight turbulence over the pass and thick, tree-top level clouds.

The F-105 pilot, his plane having been hit by a surface-to-air missile, had parachuted into a jungle-covered ridge overlooking a dangerous intersection of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in North Vietnam, just across the Laotian border.

Severe weather conditions kept Major Ernest from gaining direct fire-cover assistance from other aircraft aiding the search and rescue mission. Nevertheless, he and his crew decided to continue the search alone and entered the high risk area by diving the helicopter through a small hole in the clouds to probe for a clear path to the survivor.

Although constantly exposed to small arms, unguided rockets and accurate antiaircraft fire, Major Ernest probed a number of river valleys and ravines at very low altitude. Low visibility sometimes caused him to lose sight of the ground and often forced him to climb back up through the weather.

The crew searched for four and one-half hours until the downed pilot's location was electronically pinpointed. Darkness then forced the major to give up the rescue and fly the bullet-riddled HH-53 back to a forward operating base.

At daylight the same crew returned to the area in another HH-53 only to find that the weather was still nearly unaviable and that a clear route to the survivor could not be obtained.

Major Ernest decided to enter the clouds in a slow hover which meant he would have to depend on carefully coordinated obstacle sightings by his crew to keep the large helicopter clear of the high rock formations and trees all around them.

From a point about two miles south of the downed pilot's suspected position, Major Ernest began the treacherous tree-to-tree hover through the clouds and after an hour of grueling stop and start maneuvering finally arrived over the survivor.

A pararescueman was then lowered through the trees on the jungle penetrator. Major Ernest held the wind-buffed helicopter in a hover while the injured survivor was located and then assisted on to the penetrator so both men could be carefully lifted through the dense canopy.

40th ARRSq saves

OV-10 pilot down in Laos

TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN -- Capt. Mahlon H. Long III was rescued just before dusk after he was forced to bail out of his OV-10 aircraft in the lower panhandle of Laos.

Captain Long was flying a reconnaissance mission for the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, Da Nang Aflid, when his aircraft was hit by ground fire.

Unable to nurse the OV-10 back to Da Nang he bailed out.

The captain landed in a tree about two miles from a road. His helmet and glasses were torn off as he descended through the branches, stopping just 10 feet above ground. He lowered himself and ran for cover. "There was no place to hide," he recalled.

Thirty minutes after bailing out, he reached a cluster of trees and took time to make contact with a FAC pilot in the area.

Meanwhile, an HC-130 Hercules of the 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron which had been in pursuit of Captain Long's aircraft as it struggled towards Da Nang, called in a rescue force of A-1 Skyraiders and HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giants from the 40th ARRSq.

The A-1 pilots located Captain Long and also discovered enemy ground troops in the area. Before rescue could be effected, the A-1s strafed enemy forces nearby with the aid of Captain Long, who pinpointed their positions.

When the area appeared safe, the Skyraiders led the rescue helicopter to the pickup point. The A-1s formed their "Daisy Chain" protective flight pattern around the helicopter as it maneuvered towards the captain, who had lit a flare to mark his position.

Capt. Robert T. Paul, aircraft commander, hovered the helicopter over the survivor while Sgt. Denny R. Sanders, flight engineer, lowered the jungle penetrator.

Captain Long climbed on and was pulled to safety just minutes before darkness settled over the area.

"The seat worked just as advertised. I followed the training and it all worked well...It sure was good to get out of there," he said.

Other crewmembers aboard the rescue helicopter were Capt. Dale E. Stoval, copilot; and TSgt. John H. Young and Sgt. Paul C. Perry, pararescuemen.



PJs hallmark is action, not words

FUCHU AS, Japan -- U.S. and Japanese rescue personnel strengthened their bonds of friendship with the presentation of a traditional Kabuki doll to Lt. Col. M.D.R. Brown, director of the Fifth Air Force Joint Rescue Coordination Center.

The doll was presented by Japan Air Self Defense Force Maj. Masayoshi Sato, officer in charge of the JASDF Rescue Coordination Center at Iruma AB.

Colonel Brown and Major Sato are responsible for coordinating the rescue forces of their respective countries, so as to provide the maximum possible rescue capability in Japan.

According to Major Sato, the doll is a "token of appreciation of the friendly relationship which has existed between the men of the two coordinating centers."

The doll, known as a Kagami Jishi, symbolizes the lion in a dance performed in the Japanese Kabuki theater, and is highly valued among the Japanese people.

Pedro recovers A-1 pilot

BIEN HOA AB, RVN -- An HH-43 Pedro of Det. 14, 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, recovered a Republic of Vietnam Air Force A-1 pilot after he bailed out of his aircraft.

As the Pedro launched, Capt. Donald Eudy, the aircraft commander, saw the pilot floating to the ground.

Captain Eudy landed the helicopter in the rice paddy near the downed pilot and SSgt. Ronald Wilson, medical technician, ran to him. The pilot appeared to be dazed.

The pilot was flown back to Bien Hoa where an ambulance was waiting.

The other HH-43 crewmembers were Capt. Jack Roberts, copilot; and Staff Sergeants Robert Montgomery and Ernie Taylor, firefighters.

COVEY 219
2 MAR 72

26-Year-Old ARRS Lists 22,000 Saves

HQ ARRS, SCOTT AFB, Ill. — The world-wide Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) has saved the lives of more than 22,000 men and women in combat, accidents and civil disasters, during the past 26 years.

Once called the Air Rescue Service, the command was officially established on March 13, 1946 — a consolidation of existing air-sea rescue forces from World War II. Since that time, ARRS has developed into a global organization with forces around the world which carry out a multitude of humanitarian missions — missions which saw ARRS forces save 730 lives in 1971 alone.

During the early years of the Air Rescue Service, the pilots flew a variety of aircraft: C-47s, B-17s modified to carry lifeboats, amphibious OA-10s (or PBYS), single engine L-5 liaison planes and a few AT-11 trainers on their way to retirement.

The Service was soon placed under the Air Transport Command — forerunner of the present Military Airlift Command — and its units were located throughout the world to protect airmen flying primary over-water routes.

In Korea, for the first time, allied fighting men were backed by an organized professional combat rescue force. ARS was the most decorated unit of that war. Nearly 10,000 rescues were made, of which almost a thousand were from behind enemy lines, using SA-16s and H-5 and H-19 helicopters.

This laudable record was compiled even though the H-5, for example, could carry only two patients in externally mounted pods and its range depended upon the weight of its passengers.

After Korea, the Service con-

tinued to provide a variety of peacetime rescue and humanitarian services around the globe.

The lifeboat-carrying SB-17s and SB-29 were replaced by HC-54s which could drop survival kits and rafts by parachute. The SA-16 was modified and became the HU-16. HC-97s later provided long-range search and rescue until the advent of today's HC-130 Hercules.

fighting their way into and out of the pickup area.

The HH-3 Jolly Green Giant, and eventually the HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant helicopters, coupled with the HC-130, took over the role of the HU-16, although the Albatross (HU-16) served admirably at the start of the war in Southeast Asia and compiled a remarkable record of saves in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Today's search and rescue task

2 MAR 72 Captain Lifted From Jungle

TAN SON NHUT AB, Vietnam — Capt. Mahlon H. Long III, was rescued just before dusk recently after he was forced to bail out of his OV-10 aircraft in the lower panhandle of Laos.

He was flying a reconnaissance mission for the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron out of Da Nang Afb., when his aircraft was hit by ground fire. Unable to nurse the OV-10 back to Da Nang he bailed out around 5 p.m.

He landed in a tree about two miles from a road. His helmet and glasses were torn off as he descended through the branches, stopping just 10 feet above ground. He lowered himself and ran for cover. "There was no place to hide," he recalled.

Thirty minutes after bailing out, he reached a cluster of trees and took time to make radio contact with a FAC pilot in the area.

Meanwhile, an HC-130 King of the 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, which had been in pursuit of Captain Long's aircraft as it struggled towards Da Nang, called in a rescue force of A-1s and HH-53 from the 40th ARRS. The Sandies formed a "daisy chain" around the copter, which lowered a jungle penetrator and pulled the captain to safety.

The command's name was changed to its present title in 1966, reflecting an expanding role in space flight support. The HH-43 took on some of the new tasks required of ARRS, and replaced the H-5 and the H-19.

The war in Southeast Asia signaled another advance in rescue equipment and concepts. Some rescue crews have made several saves in a single day, literally

force — composed of the HC-130 airborne mission control aircraft, A-1 fighter escorts for suppressing ground fire, F-4 combat air patrol fighters and HH-53 copters for the pickup — evolved from the contingencies of jungle warfare.

The success of this force can be measured by the more than 3,300 lives saved since the ARRS involvement in the war in late 1964.

AF 111111
27 MAR 72
VOL 111111
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37ARRSQ HISTORY, 1 JANUARY - 31 MARCH 1972

the survivors were quickly exchanged. Two of the survivors were in critical condition, one with burns over 100% of his body, and the two PJ's, A1C Pearson and A1C Aillet, began immediate first aid to keep them alive. The need for immediate medical help for the two critically injured necessitated an intermediate stop at the 85th Medical Evacuation Hospital at Hue. Here the four survivors with less serious injuries received interim medical aid. The survivors were then evacuated by the Jollies to Da Nang.

Ten days later another Army helicopter was shot down and Queen launched Capt Roger Colgrove's crew to assist in the recovery. Charley Horse 36 had gone down in dense jungle southwest of Hue. The Jollies orbited at 5000 feet three miles south of the crash site while Sandy 7 checked the security of the area and an Army team of three men cut the two survivors from the wreckage of the Cobra gunship. When the survivors were free, Sandy 7 led Jolly Green 65 to the crash site and the ground team popped a smoke grenade to further mark their position. Capt Colgrove hovered for 26 minutes in high hover over the 135 foot trees while TSgt Pickelsimer was lowered with the stokes litter and then he and the two survivors and the three man ground team were hoisted aboard. The Jolly crew exited the area and rushed the two injured men to the 95th Medical Evacuation Hospital.

Our last save this quarter was made by Capt "Bo" Johnson's crew on 8 March 72. Queen launched the alpha crews for a Navy A-4 with an emergency fuel condition northwest of Da Nang.

37ARRSO HISTORY, 1 JANUARY - 31 MARCH 1972

LCDR Jay Crowe in Jolly Green 64 had a hydraulic problem and the alpha high aircraft was launched ahead of him and proceeded in the direction of the emergency aircraft. Approximately 15 miles northwest of Da Nang the pilot bailed out and made a tree landing sustaining minor injuries to his legs. Jolly Green 64 arrived on scene shortly after Jolly Green 21, but LCDR Crowe decided to assume the high aircraft responsibilities because he was uncertain about the nature of his hydraulic problem. An Army Huey was on scene but couldn't make the pick up because of the 180 foot trees and an 60 degree slope of the mountain side where the survivor had landed. Jolly Green 21 made an autorotative decent to the area and the survivor popped his smoke grenade for positive identification when the Jolly was one mile out. Capt Johnson hovered his aircraft in very difficult conditions against the steep slope with almost no visual references. TSgt Avery was lowered to check the survivor's condition. The two men were hoisted separately because of the Navy pilots leg injuries. Jolly Green 21 made an uneventful return to Da Nang where the survivor was turned over to personnel from the 366th USAF Dispensary.

Numerous hours were flown this quarter in support of rescue missions along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In each case, the rescue was effected by the 40 ARRSQ based in Thailand with our Jollies holding a few miles away in the event they were needed.

7 MAR CONT

To 37th.

07/0005 RR FM QUEEN: K-24 WILL NOT BE ABLE
TO SUPPORT OUR NKP DEPLOYMENT.

0030 RR ITEM 16 LS EP FLKT DPMF

0210 RR JG 67/66 ↑ FOR ORBIT

0300 B J14m 14 PASSED FM QUEEN.

04002 RR JG 67/66 ↓ FM ORBIT. RECALLED BY QUEEN
w/IMMEDIATE TURN AROUND.

04102 RR JG 73 ↑ FOR NKP

04152 RR AL JG 67 ↓ for MX. SWITCHING TO JG
21. JG 72 WILL BE TRAINER. PASSED
TO QUEEN.

05452 2y ITEM 16: LS AX MYRP EFUX

06282 2y JG 21 ↑ ORBIT

06302 2y JG 66 ↑ ORBIT

06452 2y JG 72 ↑ TNG 1

08002 2y JG 66 ↓ ORBIT

08052 2y JG 21 ↓ ORBIT

10282 2y JG 72 ↓ TNG 1

8 MAR 72

07/22302 RR MSGT RUFF TO DUTY

22502 RR ITEM REPORT TO JOKER (SGT DEAN)

23502 RR FM QUEEN: ^{STARFISH} ~~STARFISH~~ 502 DECLARING INFLIGHT
EMERGENCY DUE LOW FUEL. PSN 295/80/77.

0004 RR ACFT FLAMED OUT. SCRAMBLE JOLLIES.

0010 RR ~~SGT A SARE~~ / JG 21 ↑ SARE

0014 RR JG 64 ↑ SARE

3621

0029	RR	Jollics on scene, APJ's on ground. Pilot has hurt leg. Will return insured to 95th. Notified 366 CP & Queen to have 95th pad cleared.
0036	RR	Injured man on board.
0040	RR	Fm Queen: GF 45/280/90/77 has two fire warning lights and bottle damage
0042	RR	JG 21 has severe VIB's, thinks tail rotor hit tree. RTB, PEDRO will evac patient fm Jolly 21 to 95th
0045	RR	Fm Queen: JG 21 will land in JG valley. 366 Hosp will take care of patient.
0050	RR	JG 21/64 ↓
0055	RR	Proxutionary landing report to John, Maj Gibson. He will advise as to record report
0100	RR	Fm Queen: Joker wants 551 Record Report.
0434Z	ZY	JG 66 + 72 ↑ ORBIT
0440Z	ZY	FO ITEM 16 CANX. ♂
0450Z	ZY	JG 66 ↓ Fm ORBIT
0525Z	ZY	JG 72 ↓ Fm ORBIT
0605Z	ZY	ITEM 16: LK CN PXVQ & FYP
0620Z	ZY	JG 64 ↑ FOR TNG
0645Z	ZY	JG 72 ↑ FOR ORBIT
0648Z	ZY	JG 66 ↑ FOR ORBIT
0945Z	ZY	JG 64 ↓ Fm TNG

contributions of ARRS to the Air Force and to the world. He said that there was no greater unit, with any better mission, than that of ARRS.

General Sherrill then presented several awards to ARRS commanders.

These included Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards to Col. Frederick V. Sohle, commander, 41st ARRWg; Col. Malcolm C. Frazee, commander, 1550th ATTWg (then the Training Center at Eglin); and Lt. Col. Robert T. Dobson, commander, 54th ARRSq.

General Everest was presented the MAC Commander's Trophy for Ground Safety, and Col. Bill A. Montgomery, commander, 40th ARRWg, was presented the MAC Ground Safety Achievement Award, MAC Flying Safety Achievement Award, and a special award for ground safety.

The MAC MSET Squadron and Detachment of the Year Awards went to the 71st ARRSq and Det. 10, 44th ARRSq, respectively.

at the ship, about 20 miles southeast of Naha, 30 minutes later. The Ardattov went dead in the water and the helicopter hovered over the bow of the ship.

MSgt. James Souze, a pararescueman, was lowered to the deck of the ship. He advised the captain to change course into the wind in order for the helicopter to maintain position over the ship's deck. A litter was lowered to the deck from the hovering helicopter and the seaman, identified as Gordeen Borin, and the PJ hoisted aboard.

By this time, Borin was conscious, but still in very critical condition. The rescue crew flew the seaman to Naha AB, where an ambulance transported him to a hospital in Naha City.

Other crewmembers were Capt. Frank M. Zahrobsky, Maj. Ronald McKinley and SSgt. Benny D. Negrette.

HH-53 crew saves Navy pilot

TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN -- An HH-53 helicopter crew rescued a downed U.S. Navy A-4 pilot some 15 miles northwest of Da Nang Airfield.

The flyer, Cmdr. George R. Fendel Jr., was retrieved from thick jungle less than an hour after he ejected. Slightly injured, he was taken by the Super Jolly Green Giant to Da Nang for treatment.

Piloting the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron HH-53 was Capt. Horace E. Johnson. Other crewmembers were Capt. David E. Mullenix, copilot; SSgt. Jimmy D. Minshe, mechanic; and TSgt. Alan J. Avery and SSgt. Richard C. Stead, pararescuemen.



RESCUE

RESCUE is a newsletter published as a monthly recurring publication by and for personnel of the worldwide Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service of the Military Airlift Command and under the supervision of the Office of Information, Headquarters, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, Scott AFB, Ill., 62225. Opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the United States Air Force.

Brig. Gen. Frank K. Everest Jr.....ARRS Commander
Lt. Ronald T. Sconyers....Director of Information
TSgt. Thomas A. Clark.....NCOIC/Editor

B. MINSHE

IVHR 16

MAR 77

MAR 77

DATE	CREW	JG #	SAVE #	SAVE LOCATION	TYPE SAVE
8 MAR	JOHNSON MULLENIX MINSHAW STEED AVERY	21	702	FENZL, G.J. JR. COMDR, USN FSSN UNK USS HANCOCK	1 COMBAT

Jolly Greens add Navy jock to list

8 MAR 72 SAR

Despite thick underbrush and rough terrain, members of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) rescued a Navy A-4 pilot about 15 miles northwest of the base recently.

The rescued pilot, Cmdr. George R. Fendel Jr., is from the USS Hancock. Commander Fendel was slightly injured and was treated and released by the 366th USAF Dispensary.

The rescue involved lowering a pararescueman, TSgt. Allen J. Avery of Auburn, Mass., to the ground, placing the survivor on the penetrator, and then sending the penetrator down again for Sergeant Avery. Sergeant Avery was dropped 30 or 40 feet from the survivor because he was in an area covered by thick underbrush and briars. Both men were reeled safely aboard the hovering HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant helicopter.

Capt. Horace (Bo) E. Johnson, aircraft commander, said, "He was in a good place to hide, but it was a bad place for being

(Continued on Page 8)



Commander Fendel expresses his gratitude to Sergeant Avery upon arriving at Da Nang. Sergeant Avery was the pararescueman who went into dense jungle in order to save the downed pilot. (U.S. Air Force Photo by SSgt Roy Adams.)

Jolly Greens...

(Continued from Page 1)

picked up. He was on a steep incline covered with trees 160 to 175 feet high sticking out of the side."

The rescue helicopter was crewed by Captain Johnson of Montgomery, La.; Capt. David E. Mullenix of Bossier City, La., co-pilot; SSgt. Jimmy D. Minshew of Gadsden, Ala., flight engineer; Sergeant Avery; and Sgt. Richard L. Steed of Santa Barbara, Calif., another pararescueman.

The save raised to 706 the number of men rescued by the 37th ARRS.

Navy pilot

8 MAR 72

TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN --
An HH-53 helicopter crew rescued a downed U.S. Navy A-4 pilot some 15 miles northwest of Da Nang Airfield.

The flyer, Cmdr. George R. Fendel Jr., was retrieved from thick jungle less than an hour after he ejected. Slightly injured, he was taken by the Super Jolly Green Giant to Da Nang for treatment.

Piloting the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron HH-53 was Capt. Horace E. Johnson. Other crewmembers were Capt. David E. Mullenix, copilot; SSgt. Jimmy D. Minshew, mechanic; and TSgt. Alan J. Avery and SSgt. Richard C. Stead, pararescuemen.

Jolly Greens snatch Navy pilot 8 MAR 72

TAN SON NHUT AB - A U.S. Air Force HH-53 helicopter crew rescued a downed U.S. Navy A-4 pilot March 8 some 15 miles northwest of Da Nang Afd.

The flyer, Cmdr. George R. Fendel Jr., was retrieved from thick jungle less than an hour after he ejected from his aircraft. Slightly injured, he was taken by the Super Jolly Green Giant chopper to Da Nang for treatment at the base dispensary.

The helicopter and crew are from the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron at Da Nang.

~~SECRET~~

file
12B

DATE: 12 March 1972

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-018

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 56

OBJECTIVE: Rescue and recovery of two F-105 crew members with call sign Alamo 02.

MISSION NARRATIVE: Initial notification came from Tonant at 0540L via telephone that an aircraft was over due and would reach fuel exhaustion at 0545L. Crews on Jolly Green 56 and 61, who were scheduled to deploy TDY to Ubon, went to intelligence for a briefing and update of the last known position of the F-105. Aircraft reported to the HH-53 and were scrambled at 0650L with instructions to proceed to TACAN Channel 99 and obtain further instructions from King 21. Upon arrival at Channel 99, we were instructed to proceed to Channel 93, cock the aircraft and await further instructions. Aircraft were landed at Ubon at 0805L and placed on alert. At approximately 1420L Jolly Green 56 and 61 were notified of a scramble order for a SAR and were airborne at 1430L. Instructions after airborne were to proceed to the 170 degree radial for 43 miles on Channel 125, a distance of approximately 166NM. Enroute, we received update information from King 21, King 24 assisted by relaying information until we got close enough to be in constant radio contact with King 21. Weather enroute was approximately 4000 scattered variable broken with three miles in haze. The update information supplied by King 21 placed the survivor at the 170 degree radial for 47 1/2 NM off Channel 125. Elevation, temperature, weather, aircraft working the area and their altitudes, and survivor's conditions were all passed by King 21. He did a commendable job of coordinating and setting up a safe operation. Jolly Green 56 and 61 arrived in the recovery area at 1545L. Weather in the recovery area was approximately 4000 scattered variable broken with 1 1/2 - 2 NM visibility in smoke and haze. Through the use of UHF/ADF we were able to establish visual contact with King 21 and subsequently a visual on Pedro 26 who had picked up Alamo 02 Bravo. Pedro 26 was hovering over Alamo 02 Alpha and because of his injuries it was decided that Jolly Green 56 would use the Stokes Litter to recover him. During the recovery phase, Jolly Green 61 orbited within sight of Jolly Green 56 and Sandy 5 and 6 flew cover around Jolly Green 56 in case of any hostile action. The recovery progress was passed to King as each phase was entered and accomplished e.g. lowering pararescue man, lowering stokes litter, starting injured pilot up through undergrowth and trees etc. Recovery was initiated at 1550L and completed at 1605L. The area had tall trees and heavy ground cover. The pararescueman who was lowered to help the injured pilot got tangled in the trees and undergrowth going down and when he was brought back up to the helicopter. It required considerable time to maneuver the injured pilot in the Stokes Litter through the vines and undergrowth, and through the trees to Jolly Green 56. King 21 coordinated for a recovery base where the best immediate medical attention could be given to the injured pilot commensurate with the factors that the pilot was on the ground for approximately eleven hours, had

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

lost blood and may need extensive attention. It was suggested that Jolly Green 56 and 61 recover at Don Muang (Bangkok International) which was one hour flying time from the rescue and recovery area. Alamo 02 Alpha did not receive further medical attention enroute - his personal attention to his injury appeared to be proper and was not modified or changed. Enroute, Alamo 02 Alpha was made comfortable by the pararescuemen and then the Aircraft Commander had an opportunity to talk with him over the interplane communication system. He was in good mental condition, with no excruciating pain however, somewhat uncomfortable from his injury. This information was passed to King 21. Alamo 02 Alpha was told where we were going, the time enroute and of awaiting personnel and conveyance. He was a pleasant, cooperative and grateful patient and passenger. King 21 coordinated for the recovery at Don Muang: Medical personnel, ambulance, permission to land and refueling for Jolly Green 56 and Jolly Green 61. The aircraft were landed at Don Muang at 1759L and the patient was off-loaded at 1805L. Jolly Green 56 and 61 refueled, filed a flight plan and returned to Ubon where alert was once again resumed.

Ralph L. Allred
RALPH L. ALLRED, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded at 3 year
mark; Declassified
on 01/01/95

0635 TO CALLED CE ON TEAMITES WORK ORDER 1164
 0650 TO PASSED DIR TO JOKER
 0700 TN SGT DAVIDSON OFF DUTY SGT NEALIS ON DUTY
 0715 TN PEDRO 21 ↑ CH 89 45/TP/WALKER
 0715 TN PEDRO 21 ↓ CH 89 THIS TIME/TP
 0740 RH JG 73 ↑ CH 89 3.5 LOCAL
 0740 RH JG 30 ↑ CH 89 3.0 LOCAL
 0800 TN JG 30 ↓ CH 89 THIS TIME/TP/THOU
 0810 TN JACK CALLED CALLED JG 61-63 AIR BARR 1600
 0815 TN JG 73 ↓ CH 89 THIS TIME/TP/THOU
 0820 TN JG 61 ↓ CH 89 15/TP/THOU
 0825 TN JG 63 ↓ CH 89 /TP/THOU
 0850 TN SENT DARR AND FORSTAT TO JOKER THIS TIME
 0905 PE SGT PUSICZ ON DUTY
 0910 PE LOG CLOSED

12 MAR 72

0001 BT LOG OPENED
 0020 BT REC WX WARNING VALID 1745Z TO 1945Z
 TS WITHIN 3NM OF BASE, WINDS VAR 12 G 25 MINIMUM
 CONDITION 2 & TS. // REC BY T00C/DM
 0353 PE 100K FORSTAT + SCHAULER TO T00C + COMM CENTER
 0420 M REC. EXTENSION OF WX WARNING NOW VALID UNTIL
 0600L // REC FM T00C//
 0500 BT PASSED SAR POSTURE TO JACK + ADVISED TO
 TELL SOUTH BIRDS TO GO SOUTH ASAP//
 0535 PE ADVISED BY JACK TO LAUNCH SOUTH BIRDS ASAP, TO
 CH 93, AROUND 02 FUEL FLAME OUT AT 0530L,
 GENERAL AREA NORTH OF SARAUANE//
 0615 M TYPE AIRCRAFT F-105, 2 SOB. NO OTHER INFO AT
 THIS TIME//
 0657 TN JG 56+61 ↑ CH 89/TP/THOU
 0700 TN SGT PUSICZ OFF DUTY SGT NEALIS ON DUTY
 0805 TN JG 56+61 ↓ CH 93 THIS TIME

DATE: 12 Mar 72

MISSION NUMBER: 8-3-01 11/12 Mar 72

FLIGHT SIGNATURE: King 22

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Alamo 02 (1-105) Rescue and Recovery of Downed Airman

LOCATION: 1410N 10203E (175/41.5/125)

SAVES: 2

1. Summary of SAR Actions:

a. King 22 briefed for assignment of King 22 orbit and continuance of search for missing aircraft, Alamo 02. King 22 blocked Korat RTAFB at 0707Z. On taxi, "Guards" transmissions between Cherry 16 and Alamo 02 were heard by King 22 and a jump launch was made at 0718Z with no difficulties encountered.

b. The only problem encountered enroute was the lack of an accurate position for Alamo 02. The search was being conducted in V.R. sector 6 of Steel Tiger while the actual Alamo 02 position was some 285 miles to the southwest of the search area.

c. Launch, enroute, and on scene weather was 4000 - 4500' MSL scattered cross tiger, base 500' with 5 to 6 miles visibility enroute dropping to 2 miles on scene in the SAR area.

d. Coordination with all forces was outstanding with King 21 handling airborne mission commander duties and King 22 acting as On Scene Commander due to the nonavailability of low altitude search aircraft.

e. Very good.

f. At 0800, King 22 entered an area, determined by Cherry 16 from intelligence data, most likely to be in the vicinity of Alamo 02. Once in the area, King 22 initiated a greenish blue search utilizing all available equipment to determine the location of Alamo 02. At 0807Z, a visual sighting of Alamo 02 parachute was made in a very rugged, hilly, and mountainous area - position 0410N 10203E.

g. Many actions taken during this rescue were reported as negative by intelligence sources as the location was not known prior to the on scene.

h. Alamo 02 was rescued and is expected to be successful rescue by following the same method as King 22 precisely, with respect to transmissions made during the search, the location of Alamo 02, and the location of the parachute. Alamo 02 was seen in a very rugged, hilly area, some 100 yards from 02B, was bleeding heavily from his head and was suffering from his parachute fall into a bamboo thicket.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i. Alamo 02B was picked up by Pedro 26 at 0824Z and 02A was located by Pedro 26 at 0845Z. It was determined by the Pedro medic that 02A should be picked up by Jolly Green 56 and this was accomplished at 0906Z accounting for both saves - their condition previously noted.

j. None

k. None

l. None

m. Pedro 26 departed SAR area at 0853Z.
Jolly Green 56/63 departed SAR area at 0909Z.
King 22 departed SAR area at 0939Z.

n. King 22 landed Korat RTAFB at 1209Z after maintaining remainder of fringed orbit.

o. Use of King 22 as a low-altitude search aircraft and on scene commander in this instance provided the vitally needed quick position fixing and vectoring ability to assure a most rapid pickup and avert probable loss of at least one crew member due to the aforementioned bleeding of Alamo 02A.

2. King 22 - 1 sortie - 5.0 hours - 39 ARRSq

3. None

4. None

5. N/A

6. King 22

AMC Capt Levka
CP Lt Desormey
NAV Capt Hunger
RO SSgt Ware
FE SSgt Marchak
FE SSgt Neuber
LM SSgt Randolph

Additional Resources:

Jolly Green
Pedro 25/26
Sandy 5/6
King 21

Simon E. Levka
SIMON E. LEVKA, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 18 Mar 1972

~~SECRET~~

12-3
w.

MISSION NUMBER: 3-3-022

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 61

OBJECTIVE: Rescue and Recovery of two OV-10 crew members with callsign of Nail 31 Alpha and Bravo. Pickup attempt successful on 19 Mar 72.

ADDITIONAL SAR FORCES: JG 56, 32, 53, 63, Sandy's 1 through 10, King 42, 27.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY: At 1025 local on 18 March 1972 two HH-53C helicopters were launched from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand in response to the bailout of Nail 31 (OV-10) Alpha and Bravo. Jolly Green callsigns were 32(L) and 53(H). The survivors were located in the region of the "Catchers Mitt" approximately 42 miles north west of Saravane, Laos (16°22'N, 105°57'E). Nail 31 had apparently been hit by enemy AAA fire in this heavily defended area of Route 23, where intelligence had established defenses up to 57mm AAA. Initial orbit was established at 1125L, approximately 12 miles to the south of the survivor's position, over a karst area on the east side of route 23. Both survivors had been in contact with Nail 15, the first on-scene commander. Nail 31 Bravo could transmit, but was unable to receive on Delta channel. Both survivors requested PJ assistance because of ankle injuries. The survivors were under dense tree cover approximately 150 - 200 meters apart. The known animosity of ground forces in the area was immediately reemphasized by the loss of Sandy 01 (A-1E) about five minutes into the orbit. Hit by ground fire, he left the area, bailed out, and was immediately recovered by Hotel 70, a friendly non-USAF helicopter that was in the area. Three other Sandy aircraft also received hits during the mission. Jolly Greens 56 and 57 (HH-53C) launched from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB at 1140L to provide backup capability and continuous coverage during cycling on the tanker. Throughout the day USAF and USN forces expended massive amounts of ordinance, including area denial agents, in preparation for the recovery attempt. The survivors were completely encircled by 37mm, 23mm, 12.7mm and assorted small arms and automatic weapons. The Sandys and Nails experienced great difficulty in their attempts to pinpoint the survivors, especially 31 Bravo because of his transmit-only capability. Although enemy resistance had not been reduced to a level deemed really satisfactory for a recovery, all concerned agreed to a last light effort at 1800L. Factors favoring the attempt were poor visibility for enemy gunners, confusion caused by the day-long pounding by our forces, and particularly the small chance that the survivors could remain free overnight. A steep, circling approach from 11,000 ft AGL, almost directly over the survivors was planned. Smoke 43 and 44 (A-1E), and Sandys 13 and 14 preceeded Jolly Green 32 in the descent. By 5000 ft AGL, visual contact with the Als was intermittent due to smoke and darkness. By 4000'AGL multiple tracers filled the air from both high and low rate-of-fire weapons. Visual contact with the Als was lost by 2000'AGL and the rescue attempt was aborted. The survivors were briefed for the nights operation and a first light effort on 19 March. A Night Recovery System effort was not made due to the environment and the requirement for the crew to wear gas masks. The next morning Jolly Green 32(L) and 61(H) launched at 0430L for the first light effort. Jolly Green 30(L) and 61(H) launched at 0505L as backup crew. The Jolly Greens established an orbit west of the survivor's position and held while our forces

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
after 10 years

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continued their efforts to eliminate as many enemy gun positions as possible. During this period it became evident that the helicopters would have to refuel before attempting a rescue so JG 32 & 63 left the orbit point for a rendezvous with King 42 (HC-130P). After they completed their A/R they returned to the orbit point and Jolly Greens 30 and 61 departed for refueling. While 30 and 61 were refueling JG 63 experienced an AFCS malfunction which required him to RTB. At this time JG 30 joined with JG 32 and Jolly Green 56 was launched as high element for JG 61. Both elements completed their refueling and had returned to the initial holding point by 0800L. The helicopters continued to orbit for two more hours while the Nails and Sandys continued to eliminate gun emplacements near the survivors. At approximately 1000L renewed ground fire was observed by the Nails and the Sandys and doubt arose as to whether a try should be made. Anticipating additional delay, Jolly Green 32 decided to leave the orbit area to refuel with King 27, leaving Jolly Green 61 as primary low and JG 56 as primary high. At this time Sandy 9 decided that most of the ground fire was far enough north of the survivors to allow a pickup attempt by making a low, fast run in from the south. The sandys had also established two-way radio contact with 31 Bravo on guard channel also it was decided to use guard as the primary rescue frequency. Jolly Green 61 started the descent and run in at 1020L and was at tree top level at a point four miles south south east of the survivors. Following the smoke markers and verbal instructions of Sandy 9, 61 was able to come to a hover directly over the survivors position at which time Nail 31 Alpha popped his MK 13 survival smoke. 31 Bravo was located in the same manner. Both Alpha and Bravo also gave verbal guidance with their survival radios. A PJ was lowered on the penetrator for both survivors and the pickups were made with a minimum time in a hover. Jolly Green 61 departed the area at 1035L at tree top level and "popped up" to altitude four miles south of the pickup point. Tracers and airbursts were seen overhead during the pickup, but no ground fire came close to the helicopter. Jolly Green 61 made a second refueling for the day with King 27 at 1040L, during the return flight to NKP. Mission completed at 1147L.

MISSION FLYING TIME

40 ARRS - 9 Sorties for 59.4 hrs
39 ARRS - 8 Sorties for 47.0 hrs
56 SOW - 39 Sorties for 127.9 hrs
365 TRW - 9 Sorties for 14.9 hrs
432 TRW - 2 Sorties for 3.0 hrs

CREW OF JOLLY GREEN 61

Major Kenneth E. Ernest
Captain Mark C. Schibler
Sgt Wolfgang Beuninghoven
SSgt Michael L. Walker
A1C Craig A. Marsh
SSgt Kelly K. Shuman

JOLLY GREEN 56

Captain Richard E. Dreher

Major Ralph L. Allred

SSgt Raymond Duarte

Sgt Charles D. McGrath

SSgt Charles D. Morrow

SSgt Harold Smith

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Kenneth E. Ernest". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "K" and a long, sweeping tail.

KENNETH E. ERNEST, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

40th ARSg History, 1 January - 31 March 1972

Saves

Combat Saves

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>SURVIVOR</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
136	Capt John S. Murphy	11 Feb 72	Sea Fox
137	1Lt Thomas W. Dobson	11 Feb 72	Sea Fox
138	SSgt William E. Silva	17 Feb 72	Sun Dog 12
139	Capt Malon H. Long, III	02 Mar 72	Covey 219
140	1Lt David G. Breakman	19 Mar 72	Nail 31
141	Capt Stephen Bortlesky	19 Mar 72	Nail 31
142	Lt Col O. F. Lentz	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
143	Capt R. Cardoso	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
144	Maj D. C. Dixon	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
145	Sgt C. Davis	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
146	MSgt M. D. Frost	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
147	MSgt J. R. Thrasher	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
148	Sgt D. Tiaron	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
149	Sgt M. Tesch	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
150	Capt C. C. Johnson, Jr.	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
151	SSgt A. Denoi	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
152	Capt R. Rayburn	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
153	Sgt S. R. Reeves	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22
154	Capt W. D. Pulk	31 Mar 72	Spectre 22

~~SECRET~~

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NAIL 31/B

(C) The most contested SAR of the quarter began when Nail 31, an OV-10A Pave Nail of the 23rd TASS, was shot down in the "Catcher's Mitt" area of Steel Tiger. The Catcher's Mitt was one of the most heavily defended areas of Steel Tiger with numerous 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 23mm, 37mm, and 57mm anti-aircraft guns. The shootdown of Nail 31 occurred at about 1015L, on 18 March, as the crew was directing an airstrike in the area.¹⁵¹

(C) Joker designated Jack to coordinate the SAR effort. King 21 was near the area and Nail 15 was just entering from NKP when Nail 31 was hit. Nail 15 assumed on-scene command and immediately learned that Air America helicopters and Pave Nails were nearby. Air America was not called in because of the high threat environment. Nail 15 did request the Pave Nails. He then made quick contact with the survivors who advised that AAA positions were within 200 meters of their positions.¹⁵²

(S) At 1030L, Sandys 01/02/03/04 and Jolly Greens 32/53 were launched from NKP. At 1100L, the Sandys arrived in the area and Sandy 01 took over as on-scene commander. Nail 15, with Sandy 01 on his wing, descended to point out the approximate locations of the survivors. During this maneuver Sandy 01 took a direct hit by a 37mm round in the right side of the engine.

151. SARCO Report for Nail 31A/B, 19 Mar 72, (Doc 66).

152. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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With oil and smoke streaming from the engine, and smoke in the cockpit, Sandy 01 headed Southwest toward the nearest permissive area. The engine ran for another 1½ minutes and allowed the pilot to extract in the desired area. Within ten minutes an Air America helicopter, Hotel 70, had the pilot on board and heading for Pakse, Laos.¹⁵³

(S) Nail 31 Alpha reported enemy troops in his immediate area so Sandy 02, now the on-scene commander, ordered area denial (BLU-52) ordnance to seal off the survivors. Nail 31 Alpha also reported that he had injured his ankles upon impact and might need a para-jumper (PJ) during the pickup.¹⁵⁴

(S) Sandys 03/04 then arrived and had to be vectored into the area because of navigational instrument problems. After being briefed, Sandy 03 assumed on-scene command. The electronic search was resumed by the Sandys and the approximate positions of the survivors determined. Meanwhile, a set of F-4s had arrived with the area denial ordnance and Nail 15 directed their

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

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drops very near the survivors. Radio interference and AAA had greatly impeded search efforts so the Sandys requested that Nails 15/52 expend their fast movers on the AAA in the area. The next hour and a half was consumed marking targets, expending ordnance on AAA, and further narrowing the positions of the survivors. Nail 31 Bravo was beginning to have radio problems.¹⁵⁵

(C) Sandys 05/06 were launched out of DaNang at 1245L, and arrived on the scene at about 1330L. On scene command was passed to 05 and as 03/04 were exiting the area Sandy 03 took a near miss from a 37mm round that caused minor damage. Sandys 03/04 RTBed to NKP. Sandys 05/06 then attempted to pinpoint the locations of the survivors and in so doing Sandy 05 took a hit in the right wing. A 37mm round passed through the wing from underneath and exploded just after exiting. Both Sandys immediately headed Southwest in the event a bailout might be necessary. However, Sandy 05 was able to nurse his stricken aircraft back to NKP.¹⁵⁶

(C) At 1250L, Smokes 43/44 had been launched from NKP. Fifty miles out from NKP Smoke 43's propeller control linkage broke and he had to RTB. After a quick repair, he relaunched at 1400L. At 1330L, Sandys 09/10 launched from NKP and were briefed by Sandy 05 as they passed each other. Sandys 09/10 then entered the area and continued the AAA suppression. When Smoke 43 arrived he assumed on-scene command and decided that a last light attempt should be

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

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made since the survivors were very near the enemy and to wait till morning might be too late. It was feared the survivors might be found during the night.¹⁵⁷

(C) The time selected for the pickup attempt was 1800L. Though Nail 31 Bravo had not been heard from because of radio troubles the attempt would be made anyway, with hopes that he would either come up on radio or pop smoke. Meanwhile, Nail aircraft continued to expend fast movers on every gun they could find. For this attempt a most difficult maneuver would have to be performed by the Jolly Green. The helicopter would have to make a very steep descent from the South to avoid being unnecessarily exposed to any 37mm guns that might be left in the area, especially from the heavy concentration just North of the survivors. When the Jolly Green began his run-in he failed to descend to the treetops and during the run-in a 37mm opened up on him. Alpha reported the Jolly Green directly overhead but the chopper was forced to retreat. It was now getting dark so another pickup was not attempted. On-scene command was turned over to Nail 51 to pull the first "babysitter" tour of the night. The SAR forces RTBed and plans for the next day were begun.¹⁵⁸

(C) The next morning, on 19 March 1972, the SAR forces started taking off at 0445L and were staggered at one hour intervals. In all, eight Sandys, two Smokes, and four Jolly Greens

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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from NKP, Ubon, and DaNang participated in the effort.¹⁵⁹

(C) During the night the Nails had been working the area with fast movers and a Spectre gunship was working the roads. Strikes continued on into the daylight hours to sanitize the area. Enemy big guns were now quiet and only sporadic ZPU and 12.7mm fire was being encountered. All active guns were to the Northwest of the survivors so the planned ingress for the helicopter was from the Southeast.¹⁶⁰

(C) During the night Nail 31 Bravo had moved and was now very close to Alpha. He was still having trouble on backup frequency so it was decided to conduct the entire SAR on Guard. The survivors reported that they had heard nothing in their immediate vicinities for some time. Ten hundred was chosen as the pickup time. Smoke 43 screened the area from the guns to the Northwest while Nail 52 led Jolly Green 61 in from the Southeast. Four Sandys flew a protective daisy chain around the helicopter and expended most of their ordnance to the Northwest of the pickup area. During this time Sandy pilots reported some 23mm and 37mm fire but it was at a low angle and inaccurate. They also saw explosions below their aircraft that appeared to be rocket propelled grenades. Since Bravo's radio was not good he was instructed to pop his smoke first. His smoke was quickly sighted and in a few minutes he was aboard the Jolly Green. Then Alpha

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 MAR 72 DOC 66'

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FROM: 1st SOS (Maj Patte/2754)

SUBJECT: SARCO Report (Nail 31A & 31B)

TO: 56th SOW (DO)

1. On 18 March 1972 a SAR was declared for Nail 31 (A & B) shot down at approximately 1015 while working as a FAC putting in airstrike near D 47 in the area of the "Catcher's Mitt". Jack was designated by Joker to work the SAR and King 21 was over head. Nail 15 was the initial, OSC. Air America helicopter available in the SAR area. Pave Nails were sent to the SAR area.

2. Sandy 1, 2, 3, and 4 and G 32 and 53 were launched to a holding point northwest of the approximate survivor location, away from known enemy defenses. The holding point was later moved southwest of the SAR area to provide quicker and safer access to the final holding point. The SARCO advised Jack to order the standard mix of denial weapons loaded: CBU-42, CBU-49, CDU-14, and ELU-52, and requested CBU-52 and LGB's be ordered for AAA suppression. Hobo assets were released by Blue Chip for SAR support. Two Air America helicopters offered their assistance to King 21. They then set up orbit points for emergency bail-out and reported this to King 21.

3. Nail 15, the assistant SARCO (Nail), and intelligence report that the SAR area is extremely high threat with numerous 12.7, 14.5, 23mm, 37mm, and 57mm guns in the immediate vicinity of the survivor. Contact with survivors is made quickly and they report guns within 200m of their position. TFA was asked to monitor and advise.

4. At 1100, Sandy 01 took over OSC and made contact with both survivors but took a hit and had to extract after only a few minutes in the SAR area. He was quickly picked up by an Air America helicopter H 70 and Sandy 02 assumed OSC. Sandy 01 was taken to Pakse and later returned to NKP with no injuries. Sandy 05 and 06 were launched from DNG to replace 01 and 02.

5. At 1140, the Sandys went back to the JG holding area to allow the FAC to neutralize the AAA. JG 56 and 57 took off to join the SAR force.

6. At 1200, the survivors reported enemy activity in the area and injuries that would require PJ assistance during pickup.


7. OSC was shifted to Sandy 03 and then to Sandy 05. The Nails continued to FAC ordnance into the SAR area in an effort to neutralize the AAA. ELU-52 was also used.

8. At 1330, Sandy 09 and 10 were airborne to replace Sandy 03 and 04. Smoke 43 and 44 were also launched with a full load of M-47's. Sandy 05 took over as OSC.

DO NOT DESTROY

10581031-

CORONA HARVEST



GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

Jan-Mar 72
K-WG-56-H
MOS 95

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DOC 66²

9. At 1400 Sandy 05 took a hit and RTB'd NKP with Sandy 06. Sandy 09 took OSC and later passed it to Smoke 43.

10. At 1425 Sandy 11 and 12 took off to replace Sandy 05 and 06. AAA activity decreased in the SAR area as airstrikes continued. The survivors are reported to be separated by some distance- can't talk to each other on radios.

11. Medden kits were loaded on Sandy 13 and 14 in case more radios were needed for the survivors. Only 3 in stock. We should insure at least 4 kits are available at all times.

12. At 1635, King 27 took over from King 21 and at 1710, Sandy 13 and 14 were airborne.

13. Smoke 43 planned a pick-up attempt at 1800. JG 56 and 57 had to leave the SAR area for an IFE.

14. The pick-up attempt was aborted when JG 32 took fire on the run-in. No further attempts were made and all Sandy and JG assets were ordered to RTB.

15. The Nails immediately started working to pinpoint the survivors location in order to allow them to lay area denial ordnance around the survivor and attack the known and suspected AAA positions. King and Nail aircraft maintained continuous coverage throughout the night. The Nails continued to attack gun positions and seal off ingress routes with area denial ordnance. Spectre aircraft were also used to suppress ground fire, search for enemy activity, and help pinpoint survivor positions.

16. Joker requested two Pave Nails be on scene all night but resources prevented this. One Pave Nail was available all night.

17. First light pick-up planning was started at 1500 and the SARCO advised Jack of the plan and ordnance needed. This plan was firmed up after the aborted pick-up attempt and ordnance requests were confirmed: 4 A/C with CBU-42 (QRF), 4 A/C with CBU-49 (2QRF-2 overhead), and 10 A/C with BLU-52 (4 A/C QRF-4 A/C overhead). CBU-52 and LGB's were requested for all night attacks on AAA. TFA resources were diverted as necessary to meet requirements during the night. The first light plan was to have 4 Sandys, 2 Jollys, 1 Pave Nail, 1 Nail, and King at the SAR area 15 minutes before first light, briefed and ready to execute. Two Smoke aircraft and two additional Jollys were launched 30 minutes later than the rest of the force to provide continuity of operation for the Jollys and smoke available for the first light attempt. All forces arrived as scheduled.

18. At 0540, Sandy 04 experienced difficulty and had to RTB with Sandy 03. Sandy 05 and 06 were launched to replace them and were airborne at 0605.

Downgraded at 3 year intervals:
Declassify on: ~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1

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DOC 66³

19. Sandy 01, OSC determined the ground fire too intense to attempt a pick-up and directed the Nails to continue to suppress it while he trolled for more ground fire and pinpointed the survivors. During this search, Sandy 01 took a hit and flew off to one side to allow Sandy 02 to look him over. He continued after determining the damage was not hazardous.

20. At 0810, Sandy 09 and 10 were airborne to replace Sandy 01 and 02. Sandy 05 took OSC from Sandy 01 and continued SAR plan. At 0840, Sandy 07 and 08 were airborne to replace Sandy 05 and 06.

21. One attempt was made at 0940 to pickup the survivors but were driven off by AAA. Sandy 09 was OSC. More ordnance was expended by the Nails and one set of Jollys went to the tanker to refuel.

22. At 1020, the pickup attempt was started again with Sandy 09 as on OSC. On this attempt, the Jollys were on the tree tops for the final run-in and successfully picked both survivors. The Jollys were escorted from the SAR area on the treetops and all forces RTB NKP.

23. The coordination and cooperation during this SAR was the best I have ever witnessed. All forces involved should be congratulated for a job well done.

24. A SAR conference was convened by Joker following the successful termination and many items relevant to future SAR were discussed. One of the immediate results of the SAR conference was the return of the Sandys from Da Nang to NKP. Other results include improved command and control instructions, specific coordination instructions for controlling agencies,

George A. Batte

GEORGE A. BATTE, Maj, USAF
SARCO

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DOC 66⁴

S T A T E M E N T

18 March 72

SUBJECT: Sandy 01, 02 (SAR Report NAIL 31 A&B)

1. Sandy 01, Capt Pass, and Sandy 02, Lt Lamar Smith launched at 1030, 18 Mar 72, in support of the NAIL 31 SAR. Sandy 1 Flt was to proceed direct to the area and assume on scene command. Sandy 3 Flt were to rendezvous with the Jolly Green Flt and proceed to initial holding pt. I advised the initial holding pt to be in the high ground area of 110/105/99 tacan read out.
2. Enroute Sandy 1 requested 2 Flts of F-4's with BLU 52 to be upload and cockpit alert. King advised it was being done. Also enroute Sandy 1 was in contact with NAIL 15, who was present on scene command. I was advised that N-15 had a positive fix on their positions. I asked N-32 (a pave Nail) to hook up with N-15 and get zap on A&B position.
3. Air American helicopter HOTEL 70A85 were orbiting 5 miles west of the SAR area (DELTA 47). They repeatedly requested the UTM coordinates so they could make a pick up attempt. I told them about the intelligence briefed high threat AAA in the area and advised them to hold west of Rt. 23 until I assumed on scene command. NAIL 15 advised likewise. At approximately 1115 Sandy 1 Flt crossed over D-47 at 11,000 and descended into the SAR area. I instructed Sandy 2 to follow me down. I rendezvous with N-15 after a delay caused by poor visibility due to the haze at 6-7,000 level. He pointed out a ground reference and stated their position relative to it. I understood and descended lower to start a round vector pattern overhead. I had voice contact with both A&B. However I asked A to remain silent because I had very good voice with B and desired to work with him first. His first direction was that he could hear me but didn't know where I was. I then told him I was making a pass from South to North and to tell me when I passed abeam of him. This attempt resulted in me being east of him. I then made a pass from North to South for another identification. I had to break off this pass because Sandy 2 told me I was taking ground fire from 12 o'clock. I then turned left and asked NAIL-15 to come down to pick me up and then lead me in on a low altitude pass over their position for an identification. I attempted to tell him my location with respect to the river but my directions were not very good. While I assumed he was coming down to my altitude 2,500 indicated (about 1500 AGL) I made another round pass from Northwest to Southeast. I was told B could hear me to the North coming his way. I continued and as I was looking out over the nose I felt a solid jolt on the very front of the engine and saw a bright orange flash surrounded the engine momentarily. The engine immediately started running rough and to vibrate with white smoke coming from the stacks. I checked my engine gauge unit and it showed all steady at normal (oil, press and temp and fuel press). I vered to the left and pulled all my stores off, outboard and inboard. I was on main internal because during my let down into the area my Rt. stub went dry and I switched to main internal. After I pulled my load off I was told by N-31 and Sandy 2 to turn South heading 180 OSDS

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GROUP 3

upgraded at 12 year interval;
Not automatically declassified.

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DOC 66⁵

decided that the engine was going to fail and I was leading for immediate bail out. I pulled back the prop from 2600 to around 2400 and continued to gradually climb. I looked at my gage unit again at the suggestion of Sandy 2 and saw that the oil presser was dead at zero. Temperature was ok and fuel press was normal. I relayed this information to Sandy 2 and N-32. They then vectored me to a heading of Southeast 150 degree for immediate bailout. It across Rt 23 to the west. About 15 seconds after the oil press dropped to zero the engine wound down and stopped. I hastily rechecked fuel selector mixture and prop and then started to work the prop and throttle to attempt to catch it again. At this time I was gliding at 120 knots toward bail out area that had been picked out. Altitude when engine quit and glide started was 4,000 indicated. The plane was controlable and I stayed with it until I was sure I was in the area I wanted. The engine started firing again briefly but I could not sustain it with prop and throttle.

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5. At about 1000' AGL (2000 ind) I pulled the extraction handle at the advisory of both N-32 and Sandy 2. The canopy went, rocket fired and I was clear of the aircraft. My helmet flew off (chin strap fastened and mask on) and I saw it float away. My chute popped and I hug steady with oscillation. I checked it and it was full with no fouls. I was in the air approximately 30 seconds and then prepared for a tree entry. I closed my legs and shielded my face with my arms. I went thru the leaves and didn't hit any branches. My chute caught securely and I had suspended in the clear about 30 ^{feet} ~~degrees~~ off the ground. 295

6. I got out my radio and told Sandy 2 I was ok and in a tree. He told me to switch to DELTA. We did and then the Air American HOTEL-70 and H-34 helicopter came into view and hovered over me. The canopy would allow the horse collar to descend to me so I told them I was going to lower myself to the ground with the tree lowering device. I set it up and started down but the tape got doubled up and stopped. I worked it free and started down again and it fouled again I cleared it and made it to the ground and unstrapped. I went to a clear area and they lowered the horse collar. I got it on and was hoisted up. Mission over.

Michael Foss

M. FASS, Capt. USAF
Sandy 01

L. C. Smith

L. SMITH, 1Lt. USAF
Sandy 02

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GROUP 3
Declassify on: 12 years after date of release
K-WG-36-H-1
Jan 72
Not to be released without authority
56 SOW

~~SECRET~~

DOC 66⁶

STATEMENT

18 March 72

SUBJECT: Sandy 03, 04 (SAR Report Mail 31 AEB)

1. Sandy 03/04 (Lt Herklotz, Lt Pribe) launched immediately following sandy 01/02 at 1025L and proceeded south to meet the Jolly Greens. Since Sandy 3's tacan was out sandy 4 lead. We were advised by sandy 01 to hold in the karst North west of Saravane so we proceeded to that area. Since sandy 4's tacan was working only intermittently we had not yet found the Jollys when sandy 01 was hit and bailed out. We headed north to the area of the catcher's mit but sandy 2 had not passed the exact location where sandy 01 had bailed out. We arrived at the catcher's mit at approximately 1130L having been delayed in finding the area because of haze and tacan difficulties. Finally we found the "H" in the river and followed the river west at 5000 ft. till we found the "catcher's mit" by this time sandy 01 had been picked up by Hotel 70 and sandy 2 was orbiting overhead at 12000 waiting for us.

2. Sandy 2 briefed me on the area and I took flight lead again. During sandy 2's briefing a fast mover flight with Blu 52 (Red Roll) arrived on scene and I advised sandy 2 to have the on scene FAC put the gas down in the area of the survivors immediately. The survivors were reporting much ground movement in their area and 31A had already killed one nva who was about to discover him. The Blu 52 was put in while sandy 2 briefed me on the local area and I took on scene command. I instructed sandys 2 and 4 that they would have to handle many of the radio calls since my UHF, VHF and FM transmissions were barely readable due to static. I descended to about 5000 ft. and moved East about 3 miles to an area south east of the thumb in the catcher's mit to search for the survivors. Nail 52 was over head and advised that the survivors were east of a road running from the thumb south. He also advised that there were 2 other pave nails available so I instructed them to begin putting in strikes on the main road running North-South through the fingers to the "catchers mit" and anywhere to the north of the river. I requested 2 flight of fast mover ordnance every 20 minutes.

3. I then began to talk to the survivors but my transmissions were unreadable so nail 52 relayed them sandy 4 then took over talking to the survivors (in order to better locate them) while I attempted to mark AAA gun positions. Since entering the area ground fire has been intense with tracers coming from all directions from south around to north east and with air bursts at our altitude.

GROUP-3

Downgraded at 12 year interval;
Not automatically declassified.

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K-WG-DM-K
Jan-Mar 72
SOW 95

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DOC

667

4. I advised king that we would need replacements at 1330 and he advised that sandy 05/06 were on their way. Sandy 4 continued to talk to the survivors and make lower and lower passes over the Area to locate the survivors. I marked guns when I spotted with wp rockets advised nail 52 to strike them. we determined that the survivors were east of the road coming out to the thumb and I requested nail 52 to put strikes all along the road as I had marked several guns along that road.

5. At approximately 1325 sandy 05/06 entered the general area and I marked our position with a M-47 smoke bomb west of the road coming out of the thumb. I then briefed sandy 5 on the location of the survivors and AAA and gave him on scene command.

6. I then tried to contact sandy 4 but he has lost his ability to transmit and was striking guns along the road running out of the thumb. While attempting to join on his wing to determine his problems I felt a blast which shook the whole aircraft. Later on landing the crew chief advised that I had taken several hits in the armor plates but otherwise the A/C was ok. Sandy 3/4 departed the area and RTB'd to NKP and I lead sandy 4 in for a radio out approach.

Robert J Herklotz

R. Herklotz, 1Lt, USAF
Sandy 03

Glen C. Priebe

G. Priebe, 1Lt, USAF
Sandy 04

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year interval;
Not automatically declassified.

IH-95-GW-K
Jan - Mar 72
SOW

S T A T E M E N T

18 March 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 5 and 6 (Nail 31 SAR)

1. Sandy 5 and 6 were launched from Da Nang to the catchers mitt in support of Nail 31 SAR, at 0145Z.
2. Sandy 5 and 6 arrived on scene, and were briefed by Sandy 03 on the situation. Sandy 5 and 6 located Nail 31A and showed his location to Nail 52. While searching for Nail 31B Sandy 5's airplane was shot.
3. Sandy 5 and 6 RTB'd channel 89, landing at 0745Z.

DONALD P. MILNER, Maj, USAF
Sandy 05

Donald E. Morse
DONALD E. MORSE, Captain, USAF
Sandy 06

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DOC 669

S T A T E M E N T

18 March 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 09 and 10 (Nail 31A/B SAR)

1. Sandys 09 and 10 took off at 1330 on 18 March and proceeded to the area of Delta 47. Sandy 05, on scene commander, had radio contact with both survivors and was taking heavy AAA, up to 57mm. Nail 31A was reported to be in good shape and the owner of an AK 47; 31B was reported to have hurt both his ankles, and therefore would probably need a para jumper. Contact had not been made with B on D freq. We received a full briefing on their survival gear which was pretty standard. With Sandy 09 and 10 still about 30 min. from the SAR area; Sandy 09 took over OSC at about 1430. The Nail over head gave us a general briefing on defences and survivors locations. Sandy 09 went into the area at about 6500 feet with Sandy 10 trail at 8500 feet. As AAA came up from every possible location. Sandy 09 and 10 in coordination with Nail 21 and later Nail or directed fastmover "smart" ordnance on them at the same time Sandy 09 and 10 worked an electronic then a visual search to pin point the survivors. "A" position was pretty well pinpointed because he was able to vector Sandy 09 over his position. Two way communications with "B" was very poor, Sandy 09/10 could hear him but he couldn't hear us we later learned that he could not receive on Delta freq. Although "B" position was not pinpointed we knew his approximate position due to bailout heading and ADF cuts. We were forced to put ELU 52 on several gun positions which were very close to the survivors positions. The survivors reported no ill effects from the BLU 52 but the guns did slow down. Nail 33 was putting in many sets of fast mover air of all types along route 23 and to the north of the survivors. Nail 01 cut the ford in the "catcher's mit" thumb and to the north of the survivors above the "Y". We directed a flight of F-4 CBU 42 across some active 12.7 and ZPU pits about 150 meters north of "A"'s position. Nail 01 was shown the survivors positions when he arrived on scene, he used his smart bird to relay this information in the form of Loran time delays. At about 1545 most of the heavy AAA had quieted down and Sandy 09 moved down to 4500' with Sandy 10 at 6,500' to troll for 12.7 and ZPU in the area. We found several north of "A" about 150 meters, several south east of "A" about 100 to 150 meters and at least one south and west of "B". Sandy 10 saw a ZPU gun pit firing at Sandy 09 and marked it with a WP rocket. Sandy 09 and 10 then expended their LAU-3 rockets on this ZPU pit, silencing it. It became obvious at this time that Sandy 09/10 would not have gas enough to kill all these guns and make the pick-up. We reminded King of our 1630 bingo. Since Sandys 11/12 only had about 45 min. more gas than 09/10. We decided to make Smoke 43/44 O.S.C. since they had fuel until after dark. The Smoke birds were brought in and briefed, Sandys 09/10 put the rest of their ordnance on 12.7 and ZPU positions north and southeast of "A"'s position and RTB'ed. Sandys 09/10 landed at 1740.

John Lackey

J. LACKEY, Captain, USAF
Sandy 09

~~SECRET~~

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
JH-95-04-21
JEW-081
AOS 95

S T A T E M E N T

18 March 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 11 and 12 (SAR for Nail 31A/B)

1. On 18 March 72 Sandy 11/12 launched at 0730z and proceeded toward the SAR scene. Sandy 9/10 were on scene, as well as Smoke 43/44, and we were directed by King to rendezvous with the Jolly Green flight and assume escort. We remained on escort while Sandy 9/10 located hostile AAA activity and coordinated with the Nail FACs on scene for fast-mover ordnance. Sandy 9/10 departed the area at approximately 0900z and on-scene command was passed to Smoke 43 who continued to direct ordnance on hostile ground fire. At 1000z Smoke 43 called us into the area to aid in locating ground fire, and Sandy 13/14 were enroute to assume the Jolly Green escort. Between 1000z and 1030z very little resistance was encountered and Smoke 43 decided to attempt a last light effort. Communication with Nail 31A was very good, but 31B was unable to receive. Sandy 13/14 escorted the Jolly Green to the final holding point, approximately 6 miles southeast of the survivors, and as they arrived, Smoke 43 had all SAR forces come up VHF and gave a thorough briefing on the execution of the pickup. It was getting dark very quickly and the smoke and haze made the visibility very low as the execution began. Sandy 11/12 rejoined with the Jolly Greens and led from the final holding point to the survivors. I knew the Jolly would have difficulty keeping me in sight, so I expended white phosphorous rockets on the ingress route. The Jolly reported having them in sight and was heading directly toward Nail 31A's position. At the time I passed over the survivor's position I was at approximately 500's AGL with the Jolly and Sandy escorts directly behind. As I started to pull up to start a daisy chain around the Jolly, enemy AAA (both 23 and 37MM) came up off my left wing tip and directly behind me. Smoke 43 and Sandy 12 were in position to suppress the ground fire and the Jolly immediately turned to the egress heading. Darkness and low visibility prevented another attempt and all SAR forces exited the area.

2. (Note: Though we never had visual contact with either survivor, Nail 31A's position was exactly pinpointed, as he reported seeing the Jolly Green directly overhead. One point which I believe should be covered with the Jolly Green crews is their capability to descend rapidly from the final holding point. I believe I overestimated their capability, as they were still at approximately 2000-3000's as they arrived over the survivor, even though all SAR forces were thoroughly briefed on the necessity to run in as low as possible).

George E. Throckmorton
G. THROCKMORTON, Capt, USAF
Sandy 11

Lance L. Smith
L. SMITH, Lt, USAF
Sandy 12

IH-56-DW-K
Jan - Mar 72 vol 2
S6 SOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~S T A T E M E N T

18 March 1972

SUBJECT: Smoke 43 and 44 (SAR Report Nail 31 A & B)

1. At 1250L, Smoke 43 flight launched to the SAR with an M-47-only ordnance load (CBU-30 was not loaded due to the time required and the immediate requirement for Smoke). Approximately 50NM out, Smoke 43's prop control linkage broke, and I RTBed for a quick repair. At 1400L, 43 relaunched, with fuel tanks refilled. Smoke 44 had proceeded on into the area and was holding on scene with Sandy 9 and 10. Smoke 43 flight held high while the Sandys and Nail 01 destroyed gun positions near the survivor. Smoke 43 was asked by Sandy 9 to coordinate ordnance with King, and I did so, working with Nail 01 and Nail 33 and monitoring the fastmover strikes used to cut Rte 23 and to strike gun positions. I assisted Nail 33 in killing one 37mm which had fired at one of his strike flights.

2. Sandy 9 brought Smoke 43 flight down over the survivors and pointed out their positions. He then passed on-scene command to Smoke 43. Sandy 9 and 10 then RTB'd for fuel, delivering their CBU-25 on enemy gunners just north of the survivors as they exited. I decided to attempt a last -light pickup if I could get sufficient fastmover ordnance and if two more Sandys were available to assist Sandys 11 and 12, who were holding with the Jollys. Smoke 44, having been airborne over one hour longer than 43, had to RTB. He delivered his M-47s along the portion of Rte 23 next to the survivors, and his ordnance created secondary fires and explosions which lasted for almost two hours.

3. 1800L was selected as the execution time, and Nail 33 continued to direct fastmover strikes on gun positions. Nail 25 (Paymail) arrived, and Smoke 43 briefed the pickup on VHF. The most difficult aspect was that the Jolly would have to make a very steep descent some two to three miles out from the survivor and make his final run-in on the deck. Only in this way could the Jolly be screened from the large 37mm guns located beyond the survivors. Nail 31 Bravo was not talking on the radio, but I felt that we could make a pickup on Alpha and that Bravo, hearing the effort, would again transmit. Although Bravo's receiver appeared to be inoperative, I was willing to attempt his rescue too provided he popped a smoke or vectored the Jolly visually.

4. Smoke 43 sent Nail 25 out to lead the Jollys and Sandy 13 flight into the final holding point. While Sandy 11 marked the IP point, I FAC'd in a last BLU-52 strike just northwest of the survivors, and Gunfighter 24 and 25 made two excellent 20 meter passes. Our execution was delayed some 20 minutes due to the haze and approaching darkness. When Jolly 32 began his run, he failed to descend to the deck, and was thus exposed to enemy guns. At about the two mile point, the Jolly was above 3000 feet, and a 37mm opened up on him. At the same time, other guns outside the immediate area of the survivor began attacking the Sandys. The 37mm was within 100-150 meters of Nail 31 Alpha, and Smoke 43 rolled in on that gun as the Jolly exited. After that pass, darkness forced us to withdraw, and on-scene command was passed to Nail 51, who was inbound.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~IH-95-GW-K
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOC 66 ^{#10}

5. I told Nail 31 Alpha that we would see him in the morning, and asked him to listen for other gun positions RTB was normal. Bravo was still not talking on the radio.

Edward R. Jayne -

E. R. JAYNE III, Capt, USAF
Smoke 43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOC 66¹⁵

STATEMENT

18 March 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 13 and 14 (SAR for Nail 31 A/B)

1. On 18 Mar 72 Sandy 13/A launched @ 1010Z with maden kits on board both aircraft. Enroute S 13/14 was advised that as soon as they arrived a pick up was going to be attempted. Smoke 43 was OSC W/S 11/12 in the area also. The plan was that Smoke 43 would lay a smoke screen to the northwest and run the Jolly in from the southeast with S 11/12/13/14 covering the Jolly. We rendezvoused with the Jolly's @ 0605L and arrived at the scene at 0620L. Immediately the plan was executed because of darknees and the poor visibility. Smoke 43 laid the smoke to the west. Sandy 11 dropped a M-47 for the Jolly to start his run in. Jolly began his run in and didn't get low enough. S 11 led the Jolly in and the rest of us covered the Jolly. I was at the Jolly's 8 o'clock and a 23mm opened up directly underneath the Jolly. I rolled in W/20mm and 1 LAU-3 pod. It was dark now and two 37mm opened up on S 11 who was north of the survivors. The Jolly did a 360 climbing and went north of the survivors on the way back south the 37mm's opened up on the Jolly and created more confusion. Everyone exited the area and RTB'ed leaving Nail FAC's on scene all night.

2. (Note: 1. When delivering ordnance at night your biggest threat is running into the ground.
2. Even if the Jolly had been on the treetops he would have still flown over that 23mm.

C. BLEVINS JR, 1Lt, USAF
Sandy 13

Richard E. Brown

R. BROWN, 1Lt, USAF
Sandy 14

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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K-WG-56-HI

S T A T E M E N T

19 March 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 9 and 10 (SAR Report Nail 31A/B)

1. Sandy 9 flight was briefed at 0605 because of an abort in Sandy 3 flight. We were airborne at 0740 after awaiting the munitions for Sandy 10.
2. While enroute to the SAR area Sandy 1 flight was on scene and Sandy 5 flight was being briefed to take over on scene command.
3. We proceeded to the briefed initial holding point and rendezvoused with Jolly Green 32 and 30. Jolly Green 61 and Smoke 44 and 45 were also at the holding point at our arrival of 0815.
4. At 0850 Sandy 1 gave on scene command to Sandy 5. A pick up attempt was being considered by Sandy 5 and he called for Smoke 44 flight to proceed to the survivors location. At 0900 Sandy 5 called for Sandy 9 flight to enter the area for a briefing prior to the pick-up.
5. At 0910 Sandy 9 flight arrived in the sar area and received a briefing on the planned pick up attempt from Sandy 5. Sandy 7 flight was enroute from CH77 to the Jolly Green holding point. At 0920 Sandy 5 passed on scene command to Sandy 9 and 5 exited the area.
6. Sandy 7 had rendezvoused with Jolly 32 flight. Smoke 44 was having difficulty finding the area and Sandy 10 attempted to direct them in using ADF. Sandy 5 had reported no ground fire so Sandy 9 decided to try a pick-up as soon as the Smoke flight was in the area.
7. I continued making passes over the area both to pinpoint the survivors and to draw gun fire if any was in the vicinity.
8. After 10 minutes a 12.7 began firing from about 1km north of the survivors. After this 23mm, 37mm, and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) began firing at various times. All guns were north or west of the survivors and firing at a low angle.
9. Smoke 44 was unable to locate the SAR area and returned to CH89.
10. The survivors had heard nothing in their immediate vicinity and Sandy 9 decided to try a pick up. The plan was to bring the Jolly in from the southeast on the tree tops to avoid the guns to the north and west. Sandy 9 and 10 would use their CEU 22 for an "L" shaped smoke screen west and north of the survivors, since Alpha and Bravo were very close and Bravo's radio was not as good as Alphas it was decided to pick Bravo up first. Nail 52 was to help escort Sandy 7/8 and the Jollys to the survivors and Sandy 10 was to drop an M-47 at the turn point about 5nm SE of the survivors. From that point on the Jolly Green would be at tree top elevation. The entire operation was to be conducted on guard channel because of Bravo's radio.

IH-95-OW-K

10. Sandy 9 briefed everyone on VHF 123.1 and was then informed ^{7:10A 74 HAN} _{Jan 95}

MOS 95

Jolly 32 and 30 had gone to the tanker and Jolly 61 would be the low Jolly. Nail 01 had "fast mover" ordnance ready to put into this possible high threat areas.

11. At about 1010 Sandy 9 executed the pick up attempt. Sandy 10 had heading indicator problems and so Sandy 9 flew to the turn point and dropped the M-47.


12. During the pick-up 23mm, 37mm and RPG's were fired at the Sandys in the "Daisy Chain". The sandys expended almost all of their ordnance to the north and west of the survivors. Prior to exiting the area Sandy 9 shot "Willy Pete" rockete just west of the egress path. Nail 01 was unable to get the ordnance expected, so during the actual pickup the 4 Sandys were the only cover available.

13. At 1025 the Jolly began exiting the area with Sandy 9 giving directions until the Jolly could safely climb.

14. Sandy 7 and 8 escorted Jolly 61 flight with both survivors to CH 89. Sandy 9 was critically low on fuel and landed at LS-39 while Sandy 10 returned to CH 89. The SAR was terminated at 1030. Sandy 9 landed at LS-39 at 1110 and Sandy 10 landed at CH 89 at 1120. Sandy 9 took off again at 1150 and landed at CH 89 at 1220.



R. SMITH, Capt, USAF
Sandy 9



R. SCOTT, 1/Lt, USAF
Sandy 10

STATEMENT

19 March 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 01 and 02 (Mail 31A/B)

At 0445 19 Mar Sandys 01 and 02 took off for a first light pick-up attempt. We were in the Delta 47 area at 0540 having received a briefing from King and the on-scene Nail. The AAA had been quiet all night and the Spector on-scene had reported only one mover. Sandy 01 took 0. S.C. at about 0600 after watching Nail 25 put in fast ordnance north west of the survivors. Nail 49 was working the route 23 area to the west and north of the survivors. One 23 or 37mm gun came up about 400 meters east of "A" position and the Nail put smart ordnance on it. We worked another flight of fast CBU 42 on the 12.7 and ZPU pits north of "A" and ask for CBU 52 to put on there. We had good contact with 31A on Delta frog and 31B on guard. "A" informed us that he wanted a PJ because he didn't think he would be able to move to the penetrator. "B" had been doing allot of moving during the night and was now a lot closer to A but we could not pinpoint his exact position. With the big guns quiet Sandy 01 moved down to 3500-4000 ft. to work on the 12.7 etc. BLU 52 was put on a 12.7 location very close to "B"'s position. Sandy 01 used 20mm and 7.62mm to try to get the 12.7's to come up and RF rockets to help Nail 01 and the fast movers put their ordnance down. At about 0700 Sandy 01 took a 12.7 round in a LAU 3 pod. We exited the area for a check over, after jettisoning both LAU 3 pods and a close look over by Sandy 02, we moved back into the area. Because of the haze and high threat area we lost about 15 min. getting the check over and back into the area. At 0845 King called to say that we wouldn't have any Jollys for the next 55 min. due to air-refueling cycling. We reconfirmed our 0900 bingo with King. We continued our work on the 12.7 positions and at about 0815 brought Sandys 05/06 in and started briefing them on the defences remaining and a pick-up plan. The plan that Sandy 01 formulated and briefed to Sandy 05 was to run the Jollys in from southeast to northwest, and to screen off the small road to the west and the guns 200 to 300 meters north with M-47 smoke. After this briefing Sandy 01 and 02 used the rest of their ordnance with 31A's help to take out several of the inclose 12.7, ZPU pits, automatic weapons and small arms in the area. Sandy 01 gave 050 to Sandy 05 at about 0855 and 01 and 02 RTB'd.

LOOKING BACK:

1. Sandys must learn to pick-up and use the Nails (PAC) knowledge of the area defences before going into a threat area. They know most of the high threat areas well and can kill known guns in the area once they know the general area of the survivor's.
2. A-1s who are added assets (Smoke, strike, etc.) must use their holding time to get their "SITREP" together. Figure time and distance to reference points, an accurate Bingo and in general be part of the team. You are in a ring side seat, until you are called and may be able to see something that the G.S.C. or King is over looking.
3. We learned that intel. did not know D-47 was that well defended. In the future it might be well to start "trolling" from a reasonable altitude. The Nails recommend 2,500' with the nose moving. Of course you may have to drop the altitude down to get guns to come up but that is better than blundering in at low altitude in the beginning.

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S T A T E M E N T

19 March 1972

SUBJECT: Sandy 5 and 6 (SAR for Nail 31A/B)

1. The following is a sequence of events of Sandy 5 (Capt Lumbeth), and Sandy 6 (Lt Horklotz) for the Nail 31 A/B SAR. All events were on the 19th of Mar, and all times are Thailand local.

2. At 0608, we launched to replace Sandy 3 and 4 who air aborted. We rendezvoused with the Jolly Greens and Smoke 44 flight at approx. 0650. After about 10 minutes of holding, Sandy 1 reported taking a hit and was departing the area. I immediately started heading for the SAR area. Before arriving, Sandy 1 determined that the hit was minor, and he remained on scene commander. We went into the survivors area with Sandy 1, and started getting a briefing from Sandy 1 on the survivor's position and area defenses.

3. The immediate area of the survivors and the planned run in headings for the Jollys had been pretty well sanitized with the exception of 3 ZPU pits just south of the survivors. Sandy 1 and 2 worked over the pits prior to turning over on scene commander to me.

4. Shortly after becoming CSC, I contacted Nail 31 A and had him vector me directly over him. I attempted contact with Bravo, but his receiver was apparently not working well. I flew over his estimated position and Bravo came up on the radio and told me to gun my engine if I was hearing him. This I did, and Bravo told me he understood I was hearing him. A few seconds later he came up on Guard channel, and could receive me well. I had him vector me over his position, and found that Bravo was much closer to Alpha than I had thought.

5. I had not received any ground fire up to this time in the area of the survivors. The guns to the northeast were not going to affect the Jolly Green. I received no ground fire trolling over the area at lower and lower altitudes. I decided that it was time to organize the pickup. I sent Sandy 6 out to the Jolly's and requested Smoke 44 flight, and Sandy 7 and 10 to come into the area for a briefing. At this time Sandy 6 was getting very low on fuel, and it was apparent that he would not be able to stay on station long enough for the pickup. Sandy 7 and 9 were only ten minutes out, so I started briefing Sandy 9 on the situation. Smoke 44 flight was having difficulty finding the survivor's area, and did not reach the scene prior to my leaving. As soon as Sandy 7 flight arrived on scene with the Jollys, I told Sandy 6 to RTB. After briefing Sandy 9 on the survivor's position and Bravo's difficulties with Delta Channel, I expended my ordnance on the ZPU pits south of the survivors, thus assuring those guns would no longer be a threat.

6. Throughout the entire time that I was CSC, I had the Nails directing fast mover ordnance to the north of the survivors, which seemed to be where most of the big guns were located.

7. I did not have enough fuel to stay around for the pickup attempt. I turned on scene command over to Sandy 9 and RTB'ed. I landed at 1010.

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MOS 95

STATEMENT

Sandy 07 and 08 launched from Danang AB RVN at 0135Z on 19 March 1972. We arrived at the holding point assigned prior to takeoff at approximately 0250Z and rendezvoused with Jolly Green 32 and 30 and 61 and 57 who were already in the area. Sandy 09 and 10 were making final plans for a pickup attempt with Sandy 09 being on-scene commander. Sandy 09 had the position of both survivors narrowed down to approximately 100 meter circles and began to brief the plan of attack. However, Sandy 09 and 10 began taking more ground fire and the pickup was postponed for the time being. At this point Sandy 07 experienced temporary transmitter failure and signalled Sandy 08 to take command of the flight. After 10 minutes Sandy 07's radio problems corrected themselves and he resumed command of the flight. Shortly thereafter Jolly Green 32 and 30 left for the tanker to refuel. Sandy 09 stated that he was ready for the pickup attempt and started the briefing. King interrupted and said that there was only one Jolly Green ready to go and advised Sandy 09 to wait for Jolly Green 32 and 30 to return before starting the pickup. Jolly Green 61 quickly confirmed that he had Jolly Green 57 with him as high bird and the briefing continued. Nail 52 arrived just before execution and led Jolly Green 61 and Sandy 07 and 08 into the area. Sandy 10 was supposed to drop an armed M-47 as an IP with three 2.75"wp rockets marking ingress heading but his compass system failed and Sandy 09 put in the appropriate marks instead of Sandy 10. Nail 52 spotted the IP mark at the 8 o'clock position and directed Jolly Green 61 and Sandy 07 and 08 to it. With the IP and the marking rockets in sight, Jolly Green 61 proceeded into the area with Sandy 07 and 08 escorting. Sandy 09 directed Jolly Green 61 to slow down and for Nail 31B, the survivor, to pop his smoke. There was some confusion at this point as to which was which survivor but Jolly Green 61 spotted some smoke and went into a hover over it. Sandy 09 and 10 with Sandy 07 and 08 formed a "daisy chain" around Jolly Green 61 and expended CBU-25, 2.75" rockets, 20mm and 7.62mm cannon fire in a 360 degree circle around the helicopter. Most of the ordnance was directed to the north and west which was the direction from which the airbursts and tracers of the AAA was originating. Also observed airbursts which were later thought to be rocket propelled grenades going off below us at approximately 500 to 600 feet. No fire reported coming from inside the "daisy chain" at the helicopter. With one man on board Jolly Green 61 was directed to the other man's position by Sandy 07 and 09 and Sandy 09 instructed the second survivor to pop his smoke. Jolly Green 61 spotted the smoke and completed the pickup. All four A-1's expended along the egress route and Sandy 07 assumed on-scene command when Sandy 09 had to RTB due to low fuel. Egress was successful and Sandy 07 and 08 RTB'd to Ch 89 due to the possibility of battle damage. Battle damage results were negative and Sandy 07 and 08 returned to Danang at 1300Z on 19 March 1972.

Robert F. Burke

ROBERT F. BURKE, Capt, USAF
Sandy 07

Sandy 07 - Captain Robert F. Burke
Sandy 08 - First Lieutenant Byron E. Hukee

[REDACTED]

2. As was already known, the gas masks used by the helicopter crews hampered communications.

3. The downwash caused by the HH-53 constitutes a real hazard to the survivor on the ground and precautions should be continually emphasized.

Nail 31

When the crew of Nail 31, an OV-10 from NKP, bailed out over the Ho Chi Minh Trail on 18 March 1972, they landed in one of the most hostile environments yet faced by rescue forces. The crew was both skillful and fortunate in avoiding capture or death during the period immediately following their bailout. The pilot, Lieutenant David G. Breskman, had traveled about 600 meters from his parachute and was sitting by a tree when he detected an enemy soldier with an automatic weapon coming toward him. ^{83/}

I took out my gun as he approached and sat very still hoping he would veer away from my position. . . . He kept coming toward me; I remained motionless. He looked in my direction a number of times but apparently didn't see me. He was within 10 feet of my position when I wheeled around and fired four times. . . . I cautiously moved over to him and took his MK-47. There was a lot of groundfire at this time and my shots apparently didn't attract attention.

The SAR force had meanwhile arrived, and the groundfire that Lieutenant Breskman heard was most likely that which was directed at Sandy 01 who was trolling the area looking for enemy positions. On one of his passes Sandy 01 was hit and downed by AAA. The pilot bailed out and was immediately picked up by an Air America helicopter. Before he was shot down, Sandy 01 had pinpointed the location of Captain Steven L. Boretsky, the weapons

[REDACTED]

systems officer of Nail 31. However, a problem was to develop in that Captain Boretsky was having trouble with his radio and, since he was forced to keep moving away from gun positions, his exact location would not again be known until the next day. With SAR operations cancelled for the day due to heavy groundfire, the night was spent in trying to neutralize the enemy positions which, with his location unknown, placed Captain Boretsky in a hazardous situation.

For 24 hours, airstrikes were used to soften up the area sufficiently to enable a rescue attempt to take place the following day. Special ordnance contributed significantly toward protecting the survivors through the night. The support provided for the Nail 31 SAR operation was indicated by Captain Randy Jayne, OSC during the first afternoon: ^{B4/}

While I was OSC, I got not only all the available ordnance in the area, I also got the special ordnance that had been requested earlier in the day. Had we not put that ordnance in--I'm talking here primarily of area denial type weapons--if we hadn't put that ordnance in, if it hadn't been available, those men would not have made it through the night. They were right in the middle of an enemy storage area, bivouac area, an extremely large concentration of enemy troops and AAA.

As the time for another rescue attempt approached, a wall of smoke was laid by A-1 "Smoke" aircraft from IJCP. Enemy resistance had been subdued by the strike aircraft, some of which carried laser-guided bombs and, when the order to execute was given, the Jolly met with little groundfire enroute to the survivors. There was some confusion as to where

[REDACTED]

Captain Boretsky was, but both crewmembers were found and safely evacuated. The accuracy and the amount of firepower delivered against the enemy during the Nail 31 operation caused Colonel Cecil N. Muirhead, Jr., Commander, 3ARRGp, to speculate that, "toward the end of this operation, the enemy probably wished we would just finish and leave him alone."^{85/}

The SAR conference at which Colonel Muirhead made his remarks was held at NKP on 26 March 1972. Those in attendance included the crew of Nail 31 and most of the participants in the SAR operation. The purpose of the conference was to determine what lessons could be learned from the Nail 31 experience. The minutes of the conference included the following:^{86/}

1. It was suggested that in extremely high-threat areas, the Nail FACs maintain longer OSC prior to allowing the Sandys in the area for in-close trolling. The Sandys should insure that they are briefed thoroughly by the on-scene FAC and by King.

2. It was emphasized that the cycling and scheduling of Pave Nail assets represented a critical problem due to aircraft availability and maintenance. It was suggested that Joker coordinate closely with the 56SOW to insure the best utilization of the assets.

3. It was noted that first light planning apparently created a considerable fast-mover overload on tanker resources. This resulted from holding certain night flights over until first light without expending them. Like other assets, tankers were limited, and strike flights should expend as soon as possible to avoid excessive refuelings and exhaustion of tanker resources.

rescue efforts

every Service helicopters have rescue efforts in less than 24 civilian aircraft and her two in the Pacific Ocean off the California coast in the rescue of an Icelandic pilot after he had fallen about 120 miles from the nearest area of the largest glacier in

civilian transport DeHavilland had been forced to turn around because of fuel forced the aircraft to ditch while the ARRS crews watched

adron at Hamilton AFB, Calif., were on an emergency and would be HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant and

Pacific, Inc., Agena, Guam, and their position to a Coast Guard cutter that the DeHavilland was consid-

er aircraft, and 17 minutes later, the rescuees were lighted the area, and 10 minutes later they were safely ditched into the ocean.

On the survivors below, the rescuees were waiting, refueled in, and then the survivors in a raft,

the crash site, and Sgt. Terry assisted the survivors climb on the helicopter. The first survivor was safely ditched. Rotor wash from the survivor on the raft about one mile. However, MSgt. Donald W. Bond survivor was successfully

ton AFB Hospital, where they

of Reykjavik, Iceland, was ex- miles due east of Keflavik. The rescuee when the rope he was

Helicopter medevacs

Panamanian women

HOWARD AFB, Cal. -- An HH-53 Jolly Green Giant helicopter was sent on medical evacuation missions to recover two Panamanian women.

The Det. 2, 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing helicopter went first to Taboga Island to pick up 90-year-old Maria Carrera, who was suffering from a serious kidney infection.

She was returned to Paitilla Airport and taken by ambulance to Santa Tomas Hospital.

From Paitilla, the helicopter crew, which was commanded by Capt. John G. Woelfel, flew to the town of Patino on the gulf of San Miguel, about 85 miles southeast of Panama City.

There they picked up 20-year-old Elena Moria, who was suffering severe abdominal pains. She also was returned to Paitilla Airport and taken to Santa Tomas Hospital.

Third try success as ARRS crews save FACs down in Laos

TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN -- Air Force fighter bombers and gunships teamed with HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giants in the rescue of two downed forward air controllers (FACs) in an enemy-occupied area of the southern panhandle of Laos.

Rescue operations actually started 24 hours earlier when 1st Lt. David G. Breskman and Capt. Stephen L. Boretsky were forced to eject from their OV-10 after it was hit by communist ground fire. They landed between two major arteries of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the midst of numerous communist antiaircraft artillery locations.

The rescue was initiated almost immediately as the pilot of an accompanying OV-10 called in the enemy hit and reported seeing two good parachutes.

Conditions for the next 24 hours were spelled out as the rescue forces arrived on scene less than an hour after the call. An A-1 Skyraider escorting the rescue helicopters and flying over the area to locate the downed fliers, was hit by antiaircraft fire and downed. The pilot bailed out and was picked up by a helicopter in the area near the two downed OV-10 crewmen.

When rescue forces from the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron began taking intense antiaircraft and small arms fire tactical aircraft were called in to strike the enemy positions.

After an eight-hour exchange of fire, two A-1s led in an HH-53 piloted by Lt. Col. John Morse, into the area. The first attempt failed as the rescue forces encountered intense fire.

Throughout the night, Lieutenant Breskman, assisted the fighter bombers and gunships by directing their fire on enemy positions near him.

Meanwhile, the pair kept in hiding.

He and Captain Boretsky heard ordnance landing around them throughout the night. The captain even felt shrapnel falling from the air bursts.

Shortly after dawn, the rescue aircraft made a second attempt to pick up the pilots. Again, they ran into heavy ground fire, and the rescue team again was forced to withdraw.

Twenty-four hours after the FACs ejected, an HH-53 commanded by Maj. Kenneth E. Ernest, made a third and successful attempt.

With most small arms fire quieted, the HH-53 skimmed in low and fast to evade antiaircraft artillery, and hovered over the lieutenant. A1C Craig A. Marsh, pararescueman, rode the jungle penetrator down through the 150-foot trees, helped the lieutenant on board, and the two were hoisted to safety.

Then the helicopter maneuvered into position over Captain Boretsky and Airman Marsh repeated his descent, effecting the successful recovery of the captain.

Enemy fire trailed the helicopter as it raced out of danger.

Other crewmembers on the HH-53 were Capt. Mark L. Schibler, copilot; Sgt. Wolfgang Benninghagen, flight engineer; SSgt. Michael L. Walker, pararescueman; and SSgt. Kelly K. Shuman, combat photographer.

Date	Mission #	Sortie Length	Total A-1 Time	Total Combat Time	Aircraft
19 Mar	55	3.4	231.3	165.0	A-1H 139-608

Date	Mission #	Sortie Length	Total A-1 Time	Total Combat Time	Aircraft
19 Mar	56	2.2	233.5	167.2	A-1H 139-608

My first journal entry for 19 Mar 1972

SHOT DOWN 18 MAR

[Sandy 08 as wingman] SAR for Nail 31A B... Major, Major [Maj Don Milner] and wingman came to DaNang to help in SAR [on the 18th of March]... they launched and shortly thereafter we [on the ground at DaNang] got word that Faas had been shot down [in A-1J 142-063]... We then got launched [on the 19th]... Enroute we heard that Major, Major had taken a bad hit [in A-1H 134-551] (see pictures)... Burkner started to have radio problems so I had the lead for a while... Eventually, Burkner got the lead back and we executed... My first real taste of ground fire and my first look at air bursts (37mm or 57mm)... Well planned SAR by Ron Smith... The airbursts never stopped, even during the pickup... On egress, I lost Burkner and joined up on another A-1 flight... [Glen] Priebe never found the SAR in the Catcher's Mitt... RTB to NKP with a fly-by with King and the Jollys...SS

SAR Map

Sandy Lineup for Nail 31 SAR

Images from the Nail 31 SAR

Official Nail 31 SAR patch

This was a real shoot-em-up where we lost an A-1 and had at least three others damaged, one of them severely. Mike Faas was shot down on Day 1 of the SAR (18 Mar) while flying A-1J 142-063, and Major Don Milner took serious damage (flying A-1H 134-551) when a large caliber AAA round went through his right flap, then exploded, peppering the aft fuselage with shrapnel. This also occurred on Day 1 of the SAR effort. The weather in the SAR area was hazy with scattered to broken clouds at about 5,000 feet on both days.

Nail 31 was an OV-10 from the 23rd TASS (Tactical Air Support Squadron) with two pilots on board and was down near Delta 47 (also known as "The Catcher's Mitt") in Steel Tiger (southern Laos). Both pilots were relatively unhurt, but the enemy was deployed in force around them. Several attempts at a pickup on the 18th of March were repulsed by the enemy. Somewhere down there was a "nine-level" gunner who had three aircraft to his credit on the first day. In all, 15 A-1 sorties were flown in direct support of this SAR on this first day. During this first day, one of the survivors, Nail 31A, shot and killed an NVA soldier and took away his AK-47 assault rifle. ~~I HAVE THIS SLIDE!~~

Bob and I launched from DaNang as Sandy 07 and 08 at around 0830 local time on Day 2. The remainder of the SAR forces came out of NKP. We proceeded to the SAR area and rejoined with the Jolly Green helicopters who were holding near the area. I briefly had the lead of our two ship as Burkner was sorting out some radio difficulties. He took the lead back a short time later.

Captain Ron Smith was on scene commander as Sandy low when we arrived, with 1st Lt Randy Scott as his wingman. We were shown the survivors' locations and were soon ready to execute the rescue plan. Since there was at least one active large caliber AAA piece in the area that was not silenced, we were all briefed to stay low and watch for AAA.

At the execute command, the Jolly Green raced in on the tree tops escorted by our four A-1s. We had both survivors location's pinpointed so we were able to put down continuous protective cover around the hovering helicopter. I distinctly remember seeing the airbursts from the AAA guns exploding above us. This was the first time that I had seen AAA this large. It got my attention. Although the Jolly Green remained in the area for the pickup no more than five minutes, it seemed like it was much longer. The rescue occurred just after 1000 local time.

Following the pickup of the second survivor, the Jolly Green egressed to the southwest escorted by all four Sandys. At this time, I was heading about east, so I had to bend it around tight to get out of there and provide some sort of support. Once clear of the area, the Jolly Green began a climb to a higher altitude. I remember having a very difficult time keeping up since I had bled off what little airspeed I had during the hard turn to follow the Jolly Green. I lost sight of my flight lead (a definite no-no), but was able to keep sight of the Jolly Green. Soon enough I saw a flight of A-1s that I joined on. Turned out to be another flight, but we soon got it sorted out and I got back with Burkner.

The SAR force returned to NKP and we joined two A-1s on each wing of the King HC-130 who had the Jolly Greens in tow. We brought the whole gaggle for a 500 foot low pass down the runway at NKP then split up into our respective formations for landing. Nice little get together after landing, but Burkner and I had to turn the aircraft and get ready to head back to DaNang to finish our Sandy rotation. Fourteen A-1 sorties were flown in direct support of this SAR on Day 2.

Other accounts of this SAR are provided by Randy Jayne, Ron Smith and Buck Buchanan

My second journal entry for 19 Mar 1972

[Sandy 08 as wingman] RTB [sortie] to DaNang... (tried the northern [Ho Chi Minh trail] crossing, but north of Saravane (Toumlan Valley) Burker started taking fire... airbursts just behind him... He was straight and level at the time and I told him to, "Break right!" which he promptly did... Celebrated at DaNang that night.

We launched back to DaNang later in the day so as to resume our Sandy alert commitment. The weather was still good with haze down below us. We cruised at about 10,000 feet enroute to DaNang.

We chose trail crossing points based on the latest reported enemy activity. The Nail 31 SAR area was north of our crossing point, but close enough to our crossing point to have enemy troops who were on the move and ready to fire at anything that came within their area. The Catcher's Mitt area was hit hard with airstrikes after the SAR to try and catch enemy forces that congregated on the area including an Arc Light on that section of the trail.

As we crossed this section of the trail, I saw airbursts directly behind Burker and yelled at him to, "Break right." We both did so and I guarantee you we were moving around a lot more the rest of the way. It would have been extremely hard to explain how and why we got hit crossing where we did. There were a lot more forces on the alert due to the SAR than we had anticipated.

We landed at DaNang and re-cocked the aircraft to resume our Sandy alert status.

Date	Mission #	Sortie Length	Total A-1 Time	Total Combat Time	Aircraft
20 Mar	57	3.5	237.0	170.7	A-1H 139-608

Captain Randy Jayne's recollection of the Nail 31 SAR.

The day the Nail [31] went down, I was on the schedule for a normal Barrel Roll close air support strike mission, with 56th SOW Commander Col. Jack Robinson as my wingman. When the SAR kicked off, we were re-roled as the SMOKE flight, with wall to wall M-47 WP bombs. Col R was quite excited, because even though he was a highly decorated Korean fighter pilot, he had never flown on a SAR (not having ever checked out as a Sandy).

While we were briefing, Mike Faas was shot down, then picked up, and Don Morse [Milner] had his MAJOR battle damage. Our own pucker factor, then, was higher than I think it had ever been before, at least for me. The next memorable (but trivial) event occurred on level-off at 12,000 feet in our flight of two. When I reached to pull the prop level back from 2800 rpm to cruise setting, I discovered that the linkage had broken and the lever simply flopped back and forth in my hand. Because four Sandys were on scene, and because we had no way of knowing how timely the need for smoke might be, I sent Smoke 45 on to the scene, and I rtb'd to NKP. I landed, shut down, and watched as the crew chief spent all of four or five minutes removing a panel, locating a missing cotter pin, re-pinning the linkage, and giving me a thumbs up. At the same time, the guys topped off my main fuselage fuel tank (the only one I had used at that point).

I arrived on scene, then, some 45-50 minutes behind my wingman, and held and listened while the Sandys (who were they?) worked the scene. All of us had this really uncomfortable feeling. We could not see the infamous gun, he would not shoot, and yet he had hit three and brought down two airplanes already. At some point about three hours into this, the Sandys bingoed out. The next Sandys arrived around 1700, and for some reason, passed on-scene command to me, since I was the Sandy lead who had been there all afternoon, albeit flying with the Smoke call sign.

At this point in the story, my blood pressure started to rise, for reasons which will become clear. Col Robinson and I, talked to the two survivors (one of whom was Dave Breskman, and I forget the pilot's name [Steve Boretzky]), tried to carefully check out a South to North run-in path, "trolling" at a couple of hundred feet and looking closely for any signs of a gun emplacement or even small arms fire. Everything was quiet, and I talked to the lead Jolly, a great aviator whom I had flown two SAR's with previously. He was headed back out to the safe orbit-escorted by the two Sandies with us-- to refuel, and we agreed to conduct a classic run-in at absolute treetop level, complete with smoke, for a last-light pickup attempt. We were reasonably sure, based on the survivors' good sense of direction, that the big gun was indeed on the other (North) side of their position. We agreed that a treetop hover should keep the Jolly terrain-masked from the gunner's depressed line of sight.

Great plan, great team, time to execute. Col. R. dropped his smoke first, and put it absolutely exactly on the mark, making it very easy for me to follow suit. The Jolly started

the run-in as briefed, escorted by the two Sandys, while we two set up a tight orbit and looked all around for the gun. It was near dusk, and at the point that the HH-53 was about 8000 feet out, surrounded by the smoke, I realized that something was very wrong. Instead of flying at an altitude which caused the rotor wash to beat down the tops of the trees, the Jolly was moving along at at least 150-200 feet above the tops of the trees. Both I and the Sandys were literally yelling at the Jolly, but to no effect. As the first survivor called out a tally ho at about 400 yards, and with me in a painfully good position to watch, the obvious occurred.

The North Vietnamese 37mm gunner, clearly amazed at this 60,000 pound shooting gallery target moving along at all of 30 knots, opened fire. As all of us who have climbed all over a 37mm gun know, the clip has a 6-8 shot capacity. I actually watched the large tracers come so close to the helicopter that from my vantage point, it appeared that a round or two literally passed through the rotor's circular path! In one of my best personal miracles, I watched the gunner-who had proven he could hit three aircraft moving much faster than this Jolly-MISS! The HH-53 immediately aborted out to the South, ending our attempt. With no smoke, limited daylight, and an intense anger at the "airmanship" we had witnessed, we started to take everyone home.

As we did, both Col Robinson-who was at this point below bingo, having been airborne almost an hour longer than me-and the on-scene OV-10 Nail both said that they thought they could pinpoint the gun, since unlike me, they had been looking from the East or West, and had a better perspective. After a quick discussion, both the Nail and Smoke 45 rtb'd for fuel, and I made one last effort to accomplish something in what had been an otherwise fruitless day. Two Navy A-7's, who had orbited above us and "watched the whole thing", indicated that they had four MK-82's each, and would like to jettison them on what we thought to be the gun emplacement. Since I had no forward firing ordnance at all except 20mm, I made one LONG RANGE straffing "run" ("tracer lob" would be a more accurate descriptor-If Nail 31, Mike Faas, and Don Morse had been unlucky, I had no desire to get too close to this guy!).

As sometimes happens, one Spad driver and two Navy SLUF guys reached unanimous agreement as to where we thought the gun was. The lead A-7 rolled in during what I remember as "deep dusk", and dropped about 200 feet to one side of the target. I gave his wingman my best Hurlburt imitation of a real FAC, right down to the color commentary, and Two proceeded to drop an absolute shack, with multiple small secondary explosions. At that point, out of gas, ideas, ordnance, and patience, we all went home.

My next two recollections are diametrically different. First, I stormed TUOC in search of the Jolly pilot, to politely ask what on earth had gone on. I was met by the Ops Officer from the Jollies, in tow with the lead Jolly pilot, whom I had thought was "flying" the pickup attempt. The two of them told me what had happened, and if Joseph Heller had heard this story four decades ago, there would have been another chapter in "Catch 22". It seems that while on the refueling boom, the lead Jolly (Captain) was "told" by the backup

Jolly, that they would switch positions, so that the number two Jolly could make the pickup. That second pilot was in fact a senior officer who had for a few months been in the unit at NKP, but had been reassigned to a desk in Saigon at 7th AF. It was this individual-sitting alert that day to get his monthly sortie and combat pay-- who "flew" the almost fatal "high altitude profile", with no notification to the on-scene commander (me) about having ordered the switch. Let me end this part of the story by noting the all of this was not in any way lost on Colonel Jack Robinson, and the Jolly pilot, although not part of our Special Ops chain of command, never flew a combat mission again, at least not anywhere near the "real war".

Now for the good news story-A first light launch of a new Sandy and Jolly team arrived on scene, recreated the night before's run-in tactic exactly, picked up both guys, and come back to the ramp at NKP for a huge celebration. I won't try to re-tell the part about Dave Bretsky bringing back an AK-47-that is a "whole different war story".

From my standpoint, Nail 31 had a lot of lessons learned-the Nails knew their survival stuff, and it saved them. I reinforced something a lot of Sandies had learned before-just because you launch as a Smoke bird, keep your head in the game, because somebody may put you in charge. Third, even a well conceived plan can come apart quickly due to lack of attention to detail or execution. But, finally, even royal screwups benefit from big doses of luck on occasion-on that afternoon, we really did!

Randy Jayne

Captain Ron Smith's recollection of the Nail 31 SAR.

I remember watching the first 4 ship to launch on the SAR on the 18th. About 2 hours later we heard that Mike Faas had been shot down and picked up by Air America. We went through one group of Sandies after another that day with most of the work being to find the area, and suppress the numerous guns. The weather was terrible. It was the dry season, and the fields were being burned. You could hardly see your wingman much less other aircraft.

I was scheduled about mid day of the following day (19th Mar) with Scotty as my wingman. We had gone through so many people he was the only wingman with crew rest. This would not have been an issue except he had just returned from leave, and had not flown in over 2 weeks. We launched as Sandy low and wingman replacements. It was difficult to find the location in the smoke, but thanks to great briefings from the previous Sandys we found the area.

Two Nails in the middle of the Catchers Mitt. Most ground fire at that time came from north of the Catchers Mitt river. The survivors had not heard anything from their immediate vicinity for some time. I remember that one of them had an NVA walk up to

where he was hiding, and he shot him. After getting his AK47, he crawled to a new hiding place. I decided it was now or never, and called for a smoke flight to seal off the river with the intent of bringing the Jolly and Sandy escort in from the south. The smoke flight never made it -- they got lost and God only knows where they went.

We were flying no higher than 100ft to avoid the guns to the north. At one point a 14.5 got my range and sent a long salvo in front of me. That low and already in a turn away, there was little I could do. His last round went through the nose cone of my right LAU 3 pod. He must have run out of his clip. We were also worried about fuel, and so I forgot I was on my tip tank. Suddenly everything got real quiet as my engine quit at 100ft. It really is amazing how training comes back quickly. I went to the boost pump, switched tanks, and turned the pump back on -- the engine immediately started. The survivors were really worried about that as they told me later -- they thought another person on the ground would delay their pickup.

After briefing the pick up team on my intentions, and getting ready to execute, King advised that there was only 1 Jolly in the area, and they recommended we wait. Another bad idea from King. The execution called for Scotty and me to head south while the Jolly and Sandy escort headed east. The plan was to rendezvous at a point marked by a WP bomb. There was the only thing you could hope to see. We arrived at the designated point, I dropped the bomb, and within 3 minutes the Jolly had it in sight. We then executed a daisy chain around the jolly on the reverse heading from the one we had gone out on. We had to use heading and time to get back since visibility was so bad. We picked up the survivor closest to the river first, and then the other. We got fire from north of the river as expected, but were all flying really low so they could not hit us.

The egress was also low until we got back to the original rendezvous point. On the way out we marked the way for the Jolly by launching WP rockets every time we passed the Jolly. After reaching the rendezvous point we climbed and headed west with no opposition. Although the mission only lasted a little more than 3 hours, I did not have enough gas to make it all the way back to NKP. Had to land at a Lima sight (can't remember the name, but we had several Raven FACs there).

Ron Smith

Captain Buck Buchanan's recollection of the Nail 31 SAR.


I had asked Buck via email whether John Lackey was awarded the Air Force Cross for his role in the Nail 31 SAR.

By-----John did get the AF Cross for his role as Sandy One on the first lighter on the second day. IMHO it was, in a big part, because of John that both survivors were rescued later that day. I was scheduling the first day and we were running short of qualified aircrews and it didn't help that everyone was getting the shit shot out of them. Lackey had already flown his champagne flight 3 or 4 days before the SAR. He was hanging around TUOC and came over to the ops. shop and asked how scheduling was going. I told him that I was starting to get strapped for crews if the SAR turned into a first lighter. He said you are really short of Sandy Leads --huh? I said yup and he said what about me? I said you have already flown your sawadee flight and turned in your stuff. He said shit I can go get the xx##** stuff! So I said I would check with the powers that be (I think it was Jim Harding) and if it was okay; then I would put him up as Sandy Low for the first lighter. I asked who do you want on your wing? He answered what are you doing? I think I gulped and said I'd be glad to be on your wing.

You probably know the rest of the story. I have the narrative from my Silver Star that I could dig out but here is an over-view. We took off in the dark and climbed on top of a, as I remember, 1500 to 2000 ft overcast. We got to the mitt and John talked to the Nail on scene and found out that both A and B were okay and that A was the proud new owner of an AK. John said to me okay 2 it might be a little cramped down there so you stay up here and I will go down and take a look. I thought right then, holy shit, this guy has big balls. He wasn't down there very long and the survivors started telling him they could hear bad guys shooting at him. He then figured he had better get me down there to check his six. I came down and he trolled around and I watched and called out ground fire. There were some guys with RPG's that were harassing him and they were relatively easy for us to take care of. John knew where a 37mm was that was too close for fast-movers and he and the survivors thought there was another gun around close. Although we weren't shot at by the 37mm (we were pretty low) John put ordinance on it while I covered him. While we were doing that a 14.5mm came up on John and I just happened to be in position to get a good sighting of it and was able to put two LAU-3 pods of HEI on it. In retrospect that was a little over-kill but there was a lot of adrenalin flowing at the time. By this time we were both getting close to bingo and we thought we had the close guns killed so, as I recall, we put some strafe down around the survivors (B thought he could hear some bad guys close by.) [I was just interrupted by an ambulance call for 2 1/2 hrs.] If I recall correctly we were replaced by Ron Smith, but it seems like there were another pair of Sandys in there between Ron and us.

I flew with John some during check-out and always had a lot of respect for him as a pilot and a man. One thing is certain, you always knew where you stood with him.

-Buck

	
The welcoming committee for Nail 31A/B	1Lt Dave Breskman and Capt Steve Boretzky
	
(Lto R) 1Lt Byron Hukee, Capt Ron Smith, Capt Bob Burke	
	
Capt Ron Smith, Sandy low for the rescue	There are no small parts, only small players

Robert LaPointe

From: <King2721@aol.com>
To: <rlapointe@gci.net>
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 1999 2:29 PM
Subject: Photo #1

Bob,

If that's an AK-47 in the survivor's hand, I would guess that he is one of the Nail 31 crew rescued March 19, 1972 from the Catcher's Mitt (Steel Tiger). His name is 1Lt David Breskman and he obtained the AK after winning a gun duel with an NVA soldier shortly after he was shot down on March 18, 1972.

Dave Preston

1 Lt David Breskman
March 19, 1972

AK-47 in hand

~~SECRET~~

xv

Mar

- | | | |
|----|-----|--|
| 15 | (U) | The 56th Special Operations Wing assumed Command and Control of the 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadron. |
| 16 | (S) | An A-1J of the 1st Special Operations Squadron made a gear-up landing at NKP due to battle damage. The aircraft received major damage. |
| 18 | (S) | Nail 31, an OV-10A of the 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadron was shot down in Steel Tiger. |
| 18 | (S) | Sandy 01, an A-1J of the 1st Special Operations Squadron was shot down in Steel Tiger while searching for survivors of Nail 31. The pilot was rescued by an Air America helicopter which was on the scene. |
| 19 | (S) | Search and Recovery mission for Nail 31 was successful. |
| 27 | (C) | Search and Recovery mission for Jolly Green 61 downed in Northern Cambodia unsuccessful. No objective. |
| 31 | (C) | Search and Recovery mission for Spectre 22 shot down near the Bolovens Plateau in Laos successful. The entire crew of fifteen was recovered. |

~~SECRET~~

56 SOW
Jan - Mar 72 vol. 1
K-WG-56-HI



Photos

These pages are under constant revision--Last Update: Monday, March 27, 2000

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Photos posed on this web page are provide for review and identification purposes. I am looking for details as who is depicted, what mission it represents, and any other details you may feel important. Use of these photos for any purpose other than review and comment is prohibited without the express approval of this author. New photos will be posted periodically. **Be advised that depending on your modem rate, these photos may take quite a while to load.** Click on the animated gif to forward e-mail comments to me.




Photo #1

Photo taken by Robert LaPointe

Sometime in 1971-72

Anyone know which SAR this is?

Can anyone identify who is in the photo?

SURVIVOR.
JPA



1930 20 PASSED DAAR & FORSTAT TO JOKER

2460 20 LOG CLOSED / GETTING SHORTER !!

18 MAR 72

0001 20 LOG OPENED / 37 & WAKE UP !!

0502 20 FORSTAT TO COMM SQ / 2(S) MSG IN 13-C (171305Z) (171135Z)
1(C) 170930Z

0630 R SGT DAVISON OFF DUTY, SGT PUSICE ON DUTY

0650 PZ PASSED DIR TO JOKER //

0658 R 36617 CH89 TO CH93 // JACK + TP

0842 PZ NOTIFIED THAT J6-63 LOW OIL PRESSURE & NOSE GEAR
BOX. // OPS OFFICER // MAINT //

0845 PZ ADVISED J6-63 LANDED AT LONG, NA, THA. + J661
COMING BACK TO CH89 TO PICK UP 3 NOSE GEAR
BOX COOLER BELTS & MAINT PERSONNEL. // ADVISED
MAINT + OPS OFFICER.

0846 PZ JOKER WAS ADVISED OF SITUATION. //

0904 PZ HIGH OIL TEMP IN NOSE GEAR BOX + ENG + BRN.
OIL COOLER BELTS //

0913 R J661 CH89 AWAITING MAINT PERSONNEL + PARTS

0935 PZ J6-617 CH89 // JACK + TP

MISSION OPENED

1013 PZ TOUC ADVISED NAIL 31 & CATCHER MIT,
2 CHUTES SITED BY NAILS, HAVE VOICE QSO AFB

1015 PZ JACK ADVISED LAUNCH HOME ALERT J6-33 + 32.

1016 PZ AIRCRAFT DOWN IN P47 AREA. (KING-21)

1018 PZ NEW PSN. 102/75/99

1020 PZ J6-32 CH89 // JACK + TP

1023 PZ J6-53 CH89 // JACK + TP

1025 PZ SANDY ONE ON SEEN COMMANDER.

1032 PZ SANDY 1 DOWN AT ENM, RT23 (CATCHER MIT)

1036 PZ J6-56 + 57 CH89 // JACK + TP

1019 PZ JACK ADV. LAUNCH 56 + 57. // CRAW + OPS.

1045 PZ SANDY 1 ON BOARD H-70 (AIR AMERICAN)