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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 56TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96310



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

CC


28 March 1972

SUBJECT: SAR Conference

Meeting was on 26 Mar

TO: 3ARRG/Col Muirhead

1. Attached are the notes from the SAR Conference held at NKP on 26 March 1972. This is the compilation of all comments made at the conference.
2. We are also attaching a list of all attendees should you decide to distribute these notes.
3. Appreciated your being on hand. We always feel that we gain a lot from these discussions. We stand available to hold any future conferences whenever they appear to be necessary. Let us know if we can be of any further assistance.
4. This letter becomes unclassified when attachments are removed.


JACK A. ROBINSON, Colonel, USAF
Commander

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1. Conference Notes
2. List of Attendees

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SAR CONFERENCE NOTES

26 March 1972

1. Review of events on NAIL 31 and discussion of possible changes and problem areas:

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AME
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a. Suggest that in extremely high-threat areas, NAILS maintain longer OSC prior to allowing SANDYs in area for in-close trolling. SANDYs should insure that they are briefed thoroughly by the on-scene FAC and by KING.

SANDY
b. Insure the closest possible safe holding point for the JOLLYs to reduce time required in preparation for a run-in and pickup attempt. This should be passed by the SANDY OSC to KING.

TREC &
AME
c. Cycling of JOLLYs should be timed so that one flight is on the tanker at the point where the second flight has sufficient fuel to attempt a pickup.

JK
d. Cycling and scheduling of PAVENAIL assets represents a critical problem due to aircraft availability and maintenance. Recommend that JOKER coordinate closely with 56SOW to insure best utilization of these assets.

NAIL
e. First-light planning apparently created a considerable fast-mover overload on tanker resources. This resulted from holding certain night flights over until first light without expending them. Like other assets, tankers are limited, and strike flights should be utilized as expeditiously as possible to prevent exhaustion of tanker resources.

NAIL
f. Special ordnance requests at any stage of the SAR places constraints on overall availability of strike flights. Any ordering done by KING or ABCCC should be limited to certain ordnance until OSC aircraft relay any special requirements. A mix of BLUE-52, CBU-42, CBU-49 and CDU-14 can be useful in area denial operations. CBU-52 and LGBS are extremely effective in destroying AAA weapons. The OSC should make an assessment of the situation as rapidly as possible to insure special ordnance is available when it is needed.

NAIL
g. The value of using CBU-49 during the actual pickup run-in was cited. The random fusing creates an effective diversion and suppression weapon.

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h. The communications difficulties associated with the JOLLY's gas masks continue to hamper pickups. Higher headquarters should be advised of this so that corrective action (redesign or development of new equipment) can be taken.

i. Change of on-scene command requires considerable time and briefing. SANDYs and NAILS should obtain as much information as possible from KING and on-scene aircraft while EN ROUTE.

j. The advantages and disadvantages of QRF versus holding on tankers was discussed for fast-movers, especially those with special ordnance loads.

2. A number of other long-term issues and plans were discussed:

a. A general analysis of the reduction in all air assets indicated that future SARs will probably not enjoy the level of air support utilized in the NAIL 31 SAR. Further reduction of A-1 airframes will place an additional burden on the NAILS in prepping an area and locating survivors. Projected A-1 assets will not provide continuous SANDY coverage.

b. Intelligence inputs can be improved at all levels. The use of RF-4 photography was explained and TFA indicated the availability of its photo file. Closer communication between 56SOW and JACK could allow RCC personnel to debrief the OSC.

c. The SANDY deployment status was discussed and it was decided to terminate the Danang FOL and return the two SANDY aircraft to stand alert at NKP. This allows more efficient utilization of scarce A-1 airframes and adequate mission and intelligence briefing of SANDY pilots.

d. The development of a multi-purpose, laser-guided CBU cannister was discussed. The applicability of this weapon for gun-killing, and the possibility of a BLU-52 application were discussed. The 23rd TASS is forwarding specific recommendations on this subject.

e. The JOLLY Limited Night Recovery System was discussed, with emphasis on the limits of the system. The difficulty of spotting the IR strobe through foliage has proved to be a major problem. Much improvement of the survivors' IR strobe is needed if it is to be effective.

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OPR

NAIL

f. Gunship SAR capabilities and limitations were discussed, and the use of SPECTRES in the NAIL 31 effort was described. Effective, safe, "close-support" utilization of the gunship requires close survivor-aircraft coordination.

+FA

g. The possibility of seeding the SAR area with COMIKes was discussed. This would aid in detecting enemy movement and evaluating the effectiveness of ordnance expended.

SANDY

h. The need for low-drag, forward-firing ordnance for the A-1 was discussed. The LAU-3 is a high drag weapon and degrades the A-1 maneuverability and fuel consumption. The SUU-23 has been requested as a replacement for the SUU-11 and LAU-3s if it can be validated for the A-1. This would also allow the SANDYs to carry two more M-47 smokes needed for marking and screening.

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SAR CONFERENCE ATTENDEES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ORG</u>
ROBINSON, JACK A.	Col	56SOW/CC
MUIRHEAD, CECIL N.	Col	3ARRG
BRANDON, CLIFFORD E.	LtCol	40ARRS
LACKEY, S.E.	Capt	1SOS
BURKE, R. F.	Capt	1SOS
PRESTON, D. J.	Capt	3ARRS
WALDREN R. J.	Capt	39ARRS
GINDOFF, A. S.	LtCol	TFA
KARDONG, G. A.	LtCol	20TASS
MORSE, D. E.	Capt	1SOS
JAYNE, E. R.	Capt	1SOS
LOWE, L. W.	LtCol	TDY from Hq PACAF
GIBSON, D. J.	Capt	23TASS
MILNER, D. P.	Maj	1SOS
WHAYLEN, D. G.	Capt	1SOS
BORETSKY, S. L.	Capt	23TASS
BRESKMAN, D. G.	1LT	23TASS
MARKLE, T. A.	Capt	23TASS
JAHNS, ROBERT L.	1Lt	23TASS
BROWN, JOHN F JR.	LtCol	56SOW/DOIN
ROYCE, WILLIAM F.	Capt	23TASS
LARUE, CHARLES T.	Capt	23TASS
MILLER, C. V.	Major	1SOS
BRESTEL, N. C.	Major	23TASS

Bravo → Nail 3
Alpha

ATCHINSON, RICHARD M.

Capt

23TASS

ANDREAE, C. T.

Major

41ARRWG

MACLEAN, L.

LtCol

23TASS

MORSE, JOHN H.

LtCol

3ARRGP

SCRIVANO, P. J.

Major

OL-B, 3ARRGP (Udorn)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 56TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96310

REPLY TO
ATTN: CC

3 March 1972

SUBJECT: Minutes of Search and Rescue (SAR) Conference - 56SOW,
27 Feb 72

TO: All Conference Attendees

1. The 56th Special Operations Wing wishes to thank each organization personally for your contribution to the SAR conference. No one underestimates the purpose and value of these conferences.
2. Future conferences may be required to further insure that our record of SAR successes continues. We solicit your additional comments and refinements on your agency's abilities in the SAR area. Feel free to contact the 56SOW at any time on these matters. We will insure that all information is passed on to 7/13AF.
3. Again, our thanks for your time and efforts.
4. This letter becomes unclassified when attachment is removed.

Jack A. Robinson
JACK A. ROBINSON, Colonel, USAF
Commander

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(S) Conference Minutes

Footnote # 90, 92

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MINUTES OF

SAR CONFERENCE

NAKHON PHANOM RTAFT

27 February 1972

Col Robinson, Commander, 56 Special Operations Wing, welcomed the working group to NKP and discussed the reasons for the meeting. The purpose of this conference was to discuss recent search and rescue missions and to review all capabilities available during a SAR.

1. Night On-Scene Command. Night on-scene command involves coordination of a number of complex operations including night search, laser/loran ordnance delivery, PAVE IMP (LNRS) night rescue operations, and gunship search and fire support tactics. The 23rd TASS PAVENAIL OV-10s, working closely with 1st SOS and the 40th ARRS night rescue JOLLY GREEN crews, are developing a comprehensive set of command procedures designed to facilitate this operation. The 23rd TASS, like their day counterparts, the A-1 SANDYS, are training a number of select crews to perform this important function.

Recommendation: The 56SOW, in conjunction with the 40ARRS, provide on-scene command briefings to SPECTRE and STINGER gunship crews who could find themselves serving as on-scene commanders for periods of time prior to arrival of the PAVENAIL.

2. Rescue Coordinating Center (RCC) Areas of Responsibility. A number of factors are influential in JRCC decisions as to which RCC (JOKER, JACK or QUEEN) should exercise control in a particular SAR. Current geographical guidelines are in certain instances unrealistic, and JRCC has for some time based its decisions on a number of factors other than geographical boundaries. It is further noted that, regardless of which RCC is in command, the deployment and utilization of HH-53 and A-1 resources should consider a number of factors besides simple co-location with the RCC. The availability of intelligence information and transverse high AAA threat areas must be carefully weighed.

Recommendation: 3rd ARRG re-evaluate the RCC areas of control and consider the route structure of Laos as a possible dividing line.

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3. RCC Communications Difficulties. The current single-orbit posture of the KING aircraft has led to communications problems between KING and QUEEN. SANDY and JOLLY forces operating out of Danang have also experienced difficulties in communicating with QUEEN. Whether the problem is a mechanical one of faulty equipment or a geographical one caused by the Monkey Mountain terrain, it could continue to present difficulties in Command/Control in the QUEEN area of responsibility.

➔ Recommendation: 3rd ARRG investigate this situation in an effort to determine the specific nature of the communication problems.

4. Forward Operating Location (FOL) Problems of Obtaining Adequate Intelligence. SANDY and JOLLY GREEN crews operating from Ubon and Danang received daily intelligence briefings from units geared almost exclusively to "fastmover" operations. As a result, inadequate information is available concerning groundfire and gun locations, trail crossing points, and the low-altitude holding points.

Recommendation: Utilization of FAC operations intelligence at Danang (COVEYS) and Ubon (RUSTICs) can in some cases fill in key information. Additionally, utilization of secure telephone can allow the SAR crews to receive information directly from 56SOW and TFA Intelligence at NKP.

5. Sector FAC Role in SAR Operations: Current utilization of the 23rd TASS PAVENAIL aircraft in the SAR mission does not remove or even lessen the requirement for expert FAC knowledge of the SAR area. For SARs outside the normal NAIL areas of operation, sector FACs (COVEYS, SUNDOGS, RAVENS, etc) will be utilized by the SAR force.

Recommendation: The 56SOW SAR briefing team insure that FAC units throughout SEA are knowledgeable concerning the SAR mission and sector FAC contributions to the search and rescue operation.

6. SAR Operations in North Vietnam. The nature of the AAA threat within NVN necessitates special precautions concerning the commitment of slowmover SAR assets. Recent search operations for aircraft downed in Route Pack I indicated excellent BLUECHIP/JRCC understanding of the threat. In these instances on 19 and 20 Feb 72, precautions were taken by the JRCC control network to minimize unnecessary exposure of SANDY and JOLLY forces to NVN AAA. One problem area did concern an excessive number of slowmover FACs operating in the high threat area. The 56SOW and KING will coordinate closely in the future to insure that the on-scene commander clears only the minimum

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number of aircraft required to perform SAR tasks into the NVN high threat area. The problem of access to various geographical areas in NVN was discussed, and Navy, 40th and 37th ARRS personnel indicated their views of the practical limits of helicopter coverage provided by their units in NVN. In each SAR, JRCC should coordinate with SANDY and JOLLY forces to utilize the most effective ingress and egress in NVN, and should select the primary helicopter force in this manner.

➤ Recommendation: Prior to committing slowmover assets into a high AAA/SAM environment, radio contact with the survivor should be established.

7. SAR-Dedicated Radio Frequencies. A discussion of primary and secondary SAR radio frequencies highlighted potential problems in monitoring and in terminology. Dual sets of UHF, VHF and FM frequencies now in existence are designed to allow simultaneous SAR operations in two areas. The current single orbit being flown by KING makes it impossible for the HC-130 to monitor both sets of frequencies. This has apparently led to confusion on the part of tactical units in RVN and Thailand as to the proper frequency to use in locating KING. In addition, terminology contradictions exist between USAF and Navy labeling of "primary" and "secondary" frequencies.

Recommendation: Multiple frequencies continue to be available as SAR-only channels. Tactical units should be briefed on all of these frequencies. KING should continue its practice of securing a discrete GCI UHF frequency and directing SAR-diverted resources to that frequency. This frees the primary SAR frequencies (282.8, 364.2) for utilization by forces operating on-scene at the time. KING-ABCCC coordination allows new assets to make rapid contact with the SAR force through ABCCC monitoring of appropriate SAR frequencies.

8. Ordnance Load Designations. SAR on-scene commanders currently request special munitions by name or codeword. Fast-movers already airborne with normal loads may be diverted to SAR. Although listing of ordnance on board for KING does consume time, it is felt that KING and on-scene commanders should know the exact composition of each load.

Recommendation: If the addition of further codewords to designate specific loads would eliminate confusion, the conference suggests that the various TFWs (8th, 366th, 432nd) devise such a code system and coordinate its implementation with the 3rd ARRG.

9. Special Ordnance Validation and Control. JOKER currently initiates action through BLUECHIP to secure validation for area denial munitions in a SAR area, and monitors ARCLIGHTS

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and other strikes to insure that these missions do not expend in the SAR area.

➤ Recommendation: JOKER expand the geographical areas involved to include potential crossing and holding points being utilized by SAR forces. Any ordnance expended in these areas should be coordinated through the on-scene commander.

10. Mode II IFF. The value of the Mode II IFF in determining SAR objective locations was briefed by MOTEL.

Recommendation: 56SOW SAR briefing teams insure that all tactical units are informed of this capability and its utility.

11. Relocation of JACK. The conference discussed the possible relocation of the Western RCC (JACK) from Udorn to NKP. It is felt that co-location with the 56SOW and TFA would greatly enhance JACK's intelligence access and control of SAR operations.

➤ Recommendation: 3rd ARRG research this move.

12. Compatibility of Coding Systems. The airborne encoding systems of PACAF, SAC and Navy aircrews are not compatible with one another. KING does carry the necessary equipment to cross-code and decode, and should be used as an intermediary when aircraft from these different commands and services are attempting to exchange coded data.

Recommendation: 7AF should consider establishing the requirement for all aircraft entering the combat area to possess identical coding systems.

13. Aircrew Strobe Lights. Improved night SAR capabilities have greatly increased the importance of the strobe light and infrared (IR) filter carried in aircrew survival gear. It has been discovered that certain of these strobes are incapable of operation in the absence of an external light source, and may either fail to work at night or become inoperative when covered by the IR shield.

➤ Recommendation: This problem should be investigated immediately by JRCC through 7AF Life Support personnel, and information should be disseminated to all SEA aircrews concerning potential strobe malfunctions.

14. Multi-Crew SAR Procedures. A 56SOW draft of changes to SAR procedures for large-crew aircraft was presented to the conference for review and comment. This draft was the result of an earlier conference held at Udorn on 15 February. All units are requested to submit comments or proposed changes to

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56SOW (Project Officer, Capt E. Randy Jayne, 2754) on or before 14 March 1972. The final draft will then be forwarded to 3rd ARRG through 7/13AF headquarters, and the changed procedures will be briefed to all multi-crew tactical units flying in SEA.

15. 7AFM 64-1. 3rd ARRG is currently revising 7AFM 64-1 on combat SAR procedures, and requested all units to provide inputs to 3rd Group prior to 12 March 1972. This revision includes discussion of the various new systems and capabilities integrated into SAR operations in the past six months.

16. SAR Procedures Briefings. The 56SOW is continuing to conduct its SAR Procedures Briefings for units throughout SEA. These briefings have been updated to include new systems and procedures, and have been given to Navy and Survival Training units, as well as PACAF and SAC combat units. Units which have not received this briefing this fiscal quarter should contact 56SOW (DOT) to set up visit dates.

17. Future SAR Conferences. The SAR Conference has proven to be a valuable coordination and learning device for all forces and units involved in the SAR mission. 56SOW will continue to call for such conferences on a quarterly basis, or more frequently should events indicate a need for consultation or dissemination of new information. We urge all units to keep the 56SOW informed of any and all developments which warrant the attention of the SAR team.

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COLONEL JACK A. ROBINSON	56 SOW/CC	2010/2015	NKP
COLONEL JAMES M. CAMPBELL	7ACCS/HB	2773	UDN
LT COL STEPHEN F. TRUE	DEP DO/DDO	3225	7/13AF
LT COL W. BARBENA	1SOS/CC	2754	NKP
CAPT ROBERT J. HAGER	39ARRS/DO	3855	CRB
MAJOR EARL H. HEAL	3ARRGP/OEA	951-3997	SONTRA
MAJOR WILLIAM P. RUSSELL	620TCS/DOT	951-2501	SONTRA
LT COL PHILLIP GONZALES	40ARRS/CC	3823	NKP
LT COL CLIFFORD BRANDON	40ARRS/CC	3823	NKP
MAJOR JAMES W. GRASSMAN	Director of Tng/DOTT	2520	UBON
MAJOR JOHN W. HUDSON	16SOS/AC Gunship	2720	UBON
CAPT ROGER T. COLGROVE	37ARRS/OPS/JOLLY Pilot.	3175	DANANG
LTJG ROBERT T. SCHAUM	HC-7/Co-Pilot/Big Mother		Yankee Station
LT DENNIS P. DILLEY	HC-7/Pilot/Big Mother		Carrier/Red Crown
LT RON ABLER	HC-7/AC/Big Mother		Det 10, FPO 36601
LT COL ARTHUR E. HERMAN	56 SOW/DOV	2123	NKP
LT COL ROBERT W. MACDUFF	CH, CMD POST	2737	NKP
LT COL WILLIAM E. FLANIGIN	TUCC/DOH	3385	NKP
MAJOR VICTOR G. STEPHANS	CONTROLLER/JROC	3210	ESN

LT COL EDWARD W. HAMILTON	3ARRGP/DO	3385	NKP
MAJOR PETER J. SCRIVANO	OLB 3ARRGP/AC Controller	2206	UDN
LT COL JOHN T. BROUND	Dir of INTEL/DOIN	3210	NKP
LT DALE R. HOLMLUND	Pilot/Pave Nail/23TASS	3205	NKP
CAPT RICHARD M. ATCHISON	Pave Nail/Spec Proj/23TASS	3205	NKP
CAPT DANIEL J. GIBSON	Nail SAR Co-Ord/23TASS	3205	NKP
MAJOR JAMES A. HALVORSON	Pave Nail/Ops	3205	NKP
MAJOR HERBERT J. TROTZKY	56 SOW/DOO	3000	NKP
CAPT BUFORD L. LOWE	56 SOW/DOO	3000	NKP
1st LT JOHN G. BUSH	Pave Nail/WSO/23TASS	3205	NKP
LT COL ALBERT S. BORCHIK JR	TFA/DOO	2837	NKP
MAJOR JAMES M. DAVIS	39ARRS/DON	3855	GRB
CAPT WILLIAM C. OBERLIN	13AF/DOO	3843	Clark
CAPT JAMES MCINTYRE	40ARRS/DOV	3929	NKP
MAJOR C. V. MILLER	1SOS	2015	NKP
MAJOR D. P. MILNER	1SOS	2754	NKP
CAPT RANDY JAYNE	1SOS	2754	NKP
CAPT FRED C. BOLI	56 SOW/DOV	2123	NKP