

18 December 1971

F-4D 66-0241 555 TFS, 432 TRW, USAF, Udorn
Maj Kenneth R Johnson (POW)
1Lt Samuel R Vaughan (POW)

There had been little opportunity for air-to-air combat since the end of Rolling Thunder and the North Vietnamese MiGs had not shot down a USAF fixed-wing aircraft since 23 February 1968. Falcon 66 was one of a pair of Phantoms that was flying top cover for a helicopter that was extracting a Special Forces team from behind enemy lines in northeastern Laos. As the mission proceeded the Phantoms were attacked by MiG-21s and during the engagement Maj Johnson's aircraft was shot down by an air-to-air missile near Ban Pong Ban. The crew ejected and attempted to evade capture but were surrounded and taken prisoner by North Vietnamese troops. The pair was lucky in that they were eventually sent to the camps in North Vietnam and survived captivity. Maj Johnson was released on 14 March 1973 and 1Lt Vaughan was released in the last batch on 28 March 1973. Maj Johnson had flown 220 missions in the F-100D with the 510th TFS in 1967. He later assisted in the delivery of F-5s to the VNAF and flew a number of combat missions with them. He converted to the F-4 and was shot down on his 55th Phantom mission. 1Lt Vaughan had arrived at Udorn on 10 October and was on his 49th mission when he was shot down.

~~F-4D 65-0799 13 TFS, 432 TRW, USAF, Udorn
Maj W T Stanley (survived)
Capt L O'Brien (survived)~~

~~SECRET~~

STATEMENT

3025100: SARCO Report (Falcon 66/74/75)

1. On 18 December 1971, a SAR was declared for Falcon 66, shot down at approximately 1400 while flying MIG CAP for Hobo 40/41, escort for a DOA. Hobo 40/41 started search along with a twin Otter, call sign Arthur, in the vicinity of San Nam. No contact was made with Falcon 66. His wingman, Falcon 67, said he saw two good chutes but heard no beeper and returned to base without giving any locations. No further positive contact was made with Falcon 66 and subsequently he was reported as a POW by the NVA. If Falcon 67 had stayed on station, he could have aided the SAR effort immensely.
2. Jack launched Sandy 03/04 to search for Falcon 66 but, upon arriving in the San Nam area, Sandy 03/04 made contact with Falcon 74 who had ejected after running out of fuel searching for Falcon 66.
3. Falcon 75 also ran out of fuel while searching for Falcon 66. He last reported that he had a navigational aids failure and was heading for West Wet. He was also subsequently reported as a POW by the NVA, having actually landed in north Vietnam.
4. At 1625, 18 December 1971, Sandy 03/04 with the aid of Arthur, fixed the general location of Falcon 743 approximately 9 miles SE of San Nam. Sandy 03/04 then had to depart the SAR area and RFD due to A/C malfunction.
5. At 1638, Mail 44 also established contact with Falcon 743 and got good ADF cuts. Later, he also got good ADF cuts on Falcon 741. Numerous SAR and MIG calls made operation in the SAR area difficult.
6. At 1648, a decision was made to attempt a pickup of Falcon 741 and B. Arthur and Mail 44 reported the weather workable and negative ground fire. Mail 44 gave an accurate survivors position UN 6202. Mail 44 was also talking with Falcon 741 and B.
7. At 1750, Jolly Green 56/52 reported LS92 to proceed to the survivors position for a pickup. Sandy 01/52 were enroute to survivor's area. Weather and darkness prevented rescue.
8. At 1805, a decision was made to wait till morning for the rescue attempt. Jolly Green 56/52 and Sandy 02/51 returned to RT. Mail 44 assumed on-scene commander.
9. The decision was made to put ELJ-52 and/or CUS-14 around the survivors all night as they had reported people moving around them. The SARCO also requested continuous night coverage to include MIG CAP, COLASAL G12, and B41.
10. Contact was maintained all night between Mail aircraft and survivors. The Mail aircraft were chased out of the SAR area several times during the night.

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56 SOW

Oct - Dec 71

K-WC-56-III, causing them to jettison ordnance and fuel tanks. Hails and Pave Hails continued throughout the night as on-scene commanders.

11. At first light effort was planned and a request was placed for continued ordnance drops throughout the night using area denial munitions against the survivors and hard ordnance on known gun positions and LOC's. The Hails directed the strikes. The Jollys and Sandys were scheduled for take off to allow continuous coverage over the survivor throughout the day.

12. BLU-52 and CDU-14 were dropped around the survivor during the night. General Clay cleared the SAR forces to use area denial munitions within a 10 NM radius of the survivor.

13. The suggestion was made that when the parent organization of a downed pilot learned of an aircraft loss, they should immediately initiate a flash precedence message to the 56th SOW containing names, personal identifiers, and other pertinent information.

14. The SARCO was advised that Blue Chip needs to know the IFF/SIF Mode II settings for all aircraft involved in a SAR.

15. FPA provided a constant flow of intelligence data all night concerning traffic on the LOC's and the location and activity of MIG's. This is a very good source of supplemental intelligence information.

16. A first light SAR was launched using four Sandys and two Jolly Greens. The two Jolly Greens were held over L-32 in a safe area accompanied by two Sandys. The other two Sandys and a Pave Hail continued the search. Several times throughout the day, the SAR forces were driven from the search area by MIGs. Recommend that SAR forces be allowed to remain in the area at a low altitude during a MIG threat as they could not outrun MIG's.

17. Two flights of F-4's dropped CDU-14 around the survivors but the results are unknown. BLU-52 was also dropped near the survivor during the night. This information was not clearly understood when the first pick-up was attempted, resulting in an aborted pick-up attempt due to BLU-52 kicked up by rotor wash from the Jolly Green. While the Jolly Green crew recovered from BLU-52 and donned masks, weather closed in preventing further pick-up attempts.

18. A radio relay aircraft was launched from MCP to improve communications between the SAR forces and the SARCO.

19. Snake 44/45 flight found a way to get under clouds which were nearly on the tree tops. This information was passed on to Sandy 03/04 and they were able to locate the survivor and execute Jolly Green 55/61 for the pick-up. The survivors were then taken to Udon and the remaining SAR forces returned to MCP.

20. Hails and Pave Hails were instrumental in the SAR effort by providing continuous coverage over the survivors, directing ordnance delivery in the SAR area, aiding in locating and updating the location of the survivors,

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56 SOW

Oct - Dec 71

K-WG-56-HI

and navigation to and from the JAR area.

21. Sandys and Jolly Greens were generated as necessary with take-off times staggered from JAR to keep continuous coverage over the survivor during daylight hours.

JAMES C. HARDING, Maj, USAF
SARCO, 1st SOS

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18 DEC 71

FALCON 74 SAR

F-4D 64-0954 13 TFS, 432 TRW, USAF, Udorn
1Lt Kenneth R Wells (POW)
Maj Leland L Hildebrand (POW)

As soon as Falcon 66 was shot down the rescue task force swung into action in the hope of recovering the Phantom crew before they could be captured. A formation of Phantoms from a sister squadron at Udorn took part in the attempted rescue but two of the aircraft became casualties themselves. Nearly three hours after Falcon 66 went down Maj Stanley was heading southeast away from the area to refuel when he was attacked by a MiG and was shot down. Both crew ejected and were eventually picked up by a USAF SAR helicopter. Half an hour later another Phantom flying CAP coverage over the rescue force was also lost, the aircraft running out of fuel as it tried to reach a tanker following an

engagement with a MiG. 1Lt Wells and Maj Hildebrand ejected but were captured before they could be rescued and joined Maj Johnson and 1Lt Vaughan in captivity. Wells and Hildebrand were also sent to North Vietnam and were both released on 28 March 1973. Leland Hildebrand was on his 20th mission when he was shot down while Ken Wells was only on his 9th mission having arrived at Udorn on 9 November. Capt O'Brien survived the crash of his Phantom at Udorn on 1 February 1972.

9E
54/101
BS

ROUTINE

* UNCLASSIFIED E F T O *

021 084254

PT 00442

PTTE7YUW RUMMRSA1321 0210140-EESE--RUCTMAA.

ZNY EEEEE

R 210131Z JAN 72 ZEX

FM 3ARRGP TSN AB PVN

TO RUHHABA/41ARRWG/DO/HICKAM AFB HI

~~INFO RUCTMAA/NO ARRS/DO/SCOTT AFB IL~~

BT

UNCLAS E F T O DO

SUBJ: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT.

REF A: ARRS/CC MSG 231715Z DEC 71 (S).

THE FOLLOWING 40ARRSG/DO MSG IS QUOTED AS SUPPLEMENTAL INFO
TO REF A PARA 6 AND TO 40ARRS ARCSM 55-1 MISHAP REPORT NRR 18
DEC 71. QUOTE 1. JOLLY GREEN 62 WAS IN A 200 FOOT HOVER
APPROACHING FALCON 74 ALPHA WHEN THEY WERE HIT BY NUMEROUS
ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE. ONE OF THE ROUNDS HIT THE FUEL
LINE LEADING TO NUMBER ONE ENGINE AND THE ENGINE IMMEDIATELY
FLAMED OUT. THE PICK UP ATTEMPT WAS ADOPTED AND THE AIR-
CRAFT WAS FLOWN TO LIMA SITE 32. UNQUOTE.

BT

#1321

NNNN

ROUTINE

* UNCLASSIFIED E F T O *

~~SECRET~~

3. The Pave Nail FACs used on the mission proved that the aircraft could be a very important part of the rescue force.

4. Using the same Jolly Green crews for the continuation of the mission the next day worked very well. It was recommended that this be made a standard procedure.

Falcon 74

Due to fuel starvation, the crew of Falcon 74--an F-4D from Udorn RTAFB--was forced to eject on 18 December 1971. Both Alpha and Bravo landed safely near the NVN-Laotian border, found cover, and awaited rescue. Soon after, an Air Amerca pilot located their position and passed it on to the arriving SARTF. The Sandys reported both chutes in sight, but with approaching darkness and poor weather conditions, it was decided to await first light before attempting a rescue. The survivors were given instructions to maintain radio contact through the night and wait for the SARTF to return the following morning.^{76/}

The Sandys were on the scene early on the morning of 19 December and informed the crew that the Jolly Green was coming in to make the pick-up. Since Alpha had reported people near him, Jolly Green 62 was positioned to pick him up first. While maneuvering to pick Alpha up, the helicopter received several rounds of automatic fire in its right engine which almost resulted in loss of the aircraft. Jolly Green 62 was able to leave the area and was escorted by two A-1s to an alternate airfield. The remaining Sandy began calling in airstrikes to neutralize the area while awaiting replacement

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Jollys. Ordnance dropped included a riot control agent placed near the survivors' positions in an attempt to discourage the enemy. ^{77/}

Another flight of Jollys was scrambled from NKP with Jolly Green 55 as Jolly Low. By the time the Jollys arrived in the SAR area, the situation had become critical. The enemy had radar coverage of the area and MIGs had already forced the withdrawal of the rescue force several times. The weather was deteriorating and the survivors were reporting people moving around them. Everything considered, it appeared that if a rescue was not effected immediately, the survivors would be killed or captured. ^{78/}

A Pave Nail OV-10 found a small hole in the undercast and the OSC decided to make a pickup attempt. As Jolly Green 55 spiraled down through the hole, the AMC (in King 22) advised the crew to put on gas masks as protection against the riot control agent that had been dropped near the survivors. The gas masks hampered communication and presented a real hazard. As the Jolly Green pilot, Captain Harold O. Jones, headed for Falcon 74 Alpha, he had difficulty communicating with the survivors, other aircraft, and his own crew. As Captain Jones told it: ^{79/}

Hovering was very difficult as corrections and observations given by my crew were distorted and unintelligible with the gas masks on. Once over 74 Alpha, it took five minutes to locate him through the thick jungle canopy. . . . At one point during the hover my tail rotor got dangerously close to a tree. I was unable to understand the PJ on the aft ramp telling me not to move back. He finally ripped the mask off and used his helmet microphone to warn me. He immediately

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suffered from the effects of the [gas] we were stirring up with our rotor wash.

Falcon 74 Alpha was picked up and Jolly Green 55 started for Bravo, who reported: ^{80/}

On the first pass the Jolly had me sighted and I popped a flare, which he did not see, so I popped another one, which he saw. He flew in about 10 to 15 feet off to my right. . . . At first I started to move underneath the Jolly but the down-wash from the rotors was so strong that he blew down a couple of 100 foot trees, so I stayed out of the way in case any more trees fell.

While Jolly Green 55 was lowering the penetrator for Falcon 74 Bravo, Captain Jones noted that they were well into their reserve fuel and he requested Sandy to have a tanker ready to air refuel as soon as Bravo's pickup was completed. Bravo was soon aboard the helicopter and as it departed, Captain Jones observed that the area where 74 Alpha had been was completely obscured by clouds. Also, the hole through which Jolly Green 55 had descended was closed so an IFR climb was made through the weather. The survivors were returned to Udorn in excellent condition. ^{81/}

The following observations were made concerning the Falcon 74 operation: ^{82/}

1. The usefulness of riot control agents during a contested SAR operation was again proven. Captain Lester O'Brien, Falcon 74 Bravo, reported that during a rescue attempt earlier in the day, the gas had been stirred up causing him to cough violently. However, between his own attacks of coughing he could hear others around him suffering the same effects.

Robert LaPointe

From: "Richard M. Atchison"
To: "Robert LaPointe" <rlapointe@gci.net>
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2001 7:03 PM
Subject: Falcon 74

May be able to do better than that. I will be a member of the group that will discuss Falcon 74 and I think they are going to tape it. Will try to get a copy of the tape. Will definately write you an article as long as it does not end up being copyrighted and I can use a version of it for the FAC History. And I will be willing to send you copies of anything that the CSAR group sends to me from their historical archives which I assume may be the same sources you have. Are you a member of the CSAR education effort? I also participated in Ashcan 01, Gunfighter 84, Nail 31, the A-6, Bat 21, and a bunch of others. Tell me about your book. What is in it and how much does it cost? My address is:

R.M. Atchison
8808 Arley Drive
Springfield, VA 22153

Thanks, Rick Atchison

MAILED ALL 2 MAR

18 DEC (CONT)

20 HOLDING POINT FOR JELLIES IS 150/108 / FALCON 66
SAR OBJECTIVE / TWO CHUTES SITED NO VOICE
CONTACT AS YET

1515 20 JACK SAYS LAUNCH B/UP JGS / CREWS NX / MX - NX

1520 20 JG 52/56 HOLDING OFF CH 108

1530 20 JG 32/63 ↑ CH 89 / JACK - T.P.

1550 20 JG 52/56 HOLDING AT LIMA SITE 16 / JG 32-63 HOLDING
SOUTH OF THE FENCE. / NO WORD OF THE SURVIVERS

1610 20 NAIL 44 REPORTED BEEPER CONTACT

1615 20 SECOND SAR OBJECTIVE / FALCON 74 / 074 / 70 / 108

1625 20 JACK IS BRINGING SOUTH JGS TO CH 89 FOR STAND-BY ALERT

1625 RH JG 61 HAVE LOST ROTOR TAC AND JG 61 + 55 WILL
REMAIN AT CH 93, JACK

1655 20 NAIL 44 IN CONTACT WITH A + B MAN ON FALCON
74 / "B" man says "see" from "A" man

1700 20 JG 61-55 ↑ CH 93 FOR CH 89 / JACK - T.P. - MX

1810 20 JGS IN SAR AREA TO RTB AT THIS TIME / "A" & "B" men
ARE IN CONTACT / (2) NAIL ACFT & (1) KING ACFT TO REMAIN
IN AREA / SAR FORCES TO LAUNCH AT FIRST LIGHT.

1820 20 JG 55-61 ↓ CH 89 / JACK - T.P.

1854 BR JACK ADVISES JG 52 & 56 ETA CH 89 2025 // BR

1855 20 JG 32-63 ↓ CH 89 / JACK - T.P.

1930 20 JG 52/56 RTB TO CH 70 / JG 52 HAS OIL COOLER PROBLEM
MX & T.P. NX

1950 BR JACK ADVISES 52 & 56 1 HOUR OUT OF CH 70 // 52 MAY
HAVE POSSIBLE BATTLE DAMAGE.

2046 BR JG 52 & 56 ↓ CH 70 SAFELY // ADVSD JACK & TEECEE.

2100 BR / 001 CLOSING,

14 DEC 71

2000 BR LOG OPENED.

2032 BR KNIFE 30 ↑ CH 89 TO CH 70 TO DELIVER PARTS AND A

MEN TO REPAIR JG 52 AT 0030.

2116 BR JG 56 ↑ CH 70 TO CH 89 AT 0105 // ADVSD JACK & TEECEE.

19 DEC (CONT)

- TO JG 62 WILL LAND AT LIMA SITE 32 / JG 57 WILL PICK UP THE CREW AND RTB CH 89 / T.P. & MX / JG-60 HAS PROBE PROBLEM - WILL NOT RETRACT OR EXTEND - WILL BE REPLACED BY JG 55 / JACK-T.P.
- TO JG 61 ↑ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
- TO JG 52-30 BEING COCK FOR STAND-BY / JACK-T.P.
- FO JG 55 & 89 - JACK-TEEPEE
- TO JG 57 TO RTB CH 70 / UNABLE TO GET AR / MX
- TO JG 57 ETA TO CH 70 1100 / MX / T.P. / MAY RECIEVE AR
- TO JG 57 RECIEVED AR / ETA CH 89 1120L
- TO JG 57 ↓ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
- TO JG 32 ↓ LIMA SITE 20 WITH ROTAR TAC PROBLEM
- TO JG 32 BACK IN COMMISSION WILL REFUEL AT CH 108 AND REMAIN IN SAR AREA
- TO JG 55-61 TO RELAUNCH FROM CH 108 & TO PROCEED LIMA SITE 32
- TO JG 32 ↑ LIMA SITE 32 RTB CH 89 WITH ROTOR TAC PROBLEMS
- TO JG 63 IS AT 20 ALTERNATE WITH APP PROBLEMS AND IS UNABLE TO LAUNCH / JG-32 ETA CH 89 - 1335L
- TO JACK SAYS LAUNCH JG 30-52 / MX & CREWS
- TO JG-32 ↓ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
- TO JG-63 ↑ RTB TO CH 89 / MX-
- TO JG 30 & 52 ↑ CH 89 / JACK & TEEPEE
- TO JG 63 ↓ CH 89 / JACK & TEEPEE
- TO "A" & "B" MAN HAS BEEN PICKED UP / NO MEDICAL STATUS
- TO ~~JG 55~~ JG 55 MADE PICK UP
- TO "A" MAN HAS LAMINATION OF R LEG / "B" MAN IS OK
- TO JG 55 WILL RTB CH 70 AFTER AR
- TO JACK ADVISED US THAT JG-62 WILL BE MSN RDY IN 5 MINUTES
- TO JG-62 SHOULD BE ABN IN 30 MIN. / TANKER & SANDIES STANDING BY / PASSED BY JACK
- TO JG 30-52 ↓ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
- TO JG-62 WILL REMAIN AT LIMA SITE 32 OVERNIGHT / MX CREWS

FROM: 40th ARMSq (DO)

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report ACS: ARS V-6 Report

TO: 3 ARRCF (JRCC)

DATE: 19 December 1971

MISSION NUMBER: R-3-047

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 55

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Falcem 74A and 74B

LOCATION: 1950N 104-43E 55NM SE of Sam Hoa

SAVES: Two (2) Combat saves

1. At 0815L the back-up alert crews were notified that Jolly Green 62 had an engine shot out on an attempt to pick up Falcem 74A and was making an emergency landing at LS-32. The back-up alert was to brief and launch ASAP. After starting one aircraft, Jolly Green 55 was airborne at 0925L and joined up with Jolly Green 61. We planned to air refuel with King 23 enroute to the holding point (083°/105N/Channel 101). When King 23 aborted with an inflight fire in his air refueling system, Jolly Green 55 and 61 were diverted to LS-93 to refuel. Airborne again at 1220L the flight joined with Sandy 17 and 18 and held north of LS-32. Snake 44, on scene commander, reported there may be a break in the weather and requested the Jollys move to the forward holding point. Due to our low altitude, laser and other aids to navigation were not available but with Basic IV, marginal doppler computer and ADF cuts off SAR forces in the survivors area we were able to arrive at a point 5NM north of the survivors' area at 1355L. They were down on the North Vietnamese border southeast of Sam Hoa. The weather was completely under cast making terrain masking from high unfeasible. High had forced the withdrawal of the SAR Forces from the area several times that day. The enemy also had radar coverage of the area. Enroute to the area the survivors had reported hearing people moving around them and dogs barking. These two developments plus the rapidly deteriorating weather created concern that the survivors would be killed or captured before another pickup attempt could be made. A PAVE Nail OV-10 found a small hole in the under cast and Snake 44 decided to make a pickup attempt. On scene command was passed to Sandy 03 since Snake 44 was critically low on fuel. Jolly Green 55's SAR Bingo was 1430L which may have influenced the decision to execute at this time. As we spiraled down the hole, King 22 advised us to put on our gas masks as LS-32 had been dropped near the survivors. We broke out below the clouds over a river with mountains and karst rising on both sides with peaks rising into the clouds. From this point on, communications with the survivors, other aircraft, and Jolly 55 crew members were extremely difficult due to the design and use of the gas masks. Sandy 03 led Jolly 55 to an area that fit the description of the survivors location briefed by Snake 44. Lack of fuel had prevented Snake 44 from showing Sandy 03 the survivors position.

GROUP 7

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

[REDACTED]

We hit a hover over the spot but it was apparent we were not over the survivors. Falcon 74A had popped a smoke which we could not see, he could not hear us and the chutes we were over were flare chutes, not the survivors' canopies. There was a canister of BLU-52 about 10 meters to our left so we hovered further up the ridge and began asking Falcon 74A for short counts to try and get an ADF cut on his position. Communications were extremely garbled and broken with Falcon 74A and Sandy 03 due to terrain shielding. They could not understand my transmissions due to distortion by the gas mask. Nail 09, holding high over the scene, had been in the area earlier and told me to steer 180 degrees from my present position. We entered a box canyon with clouds obscuring the top one third of the sides. Falcon 74A reported he could now hear the helicopter and tried to vector us to his position. Time after time we ran into dead end cravasses. The known presence of ground fire made this type of maneuvering extremely hazardous but the urgency of the situation justified the risk. We found a small village which we knew was near Falcon 74A but the survivor was unable to steer us because of the confusion caused by noise of both the helicopter and A1E. We were still unable to get reliable ADF cuts. So Sandy 03 departed the immediate area and Falcon 74A was then able to steer us to his position. Hovering was very difficult as corrections and observations given by my crew were distorted and unintelligible with the gas masks on. Once over 74A, it took 5 minutes to locate him through the thick jungle canopy. The first pickup was made at 1450L after 30 minutes of searching the area. At one point during the hover my tail rotor got dangerously close to a tree. I was unable to understand the PJ on the aft ramp telling me not to move back. He finally ripped the mask off and used his helmet microphone to warn me. He immediately suffered from the effects of the BLU-52 we were stirring up with our rotor wash. As we pulled off 74A's position, 74B came up on radio and directed a left turn to his position. By now we were well into our reserve fuel so I asked Sandy 03 to request a tanker be ready to air refuel as soon as we picked up Bravo. He too was difficult to locate through the thick canopy but was hoisted up at 1510L. Rain and drizzle were moving in and my copilot had turned on the windshield wipers several times during the pickup so I could see to hover. As we departed the area we noticed Falcon 74A's position was completely obscured by clouds. The hole we had descended through was closed so we climbed out IFR. King 27 was flying east out of LS-32 to provide air refueling when Jolly Green 55 broke out on top of the clouds. The survivors were recovered to Udorn RTAFB at 1735L. Both in excellent condition. Falcon 74A had a deep laceration in his right leg.

2. Two O1-A sorties 2.5 hrs. One O1-B sortie 5.4 hrs.

3 & 4 N/A

5. a. Two pararescuemen.
b. Not deployed due to area denial ordnance
c. Two
d. Puncture type laceration of lower right leg
e. Compression bandage, pneumatic splint. Both survivors treated for shock.
f. 432nd USAF Hospital, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
g. Excellent condition - both ambulatory

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3
Intervals: 4-6
after 12 years

6. Jolly Green 02 Greenhouse (High)

10 Capt Harold G. Jones
11 Maj David G. Jones
12 SSgt Ferrol V. Lamm
13 MSgt Leon Hallwood
14 Sgt William D. Johnson
15 SSgt Kelly M. Green

Jolly Green 02 Greenhouse (High)

10 Maj Kenneth E. Jones
11 Capt Douglas G. Jones
12 Sgt Thomas E. Jones
13 TSgt Colin A. Jones
14 Sgt Paul G. Jones
15 Sgt Michael H. Jones

Harold G. Jones
HAROLD G. JONES, Captain, USAF
Aircrew Commander

GROUP 2
Discharged at 3 years
Intervals: 3 years
after 12 years

FROM: 40th ARRSq (DO)

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report ACS: ARS V-6 Report

TO: 3 ARRG (JRCO)

DATE: 19 December 1971

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-047

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MISSION OBJECTIVE: Falcorn 74A and 74B

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GROUP 7

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

[REDACTED]

We hit a hover over the spot but it was apparent we were not over the survivors. Falcon 74A had popped a smoke which we could not see, he could not hear us and the chutes we were over were flare chutes, not the survivors' canopies. There was a canister of BLU-52 about 10 meters to our left so we hovered further up the ridge and began asking Falcon 74A for short counts to try and get an ADF out on his position. Communications were extremely garbled and broken with Falcon 74A and Sandy 03 due to terrain shielding. They could not understand my transmissions due to distortion by the gas mask. Nail 09, holding high over the scene, had been in the area earlier and told me to steer 180 degrees from my present position. We entered a box canyon with clouds obscuring the top one third of the sides. Falcon 74A reported he could now hear the helicopter and tried to vector us to his position. Time after time we ran into dead end cravasses. The known presence of ground fire made this type of maneuvering extremely hazardous but the urgency of the situation justified the risk. We found a small village which we knew was near Falcon 74A but the survivor was unable to steer us because of the confusion caused by noise of both the helicopter and A1E. We were still unable to get reliable ADF cuts. So Sandy 03 departed the immediate area and Falcon 74A was then able to steer us to his position. Hovering was very difficult as corrections and observations given by my crew were distorted and unintelligible with the gas masks on. Once over 74A, it took 5 minutes to locate him through the thick jungle canopy. The first pickup was made at 1450L after 30 minutes of searching the area. At one point during the hover my tail rotor got dangerously close to a tree. I was unable to understand the PJ on the aft ramp telling me not to move back. He finally ripped the mask off and used his helmet microphone to warn me. He immediately suffered from the effects of the BLU-52 we were stirring up with our rotor wash. As we pulled off 74A's position, 74B came up on radio and directed a left turn to his position. By now we were well into our reserve fuel so I asked Sandy 03 to request a tanker be ready to air refuel as soon as we picked up Bravo. He too was difficult to locate through the thick canopy but was hoisted up at 1510L. Rain and drizzle were moving in and my copilot had turned on the windshield wipers several times during the pickup so I could see to hover. As we departed the area we noticed Falcon 74A's position was completely obscured by clouds. The hole we had descended through was closed so we climbed out IFR. King 27 was flying east out of LS-32 to provide air refueling when Jolly Green 55 broke out on top of the clouds. The survivors were recovered to Udorn RTAFB at 1735L. Both in excellent condition. Falcon 74A had a deep laceration in his right leg.

2. Two 01-A sorties 2.5 hrs. One 01-B sortie 5.4 hrs.

3 & 4 N/A

5. a. Two paratroopers.
- b. Not deployed due to area denial ordnance
- c. Two
- d. Puncture type laceration of lower right leg
- e. Compress bandage, pneumatic splint. Both survivors treated for shock.
- f. 432nd USAF Hospital, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
- g. Excellent condition - both ambulatory

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 years
Intervals: 6 months
after 12 years

6. Jolly Green 55 Greenwicks (1st)

AC Capt Harold O. Jones
 CP Maj David G. Dyer
 HM SSgt Jearold V. Bowman
 PS MSgt Leon Fullbrook
 RS Sgt William D. Robinson
 AP SSgt Kelly K. Stewart

Jolly Green 62 Greenwicks (High)

AC Maj Kenneth E. Stewart
 CP Capt Douglas G. Stewart
 HM SSgt Thomas Bryant Jr.
 PS TSgt Colin A. Jones
 RS Sgt Paul C. Perry
 AP Sgt Michael H. Pugh

Harold O. Jones
 HAROLD O. JONES, Captain, USAF
 Aircraft Commander

GROUP 2
 Examined at 3 years
 Intervals: 1 year
 after 12 years.



U.S. Air Force Photo

Captain O'Brien, second from left, and Major Stanley, enjoy cigars following their rescue. Pararescuemen on the mission were Sgt. William D. Brinson, left, and MSgt. Leon Fullwood.



U.S. Air Force Photo

..., and Major Stanley, enjoy cigars following their rescue. Pararescuemen on the ground, left, and MSgt. Leon Fullwood.

F-4 crew rescued in Laos

TAN SON NHUT -- A U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantom crew was rescued from the jungles of Laos near the North Vietnam border recently after spending nearly 23 hours on the ground.

The Phantom pilot, Maj. William T. Stanley, and the navigator, Capt. Lester O'Brien, were supporting friendly forces over Laos when they were diverted from their original mission to aid in the search and rescue of a downed F-4.

After expending ordnance on ground targets in Laos, they attempted to engage threatening MIG aircraft. No MIGs were initially engaged and as their Phantom reached "go-home fuel," they were fired upon by anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles and were attacked by MIGs. They took evasive action, which ranged over North Vietnam from high to low altitude, causing the aircraft to rapidly exhaust its fuel before either a landing base or tanker could be reached.

At approximately 5:15 p.m. the crew reported they were ejecting for lack of fuel.

Forward air controllers operating in the area established and maintained voice contact with the pair throughout the night. The rescue force of HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant helicopters, A-1 Skyraiders, tactical jet fighters, and HC-130s launched at dawn the following day.

One of the helicopters contacted the downed crew shortly after 8 a.m. but had to withdraw from the area because of bad weather and enemy ground fire. At approximately 4 p.m., after the weather began to clear and the ground fire was silenced by fighters, the Super Jolly moved in to pick up the crewmen. Both were in good condition.

milestone

-5 arrives in 'Nam

base at Travis AFB, Calif., three hours ahead of schedule.


A prime mover of U.S. retrograde equipment from the Republic of Vietnam, the 150th Galaxy left here with three U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters for the return flight home. The CH-47s are the largest single pieces of equipment to have been carried by the giant aircraft from the Republic.

In another recent flight, one C-5 carried 22 OH-6 Cayuse low observation helicopters.

With this 150th landing and departure, the Galaxy fleet operated by the U.S. Air Force has carried more than 10,700 tons of cargo and passengers in its Vietnam runs.

It has averaged about 75 tons per mission or 37.5 tons for each leg of the flight.

One hundred forty of the C-5's Vietnam runs landed here. The other 10 Galaxies flew into and out of Tan Son Nhut AB near Saigon.



[REDACTED]

DATE: 18-19 Dec 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-047-18 Dec 71

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 22, 41, 21, 23

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Falcon 74 (F-4)

LOCATION: 1952N 104.7E

SAVES: 2 Combat

Shortly after take off King 22 received a call from Cricket at 0659Z that Falcon 67 reported Falcon 66 down at 045/102/108 and two chutes were reported. A turn was made toward CH 108 at that time. Since two chutes were reported, Sandys 3 and 4 were told to head toward that position at 0705Z to begin a search of the area. At 0710Z Jolly Greens 56 and 52 were airborne as well as Sandys 1 and 2. All four aircraft were to orbit below the fence (150 degrees off 108). At 0740Z King 23 was scrambled in order to refuel JG 56/52. At 0803Z a Falcon reported smoke at 045/70/108, but later revised reconnaissance proved nothing in sight. At 0800Z Sandy 3 flight and an Air America Otter, call sign Arthur, were in the area of Falcon 66 last reported position and began searching the area.

At 0825Z the first of many MIG calls was copied, with the calls continuing through the entire flight of King 22. Nail 44 was also in the area of the search and at 0908Z reported a beeper. About that time, Falcon 74 called on 243.0 in the blind that he had lost all nav aids, was somewhere northeast of CH 108, had only 700 lbs of fuel left and needed assistance. Neither Brigham nor Invert was painting Falcon 74 and communications could not be established with him nor could his approximate position be determined by DF before he ran out of fuel and bailed out. Shortly after Falcon 74 bailout Arthur picked up their beeper, homed on it and located both survivors. He vectored Nail 44 to the scene and contact was established with both survivors at 0945Z. Nail 44 was appointed OSC. Sandy 3 reported voice contact with both Falcon 74 Alpha and Bravo. Their position was placed at VH9500 approximately 500 feet apart. At 0925Z JG 56/52 made an AT with King 23.

At 0940Z Falcon 75 was suspected overdue and JACK was requested by King 22 to make a ramp check. After both Falcon Alpha and Bravo were sighted, JG 56/52 began heading toward LS 32 from the area of CH 108 with Sandys 1 and 2. Arthur reported that Falcon Alpha had a cut on leg, bleeding stopped and 74 Bravo was OK.

At 1032Z Nail 09 had visual contact with Arthur and both continued working the area. Nail 09 relieved Nail 44 as OSC at 1042Z. During this time JG 56/52 and Sandy 1 and 2 were pressing on to the survivors position and

[REDACTED]

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a very important document, as it is the first official communication from the President to the Congress since the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln. The letter discusses the state of the Union and the challenges facing the country at the time.

King 22 requested FAC overnet coverage of area and Nail 11 at with King air-
borne as well. Prior to complete darkness, a final updated position was ob-
tained in Loran UTE's. Nail 20 replaced Nail 09 at 1145Z and Nail 09 re-
quested Jingle and CBU 42 throughout the night even though no enemy was ob-
served on the ground prior to darkness. Nail 18 contacted Falcon 74 A and B
on 282.8 and gave instructions for the night net's comm. cap. At 1224Z Nail
20 advised that Falcon 74A reported enemy in his area. At 1234Z Nail 20 RTB'd
and was replaced by Nail 38.

At 1302Z Falcon 62 Flight scrambled with ordnance and at 1303Z Killer flight also launched with ordnance. Mail 38 reported his black box inoperative at 1307Z. He then had the survivors check spare batteries for radios.

At 1344Z Nail 38 reported a MIG after him and requested Papas. At 1359Z Nail 38 declared emergency fuel and would proceed to CH 70 for refueling. At 1407Z Nail 13 arrived as on scene commander. At 1420Z Killer flight checked in with Nail 13 and Falcon 62 flight was in the area going to tank. At 1456Z Nail 18 was inbound to replace Nail 13 who ATB'd at 1502Z. At 1503Z King 41 relieved King 22 on orbit. King 22 landed CH 70 at 1535Z.

King 22 got pulled into business of relaying calls for Papas. This is not our business and Papas should definitely be controlled by ground or airborne units, not by King. Nail 20 and 38 had minimum equipment aboard their aircraft, did not know the area and each of them almost became a SAR effort on their own. Recommend night SPACS be fully equipped when operating in areas unknown to them and especially at night. The whereabouts of Falcon 75 was never discovered and he merely disappeared while working during MIG CAP.

King 41 was tasked to provide airborne mission command throughout the night and coordinate the first light effort the next day. We arrived in the area at 2155G and after receiving a briefing from King 22, we assumed mission command. Nail 13 was presently in the area and was in contact with T44 and B. The navigational equipment, however, was inoperative and ineffective in pinpointing the survivors. We RTH'd Nail 13 and provided navigational assistance to him until the end of Hash 01 (MC121). Nail 18 was now in the area and his Loran equipment was intermittently inoperative. We had previously contacted NITE BAP 11's tankline throughout the night and replacement F4's to provide continuous cover over the survivors. We determined from Nail 13 that the weather was overcast to the east of the survivors and weather at the same time was heavy, but the survivors could see stars. Nail 18's equipment was bad also and he was unable to further pinpoint the survivors. We also experienced some difficulty correlating UTM and Loran chart coordinates which had been provided. We had requested HAW 52 launched and of this time it was overhead of Kilauea (HAW 52) but because we lacked a pinpointed position for the survivors, we had to start cycling it off the tank and could not get put it into the tank. Nail 18's Loran equipment started working but he was unsure of its accuracy.

[REDACTED]

He gave us further refined coordinates and maintained communications with the survivors every 30 minutes. At 0008Z blue Chip relayed that Killer flight overhead with BLU 52 was to RTB and expend his ordnance on H21 and B30. I immediately asked Nail 18 and Nail 13 if they could use the BLU 52 near the survivors and Nail 31 (who had just arrived) answered affirmative and began working up a set of coordinates for the drop by Loran equipped Killer flight. We diverted Killer back to the SAK scene and Nail 31 put him in at 0058G. Nail 18 had just started to RTB when a bandit call off Squid placed MIGS nearing the SAK area. I cleared Nail 31 to head west out of the area and further bandit calls by Hotel placed a MIG on one of the Nails tail (Nail 18 or 31). Since both Nails were heading west we deduced that the "bandit" was on Nail 31 or 18's tail so we cleared 31 back into the area to resume the comm cap and further pinpoint the survivors position with his functioning Loran equipment and DF cuts on A and B. The previous BLU 52 drop was a Loran drop approximately 3 klicks west of the survivors and A remarked to 31 that he knew they had used the stuff. At no time did A or B state that the Jingle had landed near them as later events were to prove.

Nail 18, as he RTB'd reported a beeper and weak voice approximately 11 miles on a 250 bearing from 74A and B's position. He could not establish communication but weak DF cuts placed the beeper in that position. He was low on fuel so he continued on to RTB CM 89. We requested that additional FACS as they came out, to comm search that area which we believed might be Falcon 66 who had gone down earlier in the day.

Nail 31 determined that A was on a gentle slope, under a 50 foot canopy with clearings at approximately a 3000 foot elevation. He had heard or seen no enemy activity. Nail 31 placed B approximately 2 miles SW of A's position on a 30 to 40 degree slope under a canopy with clearings also. He had no enemy activity. Nail 31 also determined that neither A or B's ILS strobes were functioning and thus could not get their exact position with his ILS scope. Weather at 0200G was still permissible for pickup at first light. Also at 0240G, Nail 16 was inbound to the area and picked up a beeper and weak voice near the same area west where we believed Falcon 66 might be down. He also was unable to establish voice contact but remained in the area for a while to get DF cuts on the beeper. Nail 31 was approaching bingo fuel so we had Nail 16 proceed on to the 74A and B scene to take over from Nail 31. He arrived at the SAK scene at 0245Z and assumed OSC. Nail 31 also reported a beeper at the same area 11 miles west of the SAK scene as he RTB'd and gave its position as 050/24 off Beta 21. We requested more Nail FACS to come out and check out the area for the secondary SAK for Falcon 66. During this time, many of the KAC'd coords given by the Nails at both scenes were erroneous and had to be re-KAC'd. Weather at the secondary SAK scene was 3000 feet thin overcast. Just as we were beginning to believe that we had Falcon 66's general position and were involved in the secondary SAK, JACK briefed us on the details for the first light. JG's 62 and 57 were to launch at 0350G escorted by Sandies 3 and 4. Sandies 1 and 2 were to launch later and proceed direct to F74's position to arrive in time to assume OSC prior to the JG's arrival. Backup Jollies 32 and 63 were to launch with Sandies 9, 10 at approximately 0520G and proceed to a holding west of F74's position during the first light pickup attempt by Jollies 62 and 57. King 41 was requested

[REDACTED]

to plan on leaving Mission Command orbit to refuel JG 62 and 57 between the "fence" and CH 108. We objected to this degradation of mission command during the all important hours just prior to the first pickup attempt. We felt that we should stay on orbit and help the Nail further pinpoint 74's position and also work the secondary for F66 while another King tanker refueled JG 62 and 57 as they proceeded north (they had to go west and around to the north of the PDJ to reach the SAM area). We had hoped to have enough time before day light to locate Falcon 66 and combine the pickup attempts at first light on both Falcon 74 and 66. In the meantime we had additional Nails proceeding to the secondary SAM position and also our MIG CAP aircraft overhead putting our calls on guard to F66. Gunfighter (MIG CAP) also reported a beeper 051/82/108 (near the positions given by Nails for F66).

JACK informed us that they would try to get a tanker up to perform the AR but didn't know whether they would arrive in time to do the AR on schedule. At 0432G, Nail 25 had arrived on scene in addition to Nail 16. They reported A was at 4000 feet elevation on a gentle slope and that A and B had heard no "movers" and saw no problem for the Jollies to make the pickup. They also had reported previously that A said Falcon 75 (the other missing aircraft) had tried to go "feet wet" to the Gulf of Tonkin when they last had contact.

At 0443 another bandit call put MIGS 008/102 off of squid and we reconfirmed MIG CAP was being continually provided (they were working another frequency with GCI). At 0524G we established contact with JG's 57 and 62 and JACK confirmed that tanker King 21 was on way but would not arrive in time to refuel as scheduled. We agreed to depart orbit to refuel them south of CH 108. At 0539, Sandy 1 and 2, JG 32 and 63 were above proceeding to the SAM area. Sandy 1 was to become OSC upon his arrival. Sandy 9 and 10 were to escort JG 32 and 63 to the holding point to standby while JG 62 and 57 attempted the pickup.

At 0541G, we commenced AR with JG 62 and 57. At 0549G, we completed the refueling just south of CH 108 and proceeded to reassume orbit (during rendezvous and joinup, we had two possible unguided rocket launches near our position). JG's 62 and 57 proceeded on to the north to be rejoined with Sandy 3 and 4. Their ETA to the SAM scene was now 0705G (one hour past first light).

We reassumed orbit and at 0615G, Sandy 1 and 2 arrived on scene and received briefing from both King 41 and Nail 25 who was still OSC. Weather had deteriorated but Sandy 1 who assumed OSC believed a pickup could still be attempted. F74A and B still reported negative movement near their positions.

At 0711G, JG 62 and 57 arrived in the SAM area and phase Alpha began. JG 57 held high while JG 62, guided by Sandy 1, began phase B at 0713. While in hover over A's position, JG 62 noticed a canister just in front of their position about 50 meters from the A man. Shortly after, the effect of the rotor blades had stirred the contents of the canister (BLU 52) enough to affect the area of JG 62. They immediately pulled out to get clear of it. Sandy 1 then requested JG 57 to don masks for a second pickup attempt. JG 57 was very slow to get masks on and comm was and once their masks were in place. Sandy 1 elected to have JG 62, who knew the exact location of A,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

attempt the second pickup try after putting their masks on. At approximately 0805G, JG 62 hovered again over Alpha man, and at 0807G took automatic weapons fire which knocked one engine out. JG 62 departed the area on pigeons to LS 32 we had given him. He was escorted by JG 57 and Sandies 3 and 4. Note: The coordinates given by Nail for the Loran drop of BLU 52 plotted 2-3 miles away from 74A and B's positions. Alpha had never mentioned any effects of the drop on him and we had no reason to believe beforehand that the BLU 52 would have any effect on the pickup attempt.

JG 62 and 57, with Sandies 3 and 4, proceeded to the LS 32 area to be met by King 21 for refueling or to land at LS 32 if necessary. Sandy 1 and 2 were approaching bingo and Sandy 11 became the ODU at approximately 0840G. He requested more BLU 52 be uploaded on fast movers at CH 93 to standby to launch King 21 intercepted JG 62 and 57 about 15 miles east of LS 32 and escorted them to the site.

At 0858G, JG 62 landed at LS 32 and JG 57 picked up crewmembers after being refueled by King 21. At 0920G, 74A reported enemy within 50 feet of his position. We didn't have any BLU 52 overhead but Nail 41 who was in the SAA area suggested the use of "Gravel" (CDU 14) which we had in holding. Sandy 11 briefed the survivors on the contents of the coming ordnance and Nail 41 agreed to put it in on the survivors position. King 41 requested more CDU 14 diverted to the SAA effort immediately. At 0937G another bandit call placed MIGS nearing the SAA scene. JG's 63 and 62, Sandy 11, 9, 10, and 15 cleared to the west while Nail 41 remained behind to put in Card flight with the "Gravel". At 0940G, "Gravel" had been expended. At 1007G, more CDU 14 arrived overhead and King 41 briefed King 21 to assume AMC duties. At 1017G we gave AMC to King 21 and RTB'd to CH 70 with minimum fuel.

At the time King 21 assumed AMC duties the weather in the SAA area had deteriorated to the point that another recovery attempt could not be made. JG 32 flight was brought to LS 32 to orbit pending improvement in the weather. Nail FACS and Sandys cycled into the SAA area to maintain a weather watch and contact with the survivors. JG 55/61 who had launched at 0230Z as backup proceeded to CH 108. King 23, while attempting to refuel JG 57, experienced a flash fire at the end of the left refueling hose. King 23 then proceeded to Udorn. At 0335Z JG 32 lost his rotor Tac and proceeded with JG 63 to LS 20A. Smoke 44, who had assumed OGC reported weather in the search area as deteriorating with no chance for a recovery attempt for some time. JG 55 and 61 were directed to land at LS 20A to refuel and stand strip alert until the weather improved. Smoke 46 flight was directed to remain on the ground pending weather improvement.

Smoke 44 requested ODU 14 to drop around Falcon 74A as he had reported enemy movement including dogs in his vicinity. Two flights, Brushy and Calsite, carrying CDU 14 (Gravel) were cycling off of tankers and were called in to expend. Difficulty was experienced in getting the strike flights and the Pave Nails together. One strike flight had difficulty contacting the Pave Nail and had to return to a tanker for fuel. Then the Pave Nail had to RTB

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

and his replacement did not arrive in time for any overlap. Some equipment difficulties were also experienced by the Pave Nails. Coordination was finally effected and CDU 14 was delivered directly on 74A's position. Radio contact was maintained with 74A to ascertain the accuracy of the Loran drop for possible correction. Additional CDU 14 had been ordered to be uploaded ready for launch. This request was never fulfilled although the request was made very early in the mission repeated several times. When the request for CDU 14 was not fulfilled, Cbu 42 was requested and obtained for immediate expenditure should further area denial be necessary. At approximately 0620Z, Smoke 44 reported an improvement in the weather and JG 55/61 were launched from LS 20A to orbit LS 32 at 0640Z. By the time JG 55/61 reached LS 32 the weather had improved further and they continued to the SAH area. At 0726Z JG 55 began phase bravo. Falcon 74A was picked up first and P74B second with no difficulty. Pickup was completed at 0810Z. Both survivors were in excellent condition except for a laceration on the Alpha man's leg. JG 55/61 were refueled by King 27 in the vicinity of LS 32 and then proceeded to CH 70 (Udorn) to discharge the survivors.

SAH forces, except for Nail FACS were released at 0819Z and AMC duties were passed to King 22 to continue the search for Falcon 66 and 75.

King 21 Crewmembers

AMC Maj Bruce H. Driscoll
 CP 1LT Samuel K. Byers
 CP 1LT Frederick R. Wilburn
 NAV MAJ Stephen E. Katz
 NAV MAJ Marvin C. Whitfield
 RO MSG Dulan E. Lyles, Jr.
 FE MSG Harold G. Kreitlein
 FE TSG George E. Olah
 FE TSG Charles P. Neuber

Forces used by King 21

JG 55, 61, 32, 63
 Sandy 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17
 Smoke 44
 Nail 12, 27, 04, 41, 32, 33, 39, 26, 20
 Laredo (FAC)
 Falcon Flight (MIG CAP)
 Gunfighter 51 Flight (MIG CAP)
 Gunfighter 55 Flight (MIG CAP)
 Ashcan 1 (Iron Hand)
 Basket 1 (Iron Hand)
 Apollo 41 (Alint)
 Apollo 44 (Alint)
 Brushy (Strike)
 Calsite (Strike)
 Falcon 51 (Strike)
 Bosco 21, 22 (Alint)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

will. And, we tried to glean something out of it, to help somebody else in the future. More and more, as we looked at it, we saw that it was the man who knew the SAR procedure techniques, and knew his equipment - he was the one who always had the best and fastest pickup.

TOP SECRET
USE ONLY

Early debriefs revealed that downed crewmembers had only a sketchy knowledge of how to vector RESCAP or rescue helicopters over their position, or how to FAC for the fighters in suppressing ground fire. These procedures were stressed in the course, and at the end of 1971 were an integral part of the curriculum, with extensive classroom work and a final field exercise using the Lensatic compass and URC-64 radio to vector HH-3E helicopters in over the simulated survivor's position. ^{52/}

That Jungle Survival School training was effective was attested by the many debriefs in which the JSS was credited with being the difference between being recovered, or being killed or captured. Not atypical was the narrative given to the JSS class of 30 December 1971 by Captain Lester O'Brian, an F-4 backseater from Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. He recalled: ^{53/}

. . . I was sitting here about three weeks ago. I graduated from this course about the third of December. Three weeks ago I was sitting over there in Seat Number Nine. I was listening to the guys talk, and taking it in, but it was sort of like, 'Well okay, that's well and good, but hell, that'll never happen to me.' But I got to my unit at Udorn, and on my fourth mission I had to punch out.

. . . Everything I did, from that point on, it was something somebody said from some survival school saying, 'Now this is what you do.' First of all, I did just what they said, and looked up to check

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
my canopy. I had no holes in it or anything, but my two main lines were twisted, so I just grabbed them and gave a twist and they straightened out.

. . . I stepped out [of the harness] and, just like the guys said, I wanted to run like hell as soon as my feet hit the ground. So again, I went back to the only thing I had to go on, what the guys here at the survival school had said. So I did what Sgt Martino there always preaches, and I reached down and got my canteen out and washed the taste of fear down my throat.

The Captain was shot down on December 20th and was rescued the following day, after spending the night under a fallen log in the jungle. His survival school training had negated any fear he might have of the jungle, and in fact, he slept most of the night in his hideaway. ^{54/}

Captain O'Brian's two and a half weeks with his unit before going down in enemy territory was by no means a record. The record was held by a young man who graduated from the school and went on to his unit in South Vietnam that evening. Next morning he was shot down, wounded by small arms four times while evading a VC company, suffered through a failed rescue attempt and had to again become part of the jungle, evaded another group of VC, and finally helped in a successful rescue attempt although wounded. His wounds required that he be medevacuated to the Clark AB Hospital, from which he called the school 23 hours and 10 minutes after leaving class. ^{55/} He had put into use the training received in the course and wanted to let the instructors know how much it had helped him.

REF: 45

(C) On 21 December 1971, Raven 45, an C-47, ran out of fuel and oil pressure and made a forced landing northwest of Pakseng on the Bolovens Plateau of Laos. He landed in a field with two other Ravens existing over the spot. A SAR was declared, and Sandys 05 and 06 launched from Udon RTAFB at 0930, shortly after Jolly Greens 57 and 63.⁶⁹

(C) Raven 40 was overhead and took on-scene command at the time of the forced landing. He located 45 Alpha and Bravo near the downed aircraft. A nearby Dorex helicopter, Hotel 69, arrived on the scene at 0955. In spite of some small arms fire in the area, Raven 40 directed Hotel 69 in for the recovery of both Alpha and Bravo. The rescue was completed at 1007 just as the Sandys and Jolly Greens arrived. With the SAR completed the Sandys were released to Hillsboro for assignment to strike missions.⁷⁰

69. SARMO Report for Raven 45 4/2, 28 Dec 71, (Doc 18).

70. IBM1.

MAIL 28

(C) An unsuccessful SAR was conducted for MAIL 30 who was last contacted in the air in the vicinity of San Karai Pass at 0630 on 26 December 1971. A smoke trail and a puff of smoke was reported by F-4s in the area at 0640, and a SAR was initiated at 0930 when no contact had been established for three hours. No SAR aircraft were launched until 1515 hours due to lack of an identified objective for recovery.⁷¹

(C) At about noon of the 26th a signal from MAIL 30 was received by Mail 28 who was in the San Karai Pass area. Mail 28 received six rounds of accurate 100mm M1 fire from the area soon afterward. A request for a Navy Mail to record an accurate location of the signals was then made by Mail 28 while the SAR forces on the ground remained ready for the time that a location was determined.⁷²

(C) The SAR forces, consisting of two Sandys and two Jolly Greens, were launched at 1515. They proceeded to the designated location southeast of San Karai Pass where they were briefed by Mail 28 as to the beeper contacts that may have come from Mail 30. No voice contact had been made, but a fix was obtained from the beeper contacts.⁷³

(C) Sandy 05 was directed by Mail 15 to the area from

71. SARCO Report for Mail 30, 26 Dec 71, (Dec 19).

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

where the signals had come. The aircraft continued to search the layers under the aircraft but S-47B worked his way down through several holes in the clouds while S-47B held position. There was very limited room to maneuver below the clouds, but a search was conducted at from 200 to 500 feet of the objective area with the help of vectors from Para Mail 16. The objective area was searched for 30 minutes without seeing evidence of a parachute, wreckage, or a survivor. Attempts to contact Mail 30 as well as were made during this period with no response. The search was widened until it came near an area known as the Dog's Head where known A-1 positions were located. In that area and still at altitude S-47B encountered A-1 explosions close enough around the A-1 to be felt inside the cockpit. At that point the search was discontinued, and the S-47B forces returned to base for lack of a known objective.⁷⁴

(C) Mail aircraft continued to try to communicate with Mail 30 and some beeper contacts were made, but questions asked by the Mails were not answered correctly on the beeper. There was a strong possibility that the beeper was being used to entice S-47B aircraft into a trap where A-1 or heavy ground fire would be encountered. This suspicion was strengthened soon afterwards when Mail 30 was identified as a Prisoner of War of the North Vietnamese.⁷⁵

74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.

1. At 0930, 26 December 1971, a SAR was declared for Nail 30. Last radio contact was made with Nail 30 at 0630. At 0640, Falcon flight reported a smoke trail and white smoke puff near LD-22/Bun Kari Pass area. A search was started in the sector WD 6040, XD 6040, YE 6020, WE 6020.

2. At 1147, Nail 28 reported positive radio contact for 30 seconds with Nail 30 and requested cuts be made by a Pave Nail. Nail 28 reported 6 rounds of 100MM accurate AAA which was probably radio guided.

3. At 1210, the SARCO briefed TFA and requested assistance. Jolly Green 56 and 60 and Sandy 05 and 06 were alerted and briefed but held on the ground as no SAR objective had been declared. Nail 30 was responding to a request for tone but the signal was too weak for ADF cuts.

4. At 1217, Blue Chip said hold all FACs on the ground until released by Blue Chip. A later telecon revealed that this was a Blue Chip mistake.

5. At 1220, the SARCO started uploading BLU-52 on two A-1s at Jack's request. At 1235, this request was cancelled due to the threat in the area. At this time, the SARCO requested BLU-52, CBU-42, and CDU 14 be loaded on fast movers and put on ground alert. The SARCO also briefed Jack on ingress and egress plan.

6. At 1515, Jack launched Sandy 05 and 06 and Jolly Green 60 and 56 to the SAR area. Sandy 09 and 10 and Jolly Green 30 and 62 were placed on ground alert. Continued attempts to get Nail 30 to come up voice were unsuccessful. The SARCO confirmed with Jack the Mig Cap, College Eye, Iron Hand, and ECM aircraft were in the SAR area. Blue Chip had released Sandy 03 and 04 from Pakse orbit but the SARCO recovered 03 and 04 because they had not been adequately briefed on the SAR area. Nail got position from beeper and several needle swings. (XDJ229 9863)

7. Sandy 03 made a thorough search of the SAR area at low level below the clouds but found nothing. Nail 30 did not respond to specific requests on the radio.

8. With no objective, SAR forces were recovered and electronic search continued. Subsequent electronic search strengthened the possibility of a trap as questions were answered wrong using beeper and no voice contact be established. Nail 30 was later reported as a POW by the NVA.

STATEMENT

1. Sandy 05/06 were launched at 1405L, 26 Dec 71 to search for Nail 30. We went to the objective area, southeast of Ban Kari pass, accomplished a rendezvous and with Nail 23 and Nail 16 (Pave Nail). They briefed us on the area and the beeper/voice contact they had had. There was no radio contact at all with Nail 30 during the time we were in the area. Nail 23 left the area shortly after we arrived.
2. The Pave Nails had taken several cuts on the beeper and felt they had a good fix on its location. The weather was overcast to the south and east of the beeper location with a clear area over Delta 22 (the Dog's Head), which was clearly visible. There were breaks in the overcast near Delta 22. Nail 16 briefed us on the AAM/SNI threat in the area and on a road (not shown on our maps) which ran close to the beeper location.
3. After the briefing Nail 16 took me to a place where he had found a hole in the overcast, east of the objective area. The hole had begun to cover over with thin clouds but it appeared to be workable. I held Sandy 06 above the overcast due to the weather and anticipated limited maneuvering room below the clouds. I went down through the thin spot and found multiple layers of clouds. It was not possible to continue to the ground in the same hole but I was able to find successive holes, or thin spots, in each cloud layer until I was finally able to see the ground. The first time I got under the overcast I was able to stay about 2 minutes before heading up a blind valley and having to climb out IFR.
4. This was repeated about three times before I was able to become oriented shortly after breaking out and had learned which valleys I could fly through VFR. Most of the valleys were too narrow to turn around in. On my second trip down I jettisoned my M-47s and CBU-22 to increase maneuverability and rate of climb. I felt there was little chance of using smoke due to the terrain and low ceilings.
5. I finally managed to get into the area by having Nail 16 give me DF steers. The objective area was just across the ridge line east of the Dog's Head. The main road, mountainside, and bombed out ridge line were clearly visible from below the clouds. I had Nail 16 DF me into the area three times from different while I was under the clouds. Each pass started about 3 miles out -- as far as I could get without going IFR or into the Dog's Head area. Each time he told me I was in the survivor's area, I was within 200 meters of the same place.
6. I began a search pattern about 1 1/2 miles by 3/4 mile looking for a parachute, marker panels wreckage, or any sign of Nail 30. My search area was limited by kharat and clouds to the East, North, and South and by the Dog's Head to the West. The terrain was rolling hills and kharat,

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partly covered with relatively light jungle (single canopy) alternating with old farm fields that were covered with relatively light second growth. There was one stream through the area, about 15 to 20 yards wide, and a secondary road that wandered through the area. The road was unpaved but well used and clearly defined. I saw no people although they were obviously in the area. There were numerous trails and both banks of the stream had foot trails and areas where the grass and brush had been beaten down.

7. I covered the area repeatedly but could find no sign of a parachute or Nail 30. After about 30 minutes in the area, with Sandy 05 and Nail 16 telling me to get out, I extended my search pattern slowly toward the Dog's Head, using terrain masking as best I could. I continued to work in that direction until I took some AAA as I was turning away from the Dog's Head. The blasts were close enough I could feel the explosions and see them out of the corner of my eye. With that I gave it up, went southeast a mile or two and climbed out. Most of the search was conducted at 200 to 500 feet above the ground. I made continual calls on Guard but got no response on keypad or voice. I saw no evidence of a parachute, wreckage, or a survivor. I am convinced that if the survivor was in my search area he had been previously captured and his parachute picked up.

8. Shortly after climbing back up and describing what I had seen to King and Nail 16, I was released to RTR while the Nails continued to make a communications search for the survivor. I recommended to King that the communications search continue but that no one else go back down unless there was further evidence of a survivor. I felt extremely lucky that they had not moved a ZPU or 23/37s into the area as I repeatedly crossed the road at low altitude. It is doubtful if anyone would have been as lucky the next day.


CHARLES K. BOWDEN, Lt Col, USAF
Sandy 05

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Vietnam War Aircraft Losses

1429	26 Dec 1971	F-4D	NVN	Stolz L. G.	Capt	KIA		Koons D F.	1Lt	KIA
1430	26 Dec 1971	OV-10A	LAOS	Guenther L. E.	Capt	POW (returned)				
1431	31 Dec 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Duggan W. Y.	Maj	KIA		Sutter F. J.	Capt	MIA
1432	20 Jan 1972	RF-4C	LAOS	u	u	Rescued	AA Helo	u	u	Rescued
1433	20 Jan 1972	F-4E	LAOS	Davis O. J. Jr	Capt	Rescued	Army Helo	Venables R. K.	Capt	Rescued
1434	10 Feb 1972	F-4E	LAOS	Murphy J. S.	Capt	Rescued		Dobson T. W.	1Lt	Rescued
1435	16 Feb 1972	F-4D	Sea	Schwertfeger W. R.	Capt	POW (returned)		Galati R. W.	1Lt	POW (retur
1436	17 Feb 1972	O-2	u	Christy R. W.	1Lt	KIA		Silva W. E.	SSgt	Rescued
1437	17 Feb 1972	F-105G	Sea	Cutter J. D.	Capt	POW (returned)		Fraser K. J.	Capt	POW (retur
1438	17 Feb 1972	F-4	NVN	Irwin R. H.	Maj	MIA		Hawley E. A.	Capt	POW (retur
1439	2 Mar 1972	OV-10A	LAOS	Long M. H.	Capt	Rescued				
1440	6 Mar 1972	F-4E	LAOS	Howell C. A.	1Lt	KIA		Rusch S. A.	1Lt	MIA
1441	14 Mar 1972	OV-10A	LAOS	Hardy A. H.	1Lt	MIA				
1442	18 Mar 1972	OV-10A	LAOS	Breskman D. G.	1Lt	Rescued	USAF Helo	Boretsky S. L.	Capt	Rescued
1443	18 Mar 1972	A-1J	LAOS	Faas M. J.	Capt	Rescued	AA Helo			
1444	23 Mar 1972	F-4D	LAOS	Whitt J. E.	Maj	KIA		Jackson J. T.	Capt	KIA
1445	28 Mar 1972	AC-130A	LAOS	Ramsower I. B.	Maj	MIA		Wanzel C. J.	1Lt	MIA
1446	30 Mar 1972	C-130E	LAOS	Fulk W. O.	Capt	Rescued		Bolling E. N.	Capt	Rescued
1447	2 Apr 1972	O-2A	Sea	Abbot R. L.	1Lt	Rescued	USN			
1448	2 Apr 1972	EB-66C	SVN	Bolte W. L.	Maj	MIA		Hambleton I. E.	LtCol	Rescued
1449	3 Apr 1972	OV-10A	SVN	Henderson W. J.	1Lt	POW (returned)		Clark M. N.	1Lt	Rescued
1450	7 Apr 1972	OV-10A	SVN	Walker B. C.	1Lt	MIA		Potts L. F.	1Lt2	MIA
1451	9 Apr 1972	F-4D	LAOS	Banks W. M. Jr	Capt	Rescued		Jacobs M. J.	Capt	Rescued
1452	15 Apr 1972	F-4E	NVN	Trimble L. A.	1Lt	KIA		Despiegler G. A.	Maj	POW (retur

FROM: 1st Special Operations Sq (Maj Encinas/2754)

SUBJECT: SARCO Report for Raven 45 A/B


28 Dec 71

TO: 56th SOW (DO)

1. A successful rescue was made of Raven 45 A/B. The aircraft, an O-1 lost oil and fuel pressure and the Raven made a forced landing at 050 for 30 off Channel 82. This report covers the activities relating to the SAR. All times are MFP local.

2. The SARCO received a call at 0920 that Raven 45 was down. He made a forced landing in a field with two other Raven over the area. Sandy 3 and 4 launched and took off at 0943. At 0935 Sandy 5 and 6 along with Jolly 63 and 57 launched and proceeded to the scene. A Durex helicopter, Hotel 89 arrived on scene at approximately 0955. He made both pick-ups of 45 A and B. At 1007 rescue was completed. Sandy 5, 6 and Jolly 63, 57 RTB Channel 93. Sandy 3 and 4 RTD Channel 89. SAR terminated at 1007.

3. The only comment I have is that I feel a VHF and UHF Receivers should be in the SARCO's work room. One is there now but it has a very limited range. I feel some means should be available to the SARCO to monitor the SAR Frequencies.


ESEQUIEL M. ENCINAS, Major, USAF
SARCO

FROM: 1st SOS (Capt R. Smith, Sandy 03)

23 Dec 71

SUBJECT: SAR for Raven 45, 24 December 1971

TO: SARCO, Major Esequiel Encinas

We received a launch order at 0925 local and were airborne at 0943. King advised me at 0950 that the Bravo Phase had begun. At 1015 we were advised that both Alpha and Bravo had been picked up. We were told to RTB at Channel 89 but at 1025 King advised me that we had been released to Blue Chip for a strike. Hillsboro sent us to a TAC Emergency at 262/43 off of Channel 69.



RONALD E. SMITH, Capt, USAF
Sandy 03

28 December 1971

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: Captain Fred C. Boli, Sandy 05

SUBJECT: SAR for Raven 45, 24 December 1971

TO: SARCO, Major Esequile Encinas

1. Sandy 05 (Capt. Boli) and Sandy 06 (Capt. Clavenger) were on alert at Ubon RCAF on 24 December 1971 when they were scrambled to cockpit alert at 0905L. While leaving the alert quarters we were notified to launch for Raven 45 who had gone down at 068/90/93. We were at the aircraft by 0910L and shortly after Jolly Green 63/57 were airborne, we launched at 0930L. Immediately after becoming airborne Sandy 05 contacted King 21 for further information about the survivors. King 21 relayed that Raven 40 had assumed on scene command, had located Raven 45 Alpha and Bravo, and that although there was some small arms fire in the area that he was committing Hotel Alpha, an Air America or CAS helicopter (we never ascertained which), to the pickup. Hotel Alpha was successful in picking up Raven 45A on the first attempt; but was for some reason waved off by Raven 45B. As Sandy 05/06 along with Jolly Green 63/57 arrived on scene at 1005L, Hotel Alpha succeeded in picking up Raven 45B. At 1010L Sandy 05/06 were directed by King 21 to return to CH93. At 1015L Sandy 05/06 were released to Hillsboro by Joker and struck with Raven 33 at 073/40/99 and then landed at Ch 93 at 1155L.

2. One unique thing that occurred during this SAR was that rather than making the pickup on the normal 232.8 UHF frequency, Raven 40 was directing Hotel Alpha on F4 frequency 43.85; which caused some confusion among the Sandys and Jollys who were initially unable to monitor what was going on while they were on their way to the scene. King 21 is to be commended for promptly noting this abnormality and informing the Sandys and Jollys of the proper frequency.

Fred C. Boli

FRED C. BOLI, Captain, USAF
Sandy 05

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John

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OPR	UTS
ARLS	1
INFO	CYS
DO	4
DEC	1
CSEH	1
67	

~~CONFIDENTIAL/JOPREP JIFFY/OL-B, 3ARRG/RESCUE 083/240210Z
DEC 1971.~~

- Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 3/10/97

*
* C O N F I D E N T I A L *
*

DECLASSIFIED

2 SAVES AIR

IMMEDIATE
358 DAY 1971
08.00.18Z
MSG # 001013
FROM: AESC

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3/3

REVEN 45. RAVEN 41 ASSUMED ON SCENE COMMANDER AT 240220Z AND ESTABLISHED VOICE CONTACT WITH ALPHA MAN. ALBERT JOLLY GREENS (HH-53C) AND SANDIES (A-1) WERE LAUNCHED AT 240235Z AND 240225Z RESPECTIVELY FOR POSSIBLE SAR RECOVERY FROM NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB. KING 24 WAS LAUNCHED FROM CAM RANH BAY AV RVN TO PROVIDE AIR REFUELING CAPABILITY AT 240300Z. AIR AMERICAL HELICOPTERS (H-15, 54, 89 AND 59) WERE WORKING IN RECOVERY AREA AND WERE DIVERTED TO AID ASSISTANCE. WEATHER IN THE RECOVERY AREA WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE SAR MISSION. AIR AMERICA HELICOPTER (H-89) MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH BRAVO MAN AT 240240Z. BRAVO MAN WAVED H-89 OFF ON THE INITIAL PICKUP EFFORT. H-89 MADE RADIO CONTACT WITH ALPHA MAN

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AND PICKED HIM UP AT 240250Z. BRAVO MAN WAS THEN RECOVERED BY H-89 WITHOUT INCIDENT. ALPHA MAN WAS IN EXCELLENT CONDITION AND BRAVO MAN SUFFERED A POSSIBLE BROKEN LEG. ALPHA MAN WAS RETURNED TO LIMA 11 AND BRAVO MAN WAS TAKEN TO PAPA SITE 18. ALL FORCES WERE RTB'D AT 240315Z. NO AIREAL REFUELINGS WERE ACCOMPLISHED.

GP-4

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NNNN

- IMMEDIATE
358 DAY 1971
08.00.18Z
MSG # 001013
FROM: AESC

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- IMMEDIATE
358 DAY 1971
00.00.18Z
001013
FROM: AESC

CONFIDENTIAL

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B. ACTIONS TAKEN:

- (1) CONTROLLING AGENCY - OL-B, 3 ARRG
- (2) OL-B, JARRGP NOTIFIED OF SAR INCIDENT AT 240210Z BY 3ARRGP/JRCC
- (3) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES ALERTED:
 - (A) 39ARRS AT 240210Z
 - (B) 40 ARRS AT 240215Z

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- (C) 56 SOW AT 240216Z
- (4) TIME SAR FORCES LAUNCHED:
 - (A) 1 HC-130P, 39 ARRS DIVERTED AT 240212Z
 - (B) 2 A-1E, 56 SOW LAUNCHED AT 240225Z
 - (C) 2 HH-53C, 40ARRS LAUNCHED AT 240235Z
 - (D) 2 A-1E, 56SOW LAUNCHED AT 240243Z
 - (E) 1HC-130P, 39 ARRS LAUNCHED AT 240300Z

C. PERSONNEL INFORMATION:

- (1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED, 2 LOCATED, 2 RECOVERED, 2 SAVED
- (2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED BY RAVEN 40 (O-1) AT 240215Z. LOCATION 1548N 10620E
- (3) H-89 (NON ARRS H-34) MADE A LANDING RECOVERY OF BOTH SURVIVORS.
- (4) ALPHA SURVIVOR TAKEN TO L-11, BRAVO SURVIVOR TAKEN TO PS-18.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:

- (1) 39 ARRS - 2 SORTIES FOR 1.6 HOURS
- (2) 40 ARRS - 2 SORTIES FOR 2.4 HOURS
- (3) 56SOW - 4 SORTIES FOR 1.8 HOURS

E. SAVES DATA: NO SAVES CLAIMED BY ARRS

- (1) RCC MAKING SAVE- H-89 (NON ARRS H-34) PILOT NOT RELEASABLE
- (2) PERSONS SAVED- NAMES OF SURVIVORS NOT RELEASABLE

PAGE RUMOSRA1975 C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (A) SERVICE AND NATIONALITY- NOT RELEASABLE
- (b) 2 NON ARRS COMBAT SAVES
- (C) AIRCREW MEMBERS

G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:

- (1) OL-B, 3ARRGP WAS NOTIFIED AT 240210Z DEC 71 BY 3ARRGP/JRCC THAT REVEN 45 WAS DOWN. APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT WAS 050 DEGREES 30 MILES FROM CH-82. KING 21 (HC-130P) WAS DIVERTED AT 240212Z AND ASSUMED AMC DUTIES. REVEN 40 WAS ON SCENE AND HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH

- IMMEDIATE
358 DAY 1971
00.00.18Z
MSG # 001013
FROM: AESC

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SMOKE 44 SAR REPORT

On 31 Dec 71, 0700Z, Smoke 44 flight launched from NKP in support of the Charlie Horse 26 SAR at Kho San, SVN. Capt Faas was 44, and Capt Whaylen was 45.

After take-off, 44 flight contacted King 21 on 123.1 for initial words and briefing. We were told that Sandy 7 was on-scene commander and presently attempting a pick-up. We were told to continue to a designated holding point, regardless. I was determined that we would use a less direct route and prebriefed crossing point, rather than proceed directly to SAR area. King advised we were not immediately needed. We monitored 231.0 UHF enroute and could clearly hear the progress of the SAR.

After crossing the trail we proceeded inbound direct to the SAR area. After 45 minutes of flight, at 10 minutes out, we switched to primary SAR 127.7 VHF and notified Sandy 7 of our position and ETA. At this time we heard the first of Jolly Greens were RTB to CH 103 with battle damage. We established radio contact with Sandy 7 on VHF and he directed us to the immediate SAR area. We arrived at 11,000 MSL above a undercast. We were told to descend into the area and advised of a redail/DME which should be safe to descend at. Both Sandy 7 and Sandy 5 (high) suggested points of descent through the weather. Bottoms were reported as ragged at 4,500 MSL, with terrain level at 1,700 MSL. The high terrain in the SAR area was reported clear of the overcast.

Smoke 44 descended first, with 45 holding high, and made visual contact with ground at 6,500 MSL. I advised 45 to start his descent. We rendezvoused below the overcast approximately 5 kilometers west of the orbiting Sandy 7 and Sandy 5 flights.

The second set of Jollys was inbound from CH 103, about 15 minutes out. Sandy 7 determined we should come into the objective area and make visual contact with the downed chopper and receive a briefing of the situation while waiting for the Jollys. Sandy 5 led 44 flight in and directed us to the chopper while Sandy 7 briefed us on the first pickup attempt and the suspected location of the enemy ground fire. Both 44 and 45 made positive visual contact with the survivor and returned to a holding point 5 clicks west. The weather was a low overcast, ragged, with about 2,500 AGL clearance at the objective area.

The Jollys arrived in the area, descended thru the overcast. Sandy 5 rendezvoused with the Jollys and established their holding point.

Sandy 7 called Smoke 44 flight into the objective area in an orbit above the chopper. At the same time Sandy 5 was briefing the Jollys on the expected smoke screen and the ingress directions. Sandy 7 planned to start the Jolly run-in simultaneously with the laying of the smoke screen. Sandy 7 and Smoke 44 flights were on 231.0 UHF and Sandy 5 and the Jollys were on 127.7 VHF. Both elements were monitoring the same radio frequencies and had contact with each other.

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Sandy 7 put down two WP rockets marking the position for the smoke and the direction in which it was to be laid. I, as Smoke 44, misinterpreted his instructions and instead of laying the smoke in a direction of NE-SW, laid four smokes (M-47s) W-E at a position south of the chopper. Sandy 7 called for the smoke to be dropped in a safe armament mode and consequently only one of my smokes broke and smoldered. Sandy 7 said the smoke was wrong. Smoke 45 confirmed he had the correct position and direction and requested clearance to drop. Sandy 7 directed him to hold and decided to put in two more WP to definitely mark the intended area. He laid the WP rockets again and called for a positive understanding of the spots from Smoke 44 flight. I got oriented to the desired target and said I understood. Smoke 45 stated he had the target and he was cleared in. On the remaining passes it was decided to drop the M-47's armed. Smoke 45 dropped approximately 4 smokes two exploded and two dudded. Smoke 44 followed 45 in and dropped 4 more and got two explosions and two duds. Sandy 7 said that the positions and direction were good and called for the Jollys. As the Jollys were engressing Smoke 44 requested to make one more pass. I received clearance and dropped 3 more, all of which exploded. At this time the Jollys were at the objective scene with Sandy 5 directing their movements. Smoke 44 flight broke off and returned to their position to the west.

The low Jolly was reporting ground fire and stated that he had his mini-gun firing. Sandy 7 made a call for the Sandys to use their WP rockets to fill in the gaps of the disapating smoke screne. I thought that Smoke 45 could do the job using the remainder of his M-47 load. I directed him to join the daisy chain, he acknowledged, and I call Sandy 7 to say that 45 would join the daisy chain and fill in the gaps with his M-47's; Sandy 7 OK'd. I followed 45 to the daisy chain and joined, though not getting cleared into the daisy chain strafe pattern. All six A-1's were in a tight circular pattern, calling in their strafe passes to an O'Clock position of the Jolly. I made two strafe passes. The Jolly called he had completed the pickup and departed on the receprical of the run-in. All A-1s then broke off and covered Jolly's exit.

Smoke 44 and 45 rejoined and departed on an RTB heading. On scene time was 1+00.

OPINIONS: We decided that the dud M-47s were caused by a too low release altitude which did not give the required 1200' air travel time for arming of the M-47.

The inclusion of the two Smoke A-1Es in the strafe daisy chain pattern cluttered it up too much, especially considering the low altitude for operation forced on the effort by the low ceiling.

It was originally intended (but not made explicitly clear to all parties by Smoke 44) for 45 to make one smoke pass and then depart the area. I did not coordinate properly for the inclusion of two extra A-1Es in the strafing pattern.

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REFERENCE

1. On 31 December 1971 at 1300H Sandy 07/08 were scrambled by Queen from Da Nang to look for a downed helicopter, near Khe Sanh. Takeoff was at 1313H, and we arrived at the given position 240/26/103 at approximately 1350H. Reports indicated there were two helicopters, one "LOCH" and one Huey "Slick", that had been shot down with four crewmembers aboard each one. Actually, the slick had picked up the two survivors of the LOCH and were on their way out when they were hit themselves. We met Bilk 29, an O-2 FAC, who was On-Scene-Commander, made visual and radio contact with Charlie Horse 26 on 67.20 FM, and learned that there were 1 KIA and 7 survivors, with one of those seriously wounded.
2. At approximately 1355H, Sandy 07 became On-Scene-Commander. Bilk 29 stayed in the area, however, to direct fast-movers in case we needed them. He was later replaced by Bilk 23 and later by Bilk 22. They were also in control of a flight of Huey gunships who were also in the area when we first got there.
3. The geographical location of Charlie Horse 26 ^{was} ~~was~~ 3 miles South-Southeast of Khe Sanh airfield which is 12 miles south of the DMZ. Bilk 29 reported there were no friendlies in the area and that there were hostile troops "all over the place". This was evidenced later when we tried the first pickup. The weather was a definite factor being 1000'-1500' AGL at all times right over the survivors. Terrain was rolling from 500'-1000' elevation.
4. Charlie Horse 26 was located on the north side of a hill with 10' high elephant grass surrounding the chopper. There were ravines with thick undergrowth in them in all directions from the survivors. This is where most of the North Vietnamese troops were concentrated. C.H. 26 reported taking fire from all directions, but mostly from the Southwest, West and Northwest. With this in mind, Sandy 07/08 began sanitizing the area with 20mm and CBU-25 in all of the ravines nearby. After sanitizing and trolling for gun fire for approximately 40 minutes, C.H. 26 said that he hadn't received any fire for thirty minutes and neither had the Sandies. I was ready to commit Jolly Green 73 for a pickup at that time, but Sandy 05/06 from Ubon were then reported only ten minutes away.
5. One problem at this point was my FM radio. I lost voice contact with 26 after talking to him for ten to fifteen minutes. However, it was only my radio so Sandy 08 was able to maintain contact with him. Sandy 08 did an exceptional job in relaying information to the survivors and helping them keep their cool.
6. Sandy 05/06 arrived at 1525H, and we were ready for the pickup. Jolly Green 73/65 had been holding "feet with" east of Quang Tri (CH 103) at first, but were later moved closer to 242/14/103. When 05/06 arrived they were brought down below the clouds and northwest of our position, about 245/28/103 or approximately 2 miles away.

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7. JG 73 was briefed on location, in and out routes, and type of fire to expect, and the execution was made approximately 1540H. A mistake was made in coordination at this point. Sandy 08 was leading JG 73 in but neither he nor I realized 73 was as close behind 08 as he was. As a result, I missed giving him a slow down command and he overshot the survivors by 100 feet. JG 73 did spot the survivors as he passed over them and salvaged the overshoot in just a few seconds. As 73 went into the hover, he began taking ground fire to the West and Southwest. 05/06 were in the daisy chain with us by this time so we all directed 20mm and CBU-25 all around the Jolly, mostly to the West. 73 then stated he was hit but elected to remain in the hover. A few seconds later he reported more hits and that he was coming out due to a heavy vibration of unknown origin in his aircraft. He exited the area safely and made an emergency landing at CH 103 due to this vibration.

8. By this time, Smoke 44/45 were only 15 minutes out, so at this time I directed JG 21/66, backup set of Jolly Greens holding east of CH 103, to come to the holding area northwest of the survivors (about 2 miles from them).

9. When the Smokes arrived at 1600H and got familiar with the survivors' position, I had them lay a smoke screen down west of the survivors, running northeast - southwest, reaching within 75 - 100 meters of the downed crewmen at the closest point. M-47's were used for this. JG 21 had been briefed prior to the smoke, and at this time Sandy 05 led him to the survivors' position.

10. The run-in heading for 21 was southeast (like 73's) perpendicular to smoke screen, passing north of the northernmost smoke, then vectoring southwest, running parallel to the smoke and to the survivors' position. When 21 spotted the downed chopper and went into his hover, the smoke screen had drifted within 20 meters of the survivors making the best screen possible. Sandy 05/06 and Smoke 44/45 then joined us in the "daisy chain" while 21 dropped first his Stokes' litter for the WIA and KIA and then the penetrator for the rest of the Charlie Horse 26 crew, bringing them up two at a time. 21 was in the hover for approximately seven to ten minutes, during which the Sandies and Smokes were constantly laying down CBU-25, LAU-3 rockets, 20mm, and 7.62mm. After five or six minutes the smoke was starting to dissipate, so we all began dropping our remaining M-47's and CBU-22 to fill in the holes in the smoke screen. During the entire hover period, JG 21 was taking sporadic small arms fire mostly from the north and south.

11. After all crewmembers were aboard JG 21, the Sandies, Smokes, and Jolly Greens exited the area safely. Just as 21 was pulling out of his hover, we heard a SAM call in the vicinity of the DMZ, but I do not know whether it was directed at us or not. As we were pulling out we were a good 15 miles from the DMZ and fairly low to the terrain. Sandy 05/06 returned to CH 93, Smoke 44/45 returned to CH 89, and JG 21/66 returned to CH 77 with Sandy 07/08. Time of the final pickup was approximately 1645H.

12. King 21 was the airborne SAR coordinator and did a great job. Nail 07 was also on scene in case we needed him but fortunately we did not. The only known battle damage to any aircraft involved in the SAR was to JG 73.

Clifton E. Groves

CLIFTON E. GROVES, 1st Lt, USAF

CHARLIE HORSE 74

LOAN 26

(C) The intense SAR activity of December continued through the last day of 1971 when at 1200 local NKP time a SAR was launched by QUEEN from DaNang for Charlie Horse 74, an Army helicopter which had gone down three miles SSE of 15th Binh airfield, only 12 miles south of the DMZ. Charlie Horse 74 had been downed after picking up the occupants of another helicopter, Loan 26, which had gone down earlier in the area. Bilk 29, an O-7 F10 who assumed initial on-scene command, reported that there were seven survivors, some of them severely injured, and one KIA on the ground.⁷⁶

(C) QUEEN launched Sandys 07 and 08 from DaNang along with Jolly Greens 65 and 73. At the same time Snake 44 and 45 were launched from NKP and Sandys 05 and 06 from Ubon. The first Sandys, 07 and 08, arrived over Charlie Horse at 1350 and Sandy 07 assumed on-scene command after a briefing from Bilk 29 who remained in the area to direct strikes by Jet movers should they be required. There were also two gunships in the area if needed.⁷⁷

(C) The Sandys learned from Charlie Horse 74 that ground fire was being received from ravines with thick undergrowth on all sides of the downed helicopter. The most concentrated fire was from the southwest through the northwest. The Sandys then combated the area for 40 minutes with 20mm fire and various other ordnance, until no

74. SIKSO Report for Charlie Horse 74, 31 Dec 71, (Dec 29).

77. Ibid.

ground fire was being received. The second set of Jolly Greens, 21 and 22, arrived at 1415 and Jolly Green 21 was holding "loose net" east of Quang Tri. The Jolly Greens were next brought to a position two miles northwest of Charlie House 14 and given a briefing as to the proposed route and the conditions to expect. At 1540 Jolly Green 73 was guided in by Sandy 03 while the other three Sardsys formed a delay screen around the Jolly and directed heavy fire at suspected enemy locations, mostly to the west. While hovering over the survivors the Jolly Green reported heavy enemy ground fire including a hit, but he remained in the hover. Soon he reported more hits and such vibration of the helicopter from rocket impacts. He was required to withdraw to Quang Tri where he made an emergency landing.⁷⁸

(C) A second set of Jolly Greens was brought in from where they had been holding east of Quang Tri, and Smoke 44 and 45, two A-1s from WKP, arrived at 1600 and were briefed on the situation and of the requirements for a smoke screen to be placed within 100 meters of the survivors. After some confusion as to the desired location of the smoke screen, effective smoke was dropped on the second pass by both 44 and 45. Half of the smoke dropped proved to be duds, thus nullifying a thin screen.⁷⁹

(C) Jolly Green 21, who had been briefed on what to expect,

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

and the Jolly Green, which was within 20 meters of the ground, and the Jolly Green then threw a daisy chain to eliminate ground fire while the Jolly Green brought up the survivor. Since there were wounded on the ground the life hoist was used first, and then the jungle penetrator for the wounded. The hoist operation took from seven to ten minutes during which the Jolly Green received ground fire from areas not obscured by the smoke. The Daisy and Smokes used all available ordnance around the area throughout the period. When the last survivor was on board the Jolly Green, the SAR force withdrew from the scene without difficulty. The year ended with another successful SAR completed, under adverse conditions in a hostile environment, through precision flying and the coordinated teamwork of many dedicated people. 60

60. Ibid.

37 ARRSQ HISTORY, 1 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER 1971

Checklists were run and both Jolly Greens were ready for the rescue attempt upon arrival at the initial holding point. While the area was being prepared by both fast and slow moving TAC AIR the Jollys were moved to a position almost directly over the SAR area. Capt Tyler was briefed and was making his final preparations for a run in when the survivor advised that there was intense ground fire in the area and that he was with a group of armed friendlies that could take him to a more secure area. After the survivor was relocated and it was determined that the area was relatively secure Capt Tyler initiated an autorotative descent around clouds to a barren dirt field. The survivor boarded the aircraft and a near vertical departure was made from the area. The survivor was treated for second degree burns on his face, neck, and arms during the return flight to Bien Hoa.

On 31 December 1971 Jolly Green 73 and 65 were launched from Da Nang AFB to recover two army helicopter crews downed in the vicinity of Khe Sahn. The crews had been briefed on the severity of hostile action in the area prior to takeoff. The Jollies held above a high overcast waiting for the Sandies to confirm that the pickup zone was ready. The Jollies were then advised to descend and establish themselves in a holding area several miles south of the survivors position. It had been determined that even though several survivors were wounded it would be possible to use the forest penetrator for the pickup. Sandy lead advised Capt Peter H. Chapman and crew that it looked good for the pickup attempt since no ground fire had been detected during the last thirty minutes and that varied ordnance had been expended around the survivors. Following Sandy 8 Jolly Green 73 made a high speed low altitude run in toward the pickup point. Shortly

37 ARRSQ HISTORY, 1 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER 1971

they were established in the hover and the penetrator only a few feet from the ground, heavy ground fire was received from all sides of the helicopter. As the ground fire intensified a moderate vibration and schuffle was felt in the aircraft. At this time JG 73 pulled off from the hover and made a high speed egress from the area. JG 73 and JG 65 both returned to Da Nang safely after assessing the damage at Quang Tri.

As Jolly Green 73 and Jolly Green 65 were departing the SAR area the Bravo Alert Aircraft were launched from Da Nang. Enroute JG 21 and JG 66 were briefed on the SAR situation by Sandy 7. They were directed to a holding position in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh to await area sanitization, which was in part being directed by the survivors. An approach to the crash site was made detouring around concentrations of heavy enemy fire. Capt. Rodney Griffith placed his aircraft directly over the downed aircrew and the stokes litter immediately deployed. Despite a heavy smoke screen laid down for cover JG 21 began receiving small arms fire from all sectors. The ground fire was returned by JG 21, survivors and escort aircraft in the area. All seven survivors plus one KIA were hoisted aboard during a fifteen minute hover. After the last survivor was aboard an immediate egress was made and course set for the 95th Medevac Hospital. Enroute the wounded survivor was treated for a serious head injury by the pararescue personnel. This mission marked over seven hundred saves by the men of the 37th ARRSq.

37 ARRSQ HISTORY, 1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1971

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>SURVIVOR</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>
681	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
682	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
683	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
684	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
685	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
686	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
687	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
688	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
689	Unknown	Navy	25 Nov 71	A 03019
690	Richard Steed	A1C	25 Nov 71	A 03020
691	Alvin W. Moore II	Capt	29 Nov 71	A 03021
692	Noel M Harvey	Capt	31 Dec 71	A 3044
693	Veil F. Flynn	1st Lt	31 Dec 71	A 3044
694	Fernando Figueroa	Sgt	31 Dec 71	A 3044
695	George F. Cobb	Spec 4	31 Dec 71	A 3044
696	David McMillan	PFC	31 Dec 71	A 3044
697	Dennis W. Trimble	PFC	31 Dec 71	A 3044
698	Ronnie A. Mickle	Spec 4	31 Dec 71	A 3044

DEC 71

DATE
31JG #
21
361CREW
GRIFFITH
HART
ASHDOWN
SALOME
WAGNER

SAGE #

692

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696

697

698

SURVIVOR

NAME/RANK

SSN

CAPT

NOEL M. HARVEY

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

1LT

VICK F. FLYNN

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Sgt FERNANDO FIGUEROA

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

S-4 GEORGE F. COBB

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

PFC

DAVID MC MILLAN

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

PFC

DAVID W. TRIMBLE

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

D-4

RUSSELL A. MICKLE (WIA)

S-4

DENMARK

ALL FROM

DELTA TROOP

3150 5 CALNIE

MSN# A-3-044 31 DEC 71

LOCATION

248/26/103

TYPE
SAGE

COMBAT

7

DATE: 31 DEC 71

MISSION NUMBER: A-3-044

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: KING 21

MISSION OBJECTIVE: CHARLIE HORSE 26, 8 SOB

LOCATION: XD 857374

SAVES: 7 COMBAT

At 0459Z King 21 received a call on guard for help from Bilk 29. He informed King 21 that he had several helicopters down in the Khe Sanh area. A SAR objective was confirmed by Bilk 29 as 8 persons down, 2 of which were injured, at coordinates XD 857374. At 0502Z Jollys and Sandys were requested from Queen. At 0503Z King 21 was requested to be launched as tanker. Charlie Horse 14, a Loach had been shot down with 2 SOB. Charlie Horse 26, a UH-1 slick had been shot down after picking up Charlie Horse 14. The aircraft had been downed in a relatively flat area about 700' elevation. The survivors were in the helicopter talking to the FAC on an aircraft radio. They were under attack from enemy as close as 75 meters. King 21 informed Bilk 29 that ARRS would only participate if they were in charge and that the army would have to agree to this. A head Army officer whose call sign was AB assured us that as soon as the SAR forces arrived they would do nothing unless we requested it.

Weather in the area was 2000' to 2500' broken to overcast. The weather and the proximity of the enemy to the survivors precluded the use of fast movers. Soft ordnance on A1 and A37 aircraft was requested at 0509Z.

At 0522Z Jolly Green 73 and 65 together with Sandy 7 and 8 were enroute from CH 77. At 0523 additional Jollys and Sandys from CH 93 were requested. At 0525 a Smoke Flight with CHU 19 was requested. At 0533Z King 21 was informed that it would not receive additional Sandys and Jollys.

At 0539 our first VNAF A-37's checked in. They were the first of several A-37 aircraft that we received from BIG control. All A-37 aircraft carried MK 81 and MK 82 bombs which we could not use against the enemy because they were too close to the survivors. King 21 again requested soft ordnance on A-1 and A-37 aircraft. We were told that it was not available. We continued to see Army Cobra Gunship fire until the Sandys arrived. Jollys 7 and 8 were on scene. At 0607Z soft ordnance was again requested. It was evident that the rescue could not be accomplished without it. At 0612Z King 21 was informed that Sandy 5 and 6 and a smoke flight with CHU 19 would be launched.

The A-37 aircraft had to be used on targets a considerable distance from the survivors because of the type of ordnance they carried. Sandy 7 and 8 expended a portion of their ordnance on suspected enemy positions and continued to trail for enemy fire. At 0725Z Phase A was complete and Phase B was initiated. At 0730Z Jolly Green 73 received ground fire and had to leave the area to check for aircraft damage.

At 0747 soft ordnance was requested again. Jolly Green 66 and 21 went to CH 103 because of damage received during pickup attempt. Their progress was monitored by King 24. Jolly Green 66 and 21 were then moved closer to the SAR scene. Because ordnance would have to be put in during the pick-up, the ordnance on Sandy 7, 8, 5, and 6 had to be conserved. Sandy 7 and 8 had already used up most of their ordnance prior to and during the first pickup attempt. Soft ordnance was again requested in order to strike suspected enemy positions. At 0816 King 24 was informed that Sandy 9 and 10 and 2 A-37 aircraft with Nape were going to be launched to support the SAR.

At 0835Z after using some Sandy ordnance and some Smoke ordnance, Phase A was complete and Phase B was initiated. At 0840Z the first two survivors were on board Jolly 21. By 0845Z the pickup of the 8 survivors was complete. One person had been killed prior to the initiation of the SAR. Two of the survivors were injured, one critically. All survivors were taken to the 95th evac at CH 77.

There were a few problems encountered during this SAR. First, Queen called Panama, the GCI at DaNang and told them not to give King a discrete frequency. The discrete frequency we requested from Panama is to work and coordinate with Fast Movers, Tankers, ABCCC, DASC's and King. This function has nothing to do with Queen. Queens continued denial of this capability from Panama caused us several problems during initial SAR organization. It is obvious that Queen controller did not know how King organizes its radios during a SAR.

Secondly, King was told to expend the A-37's. If enemy activity had come up more than 1000 meters from the survivors, the On Scene Commander would have. However, it should be understood that during a SAR all ordnance that is fragg-ed to the SAR may not be used. This is especially true if it is not of the type requested. Our concern is to get the survivors out, not expend ordnance. Some times King will request to have ordnance available in an extremely hostile situation due to the high probability of its being used, even if the ordnance available is not the right kind, the possibility that it won't be used does exist. However, if it was not available right when it was needed the survivors might be lost.

Finally, King was told to expend the Sandys. That is not our job. Whether or not any ordnance is expended is determined by the On Scene Commander not King. In this specific situation the enemy activity was high enough that a great amount of Sandy ordnance would have to be put in during the pickup. In addition because of the number of people to be picked up, ordnance had to be put in for a long period of time. Additional ordnance had to be made available to be put in prior to the pickup attempt.

31 DEC 71

Page 8

Super Jolly Green Giants in fight to rescue downed Army crewmen

DA NANG AIRFIELD, RVN -- Seven U.S. Army helicopter crewmen were rescued from their downed UH-1 Huey after their Air Force rescuers put up a heated fight against nearby communist forces.

The men of the 17th U.S. Air Cavalry Regiment at Phu Bai, were shot down by enemy ground fire near Khe Sanh.

Within minutes, Air Force rescue forces were on the scene. First to arrive were two Air Force A-1 Skyraiders flown by First Lieutenants Clifton E. Groves and Robert B. Carlson.

"As soon as we arrived, we began laying ordnance around the area to suppress hostile fire," stated Lieutenant Groves. The downed helicopter and the enemy soldiers were both in 10-foot high elephant grass about 25-yards apart.

As soon as the A-1s appeared overhead, the communist soldiers switched

from firing on the downed helicopter with rifles to throwing hand grenades at it.

"When the guys on the ground reported no more fire, we thought we had pretty well sanitized the area," continued the lieutenant, "and we decided to attempt the rescue."

As the first HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant, piloted by Capt. Peter H. Chapman, hovered over the downed men, ground fire broke again, peppering the rescue helicopter with bullets.

The HH-53 began experiencing control problems but returned safely to its base here. Two additional A-1s were now on the scene, and again the area was strafed. The A-1s also dropped smoke to conceal the second rescue attempt from the still-active communist troops.

Meanwhile, a second HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant, flown by Capt. Rodney S. Griffith, launched from Da Nang and flew to the scene.

"The Skyraiders were dropping their ordnance so close it even scared me," said Captain Griffith, "but that's the way we like to have it...that's where it does the most good."

Flying directly into the area of the downed Army men, the crew of the Super Jolly Green Giant kept up a running duel against the ground fire from below. As the Army crew and passengers were pulled aboard, they too added their weapons' fire to defending the rescue helicopter.

"If it hadn't been for one of them with an M-60 machine gun," commented

SEE...53s IN FIGHT Page 3

...53s in fight

Captain Griffith, "we would have been hosed pretty good. Just as an enemy soldier popped up to take aim, the G.I. caught him with a quick burst of fire."

The total time for the rescue took about 10 minutes, and one injured soldier in serious condition was taken to Da Nang's 95th Evacuation Hospital.

Crewmen aboard the rescue helicopter were Capt. Leslie C. Hart, copilot; Sgt. James K. Ashdown, flight engineer; and TSgt. Charles S. Salome, and Sgt. Michael L. Wagner, pararescuemen. All are members of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron.

ROD GRIFFITH ENJOYING AN AFTER-SAR COCKTAIL



355 TFW - DA NANG
THE GUNFIGHTERS

Gunfighter Gazette

Volume VII, No. 2

January 8, 1972

31 DEC 71 SAR

37 ARRS tops 100 saves in '71, over 700 since coming to SEA

The big five-day war was over and it was back to business as usual when, in the afternoon of New Years Eve, the crews of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron here brought their total number of rescues to over 100 for the year and over 700 since the unit has been in the Republic of Vietnam.

The call for help came when a U.S. Army helicopter, a rescue chopper from Delta Troop of the 35th Cavalry at Phu Bai, was hit by ground fire and was forced to land.

They landed in an area of elephant grass, which is about 10 feet high, and they were less than 25 yards from the enemy. The enemy, also in tall grass, held off on their firing when the A-1 "Sandys" arrived, so they wouldn't give
(Continued on Page 5)



LIEUTENANT GROVES
Sandy Pilot

ARRS tops 100 for ye

(Continued

away their position. Instead, they were tossing grenades at the Army crew.

First Lt. Clifton E. Groves and 1st Lt. Robert B. Carlsen, Sandy pilots, were the first to arrive at the scene. "As soon as we arrived," said Lieutenant Groves, "We started laying down our ordnance all around to suppress the bad guys. We thought we had pretty well sanitized the area and, when the guys on the ground reported no more ground fire, we decided to bring in the Jollys for the pickup." Groves was the on scene commander for the operation.

As the first HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant rescue helicopter, piloted Capt Peter H. Chapman, went into a hover he started to receive ground fire, and had to pull out. The A-1 Sandys saturated the area again to make it clear for another attempt. By this time two more Sandys had arrived on the scene.

The first Jolly Green had picked up some hits and was having control problems and had to return to base. The Sandys then started laying down a smoke screen between the "good guys and the bad guys" to make it easier for the second chopper to make the rescue.

Capt. Rodney S. Griffith, aircraft commander on the Jolly Green which made the pick-up, said "The Sandys were dropping their ordnance so close it was even scaring me. But that's where we like to have it. That's where it does the most good." Continuing, the captain said, "All

Helicopters in Action

Rescuers Save Army Men, Help Viets Nab Prisoners

DA NANG AFLD., Vietnam — Seven Army helicopter crewmen have been rescued by an Air Force team that put up a heated fight against communist forces lurking nearby.

The Army men, from the 17th Air Cavalry Regiment at Phu Bai, were picked up by an HH-43 from the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron.

The Army UH-1 was shot down by enemy ground fire near Khe Sanh. Within moments, A-1s piloted by 1st Lt. Clifton E. Groves and 1st Lt. Robert B. Carlsen arrived and "began laying ordnance around the area," according to Lieutenant Groves.

The enemy was in elephant grass about 25 yards from the downed copter. When the A-1s arrived, they stopped firing rifles and began throwing grenades.

But after a while the ground fire stopped. "We thought we had pretty well sanitized the area," Groves said. So, Capt. Peter H. Chapman flew in with an HH-53 to try a rescue.

The communists suddenly opened fire again and peppered the helicopter with bullets, giving it some control problems. The A-1s came back to strafe the area while Chapman's copter limped back to base. One A-1 dropped smoke.

That enabled Capt. Rodney S. Griffith to get in close to the men even though, in his words, "The Skyraiders were dropping their ordnance so close it even scared me."

The HH-53 crew carried on a running duel with communists below, and as the seven Army men got aboard, they added their fire to that of the Air Force men. The entire operation took about 10 minutes.

The crew was flying UH-1 from Pleiku to Qui Nhon, but ran into foul weather. The pilot decided to land when fuel started running low.

A search for the exact site was begun immediately, and eventually an Army plane spotted the parked helicopter.

Meanwhile, the crew was looking around the area and came upon a Viet Cong, later identified as a supply commissar. The startled communist surrendered without a fight.

Search helicopters picked up the crew and the prisoner. The next day, fuel was flown to the area and the helicopter was flown out — after being checked for booby traps.



... AFTER A HOT ORDNANCE

Two ARRS crews save Russian, Icelandic man

HQ ARRS -- Two Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service crews began the new year by helping to save the lives of a Russian and an Icelandic national.

The rescue crews were called upon to aid the foreign nationals in unusual circumstances.

In the first mission, a Cessna 172 pilot from Iceland, crashed in the rigid 38-degree water just three miles short of the runway at the Reykjavik, Iceland, Airport when his single engine malfunctioned.

Seven minutes after the call for help was received at the Keflavik NATO base, an HH-3E Jolly Green Giant from Det. 14, 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing was airborne.

Within 14 minutes, the helicopter crew had located the crash site and were preparing for the rescue pickup.

After a successful pickup (only 27 minutes after the call for help), the Icelandic pilot was taken to Reykjavik where an ambulance was waiting to administer further medical aid.

Members of the Jolly Green Giant crew were Majors Phillip Roberts and William Haskett, Staff Sergeants Carl Armack and Donald J. Taylor and AIC George Daffern.

The next day, a crew from the 71st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, assisted in recovering a Russian seaman from a fishing trawler eight miles off the north shore of Nunivak Island, Alaska. The seaman, Bashmakov Vasilii Andrevich, was suffering from peritonitis and required immediate medical attention.

Previous attempts by the U.S. Coast Guard at Kodiak, Alaska, to evacuate the seaman were unsuccessful due to the weather and the trawler's inability to transfer the seaman to shore near the village of Nekoryuk.

It was decided that helicopter pickup was the only possible way to save the seaman.

The Alaskan Air Command's 5040th Helicopter Squadron launched an HH-3E Jolly Green Giant from Elmendorf with a

light surgeon on board.

At the same time, the 71st ARPSQ dispatched an HC-130 Hercules to provide helicopter escort, inflight refueling for the helicopter, and evacuation of the patient after the helicopter reached shore.

The 5040th helicopter hovered over the trawler and lowered the flight surgeon and a rescue-survival technician to the ship's deck.

The seaman was examined, placed in a Stokes litter, and hoisted aboard the

helicopter. Then the HH-3E airlifted him to the Bethel, Alaska, airstrip.

There he was transferred to the Hercules for a faster flight to the Anchorage International Airport and then to the Alaskan Native Medical Center for treatment.

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Within minutes, Air Force rescue forces were on the scene. First to arrive were two Air Force A-1 Skyraiders flown by First Lieutenants Clifton E. Groves and Robert B. Carlson.

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SEE...53s IN FIGHT Page 3

3rd ARRGp honors Pham Van Dieu for his actions

TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN -- Mr. Pham Van Dieu, of Quang Nuyen District near Saigon, was honored recently by the officers and men of the 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group.

Mr. Dieu was responsible for saving the life of a crewmember of a HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant after the helicopter crashed into the Nha Be River.

Mr. Dieu found the airman in the water near the crash scene, brought him aboard his vessel and carried him to his village. There, Air Force rescuers picked up the injured man and carried him to safety.

Col. Warner A. Britton, 3rd ARRGp commander, presented Mr. Dieu with a plaque and a transistor radio.

34 sets of gold leaves within ARRS

HQ ARRS -- Thirty-four officers assigned to the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service have been tabbed for promotion to major under the FY 1972 temporary promotion program.

Air Force selected 1,630 officers for promotion, including 1,555 primary-zone of which 1,300 are line officers.

Promotions will be effected in monthly increments as vacancies occur beginning this month.

Selected are George F. Armstrong, 40th Sq; Wilson T. Arnold, 67th Sq; Frank E. Brammer, 41st Sq; Robert A. Choate, 41st Wg; Charles R. Cole, 37th Sq; Edward L. Coleman, Det 1, 44th Sq; Dennis L. Constant, 39th Sq; and Ronald A. Cote, 79th Sq.

Also tabbed are Verl K. Diamond, Det 6, 3rd Gp; Walter J. Downs, 39th Sq; Lloyd W. Elsherry, 3rd Gp; Jerome A. Emerson, 43rd Sq; Duane W. Farnham, 40th Wg; Norman R. Foley, 37th Sq; Daniel E. Furlong, 40th Wg; and Thomas R. Gainer, Det 1, 33rd Sq.

Others are Hoyt D. Hawkins, 1550th Wg; Richard D. Hoover, 1552th Sq; Russell T. Jones, 39th Wg; Curtis E. Kelly, 67th Sq; George W. Lightner, 1551st Sq; Arthur F. Machado, Det 15, 43rd Sq; Glynn A. McGregor, Det 16, 42nd Sq; Bobby L. Meadows, 33rd Sq; and Alfred R. Meyer, 71st Sq.

And Robert J. Meyer, Hq ARRS; Aram Paquin, Det 22, 42nd Sq; Donald C. Purvis, 40th Wg; James F. Roller Jr., 1550th Wg; Rondall E. Skinner, 39th Sq; John C. Smith, Det 4, 40th Wg; Phillip W. Smith, 41st Wg; Franklin W. Watkins, 39th Wg; and Edward R. Williams, 1551st Sq.

Pedro crew pulls two from muck

WILLIAMS AFB, Ariz. -- An HH-43B Pedro crew with Det. 16, 42nd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron rescued two boys stuck in mud and was credited with saving one of them.

The rescue helicopter flew to Picacho Reservoir to help Pinal County Sheriff's office in locating and recovering the stranded youngsters. The boys had been stranded in a muddy area of the lake since late afternoon.

Another hunting companion was able to get out and go for help. Sheriff's deputies got out to the lake, but were unable to reach the hunters. They then called Williams AFB for help.

Members of the helicopter crew were Maj. Dean Ketchum, aircraft commander; and SSgt. Phillip Myers, aircraft mechanic and operator of the hoist used to pull the boys out of the waist-deep mud. Also on the mission were Captains Glen McGregor, copilot, and Harry Van Dolah, an Air Force doctor; and SSgt. George Kessel and Sgt. Richard Kinsey, firefighters.

...53s in fight

Captain Griffith, "we would have been hosed pretty good. Just as an enemy soldier popped up to take aim, the G.I. caught him with a quick burst of fire."

The total time for the rescue took about 10 minutes, and one injured soldier in serious condition was taken to Da Nang's 95th Evacuation Hospital.

Crewmen aboard the rescue helicopter were Capt. Leslie C. Hart, copilot; Sgt. James K. Ashdown, flight engineer; and TSgt. Charles S. Salome, and Sgt. Michael L. Wagner, pararescuemen. All are members of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron.

...TV series

Both Air Force and the Department of Defense have approved ARRS cooperation with the producers, and are making every attempt to insure that the program, if aired, is a success.

A pilot script has been submitted by the producers to the major television networks, and the last indication was that one of the networks was very much interested in a 90-minute motion picture pilot, with the right to expand it into a series if the pilot receives a good rating.

The Hollywood Reporter (The Hollywood News Service) carried a recent ar-

ticle that was very optimistic about the success of such a program.

This program will be one of seven proposed series by Herman Rush Associates, "all aimed at family entertainment, for networks and syndication in prime time periods."

The originators of the idea, Bill Hellinger and Clint Young, along with the producers, have visited several locations to gather ideas, including ARRS headquarters and an afternoon with Brig. Gen. Frank K. Everest Jr., ARRS commander.

The series, if produced, will be filmed on location at a selected ARRS unit. All filming will be done without conflicting with normal schedules of training, etc.

The producers are in hopes that the filming can begin this spring and the first showing will be in the fall.

All scripts will be realistic and based on actual past ARRS missions. All aircraft and aspects of the ARRS mission will be featured.

There have been several previous attempts at a similar series, but all failed in the early planning stages.

This one, however, has much support from all levels, and everyone is keeping their fingers crossed.

So keep checking your local television listings, who knows, maybe this fall you can see "yourself" in action again.

...World record

climb to 39,000 feet for the long flight.

If conditions are favorable, the mission commander may elect to extend the flight on to McGuire AFB, N.J., or Andrews AFB, Md., rather than land at Scott.

In addition to breaking the world record for distance, this flight will demonstrate the global capability of ARRS and will assist in identifying any possible operational problems that could affect search and rescue contingency plans requiring such a long range flight.

The crew making this long range flight is: Lt. Col. Edgar L. Allison, mission commander; Capt. Richard J. Racette, pilot; Capt. David E. Gardner, copilot; Maj. Anthony Liparulo and Capt. Carl E. Bennett, navigators; Technical Sergeants Morelle E. LaRouche and William F. Litton, flight engineers; Staff Sergeants Pat E. Carrothers and William L. Hippert, radio operators; TSgt. Theodore F. Trainer, loadmaster; SSgt. Robert K. Landry, crew chief; and Maj. Kenneth S. Wayne, flight surgeon.

Its Jolly Green Giant a 'known' nickname

HQ ARRS -- Have you ever wondered about the origin of the nickname "Jolly Green Giant?"

And the reference is to the helicopter version, not the "Ho, Ho, Ho" one.

This is how it came about, according to a sheet of information uncovered recently in the Hq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service historian's office.

The CH-3Cs which arrived in Southeast Asia in July 1965 were not originally nicknamed the Jolly Green Giants.

The first Jolly Green's were HH-43Bs located at Udorn Airfield, Thailand, under the command of a Capt. Dave Allen. During the initial stage of operations, Captain Allen arranged for camouflage painting of the H-43s.

The only paint available at that time was a bright green.


Although somewhat obscure, the term Jolly Green was descriptive of the paint job as expressed by an Australian Caribou pilot flying out of Udorn.

The word Giant was applied to the CH-3C when it arrived to differentiate between the two types of helicopters operating there.

When static call signs were assigned in lieu of changing call signs, the Jolly Green Giant nickname was permanently assigned to the CH-3 and the H-43s reverted to their Pedro call sign.

Now, we're wondering how the Pedro nickname came about?

Does anyone have the answer?



CREW MEMBERS OF AN HC-130 Hercules from the 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Cam Ranh Bay AB, Vietnam, watch as the aircraft's aerial refueling hose and receptacle are extended for a fuel-thirsty HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant. This teamwork increases the helicopter's range in search and rescue missions. (Air Force News Service Photo)

CHARLIE HORSE 26
31 DEC 71

DATE: 31 DEC 71

MISSION NUMBER: 1-111

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: 1-111

MISSION OBJECTIVE: 1-111

LOCATION: 1-111

SAVES: 7 COMBAT

At 0459Z King 21 received a call on ground for help from Bilk 29. He informed King 21 that he had several helicopters down in the high bank area. A SAA objective was confirmed by Bilk 29 as 8 persons down, 3 of which were injured, at coordinates XD 857374. At 0502Z Jollys and Sandys were requested from Queen. At 0503Z King 21 was requested to be launched as number. Charlie Horse 14, a Loach had been shot down with 2 SOB. Charlie Horse 26, a OH-1 Click had been shot down after picking up Charlie Horse 14. The aircraft had been downed in a relatively flat area about 700' elevation. The survivors were in the helicopter talking to the FAC on an aircraft radio. They were under attack from enemy as close as 75 meters. King 21 informed Bilk 29 that AAS would only participate if they were in charge and that the army would have to agree to this. A head Army officer whose call sign was Ab assured us that as soon as the SAA forces arrived they would do nothing unless we requested it.

Weather in the area was 2000' to 2500' broken to overcast. The weather and the proximity of the enemy to the survivors precluded the use of fast movers, soft ordnance on A1 and A37 aircraft was requested at 0509Z.

At 0522Z Jolly Green 73 and 65 together with Sandy 7 and 8 were enroute from CH 77. At 0523 additional Jollys and Sandys from CH 93 were requested. At 0525 a Smoke flight with CBU 19 was requested. At 0533Z King 21 was informed that it would not receive additional Sandys and Jollys.

At 0539 our first VNAF A-37's checked in. They were the first of five sets of A-37 aircraft that we received from BIG control. All A-37 aircraft carried MK 81 and MK 82 bombs which we could not use against the enemy because they were too close to the survivors. King 21 again requested soft ordnance on A-1 and A-37 aircraft. We were told that it was not available. Bilk 29 continued to use Army Cobra Gunship fire until the Sandys arrived. At 0601 Sandy 7 and 8 were on scene. At 0607Z soft ordnance was again requested. It was evident that the rescue could not be accomplished without it. At 0623Z King 21 was informed that Sandy 5 and 6 and A smoke flight with CBU 19 would be launched.

The A-37 aircraft had to be used on targets a considerable distance from the survivors because of the type of ordnance they carried. Sandy 7 and 8 expended a portion of their ordnance on suspected enemy positions and continued to troll for enemy fire. At 0725Z Phase A was complete and Phase B was initiated. At 0738Z Jolly Green 73 received ground fire and had to leave the area to check for aircraft damage.

1

SECRET

GROUP-4
Downgraded and/or removed from automatic
Declassification or 12 years

1. At 1205, 31 December 1971, a SAR was declared for Charley Horse 14 with 8 persons and Loch 26 with 2 persons. Loch 26 was later found to be in a friendly area and picked up without incident. Queen was the controlling agency so the SARCO did not become involved in the SAR effort.

2. The TUOC and 1st SOS did respond to the request for support and provided aircraft and ordnance requested by Queen. All survivors were picked up by Jolly Green 21. Sandy 07 was on-scene commander.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As Smoke 44, and lead smoke bird, I did not orient myself as necessary to properly deliver the first smoke pass.

MICHAEL J. FAAS, Captain, USAF
Smoke 44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~