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On 13 March 71 the 37 ARRS had a most eventful but unsuccessful day. A Navy A-7, call sign Battle Cry 315, was shot down at a position 225 degrees for 50 miles from Channel 103. The pilot of the A-7 had ejected and was injured. Voice contact was established with the survivor and the SAR was initiated. Jolly Greens 64 and 73 departed Channel 77 for the area. Sandy aircraft began working the area and small arms fire was observed.

1250
1230

DAAR JREC 1014L 1111
Line Check SXS, SSGT ARISSE OFF DUTY

T
Ae

2 MAR 71

2040 CAPT WALDER ON DUTY
2145 STATUS TO QUEEN
2332 OPS STATUS REPORT TO JOKER
0018 J.G. 73 ABN FOR ~~73~~ VUBH
0145 ITEM 14 WE up p 345 DN TG
0237 JG 77 DEPARTED @ 0230 FROM B.H. ETACH 71 @ 0245
0328 JG 72 ABN
0400 JG 70 ABN
0401 CAPT WALDER OFF DUTY SMITH ON DUTY
0605 JG 73 ON the Ground AT B.H.
0635 JG 73/788 LOGGED 4.7/3 LANDING 13 SORTIES @ B.H.
0800 JG 70 ON the Deck 4.0
0802 JG 72 ON the Deck 4.6
0840 JG 71 ABN FER
0905 JG 71 ON the Deck 0.4
0945 JG 77 ON the Deck 5.9
1340 JO (73) 788 LOGGED 2.3 2 LANDING @ B.H. } MED EVAC
JG 66/364 LOGGED 2.7 1 LANDING @ B.H. }
1345 Line Check SXS
1400 DAAR JREC TOTAL 24.6 MED EVAC CONSEN
1415 SSGT ARISSE OFF DUTY # 610 MONT 03-004

Up
Up
Up
Up

Up
Up

DS
DS
DS

DS
DS

A
A
A
A

3 MAR

2035 CAPT CARSKADON ON DUTY
2127 STATUS TO QUEEN
2332 STATUS TO JOKER
0400 CAPT CARSKADON OFF DUTY SGT SMITH ON
0410 JG 72 ABN
0430 JG 71 ABN

Up
Up
Up
Up
Up
Up

MARCH

1971

SURVIVORS

NAME RANK

SSN

DATE	CREW	JG	SAVE #	ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	TYPE SAVE
2	BAKKE HARROW ROGERS NARDI PECORARO MONTENAYOR	73	610	LE HANOI NAVY (U.N. SAILOR)	COU SON ISLAND	MEDICAL 1 NON-CME
6	MILDD MERCHANT JOHNSON MUELCHI McDONALD HACKNEY LEWIS (AP)	71	611	TIPTON, CHARLES 4LT SANDY 04 SGSOW NKP	1639 N 106.23 E	COMBAT
23	JENSEN WALDER MCKIDNEY RATLIFF HAWCOCK KIRK SHAPIRO (AP)	72	612 613	MAJOR ROBERT D. PRIEST XXXXXXXXXX 432 TFW MAJ ROBERT L. CUBBERLY XXXXXXXXXX 432 TFW	312/32/103 North VN	2 COMBAT

TOTAL MONTHLY SAVES 4

FEBRUARY

1971

NAME RANK

SEN

DATE	CREW	JG	SAVE #	ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	TYPE SAV
6	DREIBELBIS BAKKE ROGERS BAILEY MUELCHE	65	601 602 603 604 605	NGOC, TRAN-VAN BOI, HOANG 2/LT NHIEP DANG 2/LT BAT MAI VAN, ST HAO DO-HUU, CAPT.	16-18SN 108.00E UH1H SOUTH V.N. MSN II A-3-004	5 COMBAT
26	BAKKE WEIMER MCKINNEY NARDI CURTIS	65	607 608	HEDDRICH, DAVID R. CAPT. XXXXXXXXXX 37 TFW MCLAUGHLIN, THOMAS M. 1/LT XXXXXXXXXX 37 TFW	106.26E 16 42 N. COBRA 23 F-4	2 COMBAT
27	WAMMER FRIED ROGERS SCHWARTZ KIRK	72	609	McCarthy, PAUL F. 1/LT CMDR. "KITTY HAWK"	017/17/69 CHIPPIE 44 (A-7)	1 COMBAT FEETWET
MARCH 09	BEATTIE KOMICH BURCHFIELD SMITH HANCOCK	77	606	NAME UNKN V.N. WOMAN PREGNANT & HEMORRAGING	SON SON ISLAND MSN II 03-003 FEB	1 MED EVA 1 Non Com

MONTHLY TOTAL 9

SARTF SANDYs in action

I was the Operations Officer for the 1st SOS at NKP in the autumn of 1970, before taking over command of the squadron in early 1970. I flew the A-1 Skyraider on 64 sorties, which isn't very impressive considering that many of the guys in my squadron had well over 100 'counters'.

I recall one search and rescue mission that had all the ingredients of a Hollywood script. It took place in March 1971, as part of Operation Lam Son 713, an incursion into Laos by South Vietnamese Army troops (ARVN), across the DMZ toward Tchepone. In the course of this action, a US Army Huey, callsign WITCH DOCTOR 05, was monitoring the action of a group of ARVN senior officers. They were touring the front lines well beyond the advancing ground troops.

Closing on Tchepone, the Huey was hit by North Vietnamese (NVA) anti-aircraft fire, and was forced down in an area immediately adjacent to a group of NVA troops. The Huey crew and the passengers extracted themselves from the wreck of the chopper, and got into an old bomb crater that was near the main trail (Ho Chi Minh Trail) out of Tchepone. We launched the SARTF force on 5 March and headed toward the downed Huey.

While we were en route, a couple of forward air controllers were bringing in some Navy and Marine

fighters to soften up the area prior to our attempted rescue. One of the Marine A-4 Skyhawks was shot down, which created another SAR effort. One of our 'Jolly Greens' was diverted to the downed Marine pilot, and we got him out without too much trouble.

However, while the rest of the SARTF force was working on the WITCH DOCTOR mission, one of the SANDY A-1s was hit by ground fire and started to burn. The pilot, First Lieutenant Chuck Tipton, used his 'Yankee Extractor device' and got out of the aircraft at a very low altitude. The 'Jolly Green' that he'd been escorting swooped in and picked him up in less than a minute. The 'Jolly Green' pilot then made an immediate turn and went straight back to NKP with Tipton aboard.

In the meantime, another US Army Huey, callsign DOLPHIN, decided that he could probably sneak in and pick up the WITCH DOCTOR crew and passengers. He made a rather vertical approach to the area, which made him an easy target for the NVA anti-aircraft, and was hit several times. He did make it out of the area, but his co-pilot was very badly wounded.

The call went out for another SAR force to launch out of NKP. That was me - SANDY 02. SANDY 01 and myself, along with a third 'Jolly Green' helicopter, left NKP and headed directly for the area of WITCH

DOCTOR. When we arrived, we found we weren't alone, as several other A-1s had launched from Da Nang to support our effort. These guys were armed with smoke and CS gas dispensers.

The on-scene SAR commander ordered the smoke and gas to be put down, and our team started the approach to the WITCH DOCTOR crew, but the area was still too hot. Lots of heavy anti-aircraft (AAA) fire started to blossom around both my flight and the 'Jolly Green'. As soon as the AAA opened up, the 'Jolly Green' beat a hasty retreat, and stood by, out of range of the big guns. My flight started working over the NVA gun positions that had shot us off our mission. SANDY 01 killed a ZSU (23-mm twin-mount on a tank chassis) that was near WITCH DOCTOR's position, got a 37-mm gun that had set up about a mile away.

Since the area was still very hot, and darkness was approaching, the decision was made to abandon the effort for the day. Before we left, one of our younger pilots, who had been working on a scheme to air deliver supplies to downed personnel, decided to give his idea a try. He'd been working on a high-speed delivery capsule that was made from the shell of an air-dropped flare. He'd rigged up a drogue chute for the thing. Inside the capsule was a URC-10 rescue radio and spare batteries, some water, hand flares, and a few meagre rations. After two passes over WITCH DOCTOR, he made a successful drop.

The next morning NKP was alive with activity as the ground crews armed the aircraft and helicopters for another try at WITCH DOCTOR. Before we got to the point of "Start engines!", we were informed that WITCH DOCTOR, his crew and passengers, were safe and sound. They'd been rescued by an ARVN M48 tank that had been part of the original Lam Son 713 effort - which is what should have been used for the rescue effort in the first place.

Major Frank Murray
1st Special Operations Squadron
Nakhon Phanom, March 1971

5 MAR 71

WITCH DOCTOR 05

DOWNED ON WITCH DOCTOR SAR:

5 MAR 71 DOWNED SANDY

5 MAR 71 DOWNED USMC A-4

RESCUED 5 MAR 71

"

CMR ALL in D.B.

RECORD OF SAVES FOR THE HH-43 UNIT OF THE 40th ARRS SINCE THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE DETACHMENT 9, 38th ARRS 1964

	COMBAT	NON COMBAT	MED EVAC
SAVE NUMBER 100 on 21 September 68 (EST)*	63	37	
Remainder of 1968	10	4	2
1969	-	12	4
1970	4	5	1
1971	8	3	0
1972			
1968			
23 Sep		1	
5 Oct		2	
15 Oct			2
30 Oct	1		
12 Nov	9		
1969			
11 Jun Troop Evacuation		6	
26 Jan Sick Troopers	0	0	0
14 Jul Huey Gunship Crash		3	
8 Apr Troop caught on aircraft during parachute jump.			1
15 Apr Wounded Army Patient Transfer			2
16 Apr Wounded Vietnamese Troop			1
26 May Malaria		1	
8 Aug Downed LOH Crew		2	
1970			
14 Mar A-1 Crash on Takeoff	0	0	0
19 Mar A-1 Crash		1	
30 Mar F-4 Bailout	1	2	1
8 Apr Snake Bite at Camp Hunkey		1	
15 Nov F105 Bailout	2		
4 Dec Snake Bite		1	
28 Dec A-7 Bailout	1		
1971			
19 Jan Med Evac (Patient Stopped Breathing)		1	
5 Mar C-119 Bailout	8		
18 May Med Evac (Infant)		1	
2 Aug QU 22 Crash Landed		1	
17 Aug QU 22 Engine Failure on Short Final	0	0	0

PERCENT COMBAT VS. NON COMBAT SAVES ESTIMATED FROM RANDOM
SAMPLING OF RECORDS AVAILABLE AT THIS UNIT NOV 71.

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~~SECRET~~

ground fire during their egress. It was concluded that the incident was the result of ground fire damaging the tail rotor drive shaft, tail rotor blades or related controls and components.⁶⁰

(S) The third aircraft lost was an A-1H, SN 52-139734 which crashed at 0055Z on 6 March 1971 while participating in a Search and Rescue effort for Witchdoctor 05.* The A-1, Sandy 04, was hit by small arms fire and the left wing burst into flames. The pilot extracted and the aircraft exploded prior to impact. Sandy 04 parachuted safely to the ground and was immediately picked up by Jolly Green 71. All evidence showed that the aircraft was lost due to hostile ground fire.⁶¹

(C) The other loss occurred on 8 February and involved a QU-22B, SN 69-7705, which crashed near the runway at Quang Tri Air Base, RVN. After more than three hours of flight the pilot declared an emergency (because the engine failed completely) and headed for the nearest appropriate landing field. A ground control station monitored and vectored the aircraft through his descent to a point three miles from the emergency field. Quang Tri Approach Control took over and vectored the QU-22B to the approach end of runway 32. It appeared that the pilot over-shot and rolled out parallel to the runway. He was directed to turn right

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60. Msg, 56th SPOFWG, PACAF/DOH/Hickam AFB Hawaii CSAF, Priority, 1 Feb 71, (S) Comdr 48 Hour Mishap Analysis Report (U), Document #11.
61. Msg, 56th SPOFWG, 7AF/DOC/TAN SON NHUT AB RVN, 6 Mar 71, (S) Comdr 48 Hour Mishap Analysis Report (U), Document #12.
- * See Chapter III, "Search and Rescue", Witchdoctor 05 for rescue details.

~~SECRET~~

Sgt. McGrath wins AF Cross

HICKAM AFB, Hawaii— An Air Force pararescueman assigned to the 6594th Test Group here has been awarded the Air Force Cross for conspicuous heroism in combat.

Sgt. Charles D. McGrath was presented the Air Force's second highest medal for his heroism against hostile forces while rescuing the downed pilot of an Air Force F-4 jet aircraft.

Sergeant McGrath was lowered Harmon International Trophy

by cable from a hovering Air Rescue helicopter to retrieve the injured pilot.

After locating the injured man, he carried him, amid intense enemy ground fire, to a clearing in a bamboo forest. Sergeant McGrath shielded the injured pilot with his own body as they were hoisted aboard the rescue helicopter. While suspended beneath the helicopter, the injured pilot was wounded by enemy fire, as well as a pararescueman who

was assisting the men from the door of the helicopter.

Once inside the rescue helicopter, Sergeant McGrath rendered life-sustaining medical treatment to the pilot and the wounded pararescueman during the flight back to a base in Thailand.

The commander-in-chief of the Pacific Air Forces, (PACAF) Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Jr., awarded Sergeant McGrath the heroism medal in ceremonies held here.

Longest flight earns nomination

Twelve 57th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron crewmembers, who last year established a world's record for the longest unrefueled flight nonstop by turbo-prop aircraft, recently were nominated for the 1973 Harmon International Trophy (Aviator Category).

The historic flight covered a distance of 8,790.5 miles from Ching Chuan Kuan AB, Taiwan, to Scott AFB, Ill. Thus they eclipsed the old record of 6,842.5 miles set by a U.S. Navy Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft which flew from Atsugi, Japan, to Patuxent River, Md., in January

1971.

The Harmon International Trophy, a symbolic bronze statue, includes four awards—one for aviator, one for astronaut, one for aviatrix and one for spherical balloonist.

The award is given annually for the "most outstanding international achievement in the art/science of aeronautics for the preceding year, with the art of flying receiving first consideration."

Selection for the award is made by the Harmon Selection Committee and is awarded by the trustees of the

Clifford Harmon Trust Fund.

Those included in the award winning flight are: Lt. Col. Edgar L. Allison, aircraft commander; Maj. Anthony V. Liparulo, pilot; Maj. Kenneth S. Wayne, flight surgeon; Capt. Carl E. Bennett, navigator; Capt. David E. Gardner, pilot; Capt. Richard E. Racette, pilot; TSgt. Robert K. Landry, crew chief; TSgt. Morelle E. Larouche, flight engineer; TSgt. William F. Litton, flight engineer; TSgt. Theodore F. Trainer, loadmaster; SSgt. Pat E. Carrothers, radio operator and SSgt. William L. Hippert, radio operator.

Former Jolly pilot Wins Valor Award

WASHINGTON (AFNS) — A former HH-3 Jolly Green Giant commander, Lt. Col. Joseph F. Mudd, was presented the 1971 Aviators' Valor Award by the American Legion in New York recently.

Now a member of the 22nd Bomb Wing, March AFB, Calif., Colonel Mudd won the award for actions as commander of a Jolly Green Giant in rescuing a survivor of a downed Air Force A-1 Skyraider in Vietnam March 6, 1971.

During the action, one of the two Skyraiders which were assisting him in rescuing survivors from a downed Army UH-1 was hit by enemy forces.

Within seconds Colonel Mudd placed his Jolly Green in a high-speed descent to a position over the pilot and hoisted him to safety.

According to the citation accompanying the Aviators' Award, Colonel Mudd, "without benefit of prior reconnaissance, escort, or groundfire suppression, rescued a U.S. Air Force pilot from certain death or capture by a hostile armed force."

A 1954 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with 120 combat missions, Colonel Mudd was born in Detroit.

34,000 awards for

ARRS since 1965

Between Jan. 1, 1965 and Dec. 31, 1972, the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service was lauded by approximately 34,000 awards and decorations. Not included are those citations which are still pending. Included in the list were four Presidential Unit Citations, five Vietnamese Crosses for Gallantry with Palms and five Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards.

Individual decorations included: one Medal of Honor, 38 Air Force Crosses, over 600 Silver Stars and more than 6,000 Distinguished Flying Crosses.

MARCH 1971

SURVIVORS

NAME RANK

SSN

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2	BAKKE HARROW ROGERS NARDI PECORARO MONTENAYOR	73	610	LE HANG NHAN (U.N. SAILOR)	CON SON ISLAND	MED EVAC 1 NON-LMB
6	MUDD MERCHANT JOHNSON MUELEHI McDONALD HACKLEY LEWIS (AP)	71	611	TIPTON, CHARLES 4LT SANDY 04 56 SOW NKP	1639 N 106.23 E	COMBAT
23	JENSEN WALDER MCKINDEY RATLIFF HARCOCK KIRK SHAPIRO (AP)	72	612 613	MAJOR ROBERT D. PRIEST XXXXXXXXXX 432 TFW MAJ ROBERT L. CUBBERLY XXXXXXXXXX 432 TFW	312/32/103 North VN	2 COMBAT

TOTAL MONTHLY SAVES 4

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FROM: 1st SOS (Lt Col Adams/2754)

SUBJECT: SARCO's Report for WITCHDOCTOR 05

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 5-6-7 March for Witchdoctor 05, an Army helicopter, at approximately 261/46/ch 103. Final recovery of the survivors was accomplished by an Army armored column of unknown nationality. All times are Thailand local.


2. On the afternoon of 5 Mar 1971 an Army helicopter, Witchdoctor 05, with 7 S.O.B.'s was shot down along the forward lines of the Vietnamese push into Laos toward the Tchepone area. The chopper made a controlled crash, without injury to any of the occupants. The survivors left the chopper and hid in some bushes and trees within 300 meters of the crash site. The area was a very heavily contested area. Much ground fighting was evidenced and for several days air strikes had been placed in an area completely surrounding the crash site. Radio contact was established immediately by a nearby Hammer PAC. The Sandy force was called into the action at NKP at approximately 1500, however, the Sandys from Da Nang had been launched at 1320.

3. 5 Mar 71
C/S

	LAUNCH TIME (LOCATION)	REMARKS	(LDG SITE)
<u>SANDY</u> 09	05/1320 (Da Nang)	OSC Battle Damage	(Da Nang)
10	05/1320 (Da Nang)	Battle Damage	(Da Nang)
03	05/1505 (NKP)	OSC Battle Damage	(NKP)
04	05/1505 (NKP)	Battle Damage	(NKP)
01	05/1540 (NKP)	JG Escort - Rough Engine	(NKP)
02	05/1540 (NKP)		
05	05/1540 (UBON)	Strike Acft & OSC for Beddown	(NKP)
06	05/1540		
<u>SMOKE</u> 41	05/1645 (NKP)		(NKP)
42			

6 Mar 71

<u>SANDY</u> 01	06/0455 (NKP)	OSC - Battle Damage Gear up landing	(NKP)
02	06/0455		
07	06/0540 (BIEN HOA)	Preposition for SAR	(NKP)
03	06/0540		
03	06/0620 (NKP)	OSC	(NKP)
04	06/0620 (NKP)	Bailed out/PU By JG 71	
<u>SMOKE</u> 41	06/0818 (NKP)	Held Till Bingo Fuel	(NKP)
42	06/0818 (NKP)		
<u>SANDY</u> 05	06/0825 (NKP)	OSC	(NKP)
06	06/0825 (NKP)		
11	06/1025 (NKP)		
12	06/1025 (NKP)		



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C/S	LAUNCH TIME (LOCATION)	REMARKS	(LEG SITE)
<u>SMOKE</u> 43	06/1150 (NKP)	JG Escort & OSC	(NKP)
44			
<u>SANDY</u> 13	06/1355 (NKP)	OSC (Dropped Survival Kit)	(NKP)
14	06/1605		(NKP)
15	06/1705 (NKP)	Orbit in Vicinity of SAR	(NKP)
16	06/1705		

4. The general area consisted of low rolling hills, sparse to heavy vegetation, several trails and many bunkers and bomb craters. The weather was scattered with visibility most significant. Haze restricted visibility to less than 1 mile into the sun and up to 5 miles down-sun.

5. The Hammer FAC's were in the area supporting the ground war and were immediately available to locate the survivors prior to the arrival of the Sandys. They also were used extensively for fast mover strikes on 5 and 6 of March.

6. The attachments of this report will best describe the events as seen from the position of the Sandy and Smoke pilots. A brief overlay of the SAR follows. On 5 March during the first afternoon of the SAR, it was apparent that a very difficult SAR was in progress. Intelligence reports placed the survivor in the worst possible position, completely surrounded by enemy. The nearest friendly ground forces were 3-4 miles south and east. The Sandys did the usual preparatory things, trolling the area for gunfire and trying to locate the survivors position accurately. Fast mover strikes were put in to silence 23 and 37mm guns. Small arms fire was continuous and Sandys expanded as close to the survivors as possible. Sandy 09 and 10 received extensive battle damage and RTB'd to Da Nang. Sandy 03 attempted a pickup using a smoke screen. The JG was forced out of the area by a heretofore unknown 23mm that came up right under him and rescue efforts were terminated for 5 Mar. The few remaining minutes of daylight were used for further gun suppression. Beddown instructions were given to the survivors and a first light effort planned for 6 Mar.

6 Mar 1971 - Through the night, fast mover ordnance was requested and Jack was advised of the extreme shortage of A-1 resources. Request for austere use of Sandy was finally agreed upon and the first light effort was launched. Realizing that several guns had to be killed prior to any pickup attempt, the launch of JG escorts was delayed. The first Sandy OSC received ground fire and lost his hydraulic system. He was forced to RTB and land gear up at NKP. Through the remainder of the day, heavy strikes were put in by fast movers. Hard bombs as well as nape and high drags were used in close proximity to the survivors. At approximately 0740, during an attempt to mark an egress route for the choppers, Sandy 04 was hit in the wing and caught fire. He stayed with the aircraft long enough to get away from the scene before ejecting.

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His aircraft blew up in the air before it struck the ground. Sandy 04 was picked up immediately by JG 71 and the original rescue attempt was delayed.

Just before noon, another rescue attempt was made by Dolphin 40, an Army Huey. Several choppers were in the immediate vicinity and had been pressing the Sandys for a chance to attempt a pickup. Sandy 05 finally agreed to let them attempt a landing near the survivor using their superior mobility as opposed to the JG choppers. During the ingress, the chopper got hit and the pilot received face wounds. This terminated all requests by the Army to get into the act. (see Atch 8) Continued contact was maintained with the survivors and directions were received from them as to the proximity and severity of ground fire. Toward the afternoon the ground fire seemed to diminish (see Atch 9) and about the time a pickup was to be briefed, a JG was not available. Sandy 13 was OSC at that time and had two survival packages that could be dropped to the survivors. (It was noticed that the survivors radio was weak and the SARCO had two kits made ready if needed. At noon Joker asked if we could come up with a kit and we complied).

At 1615, "Serpent 20" and "Big Ben" came up on the SAR frequency and stated unequivocally that the Army was taking over. After much discussion between King, Joker, Sandy 13, the Air Force portion of the SAR was terminated. During the night of the 6th, a heavy mortar barrage was put in around the survivors. Sandys were on alert but not called out at NKP on the 7th. At approximately 1300 on the 7th, we learned that a ground force had penetrated the survivors position and the 7 survivors and over 100 ground personnel had been safely evacuated from the scene of the rescue attempt.

7. PROBLEMS & DIFFICULTIES:

Several problems were noted during this SAR: It was extremely difficult for the SARCO to get timely information from Queen on the progress of the SAR. Particularly, we were not kept updated on the Sandy's bingo fuel. Depending on the Altitudes, power settings required, ordinance load etc the Sandy Bingo time will vary up to two hours from his original estimate. An ARC light nearly caused a catastrophe in that it could not be called off and nearly struck the survivors and fast mover aircraft (see Atch 8). The Army was naturally concerned because the survivors were their people. The large numbers of Army choppers in the area and their persistent efforts to assist caused undue hardship on the Sandys. Finally the unannounced intervention of the Army came as a complete surprise to all interested parties. The shortage of A-1 aircraft must be recognized by Joker. During the SAR, Medevac missions were not released to the SAR forces. This amounted to 4 aircraft not available to the rescue effort. King used the primary VHF for conversation with Jack & Queen instead of the backup or HF.

8. Recommendations:

A. JASARC must devise a way to get dangerously close ARC light missions cancelled or diverted.

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B. Joker, King, Queen, & Jack must be responsive to requests for information from the NKP-SARCO. The shortage of A-1 airframes requires the strictest conservation of resources and a constant update of intended requirements. Bingo times must be updated at least hourly to allow lead time for launches and to preclude having a void of On-Scene-Commanders. Since all SARCO's are also Sandy qualified, their suggestions should be strongly considered whenever possible.

C. Several aircraft took battle damage from all types of gunfire. The Sandy pilots must be cautioned to be less aggressive in the face of insurmountable obstacles. Low trolling is unnecessary while 23's and 37's are still alive and known. Some heavily defended areas may take days of softening up, prior to the first attempt at pickup. Heavy concentrations of small arms fire is as deadly as occasional 23 and 37mm fire. Standard ordnance may not ever be able to neutralize the enemy if they are in shored up positions. It may be necessary to devise special ordnances that can get down into holes and may require a harder look at the use of certain C/S agents.

D. Reinstruct King to keep primary VHF clear for transmissions to Sandy Low element.

E. The A-1 is as important to rescue in opposed areas as is the JG. Without a high success rate on SARE, morale of the combat flyers will deteriorate. An attempt to increase, rather than decrease, the number of A-1's should be a priority project at the highest level.

Robert S. Adams

ROBERT S. ADAMS, Lt Colonel, USAF
1st SOS NKP

Atch - I

II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SANDY 09/10 - 5 Mar 1971

We were launched from Da Nang the first day of the SAM. We held for about 30 minutes while Hammer 55 worked 3 flights of F-4's on gun positions around the survivors. The Hammer then wanted to try a pickup because he hadn't received any ground fire. I told King we wanted the on-scene-command to do some trolling. On our second pass over the area, the whole world broke loose. Witchdoctor 05 said we were taking automatic weapons fire from numerous positions to the south, east and north of their position. I had not pinpointed the survivors yet but had their downed chopper and it took about 5 more passes to pinpoint them in a bomb crater. After finding them we started to work on silencing the gun positions ourselves because we had no fast mover ordnance available at the time. Sandy 10 and I, by using directions from the survivors started quieting down the area. There were numerous ZPU, 51 cal and 12.7 positions around. I received a few hits from 51 cal and Sandy 10 was hit twice causing him to lose his hydraulic pressure and RTB to Da Nang. I would have returned with him but the Hammer that was working with us decided to leave and not tell anyone. I found myself alone with the survivors so I remained on-scene. I continued trolling using the survivors to tell me where the ground fire was coming from. When my ordnance was just about exhausted another Hammer arrived on scene. I marked the gun positions for him and briefed him on the survivors position. I then briefed Sandy 03 & 04 on the situation and RTB'd for a lack of ordnance and not fuel.

Atch I

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SANDY 03/04 - 5 Mar 1971

Sandy 03 and Sandy 04 were scheduled for a normal Tango Orbit with a 1500 local takeoff. Just prior to taking the active, Sandy 03 and 04 were informed via Tee-lee to divert to the 262/46 miles on channel 103 for an active SAR. Enroute was normal with contact established with King. The situation briefed by King was that an Army helicopter with 7 survivors was down at an area just west of D-12. Sandy 09 and 10 had been on scene from Da Nang with Sandy 10 being escorted back to Da Nang with severe battle damage. Sandy 03 and 04 arrived on scene about 1610 local and were immediately briefed on the situation by Sandy 09. At the time, Sandy 09 was low on fuel with minor battle damage. Due to the situation of Sandy 09, Sandy 03 took immediate on scene command at 1620 local. Hammer 241 was aware of the survivors location and was presently putting in fast mover Napalm strikes just north of the crash scene. Sandy 03 was then briefed by Hammer 241 and shown the exact location of the survivors and downed Helicopter. Sandy 03 then made contact with Witchdoctor 05 and proceeded to make numerous low level passes to pinpoint the small arms fire. On all passes Sandy 03 received intense ground fire from the south and west of the survivors. The ground fire was also pinpointed on each of Sandy 03's passes by Witchdoctor. Sandy 03 and 04 then made 5 or 6 low level CBU and Strafe passes to the north and south of the survivors. Sandy 03 then went back to troll for more ground fire and on the second pass received 7.62mm battle damage in the left gear and centerline tank area. Sandy 03 then had Hammer 241 put in 3 more flights of fast mover strikes to the south and west of the survivors. Again Sandy 03 and 04 went low and experienced little or no small arms fire on 4 or 5 low level passes in the area of the survivors. Sandy 03 had now lost his radio, so all SAR forces had to work on UHF radio 364.2 and reserved guard channel for the survivor and himself. At 1730 local Sandy 03 brought in Sandy 01 and 02 (Helicopter escorts) and Smoke 41 and 42 to brief them on the survivor location, too far mark, IP mark, and the smoke pattern. Sandy 04 stayed with the Jolly Green choppers while the briefing was taking place. After the Sandy 01 and 02 and smoke flight returned to the IP (250/45/103), Sandy 03 briefed Sandy 05 and 06 on a CBU-25 run just north of the Helicopter and south of the road. When this was completed Sandy 03 brought the Jolly Green's, Sandy 01 and 02, smokes and Sandy 04 up to guard channel for a check-in. Sandy 03 then instructed Witchdoctor that we would be executing shortly and when and how to use his smoke flare. At 1750 local Sandy 03 directed the smoke aircraft to lay their screen 30 seconds apart and to have the Jolly Greens and escort to start their run to the final IP in one minute. The smoke screen was excellent. There was some confusion with the Jolly Green low bird and escort on the final turn to run-in.

At a half mile from the Helicopter Witchdoctor was told to pop his smoke. The purple smoke started up and all looked good, when suddenly a 23mm gun started firing at the Jolly Green from a point beneath him. Sandy 01 ordered a emergency egress to the north.

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All forces returned to the holding point. Sandy 01 developed engine problems and was escorted to HRP by Sandy 02. It was now dark and with the 37mm and 23mm guns spotted, Sandy 03 elected to bed down the survivors. On scene command was passed to Sandy 05 at 1830 local in order that he accurately pinpoint and possibly destroy the guns.

Atch II

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SANDY 01/02 - WITCHDOCTOR 05/ 5 Mar 71

Sandy 01 and Sandy 02 launched at 1540 local for Witchdoctor 05 SAR effort. Picked up Jolly Green 56/57 November Orbit, crossed the trails and held south of D-12 area. On command to execute the pickup phase we led JG 56 to the run in IP and started final approach phase. When the JG was descending on the final at approximately 1/2 mile from the survivors position two 23mm guns opened fire on the JG as he passed over the guns. One 37mm gun also fired on the JG and Sandys. JG 56 continued the descent and track to the smoked area and safely egressed to the south.

At the time of this attempted pickup Sandy 01 experienced a rough engine and loss UHF radio. Sandy 02 attempted to silence the 23mm site with guns and exited the area to escort Sandy 01 to NKP. Sandy 01 jettisoned all ordnance and tanks and proceeded with rough engine and occasional backfires to NKP. Sandy 02 jettisoned tanks, CBU and LAU-3's to facilitate escort and recovered at 1900 local.

Atch III

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SANDY 05/06 - WITCHDOCTOR 05/5 Mar 71

On 5 Mar 71 Sandy 05 and Sandy 06 took off from Ubon at 1530. After airborne we heard that there was a CAT in process. We proceeded to the area and Sandy 03 decided to use us as strike birds. We made two CBU passes and didn't seem to draw any ground fire. We held high while they made an attempt. On the run in I saw two 23mm come up at the Jolly Green and called the other Sandy to the positions and Sandy 04 took care of one of the positions. At about this time the attempt was aborted and the forces went out to regroup. It was getting dark and the other Sandys were getting low on gas so they RTB'd and I took on-scene-commander about 1830. I marked the big gun position for a fast mover flight but they went home for fuel. The next idea was to possibly get a dust-off 40 in, under the course of darkness, while we tried to fight the guns with our rockets and guns. This never materialized and we RTB'd at 1915.

Atch IV

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SMOKE 41/42/5 Mar 71

As Smoke 41 and 42, myself and Captain Little scramble at 1645 local on 5 Mar 71. Due to the lateness of the day we proceeded directly across the trail and arrived on scene at 1740. The second smoke element, 43 and 44, were held at NKP by Jack for reasons unknown.

Due to the intensity of the fire in the immediate area, the Jolly lead elected to move 5 miles east of the objective area. Sandy 05 later came up and moved us all east again as our holding area was not deemed secure. This put us a long distance from the SAR and as darkness was approaching and we were east of the SAR area looking into the haze we could not see anything, including smoke.

Sandy 03, the on-scene-commander ordered us forward which took longer than anticipated as we had no TACAN, and my ADF function was written out in the 761. My wingman's wife was terrible, and we proceeded on a guess as to the area and finally got joined. As time was running out for the last light, Sandy 03 took me over the area and showed me where the desired smoke was to be placed. He did this also with Smoke 42 due to the pressuring time element and restricted visibility. Sporadic ground fire was observed and reported by the survivors although I only saw a few winks SE of their location at this time.

The command of execution was given and Sandy 05 and 06 opened up with a CHU and Strafe run which raised a large dirt cloud along our inbound run. I laid my smoke first and saw a lot of small arms fire from the same place I previously had noted it. Also saw some larger tracers go by but don't know where they came from. The heaviest fire was again right where Smoke 42 was to place his smoke, which he did excellently. The smoke formed an alley but the chopper got boxed as he maneuvered to the entry point of the alley and after a gaggle in avoiding all kinds of guns that came up, the attempt was terminated and all forces RTB'd.

Atch V

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SANDY 01/02 - WITCHDOCTOR 05/6 Mar 71

Sandy 01 and Sandy 02 were launched at 0450 on a first light effort the second day of the SAR. The flight to the SAR was uneventful. We reached the SAR area about 20 minutes before sunup. Hammer 86 was the night FAC capping the survivors when we arrived. He said he had not heard from them, but they had been briefed not to use their radio unless they needed something. Hammer 86 did not know the survivors location.

As it began to get light we circled high and familiarized ourselves with the general area. No enemy activity or response had been observed during the night. After circling for a few minutes, an emergency beeper sounded on guard for a few seconds. I immediately asked for the beeper to come up voice and got a response from Witchdoctor 05. He had left his bunker and was hiding in heavy brush not far from it. He said he had heard trucks and activity most of the night about 300-400 meters East and Southeast of him, and also numerous troops in his immediate area. He asked us to expend some ordnance to cover his movement back into the bunker. We went through a short search and after locating his approximate position, began to drop GBU-25. All seven survivors moved back into the bunker. During this time the survivors kept us posted on ground fire, which consisted of small arms and automatic weapons. Each time we got any reaction we would expend on it. The bad guys had partially camouflaged the downed chopper and were taking parts off of it; they also were firing at us from it, so we strafed it and set it on fire. I put in a pair of F-4's with high drops and napalm. They laid it right on target. At this point I smelled hydraulic fumes in my cockpit. I called King and informed him we needed the next set of Sandys. The Hammer FAC had been monitoring our transmissions and knew where the survivors were, so I started back to base. Very shortly after smelling fumes, the hydraulic pressure began to fluctuate. I dumped the pressure to prevent additional loss of the hydraulic fluid. About 10 minutes later the aileron boost quit. A short while later I tried to open the canopy, but the hydraulic pressure would not come up after pushing the pressure release handle in. I then blew it open with the air bottle. About 25 miles from the base I ran out of oxygen and had to sit with my face near the slip stream to breathe. When I was about 17 miles out I put the pressure release handle in and put the gear lever down. The tail wheel went down, but not the main gear. I actuated the auxiliary hydraulic pump, with no results. I then went to the emergency gear down position and still got no results. I then porpoised and yawned the airplane and slowed down to about 110 knots. I put the tail hook down and it worked. After burning off fuel and jettisoning my remaining stores I made a gear up approach and engagement.

Atch VI

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INDY 03/04 - WITC DOCTOR 05/6 Mar 71

Sandy 03 and 04 briefed at 0300 for a launch after Sandy 01 and 02. At approximately 0600 we were launched along with two Jolly Green helicopters for the November orbit. We were airborne at 0615.

The four-ship force proceeded to the November orbit (about 120/65/89). After one orbit, Sandy 03, who was monitoring Guard, heard that Sandy 01 had been hit and had lost his hydraulic pressure. Sandy 03 and 04 were ordered to the SAR area. We proceeded directly to the crossing point (128/100/89) and then turned 072 degrees towards the area. Both aircraft did not have an operational TACAN at this time.

0715, Arrival in SAR area. We arrived in the target area, recognizing the area by smoke from striking aircraft and by getting DF steers from the FAC, Hammer 21. An ARC LITE was also hitting about 5 miles west of the area. Hammer 21 told us that it had been quiet in the survivor's area but that he would like a CBU pass south of the road. I took on-scene-commander and then Sandy 03 and 04 made the CBU pass as requested.

We made repeated passes up and down the valley along the road, mainly east of the survivors. Occasionally the survivor would report some small arms fire and the position. We made strafe and CBU passes to quiet this groundfire. Finally it appeared to all that the area was quiet.

The Jolly Green helicopters, out of Da Nang, were holding 40 miles west of channel 103. The survivors were at 46 miles so I requested the helicopters to move further west. I had everyone go to VHF and briefed everyone on the pickup attempt. The "IP" point would be approximately two miles east of the survivors and the helicopters would get to the "IP" from the ridge line, south of the survivors. After the briefing the helicopters headed west towards a rendezvous over the ridge. I flew over towards the ridge line to meet the Jolly Greens and brief them on the exact position of the survivors. Sandy 04 slipped into the valley to mark the "IP" point with a M47 and the too far smoke. He was unable to get a M47 to work so he used his smoke rockets.

0755, Sandy 04 Extracts. Sandy 04 put down smoke rockets for the IP point, then another, and then another for the "too far" smoke. Suddenly he said that he had been hit and his left wing was on fire. As I turned towards his position I observed his external ordnance being dropped and the fire on the wing. Sandy 04 continued in a shallow left turn towards the ridge line to the south of the valley. He made it to the ridge line and proceeded east; the hole in the wing, and the fire, continued. I was about 2000 feet above him and cannot recall the exact conversation but by this time I was advising him to extract. Sandy 04's parachute worked as advertised, and the east wind drifted him away from where the aircraft impacted. He was in the air approximately 30-45 seconds.

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0800, Jolly Green 71 Helicopter Pickup. By this time Jolly Green 71 was in the immediate area, and low. He had observed the parachute of Sandy 04. I made one low pass over Sandy 04 as the helicopter continued directly at his position. The immediate pickup presented itself as the only logical solution as the Jolly Green came in and dropped in the penetrator. He brought Sandy 04 up into the helicopter. The Jolly Green then exited the area north, into the valley, and then turned east. Later they reported that they had received hits from groundfire. The fast pickup probably prevented more battle damage as it did not allow the hostile forces time to organize any type of defense. They were not aware of the downed pilot's position. For the next hour and twenty minutes Hammer 21 and Sandy 03 shared the air over the survivors along with numerous shuttling "slick" helicopters of the Army. The "slicks" offered their services but I refused as I thought the area too non-permissive for them. "Snake", "napo" and 20mm were ordered and received to hit around the area. Hammer 21 ran out of smoke rockets so I started to use my smoke rockets to mark the desired targets. Hammer 21 was able to visually observe the survivors with his binoculars.

As the fast mover flights continued Hammer 21 would frequently contact the survivors on guard frequency to check the accuracy of the ordnance. He suggested that I do the FACing since I had the rockets and he would take care of conversing since we were only two and would have to wait on other forces. We started this and I fumbled through a swift OJT FAC course with a Gunfighter flight.

The fast mover ordnance was very accurate. Sandy 05 and 06 arrived on scene and I started briefing them on the area and situation. After Sandy 05 took on-scene-command I rolled in for one last run using my mini-gun and LAU-3 rockets. The survivors reported that I had stopped some guns that were just north of them.

I returned to base. The landing, on the parallel taxiway, with a 10 knot tailwind and the whole Wing observing, was "undistinguished."

Atch VII

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SANDY 05/06 - WITCHDOCTOR 05/6 Mar 71

Sandy 05 and 06 launched at approximately 0030 and proceeded directly to the location of the survivors. Enroute King advised that Sandy 04 had been picked up and Sandy 03 was holding high in the area. Upon arrival in the area, Sandy 03 briefed us on the location of the survivors. There was so much talking on VHF 127.7 that I instructed King to get all traffic off of that frequency. This was done and about half of the chatter was cut out. I asked King what kind of ordnance he had on the way up and it was all hand. I requested Nape and OBU. A Hammer PAC was on scene and he continued to put in hand ordnance northeast of the survivors. After about 20 minutes a flight of F-4's arrived with Nape. There was a small stream just east of the survivors that ran north and south. I instructed the PAC to put Nape just east of the stream and as close to it as possible. The Hammer PAC put down his smoke and the fast movers struck. The no. 2 man hit west of the stream, right on top of the survivors, but apparently none of them were hurt. They did have to move their location for a while because the Nape fires burned over their position.

An ARC light was due to go off right in the area, about a kilometer or two west. A fast mover strike was just pulling off as the first ARC light bombs were detonating. The fast movers pulled right up through the falling bombs and I don't see how they kept from being hit. The bomb string ran on about a heading of 250°. The last bomb of the first string detonated about 50 meters from the survivors. The second string of bombs in just about the same position. However, one bomb must have hung for a few seconds because it impacted southwest of the survivors.

Fast movers were put in on the road just south of the survivors where the night before a 2300 had been reported. After numerous air strikes, Sandy 05 and 06 made numerous trolling passes low over the survivors and along the ingress route of the Jolly Greens. No ground fire was reported by Sandy 06 or the survivors.

Smoke 41 and 42 had been dispatched to escort the Jolly Greens and I had them move to a forward area just south of the survivors.

Although numerous low slow passes had been made around the survivors, I did not feel that the area was safe. But what can you do after the area has been beaten to a pulp? Can you not make an attempt? A Huey slick, Dolphin 40, came into the area and insisted that he be given a chance at a pickup. There was a small clearing very close to the survivors, where he could land and pickup all seven of the survivors at one time. Witchdoctor 05 could see the area and said that they could get to it. I advised Dolphin 40 that I didn't like the idea and told him that I didn't think he should try to make the pickup. He was very insistent and I told him to come in from the east and Sandy 06 and I would form a Daisy Chain around him.

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Let's stop now and get a little background on this decision. All varying choppers had been flying down the road that ran east to west. There was a friendly landing area along this road about 3-4 miles east of the survivors position. The Army choppers were from 200-500' along the road and hadn't been fired at. A group of choppers had moved east of the survivors and I figured if they started west and then Dolphin 40 just drop out of the flight and land the effort might be successful.

Sandy 05 & 06, the Hammer FAC, Dolphin 40 and the survivor were checked in on guard channel and I briefed Witchdoctor 05 on our intentions. The choppers started west, Dolphin 40 spiraled down, and approached the H/Z. He began to call groundfire and Sandy 06 and I started dropping CBU-25 and shooting 20mm. Dolphin 40 called that the pilot was hit and they were going to crash. The co-pilot took the airplane and withdrew to the east. Sandy 06 and I then escorted them back to the friendly H/Z along the road. After Dolphin 40 had time to assess the situation he determined that things weren't as bad as he thought and they continued to Khe Sanh. Sandy 05 & 06 returned to the area of the survivors and continued to put fast mover strikes into the area. The Hammer FAC that was one scene ran out of WP rockets so I marked the target area and directed the fast mover strikes.

The Jolly Greens were forced to refuel so I directed Smoke 41 & 42 to go with them and hold them in the original holding area.

Sandy 11 & 12 arrived on scene and I briefed them on the survivors position. Sandy 06 and I again made several low passes with no ground fire. Sandy 06 and I then expended our remaining ordnance as close to the survivors as we could. After expenditure RTB was uneventful.

Atch VIII

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SA-09 11 and 12/6 Nov 1971

I was originally launched to orbit with Jolly Greens 57 and 56 at the November orbit. We spent one hour of wasted time at the "T" orbit. There is absolutely no reason to have A-1s orbit with the Jollys in this area. One hour of valuable station time on scene was used up doing absolutely nothing. I say this because the optimistic conservation of A-1 reserves was needed. When Sandy 09 and 10 called for replacements we were sent to the scene by King. When we arrived on scene Sandy had just enough fuel to brief me, expand his ordnance, and then was to cancel 09. When I assumed on-scene command the survivors were in the process of moving to a stream east of their position to get some water and try and pinpoint a 12.7mm that had just shot up an air click. I could not make contact with the survivors for approx. 30 minutes after I assumed command. The F4C, Hammer 55, had 2 flights of fast movers to expand what had very little station time. I told the F4C to expand the jets south of route 9 along the ingress route Sandy 09 had suggested. I did not want to expand any ordnance in the vicinity of the survivor until I had their position pinpointed. I marked the area south of the road for the F4C with "X". I then tried to contact Witch Doctor 05 on ground channel, the only frequency he had on his type radio. When I finally made contact with him, he had started back from the stream and had found the 12.7mm. The gun, by good luck, just happened to be positioned right beneath a white flame chert that was hanging in a tree. The survivors then moved back to the bomb crater they were using as a hiding place. My wingman and I each made one pass on the gun. Witch Doctor 05 reported that we had destroyed the gun and not to use any more of our ordnance. With the help of Hammer 55 we located the exact hole the survivors were in. We could see them so well from the air that we could count seven people sitting in the bomb crater. Now that the F4C, my wingman and myself knew the exact location of the survivors. I directed Hammer 55 to expand the fast movers along the east, west, and north side of the survivors. There were excellent natural land marks that I used as minimum distances for fast movers ordnance. All fast movers put their ordnance right on target.

In the interim between fast mover strikes I made several low passes over and near the survivors position to check for ground fire in the immediate area around them. They reported no ground fire. I instructed Hammer 55 to continue putting in air strikes around the survivor.

When I moved to the south of the survivor and started trolling for ground fire along the in and out route the Jolly would take. I picked off small amounts of C-97 05 all along the route to try and intimidate the bad guys to shoot at me. No ground fire was observed by me or my wingman who was just above me and to my rear. I also went up to the ridgeline further south to also check out that area. Everything at this time looked good for a pick-up.

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I had several lengthy conversations with Jolly 72 about whether or not it would be able to cut the Jolly down and have all the survivors climb on board at once or whether he would have to use the penetrator that could take more time. The people on the ground seemed to think the area was flat enough for the jolly to sit down. So to sit down was our primary means of pick-up and the penetrator secondary. We were ready to use either method.

The survivors had no means of marking their position for the Jolly on the run in but I felt that I, being able to see the survivors, could call the Jolly right to their position. The survivors were also briefed to be ready to use their white T-shirts to help the Jolly find them.

About this time my VHF receiver went bad. All information between the survivor and myself had to be passed via my wingman who did an outstanding job relaying. I planned to run the pick-up on VHF and have everyone monitor guard so they could hear any ground fire that was called out by the survivors. My VHF transmitter worked fine.

Next I brought the smoke birds down (43 and 44) and with them in trail I briefed them on where I wanted the smoke, the position of the survivors. I planned to use the smoke birds 20m for the daisy chain because there were not any more A-1s available. Sandy 13 and 14 both had maintenance problems and weren't expected to launch. The plan was to lay the smoke and then have smoke 43 and 44 pull around quickly and join the helicopter at the IR. My wingman's cue to start Jolly 72 to the IR was the laying of the second smoke screen. Both Jollys were to hold over the ridge line to the south of the IR. The high Jolly would be able to watch the whole pick-up and be in position if anyone was hit during the pick-up attempt. Everyone was briefed to head south if possible if they were hit or had an emergency and the high Jolly would be right there to pick them up.

As usual, timing was the most important factor so we ran through a dry run of the whole plan. About this time several Cobra gunships showed up and I had Master 55 expend half of the ordnance in close around the immediate area of the survivors and half along the entry and exit route. Everything was ready. We were waiting for the Cobras to engage. While the Cobras were expending in the area of the IR they reported adding ground fire. At this point it was obvious that that area needed more sterilizing. Master 55 said some C-124 was on the way and would be in the area in 15 minutes.

My wingman and I were right at Diego field and could not stay in the area long enough to wait for the C-124. So I made the decision to delay the pick-up attempt and brief Sandy 13 who had just arrived in the area on the plan. Smoke 43 and 44 were completely familiar with the plan and had plenty of fuel to stay in the area. My wingman and I ran to channel 89 turning on-scene command to Sandy 13 with smoke 43 to answer any questions Sandy 13 might have. I found out after I landed that the Army had taken command and was running the show.

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The one overall frustrating factor about this whole SAM is that the enemy was reluctant to shoot at the A-1's but would open up at any helicopter that came in the area.

Atch IX

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MOKE 43 - WITCHDOCTOR 05/6 Mar 71

On 6 Mar 71, Smoke 43 & 44 were launched in support of a SAR already in progress for seven downed aircrew members. Airborne at 1150 local Smoke flight arrived in the area at approximately 1245 local. Jolly 72 and his wingman were holding alone just south of the SAR area and I suggested to King that the Smokes hold with them and offer any assistance needed. This was approved and Smoke flight joined the Jollys. Sandy 11 was on scene commander, and he and Hammer 55 were working fast mover strikes in the area. At approximately 1400 local Sandy 11 requested Smoke flight to join him in the area for a briefing on the survivors location and the required position of the Smoke screen. This was accomplished and Smoke flight made a dry run through the area to pinpoint the desired position and develop the required timing. Smoke 43 then returned to hold with the Jollys. At approximately 1500 local Sandy 11 was preparing for a pickup attempt. This attempt was aborted, however, just prior to the Jolly run in due to renewed ground fire. At approximately 1530 local Sandy 11 & 12 were forced to RTB for fuel and Smoke 43 & 44 remained with the Jollys awaiting Sandy 13. When Sandy 13 arrived in the area, Smoke 43 briefed him on the situation and subsequently took him into the area and pinpointed the survivors. Smoke flight then made two strafing passes on suspected ground fire positions and RTB'd channel 89 due to fuel. Landing was at 1650 local.

Atch X

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SANDY 13/14 - WITCHDOCTOR 05/6 Mar 71

Sandy 13 was launched at 1355 local in support of Witchdoctor 05. Sandy 13 went out solo and Sandy 14 would join later.

Arriving on scene at 1445 local, Sandy 13 received a quick briefing from Sandy 11 because they were in the final briefing stages for a pickup. When ground fire cancelled the pickup attempt, Sandy 11 showed Sandy 13 where the survivors were and had to RTB for fuel. Smoke 43 then took Sandy 13 down and gave him an exact pinpoint on the survivors. During this time Hammer 55 was working fast mover strikes against the ground fire. Another attempt was planned, however, it had to be cancelled because Queen had JG 72 RTB. Also Smoke 43/44 were below bingo fuel so we didn't have time to wait for the new set of Jolly Greens. The Smokes made a few strafing passes and RTB'd for fuel. Sandy 13 was now the only A-1 on scene. Sandy 13, during this time, worked fast movers in the general area of the survivors. At 1615 local, Serpent 20 (an Army chopper) informed Sandy 13 that at 1715 local the Army was taking over on scene command and that unless the Sandy forces had a pickup attempt planned they wouldn't be needed after 1715 local. Sandy 13 called King 24 to appraise him of the situation and asked him what the story was. King 24 started asking around to determine who was making all the decisions. As near as we could determine "Big Ben" (Army) was the controlling force of the Army's effort. Sandy 13 contacted Big Ben and was told the Army would be taking over, and if they failed in their try the SAR forces could make a last light effort.

Sandy 14 launched at 1600 local and joined Sandy 13 at 1645 local. He was briefed on the Army plan.

Sandy 13 in anticipation of a last light effort had King 26 refuel JG 64/71 and had Smoke 45/46 and Sandy 15/16 launched. They arrived on scene at 1730 local. Sandy 13 briefed all the forces for a possible last light effort and everybody stood by to watch the Army get shot up.

When Sandy 13 determined that the Army wasn't going to get the survivors out before dark, he dropped a survival package (2-URC64's, 3 batteries, 3 flares and 4 water cans) to them. The packages were dropped and they recovered the first one for sure but we never determined if they got the second package.

A last light effort by the Sandys was not attempted because the Army had many friendly troops moving into the area and the Sandys couldn't expend any ordnance.

King 26 finally decided to have all the SAR forces RTB.

Atch XI

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SARTF SANDYs in action

I was the Operations Officer for the 1st SOS at NKP in the autumn of 1970, before taking over command of the squadron in early 1970. I flew the A-1 Skyraider on 64 sorties, which isn't very impressive considering that many of the guys in my squadron had well over 100 'counters'.

I recall one search and rescue mission that had all the ingredients of a Hollywood script. It took place in March 1971, as part of Operation Lam Son 713, an incursion into Laos by South Vietnamese Army troops (ARVN), across the DMZ toward Tchepone. In the course of this action, a US Army Huey, callsign WITCH DOCTOR 05, was monitoring the action of a group of ARVN senior officers. They were touring the front lines well beyond the advancing ground troops.

Closing on Tchepone, the Huey was hit by North Vietnamese (NVA) anti-aircraft fire, and was forced down in an area immediately adjacent to a group of NVA troops. The Huey crew and the passengers extracted themselves from the wreck of the chopper, and got into an old bomb crater that was near the main trail (Ho Chi Minh Trail) out of Tchepone. We launched the SARTF force on 5 March and headed toward the downed Huey.

While we were en route, a couple of forward air controllers were bringing in some Navy and Marine

fighters to soften up the area prior to our attempted rescue. One of the Marine A-4 Skyhawks was shot down, which created another SAR effort. One of our 'Jolly Greens' was diverted to the downed Marine pilot, and we got him out without too much trouble.

However, while the rest of the SARTF force was working on the WITCH DOCTOR mission, one of the SANDY A-1s was hit by ground fire and started to burn. The pilot, First Lieutenant Chuck Tipton, used his 'Yankee Extractor device' and got out of the aircraft at a very low altitude. The 'Jolly Green' that he'd been escorting swooped in and picked him up in less than a minute. The 'Jolly Green' pilot then made an immediate turn and went straight back to NKP with Tipton aboard.

In the meantime, another US Army Huey, callsign DOLPHIN, decided that he could probably sneak in and pick up the WITCH DOCTOR crew and passengers. He made a rather vertical approach to the area, which made him an easy target for the NVA anti-aircraft, and was hit several times. He did make it out of the area, but his co-pilot was very badly wounded.

The call went out for another SAR force to launch out of NKP. That was me - SANDY 02. SANDY 01 and myself, along with a third 'Jolly Green' helicopter, left NKP and headed directly for the area of WITCH

DOCTOR. When we arrived, we found we weren't alone, as several other A-1s had launched from Da Nang to support our effort. These guys were armed with smoke and CS gas dispensers.

The on-scene SAR commander ordered the smoke and gas to be put down, and our team started the approach to the WITCH DOCTOR crew, but the area was still too hot. Lots of heavy anti-aircraft (AAA) fire started to blossom around both my flight and the 'Jolly Green'. As soon as the AAA opened up, the 'Jolly Green' beat a hasty retreat, and stood by, out of range of the big guns. My flight started working over the NVA gun positions that had shot us off our mission. SANDY 01 killed a ZSU (23-mm twin-mount on a tank chassis) that was near WITCH DOCTOR's position, got a 37-mm gun that had set up about a mile away.

Since the area was still very hot, and darkness was approaching, the decision was made to abandon the effort for the day. Before we left, one of our younger pilots, who had been working on a scheme to air deliver supplies to downed personnel, decided to give his idea a try. He'd been working on a high-speed delivery capsule that was made from the shell of an air-dropped flare. He'd rigged up a drogue chute for the thing. Inside the capsule was a URC-10 rescue radio and spare batteries, some water, hand flares, and a few meagre rations. After two passes over WITCH DOCTOR, he made a successful drop.

The next morning NKP was alive with activity as the ground crews armed the aircraft and helicopters for another try at WITCH DOCTOR. Before we got to the point of "Start engines!", we were informed that WITCH DOCTOR, his crew and passengers, were safe and sound. They'd been rescued by an ARVN M48 tank that had been part of the original Lam Son 713 effort - which is what should have been used for the rescue effort in the first place.

Major Frank Murray
1st Special Operations Squadron
Nakhon Phanom, March 1971

5 MAR 71

WITCH DOCTOR 05

DOWNED ON WITCH DOCTOR SAR:

5 MAR 71 DOWNED SANDY

5 MAR 71 DOWNED USMC A-1

RESCUED 5 MAR 71

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WITCHDOCTOR 05 SEARCH AND RECOVERY (SANDY 04)

(C) Search and Recovery forces waged a fierce two day war in an effort to rescue seven United States Army personnel who survived the crash of Witchdoctor 05, a helicopter supporting a major invasion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in Laos. The helicopter had received battle damage and made a controlled crash landing in an extremely contested area at 263/46 from Tacan Channel 103 located at Quang Tri Air Base, Republic of Vietnam. All seven survivors egressed from the aircraft uninjured and took cover in a bomb crater to wait for assistance. They survived enemy assaults for two days and three nights while they helped to direct air strikes on gun emplacements and enemy personnel. They were finally rescued on the third day by army ground forces of an undisclosed nationality.¹⁶¹

(C) An untold number of aircraft participated in the effort and several pick up attempts were prevented by the intense enemy resistance. The enemy continually hammered away at all aircraft with small arms, automatic weapons, anti-aircraft equipment and rockets. Resistance became particularly intense each time a helicopter was brought in and on one occasion the pilot of a US Army helicopter was shot in the face but was able to escape safely. During the effort six A-1 aircraft received battle damage. One of them caught fire and exploded in the air and another was forced to make a gear up landing at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB.¹⁶²

161. SARCO Report for Witchdoctor 05, Document #1.

162. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) The survivors were down in well defended enemy territory in an area of rolling hills with sparse to heavy vegetation. Several trails, many bunkers and a multitude of bomb craters could be observed in their vicinity. They were completely surrounded by enemy forces and the only known friendly ground forces were located approximately four miles to the southeast. Ground fire was coming from positions very near the survivors and it was necessary to attack the very proximity of the bomb crater which protected them. On one occasion an F-4 missed his target and discharged napalm on the objective position. None of the survivors were injured but it was necessary to vacate the area temporarily due to fires started by the napalm. On another occasion a B-52 strike dropped bombs and one A-1 pilot said some of the bombs landed within 50 meters of the survivors.¹⁶³

(C) On the second day of the effort Sandy 01/02 were busy striking enemy positions when Sandy 01 detected hydraulic fumes in his cockpit. He decided to return home and enroute the aileron boost quit. A short while later he tried to open the canopy but there was insufficient hydraulic pressure. He was successful in jettisoning the canopy by using the emergency air bottle. Approximately 25 miles from the base he ran out of oxygen and was forced to sit with his face near the slip stream to breath and avoid the fumes. The loss of hydraulics prevented

163. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sandy 01 from lowering his main landing gear although his tail gear did come down successfully. Emergency gear extraction procedures failed and it was necessary for Sandy 01 to land gear up. The runway was prepared and emergency forces stood by while Sandy 01 put his tail hook down and performed a gear up approach and successfully engaged the runway barrier. The emergency landing was accomplished without further incident and the pilot walked away uninjured.¹⁶⁴

(C) Later that morning at approximately 0755L Sandy 04 was making passes to position smoke rockets when he was hit by ground fire. His left wing caught fire, he jettisoned his ordnance and took up an easterly heading. He was able to ride the burning aircraft to a safer area prior to ejecting. Sandy 04 parachuted safely to the ground seconds before the aircraft exploded. A rescue helicopter, Jolly Green 71, observed the entire incident and followed Sandy 04's parachute to the ground. He went into a hover over the pilot, dropped a jungle penetrator and immediately picked up the survivor. The Jolly Green was able to egress safely although the helicopter had received ground fire throughout the procedure. The safe recovery of Sandy 04 was the result of immediate and decisive action taken by Jolly Green 71. The pilot was rescued before the enemy could determine his position and move defenses into the area. The other four A-1's which received battle damage landed with further incident.¹⁶⁵

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(C) At 1615L on the second day of the SAR, the US Army stated that they were taking charge of the rescue and the Air Force portion of the effort was terminated. During that night a heavy mortar barrage was executed in the area around the survivors and on the morning of 7 March 1971 an armored column of undisclosed size moved in and safely rescued the seven survivors. Two days of sustained air attacks and the heavy mortar barrage on the previous night made it possible for the ground rescue forces to complete the rescue with relatively light resistance.¹⁶⁶

166. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A last-light run-in was attempted but was aborted when both helicopters took hits from heavy small arms fire. One Pararescue man was wounded in this attempt. A first-light effort on 2 January resulted in a successful rescue of both crewmembers.

(S) BIGOT 02: On 3 February, two crewmembers of an F-4D bailed out of Bankari² Pass near the NVN border. 40th ARRS Jolly Greens were scrambled from both Nakhon Phanom Airfield³ and Ubon RTAFB⁴. Low ceilings precluded any attempt that day. A maximum effort SAR was planned on the 4th with 8 Jolly Greens in place at NKP for a first-light effort. HH-53 BUFFs were on continuous airborne orbit from pre-dawn to darkness on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of February. Continued low ceilings and bad weather conditions in the area precluded any rescue attempts. After all radio contact was lost with the survivors at noon on the 6th, and no weather improvement forecast, the active participation of the 40th ARRS ceased. The force of tired and disappointed crews were returned to Udorn that night.

(S) DUDLEY 02: On 16 February, two crewmembers of an F-D bailed out in eastern Laos. Two Jolly Greens scrambled and both crewmembers were rescued less than two hours after bailout.

(S) WITCHDOCTOR 05: On 5 March, an Army UH-1 helicopter was shot down in eastern Laos with 7 people on board. A last-light run-in was attempted but intensive AAA and small arms fire precluded any rescues. The survivors were rescued by a U.S. Army ground team on 7 March.

GROUP 4
During 1971, the 40th ARRS
was active in Laos
and Thailand.

The aircraft commander of Jolly Green 72 who made the pick-up was Captain David H. Wammer.

The month of March started off with a Medevac from Con Son Island to Long Binh hospital. On 2 March 71 the Jollys at our FOL were notified that a Vietnamese Seaman was very ill at Con Son. Jolly Greens 73 and 66 were dispatched to the island for the evacuation. The mission was completed without incident. The aircraft commander of the Jolly Green making the evacuation was Captain Karlton I. Bakke.

On 6 March 71 Jolly Greens 71 and 64 were holding west of Channel 103 in preparation for an attempted pickup of seven survivors of an Army helicopter which was shot down. One of the Sandy aircraft preparing the area was hit by ground fire and the pilot was forced to bail out. Jolly Green 71, flown by Major Mudd, observed the bailout and immediately recovered the pilot. Other Jolly Greens from the 37 ARRS took over the Witchdoctor mission but all attempts to rescue the seven survivors by helicopter were unsuccessful due to hostile fire. A ground team did recover the seven men the next day.

On 13 March 71 the 37 ARRS had a most eventful but unsuccessful day. A Navy A-7, call sign Battle Cry 315, was shot down at a position 225 degrees for 50 miles from Channel 103. The pilot of the A-7 had ejected and was injured. Voice contact was established with the survivor and the SAR was initiated. Jolly Greens 64 and 73 departed Channel 77 for the area. Sandy aircraft began working the area and small arms fire was observed.

At 0520Z the first attempt was made. Jolly Green 64, flown by Lt Col Brown, came to a hover near the survivor but was driven off by intense ground fire. After evaluating the condition of his aircraft and crew, Lt Col Brown elected to make another attempt. On this try, again intense small arms fire was encountered and the copilot, Major Frank J. Pehr, was severely wounded in the left leg. A pararescueman had received a minor wound on the first attempt. At this point Jolly Green 64 had to depart the scene to get Major Pehr to a hospital. Jolly Greens 71 and 67 replaced them on scene and at 0853Z another attempt was initiated. Again heavy small arms fire was encountered and minor flesh wounds were received by three of the crewmembers. Jolly Green 71, commanded by Major Donald L. Jensen, was forced to RTB to Channel 103. Jolly Greens 71 and 67 were then replaced by Jolly Greens 73 and 70. When they arrived at the scene it was getting dark and it was decided to make one last rescue attempt before complete darkness. At 1100Z JG 71, flown by Lt Col Copperthite, made a run into the area. As the helicopter started to slow down, intense small arms fire was encountered. Jolly Green 71 was forced to leave the area on one engine and with two wounded crewmembers. All SAR efforts for Battle Cry 315 were terminated. The pilot had not been heard from for several hours and he is listed as missing in action. Major Frank Pehr was the most seriously wounded on the Battle Cry 315 mission. He was hospitalized on the hospital ship Sanctuary for approximately two weeks and then air evacuated to the CONUS.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE SILVER STAR

TO

MICHAEL A. CURTIS

Airman First Class Michael A. Curtis distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force near Tchepone, Laos, on 13 March 1971. On that date, Airman Curtis was a Pararescue Specialist on an HH-53 Rescue Helicopter that twice attempted the rescue of a wounded United States Navy pilot from certain death or capture by hostile armed forces. With full knowledge of the extent of hostile fire in the area, and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, Airman Curtis continued to expose himself manning his gun position after being wounded, until withering ground fire crippled the helicopter and wounded another crew member, making continued rescue attempts impossible. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Airman Curtis has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

37 ARBSQ HISTORY, 1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1971

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #12

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF
THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

JAMES D. SCOTT

Master Sergeant James D. Scott distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as a Pararescue Technician on an NH-53 Rescue Helicopter, near Tchepone, Laos, on 13 March 1971. On that date, Sergeant Scott attempted the rescue of a wounded United States Navy pilot from certain death or capture by hostile armed forces. With full knowledge that two other helicopters had been driven off by ground fire, and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, Sergeant Scott continued to expose himself manning his gun position after being wounded, until withering ground fire crippled the helicopter and wounded another crew member, making continued rescue attempts impossible. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Scott reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE SILVER STAR

TO

STEVEN C. RHODY

Airman First Class Steven C. Rhody distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force near Tchepone, Laos, on 13 March 1971. On that date, Airman Rhody was a Pararescue Specialist on an HH-53 Rescue Helicopter that twice attempted the rescue of a wounded United States Navy pilot from certain death or capture by hostile armed forces. With full knowledge of the extent of hostile fire in the area, and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, Airman Rhody twice exposed himself on the rescue hoist outside the door of the helicopter to descend to help the wounded survivor on the ground, until withering ground fire crippled the helicopter and wounded two crew members, making continued rescue attempts impossible. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Airman Rhody has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

(S) BATTLE CRY 315: On 13 March, an A-7 pilot ejected in the Lam Song 719⁵ area. Two Jolly Greens were scrambled and went to an orbit area near the survivor. It was decided to use the Jolly Greens from the 37th ARRS, also in the orbit area, for the attempted run-in. There was no further participation by the 40th ARRS in this mission.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BATTLE CRY 315 SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) Sandy 04 heard the pilot of Battle Cry 315 say "Come and get me! Come and get me! They are coming!" It was the last known transmission from the pilot who bailed out of his damaged A-7 aircraft and landed in a hostile area west of Delta 12, a key interdiction point on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The exact position was 225/50 from Tacan Channel 103 (Quang Tri Air Base, RVN) and about two kilometers from the nearest route structure. The survivor's parachute was located hanging from a tree in an otherwise relatively open field. The survivor was a short distance south of his parachute and requested a quick pick up because he had suffered a broken leg, a broken arm and was afraid he was going to lose consciousness as a result of the pain.¹⁶⁷

(C) The SAR was initiated at 1030L. Two A-1's and two Jolly Green helicopters were immediately launched from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB while two additional A-1's and two other Jolly Greens were being launched from DaNang Air Base, RVN. Sandy 03/04 arrived at the scene and was briefed by Nail 34, a FAC who had already located the survivors position. Sandy 03 took charge as On-Scene Commander and immediately started trolling for ground fire. Several passes were made without resistance and the area appeared to be permissive. Due to the serious condition of the

167. SARCO Report, Battle Cry 315, 21 Mar 71, Document #9.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

survivor, Sandy 03 decided to attempt a pick up as soon as possible. His plan was executed and Jolly Green 64 received 23 millimeter ground fire during the approach phase and intense small arms ground fire from all quadrants when he attempted to hover. The pick up was aborted and Jolly Green 64 insisted on making another effort. This attempt was driven off also by small arms fire and two crewmembers of the helicopter were wounded. 168

(C) It was apparent that the SAR forces were up against experienced and disciplined resistance since the enemy refused to fire at the A-1's and waited each time to ambush the slow moving helicopter. Sandy 03 decided to sterilize the area and fast movers were called in to assist. Several offensive passes were made and during this time Battle Cry 315 could be seen lying face down and motionless in the open field. Sandy 03/04 continued to expend ordnance until they were low on fuel and then turned On-Scene Command over to Sandy 01 who arrived at 1510L. Once again the area appeared permissive and Sandy 01 planned another pick up attempt. This time a smoke screen was put down south of the objective area but it was somewhat ineffective. Jolly Green 71 came in and hovered over the objective position but did not see Battle Cry 315. After hovering for approximately two minutes the helicopter started receiving intense small arms fire. Jolly Green was forced to exit back to the Initial Point with a wounded crewmember. More ordnance was requested and at 1730L Sandy 09/10

168. Ibid.

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arrived to replace Sandy 01/02 who were running low on fuel.¹⁶⁹

(C) Darkness was approaching so Sandy 09 called all forces in for a last light attempt. Additional strikes were accomplished by the remaining fast mover resources. Smoke screens were put down but were not completely effective due to the strong winds. Jolly Green 73 was called in for the pick up and was met by heavy ground fire as he approached the objective area. The ground fire was coming from all quadrants and the helicopter was forced to depart with two wounded crewmembers. The day's effort was terminated because of darkness and overwhelming resistance.¹⁷⁰

(C) All SAR forces were in general agreement that the existence of an objective was doubtful. Battle Cry 315 had not transmitted since 1230L and had last been seen by Sandy 03 prior to 1500L. His inability to move and the close proximity of many enemy forces denied him an opportunity to escape or evade. It was decided that the SAR forces would maintain normal alert the following day. Nail FAC's would monitor Battle Cry 315's position throughout the night and Nail 34 would make a visual check for him the following morning. This was accomplished with negative results and the unsuccessful Search and Recovery for Battle Cry 315 was terminated at 1854L on 7 March 1971.¹⁷¹

169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 13 Mar 71

19 Mar 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-009-13 Mar 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 24

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Battlecry 315

LOCATION: 225/50/103 UTM XC 6591

SAVES: None

(S) At approximately 0315Z, 13 Mar 71, K 24 was notified by a Covey 215 that Hillsboro had reported a Battlecry aircraft down at 225/50/103. Nail 34 was on scene and had reported a good chute. K 24 had been working the Blade 71 mission in the Dalat area was unable to talk directly to Hillsboro or Nail 34. At 0320Z Hillsboro reported Nail 34 was in contact with the survivor, Battlecry 307. This call sign was later changed to Battlecry 317 and finally confirmed as Battlecry 315. K24, working through Covey 215 to Hillsboro and to Nail 34 designated Nail 34 the On-Scene-Commander and requested SAR forces be launched from Channel 77. At approximately 0334Z, Nail 34 requested CHU 24/29, Nape and Paveways. Weather in SAR area was reported as 4/8 broken and workable for PW's, by Nail 34. This information was passed to Queen and K-24 was informed that Jack was controlling the mission. K 24 requested a MIRCAP, Border Clearances, Iron Hand, and Sandy's from Channel 89 and 93. At 0342Z, K 24 requested Chop be uploaded and be put on standby at Channel 89. At 0347Z Jack confirmed Sandy's 9 and 10, JO 64/73 would launch from Channel 89. At 0358Z Nail 34 talked with survivor and relayed that he had a broken arm and leg. He was located in a small valley, elevation 1400 feet. Primary frequencies established, Nail 34 working Fast Movers on Hillsboro's Lim, SAR discrete 340.8 (Pumper), SAR forces on 123.1/38.9. Fast Mover holding point established 275/95/77, Slow Mover holding point 275/40/77. ETA for SAR area for SAR Forces, (CH 77 Sandy 9/10 JO 64) 0445Z; (CH 89, Sandy 03/04, JO 60/62) 0455Z. At 0440Z Nail 34 reported no ground fire observed and requested location for a possible pickup attempt. Sandy 09 could not be contacted on WHF. Sandy 03 was briefed by Nail 34 and was designated CUS at 0505Z. The survivor was contacted on Gaird and indicated he thought he might pass out shortly. Sandy 03 briefed SAR Forces on 36.0(FM) and 123.1 (WHF) and phase Alpha commenced, at 0547Z. Phase Alpha was discontinued at 0548Z because of intense ground fire. The survivor did not respond to radio calls. JO 64 took several hits and reported 2 crewmembers wounded. JO 64/73 RTB

to CH 103 with Sandy 9/10 as an escort. Nail 34 was replaced by Nail 64 and began to put in Fast Mover strikes. Smoke 41/42 was requested from CP 89 with Sandy 05/06. JO 71/67 requested from CH 77. Sandy 03 remained as OSC. Nail 64 requested Fast Movers with Nape and CBU. Sandy 03 was queried as to the requirement for additional Smoke and agreed to upload two more at CH 89 and hold for a later effort. Ringneck Flight was in the area with Smoke. Jack advised Sandy 01/02 would launch at 0800Z from CH 73. From 0600Z to 0715Z Nail 64 put Fast Mover strikes in area. At 0703Z Nail 64 requested additional Fast Movers with "Snake" and "Nape". At 0715Z K 26 was briefed and assumed ANC at 0723Z.

King 24 Crewmembers

Resources

AC/ANC	Major Soroka	Flying Eagle
CP	1 Lt Bedwell	Battlery
N	Major Host	Wolfpack 10/11
RO	TSgt Marts	Jury 302
FE	MSgt Gartman	Magic Stone 413
FE	TSgt Glasser	Chippy 02
LM	TSgt McPheters	Wolfpack 24
		Wolfpack 26
		Gunfighter 36
		Ringneck

Additional Resources

Sandy's 3, 4, 9, 10	JO 64/73, 60/62
PAC's Nail 34, 64	Tanker K 23

RONALD J. SOROKA, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 years interval
Declassified

Additional Comments:

1. Initial communications problems were encountered as K 24 was over 200 miles from the SAR scene. Radio contact could not be established with either Nail 34 or Hillsboro.
2. Sandy 09 had UHF problems and had to be worked on VHF and FM. This resulted in a slight delay in pickup attempt until Sandy 03 was briefed by Nail 34 and assumed O.C.
3. Fast Mover resources were sent directly to the strike frequencies instead of checking in with K 24 on the SAR discrete. Contact with Hillsboro could not be affected on the SAR discrete frequency. This caused much congestion on the primary SAR frequency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battle Cry 315, Sandy 09/10 Major Belt/Capt Taylor

The information reported herein comprises a chronological sequence of events actions relating to the participation of Sandy's 09/10 in the SAR effort for Battlecry 315 on 13 Mar 71. Two flights were flown by these Sandy's while operating out of Channel 77. First word was received from Queen at approximately 03:30Z directing a scramble. After engine start, and prior to taxi, a check with Queen, as requested by Da Nang Ground Control, brought word to cancel the scramble. Queen gave the reason as "the SAR has been taken from our control" or words to that effect. Approximately fifteen minutes later a second scramble order was received and the aircraft launched at 04:05Z and proceeded to rendezvous with Jolly Green's 64/73 as directed. This was accomplished at approximately 04:50Z.

At this time King 24 requested that Sandy 09/10 proceed to the survivors position to relieve Nail 34, the on scene commander. Sandy's 3 and 4 arrived at about the same time as 9 and 10, however, they had already begun their briefing with the Nail. Contact with the survivor was good. See Note One. Sandy's 9 and 10 then proceeded back to rejoin with Jolly Green's 64 and 73. Before reaching the Jolly's Sandy 3 requested that Sandy 9 return to the SAR area in preparation for a pickup attempt. This was done with the survivors position noted, the ingress route established and marked. Sandy 10, who was with the Jolly's, was requested to bring Jolly Green 64 into the Sar area. A road passing near the survivors position was between the holding area and the IP which required the Jolly to cross the SAR area at altitude, then descend in a clear area west of the IP. Upon crossing trail, a 23mm fired at the Jolly who was then directed to remain high and proceed to a holding point over a cloud deck a short distance west of the IP. The situation was then reassessed and a fast mover flight began striking the area of the 23mm and the pickup attempt continued.

Jolly Green 64 arrived over the survivor without incident, but was driven off by small arms fire originating in the immediate vicinity of the survivor. He elected a second attempt only to be driven off again, this time with battle damage and two casualties. Sandy's 9 and 10 escorted Jolly Green's 64 and 73 to the vicinity of Channel 103. At this time, King requested the Sandy's intentions. (Sandy's 9 and 10) He was informed the plan was to RTB to Channel 89. King requested that Sandy's 9 and 10 RTB to Channel 77 and execute a quick turnaround. This was accomplished, however, it was discovered that Sandy 10 had sustained minor battle damage. The aircraft was still airworthy.

K. C. BELT, Major, USAF
Sandy 09

Atch 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battle Cry 315, Sandy 01/02 Lt Col Dunwoody/Capt Lorenzen

Sandy 01/02 were alerted for a possible SAR while on alert at Ubon. Following a series of phone calls Sandy 01/02 were scrambled at 1340 local and were airborne at 1400 local. King was contacted enroute and briefed that Sandy 03/04 were on scene with Nail 64. Sandy 04 briefed us that the survivor was injured and no voice or beeper contact had been made for 1 hour and that his body was 15' south of the chute. Due to lack of fuel Sandy 03/04 RTB'd. At this time two sets of Jolly Greens were holding - Jolly Green 71 flight east of the survivor and Jolly Green 60 west. Sandy 09/10 had RTB'd to Da Nang to refuel and Smoke 41 flight was holding with Jolly Green 60 flight. We arrived on scene at 1445 and finally located Nail 64 who was working fast movers with Snake, Nape, and hard bombs. Sandy 01 took on scene command at approximately 1510 local and Nail 64 pointed out the chute. On numerous low level passes Sandy 01/02 could not visually see the survivor. Sandy 01 put down two M-47 WP duds for IP and "too far" marks and then proceeded to sprinkle CBU-25, 7.62 minigun and 20mm east and west of the survivor and trolled for reaction. No ground fire observed at this time. Sandy 01 then briefed Nail 64 to continue to work the area with fast movers. At 1600 local Sandy 01/02 went back to trolling with no ground fire observed again. At 1615 local Sandy 01 called for Jolly's 60 to come to final IP along with smoke aircraft. Since they were refueling, Sandy 01 briefed Jollys 71/73 to expedite to IP since they were now west and available. They had scurried across the trail to the east unknown to King or low Sandys. Sandy 02 picked up Jolly 71 flight and held them at the IP at 8,000 feet. The Smokes had trouble finding the scene but ultimately arrived at the IP after help from Nail 64 and Sandy 02. Nail 64 then RTB'd for lack of fuel and was replaced by Nail 12.

Sar. 05/06 along with Jolly 71/73, smoke 41,42, and Sandy 02, were now all in position at the IP. Sandy 01 then had Smoke birds come in for the Smoke brief and were shown the survivor location. Sandy 05/06/02 stayed at IP-Sandy 05 was already familiar with the area and remarked that he needed no brief. At 1630 local Sandy 01 brought all forces to guard frequency and after a small delay finally got Jolly Green 71 to check in. At 1635 local Sandy 01 ordered Smoke 41 flight to execute and Jolly Green 71 to follow in one minute. The Smoke pattern was laid south of the survivor on a straight line heading of 050 into the 060°/15 knot wind. The run was excellent with one small gap that Sandy 01 filled in with CBU-22 Smoke. Sandy 01 then pulled up over the survivor and told Jolly Green 71 to start slowing down and gave him GCA headings to the chute. The Jolly reached the area and Sandy 02, 05 and 06 were now in the Daisy Chain expending most ordnance to the 3 o'clock position. Sandy 01 dropped down and now joined the Daisy Chain. Jolly stayed in hover for 1-2 minutes but did not see the survivor. Jolly then took a volley of hits and egressed 180° to IP area. Sandy 02 noticed a small hit in the right wing and was checked over by Sandy 01 who also had unnoticed battle damage. Sandy 01 ordered more fast movers and briefed Nail 12 on the area to be hit. At 1715 local Sandy 09/10 arrived and were briefed by Sandy 01. Sandy 01/02 then expended remaining ordnance and took a few rounds of 23mm from the road southeast of the survivor. Sandy 01 suggested to Sandy 09 that use of Twiggy might be the answer and this was passed to King. At 1730 local CSC was passed to Sandy 09 and 01,02 RTB'd to Channel 89 both with minor battle damage. We landed at NKP at 1815 local.

RICHARD H. DUNWOODY, Lt Colonel, USAF
Sandy 01

Atch 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battle Cry 315, Smoke 41/42 Capt Stewart/Major Nicholson

Launched at 1325 and proceeded to 020/88/82 to orbit with Jolly Green 67/60. Orbited with them until they withdrew to the west for refueling. While Jolly Green 62/60 were refueling we maintained our orbit at the original position. When Sandy 01 stated that he would use 62/60 in an attempted pick up, we started west to escort them. In the meantime Jolly Green 71/67 had slipped across the trail and were picked for a pickup attempt. This put us far out of position to the west. We had trouble locating the IP due to poor terrain in both birds and the haze. After reaching the IP we were briefed by Sandy 01 on the situation and where he wanted the smoke. We layed the smoke and were told to hold to the west. As we were proceeding back to the IP Sandy 01 ask us to put 20mm along the road to the east which we did. After Jolly Green 71 was shot off we RTB'd to 89 due to fuel.

JOHN W. STEWART, Capt, USAF
Smoke 41

Atch 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battle Cry 315, Sandy 05/06 Capt Smith/Col Weber

Sandy 05/06 launched from NKP at 1415 Local on 13 Mar 71. As we were enroute King 26 advised us that Sandy 01/02 out of Ubon were ahead of us about 25 minutes and would be relieving Sandy 03/04 instead of us. We were instructed to go across the trail and join with Jolly Green 71/67, which we did. Sandy 01 was preparing for a pick up so we brought the Jollys across to the Forward Holding Point. (Jolly 60/62 were refueling at this time) The area was clear and we could see the SAR area from this point. After the briefing and smoke screen was laid, Sandy 02 led Jolly Green 71 in with myself and my wingman flying on either side of the Jolly laying down CBU. Approximately 30 seconds after starting the hover, the Jolly called that he was taking ground fire from very close and was pulling out. He said one PJ had been wounded slightly. We escorted them to Channel 103, then returned to escort Jollys 60/62 since no more Sandys were available. As we neared our Bingo fuel Smoke 43/44 assumed the Jolly escort and we went down and expended in the SAR area. We then RTB'd at approximately 1815.

While we were in the SAR area I saw no gun fire. When the Jolly was in the hover, I saw the survivor's parachute but I did not see the survivor. I did not see the fire the Jolly was taking and he pulled out at the same time he called it. I did not hear him call the direction from which he was taking fire.

King 26 was using VHF 123.1 to brief the other King birds and it interrupted the communications between the Sandys considerably.

MICHAEL W. SMITH, Capt, USAF
Sandy 05

Atch 7

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S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battlecry 315: Sandy 89/10 Maj Belt/Capt Taylor

At approximately 09:00Z Queen directed Sandy 9/10 to again launch and proceed directly to the SAR area. Upon arriving on scene Sandy 1, the on-scene-commander, commenced briefing Sandy 9 in preparation for assuming command. This was delayed for approximately 10 minutes while Nail 12 directed a fast mover strike in the area of the survivor. The position of the survivor was confirmed by Sandy 9, since he had already been in the area, and command was passed at approximately 1030Z. There was no contact with the survivor at this time. (See Note One)

While trolling the area for ground fire a 23mm came up just SE of the survivors position. Nail 12, who had an idea where the gun was located, was requested to put a fast mover strike on the position. This was accomplished, but required a lot of time which was fast running out due to approaching darkness.

Twiggy had been requested by Sandy 1 and was on station, however, they required refueling by 1050Z. Since they couldn't work in the area while the strike against the 23mm was underway, they were directed to proceed with the refueling. The strike was completed at approximately 1055Z.

Meanwhile, Sandy's 5 & 6, who were escorting the Jolly's, had reached their bingo time. They were brought in to work the area around the survivor. Sandy 10 was directed to bring the Jolly Low into the SAR area. King was requested to expedite the arrival of the Twiggy since darkness was rapidly covering the area. Smoke 41 was also directed to proceed to the SAR area. When the preparation of the area around the survivor was terminated, trolling began again. No fire was received.

King then advised that the Twiggy birds were still on the tanker. Also, the Smoke aircraft arrived in the SAR area, so Chop was elected instead. Chop was then employed, but was not effective. (See Note Two)

Smoke was then employed forming a corridor for the approach of Jolly Green 73 to the survivor from the SW, however, by the time Jolly Green 73 arrived, which was excessive for some unknown reason, the smoke had moved clear of the survivors position and darkness had practically obscured the terrain. Jolly Green 73 was asked if he thought a hover was possible. His reply was he would know that after he reached a lower altitude. He was directed to immediately depart the area at the first indication of ground fire. (This was deemed appropriate due to the failure of the smoke and Chop)

Since the corridor was obliterated with smoke, Jolly Green 73 was brought in on the side of the smoke and turned into the survivors position. (The fires started by the WP bombs generated some smoke, but the bulk of the WP smoke had blown clear of the survivors position) Immediately upon arriving over the survivor the area between 20 to 30 meters from the survivor forming an arc of approximately 270 degrees exploded with automatic weapons firing tracers. Jolly Green 73 exited the area with one engine out and two casualties on board. The SAR effort for the day was terminated and Sandy's 9 & 10 escorted the Jolly's to a point 35 miles out of Channel 77, then RTB'd to Channel 89.

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NOTE: Between 0500Z and 0530Z the survivor was heard on several occasions to ask that the recovery be expedited, that he didn't know how much longer he could remain conscious. He was asked to maintain radio silence until further advised, but to come-up beeper if movement was detected in his area. Not long thereafter, he transmitted several times, which were unreadable, followed by the statement, "Oh God No". This was immediately followed by a short series of beepers. No further contact. The exact time of these transmissions is unknown by Sandy 9, however, they occurred prior to the first pick-up attempt.

NOTE TWO: There were several factors which rendered the Chop ineffective. First, the wind was high, estimated in the area of 15-20 Kts. Two, only one of the aircraft dispensed Chop, the other bombed the containers off. Three, the Chop dispensed was too high and appeared incomplete, i.e. partially expended. The result was that the enemy in the immediate area of the survivor was not subjected to the effects of Chop.

K. C. BEIT, Major, USAF
Sandy 09

Atch 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
STATEMENT

SAR for Battle Cry 315 Smoke 43/44/Lt Anderson /Major Arnold

Smoke 43/44 launched from Channel 89 at 1655L for a last light effort. We arrived on the scene at 1735, at which time we relieved Sandy 05/06 and orbited with Jolly 60/62. Shortly thereafter one of the Jollies had a fire light and had to shut down an engine. They RTE'd and left the primary responsibilities to the Da Nang Jollies. At approximately 1805 we went down to execute both our Chop and the Smoke. Sandy 09 showed us where he wanted the ordnance and we proceeded to expend. Due to an aircraft malfunction Smoke 43's CBU-30's bombed off. (NOTE) CBU 30 makes a beautiful explosion when it hits the ground. Smoke 44 did a beautiful job however and put his Chop right on target. I doubt that the Chop had any effect due to an approximate 20 kt wind. After the Chop was expended Sandy 09 wanted the Smoke. We set up two parallel smoke screens running north east to south west with the survivor in the middle. The Jollies executed about 5 minutes after the screen was laid and due to the darkness the smokes held high and stayed out of everyone's way. As the Jolly came to a hover over the survivor what appeared to be three 12.7's or possibly ZPU's opened up on the Jolly. All of the guns were extremely close to where the survivor was supposed to be. Due to the darkness and my distance away I cannot estimate accurately how close they were. With 20/20 hind sight I can say that we shouldn't have even tried but at the time we all felt that we had to make one more attempt. The fact that the first set of Jollies had to go home set us back a little in that it took a pretty long time to get the other Jollies in the area.

The one problem that has really set us back is our inability to get A-1's and slowmover strikes to effectively sanitize the area around the survivor. I think maybe we should develop some ideas on how we could handle this problem.

RALPH P. ANDERSON, 1LT, USAF
Smoke 43

CARROL B. ARNOLD, Major, USAF
Smoke 44

Atch 9

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: LSOS(CC)

21 Mar 71

SUBJECT: SARCO Report, Battle Cry 315

TO: DO

1. An unsuccessful rescue effort was conducted on 13 March 71 for the pilot of Battle Cry 315. The aircraft, an A-7 from the USS Ranger, went down at approximately 1015L 13 Mar on the 225° radial for 50NM of Channel 103. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue attempts. All times are Thailand local. Sequence of events shown in attachment 1.
2. At 1030L, 13 Mar 71, a SAR was declared for Battle Cry 315. The aircraft was downed in the Lam Song 719 area west of D-12, a parachute had been observed and radio contact had been established with the survivor. The area was known to be hostile but had not been reported as being active in the past few days. The survivor was on the side of a 1400' hill in a valley and was lying in an open area.
3. At the time the SAR was declared JACK scrambled Sandys 03/04 and Jolly Greens 60/62 from NKP as well as Sandys 09/10 and Jolly Greens 64/73 from Da Nang. These were the initial forces participating. A total of 18 sorties were launched prior to termination. (Atch 2)
4. Sandy 03 was the first A-1 on-scene commander, taking over at approximately 1205L after being briefed by King and Nail 34. The position of the survivor was pinpointed in an open field 10 feet down from his chute which was hanging in a tree. Radio contact with the survivor had established he had suffered a broken arm and leg in the ejection and was in poor condition. In addition he could hear no movement around him. Sandy 03 and 04 made repeated trolling passes at tree top level during which no ground fire was detected. Nail 34 had been putting in fast mover strikes against known 23mm positions. The survivor then came up voice indicating unfriendlies were approaching after which a beeper came on for approximately 10 seconds. This was at approximately 1230L and was the last transmission received from the survivor. Due to the survivors condition, this last transmission and the fact no ground fire had been received while trolling it was decided to attempt a pickup. The on-scene commander elected to use Jolly Green 60-62, holding to the west, but was countermanded when Jolly Green 64 informed King he was going to make the pick up as the survivor was in his geographical area of responsibility. King agreed. As a result Jolly Greens 64/73 came across the trail at a different spot and lower than briefed by Sandy 03 and got hosed by a 23mm. (Atch 3) When the Jolly Greens got in position with Sandys 09/10 phase "B" was initiated. Jolly Green 64 made the run-in, sighted the chute and then the survivor. As 64 went into the hover and prepared to lower the PJ intense small arms ground fire was experienced from all quadrants. 64 did not call the direction of any fire until he had exited the immediate area so the Sandys were unable to pinpoint any source. Jolly Green 64 stated he wanted to make another attempt. This was done only to be driven off again with 2 wounded crewmembers. Jolly Greens 64/73 then

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PROJECT GORDON HARVEST
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DO NOT DESTROY
No. 0251767 D-9

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RTB'd Channel 103 with Sandys 09/10 escorting. (ATCH 4) Sandy 03 then directed Nail 47 to use fast mover strikes against the possible troop positions and requested King to have replacement Sandys launched. Again repeated trolling passes were made expending CBU but the enemy could not be intimidated. During these passes the survivor was seen to be laying face down and motionless in the open completely without cover from the surrounding treelines. Sandy 03 then briefed Nail 34 on the situation and RTB'd Channel 93 due low fuel. Enroute radio contact with Sandy 01 was established and the situation briefed. Sandy 01/02 arrived on scene and after briefing by Nail 34 assumed on scene command at approximately 1510L. (ATCH 5) 01/02 trolled the area for approximately one hour expending ordnance at irregular intervals but no ground fire was experienced. Fast mover strikes were being put in continually by Nail 34. At 1615L the decision was made to make a pick up attempt. At 1635L phase "B" was executed and smokes 41/42 dropped their M-47 bombs to lay a straight line smoke screen south of the survivor. (ATCH 6) Sandys 06/05 brought Jolly Green 71 down the chute and all four sandys set up a daisy chain around him. 71 entered a hover over the survivors position but did not see him. 1 to 2 minutes after start of hover Jolly Green 71 started receiving heavy small arms fire and exited back to the IP with one casualty. (ATCH 7) More fastmovers were requested and Sandy 01 briefed Nail 12 on areas of ground fire. At 1730L Sandy 09/10 relieved 01/02. 01 had requested Twiggy through King. Trolling for ground fire was once again accomplished and this time a 23mm SE of the survivor opened up. Fastmover strikes were requested for this gun. Darkness was rapidly approaching so a last light effort was decided on. The Twiggy flight had arrived on station but were on the tanker when the fastmover strikes were completed. As the second Smoke flight had arrived it was decided to use Chop. (ATCH 8) All forces were brought into the area to prepare for a last attempt. After the last fastmover strikes were terminated the Sandys once again began trolling at tree top level and once again no ground fire was detected. The Smoke flight was then executed. On the first pass Chop was dispensed but was ineffective. One reason was high surface winds and another, the second aircraft "bombed off" the cannisters due an internal malfunction. On the second pass a smoke screen was put down for the approach of Jolly Green 73. (ATCH 9) The Jolly Green was delayed for some reason and by the time he arrived the surface winds had blown the smoke clear of the survivor and day light was almost completely gone. The Jolly Green pilot was asked if he thought a hover would be possible. His reply was that he would know after he had reached a lower altitude. The Jolly Green was then brought in to one side of the smoke and turned towards the survivor. Immediately upon arrival at the survivors position ground fire broke out from all quadrants concentrated on the Jolly Green. 73 exited the area with one engine shut down and two casualties. This terminated the days efforts and Sandys 09/10 escorted Jolly Green 73 to a short distance out of 73 and then RTB'd 89 with the remaining forces.

5. After debriefing all crews on scene, A-1's and FAC's, it became increasingly doubtful that we still had an objective. The survivor had not been heard from since 1230L nor had he been seen since Sandy 03 left the scene. In addition the last transmissions would indicate the survivor was about to be captured. The Groundfire was becoming increasingly heavy from immediately around the survivors position and had been reported coming from as close as 60 feet away. After passing all information to JACK/JOKER we were directed to generate the normal ground alert force for the next day. Nail FACs would be in the survivors area during the night and at first light Nail 34 would make a visual

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check of the area to see if we did have an objective. This was done the next morning with negative results. JOKER terminated the SAR for Battle Cry 315 at 141354L Mar 71.

6. Old problems continue to repeat themselves. King 26 was once again utilizing VHF 123.1 as a common frequency for such things as briefing other King aircraft and for air to ground communication. The Sandys reported this hampered their communications considerably. The Jolly Green's on one occasion interrupted a Sandy Low briefing King and arbitrarily changed the plan in regards to which Jolly Greens were to be used in an attempt. Without even consulting the on-scene commander as the validity of this change King acquiesced. It must be emphasized the Sandy was the on-scene commander, not the Jolly Green. The reason for the Sandys decision was borne out when the Jolly Greens crossed the trail at a lower altitude and at a different point than briefed by Sandy and were fired on by AAA. The Jolly Green's holding to the west did not have to cross any high threat areas to reach the survivor.

The ground fire pattern on this SAR shows that we were up against a highly disciplined force. The fact that they only fired once the Jolly Green arrived over the survivor proves this. Due to the proximity of the ground fire to the survivor it is felt that the only way we could have sanitized the area was with slow mover strike aircraft and saturate it with BLU-52. How the strong surface wind would have affected the latter can only be guessed at. The next time a pattern like this appears the area must be thoroughly "prepped" and sanitized. It is only by the grace of god that at least one helicopter wasn't lost on this day. We cannot be lulled by the lack of gunfire while trolling.

Once again the SARCO and JACK both had an extremely hard time extracting any information from King. In one instance Bingo times for Sandys 03/04 had been passed 2 hours in error which could have caused a premature launch of replacement Sandys. Took 35 minutes to resolve that one. JACK needed the information just as much as we did. On another occasion King changed RTB destination of Sandys 09/10. Jack passed this to us as being due to fuel. King had actually told them to go to Da Nang for a "quick turnaround" after 09 had said they were going to NKP. It had been requested that all A-1's RTB 89 due maintenance and armament considerations. Sandy 10 had minor battle damage.

On the first attempt the Jolly Green did not call ground fire until he was well clear of the survivor. If the Sandys are to be effective in gun suppression they need to know immediately when and where the fire is coming from. In addition the Sandys must expend something on each pass while in a daisy chain. Dry passes do not help the jolly.

WILLIAM J. HAGAN, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO Commander

9 Atch

1. SARCO LOG
2. FLYING SCHEDULE
3. STATEMENT SANDY 03/04
4. STATEMENT SANDY 09/10
5. STATEMENT SANDY 01/02
6. STATEMENT SMOKE 41/42
7. STATEMENT SANDY 05/06
8. STATEMENT SANDY 09/10
9. STATEMENT SMOKE 43/44

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13 MARCH 1971

- 1030L JACK called - SAR declared for Battle Cry 315, a Navy A-7, downed by ground fire 225/50/103. Good chute and have possible radio contact with survivor.
Launch Sandys 03/04 to "N" orbit along with Jolly Greens 60/62.
Generate 2 smokes.
- 1043L JACK - Launching Sandys 09/10 from Da Nang along with Jolly Greens 64/73. Nail 34 is over survivor and has voice contact.
- 1055L Sandys 04/03 airborne. No aircraft available for immediate up load as Smokes due BR Medevacs told same to JACK.
- 1105L Sandys 09/10 airborne from 77. ETA on scene 1135L.
- 1115L Nail 34 Bingo time 1230L.
- 1120L Major Smith, Heavy Hook, Hobos 20/21 diverted from PF to SAR and are on scene. Said can be used to attempt pick up when area is sanitized.
- 1130L Hobos 20/21 holding in area but not being utilized.
- 1135L King/Jack said to launch Chop, told them "no hab" (Reference 1055L entry). Earliest ETIC would be 1330L and that is just a WAG as both aircraft are out for maintenance.
- 1136L Bingo times received for airborne aircraft
- | | |
|---------------------|-------|
| Jolly Green's 60/62 | 1300L |
| Jolly Green's 64/73 | 1450L |
| SANDY'S 03/04 | 1300L |
| SANDY'S 09/10 | 1500L |
- 1142L Nail 34 on scene commander at 1035L.
- 1155L Survivor reported to have broken arm and leg. Requested Jack verify Sandy 03/04 Bingo time. Doesn't seem correct. If it is will have to scramble two more Sandy's ASAP.
- 1200L Nail 34 putting in fast mover strikes. No ground fire reported. Twiggy requested by someone on scene but is not available right now. Sandy 09 is having UHF problems, is bringing 03 flight down to replace him as OSC. Ringneck Smoke will be available in one hour.
- 1225L Have been trying for 25 minutes to get confirmation on Sandy 03/04 Bingo times. Cannot get information from King through Jack. King not talking.
- 1226L Phase "A" initiated. Sandy 03 OSC at 1205L.
- 1230L All forces pulling back due ground fire.
- 1235L Sandy 03/04 revised Bing time 1500L. Determine later what happened.

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1240L Phase "A"

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1250L All forces pulling back again due ground fire directed at Jolly Green 64. 64 was hit and sustained two casualties.

1300L Launch Smoke 41/42.

1325L Smokes 41/42 airborne. Directed to launch Sandys 05/06 to replace 09/10 as Jolly Green escort, "N" orbit. 09/10 RTB 1430 early for fuel. Cannot determine why. King will not pass any information. Had earlier requested all aircraft RTB 89 due maintenance/ordnance considerations.

1350L Sandy 05 needs maintenance on compass.

1400L Sandys 05/06 ready to start engines.

1410L Last contact with survivor reported as 1230L.

1415L Transmitted UMT coordinates to Jack. xc 645825. Received from Nail 34. Sandys 05/06 airborne.

1435L K. G. Belt, Sandy 09, called from Da Nang. Had escorted Jolly Green's with casualties back there. Was asked intentions by King and when he said RTB 89 as requested he was directed to land Da Nang and turnaround. Sandy 09/10 were not low on fuel as originally passed to Jack.

1442L Sandy 03/04 RTB 93 due fuel. ETA 1521L. Sandy 09/10 ETD 77 1600L.

1500L Sandy 07/08 being delayed at Bien Hoa to upload stub tanks. Had jettisoned them day before in another SAR.

1532L Sandy 01 on scene commander.

1536L Sandy 08, rough running engine, oil temp high, oil pressure low, RTB Bien Hoa.

1545L Smoke 43/44 cocked.

1625L Phase "A"

1630L Attempt aborted due ground fire directed at Jolly Green. Jolly Green 71 hit in windshield and one PJ injured. Source not sighted. Survivor not sighted.

1655L Smoke 43/44 airborne.
Sandy 09/10 airborne out of 77 at 1625.
Sandy 05/06 Bingo 1745L.

1720 Sandy 09 on scene commander. 01/02 RTB 89.

1825 Phase "B"

1835 Phase "B" terminated due ground fire directed at Jolly Green 73 who exited the area with one engine shut down and two casualties.

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1845 Darkness. All forces RTB'd. N. 3s will be overhead all night.

2100 Nail 34 will make visual check at first light to see if we have an objective.
Otherwise will be normal posture tomorrow.

4/1845L SAR terminated by Joker.

Atch 1

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FLYING SCHEDULE

13 Mar 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>ATD</u>	<u>ATF</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	<u>SANDY</u>			
DUNWOODY	01	1400	4.3	On Scene Commander
LORENZEN	02	1400	4.3	
LYON	03	1055	4.6	On Scene Commander
OBERLIN	04	1055	4.6	
SMITH	05	1415	4.8	
COL WEBER	06	1415	4.8	
SINGER	07	1510	.7	Sympathetic Abort
KILAND	08	1510	.8	Air Abort Rough Engine
BELT	09	1105	3.0	Da Nang - Da Nang
TAYLOR	10	1105	3.0	" "
	<u>SMOKE</u>			
STEWART/ YOUNGBLOOD	41	1325	4.0	
NICHOLSON	42	1325	4.0	
ANDERSON	43	1655	2.6	
ARNOLD/WISE	44	1655	2.7	
	<u>SANDY</u>			
LYON	03	1655	.8	RTB from Ubon
OBERLIN	04	1655	.8	" "
BELT	09	1625	3.4	On Scene Commander/DNG/NKP
TAYLOR	10	1625	3.4	" " " " "

Atch 2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
STATEMENT

Battle Cry 315, SAR

Sandy 03/04 Lt Lyon/Capt Oberlin

We were launched on the SAR at 1055 the morning of the 13th, on the way to the area King 24 gave us a complete rundown of who was on scene and what resources were immediately available. We had two Jolly Green's east of the route and two west, which later proved to be a mistake. All of the Jolly Green's should have been held to the west. Sandy 09/10 were escorting the Jollys and after arriving on scene and getting abriefing from Nail 34 I assumed on scene command. The downed pilot was in bad shape due to a broken arm and leg as well as feeling he was going to pass out. He was located about 2 kilometers from the nearest route in an open field. His chute was hung in a tree and he was 10 ft down the hill from his chute, to the best of our knowledge he was brought down by a 23mm gun on a strafing pass. When I got there Nail 34 was putting strikes in against the gun. After hearing the survivors condition and that no movement was around him, I decided the sooner we could make the pick up the better. With the Nail working strikes, I set to trolling the area which gave me negative results. I could get no ground fire from the survivors immediate area. After numerous passes Sandy 04 heard the survivor say "come and get me, come and get me, they are coming" and then a beeper. Battlecry 314 broke in and said the survivor was just nervous and wanted out. I believe the survivor was being pressed by the hostiles at the time because that was his last radio transmission. I decided to attempt a pick up at this point figuring maybe the survivor had passed out. I was going to use Jolly Green 60/62 being they were west of the route and wouldn't have to cross the road network east of the survivor. Jolly Green 64 then in no uncertain terms informed King he was the primary bird due to the geographical location of the survivor within Laos. King then said we were to use Jolly Green 64/73. I brought Sandy 09 in and showed him the exact location of the survivor and then sent him back to the helicopters. Sandy 04 placed a M-47 bomb safe on top of the karst east of the road and I placed one west of the survivor as an IP I then briefed the Sandys and Jollys I wanted them to start at the eastern M-47 and fly to the western one at 10,000 ft or above as they crossed the road. Upon reaching the IP they were to descend and head 065° to the survivor. A PJ was to be sent down to assist the survivor. Somewhere along the line the Jollys got too far south and low crossing the road and a 23mm gun opened up on them. We finally got things set up and executed the pick up phase. The Jolly found the chute and sighted the survivor. He had stopped in the hover when he received intense ground fire from all quadrants and pulled off. Jolly Green 64 then said he wanted to make another attempt so we tried again only to get the co-pilot and PJ shot up. I sent 09/10 and the Jolly to Channel 103 and started Nail 47 working fast mover strikes against the troop positions. We then requested more Sandy's be launched to replace us. We started trolling the area dropping CBU but no one would shoot at us. Somewhere during this time Sandy 03 took 4 hits but didn't know it until later. At this point I saw the survivor for the first time laying motionless just down from his chute. On 2 subsequent passes I observed him but he never moved. We then briefed Nail 64 on the whole area so he could brief Sandy 01 when he arrived on scene. We then RTB'd to Channel 93 for fuel. On the way home I gave Sandy 01 a complete briefing of what we had done.

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MISTAKES: First, I let King talk me into using the Jolly Green on the eastern side of the route thus making them a target as they crossed the road.

Second, the Jolly Green never called off ground fire until he was well clear of the survivor. We had no way of knowing where it was coming from or even that he was being shot at.

Third, when a daisy chain is formed, ordnance should be laid down everytime a Sandy makes a pass. Dry passes don't do the Jolly any good.

THOMAS J. LYON, 1LT, USAF
Sandy 03

WILLIAM C. OBERLIN, Capt, USAF
Sandy 04

Atch 3

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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 13 Mar 71

19 Mar 71

MISSION NUMBER: E--009-15 Mar 71

BT TREA-AL AIRCRAFT: Battlecry 315

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 26

LOCATION: 225/50/103 UTM XC 6591

SAVES: None

(S) King 26 departed Channel 71 at 0423Z and proceeded west of Channel 77 where mission, Battlecry 315 was in progress under the airborne control of King 24. Arrived on scene at 0552Z and initiated an orbit on the 270.20-60/77. He monitored SAR effort underway which involved a pickup attempt by Jolly Green's 64/73.

At 0602Z, received a Mayday call from Chance 19, an Army Helicopter, which was going down 2NM South of the Anvil, North of Khe Sanh. Contacted Passer 28 on Guard and designated the pilot CAC at 0607Z. At 0611Z, Passer 28 established communications with Lotus 20 and the latter aircraft effected the pickup of the 2 survivors at 0620Z. The survivors were airlifted to Khe Sanh. Loyal 12, 14 and 21 along with Passer 28 and his wingman maintained gunship cover of the area during the SAR.

Resumed orbit West of CH 77 at 0640Z and monitored the escort of JG 64 by JG 73 to CH 103. Assumed control of Battlecry mission 315 at 0715Z and received the following information from King 24:

- (a) FAC on scene was Nail 64
- (b) O.S.C. was Sandy 03
- (c) Position of survivors was 225/50/103 or UTM(XC 6591). He was located in a valley at the 1400 foot level just 10 feet south of his chute.
- (d) Condition of survivor included a broken arm and leg and he lay near unconsciousness (Moving very rarely).
- (e) Enemy disposition -- hostile gun fire encircled the survivors position with 23MMs, 37MMs and a suspected 57MM in the area.

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year interval
Declassified after 12 years.

[REDACTED]

(f) S.R Resources on scene: Sandy's 03 and 04 on scene and Jolly Green's 60 and 62 holding 020/80/82.

(g) Last communication with survivor occurred at 0525Z.

(h) Weather: 40-60 broken vis 10NM altimeter 29.95. At 0715Z, Sandy 03, OSC, made 3 passes over the downed airman and no movement was observed on the part of the survivor. Jack advised at 0718Z that Sandys 05 and 06 were airborne from CH 89 and their ETA to the SAR scene was 0745Z. Also, Sandys 01 and 02 were off CH 89 at 0721Z estimating the area at 0800Z.

Since Jolly Green 64 had received intense ground fire on the initial pickup attempt, Sandy 03 and Nail 64 put in additional Fast Mover strikes to sanitize the area. The pilot of Jolly Green had indicated that most of the ground fire directed at his aircraft had come from the Northeast and Northwest quadrants relative to the survivors' position. Further, he stated that he took fire from as close as 100 feet; therefore, air strikes were concentrated North of the survivors' position.

Sandy's 05 and 06 arrived on scene at 0745Z and were directed to rendezvous with Jolly Green's 71 and 57 which had taken off from CH 77 and were estimating 270/40/77 at 0730Z. Snakes 41 and 42 arrived at 020/80/82 at 0730Z and at 0804Z Jack advised that Twiggy was being uploaded. King 23 refueled JC's 60/62 at 0830Z. Sandy 01 assumed OSC at 0832Z and at 0844Z, Jack relayed that Cobras 9 and 10 were enroute with Twiggy. Sandy's 03 and 04 RPS CH 93 ETA 0821Z.

After studying the situation on the ground, Sandy 01 elected to put in more hard ordnance strikes to further soften up the area; Cobras 9 and 10 with Twiggy were sent home because the environment was thought to be pervasive.

At 0925Z, Jolly Greens 71 and 57 supported by Sandys 01, 02, 05 and 06, and Snakes 41 and 42 made a second rescue attempt. Again, the primary aircraft, this time, Jolly 71, received intense ground fire and had to withdraw with battle damage to CH 103. The copilot and a P.J. were wounded while hovering over the survivor site. The pilot indicated that he let down on the survivor facing to the South with his guns pointing to the North — the previous area of fire. Subsequently, ground fire erupted from the East and South as close as 200 feet. The fire appeared to be small arms and it originated from above the ridge lines to the East and South. The pilot concluded

SECRET

that from the I.P. in, his aircraft had taken only 1 round.

Jolly Green 71 was escorted to CH 103 by JG 67 and Sandys 05 and 06. ETA 1010Z. Smokes 41 and 42 RTE CH 89 ETA 0947Z.

After the second unsuccessful attempt, Sandy 01 and Mail 12, put in further air strikes to sanitize the area to the South and East. At 0937Z, Jack advised that Twiggy would be available again in 40 minutes. Launch occurred at 1018Z aboard Cobra 11 Flight.

Sandy's 09 and 10 and Smokes 43 and 44 arrived in the area at 1023Z; Sandy 09 assumed OSC and 01 and 02 RTE CH 89 ETA 1113Z. Jack advised at 1037Z that additional Sandy resources were not available. Sandys 05 and 06 arrived back on scene at 1050Z and were directed to hold hands with Jollys 60 and 62 holding 020/60/62. Requested additional slow mover aircraft from Hillsboro, but ABCCC could not produce needed resources. At 1055Z, Twiggy was over the scene aboard Cobra 11 but was held since softening action was still in progress.

At 1058Z, JG 62 had #1 fire warning light illuminate and #1 engine was shut down. Both 60 and 62 RTE CH 89 ETA 1235Z. At 1100Z, Cobra 11 Flight was refueled. Smokes 43 and 44 expended Chap in the survivor area at 1114Z and Sandy's 05 and 06 RTE CH 89 ETA 1150Z. At 1135Z, the scene was prepared for the final last light attempt. Cobra 11 Flight was just returning from the tanker and time was not available to use them before the last light effort. The thrust was spearheaded by Sandys 09 and 10 and Smokes 43 and 44 in support of JG's 73 and 79. Jolly 73 while approaching a hover over the survivor's position was driven off by fierce fire and the aircraft withdrew to CH 103 with #1 engine shot out. The pilot and a P.J. were injured in the attempt. The crew did not see the survivor nor his chute and indicated that the ground fire erupted from beneath the helicopter as it hovered approximately 60 feet from the survivors' position. Sandy's 09 and 10 escorted the stricken 73 and sister ship, 79, to 103; King 26 monitored the escort closely until landing was effected at 1220Z. Then, Sandy's 9 and 10 RTE CH 89 at 1215Z ETA 1245Z. Mail 12 RTE CH 89 at 1149Z ETA 1220Z. King 26 headed for CH 71 arriving at 1345Z.

As a final note, with the last light effort a failure, Sandy 9 and King 26 terminated the SAR for the day. King 26 requested Comm Cap during the night to maintain electronic surveillance.

SECRET
88

King 26 Crewmembers

AC/ANC Lt Col Spilseth
CP 1 Lt Lorens
N Major McDonald
RC MSgt Koehler
FE MSgt Keel
FE TSgt Fielder
LM MSgt Patterson

SAR Forces Utilized

Jolly Greens 60, 62, 71, 57, 73, 70
Sandy's 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10
Snakes 41, 42, 43, 44
King 23
King 26
PAC Utilized: Mail 64, 12

Strike Forces

Gunfighter 03
Falcon 81
Ringneck 95, 96
Camata 411
Garfish 501
Falcon 57

Wolfpack 26, 27
Wolfpack 38, 39
Gunfighter 60
Cobra 03
Chippy 412, 413

Sid Spilseth
SIDNEY M. SPILSETH, Lt Colonel, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

To: Bob Lapointe, rlapointe
From: Jim Scott, INTERNET:jdsconfig@jps.net
Date: 4/7/99, 1:58 PM
Re: Thanks for the reply

Thank you for the reply upon receiving that stuff. You don't have to return the clipping on Dave Rhody. Don't know where it came from I do have a copy. The reason I sent the original is it has a base team sports standing on the back and by looking at that you may be able to figure where it came from by the units mentioned.

I will go into a couple of other things that happened while I was there that you may be able to use. You can verify/get more info on these from Swerve ie dates etc.

A Navy aircraft had been shot down just South of Tchepone Laos where the trail crosses on the evening of 12 March 71. Swerve and I were on alert the next day on the high bird. Major Frank Pehr was the Co Pilot of the low bird Steve Rhody (Dave's son) was his #2PJ cant remember who the other PJ was. You could see the survivors parachute and he had been injured. Just as soon as they were in a hover with the #1PJ in the door on the penetrator all hell broke loose Major Pehr took a round through his thigh cutting the femoral artery. Col Brown the pilot started pulling out screaming for the Sandys to come and lead him out, but the Sandys had split to the four winds and no one came to his aid but us. I had never seen anything like that from the Sandys before nor did I ever seen them skip out again. Steve Rhody stuck his finger in the hole to help stop the blood flow. We took him back to Quang Tri where an Army dust off took him out to the Sanctuary (Hospital ship) we didn't know that they had closed the hospital at Quang Tri.

We went back to DaNang while another one of our 53s went in and got shot off. In the early afternoon the survivor had told the SAR forces not to try any more just Bump the hell out of him because he was just bait that they were set up around him and suckering the choppers in for an easy kill. Later in the afternoon the survivor screamed "OH MY GOD NO" and that was the last that was heard from him.

We had by now made it down to alpha 1 low and back we went. It was just dusky dark when they decided to send us in for a last ditch effort to try and get him. They briefed us that ann Al was going to drop some Blouic-52 and we should all wear our gas masks. I was the #1 PJ and told the pilot that I would stay on my gun until we were in a hover and not getting hammered. As we settled into a hover they pooped a flair above us and all hell broke loose. Henry Kirk on our high bird said it was beautiful to look at. All our mines sending solid streams of tracers and the bad guys sending all different colored tracers at us. I felt something hit my leg and about that same time the pilot Col Harry Coppenthorne said he had been hit and that we had an engine shot out and may be going in as we pulled off. I smelled fuel and there was smoke inside the fuselage. I looked back at Swerve and he was hammering away. The floor of the chopper was awash with some kind of liquid, the whole world was on fire and it reflected in the liquid running towards the ramp. We had smoke, fuel, and I expected next wake up dead. Thank god we were in a 53-B because no H-3 or B model would have had the power to come out. when the pilot was hit he called for the co-pilot but none of us could get him to respond. It turned out his intercom had been shot out. The pilot had been hit with shrapnel in both his arms and hands. I had it in my right leg call.

Our drop tanks had the foam in them so we kept them on for protection. they were full of holes. "the smell" the engine wiring had been shot out "the smoke" and our 5 gallon water can had been blown to heck "the fluid"

After we got to a safe altitude and back to SVN we started clearing all the weapons. Swerve and I were standing about half way to the ramp when Swerve took his CAR -27

Pulled back to bolt to eject to round in the chamber, let it go forward and then took out the magazine out. and pulled the trigger as we always did. Thank god the barrel was pointing towards the open ramp when it shot. The plane made a few sudden jerks then the pilot asked what was that. I said cook off sir. Get with swerve and have him go over this and see how his memory sees it that is if you can or want to use any of it. Please confirm about the Sandys with him. We had seven people wounded that day.

I'll send you some more stuff that is comical later.

Scotty

----- Internet Header -----
Sender: jdsdscott@jps.net
Received: from smtp5.jps.net (smtp5.jps.net [209.63.224.55])
by hpdmgaaa.compuserve.com (8.8.8/8.8.8/HP-1.1) with ESMTP id RAA22841
for <rlapointe@compuserve.com>; Wed, 7 Apr 1999 17:58:56 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from jps.net (209.142.48.60.stk.jps.net [209.142.48.60])
by smtp5.jps.net (8.8.8/8.8.8.5) with ESMTP id XAA12607
for <rlapointe@compuserve.com>; Wed, 7 Apr 1999 23:03:19 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <37C8D499.8261AF68@jps.net>
Date: Wed, 07 Apr 1999 14:56:41 -0700
From: Jim Scott <jdsdscott@jps.net>
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.04 [en] (Win95; U)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bob Lapointe <rlapointe@compuserve.com>
Subject: Thanks for the reply
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

39DO

22 Mar 71

Battlecry 315 Mission

3ARRGP/3JRCC (Lt Col Rudloff)

With reference to our tele-conversation on 20 Mar 71, the following is submitted in addition to my mission narrative. On 1 Mar 71, King 24 was working the search mission for Blade 71 in the Delta area. At approximately 0351Z King 24 was notified by a Covey FAC (215?) that Hillsboro reported A7 Battlecry aircraft was down at 250/50/103. Nail 34 was on scene and reported a good chute. Because of the distance involved (approximately 265 miles) King 24 could not establish radio contact with either Hillsboro or Nail 34. Shortly thereafter, approximately 0320Z, the Covey relayed from Hillsboro that Nail 34 had radio contact with the survivor. King 24 at that time directed Hillsboro via the Covey FAC to designate Nail 34 the OSC and requested Jack to launch the SAR Forces from CH 77. King 24 then requested a MICCAP, IRON HAND, Border Clearance and additional Sandy's from CH 89 and 93. At 0328Z, King 24 received information that the survivor was injured but conscious and that Nail 34 was requesting CBU 24/29, Nape and Paveways. The reported weather in the area was 4/8 coverage and workable for Paveways. King 24 continued north and did not have radio contact with Nail 34 until approximately 0400Z. Contact was established on Hillsboro's strike frequency (UHF). At 0408Z Jack passed an ETA for Sandy 9/10 as 0435Z. Nail 34 was putting in Fast Mover strikes at this time. At approximately 0415Z another Nail FAC (47?) was up on the strike frequency and advised he had two Hobo's, 20/21 and 2 CH-53's in the area. King 24 did not have radio contact with the Hobo's, but Nail 34 advised one of the Hobo's was SAR qualified. At 0415Z, King 24 was holding 270/20-50/77. JO 64/73 ETA for holding point was established at 0435Z. Sandy 03/04 ETA was 0455Z with JO 60/62. At approximately 0434Z Nail 34 talked with the survivor and reported he was hurt but calm. He then asked King 24 where the Sandy's were. I advised him that I would get Sandy 09 up on UHF for briefing as I intended for Sandy 09 to become the OSC for the pickup attempt. There was about a 5-10 minute delay as Sandy 09 had UHF problems and I couldn't get him up for the briefing. At this point Nail may have said something about the Hobo's and I indicated the Sandy's and JO were ready as soon as I could get them up. Sandy 03 came up and said he was in the area and I believe Nail 34 said "Lets get with it" - Sandy 03 said "I'm waiting on King." I told Sandy 03 to come on in and get briefed by Nail 34, which he did. There were several Guard transmissions with the survivor, one of which was a Battlecry aircraft. At 0505Z Sandy 03 was appointed OSC and proceeded with the first pickup attempt with Sandy 04, 09/10 and JO 64/73. At no time prior to the time indicated do I recall getting information from Nail 34 that the area was permissive and that he wanted to utilize the Hobo's and CH-53's for a pickup attempt.

RONALD J. SOROKA, Major, USAF
Assistant Operations Officer

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MAJOR FRANK PEHR MAKES A STOP AT
THE VALLEY PRIOR TO HIS
MEDEVAC BACK TO THE STATES
26 MAR 71



Pehr.jpg

13 MAR 71
SAR

MAJ PEHR IS THE 8th MEMBER OF THE
37th ARRS
TO RECEIVE A PURPLE HEART FOR
"BATTLE CRY 315"

0945 JG 65/383 LOGGED 6.1 / 1 CLANDING
 1045 JG 66/24 LOGGED 7.0 5 CLANDING
 1050 DARR JRCC TOTAL 25?
 1051 LINE CHECK 5X5
 1200 SSGT ARUBE OFF DUTY

13 MAR 71

12/ 2045- CAPT GRAVES ON DUTY
 2130 MAINTENANCE STATUS RELAYED TO QUEEN
 2350 STATUS TO JOKER
 13/ 0100 JG 65 AIRBORNE CH 73
 0100 ITEM 14 CL WMFKQUOR
 0228 JG-71 AIRBORNE - ~~ENROUTE 95TH~~ and ITEM 14
 0245 JG 67 AIRBORNE - ENROUTE 95TH and ITEM 14
 0320 Queen & King 24 Report A Battle Cry 315
 AIRCRAFT IS DOWN 225/50/103 OR 275/98/77
 0323 JG-71/67 enroute to AREA. A NAL FAL HAS
 CONTACT WITH THE SURVIVOR - he is OKAY.
 0325 Queen Advises CHA 89 will get mission.
 0345 Joker Advises to stand by for Launch of
 Bravo Birds.
 0349 Queen Advises to Launch BRAVO BIRDS
 JG-64 (COL BROWN) - JG-73 (COPPERHEAD)
 0355 JG-64 and 73 AIRBORNE AT 77
 0402 JG 64/73 HOLDING 275/65/77
 0405 SANDY 3+4 ETA 0415
 0410 SANDY 9+10 ETA 0435
 0415 MAIL 34 BINGO 0530
 0425 SANDY 3+4 AND JG 60/62 BINGO 0600
 0435 SANDY 9+10 AND JG 64/73 BINGO 0750

0436 King 24 requested CBU 19 FRONI Q#89

C-437 WEATHER 4/8 COVER BASES 4M-6M VISIBILITY 10+
TERRAIN IS A VALLEY ABOUT 1400'

0440 SURVIVOR SLIGHTLY HURT BUT CALM

Q455 SURVIVOR HAS ONE BROKEN ARM & ONE BROKEN LEG

0458 SURVIVOR SAYS HE HEARS NO GROUND FIRE - WILL REPORT IT IF HE DOES

0506 SANYO 9610 HOLDING 270/80/77

0610 SURVIVOR STILL OK.

0505 | S4N04 03 OSC

0530 SOMEONE TOOK GLD FIRE & HAS PULLED OUT.

053, J.G. 71 ~~1971~~ Landed

0535	HOLDING SMOKE A1 + A2 ON GENO
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0538 PHASE ALPHA TERMINATED FOR TIME BEING

0541	RINGNECK SMOKE AVAILABLE ON REQ
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0513 PHASE ALPHA IN PROGRESS AGAIN

0551 PHASE ALPHA TERMINATED DUE GROUND FIRE TAKEN BY J. G. 64

0553 Two PEOPLE HURT ON J6 64

0555 QUEEN SAYS JG 64 GOING HOME/103

0566 ONE PERSON HURT PRETTY BAD (QUEEN ST)

0600 ✓ 67 - ~~DRIVE~~ LANDED

0820 LAUNCHING LG. OUT OF 89

OFF: REQUESTING SMOKE.

0600 LAUNCHING 71-ABW Now

0705 | J. 671 Hondine AT 275/ /77

0806 QUEENS REQ WE LAUNCH BIRD TO T6 103 WITH EXTRA
CP TO REPLACE CP ON J6, 64 / LAUNCH J6. 70

0611 | 26 67 Acm.

0611 ~~SNEAKY~~ ^{CHAS} ~~WINTER~~ ¹⁹ 21 IS DOWN. ANOTHER ARMY CHOPPER

Is Alternative P/U. Location UNK This Time

0618 KING REQ. NAFC AND OTHERS GOODIES.

0622 SANDY ^{RTA} 9:10 To 77 For Fuel

0623 A/R Computer JG 60/62 BINGO 0845

0640 L.G. 70 ABN For 103 With CP₂

0635 MAS PEHR IN HOSPITAL @ 103 at 103

0739 SET CURTIS 16 OTHER INSURED

06349 STILL PUTTING IN FAST MOVES

1.6. 71 & 67 ON THE DECK, 67 ~~REG~~ IS REFUELING.



1023 A 23mm JUST CAME UP AND HOSED DOWN SANDIES. (LR)

1047 JG 67 called Queen on HF. J.G. 71 will be left at CH 103
 FLT ENGINEER WILL REMAIN WITH AIRCRAFT (ALSO P.S.) INJURED
 P5 RETURNING TO CH 77 ON J.G. 67 CDF

1058 Phase ALPHA STARTING CDF

1059 JG 67 Airborne from 103 AT 1055. ETA CH 77 1145 CDF

1110 JG 67 called in - spoke to USS SANCTUARY - Preliminary
 prognosis on MAS Pehr - fragmentary wounds - no Broken Bones CO.

1112 SANDY'S REPORTED LAYING IN CHOP

1124 Phase BRAVO COMMENCING

1128 KING 26 called - Phase ALPHA Complete.

1133 Phase BRAVO COMMENCING

1134 Phase BRAVO TERMINATED (TAKING GROUND FIRE)

1136 JG 70 called on HF - JG 73 TOOK HITS. PILOT AND P5 HIT.

1138 Pilot of JG 73 HIT IN LEFT ARM. P5 HIT BUT EXTENT NOT
 KNOWN. NOT BELIEVED SERIOUS. JG. 73 PROCEEDING TO 103. (LR)

1140 P.S. NOT SERIOUS, THEY HAVE AN ENGINE SHOT DOWN. (LR)

1145 SANDY'S HOLDING HANDS WITH LOLLIES. (LR)

1148 SET SCOTT WAS WOUNDED BUT MINOR (LR)

1152 73 DID NOT SEE THE SURVIVOR BUT DID SEE CHUTE (LR)
 QUEEN BELIEVES THAT HE DID NOT COME TO A HOVER - THAT
 HE WAS HIT ON THE APPROACH TO THE HOVER AND THEN SHOT
 ENGINE DOWN. GLIMBOUT WAS ON DUE ENG. (LR)

1226 Capt Walker Off (LR)

1225 JG 73 DOWN @ CH 103 (LR)

1250 QUEEN CALLED TO SAY THAT J.G. 70 IS JFM
 AIRBORNE AND ENROUTE TO CHAN 77 WITH
 CREW OF J.G. 73. FE, PRIMATE, STAYING AT 103 w/ JG 73.

1255 FLIGHT SURVEILLANCE REQUESTED TO MEET J.G. 70 JFM

1335 J.G. -70 ON DECK 77 JFM

1410 NORMAL SAR POSTURE NOTIFY BY QUEEN. *

1400 DAAR JRCC TOTAL 35.7 *

1425 LINE CHECK SIX *

1440 SET ARISE OFF DUTY *