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3. The Pave Nail FACs used on the mission proved that the aircraft could be a very important part of the rescue force.

4. Using the same Jolly Green crews for the continuation of the mission the next day worked very well. It was recommended that this be made a standard procedure.

Falcon 74

Due to fuel starvation, the crew of Falcon 74--an F-4D from Udorn RTAFB--was forced to eject on 18 December 1971. Both Alpha and Bravo landed safely near the NVN-Laotian border, found cover, and awaited rescue. Soon after, an Air Amerca pilot located their position and passed it on to the arriving SARTF. The Sandys reported both chutes in sight, but with approaching darkness and poor weather conditions, it was decided to await first light before attempting a rescue. The survivors were given instructions to maintain radio contact through the night and wait for the SARTF to return the following morning.^{76/}

The Sandys were on the scene early on the morning of 19 December and informed the crew that the Jolly Green was coming in to make the pick-up. Since Alpha had reported people near him, Jolly Green 62 was positioned to pick him up first. While maneuvering to pick Alpha up, the helicopter received several rounds of automatic fire in its right engine which almost resulted in loss of the aircraft. Jolly Green 62 was able to leave the area and was escorted by two A-1s to an alternate airfield. The remaining Sandy began calling in airstrikes to neutralize the area while awaiting replacement

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Jollys. Ordnance dropped included a riot control agent placed near the survivors' positions in an attempt to discourage the enemy. ^{77/}

Another flight of Jollys was scrambled from NKP with Jolly Green 55 as Jolly Low. By the time the Jollys arrived in the SAR area, the situation had become critical. The enemy had radar coverage of the area and MIGs had already forced the withdrawal of the rescue force several times. The weather was deteriorating and the survivors were reporting people moving around them. Everything considered, it appeared that if a rescue was not effected immediately, the survivors would be killed or captured. ^{78/}

A Pave Nail OV-10 found a small hole in the undercast and the OSC decided to make a pickup attempt. As Jolly Green 55 spiraled down through the hole, the AMC (in King 22) advised the crew to put on gas masks as protection against the riot control agent that had been dropped near the survivors. The gas masks hampered communication and presented a real hazard. As the Jolly Green pilot, Captain Harold O. Jones, headed for Falcon 74 Alpha, he had difficulty communicating with the survivors, other aircraft, and his own crew. As Captain Jones told it: ^{79/}

Hovering was very difficult as corrections and observations given by my crew were distorted and unintelligible with the gas masks on. Once over 74 Alpha, it took five minutes to locate him through the thick jungle canopy. . . . At one point during the hover my tail rotor got dangerously close to a tree. I was unable to understand the PJ on the aft ramp telling me not to move back. He finally ripped the mask off and used his helmet microphone to warn me. He immediately

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suffered from the effects of the [gas] we were stirring up with our rotor wash.

Falcon 74 Alpha was picked up and Jolly Green 55 started for Bravo, ^{80/} who reported:

On the first pass the Jolly had me sighted and I popped a flare, which he did not see, so I popped another one, which he saw. He flew in about 10 to 15 feet off to my right. . . . At first I started to move underneath the Jolly but the down-wash from the rotors was so strong that he blew down a couple of 100 foot trees, so I stayed out of the way in case any more trees fell.

While Jolly Green 55 was lowering the penetrator for Falcon 74 Bravo, Captain Jones noted that they were well into their reserve fuel and he requested Sandy to have a tanker ready to air refuel as soon as Bravo's pickup was completed. Bravo was soon aboard the helicopter and as it departed, Captain Jones observed that the area where 74 Alpha had been was completely obscured by clouds. Also, the hole through which Jolly Green 55 had descended was closed so an IFR climb was made through the ^{81/} weather. The survivors were returned to Udorn in excellent condition.

The following observations were made concerning the Falcon 74 ^{82/} operation:

1. The usefulness of riot control agents during a contested SAR operation was again proven. Captain Lester O'Brien, Falcon 74 Bravo, reported that during a rescue attempt earlier in the day, the gas had been stirred up causing him to cough violently. However, between his own attacks of coughing he could hear others around him suffering the same effects.

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STATEMENT

SUBJECT: SARCO Report (Falcon 66/74/75)

1. On 18 December 1971, a SAR was declared for Falcon 66, shot down at approximately 1400 while flying MIG CAP for Hobo 40/41, escort for a DOB. Hobo 40/41 started search along with a twin Otter, call sign Arthur, in the vicinity of San Hoa. No contact was made with Falcon 66. His wingman, Falcon 67, said he saw two good chutes but heard no beeper and returned to base without giving any locations. No further positive contact was made with Falcon 66 and subsequently he was reported as a POW by the NVA. If Falcon 67 had stayed on station, he could have aided the SAR effort immensely.
2. Jack launched Sandy 03/04 to search for Falcon 66 but, upon arriving in the San Hoa area, Sandy 04/05 made contact with Falcon 74 who had ejected after running out of fuel searching for Falcon 66.
3. Falcon 75 also ran out of fuel while searching for Falcon 66. He last reported that he had a navigational aids failure and was heading for West Wet. He was also subsequently reported as a POW by the NVA, having actually landed in north Vietnam.
4. At 1625, 18 December 1971, Sandy 03/04 with the aid of Arthur, fixed the general location of Falcon 743 approximately 9 miles SE of San Hoa. Sandy 03/04 then had to depart the SAR area and RIB due to A/C malfunction.
5. At 1638, Mail 44 also established contact with Falcon 743 and got good ADF outs. Later, he also got good ADF outs on Falcon 741. Numerous SAM and MIG calls made operation in the SAR area difficult.
6. At 1648, a decision was made to attempt a pickup of Falcon 741 and B. Arthur and Mail 44 reported the weather workable and negative ground fire. Mail 44 gave an accurate survivors position UH 6202. Mail 03 was also talking with Falcon 741 and B.
7. At 1730, Jolly Green 56/52 departed L352 to proceed to the survivors position for a pickup. Sandy 01/02 were enroute to survivor's area. Weather and darkness prevented rescue.
8. At 1805, a decision was made to wait till morning for the rescue attempt. Jolly Green 56/52 and Sandy 02/01 returned to BTP. Mail 03 assumed on-scene commander.
9. The decision was made to put BLU-52 and/or CBU-14 around the survivors all night as they had reported people moving around them. The SARCO also requested continuous night coverage to include MIG CAP, COLLIER G12, and BOM.
10. Contact was maintained all night between Mail aircraft and survivors. The Mail aircraft were chased out of the SAR area several times during the night.

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K-WO-56-III, causing them to jettison ordnance and fuel tanks. Hails and Pave Hails continued throughout the night as on-scene commanders.

11. At first light effort was planned and a request was placed for continued ordnance drops throughout the night using area denial munitions around the survivors and hard ordnance on known gun positions and LOC's. The Hails directed the strikes. The Jollys and Sandys were scheduled for take off to allow continuous coverage over the survivor throughout the day.

12. BLU-52 and CDU-14 were dropped around the survivor during the night. General Clay cleared the SAR forces to use area denial munitions within a 10 NM radius of the survivor.

13. The suggestion was made that when the parent organization of a downed pilot learned of an aircraft loss, they should immediately initiate a flash precedence message to the 56th SOW containing names, personal identifiers, and other pertinent information.

14. The SARCO was advised that Blue Chip needs to know the IFF/SIF Mode II settings for all aircraft involved in a SAR.

15. TFM provided a constant flow of intelligence data all night concerning traffic on the LOC's and the location and activity of MIG's. This is a very good source of supplemental intelligence information.

16. A first light SAR was launched using four Sandys and two Jolly Greens. The two Jolly Greens were held over L-52 in a safe area accompanied by two Sandys. The other two Sandys and a Pave Hail continued the search. Several times throughout the day, the SAR forces were driven from the search area by MIGs. Recommend that SAR forces be allowed to remain in the area at a low altitude during a MIG threat as they could not outrun MIG's.

17. Two flights of F-4's dropped CDU-14 around the survivors but the results are unknown. BLU-52 was also dropped near the survivor during the night. This information was not clearly understood when the first pick-up was attempted, resulting in an aborted pick-up attempt due to BLU-52 kicked up by rotor wash from the Jolly Green. While the Jolly Green crew recovered from BLU-52 and donned masks, weather closed in preventing further pick-up attempts.

18. A radio relay aircraft was launched from MKP to improve communications between the SAR force and the SARCO.

19. Smoke 44/45 flight found a way to get under clouds which were nearly on the tree tops. This information was passed on to Sandy 03/04 and they were able to locate the survivor and execute Jolly Green 55/61 for the pick-up. The survivors were then taken to Udorn and the remaining SAR forces returned to MKP.

20. Hails and Pave Hails were instrumental in the SAR effort by providing continuous coverage over the survivors, directing ordnance delivery in the SAR area, aiding in locating and updating the location of the survivors,

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and navigation to and from the JMI area.

21. Sandys and Jolly Greens were generated as necessary with take-off times staggered from JMI to keep continuous coverage over the survivor during daylight hours.

JAMES C. HARDING, Maj, USAF
SARCO, 1st SOS

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12 urB

FROM: 46th ARRSq (DO)

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report ACS: ARS V-6 Report

TO: 3 ARRG (JROC)

DATE: 19 December 1971

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-047

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 55

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Falcorn 74A and 74B

LOCATION: 1950N 104-48E 55NM SE of Sam Neua

SAVES: Two (2) Combat saves

1. At 0815L the back-up alert crews were notified that Jolly Green 62 had an engine shot out on an attempt to pick up Falcorn 74A and was making an emergency landing at LS-32. The back-up alert was to brief and launch ASAP. After aborting one aircraft, Jolly Green 55 was airborne at 0925L and joined up with Jolly Green 61. We planned to air refuel with King 23 enroute to the holding point (003°/105°N/Channel 103). When King 23 aborted with an inflight fire in his air refueling system, Jolly Green 55 and 61 were diverted to LS-98 to refuel. Airborne again at 1220L the flight joined with Sandy 17 and 18 and held north of LS-32. Smoke 44, on scene commander, reported there may be a break in the weather and requested the Jollys move to the forward holding point. Due to our low altitude, tacan and other aids to navigation were not available but with Basic EM, marginal doppler computer and ANF cuts off SAR forces in the survivors area we were able to arrive at a point 5NM north of the survivors' area at 1355L. They were down on the North Vietnamese border southeast of Sam Neua. The weather was completely under cast making terrain masking from Wigs unfeasable. Wigs had forced the withdrawal of the SAR Forces from the area several times that day. The enemy also had radar coverage of the area. Enroute to the area the survivors had reported hearing people moving around them and dogs barking. These two developments plus the rapidly deteriorating weather created concern that the survivors would be killed or captured before another pickup attempt could be made. A PAVE Nail CV-10 found a small hole in the under cast and Smoke 44 decided to make a pickup attempt. On scene command was passed to Sandy 03 since Smoke 44 was critically low on fuel. Jolly Green 55's SAR Bingo was 1430L which may have influenced the decision to execute at this time. As we spiraled down the hole, King 22 advised us to put on our gas masks as BDU-52 had been dropped near the survivors. We broke out below the clouds over a river with mountains and karst rising on both sides with peaks rising into the clouds. From this point on, communications with the survivors, other aircraft, and Jolly 55 crew members were extremely difficult due to the design and use of the gas masks. Sandy 03 led Jolly 55 to an area that fit the description of the survivors location briefed by Smoke 44. Lack of fuel had prevented Smoke 44 from showing Sandy 03 the survivors position.

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GROUP 2

Downgraded at 5 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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We hit a hover over the spot but it was apparent we were not over the survivors. Falcon 74A had popped a smoke which we could not see, he could not hear us and the chutes we were over were flare chutes, not the survivors' canopies. There was a canister of BLU-52 about 10 meters to our left so we hovered further up the ridge and began asking Falcon 74A for short counts to try and get an ADF cut on his position. Communications were extremely garbled and broken with Falcon 74A and Sandy 03 due to terrain shielding. They could not understand my transmissions due to distortion by the gas mask. Nail 09, holding high over the scene, had been in the area earlier and told me to steer 180 degrees from my present position. We entered a box canyon with clouds obscuring the top one third of the sides. Falcon 74A reported he could now hear the helicopter and tried to vector us to his position. Time after time we ran into dead end cravasses. The known presence of ground fire made this type of maneuvering extremely hazardous but the urgency of the situation justified the risk. We found a small village which we knew was near Falcon 74A but the survivor was unable to steer us because of the confusion caused by noise of both the helicopter and A1E. We were still unable to get reliable ADF cuts. So Sandy 03 departed the immediate area and Falcon 74A was then able to steer us to his position. Hovering was very difficult as corrections and observations given by my crew were distorted and unintelligible with the gas masks on. Once over 74A, it took 5 minutes to locate him through the thick jungle canopy. The first pickup was made at 1450L after 30 minutes of searching the area. At one point during the hover my tail rotor got dangerously close to a tree. I was unable to understand the PJ on the aft ramp telling me not to move back. He finally ripped the mask off and used his helmet microphone to warn me. He immediately suffered from the effects of the BLU-52 we were stirring up with our rotor wash. As we pulled off 74A's position, 74B came up on radio and directed a left turn to his position. By now we were well into our reserve fuel so I asked Sandy 03 to request a tanker be ready to air refuel as soon as we picked up Bravo. He too was difficult to locate through the thick canopy but was hoisted up at 1510L. Rain and drizzle were moving in and my copilot had turned on the windshield wipers several times during the pickup so I could see to hover. As we departed the area we noticed Falcon 74A's position was completely obscured by clouds. The hole we had descended through was closed so we climbed out IFR. King 27 was flying east out of LS-32 to provide air refueling when Jolly Green 55 broke out on top of the clouds. The survivors were recovered to Udorn RTAFB at 1735L. Both in excellent condition. Falcon 74A had a deep laceration in his right leg.

2. Two 01-A sorties 2.5 hrs. One 01-B sortie 5.4 hrs.

3 & 4 N/A

5. a. Two pararescuemen.
b. Not deployed due to area denial ordnance
c. Two
d. Puncture type laceration of lower right leg
e. Compress bandage, pneumatic splint. Both survivors treated for shock.
f. 432nd USAF Hospital, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
g. Excellent condition - both ambulatory

GROUP 4

Declassified at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

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6. Jolly Green 56 Organizational (Low)

NO Capt Harold G. Jones
 JP Maj David G. Dyer
 HM SSgt Ferrol S. Lawman
 PE MSgt Leon Fullwood
 RS Sgt William D. Robinson
 AP SSgt Kelly R. Gannon

Jolly Green 62 Organizational (High)

NO Maj Kenneth E. Forrest
 JP Capt Douglas C. McGraw
 HM SSgt Thomas Bryant Jr.
 PE TSgt Colin A. Jones
 RS Sgt Paul C. Perry
 AP Sgt Michael H. Poon

Harold G. Jones
 HAROLD G. JONES, Captain, USAF
 Aircraft Commander

DATE: 18-19 Dec 71

MISSION NUMBER: E-3-047-18 Dec 71

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 22, 41, 21, 23

MISSION OBJECTIVES: Falcon 74 (E-4)

LOCATION: 1952N 104.7E

SAVES: 2 Combat

Shortly after take off King 22 received a call from Cricketer at 0659Z that Falcon 67 reported Falcon 66 down at 045/102/108 and two crates were reported. A turn was made toward CH 108 at that time. Since two crates were reported, Sandys 3 and 4 were told to head toward that position at 0705Z to begin a search of the area. At 0710Z Jolly Greens 56 and 52 were airborne as well as Sandys 1 and 2. All four aircraft were to orbit below the fence (150 degrees off 108). At 0740Z King 23 was scrambled in order to refuel JG 56/52. At 0803Z a Falcon reported smoke at 045/70/108, but later revised reconnaissance proved nothing in sight. At 0800Z Sandy 3 flight and an Air America Outter, call sign Arthur, were in the area of Falcon 66 last reported position and began searching the area.

At 0825Z the first of many SIG calls was copied, with the calls continuing through the entire flight of King 22. Nail 44 was also in the area of the search and at 0908Z reported a beeper. About that time, Falcon 74 called on 243.0 in the blind that he had lost all nav aids, was somewhere northeast of CH 108, had only 700 lbs of fuel left and needed assistance. Neither Brigham nor Invert was painting Falcon 74 and communications could not be established with him nor could his approximate position be determined by DF before he ran out of fuel and failed out. Shortly after Falcon 74 bailout Arthur picked up their beeper, homed on it and located both survivors. He vectored Nail 44 to the scene and contact was established with both survivors at 0945Z. Nail 44 was appointed OSC. Sandy 3 reported voice contact with both Falcon 74 Alpha and Bravo. Their position was placed at WH9500 approximately 500 feet apart. At 0925Z JG 56/52 made an AL with King 23.

At 0940Z Falcon 75 was suspected overdue and JACK was requested by King 22 to make a ramp check. After both Falcon Alpha and Bravo were sighted, JG 56/52 began heading toward LS 32 from the area of CH 108 with Sandys 1 and 2. Arthur reported that Falcon Alpha had a cut on leg, bleeding stopped and 74 Bravo was OK.

At 1032Z Nail 09 had visual contact with Arthur and both continued working the area. Nail 09 relieved Nail 44 as OSC at 1042Z. During this time JG 56/52 and Sandy 1 and 2 were pressing on to the survivors position and

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GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year interval
Declassified after 12 years

King 22 requested PAC overhead coverage of survivors at King air-
borne as well. Prior to complete darkness, a PAC update position was ob-
tained in Loran UTM's. Nail 38 replaced Nail 09 at 1143Z and Nail 09 re-
quested Jingle and UBU 42 throughout the night even though no enemy was ob-
served on the ground prior to darkness. Nail 38 contacted Falcon 74 A and B
on 282.8 and gave instructions for the night hours comm. cap. At 1224Z Nail
20 advised that Falcon 74A reported enemy in his area. At 1234Z Nail 20 WTB'd
and was replaced by Nail 38.

At 1302Z Falcon 62 flight scrambled with ordnance and at 1303Z Killer flight
also launched with ordnance. Nail 38 reported his black box inoperative at
1307Z. He then had the survivors check spare batteries for radios.

At 1344Z Nail 38 reported a MIG after him and requested Papas. At 1354Z Nail
38 declared emergency fuel and would proceed to CH 70 for refueling. At 1407Z
Nail 13 arrived as on scene commander. At 1420Z Killer flight checked in with
Nail 13 and Falcon 62 flight was in the area going to tank. At 1456Z Nail 18
was inbound to replace Nail 13 who WTB'd at 1502Z. At 1503Z King 41 relieved
King 22 on orbit. King 22 landed CH 70 at 1535Z.

King 22 got pulled into business of relaying calls for Papas. This is not our
business and Papas should definitely be controlled by ground or airborne units,
not by King. Nail 20 and 38 had minimum equipment aboard their aircraft, did
not know the area and each of them almost became a SAR effort on their own.
Recommend night PACS be fully equipped when operating in areas unknown to them
and especially at night. The whereabouts of Falcon 75 was never discovered and
he merely disappeared while working during MIG CAP.

King 41 was tasked to provide airborne mission command throughout the night
and coordinate the first light effort the next day. We arrived in the area at
2154Z and after receiving a briefing from King 22, we assumed mission command.
Nail 13 was presently in the area and was in contact with 74A and B. His
radio equipment, however, was inoperative and ineffective in pinpointing
survivors. We WTB'd Nail 13 and provided navigational assistance to him. At
the same time the aid of Hash 01 (MC121). Nail 18 was now in the area and his
Loran equipment was intermittently inoperative. We had previously provided
MIG CAP and had time throughout the night and replacement PAC's to provide con-
tinuous comm cap over the survivors. We determined from Nail 18 that the sur-
vivors were located to the east of the survivors and weather at the time was
okay, but the survivors could see stars. Nail 18's equipment was bad and
he was unable to further pinpoint the survivors. We also experienced some dif-
ficulty correlating UTM and Loran chart coordinates which had been passed. We
had requested Nail 52 launched and of this time it was overhead the Killer flight
(Killer) but because we lacked a pinpointed position for the survivors, we had
to start cycling it off the tank and could not yet put it into the area. Nail
18's Loran equipment started working but he was unsure of its accuracy.

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He gave us further refined coordinates and maintained communications with the survivors every 30 minutes. At 0038Z Blue Chip relayed that Killer flight overhead with MLU 52 was to fly and expend his ordnance on H21 and H30. I immediately asked Nail 18 and Nail 13 if they could use the MLU 52 near the survivors and Nail 31 (who had just arrived) answered affirmative and began working up a set of coordinates for the drop by Loran equipped Killer flight. We diverted Killer back to the SAK scene and Nail 31 put him in at 0058G. Nail 18 had just started to RTB when a bandit call off Squid placed MIGS nearing the SAK area. I cleared Nail 31 to head west out of the area and further bandit calls by Hotel placed a MIG on one of the Nails tail (Nail 18 or 31). Since both Nails were heading west we deduced that the "bandit" was on Nail 31 or 18's tail so we cleared 31 back into the area to resume the comm and further pinpoint the survivors position with his functioning Loran equipment and DF cuts on A and B. The previous MLU 52 drop was a Loran drop approximately 3 klicks west of the survivors and A remarked to 31 that he knew they had used the stuff. At no time did A or B state that the Jingle had landed near them as later events were to prove.

Nail 18, as he RTB'd reported a beeper and weak voice approximately 11 miles on a 250 bearing from 74A and B's position. He could not establish communication but weak DF cuts placed the beeper in that position. He was low on fuel so he continued on to RTB CH 89. We requested that additional FACS as they came out, to comm search that area which we believed might be Falcon 66 who had gone down earlier in the day.

Nail 31 determined that A was on a gentle slope, under a 50 foot canopy with clearings at approximately a 3000 foot elevation. He had heard or seen no enemy activity. Nail 31 placed B approximately 2 miles SW of A's position on a 30 to 40 degree slope under a canopy with clearings also. He had no enemy activity. Nail 31 also determined that neither A or B's Ix strobes were functioning and thus could not get their exact position with his Ix scope. Weather at 0200G was still permissible for pickup at first light. Also at 0240G, Nail 16 was inbound to the area and picked up a beeper and weak voice near the same area west where we believed Falcon 66 might be down. He also was unable to establish voice contact but remained in the area for a while to get DF cuts on the beeper. Nail 31 was approaching since fuel so we had Nail 16 proceed on to the 74A and B scene to take over from Nail 31.

He arrived at the SAK scene at 0245Z and assumed OSC. Nail 31 also reported a beeper at the same area 11 miles west of the SAK scene as he RTB'd and gave its position as 050/24 off Beta 21. We requested more Nail FACS to come out and check out the area for the secondary SAK for Falcon 66. During this time, many of the KAC'd coords given by the Nails at both scenes were erroneous and had to be re-KAC'd. Weather at the secondary SAK scene was 3000 feet thin overcast. Just as we were beginning to believe that we had Falcon 66's general position and were involved in the secondary SAK, JACK briefed us on the details for the first light. JG's 62 and 57 were to launch at 0350G escorted by Sandies 3 and 4. Sandies 1 and 2 were to launch later and proceed direct to F74's position to arrive in time to assume OSC prior to the JG's arrival. Backup Jollies 32 and 63 were to launch with Sandies 9, 10 at approximately 0520G and proceed to a holding west of F74's position during the first light pickup attempt by Jollies 62 and 57. King 41 was requested

to plan on leaving Mission Forward orbit to refuel JG 62 and 57 between the "fence" and CH 108. We objected to this degradation of mission command during the all important hours just prior to the first pickup attempt. We felt that we should stay on orbit and help the Nail Partner pinpoint 74's position and also work the secondary for F66 while another King tanker refueled JG 62 and 57 as they proceeded north (they had to go west and around to the north of the PWS to reach the SAA area). We had hoped to have enough time before daylight to locate Falcon 66 and combine the pickup attempts at first light on both Falcon 74 and 66. In the meantime we had additional Nails proceeding to the secondary SAA position and also our MIG CAP aircraft overhead putting our calls on guard to F66. Gunfighter (MIG CAP) also reported a beeper 055/82/108 (near the positions given by Nails for F66).

JACK informed us that they would try to get a tanker up to perform the AR but didn't know whether they would arrive in time to do the AR on schedule. At 0432G, Nail 25 had arrived on scene in addition to Nail 16. They reported A was at 4000 feet elevation on a gentle slope and that A and B had heard no "movers" and saw no problem for the Jollies to make the pickup. They also had reported previously that A said Falcon 75 (the other missing aircraft) had tried to go "feet wet" to the Gulf of Tonkin when they last had contact.

At 0443 another bandit call put MIGS 003/102 off of squid and we reconfirmed MIG CAP was being continually provided (they were working another frequency with G61). At 0524G we established contact with JG's 57 and 62 and JACK confirmed that tanker King 21 was on way but would not arrive in time to refuel as scheduled. We agreed to depart orbit to refuel them south of CH 108. At 0539, Sandy 1 and 2, JG 32 and 63 were above proceeding to the SAA area. Sandy 1 was to become OSC upon his arrival. Sandy 9 and 10 were to escort JG 32 and 63 to the holding point to standby while JG 62 and 57 attempted the pickup.

At 0541G, we commenced AR with JG 62 and 57. At 0549G, we completed the refueling just south of CH 108 and proceeded to reassume orbit (during rendezvous and joinup, we had two possible unguided rocket launches near our position). JG's 62 and 57 proceeded on to the north to be rejoinup with Sandy 3 and 4. Their ETA to the SAA scene was now 0700G (one hour past first light).

We reassumed orbit and at 0615G, Sandy 1 and 2 arrived on scene and received briefing from both King 41 and Nail 25 who was still OSC. Weather had deteriorated but Sandy 1 who assumed OSC believed a pickup could still be attempted. F74A and B still reported negative movement near their positions.

At 0711G, JG 62 and 57 arrived in the SAA area and phase Alpha began. JG 57 held high while JG 62, guided by Sandy 1, began phase B at 0713. While in hover over A's position, JG 62 noticed a canister just in front of their position about 50 meters from the A man. Shortly after, the effect of the rotor blades had stirred the contents of the canister (BLU 52) enough to affect the area of JG 62. They immediately pulled out to get clear of it. Sandy 1 then requested JG 57 to don masks for a second pickup attempt. JG 57 was very slow to get masks on and comm was had once their masks were in place. Sandy 1 elected to have JG 62, who knew the exact location of A,

attempt the second pickup try after putting their masks on. At approximately 0805G, JG 62 hovered again over Alpha man, and at 0807G took automatic weapons fire which knocked one engine out. JG 62 departed the area on pigeons to LS 32 we had given him. He was escorted by JG 57 and Sandies 3 and 4. Note: The coordinates given by Nail for the loam area of BLU 52 plotted 2-3 miles away from 7A and B's positions. Alpha had never mentioned any effects of the drop on him and we had no reason to believe beforehand that the BLU 52 would have any effect on the pickup attempt.

JG 62 and 57, with Sandies 3 and 4, proceeded to the LS 32 area to be met by King 21 for refueling or to land at LS 32 if necessary. Sandy 1 and 2 were approaching bingo and Sandy 11 became the OAC at approximately 0840G. He requested more BLU 52 be uploaded on fast movers at CH 93 to standby to launch King 21. Intercepted JG 62 and 57 about 15 miles east of LS 32 and escorted them to the site.

At 0858G, JG 62 landed at LS 32 and JG 57 picked up crewmembers after being refueled by King 21. At 0920G, 7A reported enemy within 50 feet of his position. We didn't have any BLU 52 overhead but Nail 41 who was in the SAK area suggested the use of "Gravel" (CDU 14) which we had in holding. Sandy 11 briefed the survivors on the contents of the coming ordnance and Nail 41 agreed to put it in on the survivors position. King 41 requested more CDU 14 diverted to the SAM effort immediately. At 0937G another tandem call placed MICS nearing the SAM scene. JG's 63 and 62, Sandy 11, 9, 10, and 15 cleared to the west while Nail 41 remained behind to put in Card flight with the "Gravel". At 0940G, "Gravel" had been expended. At 1007G, more CDU 14 arrived overhead and King 41 briefed King 21 to assume AMC duties. At 1017G we gave AMC to King 21 and RTB'd to CH 70 with minimum fuel.

At the time King 21 assumed AMC duties the weather in the SAM area had deteriorated to the point that another recovery attempt could not be made. JG 32 flight was brought to LS 32 to orbit pending improvement in the weather. Nail PACS and Sandys cycled into the SAM area to maintain a weather watch and contact with the survivors. JG 55/61 who had launched at 0830Z as backup proceeded to CH 108. King 23, while attempting to refuel JG 57, experienced a flash fire at the end of the left refueling hose. King 23 then proceeded to Udorn. At 0835Z JG 32 lost his refuel Tac and proceeded with JG 63 to LS 20A. Smoke 44, who had assumed OAC reported weather in the search area as deteriorating with no chance for a recovery attempt for some time. JG 55 and 61 were directed to land at LS 20A to refuel and stand strip alert until the weather improved. Smoke 46 flight was directed to remain on the ground pending weather improvement.

Smoke 44 requested CDU 14 to drop around Falcon 7A as he had reported enemy movement including dogs in his vicinity. Two flights, Brushy and Calate, carrying CDU 14 (Gravel) were cycling off of tankers and were called in to expend. Difficulty was experienced in getting the strike flights and the Pave Nails together. One strike flight had difficulty contacting the Pave Nail and had to return to a tanker for fuel. Then the Pave Nail had to RTB

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and his replacement did not arrive in time for any overlap. Some equipment difficulties were also experienced by the Para Nails. Coordination was finally effected and CDU 14 was delivered directly on 74A's position. Radio contact was maintained with 74A to ascertain the accuracy of the Loran drop for possible correction. Additional CDU 14 had been ordered to be uploaded ready for launch. This request was never fulfilled although the request was made very early in the mission repeated several times. When the request for CDU 14 was not fulfilled, Cbu 42 was requested and obtained for immediate expenditure should further area denial be necessary. At approximately 0620Z, Smoke 44 reported an improvement in the weather and JG 55/61 were launched from LS 20A to orbit LS 32 at 0640Z. By the time JG 55/61 reached LS 32 the weather had improved further and they continued to the SAK area. At 0726Z JG 55 began phase Bravo. Falcon 74A was picked up first and F74B second with no difficulty. Pickup was completed at 0810Z. Both survivors were in excellent condition except for a laceration on the Alpha man's leg. JG 55/61 were refueled by King 27 in the vicinity of LS 32 and then proceeded to CH 70 (Udon) to discharge the survivors.

SAK forces, except for Nail FACS were released at 0819Z and AMC duties were passed to King 22 to continue the search for Falcon 66 and 75.

King 21 Crewmembers

AMC Maj Bruce H. Driscoll
CP 1LT Samuel K. Byers
CP 1LT Frederick K. Wilburn
NAV MAJ Stephen E. Katz
NAV MAJ Marvin C. Whitfield
RO MSG Dulan E. Lyles, Jr.
FE MSG Harold G. Kreitlein
FE TSG George L. Olah
FE TSG Charles P. Neuber

Forces used by King 21

JG 55, 61, 32, 63
Sandy 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17
Smoke 44
Nail 12, 27, 04, 41, 32, 33, 39, 26, 20
Laredo (FAC)
Falcon Flight (MIG CAP)
Gunfighter 51 Flight (MIG CAP)
Gunfighter 55 Flight (MIG CAP)
Ashcan 1 (Iron Hand)
Basket 1 (Iron Hand)
Apollo 41 (Alint)
Apollo 44 (Alint)
Brushy (Strike)
Caliste (Strike)
Falcon 51 (Strike)
Bosco 21, 22 (Alint)

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DATE: 18-19 Dec 71

MISSION NUMBER: E-3-047-18 Dec 71

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 22, 41, 21, 23

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Falcon 74 (F-4)

LOCATION: 1952N 104.7E

SAVES: 2 Combat

Shortly after take off King 22 received a call from Cricket at 0659Z that Falcon 67 reported Falcon 66 down at 045/102/108 and two chutes were reported. A turn was made toward CH 108 at that time. Since two chutes were reported, Sandys 3 and 4 were told to head toward that position at 0705Z to begin a search of the area. At 0710Z Jolly Greens 56 and 52 were airborne as well as Sandys 1 and 2. All four aircraft were to orbit below the fence (150 degrees off 108). At 0740Z King 23 was scrambled in order to refuel JG 56/52. At 0803Z a Falcon reported smoke at 045/70/108, but later revised reconnaissance proved nothing in sight. At 0800Z Sandy 3 flight and an Air America Outter, call sign Arthur, were in the area of Falcon 66 last reported position and began searching the area.

At 0825Z the first of many MIG calls was copied, with the calls continuing through the entire flight of King 22. Nail 44 was also in the area of the search and at 0908Z reported a beeper. About that time, Falcon 74 called on 243.0 in the blind that he had lost all nav aids, was somewhere northeast of CH 108, had only 700 lbs of fuel left and needed assistance. Neither Brigham nor Invert was painting Falcon 74 and communications could not be established with him nor could his approximate position be determined by DF before he ran out of fuel and nailed out. Shortly after Falcon 74 bailout Arthur picked up their beeper, homed on it and located both survivors. He vectored Nail 44 to the scene and contact was established with both survivors at 0945Z. Nail 44 was appointed OSC. Sandy 3 reported voice contact with both Falcon 74 Alpha and Bravo. Their position was placed at 094500 approximately 500 feet apart. At 0925Z JG 56/52 made an AT with King 23.

At 0940Z Falcon 75 was suspected overdue and JACK was requested by King 22 to make a ramp check. After both Falcon Alpha and Bravo were sighted, JG 56/52 began heading toward LS 32 from the area of CH 108 with Sandys 1 and 2. Arthur reported that Falcon Alpha had a cut on leg, bleeding stopped and 74 Bravo was OK.

At 1032Z Nail 09 had visual contact with Arthur and both continued working the area. Nail 09 relieved Nail 44 as OSC at 1042Z. During this time JG 56/52 and Sandy 1 and 2 were pressing on to the survivors position and

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GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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King 22 requested FAC overnarrow coverage of survivors all night with King airborne as well. Prior to complete darkness, a final updated position was obtained in Loran UTM's. Nail 20 replaced Nail 13 at 1145Z and Nail 07 requested Jingle and CBN 42 throughout the night even though no enemy was observed on the ground prior to darkness. Nail 38 contacted Falcon 74 A and B on 282.8 and gave instructions for the night hours comm. cap. At 1224Z Nail 20 advised that Falcon 74A reported enemy in his area. At 1234Z Nail 20 RTB'd and was replaced by Nail 38.

At 1302Z Falcon 62 flight scrambled with ordnance and at 1307Z Killer flight also launched with ordnance. Nail 38 reported his black box inoperative at 1307Z. He then had the survivors check spare batteries for radios.

At 1344Z Nail 38 reported a MIG after him and requested Papas. At 1359Z Nail 38 declared emergency fuel and would proceed to CH 70 for refueling. At 1407Z Nail 13 arrived as on scene commander. At 1420Z Killer flight checked in with Nail 13 and Falcon 62 flight was in the area going to tank. At 1456Z Nail 18 was inbound to replace Nail 13 who RTB'd at 1502Z. At 1503Z King 41 relieved King 22 on orbit. King 22 landed CH 70 at 1535Z.

King 22 got pulled into business of relaying calls for Papas. This is not our business and Papas should definitely be controlled by ground or airborne units, not by King. Nail 20 and 38 had minimum equipment aboard their aircraft. They did not know the area and each of them almost became a SAR effort on their RTB. Recommend night FACs be fully equipped when operating in areas unknown to them and especially at night. The whereabouts of Falcon 75 was never discovered and he merely disappeared while working during MIG CAP.

King 41 was tasked to provide airborne mission command throughout the night and coordinate the first light effort the next day. We arrived in the area at 2156G and after receiving a briefing from King 22, we assumed mission command. Nail 13 was presently in the area and was in contact with 74A and B. His navigational equipment, however, was inoperative and ineffective in pinpointing survivors. We RTB'd Nail 13 and provided navigational assistance to King 41 in the area with the aid of Hash 01 (121Z). Nail 18 was now in the area and his Loran equipment was intermittently inoperative. We had previously initiated MIG CAP at 2100G throughout the night and replacement FAC's to provide continuous cover over the survivors. We determined from Nail 18 that the survivors were located to the east of the survivors and weather at the scene was hazy, but the survivors could see stars. Nail 18's equipment was bad and he was unable to further pinpoint the survivors. We also experienced some difficulty correlating UTM and Loran chart coordinates which had been passed. We had requested BHP 52 launched and of this time it was overhead by Killer flight (241Z) but because we lacked a pinpointed position for the survivors, we had to start cycling it off the tank and could not yet put it into the area. Nail 18's Loran equipment started working but he was unsure of its accuracy.

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