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more difficult than the others, were unusual for some reason, or resulted in proposed changes in concepts and tactics.

Ashcan 01

On the morning of 10 December 1971, Ashcan 01, an F-105G out of Korat RTAFB, was downed by a SAM in the Mu Gia Pass. The pilot, Major Robert E. Belli, had received launch indications and had started evasive action when his aircraft was hit. The aircraft went immediately out of control and Major Belli called for the backseater to get out while he (Major Belli) went for his ejection handles. Major Belli recalled that the negative "G" forces made it almost impossible to reach the handles, but "I do remember finally grabbing them. And that's all I do remember until I woke up on the ground." ^{65/}

Major Belli's impact with the trees was so great that his parachute was torn in half and he was completely separated from the shroud lines. When he awoke, approximately 15 minutes after his ejection, he discovered that he had a badly broken arm and a dislocated knee. The injuries immobilized him and, in his own words, "I knew that I was going to stay right there until either they rescued me or something else happened." ^{66/}

Word was received at NKP on Ashcan 01's plight at 1027, and the Jolly Greens were scrambled with Jolly Green 52 to act as low aircraft. When the Jolly Greens arrived at the scene, it was learned that neither the OV-10 Nail FAC nor the Sandy had been able to locate the survivor due to poor weather. In the immediate area of the survivor, the weather was completely

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overcast with bases of the clouds extending to the ground. Winds were from the northeast, gusting to over 30 knots.^{67/}

Jolly Green 52 located a hole in the clouds about three miles southwest of the survivor and descended below the overcast. Each attempt to head north toward the survivor was met with a wall of clouds and on many occasions, while looking for a clear route, the helicopter was forced to climb up through the clouds. Attempts from the north were barred by 6,000-foot mountains, while the ridge that the survivor was on precluded attempts from the west.^{68/}

At one time, a SAM passed within 200 feet of Jolly Green 52 and on four other occasions, the Jolly received hits from automatic groundfire after drifting over Mu Gia Pass. Another flight of Jolly Greens arrived in the area and became the target for several SAM firings. As the afternoon progressed, weather conditions worsened in the area and it was decided at 1730 to call off the SAR effort for the day. Sandy gave Ashcan 01 bed-down instructions and insured him that the SARTF would be back first thing the next morning. With the weather and the approaching darkness, the survivor allowed that there was not much that could be done about it and he settled down for the night awaiting first light.^{69/}

The Sandys and the Jollys held a meeting at NKP that night to discuss the best method of operation for the next day's effort. It was determined at that time that there just was no better way to do it except wait for the weather to improve. Later that night, however, Major Kenneth Ernest, the

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[REDACTED]

pilot of Jolly Green 52 scheduled for the Jolly Green Low position the following morning, called a meeting of his crew to brief a tactic that had never been tried before. Major Ernest told the author: ^{70/}

We just decided to go in in the weather--in a hover right on the trees. Everyone was briefed on just how I wanted our position passed. We knew at times that there would just be one person who would have sight of a tree, and everybody else would be IFR and I would just fly on that one person. If someone sighted something on one side of the airplane or in the rear he would say "clear" in that area. That would mean he had something in sight then he would start giving "move left five feet" and I'd have my eyes out front hoping I could catch something. And then we would leap to it and wait for something else to clear in front and then leap to that tree.

The SARTF arrived back on the scene at 0545, 11 December, and awaited first light. Major Ernest's crew in Jolly Green 30 (Jolly Low) secured a doppler fix from over the survivor's position to aid in returning to him and, since the weather was about the same as the day before, Jolly Green 30 descended through a hole in the clouds and began searching. Beginning his run-in to Ashcan 01 from about two miles southwest, Major Ernest was IFR and required assistance in locating the survivor. The assistance was provided by a Sandy and a Pave Nail. The Sandy orbited behind the Jolly Green and provided headings for the Jolly through direction finder cuts with the survivor. The Pave Nail orbited 90 degrees off the Jolly's track and monitored the angle between DF cuts on the survivor and on the Jolly. ^{71/}

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In this manner, Jolly Green 30 slowly made its way from tree to tree toward Ashcan 01 Alpha. Along the way, the parachute of Ashcan 01 Bravo (the backseater) was discovered. A flight surgeon aboard Jolly Green 30 determined that the man (who had by then been hanging in his parachute harness for over 20 hours, suspended in a tree, with the wind causing him to swing against the tree trunk) was not alive. An unenviable decision had to be made at that time by Major Ernest. To retrieve the body would require lowering a PJ on Jolly Green 30's only penetrator. With the gusting winds making the helicopter difficult to control, this meant risking the life of the PJ and losing the penetrator. Without the penetrator the mission would have to be aborted, and with Ashcan 01 Alpha calling out that he was just a short distance away, Major Ernest elected to continue to the survivor. In discussing the decision he made, Major Ernest recalled thinking: ^{72/}

. . . What happens if I lower the PJ down there-- we only have one penetrator. . . what happens if I get him or the penetrator stuck down there in the trees? We would have to abort the whole mission because we wouldn't have a penetrator to pick up Alpha. That's one thing--also risking the life of the PJ going after a dead man, that's the second thing. Also--here's a live man. Let's get him. Let's get him right now.

The coordination between the Jolly, the Pave Nail, and the Sandy resumed as Jolly Green 30 continued to inch its way toward Alpha until a hover was established over Major Belli. Approximately one hour had been spent in mostly IFR weather for Jolly Green 30 to move the two miles or so to Ashcan 01 Alpha. Major Belli described the pickup from his vantage point on the ground: ^{73/}

[REDACTED]

The rain and winds were still gusty, and I could see the cloud cover right over the top of the tree canopy. Anyway, they finally got over me, and they asked if I wanted a PJ to come down. I told them I guessed one had better since I wasn't in much of a condition to help myself. Actually, they sent two down, which was probably lucky because I think it took both of them to get me on the penetrator. It was kind of funny, because I could see the penetrator with the PJs coming down, and I could see the bottom of the helicopter, but the top of it was in the clouds. I thought that chopper pilot must be having one helluva tough time trying to hover there, with the gusty winds, and him just about IFR. Anyway, they got me on the penetrator and pulled me aboard.

Major Ernest, who won the Aviation/Space Writers' Association Helicopter Heroism Award for his part in the Ashcan 01 Alpha rescue, gave much of the credit to Major Belli. The importance of the actions taken by the survivor was emphasized when Major Ernest said, "I didn't make the pickup. The guy on the ground helped so damn much. His vectors--stuff like that, trying to get me to him--little helpful hints on what the area looked like, what to look for."^{74/}

The rescue of Ashcan 01 Alpha marked the first time an IFR recovery had been made. Several observations and suggestions resulted from the operation. Some of these were:^{75/}

1. An LNRS night pickup was considered but prevented by the weather in the area the night of the 10th.
2. The modified doppler on the LNRS aircraft proved to be very accurate and it was recommended that all HH-53 helicopters be so equipped.

3. The Pave Nail FACs used on the mission proved that the aircraft could be a very important part of the rescue force.

4. Using the same Jolly Green crews for the continuation of the mission the next day worked very well. It was recommended that this be made a standard procedure.

Falcon 74

Due to fuel starvation, the crew of Falcon 74--an F-4D from Udorn RTAFB--was forced to eject on 18 December 1971. Both Alpha and Bravo landed safely near the NVN-Laotian border, found cover, and awaited rescue. Soon after, an Air America pilot located their position and passed it on to the arriving SARTF. The Sandys reported both chutes in sight, but with approaching darkness and poor weather conditions, it was decided to await first light before attempting a rescue. The survivors were given instructions to maintain radio contact through the night and wait for the SARTF to return the following morning.^{76/}

The Sandys were on the scene early on the morning of 19 December and informed the crew that the Jolly Green was coming in to make the pick-up. Since Alpha had reported people near him, Jolly Green 62 was positioned to pick him up first. While maneuvering to pick Alpha up, the helicopter received several rounds of automatic fire in its right engine which almost resulted in loss of the aircraft. Jolly Green 62 was able to leave the area and was escorted by two A-1s to an alternate airfield. The remaining Sandy began calling in airstrikes to neutralize the area while awaiting replacement

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FROM: 1st SCS (Maj Miller/2010)

13 December, 1971

SUBJECT: SARCO Report, Ashcan 01

TO: 56 SCW (DO)

1. On 10 December, 1971, a SAR was declared at 1025L for Ashcan 01, a F-105, approximate location 075/65/09. Jack launched Sandy 01 & 02, plus Jolly Greens 52, 57, 53 & 30. Radio contact was established with Ashcan 01A, who was reported in good spirits although he apparently had a broken arm and possibly a broken leg.

2. SARCO requested and Jack approved launch of Sandy 03 & 04 for escort of the Jolly Greens. Sandy 01 & 02 were airborne at 1039L and Sandy 03 & 04 were airborne at 1056L.

3. Combat Operations coordinated the release of other Hobo assets to give a back-up Sandy capability and Smoke resources. Sandy 04 air aborted and Sandy 09 & 10 were launched to replace them. Jack did scramble Sandy 05 & 06 for this but their launch was cancelled and Sandy 09 & 10 were airborne at 1152L.

4. Additional aircraft were then uploaded to Smoke configuration as they became available. Jetter had requested further Smoke aircraft be uploaded and aircraft previously designated as Sandy back-up were re-loaded. The aircraft in Sandy 03 flight were repaired and used for Sandy 11 & 12 as they became available.

5. Pave Nail FACs were requested and a local training flight was diverted to this mission, and an additional sortie was generated.

6. Jolly Green 32 & 55 had been launched from Ubon and were then recovered at NKP to be used as back-up.

7. Word was received at 1152L that the early portion of Phase Bravo was in effect and Jolly Green 52 had a chute in sight and was putting a P.J. down. This was terminated at 1203L and the chute was determined not to be that of a survivor.

8. Good radio contact was maintained with Ashcan 01 A, but weather at his location was reported as "on the trees". Jolly Green 52 flight pulled out to air refuel at 1348L and Jolly Green 53 flight assumed the search. Another set of Sandys was requested as Sandy 01 & 02 would reach Bingo fuel shortly. At 1350L Sandy 11 & 12 were notified and were airborne at 1422L.

9. Smoke was requested by Jack at 1408L and Smoke 41 & 45 were airborne at 1429L, Smoke 46 & 47 were airborne at 1432L. A report was received at this time that Jolly Green 52 had taken some small arms hits, but no problems were evident and he was remaining in the effort.

10. During the period from 1430L to approximately 1530L much confusion was apparent in the radio transmissions with requests for Fast Mover Smoke and the reasons they were not able to launch. Also during this time the status and number of Pave Nail equipped aircraft was confused and coordination through

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Combat Operations eventually straightened this out. Pave Nail 07 did RTB at 1500L and he passed a very accurate location of the downed crewmember.

11. Sandy 07 & 08 were scheduled for rotation from Da Mang back to NKP and they were used to relieve Sandy 09 & 10. They arrived in the area at approximately 1630L and Sandy 11 then assumed on-scene command from Sandy 09.

12. During the period 1530L to 1800L many requests for ordnance were relayed through King and the ordnance was apparently not available. Pave Nail FACs were scheduled through-out the night and they would be assuming on-scene command.

13. An additional Smoke flight was launched, Smoke 42 & 43 at Blue Chip's request and they were airborne at 1830L. Sandys and Jollys on-scene RTB'd at night fall and recovered at NKP between 1825L and 1840L.

14. During the night contact was maintained with Ashcan 01 A by the Nail FAC on-scene-commanders. However the ordnance which had been requested by King was not available, or not coordinated, until approximately 0200, 11 December. I was debriefed at 2200L by the first Pave Nail On-scene commander during the night and he had received no ordnance.

15. The first-light effort was coordinated locally and briefing for all aircrews was set for 0330L, 11 December. Take-off times were established so the forces could be over the survivor at first-light. These forces included 4 Sandy aircraft, 4 Jolly Greens, a Pave Nail FAC, and a visual FAC. Smoke aircraft were also on ground alert at this time.

16. All forces arrived in the survivors area at approximately 0550L. Weather was reported as still on the trees, good voice contact was again established with Ashcan 01 A.

17. Fast Mover Smoke was launched at 0650L. Smoke pilots here were alerted but not utilized.

18. Jolly Green 30 reported visual contact with Ashcan 01 B at 0710L, reported to be inactive and J.G. 30 continued to Ashcan 01 A position. A P.J. was put on the ground and the survivor was successfully picked up at 0717L. All SAR forces RTB'd to NKP at 0725L.

19. Survivor and all forces recovered at NKP at 0735L. SAR terminated.

20. The Pave Nail FACs and their equipment capabilities and limitations must be briefed to all concerned agencies. This equipment can now enable the SAR forces to continue their efforts throughout the night to isolate the survivor from hostile forces. The capability to accurately locate the survivor's position is invaluable during a prolonged SAR such as this one.

Craig V. Miller

CRIG V. MILLER, Major, USAF
SARCO, 1st SCS

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Sandy 01 flight was scrambled for cockpit alert at 0320Z 10 Dec. Prior to reaching the aircraft, Sandy 01 flight received a launch order, and instructed Sandy Three and Four to assume cockpit alert. At 0330Z King passed coordinates to Sandy One indicating that the SAR scene was in an extremely high threat area, and Sandy 01 requested immediate launch of Sandy Three flight, BLU-52, CBU-49, and CBU-42. Sandy 01 flight was airborne at 0339Z, with some difficulty experienced in the arming area with a slow aiming crew.

Sandy 01 flight rendezvoused with Nail 49 and Nail 43, who had taken on-scene command at the time the downed aircraft, Ashcan 01, (F-105F) had been hit by a SAM. Nail 49 briefed Sandy 01 on the area, defenses, and E & E areas. The survivor was in high ground just west of the center of Mu Ghia Pass, and the immediate area was covered with a solid low cloud deck. Sandy 01 took on-scene command and verified Ashcan 01's approximate position using UHF timing cuts provided by the Nails and by flying low over the clouds until the survivor heard the A-1 directly overhead.

Sandy 01 then attempted to fly over the survivor under the clouds. Ceilings deteriorated from approximately 300 feet within ten KM of the survivor down to zero at a point approximately two clicks short of his position. Sandy 01 and 02 were forced to pull up and then fly back down through the pass itself in order to avoid the weather-obscured high ground to the North.

At this time it was decided that A-1s could not hope to operate below the clouds, but that the high ground appeared free of any enemy activity

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It was decided by Sandy 01 and Jolly Green 52 that the Jolly would attempt to search the area under the clouds alone. It was at this time that the capabilities of the Pavenail OV-10 were utilized, and this system contributed significantly to what was to be a very different kind of SAR. Nail 07, Pavenail equipped, joined on Sandy 01's wing and was led over the survivor above the weather. Nail 07 thus obtained a LORAN location which could serve as a permanent reference for entire SAR force. Nail 07 then vectored Jolly 52 in above the clouds, allowing the Jolly to zero its doppler gear on the same fix.

This entire process took only fifteen minutes, and saved valuable time in the search which followed. JG52 then began what was to be a seven hour search in the weather. Sandy acted as radio relay between the Jolly and Ashcan 01. Nail 07 continued to act as a sort of airborne GCI site for the Jolly, using the Pavenail Loran and UHF homing.

Further checks with Ashcan 01 determined that he had a broken arm and leg injury. He had two survival radios, and checks were made of each. He also had his flares and gyrojet. At one point, JG52 located a parachute and asked Ashcan to pop a smoke. It was later determined that the chute had been a flare chute and was located some 3-4 klicks Southwest of the survivor's actual position. Also during this time, the Jolly received small arms fire from a point near the rim of the pass well SW of Ashcan's position. A single gyrojet round was requested by Sandy 01 and Ashcan, fired. However the rocket did not appear to clear the clouds.

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During one of JG52's efforts to locate a closer break in the undercast, a SAM warning was broadcast and Sandy 01 observed the SAM tracking JG52 and Sandy 01. The missile broke out above clouds, passed directly under JG52, continued on toward Sandy 01, and reentered the clouds below without detonating. An unknown number of SAM's and unguided rockets were fired at the SAR force and it's Ironhand and MIG-cap cover. These firings continued into the night.

Sandy 01 flight reached fuel bingo at approximately 0900Z, and briefed Sandy 01 flight. JG52 and 53 were trading off on the low-altitude search, one searching while the other returned to King to refuel. Sandy 01 passed command to Sandy 11 flight, who bedded down the survivor for the night. Strikes were put into the pass area all night, and Nail FACs maintained constant radio contact with Ashcan 01. A-1's delivered BLU-52 onto the route structure during the period.

The first light effort was launched at 2310Z with Sandy 01 and Sandy 03 flights, and the same JG crews from the previous days in JG 30 (52) and JG 53. It was hoped that weather would permit an A-1 escorted pickup, but again, the ceilings were on the treetops. S01 showed S02 and S03 the survivor's general location, and Nail 07 again vectored JG 30 in for a doppler update. Sandy 01 made an attempt to fly over the survivor under the clouds, but was forced to turn around approximately 1500 meters west of his position. On egress, S01 encountered ground fire from the same location that had hit the Jolly the day before, and S01 silenced this fire with a rocket/20MM/7.62 pass.

JG30 again began the treetop search, and it became evident to Nail 07 and Sandy 01 that the original doppler fix was well south-some 1100 meters -- of the survivor.

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JG30 therefore began working North, and discovered Ashcan 01 Bravo, whose body was hanging in his parachute. Because Ashcan 01 Alpha could hear the Jolly's rotor for the first time in the SAR, it was decided to move toward his position without attempting to recover Bravo. Alpha was located some 200 meters to the North, and a PJ brought him on board at approximately 0000Z. High winds prevented JG30 from turning around to the south, and a backwards hover movement was impossible due to the lack of visibility. Therefore, no further effort was made to recover Bravo's body.

This SAR saw remarkable assistance rendered to the Sandy/Jolly force by the Nails of the 23rd TASS. Their initial work in locating the survivor and their assistance to SO1 in communicating with Ashcan 01 was invaluable, as were the PAVENAIL contributions of Nail 07 in guiding aircraft to the survivor. Although serious problems were encountered in obtaining adequate area denial ordnance from BLUE CHIP, the Nails did succeed in saturating the pass area from Delta 29 to Delta 30 for the twelve hours between sunset and sunrise. Nail 49 continued to direct strikes during the first high effort. No SAMs were fired during the three hour pickup effort, indicating the probable effect of the night's strikes.

Any further SAR should include a request for a PAVENAIL, and the systems contribution increases with deteriorating weather. It should be noted that A-1 IFR delivery of BLU-52 is completely feasible using the PAVENAIL as lead-in.

The Ashcan 01 SAR saw a lot of teamwork and coordination, but its real success rest with two Jolly Greens who hovered unescorted in rugged terrain for almost seven hours. Visibilities during this period generally

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included only the treetops immediately below the helicopter. Only the lack of hostile inhabitants in the survivors area and the skill of the Jollys made rescue possible.

EDWARD R. JAYNE II, Capt, USAF
Sandy 01

10 Dec

Sandy 1 - Jayne

Sandy 2 - Priobe

Sandy 3 - Encinas

Air Abort

Sandy 4 - Horklots

Sandy 9 - Bowden

Sandy 10 - Welken

Sandy 11 - Little

Sandy 12 - Paas

Sandy 07 - Burke

Sandy 08 - Fossum

11 Dec

Sandy 1 - Jayne

2 - Encinas

3 - Whaylen

4 - Throckmorton

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10 DEC 71

0001 HY LOG OPENED
 0400 HY CARRIED FORSTAY TO COMM CENTER AND TODAY'S
 FLIGHT SCHEDULE TO T40C
 0505 HY PASSED MX AND SAR POSTURE TO JABAR
 0700 HY PASSED ITEM REPORT TO JOKER
 0715 TO SSGT HARDY OFF DUTY / SGT DAVISON ON DUTY
 0820 TO PEDRO 42 OUT OF COMMISSION FOR TACK GEN CHANGE / ETIC 20 min
 0840 TO JG 55 ↑ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
 0905 TO JOKER ADVISES NO LOCALS TO BE FLOWN TODAY
 0905 TO JG 32 ↑ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
 1011 SH JG 32 & 55 ↓ CH 93 JACK / TEEPEE
 1025 SH AND BY JACK BRING ACFT TO COCKPIT ALERT
 1027 SH **SCRAMBLE ALERT ACFT / COORDINATES 075/65/89**
 ACFT IS A F-105
 CALL SIGN ASH CAN 2 / BEEPER ON VOICE CONTACT
 1035 TO JG 52/57 ↑ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
 1045 TO PEDRO 42 ↑ CH 89 / T.P.
 1055 TO JACK SAYS LAUNCH JG 30/53 / CREW - MX
 1113 TO SOUTH BIRDS TO RTB FOR B/UP ALERT / JACK
 1115 TO JG 30/53 ↑ CH 89 / JACK-T.P.
 1130 ~~TO~~ ~~JG 55/32 SENT TO SAR AREA FROM CH 93~~
 1155 TO **IN PHASE "B" AT PRESENT / SHUTE WAS SITED, A-MAN NOT IN AREA**
 1200 TO PEDRO 42 ↓ CH 89 / T.P.
PJ ON GROUND FROM JG-52 / HAS SITED A-1 MAN
 1220 TO JG 60 IN COMMISSION / JACK-T.P.
 1235 TO JG 55/32 ↓ CH 89 / JACK-T.P. JG 60 WILL REPLACE JG-55
 1310 TO **JG 52 TAKING GUN FIRE / NO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE / JACK**
 1315 AP **A1 MAN HAS BROKEN ARM AND BROKEN LEG**
HAVE TO PUT PJ'S IN TO GET HIM
 1335 TO JG 55 BACK IN COMMISSION / JACK-T.P.
 1345 TO **JG 30/53**
 SECONDARY FORCES NOW IN SAR AREA / JG 52/57 ARE TOT LWS
 RE FUEL
 1435 TO **JG 52/57 HAVE BEEN REFUELED AND HAVE BEEN PUT ON HOLD**
 PEDRO ... A ... / ...
 ...

10 DEC (CONT)

35 ZD JG55 IN COMMISSION / JACK-T.P.
40 ZD JG 30/53 ↓ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
50 ZD JG 57 ↓ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
58 ZD JG 52 ↓ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
150 RH SGT DAVISON OFF DUTY SSGT HARVEY ON DUTY II
30 RH PASS DAAR TO JOKER
400 RH LOG CLOSED

11 DEC 71

21 RH LOG OPEN
20 RH RECEIVED MAINT ON ALL ACFT
00 RH CARRIED FORSTATE TO COMM CENTER AND TODAY'S SCHEDULE TO TUC
30 RH PASS MAINT STATUS & SAR POSTURE TO JACK
10 PB JG 30/57 ↑ CH89 TO SAR AREA // NOTIFIED JACK & TP
15 PB JG 53/55 ↑ CH89 TO SAR AREA // NOTIFIED JACK & TP
150 PB PASSED DIR TO JOKER //
750 ZD JG-30/50/53/55 ↓ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
255 ZD CREWMEMBER
800 ZD LATE ENTRIES / 0718G ~~SAR~~ "B" MAN SITED IN TREE, WAS NOT ALIVE
0714L PG ON GND FOR "A" MAN PICK-UP, JG 30 MADE PICK-UP
0720L JGS DEPART SAR AREA / 1730L SAR TERMINATED...

335 ZD JG ⁶⁰61/55 ↑ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
415 ZD JG 32 ↑ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
550 ZD JG 66/21 ↓ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
740 ZD JG 55/32 ↓ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
830 ZD JG 71 ↓ CH89 / JACK-T.P.
900 RH SGT DAVISON OFF DUTY SSGT HARVEY ON DUTY
000 RH PASSED DAAR TO JOKER "CNR"
400 RH LOG CLOSED

12 DEC 71

0001 RH LOG OPEN
300 RH RECEIVED MAINT STATUS ON ALL ACFT
400 RH CARRIED FORSTATE REPORT TO COMM CENTER AND TODAY'S SCHEDULE TO TUC
430 RH PASS MAINT STATUS & SAR POSTURE TO JACK
0730 PT SGT HARVEY ON DUTY, SGT. POSNER ON DUTY



RESCUE

NEWS LETTER OF THE AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE

VOL. 2, NO. 1

Scott AFB, Ill. 62225

JANUARY 1972

ARRS wraps up another year 25th anniversary highlights 1971

HQ ARRS -- "The men and women of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service have provided the Air Force, the nation, and mankind with unparalleled service. Its accomplishments are particularly reflected by the gratitude of the more than 22,000 people whose lives have been saved," commented Gen. John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff, USAF, on the 25th anniversary of ARRS, March 13, 1971. "The record of ARRS stands as an inspiration to all those who serve their country."

1971 was a fitting culmination of 25 years of service to mankind, and an even better foundation for a successful future, for it was a year with epic accomplishments that will be etched forever in history.

In missions of unusual scope and diversity, ARRS crews saved the lives of 250 men in Southeast Asia and 482 men and women throughout other areas of the world. They will long remember ARRS as an example of a selfless attitude that reflects the high value the people of the United States have always placed on human life. ARRS crews not only saved lives, but served as unofficial goodwill ambassadors to all nations of the world.

Three times in less than nine months ARRS pararescuemen parachuted to Russian vessels far out in the sea to assist sick or injured sailors in critical condition. The 57th ARRSq at Lajes Airfield, Azores, and the 304th ARRSq (Reserves) at Portland International Airport, Ore., flew hundreds of miles over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in response to these pleas for help.

SEE...ARRS WRAPS UP Page 3

Italians honor Det 10

AVIANO AB, Italy -- Det. 10, 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing at Aviano AB has been honored by the Italian International Organization of Mountain Spirit.

The organization, an official agency of the government of Italy, awarded the detachment with The Order and Star of the Thistle (Cardo).

SEE...DET 10 HONORED Page 6



MSGT. LEON FULLWOOD, a pararescueman, is welcomed back to his base after he descended on the HH-53's jungle penetrator to assist the injured major to safety.

PJs jump in Pacific, save Caribou pilot pinned in cockpit

HQ ARRS -- Two Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service pararescuemen saved an Air Force pilot (Dec. 19) when his C-7 Caribou was forced to ditch in the Pacific Ocean southwest of San Francisco after a flight from Hawaii.

TSgt. Lewis Craig and SSgt. Michael Fish jumped from an HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant to rescue the pilot, Capt. Donald Henderson, from the cockpit of his sinking aircraft.

The cargo plane, originally from Cam Ranh Bay AB, Republic of Vietnam, was part of a flight of 12 C-7s enroute to the U.S. for maintenance. The flight had stopped at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and was enroute to Langley AFB, Va., with a

SEE...PJs JUMP Page 4

Rescue saves F-105 pilot in Laos

TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN -- One of the most dramatic air rescues in recent months took place in Laos (Dec. 11) when an Air Force F-105 Thunderchief pilot was retrieved after his aircraft was downed by a surface to air missile (SAM) near the Mu Gia Pass.

A harrowing 20 hours for the pilot on the ground in Laos preceded his rescue.

The pilot, Maj. Robert E. Belli, was supporting an interdiction mission about eight miles northwest of the pass on Dec. 10 when his aircraft was downed by a SAM from the North Vietnamese side of the border.

The 39th and 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadrons were immediately notified of the crash and sped to the area.

The major had successfully ejected and the search and rescue (SAR) force of HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giants and HC-130 Hercules found him in hostile territory.

The SAR aircraft established both voice and beeper contact with the pilot of the downed aircraft, who reported he was in a secure position although enemy troops were in the area.

Due to deteriorating weather, the SAR aircraft were unable to extract the pilot before darkness, and he spent the night on the ground.

He reported he had a broken arm and a possible broken leg but there was little the rescue force could do for him until the weather broke.

SEE...SAVES PILOT IN LAOS Page 3



CAPT. ALVIA W. MOORE II, r, returns to Bien Hoa AB, Republic of Vietnam, after his successful rescue from hostile territory. Capt. Stephen Tyler, l, was the aircraft commander of the HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant that made the rescue. SEE PAGE 4 FOR STORY.

10 DEC 71

...ARRS wraps up

Also in the Pacific area, a 31st ARRSQ crew rescued 25 Chinese off the coast of the Philippines when their merchant vessel was swamped and the crew forced to abandon ship.

Earlier in the year, the 55th ARRSQ (now at Eglin AFB, Fla.), McCoy AFB, saved the life of a sailor aboard a Liberian oil tanker 800 miles east of Puerto Rico; Dets 10 and 11, 43rd ARRSQ Laredo and Laughlin AFB's, Tex., respectively, assisted the Mexican government to evacuate 19 victims of a flash flood in northern Mexico, and flew Mexican government officials in order that they might survey the stricken areas; a 54th ARRSQ HC-130 crew at Pease AFB, N.H., transported surgical clips from the U.S. to Keflavik, Iceland, and were credited with saving a neurosurgery patient's life; the 31st ARRSQ again responded to a call for help from four Taiwan fishing boats that had run aground and capsized, saving the lives of 23 fishermen; the 33rd ARRSQ, Kadena AB, Okinawa, saved 10 Filipinos when the ship, Yakal, was in distress; another flash flood in northern Mexico and this time Det. 10, 43rd ARRSQ airlifted 91 stranded people to safety; and two PJs from the 41st ARRSQ, Hamilton AFB, Calif., saved the life of a C-7 Caribou pilot forced to ditch in the Pacific Ocean off the California coast.

Apollo missions, 14 and 15, found ARRS men and aircraft stationed around the world ready to respond in event the missions encountered difficulty.

Total ARRS support during the various stages of the Apollo 15 mission involved 16 aircraft at six locations and more than 200 personnel. This rescue force provided launch site, launch abort, secondary and contingency landing area, and planned end of mission support for the Apollo 15 mission.

Early in 1971, prior to the Apollo 14 mission, ARRS crews successfully demonstrated their emergency Apollo recovery capability when they picked up three simulated astronauts from an Apollo capsule mockup 520 miles off the east coast of Florida during the night.

Brig. Gen. Frank K. Everest, Jr., commander, ARRS, explained that test proves ARRS has "an efficient and effective means of recovering astronauts who are forced to abort a mission in the first crucial minutes after launch, whether during the night or day."

In support of NASA's space program, Det. 21, 43rd ARRSQ at Ellington AFB, Tex., is responsible for the astronauts' safety during their training in the Lunar Landing Training Vehicle (LLTV). In January 1971, the unit's HH-43 was on the scene just 15 seconds after a NASA pilot was forced to eject from the LLTV because of electrical power loss.

With the organization of the 1550th Aircrew Training and Test Wing at Hill AFB, Utah, ARRS is now responsible as manager of the school, which includes the consolidated Air Force helicopter, the HC-130 specialized aircrew, and the pararescue training schools.

1971 found new ARRS aircraft entering both the active and reserve units.

HH-1 Hueys began to replace some of

the HH-43 Pedros in the ARRS local base rescue mission, and several of the reserve rescue squadrons received HH-34 helicopters to replace the amphibious HU-16 Albatross.

ARRS crews once again flew history-making transoceanic flights to replace older existing resources with new and more advanced aircraft.

Early last year, HH-53Cs flew 9,000 miles from Eglin AFB to Da Nang Airfield, Vietnam, to replace HH-53Bs, and in November two HH-53Cs flew from Pease AFB to Woodbridge AB, England, to replace the 67th ARRSQ's HH-3 Jolly Green Giants.

Some HH-53s were equipped with a night recovery system, giving a new capability to our rescue crews to extract downed personnel in a combat environment 24 hours a day.

Late in 1970, two ARRS detachments joined three Army units in a joint Departments of Defense and Transportation test program. Dets 15 and 22, 42nd ARRSQ, Luke AFB, Ariz., and Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, respectively, made their HH-43s available to victims of civilian emergencies in a test of the Military Assistance for Safety in Traffic (MAST) program. The test program was originally scheduled to end Dec. 31, 1970, but was extended twice, until Dec. 1, 1971, when the program ended. During that time, the two detachments flew 37 missions, which assisted 73 people and saved 32.

And what of the people in ARRS.

For the first time in the history of a rescue unit, a WAF joined a detachment as an aircrew member. Although assigned to Loring AFB, Maine, medical facility, AIC Marilyn Pierce volunteered to work as a medical technician with Det. 10, 42nd ARRSQ there.

Maj. Travis Wofford, now assigned to the 1550th, was presented the 1970 Cheney Award for his heroic actions in Vietnam.

Maj. James L. McAfee, Det. 11, 43rd ARRSQ, received the Air Force Association's Citation of Honor in recognition of his outstanding skill and courage as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam.

And TSgt. Lawrence Wellington, with the 1550th, was selected as one of the Air Force's Outstanding Airmen of 1971. A PJ, he was on the Son Tay mission.

And what other impressive awards have ARRS crews received--sometimes no more than a heartfelt handshake and a thanks, the most satisfying reward--and sometimes a letter.

One thankful father wrote, after a 1550th crew saved his son's life, "We are so grateful! Whenever we see or hear a helicopter in the air over this valley, we'll thank God for their presence and we'll sleep better at night, knowing there are such fine young men serving the U.S. Air Force."

And one appreciative wife, whose husband was rescued from an enemy-infested jungle in SEA by an ARRS crew, relayed in a Christmas message to a friend, "This Christmas will be a most happy one--thanks to God and the Jolly Green Giants."



MAJ. ROBERT E. BELLI, an F-105 pilot, shot down over Laos, is carried off the rescue helicopter which saved him from possible capture or death after 20 hours on the ground in enemy territory.

...Save pilot in Laos

The major did report however, that he had not been detected by the enemy and that he had a complete survival kit before the decision to postpone the rescue was made.

Throughout the night, an orbiting HC-130 kept in contact with the major, while Air Force fighter-bombers kept the enemy from reaching the pilot.

The rescue force was back on the morning of Dec. 11. At 8:11 a.m., one of the A-1 Skyraiders reported seeing the major and led an HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant to the area.

One helicopter made the pickup while another stood by, ready to take over should the first Super Jolly Green Giant come under enemy fire. Suppressive fire by the supporting aircraft allowed the helicopter to make the pickup on the first try.

MSgt. Leon Pullwood, a pararescue man, was lowered into the heavily wooded area on the jungle penetrator. He helped the injured major onto the device and the two were hoisted to the hovering HH-53.

Capt. William L. Burner III, the flight surgeon aboard the Super Jolly Green Giant, treated Major Belli's injuries on the return flight to base.

After the successful rescue, Major Belli indicated there was a jolt and his F-105 aircraft lost altitude immediately and banked sharply.

"I bailed out," the major said, "and landed on a hillside in deep jungle. It was the longest and loneliest night of my life."

"I can't thank the rescue guys enough. Hearing the choppers moving in was the greatest sound I've ever heard."

Other members of the HH-53 crew making the rescue were: Maj. Kenneth E. Ernest, aircraft commander; Capt. Joel L. Summers, copilot; Sgt. John C. Repper, flight engineer; and TSgt. Kelsey R. Adams, and Sgt. Paul C. Perry, pararescuemen.



U.S. Air Force Photo by Sgt Martin Cavazos

Major Belli is carried from the HH-53 helicopter following his rescue

Second batch

12 more C-7s go home

CAM RANH BAY -- Twelve Air Force C-7 Caribou cargo aircraft departed here Dec. 10 on an 8,000-mile journey across the Pacific to the United States.

The aircraft, all from the 483d Airlift Wing at Cam Ranh

3d ARRGp saves

37 last month

TAN SON NHUT -- November turned out to be a busy month for the men assigned to the units of the 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (ARRGp) headquartered here.

The 3d ARRGp was credited with saving 37 lives during November, 33 of these under combat conditions. This brings the total number of saves recorded by the rescue units in Southeast Asia to 3,403, of which 2,303 were combat saves.

The busiest unit of the 3d ARRGp during November was the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) at Da Nang Airfield. Flying HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giants, the 37th ARRS was responsible for 30 of the saves.

Commanded by Col. Warner A. Britton, the 3d ARRGp registered its first save in December 1964. Since that time, it has twice been presented the Presidential Unit Citation for outstanding operations in Southeast Asia. In addition, it has been presented the Air Force Outstanding Unit award and the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm.

Bay, are being returned to the states because of the increased airlift capability of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) and a reduction in the airlift workload of the U.S. Air Force in the war zone.

Some of the crew members of the C-7s are 483d personnel scheduled for stateside reassignment in December and who volunteered to ferry the aircraft home. Other are on temporary duty and will return to Vietnam after the flight.

Col. John I. Daniel III is the mission commander. He also was the mission commander of the flight of 15 Caribous from the 483d that returned to the United States in September.

Each of the 12 C-7s was equipped with two 480-gallon fuel "ferry tanks" and an extra 18-gallon oil tank. Two maintenance teams also are flying ahead of the C-7s in C-130 Hercules aircraft to provide maintenance support at stops along the way.

The C-7 aircraft were turned over to the Air Force by the U.S. Army when that service's authority for fixed wing transport aircraft was terminated in 1967. Since then the 483d has operated the C-7s throughout the Republic of Vietnam, earning the unofficial nickname of the "Compassionate Airline." This tag was in recognition of the wide variety of people and materials it transported in and out of Vietnam airstrips and airfields.

The C-7, built by the DeHavilland Corp. of Canada, became noted for its short landing and takeoff capability and was a prime mover of supplies into remote camps and firebases in Vietnam.

he spent the night on the ground. He reported he had a broken arm and possibly a broken leg but there was little the rescue force could do for him until the weather broke. The major did report however, that he had not been detected by the enemy and that he had a complete survival kit before the decision to postpone the rescue was made.

Throughout the night, an orbiting HC-130 kept in contact with the major, at the same time searching for

was the longest in my life. I can't thank the rescue guys enough. Hearing the choppers moving it was the greatest sound I've ever heard."

Other members of the crew of the HH-53 making the rescue were: Maj. Kenneth E. Ernest, aircraft commander; Capt. Joel L. Summers, pilot; Sgt. John C. Repper, flight engineer; and pararescuemen TSgt. Kelsey R. Adams and Sgt. Paul C. Perry.



U.S. Air Force Photo by Sgt Martin Cavazos

The Jolly Green Giant crew, members of the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, get together after the pickup for a celebration

Fast feet

Maintenance men move 'em

U-TAPAO RTN AIRFIELD, Thailand -- It's a hard working bird that flies five missions in 47 hours with only 3½ to 4½ hours R&R (rest and repairs) between sorties. Thanks to Team 15 of the 307th Organizational Maintenance Squadron here, a particular B-52 Stratofortress bomber recently accomplished this feat.

The team crew chief, SSgt. George L. Badger, along with his two assistances, Sgt. Danny J. Guillory and Sgt. Thomas R. Issendorf, accomplished some hard and fast maintenance to make the quick turn-arounds possible. Normally at U-Tapao, the B-52s get a 12 to 15 hour rest as opposed to about 36 hours in the states.

120171 SAR

AIR FORCE MEN AND WOMEN

who gave their lives in the Battle of Britain and is located in a 17th century farmhouse near Luddington, Hunts.

RESCUE

There's a line in the *Desiderata* that goes: "and everywhere, life is full of heroism." Here's a recent story that bears out that fact. Maj Robert E. Belli, pilot, and his back-seater, were supporting an interdiction mission about 8 miles northwest of the Mu Gia Pass when their F-105 **Thunderchief** was downed by a SAM. Search and rescue units rushed to the crash site and established voice and beeper contact with the pilot. Bad weather prevented a pickup before darkness, however. The pilot reported a broken arm and possible broken leg.

Throughout that long night, an orbiting HC-130 kept in contact with Belli, while it searched for the second man. Fighter-bombers kept the enemy away from the pilot. The next morning an A-1 **Sky-raider** made visual contact with Belli and an HH-53 went in for the

11 DEC 71 SAR

RESCUE



pickup. PJ MSgt Leon Fullwood was lowered and helped Belli aboard the hovering **Super Jolly Green Giant**. About his 20 hours on the ground in enemy territory, Belli said later, "It was the longest and loneliest time of my life. I can't thank the rescue guys enough." He's shown here being taken off the helicopter that plucked him from the hands of the enemy.

CHIEF FANS

Until last fall, Wing Commander Douglas W. Hills and his wife Betty, wondered what makes tickets for home games of the Kansas City Chiefs rarer than polar bears in Panama. The Royal Air Force officer commented, "I've always been aware of American football, but they don't pay too much attention to it in England." About a year ago, Hills came to Air Force Communications Service headquarters, Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo., as a Deputy Director of Requirements in an officer exchange program. He really wanted to learn the game, but it was impos-

sible. "It was a different language — like Chinese. I couldn't find a book that would give me a start!" The breakthrough was a paperback called **A Woman's Guide to Football**. With this, Hills became a football fan. Like most other fans, he had to watch the home games from outside looking in.

He decided to write a letter to Lamar Hunt, the Chiefs' owner, offering him two tickets for a Championship soccer or Rugby match in England in return for two tickets to a Chiefs' game at Municipal Stadium. Two weeks later, Hills received a call from Hunt's secretary. It was an invitation for Hills and his wife to sit in the owner's box for the Chiefs' game with the Washington Redskins. "I got an enormous kick out of the whole thing," he said after.

DAD DID IT

Rose Lynda Duvall, center, receives the Oath of Enlistment from Lt Col George Ransom (right), Commander, Det 408, 3504th Recruiting Gp in New Orleans. So what's

the big deal? The man on the left, who recruited Rose, is her dad, MSgt Johnny W. Duvall.

BIRTHDAY

Let's take a couple of minutes and give a word of cheer for a really great bird who just had her 8th birthday awhile back. We mean, of course, the C-141 **Starlifter**, launched exactly 60 years after the Wright Brothers' first flight. Just exactly what has the **Starlifter** and her hardworking crews done to earn that kind of praise? Well, they helped create an all-time low fatality rate for persons wounded in Vietnam. They transported more than a million pints of blood from the US to Southeast Asia. The **Starlifter** fleet was the backbone of the Military Airlift Command's supply line of troops and cargo from America to Southeast Asia. Astronauts, home from their moon travels, have been flown from the Pacific to Texas in the **Starlifter**. The fleet has now amassed more than 3-million flying hours, setting safety records at every turn. Cheers.

CHIEF FANS



DAD DID IT



(C) The first full SAR of the rescue began on 10 December 1971. Ashcan 01, an F-105, was reported down in high forest just west of the center of Na Gia Pass. He reported that his aircraft had been hit by a SAM and that he was on the ground, with a broken arm and perhaps a broken leg.³⁵

(C) A SAR was declared at 1025 local time and Sandys 01 and 02 were scrambled, as well as Jolly Greens 30, 31, 33, and 37. The Sandys launched at 1056 to provide escort for the Jolly Greens in the extremely high threat area of Na Gia Pass. During this time communications remained good with Ashcan 01 Alpha despite his injuries. He reported a solid low cloud deck in the area and no immediate enemy threat to his position.³⁶

(C) Two OV-10s, Nail 49 and Nail 43, were in the area and had taken on-scene command after Ashcan 01 went down. They had located the approximate position of Ashcan 01 Alpha, and upon arrival of the Sandy flight they turned over on-scene command to Sandy 01. They then briefed the Sandys on local area conditions and the approximate position of the survivor. The A-1s proceeded to verify the location by flying low over the clouds and asking the survivor for notification when they were overhead. Sandy 01 next tried to reach the area of the survivor by flying under the clouds. He found that, while the clouds were at 300 feet over the treetops

35. SARCO Report for Ashcan 01, 13 Dec 71, (Doc 15).

36. Ibid.

10 Km away, they came down to tree-top level at about 3 Km from the last known position of the survivor. He was forced to pull up and go above the clouds again. The hazard of both low clouds and mountains made it quite obvious that the F-1s could not operate under the clouds with any degree of safety. The low level penetration by Sandy 01 did, however, substantiate the opinion that the high ground around the survivor was free of enemy activity.³⁷

(C) A new concept in SAR operations was next employed. Pave Nail, Nail 07, was led over the clouds by Sandy 01 to the last known position of Airman 01 Alpha. The Pave Nail determined a very accurate MORAN position which, from that point forward, was used by the SAR forces. Jelly Green 52 came over the spot and adjusted its Doppler equipment to zero.³⁸

(C) Jelly Greens 52 and 53, alternating one at a time, next began a search which lasted for seven hours either below, in, or above the clouds. They used Pave Nail 07 as an airborne COI site for directions to the survivor. At one point, while Jelly Green 52 and Sandy 01 were looking for a hole in the undercast near the survivor, they were tracked by a SAM site, and a SAM came up out of the clouds, passed directly under Jelly Green 52 towards Sandy 01. The SAM missed and then went back down into the clouds without detonating.³⁹

(C) While searching under the clouds, Jelly Green 52 released a parachute and lowered a RT, but the chute proved to be from a mine

37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.

located three or four miles from the survivor. Various attempts were made to attempt for locating and identifying the survivor. He was asked to activate one of his rockets and later to fire one of his gyro-jets, but these efforts were lost in the low clouds which prevailed throughout the day. The two Jolly Greens continued the search until darkness was near; the one searching while the other refueled. The Sandys and Jolly Greens were forced to call a halt to the search as darkness came.⁴⁰

(C) Pave Nail FACS took over on-scene command in the morning and maintained communications with Ashcan 01 Alpha. Area denial ordnance was requested to saturate the Mu Gia Pass area during the night. Limited response was obtained to the requests in the early hours of the night but in the late hours numerous strikes were put in and around the pass. The use of BLU-52 was approved and it was dropped by A-1s along the route structure near the pass to deter the enemy.⁴¹

(C) A first light effort was planned using a force of four Sandys, four Jolly Greens, a Pave Nail FAC, and a Nail FAC. This force took off at about 0330 local and was in position at 0500 near the survivor, but again over an undercast which seemed to be much the same as the previous day. Sandy 01 tried again, as the day before, to locate Ashcan 01 Alpha by flying under the clouds. Again he was forced to turn around short of the objective when the cloud

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.

CONFIDENTIAL

never dropped down to treetop level. It was scattered across the rim of Ma Gia Pass as he climbed out. The fire was not close to the survivor and Sandy 01 silenced it with rocket and gun firing passes.⁴²

(3) A treetop search was again started, this time by Jolly Green 30. Through cross checking known information, it became evident that an adjustment to the suspected position of the objective was necessary. The search was adjusted to a point 1000 meters further to the north. At that point the parachute and body of Ashcan 01 Bravo was discovered in a tree. Thus, the reason why the SAR forces had had no communications with Bravo was evident. Due to the treetop cloud conditions which made helicopter operations extremely hazardous, a decision was made to move forward to recover the living crewmember. Ashcan 01 Alpha was located about 200 meters to the north and a PJ brought him on board Jolly Green 30 at 0700 local. Wind and cloud conditions made it impossible to recover the body of Bravo. Visibility was limited to only those treetops immediately below the helicopter in the area of the survivor. After the recovery of Alpha all SAR forces returned to KMP, and at 0725 on 11 December 1971 the SAR was terminated.⁴³

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

DATE: 10-11 Dec 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-045-10-11 Dec 71

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 21/22/27/23

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Ashcan 01 (F-105 IRON HAND)

LOCATION: WL 6046 (MUGIA PASS)

SAVES: 1 Combat

At 1020L Udon time King 21 received a SAM launch warning. Immediately afterward Ashcan 02 was heard calling for Ashcan 01 on 243.0. After two such calls Ashcan 02 began calling King on 243.0. King 21 responded. Ashcan 02 advised that following a SAM launch he lost contact with Ashcan 01 and observed a large cloud of orange smoke. King 21 immediately requested the Jolly and Sandy forces at NKP to be brought to cockpit alert. King 21 established a SAM FREQUENCY of 282.8 with Ashcan 02 and a discrete JOL frequency with invert controller 45. Ashcan 02 advised he had 45 minutes fuel remaining and would continue searching for Ashcan 01. A few minutes later Ashcan 02 reported hearing an intermittent beeper.

King 21 ordered the launch of the NKP SAR forces; requested Iron Hand, Alint, MIG CAP, Border Clearance, Tac Air, slow FAC support, and upload of TOWCAN and PREVIEW. Tailback 31 (2B-66) immediately checked in to report on station for the SAR. At 1035 Hillsboro advised that all requests were approved and requested forces were either airborne, enroute or alerted. At this time Nail 43 and 49 checked in as they moved into the SAR area. Nail 43 was designated On Scene Commander. A request for launch of two additional Jollies and additional Sandys was passed with a request to bring additional Jollies to alert status. King 23 was launched from Udon to act as a tanker.

By 1045 MIG CAP, Alint, Iron Hand, Tac Air fast movers, and Nail PACS were on scene with replacement forces topping off at tankers. Nail 43 established voice contact with the survivor and confirmed his identity as Ashcan 03A. Intermittently SAMs were fired at the SAR forces and radar controlled 57, 57, and 85MM AAA were confirmed in the area.

Weather in the SAR area was extremely poor. The survivor reported that the bases of the clouds were as low as 100 feet above the tops of the trees. To fix the survivors position the Sandys and Nails took crosscut DF bearings and attempted to track the survivors radio. A Pave Nail was requested to mark the survivors location. Sandy 01, King 21, and Nail 43 discussed the situation. It was decided to allow Jolly 52, at his discretion, attempt to work up to the survivor beneath the overcast. Numerous attempts were made, but weather conditions were such as to preclude Jolly 52 from reaching the survivor.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years.

As the Jolly and Sandy flights came in, they arrived at 0700Z and were cycled to King 21 and freshly refueled Jolly flight. The tanks would RTB. King 23 offloaded more than 25,000 lbs of fuel to 55, 57, 53 and 30. The MIG CAP, Iron Hand and plans were assigned frequencies by King, but advise to work any area they felt would be best for SAM suppression activities.

It was determined that the survivor had a broken arm and possible broken leg, but was holding on. He was in a relatively secure area, and possessed two radios, one extra battery, two day and two night flares and a pen gun flare.

At 0705Z after numerous attempts by the Jolly forces to extract the survivor, it was decided to secure the ground approach paths to the survivor. The survivor's position, though relatively secure, was close enough to the main road that he could hear work being done on the road. Smoke flights were launched and expended.

During the remainder of the afternoon a minimum of SAM launches were observed with Iron Hand accomplishing four protective reaction strikes. A total of 32 Mint, MIG CAP and Tac Air aircraft had been cycled to their tankers. At 1040Z King 21 turned operational control over to King 22.

King 22 launched at 0730Z to become a tanker to replace King 23. We contacted King 21 for information and were briefed to hold 320/10 to 50 from CH 89 in case we would be needed. King 23 was acting as tanker when we arrived OS. King 22 monitored the progress at the SAM until taking over as AMC at 1040Z. At that time Nail 20 was turning over OSC to Nail 25. After talking with the survivor and Sandy 11, Nail 25 became OSC. King 21 talked with Nail 25 and received ordnance requests for the remainder of the night. We had monitored King 21's previous requests and King 22 also requested CBU 42 and 49 and additional BLU 52 flights on Loran equipped aircraft every 30 minutes for the remainder of the night from JACK and MOONBEAM. Smoke 42 and 43 checked in with BLU 52 and were put to work with Nail 25. King 22 was informed that there would be Mint, Iron Hand and Border Clearance for the remainder of the night, however we would have MIG CAP only until 1300Z. Inquires with JACK and MOONBEAM on the status of our ordnance requests were negative. At 1200Z King 22 turned over AMC to King 27.

King 27 scrambled at 1031Z to hold night Comcap for Ashcan 01. Arrived on scene and assumed command at 1200Z from King 22. On Scene Commander was Pave Nail 25. Weather over the survivor was 8/8. Pave Nail 25 was requesting CBU 24/49 or CBU 24 as backup. There was none on the way at this time. Advised by JACK at 1256Z that Blue Chip could not get Loran equipped aircraft and that we should contact MOONBEAM for all resources. At 1258Z Pave Nail 25 completed putting in Smoke 42/43 with BLU 52 and D-30. Pave Nail 25 advised us that he needed Commando Nail for live nos. 235, 532 and 405. King 27 advised MOONBEAM and the advised Bennett flight with Loran and CBU 24 was inbound. Nail 25 worked Bennett flight and RTB CH 89. Nail 09 assumed OSC. At this time there was no contact with Ashcan 01A by Nail 09

DATE: 11 December 1971

MISSION NUMBER: A-3-040

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: KING 22

MISSION OBJECTIVE: GHOST 033 (US ARMY COBRA GUNSHIP) AH-1G

LOCATION: 40NM SE CHU LAI

SAVES: TWO (NONCOMBAT)

At 2140L during RTB to Cam Ranh Bay from Udorn, a call for any aircraft was received on 243.0 from Ghost 033. King 22 responded to the call and asked for the nature of Ghost 033's difficulty and position. Ghost 033 replied that his navigation equipment had failed, he was in IFR conditions, low on fuel, and unsure of his position. King 22 directed Ghost 033 to squawk emergency for radar pick-up and also requested UHF hold down for a DF cut. GCI and Danang approach control both reported that they were not receiving an IFF emergency Squawk. King 22 continued with standard air rescue "lost aircraft" procedures and determined that Ghost 033 was approximately 40 SE of Chu Lai.

Ghost 033 was advised to head 300° and climb to 5000' minimum to avoid possible high terrain. King 22 then accomplished a DF intercept on Ghost 033. Ghost 033 was intercepted approximately 28NM southeast of Chu Lai. Queen provided updated data on facilities available at Chu Lai which were relayed to Ghost 033. Ghost 033 landed safely at 2240L.

LESSON LEARNED: During the course of this mission Ghost 033 was asked to make turns for radar identification. As a helicopter his turn radius was much smaller than that of a fixed wing aircraft. Because of this it was necessary to have Ghost 033 fly the new heading for several minutes in order to give GCI radar an opportunity to recognize the turn.

KING 22 CREWMEMBERS

AMC Capt. Obstant
CP Maj. Johnson
CP Capt. Hassell
NAV Capt. Condie
RO TSgt. Farr
RO TSgt. Alford
FE TSgt. Lamb
FE SSgt. Stubbs
LM SSgt. Alexander

ADDITIONAL CREW ABOARD KING 22

AC Lt. Col. Klingenberg
AMC Capt. Rager
CP Capt. Williams
NAV Maj. Siegel
RO TSgt. Fierros
FE TSgt. Tye
FE SSgt. Underwood
LM SSgt. Gartland

MICROFILMED BY ISAM

~~IMMEDIATE~~
350 DAY 1971
14.21.31Z
MSG # 002727
FROM: AESC

DECLASSIFIED

ED 13A
54/DZ
125

OTTSZYUW RUMMRSA8483 3501314-SSSS--RUCIMAA.
ZNY SSSSS

0 161455Z DEC 71
FM 3ARRGP TSN AB RVN
TO RUEFHQA/CSAF/COMMAND POST
RUHHBBA/PACAF
RUCIMAA/HQ ARRS/COMMAND POST/SCOTT AFB ILL
~~INFO RUCWAAA/HQ USAF AFT MAXWELL AFB AL~~
RUCPAAA/MAC/MAOCCP-
RUHHBBA/41ARRWG/CONTROL CENTER/DOC/HICKAM AFB HAWAII
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC/CC
RHMSMVA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUEKAAA/USAF/AFEOC/FT RITCHIE MD
RUMFRBA/CTF 77
RUHGOSA/CTG 77.0
RUWTFJA/USAFMPC/DPMCS RANDOLPH AFB TX
RUMOJAA/39ARRS CRB AB RVN
RUMUJNA/OL A 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
RUMOSRA/OL B 3ARRGP UDORN AFLD THAI
RUHG0EA/CTG 77.4
RUMFRJA/CTG 77.5
RUHG0XA/CTG 77.6

Do

[illegible]

K 318.241-6
16 Jan - 29 Dec 1971

X R

PAGE 2 RUMMRSA8483 S E C R E T
RUMIJBA/37ARRS DA NANG AB RVN
RUMOREA/40ARRS NAKHON PHANOM APRT THAI
RUMUUBA/8TFW UBON AFLD THAI
BT

~~SECRET~~ JOPREP JEEFY JRCC RESCUE 016

1. RESCUE OPENING/CLOSING REPORT 16 DEC 71
2. MISSION NUMBER: 03-023 DECEMBER 1971

3. SITUATION: F-4 CREW RECEIVED GROUND FIRE AND BAILED OUT OF AIRCRAFT.

A. DESCRIPTION OF SAR OBJECTIVE:

1. F-4/668744/CAMOUFLAGED/HEADPIN 01
2. TACTICAL
3. MAJ MORRIS/UBON THAILAND/8 TFW
4. 2 POB
5. NONE
6. USAF STANDARD

- IMMEDIATE
350 DAY 1971
14.21.31Z
MSG # 002727
FROM: AESC

RD [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Classified by
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 3/Dec 79

MESSAGE NOTIFICATION

Individual
Contacted:

Local Time
and Date:

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
Or Changed to CONFIDENTIAL
By Authority of DOB 5200-1R
By _____ (Date) _____

01118823

ENCLOSURE

- IMMEDIATE
350 DAY 1971
14.21.31Z
MSG # 002727
FROM: AESC

* ~~SECRET~~ *
* ~~SECRET~~ *

DECLASSIFIED

7. 1133N, 10451E
B. ACTION TAKEN:
1. 7AF JRCC/0708Z/7AF CP BLUE CHIP
2. 0708Z ON ALERT AT UBON

PAGE 3 RUMMRSA8483 S E C R E T

3. 0708Z SAR FORCES LAUNCHED AT UBON

C. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. TWO P08, TWO PICKED UP
2. CAMBODIAN HELO CALL SIGN KHMER (UH1) LANDED BESIDE AIR-
MEN AND MADE PICK UP.
4. DOWNED AIRMEN WERE FLOWN TO PHNOM PENH AIRPORT.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:

1. 40 ARRS/HH-53/3.0HR/2 SORTIES
2. 56 SOW/A-1/3.0HR/2 SORTIES
3. 39 ARRS/C-130/3.0HR/1 SORTIE

E. SAVES DATA: NO SAVES CLAIMED

F. SUMMRY OF SAR ACTIONS:

1. INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF DOWNED AIRCRAFT WAS PASSED TO
JOKER BY 7AF CP (BLUE CHIP). JOKER SCRAMBLED JOLLY GREEN 55 AND
61, SY 5 AND 6. KING 24 HAD JUST DEPARTED CAM RANH BAY TO REPLACE
K-21 ON ORBIT AND WAS DIVERTED TO THE SEARCH AREA. IT WAS THEN RE-
PORTED TO JOKER BY BLUE CHIP THAT BOTH PILOTS WERE PICKED UP BY
CAMBODIAN HELO AND TAKEN TO PHNOM PENH. JOLLY GREEN 55 AND 61 WERE
TOLD TO CONTINUE TO PHNOM PENH TO PICK RESCUED CREW AND RETURN THEM
TO HOME STATION. TELEPHONE CONTACT WAS MADE WITH DOWNED CREW AT

PAGE 4 RUMMRSA8483 S E C R E T

PHNOM PENH AND THEY REPORTED NO INJURIES. JOLLY GREEN 55 PICKED
UP DOWNED CREWMEN AT PHNOM PENH AIRPORT AND RETURNED THEM TO UBON
WITHOUT INCIDENT.

2. SEE ITEM D
3. N/A

GP-4
BT
#8483

* ~~SECRET~~ *
* ~~SECRET~~ *

- IMMEDIATE
350 DAY 1971
14.21.31Z
MSG # 002727
FROM: AESC

DECLASSIFIED

Gunfighter 82A/B

18 Dec 1971

(tape courtesy of Robert "Black Bart" Bartunek, Sandy pilot)

Gunfighter 82 was an F-4E crew assigned to the 366th TFW at DaNang AB, RVN. On the night of 17 December 1971, Gunfighter 82 was downed by a SAM near Mu Gia Pass about 65 nm east of Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand. Mu Gia Pass was a notoriously bad place situated along the Ho Chi Mihn trail. One week earlier, the crew of Ashcan 02, an F-105 Wild Weasel was downed and rescued in the same general vicinity.

Both 7th Air Force News and Pacific Stars and Stripes ran stories of the rescue.

Gunfighter 82A was Lt Col Arthur Blissett

Gunfighter 82B was Lt Michael Murray

There were two HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant rescue helicopters from the 40th ARRS out of NKP Thailand, with Jolly Green 30 performing the actual pickup:

Jolly Green 30 was crewed by Maj. Clyde E. Bennett, aircraft commander; Maj Donald L. Roston, pilot; AIC William T. Lyles, flight engineer; and pararescuemen MSgt Daniel L. Schmidt, SSgt William E. Brown and Sgt Dennis E. Williamson.

Four Sandy's were involved in the pickup of Gunfighter 82. Sandy 01 and 02 were working the survivor and Sandy 03 and 04 initially remained with the HH-53s west of the survivors location.

Sandy 01 was Capt Roger Youngblood

Sandy 02 was Capt Ron Smith

Sandy 03 was

Sandy 04 was

Nail 07 was on scene and assisted in putting in air strikes to suppress enemy activity.

Nail 07 was ??

Participant's Accounts

- Sandy 01 - **Capt. Roger Youngblood**
- Gunfighter 82A - **Lt Col. Art Blissett**
- Jolly Green 30 Aircraft Commander - **Maj Clyde Bennett - Text and photos**
- Jolly Green 30 Lead PJ - **SSgt. William E. Brown**

The tape is presented here in its entirety. It runs 24 minutes and 25 seconds and is in RealAudio format. You will need RealAudio on your computer system in order to access the tape.

The tape begins with Sandy 01 about to commit the SAR force to the pick-up of Gunfighter 82A. Up until this time, there was only one objective, the pilot (A) of Gunfighter 82. Gunfighter 82B (the WSO), was not in contact with the SAR pickup force up until this point in time. As Sandy 01 briefed the rescue forces on the forthcoming pick-up attempt, Gunfighter 82B suddenly came up on his survival radio. This forced a short "fall back and regroup" delay while Sandy 01 located the back seater (Bravo).

Soon all is sorted out and both survivors were ready for pick-up. The tape ends as Jolly 30 with both survivors on board exited the area to the northwest.

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Play Gunfighter 82 SAR tape

To: Robert LaPointe, rlapointe
From: Bill Brown, INTERNET:nremtwebofc@attmail.com
Date: 6/21/99, 5:03 AM
Re: Re: Test of e-mail address

Bob,

Crew's Names

Maj. Clyde Bennett, AC
Maj. Dan Ruston, CP
Sgt. William Lyle, FE
SSgt William E. Brown, Jr, PJ
Sgt Dennis C. Williamson, PJ
MSgt Dan Schmidt, PJ

Have article from Stars and Strips newspaper. Do you have FAX number.

Author of article is me. Accepted for publication but not published to date in VIET NAM, a magazine. Don't know if and when they will publish it, but you can use it first. Do you want to contact Col. Blissett? I can find his phone number to get his account. I talked with him last year while passing through FL. Also, have you checked out the Sandy Web Page? Skyriaider Association will lead you there.

Bill Brown

GUNFIBER 82

----- Internet Header -----
Sender: nremtwebofc@attmail.com
Received: from lrau.lr.mt.np.els-gms.att.net (lrau.lr.mt.np.els-gms.att.net [199.191.144
by hil-img-5.compuserve.com (8.8.6/8.8.6/2.19) with SMTP id JAA11867
for <rlapointe@compuserve.com>; Mon, 21 Jun 1999 09:03:12 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 1999 08:57:35 +0000
From: nremtwebofc@attmail.com (Bill Brown)
Received: from nremtwebofc by attmail; Mon Jun 21 12:55:00 GMT 1999
Subject: Re: Test of e-mail address
In-Reply-To: your message <199906181809_MC2-79EF-1A5F@compuserve.com> of Fri Jun 18 18:0
To: rlapointe@compuserve.com (Robert LaPointe)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-ID: <winATT-3_0-nremtwebofc-2219@attmail.com>

The Combat Rescue of Gunfighter 82

We completed our 36 hours as "high bird" knowing that if a mission would be called we would be designated first-in, or "low bird" for any air rescue attempts that would be made over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos or on the western side of North Viet Nam. The 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, the squadron of HH-53 "Super Jolly Greens" was on alert 24 hours a day throughout the year. Tomorrow would be December 19, 1971 and all was calm when the rescue crew went to bed.

We were awakened about mid-night and told to report to intelligence for a briefing. An American aircrew was shot-down, and we were to be "low-bird" on the mission. I immediately remembered that as we changed from high-bird to low-bird, I had changed positions from "Number 1" PJ (Pararescueman) to "Number 2" PJ, meaning if one of the PJ's was to go on the ground to rescue, provide medical care, or support a pilot, I would not be the one assigned. I was struck a blow of "hard luck" which affected many Pararescueman during Nam; I wouldn't be the primary PJ but would serve as a member of the team rather than the rescuer. We jumped out of bed, put on our clothes, hit the head, and waited only seconds for the truck to take us to intelligence for our rescue briefing.

After passing the security checks we entered the bowels of intelligence at Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand where much of the intelligence gathering taking place along the Ho Chi Mien Trail was housed. The room was small without windows. Charts and maps were on every wall with lights shining on them for better clarity. The room was dark, setup in theater style. In the front was an Air Force officer, behind him maps of the familiar geography of Laos. We knew this mission was not going to be easy. The

maps were covered with up to a hundred green and red dots with intersecting circles around each dot. It resembled a bowl of cheerios with colored dots at the center. The dots represented anti-aircraft guns and surface to air missile sites. The intell officer briefed us that we were to attempt the rescue of two F-4 pilots shot down by surface-to-air missiles "SAM.s" while bombing Mia Guia Pass. It would be a first light rescue attempt and we would approach the area under cover of darkness. The pass, a well known target of US fighter bombers, was a place along the trail where the trail became congested because it passed through a narrow valley with 1,500 foot mountain cliffs on each side. The pass appeared about four miles in length, and contained caves in the boarder cliffs that housed North Viet Nameese soldiers and their radar guided anti-aircraft guns. The nightly and seasonal airbattles fought over Mu Gia Pass were a test for the best of America's pilots. Intell did not know the exact location of the pilots but the pilots had established radio contact with an OV-10 "Cuvy" FAC who was circling over the area offering moral support and a link to safety for the two pilots. Intel also said the area where the pilots ejected contained fires representing troop concentrations, multiple SAM sites, and anti-aircraft guns. Our anxiety increased with each word as we knew taking helicopters into this area of the war zone would be most dangerous. It was in this same area two years before, Boxer 22 was rescued. Boxer 22 was later described in the Pararescue 50 Years as follows: "On December 6, 1969, Boxer 22, an F-4C goes down in Laos directly over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, an awesomely fortified transportation network. During the next three days, ARRS coordinates one of the largest search and rescue missions ever to be conducted in Southeast Asia. One pararescuman, David M. Davidson

loses his life. The search and rescue task force flies 336 sorties and fifty-one hours in support. Although the F-4 pilot is never recovered, the navigator 1st Lt. Woodrow J. Bergeron is rescued. Nearly forty pararescumen participate in action against the enemy. Some are wounded in the foray. When it is over five of the ten helicopters involved never fly again because of battle damage. Five Sandy A-1's suffer heavy damage"1. Although this account was written many years later, the members of the 40th ARRS were well aware of the history of Boxer-22.

Down at the flight line it was business as usual. A little joking to relieve the stress and a long preflight check to assure all systems were functioning properly. Our aircraft commander, Lt.Col. Clyde Bennett and co-pilot Major Don Roston were welcome additions. We knew if the going was getting rough these two helicopter pilots would not back down in the face of enemy fire. The flight engineer, William Lyles, was experienced and we had flown many alert missions together. My fellow Pararescueman, Dennis Williamson, was my "buddy" in SCUBA school, a fellow PJ classmate, and one I knew I could count on if the going got rough. Before take off, I asked Denny if he wanted to change positions, from "Number 1" PJ to "Number 2". He agreed, and I prepared my gear to ride the hoist down into enemy territory. A CAR-15 with 200 rounds of ammo, two radios with six backup batteries, one quart of water, two one-pint water flasks, trauma bandages, pen flares, maps, and a Randal knife comprised the gear I would carry if it became necessary to ride the hoist into the jungle. All was in working order and I rechecked the knots on a ten foot section of rope I had concocted with a snap link tied to each end. One end would be snapped to the hoist support and the other free to snap onto a pilot's parachute harness should a quick retrieval become necessary.

After pre-flight checks we took off straight for Mu Gia Pass. It was about an 80 minute flight. We were to be supported by all the planes in the inventory of the Air Force in order to complete a successful recovery of the two American pilots. MIGCAP, F-4's would be circling the area to prevent a loss of any rescue forces similar to the January 1970 loss of a Jolly Green helicopter shot down by a MIG. We would have F-105's "Wild Weasels" to take care of SAM missile sites. The always supporting A-1E "Sandy" aircraft, loaded with anti-personnel bombs and other weapons would be on-scene, locating, circling and protecting the survivors. The OV-10 would also continue to circle the area talking with the survivors and rescue forces. The C-130 "King" birds would be present to keep in contact with headquarters MAC-V and to re-fill the gas tanks via air-to-air refueling with the Jolly Greens. In all, some 30-40 planes would begin this first light rescue attempt.

While en route we loaded our mini-guns. Each Jolly had three 7.62 cal mini-guns capable of firing 2,000 or 4,000 bullets per minute. The best venue for defense was the rear mounted gun, placed on the ramp of the helicopter. From there a PJ in a "gun-tub" could burst fire the mini-gun and serve as a stinger at the end of the tail of the helicopter. During the rescue attempt, we all knew we had to swing the mini-gun designed to fire out the rescue door away from its position and that it would serve no benefit for our defense. Loading the guns in the dark was a skill possessed by every PJ because most approaches to missions were accomplished in early morning as "first lighters". Once clearance was given we fired the guns into the blackness of the night. Jolly 36, serving as our high bird left a trail of red dots falling thousands of feet into the jungle below. We knew all was ready as we began a three mile circle in a "safe" area over Laos, where no

anti-aircraft guns or SAMs had been reported by intelligence. The helicopters were to remain in this pattern, circling at 10,000 feet until the survivors were found and the scene was determined by the Sandy pilots as "safe" for helicopters to enter.

As the search phase was conducted, we often took dives down to the jungle top, when altered first by "SAM Warning" later followed by "SAM Launch". The dives of the helicopter, spinning around in a tight circle, with each crew member looking for an upcoming SAM, occurred a number of times during the morning. On a half-dozen or so occasions we saw the "telephone pole size" missiles race past low flying aircraft and detonate high in the sky near an F-4 covering MIGCAP, or leaving the scene after dropping ordnance to keep the enemy busy while rescue forces attempted to locate the survivors. We knew the jungle canopy must have been thick because even though we could hear the Bravo Survivor on the radio, no one could place a visual on his position. The Alpha Survivor was easily located, hanging in a tree, unable to get out of his parachute harness and descend to the ground. His height above the ground was estimated at 250 feet and he possessed only 150 feet of let-down cord. We knew his rescue would be pretentious. Smoke from Bravo was difficult to see, dissipating as it drifted toward the sky. Both survivors had passed the identifier test used by the Air Force and had answered their personal questions correctly. With positive identity known, the exact location of the Alpha survivor and near location of Bravo, a rescue attempt was about ready. The final touch came when a Sandy overflowed the area at a very slow speed and did not receive any ground fire. It seemed the troop concentrations we were alerted to by intelligence was a few miles away with thick jungle and mountainous terrain between the pilots and the

camp. However, the ARRS had been caught in traps laid by the enemy before, and this rescue would be accomplished like all others with full combat support.

We circled around as the sun rose high in the pass and mountains. It was a lovely sight, thick green trees, and mountains that would be excellent to sport climb. From the air it looked so peaceful even though the area was completely controlled by North Viet Nameese regulars. Monitoring the radios we heard Sandy lead signal the forces it was time for a rescue attempt. We began the "run-in".

Run-ins begin with a fast helicopter dive from altitude to tree-top level. The drop is similar to ascending the longest roller-coaster ride in the world with a G-force ending that requires one to grunt and plant your feet in order to remain standing during the transition from vertical to horizontal. Two hundred miles an hour at tree top level. Doors on the helicopter are all open with wind whipping through the helicopter at breath-taking speeds. All equipment is tied down. Fingers on the triggers of mini-guns, pointing out toward the ground. Heads kept low, squinting through the sites. Noise so loud that you can not hear yourself yell at the top of your lungs. Radio blasting instructions to the pilot about distance to the survivors; 8 miles, 6 miles, 4 miles, closer and closer, jumping high trees causing every crewmember to leave their seats and bless the inventor of the safety tie down strap. Pulses pounding in the chest, sweating from both the heat of the jungle and nerves squeezing the sweat glands. Anxiety high, remembering training, remembering commands, watching other members, anticipating the slowing of the Jolly to hover when the danger increases ten fold. Will this be it? Will this be the pinnacle of a years worth of training, the reason we served in the Air Force, the opportunity to bring home an American pilot, to snatch him from the hands of the enemy? Or, will we be in the fight

of our lives, small rounds popping through the thin skin of the helicopter? Will all of us make it alive? Will we need our medic skills? Questions, questions, questions, eyes open wondering! Then the Sandy lead tells Col. Bennett straight ahead 3/4 quarter of a mile, a clump of higher trees at a one o'clock position, that is the position of the Bravo survivor. The Jolly begins to slow and flare toward a hover. The blurring trees come into focus. The canopy is thick. We listen, no small arms fire thus far, the Sandy's begin circling the Jolly, weaving around attempting to draw small arms fire upon themselves. Jolly 30 is in a hover, the Bravo survivor says over the radio he can hear the helicopter but can not see it. We hover around the general area until he tells us we are over his head and he can see the helicopter. We lower the jungle penetrator seat, 100 feet a minute, taking more than two minutes to reach the ground. Bravo says he can't see the penetrator, the canopy is too thick and the vines in the jungle prevent him from finding the penetrator. Col. Bennett tells Sgt Lyles to bring up the hoist and send down a PJ to attempt the rescue. I know it's me, my time has come, I am ready! As we wait for the hoist to return from earth, I recheck everything. Finally after what seems like eternity it is here. I quickly strap myself in and begin the descent. After exiting the helicopter I see how exposed we are, we are on a ridge above the trail, the sun is bright, thankfully there is no small arms fire. Sgt. Lyle lowers me into the jungle, the ride is much faster on the hoist, banging through the trees, pushing the jungle away from me and the gear. No slowing down, my weight brings me down fast, I crash onto the jungle floor. Standing, I see Lt. Murry, the Bravo survivor talking into his radio, looking up at the helicopter, he doesn't see me! I have come down through the trees and he can't see me! I am only 20-

30 yards away and he doesn't see me; how dumb can a pilot be? I jump up and down waving my arms. He continues to look up at the helicopter and doesn't look in any other direction. I make the decision, one I did not want to make, to leave the security of the hoist and approach the Bravo survivor. I run toward him as I get within 10 feet he sees me, his face is full of fright, he knows I am not the enemy. I signal him to follow and he does. We can not speak to each other, my helmet is on, I am monitoring the radios. We begin the ascent to the helicopter, still there is no small arms fire. I am confident we will complete one-half of the rescue attempt. We break the tree line and are exposed again to a 360 degree angle for small arms fire. No firing occurs. Sandy's continuing to circle the Jolly in close range. Any enemy on the ground would know where we were, the noise is unbelievable. Sgt. Lyle pulls us into the helicopter and Lt. Murry is as safe as we are. He takes a seat in one of the bunks while we attempt rescue of the Alpha survivor.

Alpha survivor, so named because he occupied the front seat of an F-4, remains suspended in a tree not far from the site of the successful recovery of his fellow crewmember. Jolly 30 hovers over in his direction. Sgt. Lyle and I look into the trees and see the pilot. His chute rests next to him in the tree. Shroud lines and silk enveloping him, the tree and nearby trees. He is 150 feet below the Jolly. I attached my snap linked rope to the penetrator thinking it may be difficult to get the pilot onto the hoist in mid-air about 250 feet above the ground. I can not talk to Lyle, my radio is set on the rescue frequency and Lyle is on the intercom of Jolly 30. He gives the hand signal to prepare to be lowered and I give him the thumbs up. He begins lowering me. Within seconds I am next to the pilot, he reaches for me and the penetrator. He fails. I oscillate below the chopper, feet apart yet so close to freedom. Lyle commands the helicopter to

adjust position and I swing from side to side. Grabbing parachute lines I pull my way toward the pilot. I am near enough and quickly snap the link into his parachute harness. We will be together for the remainder of the rescue. Lyle moves the hoist in an attempt to get me closer to the pilot but now that I am hooked into him, I turn upside down, hanging by the hoist, wrapped in shroud lines, 250 feet above the ground. I radio the crew that I have the survivor on the hoist; a signal to begin lifting us upward. Then I feel the parachute lines which are tangled into my gear, around the hoist, the pilot and myself. They are preventing us from ascending to the safety of the helicopter. My knife is strapped to the calf of my leg. I have to reach it. With great strain I grab the knife as I feel the pressure of the parachute cord on my legs, pulling them with great force. I unsheathe the knife and only tap the lines, they spring apart like a broken string on a guitar. I have to cut perhaps ten lines as we ascend. I can not see the Alpha Survivor, he is below me attached to the hoist by my home-made rescue device. I only hope as I am cutting lines that the knots I have tied hold and he does not fall 250 feet to his death. We have been in a hover over the survivor for a three or four minute period, still there is no ground fire. For this I am thankful. Sgt. Lyle brings us to the helicopter and I am brought in the door, the alpha survivor is still attached to the rope below the helicopter. Lyle and Williamson reach below the helicopter and bring him into the Jolly. We quickly inform Col. Bennett the survivors are aboard and Jolly 30 begins the dangerous extraction from the scene. Slowly gaining speed, following a course behind three Sandy's flying ever so slowly to attract any ground fire before the Jolly passes over a site. Picking up speed, manning mini-guns, listening to F-4's draw anti-aircraft fire and attention away

from rescue forces. Gaining speed we stay on the tree tops, out of the immediate rescue area, following a course plotted by intelligence, we gain speed until Sandy lead tells us its time to go to altitude.

In the Jolly we begin to relax as we gain altitude. We know with each minute we are further from the Mu Gia Pass, further from immediate danger, further from the enemy. Lt. Murry needs wound care from an ejection injury and Sgt Williamson provides medical care. Col. Blissett rests on the cot, the crews voices are picking up, you can hear the excitement, the joy, the accomplishment, "Shit hot", is called out more than once by Sandy's, King, Phantom Pilots. The joy passes along airwaves throughout Laos, there will be celebrating tonight in rescue forces. We approach Thailand, unload the mini-guns and prepare for a "fly-by" of the flight line. We see NKP in the distance, and ready smoke grenades we will pop in celebration. Already 100-150 fellow rescueman, pilots, mechanics, avionics technicians, PJ's, medics, every type of specialist who supports these missions is there to participate in the joy of the rescue of American pilots. The fly-by smoke fills the chopper, everyone is smiling. We land and taxi to our spot on the tarmac, shutting down the engines. Col. Blissett is first out, he is sprayed with champagne, followed by Lt. Murry also a victim of rescue celebration champagne. Next comes Air Craft Commander Clyde Bennett, splashed with buckets of water, like the coach of a Super Bowl team. Col. Bennett held Jolly 30 in a hover over enemy held territory for between an eight and ten minute period in full exposure of any enemy on the ridge. Finally the remainder of the crew. We gather in front of Jolly 30 for a picture and everyone gives warm embraces and handshakes thanking each other for a mission well done. The survivors are lead off in a military ambulance to the hospital for a checkup,

the ground crews park the Jolly, maintenance men immediately begin checkups. The crew boards the transport trucks and heads back to the barracks. We are off alert for the rest of the day. Soon we will be asleep, resting for another mission, another opportunity to fulfill the air rescue motto, "These things we do, so that others may live".

Epilogue: Ssgt William Brown never had an opportunity to talk with the pilots he rescued from the jungles in North Viet Nam until years later. He received the Distinguished Flying Cross for his efforts in the rescue of Gunfighter 82 in the US mail after being discharged from the Air Force. His father, a member, and later Commander of the Ohio Department of AMVETs contacted the Air Force in 1975 and asked them to locate Col. Blissett, the Alpha survivor. During an Ohio AMVET convention in Columbus, Ohio, Col. Blissett, in a surprise ceremony, thanked and presented SSgt. Brown with his DFC in front of family and friends. Gunfighter 82 finally was a mission complete.

The Rescue of Gunfighter 82

William E. Brown, Jr.

Abstract

When an aircraft went down in Southeast Asia, massive resources were mobilized to recover the aircrew. Often, it was a race between United States forces and the enemy to see who could get there first. Predictably, the US determination to rescue aircrew led to a target-rich environment for the enemy, with ambushes and antiaircraft traps. In the end, US efforts often depended upon a lone junior enlisted pararescueman going down a hoist to make someone else's problem his own.



The crews of the "Jolly 30" and the "Gunfighter 82" celebrate after the rescue in 1971. From left: Staff Sgt William Brown, Jr., Staff Sgt William Lyles, the pilot Lt Col Clyde Bennett, Lt Col Arthur Blissett, Lt Michael Murray, Sgt Dennis Williamson, and co-pilot Maj Don Roston

Photo courtesy of William Brown, Jr.

would be the first in, or "Bluebird," for any air rescue attempts made over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos or the western side of North Vietnam. The next day would be December 19, 1971, and all was calm when our rescue crew went to bed at Nakhon Phanom Air Base, Thailand.

We were awakened about midnight and told to report to Intelligence for a briefing. An American aircrew had been shot down, and we were to serve as low bird on the rescue mission. I

The 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), the squadron of Sikorsky HH-53 "Super Jolly Greens" in which I served as a pararescueman, was on alert 24 hours a day throughout the year. We had just completed a 36 hour stint as "high bird," knowing that if a mission were now called, we

immediately remembered that as we changed from high bird to low bird, I changed positions from No. 1 PJ (pararescueman) to No. 2 PJ. That meant if one of the PJs were needed on the ground to make a rescue, provide medical care or support a pilot, I would not be the one to go.

of the helicopter. From there, a PJ in a gun tub could burst fire the minigun and serve as a stinger at the end of the helicopter. During the rescue attempt, however, we had to swing the minigun — designed to fire out the rescue door — away from its position, so we would not be able to use it for a time. Loading the guns in the dark was a skill acquired by every PJ, since most approaches to missions were before dawn.

Once clearance was given, we fired the guns into the blackness. Jolly 36, which was serving as our high bird, left a trail of red dots falling thousands of feet into the jungle below. We began a three-mile circle in a "safe" area over Laos, where no anti-aircraft guns or SAMs had been reported. The helicopters were to remain in this pattern, circling at 10,000 feet, until the survivors were located and the Sandy pilots determined it was safe to approach the rescue site.

We knew the jungle canopy must have been thick, because even though we could hear the "Bravo" (back seat) survivor on the radio, no one could get a visual fix on his position. The "Alpha" (front seat) survivor was easily located, hanging high in a tree, unable to get out of his parachute harness and climb down. We knew his rescue would be tricky. There was signal smoke from Bravo, but it was difficult to see, since it dissipated as it drifted upward. Both survivors had passed the identifier test used by the Air Force, answering their personal questions correctly. The rescue attempt was about ready to start. The final touch came when a Sandy flew over the area at low speed and did not receive any ground fire. It seemed the troop concentration intelligence had warned about were a few miles away, with thick jungle and mountainous terrain between the pilots and the enemy camp. However, the ARRS crews had been caught before in traps laid by the enemy, and this rescue would be accomplished like all others — with full combat support.

We circled as the sun rose high in the pass and mountains. It was a lovely site — thick green trees and mountains that would be excellent for sport climbing. From the air it looked peaceful, even though we knew the area was controlled by NVA regulars. Monitoring the radios, we heard the lead Sandy signal that it was time for the rescue. Run-ins began with a fast helicopter dive to treetop level. The drop is similar to the longest roller coaster ride in the world, with a G-force ending that requires you to plant your feet in order to remain standing during the transition from vertical to horizontal flight. We flew at 200 mile per hour at treetop level with the doors on the helicopter open, the wind whipping through the aircraft so loud that you could not

hear yourself yell. The radio blasted instructions to the pilot about distance to the survivors — eight miles, six miles, four miles, closer and closer. We had to jump high trees, causing every crewmember to leave his seat and bless the inventor of the safety tie-down strap.

Anxiety ran high. We were remembering our training, remembering commands, watching other crewmembers, anticipating the Jolly slowing to a hover, when the danger would increase tenfold. This would be the pinnacle of a year's worth of training, the reason we served in the Air Force, the opportunity to bring home an American pilot, to snatch him from the hands of the enemy. Would we be in the fight of our lives, with small arms rounds popping through the thin skin of the helicopter? Would we make it back alive?

The Sandy lead told Colonel Bennett that straight-ahead, three-quarters of a mile, in a clump of higher trees at the one o'clock position, was the Bravo survivor. The Jolly began to slow and flare out toward a hover. As the trees came into focus, we saw that the canopy was thick. The Sandys began circling the Jolly, weaving around, attempting to draw small arms fire. Jolly 30 was in a hover by then. The Bravo survivor said over the radio he could hear the helicopter but could not see it. We hovered around the general area until he could see the helicopter over his head.

We lowered the jungle penetrator seat at 100 feet per minute. It took more than two minutes to reach the ground. Bravo radioed that he could not see it — the canopy and vines were too thick. Colonel Bennett told Sergeant Lyles to bring up the hoist and to send down a PJ to attempt the rescue. My time had come.

As we waited for the hoist to return to the chopper, I rechecked everything. Finally, it was back up. I quickly strapped myself in and began the descent. After exiting the helicopter I saw how exposed we were. Sergeant Lyles lowered me onto the jungle. I banged through the trees, pushing the jungle away from me. My weight brought me down fast, and I crashed into the jungle floor, stood up, and caught sight of Lieutenant Murray, the Bravo survivor. I had come down through the trees less than 30 yards away, but he still had not seen me. I jumped up and down, waving my arms but he continued to look only up at the helicopter. Leaving the security of the hoist, I ran toward him. Finally, when I got within ten feet, he saw me. His face was full of fright, but he realized I was not the enemy. I signaled for him to follow me. We could not speak to each other because my helmet was on and I was monitoring the radio.

The author, Bill Brown, RN, MS, CEN, NREMT-P is now the Executive Director of the National Registry of EMTs. He began his EMS career as a USAF Pararescueman. After leaving the service he graduated from Youngstown State University with two Bachelors Degrees, one in Nursing the other in Law Enforcement. He received a Masters Degree in Health and Safety Education from Indiana University in 1979. He worked for over 10 years as an emergency department nurse and as a street level paramedic. Following graduation from Indiana University, Mr. Brown became the Paramedic Program Director at Youngstown State University in 1979. In 1985 he began working for the National Registry of EMTs as the Advanced Level Certification Coordinator. In 1989 he became the Executive Director of the National Registry. Since that time he has served on the writing committees for all four national DOT EMT education programs from First Responder through Paramedic. He was on the Task Force for the EMS Education and Practice Blueprint and the EMS Education Agenda for the Future. Mr. Brown has worked with the Special Forces Paramedic Course at Ft. Bragg and continues to support medical education standards for members of the Special Forces community. He is committed to holding the standards for SOF medics as equal to those of every Paramedic in the nation.



This photo shows an HC-130 in the background and an HH-53 in the foreground readying for a rescue mission

The OV-10A Bronco is a twin-turboprop short takeoff and landing aircraft conceived by the Marine Corps and developed under an Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tri-service program. The first production OV-10A was ordered in 1966 and its initial flight took place in August 1967.



The Bronco's mission capabilities include observation, forward air control, helicopter escort, armed

reconnaissance, gunfire spotting, utility and limited ground attack. However, the USAF acquired the Bronco primarily as a forward air control (FAC) aircraft. Adding to its versatility is a rear fuselage compartment with a capacity of 3,200 pounds of cargo, five combat-equipped troops, or two litter patients and a medical attendant.

The first USAF OV-10As destined for combat arrived in Vietnam on July 31, 1968. A total of 157 OV-10As were delivered to the USAF before production ended in April 1969.

First flown in May 1958, the Phantom II originally was developed for U.S. Navy fleet defense and entered



service in 1961. The USAF evaluated it for close air support, interdiction, and counter-air operations and, in 1962, approved a USAF version. The USAF's Phantom II, designated F-4C, made its first flight on May 27, 1963. Production deliveries began in November 1963. In its air-to-ground role the F-4 could carry twice the normal bomb load of a WW II B-17. USAF F-4s also flew reconnaissance and "Wild Weasel" anti-aircraft missile suppression missions.

The HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant was the backbone of air rescue operations for downed pilots. It



was capable of air refueling from a tanker-modified C-130 to extend its mission time. It was large and heavy enough that it usually taxied to a runway (given that one was available) and did a rolling takeoff more reminiscent of a fixed wing aircraft than a helicopter.

JULY A/C

Clyde Bennett's Recollection of the Gunfighter 82 SAR

As I recall, we were alerted sometime after midnight. The Fast FACs and King had been talking to 82 Alpha and Bravo, but then Bravo went off the air.

The Sandys and Jollys launched at first light for the pickup attempt. We started in to get Alpha and when we were just about there, Bravo came up [on the radio] again. We backed off while Sandy low pinpointed Bravo, and since we knew where **Blissett [Alpha]** was and Bravo was on more danger, the decision was made to get Bravo first. He got [his] smoke popped and we got him and then proceeded up the hill to get Alpha. His tree [personnel] lowering device would not work so we decided to hook a metal snap ring [caribeener] into his harness so when he cut loose from his chute, we [would] have him secured. After [the **PJ, SSgt] Brown** got to him, some of the tree blew down and kind of entangled them in the shroud lines.


If you look at photo #3, it appears that Brown's right knee and left leg are higher than his head. As I recall he said that he was afraid that the lines across his legs might do some damage and I think he said he had his knife out and all he had to do was touch the lines and they would snap.

We finally got Alpha and the PJ on board and we got out of there, and RTBed to NKP.



Blissett in trees as we come over him. PJ's helmet in lower right corner on the way

down.



PJ, SSgt. William Brown on the way down to Gunfighter 82A



Brown entangled in shroud lines. Off to the left of his helmet (toward chute) you can make out his right knee bent and sticking up through the lines. His right leg and foot are further out to left. Back of Blissett's neck (shaped like 1/4 moon) can be seen just to the right of Brown's helmet.



Sandy 01, Roger Youngblood sips the fruits of his labors following the Gunfighter 82 SAR



(L to R) Rick Atcheson, Roger Youngblood, Glenn Priebe, and Rocky Smith



This poster along with a case of champagne (Corbel?) was left at Ops for the Jolly Greens



**A joyous throng greets Art Blissett after his rescue from Mu Gia Pass
(Blissett has his head down and his hand on Clyde Bennett's shoulder)**

(The guy with the blue Hobo cap on just to the left of the hoist hook is 1Lt Byron Hukee)

[Back to Gunfighter 82 Page](#)

Pacific Stars and Stripes

Monday Dec. 20, 1971

S&S Vietnam Bureau

GUNFIGHTER 82

SAIGON. A U.S. Air Force pilot dangled from a 70-foot-high tree in Laos for nine hours after he and his copilot parachuted from an F4 Phantom hit by a surface-to-air missile late Friday night, 7th Air Force spokesmen said Saturday.

Low cloud cover prevented rescue aircraft from reaching the men until Saturday morning when helicopter crewmen followed a fading radio signal to the copilot and plucked the pilot out of the tree a mile away, spokesmen said.

North Vietnamese soldiers fired another SAM at the rescue aircraft and rescuers reported small arms fire in the area, but there was no damage to the aircraft, spokesmen said.

The pilot, Lt. Col. Arthur S. Blissett, and copilot, 1st Lt. Michael H. Murray, were reported in excellent condition Saturday afternoon.

The men landed in heavily forested hills five miles west of the North Vietnamese-Laotian border after parachuting from the stricken F-4, spokesmen said.

They were escorting an Air Force RF-4 reconnaissance plane near North Vietnam's Mu Gia pass when the Soviet-made SAM ripped into the fighter-bomber, according to spokesmen.



Lt Murray receives medical treatment aboard the HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant following his rescue from the Laotian jungle.

"I thought I'd be left there because my radio was getting weak"

Blissett's parachute lines tangled in a tree, leaving him suspended 70 feet off the ground, and Murray landed on the ground a mile away, spokesmen said. An HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant helicopter crew from Thailand picked up Murray's faint radio signal and pinpointed his position about 8 a.m. Saturday.

"I thought I'd be left there because my radio was getting weak," Murray said after being picked up.

Minutes later the chopper hovered above Blissett and lowered a crewman who helped hoist the pilot into the helicopter. "I believe we lifted half that tree up with us," Blissett said.

The F-4 Phantom was the second U.S. warplane downed by a SAM over Laos in a week, spokesmen said.

An Air Force F-105 fighter bomber was hit by a SAM over Laos Dec. 10, and rescuers recovered only one of the two crewmen.

The two fighter-bombers are the only U.S. planes that have been shot down by SAMs over Laos, according to 7th Air Force spokesmen.

Blissett and Murray are members of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing in DaNang.

Seventh Air Force News

(undated)

40th ARRS Picks up pair of downed pilots

TAN SON NHUT Two Air Force aircrew members were returned from the jungles of Laos recently by American rescue forces after their aircraft was hit by a surface to air missile (SAM).

They were flying a F-4 Phantom from the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, DaNang Aflld., on a reconnaissance escort mission over North Vietnam Dec. 17, when struck by the missile. They went down about five miles west of Mu Gia Pass in Laos.

The pilot, Lt. Col. Arthur S. Blissett, and the back seater, 1st Lt. Michael H. Murray, successfully ejected from the stricken aircraft and landed in dense mountainous jungle terrain. Voice contact was established almost immediately with the downed aircrew by forward air controllers operating in the area and an HC-130 Kingbird maintained the contact throughout the night. The rescue force planned to launch for the pick-up at first light.

Colonel Blissett and Lieutenant Murray both reported that they were uninjured.

To insure their safety during the night., U.S. fighter aircraft conducted bombing and strafing strikes on the area surrounding the men who had landed about 3,500 feet apart. Colonel Blissett landed in the tree tops and spent the night there rather than risk a drop of some 70 feet to the ground.

In the morning an A-1 Sandy aircraft spotted both parachutes and directed an HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant helicopter to the area. After spotting Colonel Blissett safely tied to his tree top, the Super Jolly of the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron went to look for Lieutenant Murray.

Radio contact with the lieutenant indicated that the chopper was right above him but they could not see him. Asked, "Where have you been" by one of the Jolly Green crew, Lieutenant Murray replied, "I've been right here all night." He was then lifted to safety.



Lt Michael Murray pauses to reflect on his recent ordeal and on his rescue from the Mu Gia Pass area.

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**"I think we
brought half that
tree up with us"**

Getting Colonel Blissett from atop the jungle canopy proved to be a bit more difficult. A pararescueman was lowered on the jungle penetrator and assisted him in cutting parachute lines that he had used in tying himself to the tree. After hacking through the lines and the heavy foliage to which the colonel had attached himself, the pair was hoisted from their tree top perch.

"I think we brought half that tree up with us" was Colonel Blissett's remark following the successful rescue.

Members of the crew of the HH-53 making the rescue were: Maj. Clyde E. Bennett, aircraft commander; Maj Donald L. Roston, pilot; A1C William T. Lyles, flight engineer; and pararescuemen MSgt Daniel L. Schmidt, SSgt William E. Brown and Sgt Dennis E. Williamson.

VNAF take job of Quang Tri FACs

DA NANG Afd. -- One of the most vital missions in Southeast Asia is no longer flown by American pilots.

On Dec. 1, the Air Force forward air controllers (FACs) in Quang Tri Province ceased operation and turned the responsibility for air power to FACs of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). Quang Tri Province borders the DMZ and North Vietnam.

The Quang Tri FACs, part of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) located here, operated with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam's (ARVN) crack First Infantry Division and, in this last month, with the Third Infantry Division.

Flying since 1967, the Quang Tri FACs directed the air support in all of the large battles and activity in the province. They were flying over Khe Sanh in 1968 when U.S. Marines held on to the fire support base. During Tet of 1968 they were in Hue.

During Lam Son 719 -- the Vietnamese incursion into Laos -- the USAF FACs had two jobs. They operated their normal mission of supplying air power to units operating in Quang Tri Province, and they flew as night FACs in Laos with ARVN ground troops.

In the attack on Firebase Fuller in June, Quang Tri's FACs were over-head. It was their alertness and quick reaction that saved many lives on the firebase. The Army ground adviser at Firebase Fuller

recommended two pilots for Silver Stars for their part in the action.

More recently, they helped the ARVN repel a large enemy attack on Firebase Nui Ba Ho, close to Firebase Fuller. According to Maj. Edward P. Schuster, leader of the FACs, "There is no way of knowing how many enemy were killed. At one time, Army ground forces and observation helicopters counted 220 bodies. We would put in air strikes, but an hour later, they'd start up again.

"I feel certain that in working around Nui Ba Ho before Lam Son 810, we probably killed a battalion of NVA soldiers," continued the major.

Lam Son 810, in September, was their last big operation. Major Schuster remembers this action, because of the cooperation between various air units. "I think it really says something about the Air Force when, on an operation that came up on such short notice, we were able to have two fighter aircraft over the target fully loaded every 15 minutes during daylight for a 10-day period. This was mainly Air Force, but also included VNAF and Navy aircraft. It was a tremendous feeling to see the cooperation to support ground troops."

The FACs have had one of the most difficult and demanding tasks in this war. Their area of operation covered an area from the DMZ to the edge of Quang Tri Province, and from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Laotian border.



U.S. Air Force

Backseater Lieutenant Murray (1.) gives a smiling thumbs-up rescue crewmembers AIC William T. Lyles and SSgt. William E. B

40th ARRS picks up pair of downed pilots

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The pilot, Lt. Col. Arth Blissett, and the back seater, Michael H. Murray, were ejected from the stricken aircraft landed in dense mountainous terrain. Voice contact was established almost immediately with the aircrew by forward air controller operating in the area and an F-4 Kingbird maintained the contact throughout the night. The rescue team planned to launch for the pickup first light.

Colonel Blissett and Lieutenant Murray both reported that they were uninjured.

To insure their safety during the night, U.S. fighter aircraft conducted bombing and strafing strikes on the area surrounding the men.

Kudos for 600th Photo

Photogs nab PACAF, AF honors

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Backseater Lieutenant Murray (1.) gives a shining thumbs up from rescue crewmembers A1C William T. Lyles and SSgt. William E. Brown

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Photo

nab PACAF, AF honors

photographer, won first place in the "Children" category and second place in the "Military Life" category. He also received honorable mention in three other areas. All of his submissions were color transparencies.


The squadron commander, Col. Frank L. Cox Jr., won honorable mention in the Air Force contest in the "Military Life" class.

In the PACAF contest, Sergeant Seel almost swept the field, taking first place in the categories of "Children," "Military Life," and "Experimental." He also won second place awards in "Action" and "Military Life." The 23-year-old photographer also gained

four honorable mentions for a total of 11 awards. All submissions were color transparencies.

Colonel Cox took several awards in the PACAF contest. He was awarded second place in the area of "Military Life" and "Action" in monochrome competition and took third place in the area of "Children." The colonel also won honorable mention in the "Military Life" and "Action" categories. With the exception of "Military Life," all submissions were black and white.

The Air Force-wide contest was held at Luke AFB, Ariz., while the PACAF competition was conducted at Hickam AFB, Hawaii.





A PARARESCUEMAN IS LOWERED from an HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant to help Lt. Col. Arthur S. Blissett in cutting the parachute lines and heavy foliage which he used to tie himself to the tree top. The colonel spent the night rather than risk a 70 foot drop to the ground. Colonel Blissett had been on a night reconnaissance escort mission over North Vietnam when his F-4 Phantom was struck by a surface to air missile. He went down in Laos.

40th ARRSq pulls two pilots from jungle

TAN SON NHUT AB, RVN -- Two Air Force air crew members were returned from the jungles of Laos by Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service rescue forces after their aircraft was hit by a surface to air missile (SAM).

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Voice contact was established almost immediately with the downed aircrew by forward air controllers operating in the area and an HC-130 Hercules maintained contact throughout the night.

The rescue force planned to launch for the pick up at first light.

Both men reported that they were uninjured.

To insure their safety during the night, Air Force fighters conducted bombing and strafing strikes on the area surrounding the men who had landed about 3,500 feet apart.

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That morning an A-1 Skyraider spotted both parachutes and directed an HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant to the

area. After spotting the colonel safely tied to his tree top, the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron's helicopter went to look for Lieutenant Murray.

Radio contact with the lieutenant indicated that the helicopter was right above him but they could not see him.

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Members of the HH-53 crew making the rescue were Majors Clyde E. Bennett, aircraft commander, and Donald L. Roston, copilot; A1C William T. Lyles, flight engineer; and MSgt. Daniel L. Schmidt, SSgt. William E. Brown, and Sgt. Dennis E. Williamson, pararescuemen.

31st joins in test

HQ ARRS -- The 31st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron has joined with four other Military Airlift Command units at Clark AB, P.I., to form a single unit, the 1600th Support Group.

This consolidation is a one-year test, directed by USAF, to determine the feasibility of having the separate MAC functions at Clark under a single manager.

76th crew assists stricken Navy P-3 after midair crash

By Capt. Monroe S. Sams Jr.

HICKAM AFS, Hawaii -- Nothing can be more chilling to a rescue aircrew searching under a low, threatening overcast for the survivors of a sunken ship than a "Mayday" call from one of the other SAR aircraft.

Yet, the quick reaction to such a call by a 76th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron HC-130 crew may well have been the deciding factor in the saving of 10 lives aboard a Navy P-3.

The Navy aircraft had collided in midair with a Coast Guard C-130 during an extensive search operation.

In the confusion which followed the initial distress call from the Coast Guard C-130, which was only slightly damaged, no word was heard from the P-3 and it was presumed lost.

However, the instinctive effort by the ARRS HC-130 crew to contact the craft met with success.

The P-3 was still flying, although it was only a few feet above the water and virtually uncontrollable with almost 10 feet of its left wing chopped off.

Disorientated from the midair collision, which had sent them plummeting from 500 feet to just inches above the water and faced with almost total instrument weather conditions, the Navy crew was fighting a desperate battle just to keep their machine flying.

It was at this point that the calm, professional presence of Capt. Richard L. Cecil's crew helped make order out of chaos.

Reassuring the distressed crew that help was nearby if they could just hang on, Captain Cecil's crew began an immediate intercept of the P-3.

Fast work on the radar by Maj. Sada-yoshi Sakamoto, the navigator, pinpointed the P-3's position and vectors were given to Midway.

Following the calm, "common sense" advice of the rescue crew and displaying outstanding airmanship, the P-3 pilot was able to regain control of his aircraft and assess the damage.

While he was performing controllability checks on his battered craft, the loadmasters and PJs aboard the rescue HC-130 completed preparations for MA-1 kit and pararescue deployment--just in case.

The copilot and radio operator coordinated instructions and clearance between the distressed aircraft and ground agencies.

Following instructions from the rescue HC-130, the crippled P-3 made its way through the weather and made a difficult landing under extreme crosswinds at Midway.

In the opinion of the Navy pilot, the immediate "helping hand" given him and his men by the 76th ARRSq crew was the decisive factor in the safe recovery of his aircraft and crew.

728 BR owl 82 Down CH-89 OKAY.
746 BR JG-57 ↓ CH 70 AT 1740 / ADVISE JACK & Teepee;
830 HY SSGT Hardy on duty SSGT Becker off duty
840 HY JG-57 ↓ CH 89 JACK/TP
850 HY JG-63 ↑ CH 70 TP
945 HY JG-63 ↓ CH 89 JACK/TP
2145 HY Notified By JACK That Gunfighter 82/F4 was down
/ Gave location of 075/64 CH 89 Contact with both
/ A+B had been made
2149 HY Alert Crews And MX
2150 HY Notified Col Moore + Lt Col McAllister
2159 HY Alert Crews Arrived
2200 HY Received WX in BAR AREA - 120 Below 0
2359 HY Log Closed

18 Dec 71

0001 HY Log Opened
340 HY JG-30+32 ↑ CH 89 JACK/TP
355 HY JG-30+32 ↓ CH 89 JACK/TP
425 HY JG-30+52 ↑ CH 89 JACK/TP
550 HY Carried Forstater to Comm center at 0400
620 HY Notified South crew to stand by. For launch
630 HY Notified South crew to Report to ACFT AND
monitor H-A Radio
0640 HY South Crews launched
0635 HY JG-30 Started in for pick up.
0652 HY JG-30 picked up - B preceding to A
0655 HY JG-30 now has A+B on board
704 R MSG# FOR PICK-UP B-3-046
0656 HY South launch CNX
730 HY JG 30 & 52 ↓ CH 89 JACK/TEEPEE
730 ZD SSGT HARDY OFF DUTY / SGT DAUNSON ON DUTY
75 ZD NOTIFIED BY JACK THAT OUR SOUTH JG's WERE ON ACFT
STAND-BY FOR POSSIBLE SAR
720 ZD JACK SAYS OUR TOLLIES WERE LAUNCHED / COORDINATES
071/70/65 / Col MOORE NX

FROM: 1st SOG (DO/1st Col Bowden/2751)

11 January 1972

SUBJECT: SARCO Report, Gunfighter 82

TO: 56th SOW (DO)

1. This report covers the activities of the SAR forces during the successful SAR for Gunfighter 821 and 823, 17-18 December 1971. All times are Thailand local. The SAR was declared by Jack at 2120. Initial report was that there were two survivors down near Mu Gia Pass. Nail 13, the area FAC, was acting as On-Scene Commander. Weather was reported as 3/8 scattered, bases 13,500' (6-8,000MSL). The cloud layer was east of the survivors and moving west. Nail 51 (Pave Nail) went directly to the area and assumed On-Scene Command at 2245.

2. The reported positions of the survivors varied widely until 0030, 18 Dec 71, when a good fix was obtained by Nail 51. Nail 13 initially reported the survivors were in the kharst east of the valley which runs north-south through Mu Gia. When Nail 51 arrived in the area he attempted to locate the survivors by flying over them and asking the survivors to tell him when he was directly overhead. He then located this position using Loran. On his first attempt one of the classic errors in this type of search occurred when the survivors identified another OV-10 as being directly overhead. Nail 51 soon realized his fix was wrong and used UHF DF to refine his initial position. A good fix was obtained at 0030 of WE 7248 4898. A slightly refined fix of WE 735 505 was obtained at 0145 and continued to be used throughout the night. Until the 0030 fix the only thing known for sure was that the survivors were down in dense jungle and had no signs of activity around them. Based on this information interdiction strikes were begun on the road network, well clear of the survivors.

3. Immediately after arriving at the Command Post, I contacted Blue Chip, with Jack and Joker listening in, to:

a. Request area denial munitions. BBU-52, CBU 42 (anti personnel mines), and CDU 14 (gravel) were requested to be loaded and placed on Quick Reaction Force (QRF) alert.

b. Explain that it was essential to isolate the objective area to prevent movement of vehicles and AAA into the immediate area.

c. Advise that when the survivors positions were pinpointed they could expect the On-Scene Commander to start calling for area denial munitions to cut off all access to the survivors immediate area.

d. Recommend that TFA retain control of Sector 2 and work directly with the On-Scene Commander to control ordnance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c. Ask for release of all Para Mail sorties to the SAR to act as On-Scene Commanders during the night and as On-Scene FACs during the day.

4. At this point the results of the SAR working group which met on 16 December at NKP became apparent. I was repeatedly talking to the other members of the working group. Only brief conversations were needed to reach understanding due to our common knowledge and the general consensus of opinion on what should be done at night during a SAR. I cannot over-emphasize the results of this conference. To the best of my knowledge this was the first concerted effort to immediately use large scale night strikes in direct support of a SAR. It went very smoothly.

5. At 2255, Lt Col Thompson, TFA, called to confirm the survivors location. We agreed that TFA should retain control of Sector 2 and put in ordnance on the roads. Until the survivors were pinpointed, ordnance drops were restricted to the road network well clear of the survivors positions. After the survivors were located, strikes would be put in on known AAA sites near the survivors location and area denial weapons would be used to isolate the survivors from the road network. From this point on TFA controlled the interdiction campaign. The only difficulty occurred about 0030 when TFA advised me that King was turning back ordnance. I contacted Jack, TFA contacted Blue Chip, and Maj Bristol (Mail Coordinator) talked direct to the On-Scene Commander. We all emphasized the need to interdict the area. Within 30 minutes ordnance was going in and continued throughout the SAR.

6. At 2300, Col Moore, Commander, 40th MRS, discussed the possible use of the Limited Night Recovery System (LNRS) with Jack. Two LNRS aircraft, Jolly Green 32 (low) and 30 (high), took off at 0340L. Jolly Green 32 aborted, 30 became low, and 52 launched as high. After arriving in the objective area the LNRS aircraft decided not to attempt a pickup due to terrain, exposure to SAMs/AAA, and uncertainty as to the survivors exact position. These Jollys held until daylight and made the pickup.

7. Sandys 01, 02, 03, and 04 launched at 0510 and arrived on scene at 0540. At 0617, Sandy 01 sighted Alpha's parachute but was unable to pinpoint Bravo. Both survivors still reported no movement in their area. Gunfighter 82 Alpha was hung securely in a tree. He attempted to lower himself but the tree lowering device jammed after lowering him a few inches. Bravo was on the ground. The Sandys expended no ordnance.

8. Phase Bravo was started at 0622. The Sandys flew a protective daisy chain but expended no ordnance. At 0640 Bravo's smoke was spotted and he was picked up by Jolly Green 30 at 0645. Jolly Green 30 then went to Alpha's parachute and lowered a PJ to assist him. The PJ and survivor became entangled in parachute shroud lines but were cut loose by the PJ while going up on the penetrator. At 0657, Alpha was on board and the rescue was complete. All SAR forces exited the area and returned to NKP. There was no enemy opposition during the pickup. Mail 07 held over the Sandys and relayed radio calls.

CONFIDENTIAL

9. Recommendations: Night SAR activity should follow the same general pattern used in this SAR. Specifically:

a. TFA should retain control of the SAR area if this is an area they can work effectively.


b. Night ordnance delivery should be used continuously to interdict the area. Ordnance delivery should be restricted only by uncertainty as to the survivor's position and minimum safe distance from the survivor.

c. Maximum use of the OV-10 Pave Nail aircraft should be made both day and night. The combination of Loran, laser, visual FACING, and availability at MKP for continuing detailed briefing on the SAR procedures and techniques makes use of the Pave Nail invaluable.

d. Jolly Greens should utilize the LERS whenever terrain, weather, and enemy threat permit. Joint planning and training between the Jolly Greens, Pave Nails, and Spectres are necessary to most effectively utilize this capability. This is especially true in locating the survivors exact position. Present capability to pinpoint a survivor at night is not adequate.

e. The SARCO does not have adequate radio receivers to effectively monitor the progress of the SAR. This prevents the Sandys, Pave Nails, and Jolly Greens from being briefed on the most complete information available before the takeoff. Brief, complete communications between the SAR forces is a continuing problem. Better briefings before takeoff would be a significant help in this area.

f. The SARCO should continue to act aggressively to influence the conduct of a SAR. The SARCO's qualifications, and access to information are unmatched by any other individual. He briefs all crews (except the initial alert crews) prior to launch and discusses their plans with them. He debriefs returning crews and gets recommendations from them. He has detailed intelligence data from Wing Intelligence and TFA. He is well qualified to recommend the use of ordnance and delivery systems.



CHARLES K. BOWDEN, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

RECEIVED

GUNFIGHTER 82

17+18 DEC 71

DATE:

MISSION:

AIRBASE:

MISSION:

LOCATION:

STATUS:

King 41 arrived

JACK that night

a Spectre aircraft

ed that he was

the survivors.

that frequency.

position as 0677/

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as OSC and refined

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possible MKS at 1510.

passes in the high

aircraft started

Dollar flights

replaced Nail 61

determined that

know B's position

replaced Nail 51

a position west

position was 0672484895.

Nail 18 determined

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Nail 31 became

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even though we

to drop anything.

Owl 03 to fast

in the pass and

Owl 03 and Gun

Nail 31 was

at 1916Z. His

projectile as

King 27 had arrived in the area to relieve King 41 and had received a partial briefing when we got a cargo compartment overheat at 1944Z. We descended because of loss of pressurization and briefed King 27 on what

SECRET

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified at or 12 years.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dt} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \, dx &= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \operatorname{div} \mathbf{u} \, dx \\ \frac{d}{dt} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \, dx &= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \operatorname{div} \mathbf{u} \, dx \\ \frac{d}{dt} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \, dx &= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \operatorname{div} \mathbf{u} \, dx \\ \frac{d}{dt} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \, dx &= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \operatorname{div} \mathbf{u} \, dx \\ \frac{d}{dt} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \, dx &= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \operatorname{div} \mathbf{u} \, dx \\ \frac{d}{dt} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \, dx &= \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \rho \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \otimes \mathbf{u} \operatorname{div} \mathbf{u} \, dx \end{aligned}$$

Sar Forces from Africa

King 21, 22
JG 32, 32
Moonbeam

[REDACTED]

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to all
not Nail
light
to him

King 21 was
covered
covered
accomplished
radio contact.
at 1950. Nail 31 was
area while Nail 31 was
ed having trouble
supply the ordnance
with King for instructions. He advised them that about 2000Z the re-
quest of Nail 31 so they would not interfere with strike in the west.
Nail 31 was on scene and we requested a replacement FAC for him.
Nail 31 advised that Nail 25 was coming up to relieve him. A secure coordi-
nation was being completed thru secure radios between Headshed, the Nails
and other secure radio equipped aircraft. We were provided the resources
thru Headshed and passed them to the FAC in a smooth manner during the
whole SAK. The double FAC concept works very well. We were obviously by-
passed on some of the coordination between the strike FAC's requirements
and Headshed. Here again secure UHF radios or secure FM radios were re-
quired. JG 32 and 30 departed 89 at 2040. 32 had maintenance problems and
RTB'd to 89. JG 52 took 32's place. The Sandies did not launch until
later since they don't have night capabilities. JG's reported in the hold-
ing pattern at 2150Z, the Sandies at 2240. Nail 31 had advised that the
weather was closing in and would be good for about 1 1/2 hours. We requested
second flight of JG be launched (JG 32 and 62). At 2311Z Sandy 02 went in
for a look. Nail 25, a night FAC, assumed on scene from Nail 31. The
Sandies sighted some chutes but decided they were not personnel chutes be-
cause the color was all white. Sandy 01 pinpointed the Alpha man and tried
to get the Alpha man to lower himself off the tree. The 82A man could not
lower himself so he was given instructions to pop the day end of his flare
when Sandy 01 gave the instructions. The recovery phase was started and
the Bravo man came up frequency. At 2339Z Sandy 01 cleared the area, got a
definite position and decided to pick him, Bravo first. The same instructi-
ons were relayed to him and JG 30 was vectored into the 82B's area and the
Bravo man was advised to pop his smoke. The smoke was sighted and Bravo
man was picked up at approximately 2350Z. JG 30 was vectored to the 82A
man and the A man was advised to pop the day end of his flare. The Alpha
man was located but some difficulty was encountered with the parachute
risers, cutting them free from the survivor. The Alpha man was on his way
up the hoist at 2355Z. He was on board at 2357Z. The Jollys and Sandys
RTB'd to 89. ETA to 89 was 0025Z. Refueling was not required so King 21,
the tanker, was released. All forces were released at 17/2400Z except for
MIG CAP which stayed with us until 0020Z and were released at that time.

SECRET

GUNFIGHTER 02A/B

SANDY 01/02

18 December 1971

On 18 Dec 71, I was Sandy 01 on a first light SAR effort for Gunfighter 82 Alpha and Bravo. The SAR forces briefed at 0330L and Sandy 01/02 took off at 0510L. We arrived on scene and briefed with King and Nail 25. At first light, Nail 25 took me over the known survivors' position and I established contact with 02 Alpha. Alpha was hung in a tree and his tree lowering device was inoperative. I briefed Alpha on his duties with his radio and smoke. We could not locate Bravo so I decided to brief the SAR forces and pick up Alpha. As I was about to execute the pick up, Bravo came up on the radio. I still could not locate Bravo but I knew he was very close to Alpha. So I decided to bring Jolly 30 in on Alpha's position and direct the Jolly over the Bravo's position. I executed Sandys 02/03/04 and Jolly 30. As the SAR forces were approaching Alpha's position, I asked Bravo to pop his day smoke. Bravo's smoke came up about 50 meters from Alpha and Jolly 30 headed straight for it. Jolly 30 hovered and picked up Bravo and directed the Jolly over to Alpha position. We picked Alpha up and exited the area. During the complete SAR effort, Nail 07 assisted me in relaying radio traffic. Nail 49 continued to pour ordnance on the Gas Pass and Delta 30. This kept the AAA and SAM threat down. Sandy 02 did an outstanding job of controlling communication between the King aircraft, Nail 07/49, and Jollys.


ROGER L. YOUNGBLOOD, Capt, USAF
Sandy 01

CONFIDENTIAL 321/3
SINOT 02/04

18 December 1971

As Sandy 02/04, Capt Fenn and I both launched as Jolly Green escorts on the first light effort for Sunlighter 32. We proceeded to the initial holding point, maintaining altitude separation until we were able to visually acquire the Jollys, at which time we set up an orbit around them. Sandy 01/02 were holding close to the survivor's position, as were Nail 25 and Nail 07. At first light, Nail 25 led Sandy 01 to the survivor's area and Sandy 01 immediately sighted 32A. We began trolling the area for possible reception but was unable to expend as 32B had not been located yet. 32A was able to talk to the Sandys and Sandy 01 decided to make a pick up and then continue searching for 32B. As we started moving the Jolly into the creek, 32A called Sandy 01 and said he could hear 32B calling. We stopped the Jollys and held approximately three miles west of the survivor's position while Sandy 01 began searching again for 32B. Everytime Sandy 01 would fly over 32A, 32B would say "you're right over me." It was evident that the two were located very close together, and as 32A's engine was plainly visible, Sandy 01 again called for the Jolly Green to start his run in while directing 32B to pop his smoke. The Jolly quickly saw the smoke, approximately 100 yards from 32A's position, and moved into the hover. We entered the daisy chain around the Jolly as he picked up 32B, then moved directly to 32A and made the second pick up. As he headed out of the area Sandy 01/02 and Sandy 03/04 continued to escort until the Jollys were across the river.

George E. Throckmorton
GEORGE E. THROCKMORTON, Capt, USAF
Sandy 03

FROM: 10th ARRSq (DO)

SUBJECT: RCS: ARRS V-6 Report

TO: 3rd ARRGp (JROC)

DATE: 13 Dec 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-03-046

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 30

MISSION OBJECTIVE: (F-4) Gunfighter 82 ALPHA and BRAVO

LOCATION: MU GIA Pass, 105-45E, 17-40N

SAVES: Two (2) Combat Saves

At 0340L, Jolly Green 32 (Low) and Jolly Green 30 (High) departed MKP for the attempted night recovery of Gunfighter 82 Alpha and Bravo (F-4). JG 32 aborted shortly after takeoff due to a large torque split and a malfunctioning camera, and JG 30 became Low and JG 52 was launched as High. After arriving at the initial holding point, we were notified that Alpha was hanging in a tree and Bravo was on the ground under a multiple canopy of trees. Due to the location of the survivors, Alpha's inability to use his strobe light, the close proximity of MU GIA Pass, the SAM threat, and the increased altitude required for a night recovery search, I made the decision to wait until first light for the rescue attempt. Mail 25 (OV-10 Pave Mail) was on scene at this time and had established the approximate location of both survivors. In addition, he and the other Mail FACs had been directing ordnance in the vicinity that silenced most of the enemy activity in the area. Nails 07 and 49 and Sandys 1,2,3 and 4 (A-1s) launched with us and Mail 25 and 07 and Sandy 1 had the survivors pinpointed prior to first light and at first light spotted the chute of Alpha. A search for Bravo was then started and even though he was never spotted visually, it was decided that an attempt could be made on Bravo and that he would be picked up first. At 0640L we started our run in on Bravo and with Sandys 2,3, and 4, as escort in a daisy chain, Sandy 1 directed Bravo to pop his smoke and smoke was observed approximately 200 yards south east of Alpha's chute at the base of a vertical karst formation. The karst and trees made it impossible to hover into the wind so a down wind hover was established in the vicinity of Bravo's smoke and my number 1 PJ, SSgt Brown was lowered to the ground to search for the survivor. The PJ descended 200 feet for Bravo as he was closest to the Pass and the on scene Commander wanted him picked up first to reduce vulnerability from rapidly improving light conditions. The aircraft at this time was exposed to a large valley with a river at the bottom. The PJ was especially exposed at this time until he entered the canopy of the trees. After arriving on the ground, the PJ conducted a search for Bravo since Bravo had been unable to see the PJ descend into the trees. Bravo was found in minimum time and the pair were retrieved into the helicopter by ALC Liles, Flight Engineer/Hoist Operator, at 0652L. We then proceeded over to Alpha's position. He was located 200 yards northwest of Bravo's position approximately 150 feet from the top of the karst formation in a small ravine.

GROUP 4
Declassified at 3 Year
Interval
From 18 Years

I offered my Co-pilot, Major Rosten, the pickup and he immediately accepted. Again a down wind hover was necessary and the hover established above Alpha. The PJ (SSgt Brown) again exposed himself to the valley and descended to assist 82A. His chute was hanging in a dead tree approximately 150 feet from the ground. When the PJ was about 20 feet below the helicopter, the top of the tree in which the survivor was located snapped off and fell beside the survivor. The PJ continued descent to Alpha and because of the pendulum action and the speed of descent he and the jungle penetrator became entangled in the tree, parachute and shroud lines. Pulling himself through the tree in an attempt to reach Alpha, he became inverted. He continued to Alpha in the inverted position and successfully snapped a device into the survivor's parachute harness, and began to cut him loose. The hoist operator seeing that the PJ was inverted, began to slowly bring the PJ and Alpha up. SSgt Brown wisely used his knife to cut away the shroud lines and chute. At times there were extreme pressures on SSgt Brown because the chute was still secure to the tree and he had lines between himself and the penetrator. Had he not been able to cut away the chute and consequently the tree, great injury and damage could have been inflicted upon the survivor, himself and the helicopter. The PJ could not use his radio because the antenna had broken when he became entangled. The quickness on the part of the PJ and the deftness of the hoist operator, ALC Liles, were directly responsible for the recovery of 82A. With the hoist in the full up position, the survivor was still a few feet below the door, my other two PJ's, MSgt Schmidt and Sgt Williams, along with ALC Liles, exposed themselves to great danger and hostile activity by reaching down and out of the helicopter to retrieve Alpha at 0700L. With the survivors safely on board, Sandy 1 gave us an egress heading and told us to keep it on the trees. We departed with the Sandys and Mails and kept it on the deck for approximately 3 miles and then climbed to a safe altitude and proceeded back to MFP arriving at 0730L.

Other Comments:

1. Even though we were in the immediate vicinity of MUGIA Pass, Mail 25 had received all of the ordinance he had requested (in sharp contrast to the Ash Can 01 SAR on the 10th and 11th of Dec 71) and had silenced all of the big guns in the area. He was on scene most of the night and had done an excellent job.
2. Mail 07 did excellent work. Pete Mail is an invaluable asset to the SAR effort.
3. King did an excellent job on coordination of ordinance request.
4. Mail 49 and the other sector FACs gave excellent assistance in suppressing enemy activity.
5. This was probably as close to a classic SAR as possible.

Jolly Green 30 Crewmembers (Low)

AC	Major Clyde E. Bennett	SS
CP	Major Donald L. Rosten	SS
EM	ALC William T. Liles	DM
RS	MSgt Daniel L. Schmidt	SS
RS	SSgt William E. Brown	SS
RS	Sgt Dennis C. Williams	SS
AP	ALC Patrick A. Alexander	SS

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
Intervals; declassified
after 12 years

Jelly Green 52 Commanders (Hqs)

AO Major Kenneth E. Earnest
CP I/C Anthony E. Holland
HM SSgt Jerrold T. Dearman
RS Sgt John S. Lackeas
RS ALC Charles D. McGrath

Other SAR Forces:

Sandy's 1, 2, 3, and 4

Nail's 25, 67, and 49, and other Nail FAC's

King 21, 27, and 41

Plus many, many strike aircraft

CLYDE E. BENNETT, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

~~SECRET~~

TO: 10th AIRSg (DC)

SUBJECT: RCS: AIRS V-6 Report

TO: 3rd AIRSg (JRCC)

DATE: 13 Dec '71

MISSION NUMBER: B-03-046

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 30

MISSION OBJECTIVE: (F-4) Gunfighter S2 ALPHA and BRAVO

LOCATION: MU GIA Pass, 105-45E, 17-40N

SAVES: Two (2) Combat Saves

At 0240L, Jolly Green 32 (Low) and Jolly Green 30 (High) departed NKP for the attempted night recovery of Gunfighter S2 Alpha and Bravo (F-4). JG 32 aborted shortly after takeoff due to a large torque split and a malfunctioning camera, and JG 30 became Low and JG 32 was launched as High. After arriving at the initial holding point, we were notified that Alpha was hanging in a tree and Bravo was on the ground under a multiple canopy of trees. Due to the location of the survivors, Alpha's inability to use his strobe light, the close proximity of MU GIA Pass, the SAM threat, and the increased altitude required for a night recovery search, I made the decision to wait until first light for the recovery attempt. Mail 25 (OV-10 Pave Nail) was on scene at this time and had established the approximate location of both survivors. In addition, he and the other Mail PACS had been directing ordnance in the vicinity that silenced most of the enemy activity in the area. Nails 07 and 49 and Sandys 1, 2, 3 and 4 (4-15) launched with us and Mail 25 and 07 and Sandy 1 had the survivors pinpointed prior to first light and at first light spotted the chute of Alpha. A search for Bravo was then started and even though he was never spotted visually, it was decided that an attempt could be made on Bravo and that he would be picked up first. At 0440L we started our run in on Bravo and with Sandys 2, 3, and 4, in escort in a daisy chain, Sandy 1 directed Bravo to pop his smoke and smoke was observed approximately 200 yards south east of Alpha's chute at the base of a vertical karst formation. The karst and trees made it impossible to hover into the wind so a down wind hover was established in the vicinity of Bravo's smoke and my number 1 PJ, SSgt Brown was lowered to the ground to search for the survivor. The PJ descended 200 feet for Bravo as he was closest to the Pass and the on scene Commander wanted him picked up first to reduce vulnerability from rapidly improving light conditions. The aircraft at this time was exposed to a large valley with a river at the bottom. The PJ was especially exposed at this time until he entered the canopy of the trees. After arriving on the ground, the PJ conducted a search for Bravo since Bravo had been unable to see the PJ descend into the trees. Bravo was found in minimum time and the pair were retrieved into the helicopter by ALC Miles, Flight Engineer/Host Operator, at 0652L. We then proceeded over to Alpha's position. He was located 200 yards northwest of Bravo's position approximately 150 feet from the top of the karst formation in a small ravine.

GROUP 4
Declassified and approved for release
DATE 12-18-2013

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Other Comments:

1. Even though we were in the immediate vicinity of MUGIA Pass, Mail 25 had received all of the ordinance he had requested (in sharp contrast to the ALC Can O1 SAR on the 10th and 11th of Dec 71) and had silenced all of the big guns in the area. He was on scene most of the night and had done an excellent job.
2. Mail 07 did excellent work. Pave Mail is an invaluable asset to the SAR effort.
3. King did an excellent job of coordination of ordinance request.
4. Mail 49 and the other sector FACs gave excellent assistance in suppressing enemy activity.
5. This was probably as close to a classic SAR as possible.

Jolly Green 39 Crewmembers (low)

AC	Major Clyde E. Bennett	SS
CP	Major Donald L. Roston	SS
HM	ALC William T. Miles	DC
RS	MSgt Daniel L. Schmidt	SS
BS	SSgt William H. Brown	SS
RS	Sgt Dennis C. Williams	
AP	ALC Patrick A. Alexander	

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

[REDACTED]

Sally Green SP Capt. (M. 7)

AC Major Kenneth H. Brown
CP J/C Anthony M. Holland
DI SCgt Jernold T. Darian
RS Sgt John S. Jackson
RS ALC Charles D. McGrath

Other SAR Forces:

Sandy's 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Nail's 25, 07, and 49, and other Nail PAC's

King 21, 27, and 41

Plus many, many strike aircraft.

OLYDE E. BENNETT, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

CONCLUSIONS

(C) On 11 December, an F-4, Gunfighter 82, was shot down in the vicinity of Mu Gia Pass very near the location of the A-1H 01 shootdown, and a SAR was declared. Both Gunfighter 82 Alpha and Bravo reported themselves to be uninjured and with no enemy activity detected in their area despite their proximity to Mu Gia Pass.⁴⁴

(C) An OV-10 aircraft, Dove Nail 51, equipped with special electronic gear, was sent to the area. He assumed on-scene command at 2245. Nail 51, in conjunction with Nail 13, who had been working in the area, proceeded to locate the precise coordinates of the survivors by flying over them and requesting notification when the aircraft was overhead. The exact position at time of notification was obtained by precision LORAN fixing. A position was soon obtained but found to be inaccurate since the plane overhead upon notification was not the one that contained the LORAN equipment. Efforts continued to obtain a precision fix with other aircraft keeping away from the area to avoid confusion. At 0030 local, on the morning of 16 December, the position of the survivors was accurately located in the jungle way from the route structure of the pass.⁴⁵

(C) Based somewhat on lessons learned during the A-1H 01

44. SARCO Report for Gunfighter 82, 11 Jan 72, (Doc 15).
45. Ibid.

SAR, a SAR working group, had met on 16 December at 0700 to plan and coordinate the use of techniques and equipment to most effectively achieve SAR objectives. Many of the techniques discussed less than two days before were now brought into play by, in many cases, people from different organizations who had participated in the conference.⁴⁶

(C) With the positions of the survivors located and confirmed, heavy air strikes were put in on the road structure and known AAA positions which might hamper the rescue efforts. Area denial weapons were used to isolate Gunfighter 82 Alpha and Bravo from the roads from which the enemy would most logically approach. Heavy air strikes continued throughout the SAR, not only to neutralize the offensive capability of the enemy in the area, but also to preclude his bringing in additional AAA or ground forces which could be directed against the SAR forces or the survivors.⁴⁷

(C) Late on the 17th, a joint decision was made by JAGC and the 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron to attempt a pickup at night through use of the Limited Night Recovery System (LNRS) by the Jolly Greens. Accordingly, Jolly Greens 30 and 32 took off at 0340; however, 32 aborted and was replaced by 52. After they arrived in the pickup area a decision was made to hold until first light since the terrain, survivors' exact location, and AAA and SAM situations were all unknown to some degree.⁴⁸

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

(C) At 0510 a team of four men was launched, Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04. They reached their objective at 0540 and were contacted by KING and Nail 05 who were on the scene. Nail 05 called Sandy 01 to the survivors' position where 01 immediately located the parachute of Alpha who was suspended in a tree. Sandy 01 then searched the area for enemy ground fire with 02 providing protection overhead. The rest of the SAR force held three miles to the east. In addition from the ground was encountered and Sandy 01 started a search for Bravo while Alpha tried to lower himself to the ground with the wire lowering device contained in his parachute harness. The lowering device jammed after moving only a few inches. Alpha gave up the effort to lower himself, but reported that each time Sandy 01 flew over his position Bravo reported his location. It was decided that the two must be in close proximity.⁴⁹

(C) At 0622 it was decided to bring in Jolly Green 30 to Alpha's position since Bravo, while not yet located, was in the same area. Jolly Green 30 was called in while the Sandys flew a protective chain of potential fire power around him. Bravo was asked to pop his day smoke, and at 0643 he was located about 50 meters from Alpha. He was picked up within five minutes without any difficulty.⁵⁰

(C) With Bravo on board Jolly Green 30 went to Alpha's

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-11-83 BY 1043

parachute and lowered a PJ on the jungle floor to aid in extracting Alpha from the parachute area. Both Alpha and the PJ soon became entangled in the parachute but were cut loose by the PJ as the penetrator was slowly raised. Alpha was brought on board at 0657 and the entire force exited without having expended any ordnance or encountering any enemy fire. It was a successful SAR conducted in a hazardous area where mistakes might well cause disaster. The SAR conference conducted just two days earlier had served in good stead.⁵¹

51. Ibid.

[REDACTED]

DATE: 12 Dec 71

MISSION NUMBER: 1-1-046-17-34-11

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 27

MISSION OBJECTIVE: F-4 Gunfighter 82

LOCATION: 1735N 10942E

STATUS: 2 Combat Credits to King 27

King 41 airborne ON 70 1415Z to WTB ON 71. At 1437Z we were notified by JACK that Gunfighter 82 was downed in Mugia Pass. We received word that a Spectre aircraft was near that location. After contacting him we learned that he was WTB for battle damage and that Nail 13 was in contact with the survivors. We got Nail 13 up on 232.8 and he got the survivors up on that frequency. Nail 13 started getting DF cuts on A and B and passed position as 087/76/89 (area between passes in high karst). We requested MIG CAP border clearance, Ironhand and Elint. Nail 16 replaced Nail 13 as OSC and refined position in that general area and determined that A and B were in good condition. I alerted JACK to have Jollies stand by for possible NKS at 1518Z because of the relatively good position between the passes in the high karst. At approximately this same time our "package" aircraft started checking in on Invert's discrete frequency. Coach and Dollar flights (MIG CAP), Bison (Ironhand), Tailback (Elint). Nail 51 replaced Nail 61 as OSC and continued to refine position of A and B. He determined that A was in a tree facing east in the high karst and A did not know B's position but they could hear each other on the radio. Nail 18 replaced Nail 51 as OSC and changed position to 075/61/89 then 073/63/89, a position west of the pass, not between passes as previously given. UIN position was W472484895. Nail 18 determined that A and B had ample radio and batteries and reconfirmed good conditions. Nail 31 became OSC at 1800Z. By this time, Headshed had become convinced that A and B were in high ground away from Mugia several miles and wanted to close the pass with Jingle even though we disagreed that the position wasn't pinpointed well enough to drop anything. Headshed had Jingle holding high on Gunfighters with Owl 03 to fast PAC them into the pass. Headshed pressed us to okay Jingle in the pass and Nail 31 agreed finally that it would be okay. At 1912Z Owl 03 and Gunfighter put in Jingle on D-29 along the road to the south. Nail 31 was observing from the northwest and reported a SAM launch at him at 1916Z. His position was 3 miles NW of D-29 (Mugia). He described the projectile as having a red flame.

King 27 had arrived in the area to relieve King 41 and had received a partial briefing when we got a cargo compartment overheat at 1942Z. We descended because of loss of pressurization and briefed King 27 on what

SECRET

GROUP 1

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified at or 12 years.

was happening. As I probably mentioned before, King 27 and Nail 41 also to CH 70. Just prior to this we were about to expect first light effort, not NKS. JACK told us that the Jollies would launch at 10:00 for a first light effort. The FAC's were advised not to turn down any ordnance sent to him by Headshed. They had turned down some OBU 19:30 as not necessary.

King 27 was notified to launch at 1730Z. King 27 blocked at 1722 discovered a visible prop leak on #4 engine, returned to the PAD and discovered it was a sticky substance so the engines were started and takeoff accomplished at 1800Z. We started monitoring the SAK as soon as we got radio contact. We arrived on scene CH 89 at 1935Z. We assumed AMC duties at 1950Z. Nail 41 came into the area and was running strikes into the area while Nail 31 monitored the area around the survivors. Nail 41 started having trouble with his UHF radios and RTB'd. Headshed continued to supply the ordnance. The Ironhand, MIG CAP, and Flint aircraft checked in with King for instructions. We advised them to stay above 250 at the request of Nail 31 so they would not interfere with strikes in the pass. Nail 31 was on scene alone and we requested a replacement FAC for him. Nail 31 advised that Nail 25 was coming up to relieve him. I assume coordination was being completed thru secure radios between Headshed, the Nails and other secure radio equipped aircraft. We were provided the resources thru Headshed and passed them to the FAC in a smooth manner during the whole SAK. The double FAC concept works very well. We were obviously bypassed on some of the coordination between the strike FAC's requirements and Headshed. Here again secure UHF radios or secure FM radios were required. JG 32 and 30 departed 89 at 2040. 32 had maintenance problems and RTB'd to 89. JG 52 took 32's place. The Sandies did not launch until later since they don't have night capabilities. JG's reported in the holding pattern at 2150Z, the Sandies at 2240. Nail 31 had advised that the weather was closing in and would be good for about 1 1/2 hours. We requested second flight of JG be launched (JG 32 and 62). At 2311Z Sandy 02 went in for a look. Nail 25, a night FAC, assumed on scene from Nail 31. The Sandies sighted some chutes but decided they were not personnel chutes because the color was all white. Sandy 01 pinpointed the Alpha man and tried to get the Alpha man to lower himself off the tree. The 82A man could not lower himself so he was given instructions to pop the day end of his flare when Sandy 01 gave the instructions. The recovery phase was started and the Bravo man came up frequency. At 2339Z Sandy 01 cleared the area, got a definite position and decided to pick him, Bravo first. The same instructions were relayed to him and JG 30 was vectored into the 82B's area and the Bravo man was advised to pop his smoke. The smoke was sighted and Bravo man was picked up at approximately 2350Z. JG 30 was vectored to the 82A man and the A man was advised to pop the day end of his flare. The Alpha man was located but some difficulty was encountered with the parachute risers, cutting them free from the survivor. The Alpha man was on his way up the hoist at 2355Z. He was on board at 2357Z. The Jollies and Sandys RTB'd to 89. ETA to 89 was 0025Z. Refueling was not required so King 21, the tanker, was released. All forces were released at 17/2400Z except for MIG CAP which stayed with us until 0020Z and were released at that time.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: The coordination of the pick up with Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04 and 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10. The operation was smoothly run and coordination was excellent between all parties during the entire operation. The need for secure radios was not as apparent on this mission as it would be on one where the Nails will not be able to contact Headshed and NKT direct. I strongly recommend we (King) be equipped with secure UHF and secure FM radios.

King 27 Crew Members

AMC Major Arthur T. Provencio
 CP LT Thomas I. Parks
 CP Capt Robert J. Hager
 NAV Capt Dale M. Condie
 RO TSgt Larry B. Alford
 FE SSgt Raymond M. Siegler
 FE SSgt Robert B. Underwood, Jr.
 LM SSgt Charles S. Alexander

King 41 Crew Members

AMC Capt David J. Preston
 CP LT James F. May
 NAV Capt Frank W. Young
 RO SSgt Rosco Williams
 RO TSgt Ruark, Lester L.
 FE TSgt Harry E. Fielder
 LM SSgt Rex D. Stephens

SAF Forces Used

Jolly Green 30, 52
 Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04
 Nail 13, 16, 18, 31, 25, 07, 49, 51
 Invert
 Headshed

SAR Forces Not Used

King 21, 23
 JG 32, 62
 Moonbeam

Arthur T. Provencio

ARTHUR T. PROVENCIO, Major, USAF
 Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

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