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S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battle Cry 315, Smoke 41/42 Capt Stewart/Major Nicholson

Launched at 1325 and proceeded to 020/88/82 to orbit with Jolly Green 67/60. Orbited with them until they withdrew to the west for refueling. While Jolly Green 62/60 were refueling we maintained our orbit at the original position. When Sandy 01 stated that he would use 62/60 in an attempted pick up, we started west to escort them. In the meantime Jolly Green 71/67 had slipped across the trail and were picked for a pickup attempt. This put us far out of position to the west. We had trouble locating the IP due to poor terrain in both birds and the haze. After reaching the IP we were briefed by Sandy 01 on the situation and where he wanted the smoke. We layed the smoke and were told to hold to the west. As we were proceeding back to the IP Sandy 01 ask us to put 20mm along the road to the east which we did. After Jolly Green 71 was shot off we RTB'd to 89 due to fuel.

JOHN W. STEWART, Capt, USAF
Smoke 41

Atch 6

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S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battle Cry 315, Sandy 05/06 Capt Smith/Col Weber

Sandy 05/06 launched from NKP at 1415 Local on 13 Mar 71. As we were enroute King 26 advised us that Sandy 01/02 out of Ubon were ahead of us about 25 minutes and would be relieving Sandy 03/04 instead of us. We were instructed to go across the trail and join with Jolly Green 71/67, which we did. Sandy 01 was preparing for a pick up so we brought the Jollys across to the Forward Holding Point. (Jolly 60/62 were refueling at this time) The area was clear and we could see the SAR area from this point. After the briefing and smoke screen was laid, Sandy 02 led Jolly Green 71 in with myself and my wingman flying on either side of the Jolly laying down CBU. Approximately 30 seconds after starting the hover, the Jolly called that he was taking ground fire from very close and was pulling out. He said one PJ had been wounded slightly. We escorted them to Channel 103, then returned to escort Jollys 60/62 since no more Sandys were available. As we neared our Bingo fuel Smoke 43/44 assumed the Jolly escort and we went down and expended in the SAR area. We then RTB'd at approximately 1815.

While we were in the SAR area I saw no gun fire. When the Jolly was in the hover, I saw the survivor's parachute but I did not see the survivor. I did not see the fire the Jolly was taking and he pulled out at the same time he called it. I did not hear him call the direction from which he was taking fire.

King 26 was using VHF 123.1 to brief the other King birds and it interrupted the communications between the Sandys considerably.

MICHAEL W. SMITH, Capt, USAF
Sandy 05

atch 7

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S T A T E M E N T

SAR for Battlecry 315: Sandy 89/10 Maj Belt/Capt Taylor

At approximately 09:00Z Queen directed Sandy 9/10 to again launch and proceed directly to the SAR area. Upon arriving on scene Sandy 1, the on-scene-commander, commenced briefing Sandy 9 in preparation for assuming command. This was delayed for approximately 10 minutes while Nail 12 directed a fast mover strike in the area of the survivor. The position of the survivor was confirmed by Sandy 9, since he had already been in the area, and command was passed at approximately 1030Z. There was no contact with the survivor at this time. (See Note One)

While trolling the area for ground fire a 23mm came up just SE of the survivors position. Nail 12, who had an idea where the gun was located, was requested to put a fast mover strike on the position. This was accomplished, but required a lot of time which was fast running out due to approaching darkness.

Twiggy had been requested by Sandy 1 and was on station, however, they required refueling by 1050Z. Since they couldn't work in the area while the strike against the 23mm was underway, they were directed to proceed with the refueling. The strike was completed at approximately 1055Z.

Meanwhile, Sandy's 5 & 6, who were escorting the Jolly's, had reached their bingo time. They were brought in to work the area around the survivor. Sandy 10 was directed to bring the Jolly Low into the SAR area. King was requested to expedite the arrival of the Twiggy since darkness was rapidly covering the area. Smoke 41 was also directed to proceed to the SAR area. When the preparation of the area around the survivor was terminated, trolling began again. No fire was received.

King then advised that the Twiggy birds were still on the tanker. Also, the Smoke aircraft arrived in the SAR area, so Chop was elected instead. Chop was then employed, but was not effective. (See Note Two)

Smoke was then employed forming a corridor for the approach of Jolly Green 73 to the survivor from the SW, however, by the time Jolly Green 73 arrived, which was excessive for some unknown reason, the smoke had moved clear of the survivors position and darkness had practically obscured the terrain. Jolly Green 73 was asked if he thought a hover was possible. His reply was he would know that after he reached a lower altitude. He was directed to immediately depart the area at the first indication of ground fire. (This was deemed appropriate due to the failure of the smoke and Chop)

Since the corridor was obliterated with smoke, Jolly Green 73 was brought in on the side of the smoke and turned into the survivors position. (The fires started by the WP bombs generated some smoke, but the bulk of the WP smoke had blown clear of the survivors position) Immediately upon arriving over the survivor the area between 20 to 30 meters from the survivor forming an arc of approximately 270 degrees exploded with automatic weapons firing tracers. Jolly Green 73 exited the area with one engine out and two casualties on board. The SAR effort for the day was terminated and Sandy's 9 & 10 escorted the Jolly's to a point 35 miles out of Channel 77, then RTB'd to Channel 89.

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NOTE: Between 0500Z and 0530Z the survivor was heard on several occasions to ask that the recovery be expedited, that he didn't know how much longer he could remain conscious. He was asked to maintain radio silence until further advised, but to come-up beeper if movement was detected in his area. Not long thereafter, he transmitted several times, which were unreadable, followed by the statement, "Oh God No". This was immediately followed by a short series of beepers. No further contact. The exact time of these transmissions is unknown by Sandy 9, however, they occurred prior to the first pick-up attempt.

NOTE TWO: There were several factors which rendered the Chop ineffective. First, the wind was high, estimated in the area of 15-20 Kts. Two, only one of the aircraft dispensed Chop, the other bombed the containers off. Three, the Chop dispensed was too high and appeared incomplete, i.e. partially expended. The result was that the enemy in the immediate area of the survivor was not subjected to the effects of Chop.

K. C. BEIT, Major, USAF
Sandy 09

Atch 8

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STATEMENT

SAR for Battle Cry 315 Smoke 43/44/Lt Anderson /Major Arnold

Smoke 43/44 launched from Channel 89 at 1655L for a last light effort. We arrived on the scene at 1735, at which time we relieved Sandy 05/06 and orbited with Jolly 60/62. Shortly thereafter one of the Jollies had a fire light and had to shut down an engine. They RTE'd and left the primary responsibilities to the Da Nang Jollies. At approximately 1805 we went down to execute both our Chop and the Smoke. Sandy 09 showed us where he wanted the ordnance and we proceeded to expend. Due to an aircraft malfunction Smoke 43's CBU-30's bombed off. (NOTE) CBU 30 makes a beautiful explosion when it hits the ground. Smoke 44 did a beautiful job however and put his Chop right on target. I doubt that the Chop had any effect due to an approximate 20 kt wind. After the Chop was expended Sandy 09 wanted the Smoke. We set up two parallel smoke screens running north east to south west with the survivor in the middle. The Jollies executed about 5 minutes after the screen was laid and due to the darkness the smokes held high and stayed out of everyone's way. As the Jolly came to a hover over the survivor what appeared to be three 12.7's or possibly ZPU's opened up on the Jolly. All of the guns were extremely close to where the survivor was supposed to be. Due to the darkness and my distance away I cannot estimate accurately how close they were. With 20/20 hind sight I can say that we shouldn't have even tried but at the time we all felt that we had to make one more attempt. The fact that the first set of Jollies had to go home set us back a little in that it took a pretty long time to get the other Jollies in the area.

The one problem that has really set us back is our inability to get A-1's and slowmover strikes to effectively sanitize the area around the survivor. I think maybe we should develop some ideas on how we could handle this problem.

RALPH P. ANDERSON, 1LT, USAF
Smoke 43

CARROL B. ARNOLD, Major, USAF
Smoke 44

Atoh 9

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FROM: LSOS(CC)

21 Mar 71

SUBJECT: SARCO Report, Battle Cry 315

TO: DO

1. An unsuccessful rescue effort was conducted on 13 March 71 for the pilot of Battle Cry 315. The aircraft, an A-7 from the USS Ranger, went down at approximately 1015L 13 Mar on the 225° radial for 50NM of Channel 103. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue attempts. All times are Thailand local. Sequence of events shown in attachment 1.
2. At 1030L, 13 Mar 71, a SAR was declared for Battle Cry 315. The aircraft was downed in the Lam Song 719 area west of D-12, a parachute had been observed and radio contact had been established with the survivor. The area was known to be hostile but had not been reported as being active in the past few days. The survivor was on the side of a 1400' hill in a valley and was lying in an open area.
3. At the time the SAR was declared JACK scrambled Sandys 03/04 and Jolly Greens 60/62 from NKP as well as Sandys 09/10 and Jolly Greens 64/73 from Da Nang. These were the initial forces participating. A total of 18 sorties were launched prior to termination. (Atch 2)
4. Sandy 03 was the first A-1 on-scene commander, taking over at approximately 1205L after being briefed by King and Nail 34. The position of the survivor was pinpointed in an open field 10 feet down from his chute which was hanging in a tree. Radio contact with the survivor had established he had suffered a broken arm and leg in the ejection and was in poor condition. In addition he could hear no movement around him. Sandy 03 and 04 made repeated trolling passes at tree top level during which no ground fire was detected. Nail 34 had been putting in fast mover strikes against known 23mm positions. The survivor then came up voice indicating unfriendlies were approaching after which a beeper came on for approximately 10 seconds. This was at approximately 1230L and was the last transmission received from the survivor. Due to the survivors condition, this last transmission and the fact no ground fire had been received while trolling it was decided to attempt a pickup. The on-scene commander elected to use Jolly Green 60-62, holding to the west, but was countermanded when Jolly Green 64 informed King he was going to make the pick up as the survivor was in his geographical area of responsibility. King agreed. As a result Jolly Greens 64/73 came across the trail at a different spot and lower than briefed by Sandy 03 and got hosed by a 23mm. (Atch 3) When the Jolly Greens got in position with Sandys 09/10 phase "B" was initiated. Jolly Green 64 made the run-in, sighted the chute and then the survivor. As 64 went into the hover and prepared to lower the PJ intense small arms ground fire was experienced from all quadrants. 64 did not call the direction of any fire until he had exited the immediate area so the Sandys were unable to pinpoint any source. Jolly Green 64 stated he wanted to make another attempt. This was done only to be driven off again with 2 wounded crewmembers. Jolly Greens 64/73 then

PROJECT GORDON HARVEST
CATALOGED
DO NOT DESTROY
No. 0251767 D-9

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RTB'd Channel 103 with Sandys 09/10 escorting. (ATCH 4) Sandy 03 then directed Nail 47 to use fast mover strikes against the possible troop positions and requested King to have replacement Sandys launched. Again repeated trolling passes were made expending CBU but the enemy could not be intimidated. During these passes the survivor was seen to be laying face down and motionless in the open completely without cover from the surrounding treelines. Sandy 03 then briefed Nail 34 on the situation and RTB'd Channel 93 due low fuel. Enroute radio contact with Sandy 01 was established and the situation briefed. Sandy 01/02 arrived on scene and after briefing by Nail 34 assumed on scene command at approximately 1510L. (ATCH 5) 01/02 trolled the area for approximately one hour expending ordnance at irregular intervals but no ground fire was experienced. Fast mover strikes were being put in continually by Nail 34. At 1615L the decision was made to make a pick up attempt. At 1635L phase "B" was executed and smokes 41/42 dropped their M-47 bombs to lay a straight line smoke screen south of the survivor. (ATCH 6) Sandys 06/05 brought Jolly Green 71 down the chute and all four sandys set up a daisy chain around him. 71 entered a hover over the survivors position but did not see him. 1 to 2 minutes after start of hover Jolly Green 71 started receiving heavy small arms fire and exited back to the IP with one casualty. (ATCH 7) More fastmovers were requested and Sandy 01 briefed Nail 12 on areas of ground fire. At 1730L Sandy 09/10 relieved 01/02. 01 had requested Twiggy through King. Trolling for ground fire was once again accomplished and this time a 23mm SE of the survivor opened up. Fastmover strikes were requested for this gun. Darkness was rapidly approaching so a last light effort was decided on. The Twiggy flight had arrived on station but were on the tanker when the fastmover strikes were completed. As the second Smoke flight had arrived it was decided to use Chop. (ATCH 8) All forces were brought into the area to prepare for a last attempt. After the last fastmover strikes were terminated the Sandys once again began trolling at tree top level and once again no ground fire was detected. The Smoke flight was then executed. On the first pass Chop was dispensed but was ineffective. One reason was high surface winds and another, the second aircraft "bombed off" the cannisters due an internal malfunction. On the second pass a smoke screen was put down for the approach of Jolly Green 73. (ATCH 9) The Jolly Green was delayed for some reason and by the time he arrived the surface winds had blown the smoke clear of the survivor and day light was almost completely gone. The Jolly Green pilot was asked if he thought a hover would be possible. His reply was that he would know after he had reached a lower altitude. The Jolly Green was then brought in to one side of the smoke and turned towards the survivor. Immediately upon arrival at the survivors position ground fire broke out from all quadrants concentrated on the Jolly Green. 73 exited the area with one engine shut down and two casualties. This terminated the days efforts and Sandys 09/10 escorted Jolly Green 73 to a short distance out of 73 and then RTB'd 89 with the remaining forces.

5. After debriefing all crews on scene, A-1's and FAC's, it became increasingly doubtful that we still had an objective. The survivor had not been heard from since 1230L nor had he been seen since Sandy 03 left the scene. In addition the last transmissions would indicate the survivor was about to be captured. The Groundfire was becoming increasingly heavy from immediately around the survivors position and had been reported coming from as close as 60 feet away. After passing all information to JACK/JOKER we were directed to generate the normal ground alert force for the next day. Nail FACs would be in the survivors area during the night and at first light Nail 34 would make a visual

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check of the area to see if we did have an objective. This was done the next morning with negative results. JOKER terminated the SAR for Battle Cry 315 at 141354L Mar 71.

6. Old problems continue to repeat themselves. King 26 was once again utilizing VHF 123.1 as a common frequency for such things as briefing other King aircraft and for air to ground communication. The Sandys reported this hampered their communications considerably. The Jolly Green's on one occasion interrupted a Sandy Low briefing King and arbitrarily changed the plan in regards to which Jolly Greens were to be used in an attempt. Without even consulting the on-scene commander as the validity of this change King acquiesced. It must be emphasized the Sandy was the on-scene commander, not the Jolly Green. The reason for the Sandys decision was borne out when the Jolly Greens crossed the trail at a lower altitude and at a different point than briefed by Sandy and were fired on by AAA. The Jolly Green's holding to the west did not have to cross any high threat areas to reach the survivor.

The ground fire pattern on this SAR shows that we were up against a highly disciplined force. The fact that they only fired once the Jolly Green arrived over the survivor proves this. Due to the proximity of the ground fire to the survivor it is felt that the only way we could have sanitized the area was with slow mover strike aircraft and saturate it with BLU-52. How the strong surface winds would have affected the latter can only be guessed at. The next time a pattern like this appears the area must be thoroughly "prepped" and sanitized. It is only by the grace of god that at least one helicopter wasn't lost on this day. We cannot be lulled by the lack of gunfire while trolling.

Once again the SARCO and JACK both had an extremely hard time extracting any information from King. In one instance Bingo times for Sandys 03/04 had been passed 2 hours in error which could have caused a premature launch of replacement Sandys. Took 35 minutes to resolve that one. JACK needed the information just as much as we did. On another occasion King changed RTB destination of Sandys 09/10. Jack passed this to us as being due to fuel. King had actually told them to go to Da Nang for a "quick turnaround" after 09 had said they were going to NKP. It had been requested that all A-1's RTB 89 due maintenance and armament considerations. Sandy 10 had minor battle damage.

On the first attempt the Jolly Green did not call ground fire until he was well clear of the survivor. If the Sandys are to be effective in gun suppression they need to know immediately when and where the fire is coming from. In addition the Sandys must expend something on each pass while in a daisy chain. Dry passes do not help the jolly.

WILLIAM J. HAGAN, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO Commander

9 Atch

1. SARCO LOG
2. FLYING SCHEDULE
3. STATEMENT SANDY 03/04
4. STATEMENT SANDY 09/10
5. STATEMENT SANDY 01/02
6. STATEMENT SMOKE 41/42
7. STATEMENT SANDY 05/06
8. STATEMENT SANDY 09/10
9. STATEMENT SMOKE 43/44

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13 MARCH 1971

- 1030L JACK called - SAR declared for Battle Cry 315, a Navy A-7, downed by ground fire 225/50/103. Good chute and have possible radio contact with survivor.
Launch Sandys 03/04 to "N" orbit along with Jolly Greens 60/62.
Generate 2 smokes.
- 1043L JACK - Launching Sandys 09/10 from Da Nang along with Jolly Greens 64/73. Nail 34 is over survivor and has voice contact.
- 1055L Sandys 04/03 airborne. No aircraft available for immediate up load as Smokes due BR Medevacs told same to JACK.
- 1105L Sandys 09/10 airborne from 77. ETA on scene 1135L.
- 1115L Nail 34 Bingo time 1230L.
- 1120L Major Smith, Heavy Hook, Hobos 20/21 diverted from PF to SAR and are on scene. Said can be used to attempt pick up when area is sanitized.
- 1130L Hobos 20/21 holding in area but not being utilized.
- 1135L King/Jack said to launch Chop, told them "no hab" (Reference 1055L entry). Earliest ETIC would be 1330L and that is just a WAG as both aircraft are out for maintenance.
- 1136L Bingo times received for airborne aircraft
- | | |
|---------------------|-------|
| Jolly Green's 60/62 | 1300L |
| Jolly Green's 64/73 | 1450L |
| SANDY'S 03/04 | 1300L |
| SANDY'S 09/10 | 1500L |
- 1142L Nail 34 on scene commander at 1035L.
- 1155L Survivor reported to have broken arm and leg. Requested Jack verify Sandy 03/04 Bingo time. Doesn't seem correct. If it is will have to scramble two more Sandy's ASAP.
- 1200L Nail 34 putting in fast mover strikes. No ground fire reported. Twiggy requested by someone on scene but is not available right now. Sandy 09 is having UHF problems, is bringing 03 flight down to replace him as CSC. Ringneck Smoke will be available in one hour.
- 1225L Have been trying for 25 minutes to get confirmation on Sandy 03/04 Bingo times. Cannot get information from King through Jack. King not talking.
- 1226L Phase "A" initiated. Sandy 03 OSC at 1205L.
- 1230L All forces pulling back due ground fire.
- 1235L Sandy 03/04 revised Bing time 1500L. Determine later what happened.

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1240L Phase "A"

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1250L All forces pulling back again due ground fire directed at Jolly Green 64. 64 was hit and sustained two casualties.

1300L Launch Smoke 41/42.

1325L Smokes 41/42 airborne. Directed to launch Sandys 05/06 to replace 09/10 as Jolly Green escort, "N" orbit. 09/10 RTB 1430 early for fuel. Cannot determine why. King will not pass any information. Had earlier requested all aircraft RTB 89 due maintenance/ordnance considerations.

1350L Sandy 05 needs maintenance on compass.

1400L Sandys 05/06 ready to start engines.

1410L Last contact with survivor reported as 1230L.

1415L Transmitted UMT coordinates to Jack. xc 645825. Received from Nail 34. Sandys 05/06 airborne.

1435L K. G. Belt, Sandy 09, called from Da Nang. Had escorted Jolly Green's with casualties back there. Was asked intentions by King and when he said RTB 89 as requested he was directed to land Da Nang and turnaround. Sandy 09/10 were not low on fuel as originally passed to Jack.

1442L Sandy 03/04 RTB 93 due fuel. ETA 1521L. Sandy 09/10 ETD 77 1600L.

1500L Sandy 07/08 being delayed at Bien Hoa to upload stub tanks. Had jettisoned them day before in another SAR.

1532L Sandy 01 on scene commander.

1536L Sandy 08, rough running engine, oil temp high, oil pressure low, RTB Bien Hoa.

1545L Smoke 43/44 cocked.

1625L Phase "A"

1630L Attempt aborted due ground fire directed at Jolly Green. Jolly Green 71 hit in windshield and one PJ injured. Source not sighted. Survivor not sighted.

1655L Smoke 43/44 airborne.
Sandy 09/10 airborne out of 77 at 1625.
Sandy 05/06 Bingo 1745L.

1720 Sandy 09 on scene commander. 01/02 RTB 89.

1825 Phase "B"

1835 Phase "B" terminated due ground fire directed at Jolly Green 73 who exited the area with one engine shut down and two casualties.

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1845 Darkness. All forces RTB'd. N. 13 will be overhead all night.

2100 Nail 34 will make visual check at first light to see if we have an objective.
Otherwise will be normal posture tomorrow.

4/1845L SAR terminated by Joker.

Atch 1

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FLYING SCHEDULE

13 Mar 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CALL</u> <u>SIGN</u>	<u>ATD</u>	<u>ATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	<u>SANDY</u>			
DUNWOODY	01	1400	4.3	On Scene Commander
LORENZEN	02	1400	4.3	
LYON	03	1055	4.6	On Scene Commander
OBERLIN	04	1055	4.6	
SMITH	05	1415	4.8	
COL WEBER	06	1415	4.8	
SINGER	07	1510	.7	Sympathetic Abort
KILAND	08	1510	.8	Air Abort Rough Engine
BELT	09	1105	3.0	Da Nang - Da Nang
TAYLOR	10	1105	3.0	" "
	<u>SMOKE</u>			
STEWART/ YOUNGBLOOD	41	1325	4.0	
NICHOLSON	42	1325	4.0	
ANDERSON	43	1655	2.6	
ARNOLD/WISE	44	1655	2.7	
	<u>SANDY</u>			
LYON	03	1655	.8	RTB from Ubon
OBERLIN	04	1655	.8	" "
BELT	09	1625	3.4	On Scene Commander/DNG/NKP
TAYLOR	10	1625	3.4	" " " " "

Atch 2

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S T A T E M E N T

Battle Cry 315, SAR

Sandy 03/04 Lt Lyon/Capt Oberlin

We were launched on the SAR at 1055 the morning of the 13th, on the way to the area King 24 gave us a complete rundown of who was on scene and what resources were immediately available. We had two Jolly Green's east of the route and two west, which later proved to be a mistake. All of the Jolly Green's should have been held to the west. Sandy 09/10 were escorting the Jollys and after arriving on scene and getting abriefing from Nail 34 I assumed on scene command. The downed pilot was in bad shape due to a broken arm and leg as well as feeling he was going to pass out. He was located about 2 kilometers from the nearest route in an open field. His chute was hung in a tree and he was 10 ft down the hill from his chute, to the best of our knowledge he was brought down by a 23mm gun on a strafing pass. When I got there Nail 34 was putting strikes in against the gun. After hearing the survivors condition and that no movement was around him, I decided the sooner we could make the pick up the better. With the Nail working strikes, I set to trolling the area which gave me negative results. I could get no ground fire from the survivors immediate area. After numerous passes Sandy 04 heard the survivor say "come and get me, come and get me, they are coming" and then a beeper. Battlecry 314 broke in and said the survivor was just nervous and wanted out. I believe the survivor was being pressed by the hostiles at the time because that was his last radio transmission. I decided to attempt a pick up at this point figuring maybe the survivor had passed out. I was going to use Jolly Green 60/62 being they were west of the route and wouldn't have to cross the road network east of the survivor. Jolly Green 64 then in no uncertain terms informed King he was the primary bird due to the geographical location of the survivor within Laos. King then said we were to use Jolly Green 64/73. I brought Sandy 09 in and showed him the exact location of the survivor and then sent him back to the helicopters. Sandy 04 placed a M-47 bomb safe on top of the karst east of the road and I placed one west of the survivor as an IP I then briefed the Sandys and Jollys I wanted them to start at the eastern M-47 and fly to the western one at 10,000 ft or above as they crossed the road. Upon reaching the IP they were to descend and head 065° to the survivor. A PJ was to be sent down to assist the survivor. Somewhere along the line the Jollys got too far south and low crossing the road and a 23mm gun opened up on them. We finally got things set up and executed the pick up phase. The Jolly found the chute and sighted the survivor. He had stopped in the hover when he received intense ground fire from all quadrants and pulled off. Jolly Green 64 then said he wanted to make another attempt so we tried again only to get the co-pilot and PJ shot up. I sent 09/10 and the Jolly to Channel 103 and started Nail 47 working fast mover strikes against the troop positions. We then requested more Sandy's be launched to replace us. We started trolling the area dropping CBU but no one would shoot at us. Somewhere during this time Sandy 03 took 4 hits but didn't know it until later. At this point I saw the survivor for the first time laying motionless just down from his chute. On 2 subsequent passes I observed him but he never moved. We then briefed Nail 64 on the whole area so he could brief Sandy 01 when he arrived on scene. We then RTB'd to Channel 93 for fuel. On the way home I gave Sandy 01 a complete briefing of what we had done.

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MISTAKES: First, I let King talk me into using the Jolly Green on the eastern side of the route thus making them a target as they crossed the road.

Second, the Jolly Green never called off ground fire until he was well clear of the survivor. We had no way of knowing where it was coming from or even that he was being shot at.

Third, when a daisy chain is formed, ordnance should be laid down everytime a Sandy makes a pass. Dry passes don't do the Jolly any good.

THOMAS J. LYON, 1LT, USAF
Sandy 03

WILLIAM C. OBERLIN, Capt, USAF
Sandy 04

Atch 3

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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 13 Mar 71

19 Mar 71

MISSION NUMBER: E--009-15 Mar 71

SI TRAIL AIRCRAFT: Battlecry 315

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 26

LOCATION: 225/50/103 UTM XC 6591

SAVES: None

(S) King 26 departed Channel 71 at 0423Z and proceeded west of Channel 77 where mission, Battlecry 315 was in progress under the airborne control of King 24. Arrived on scene at 0552Z and initiated an orbit on the 270.20-60/77. He monitored SAR effort underway which involved a pickup attempt by Jolly Green's 64/73.

At 0602Z, received a Mayday call from Chance 19, an Army Helicopter, which was going down 2NM South of the Anvil, North of Khe Sanh. Contacted Passer 28 on Guard and designated the pilot CAC at 0607Z. At 0611Z, Passer 28 established communications with Lotus 20 and the latter aircraft effected the pickup of the 2 survivors at 0620Z. The survivors were airlifted to Khe Sanh. Loyal 12, 14 and 21 along with Passer 28 and his wingman maintained gunship cover of the area during the SAR.

Resumed orbit West of CH 77 at 0640Z and monitored the escort of JG 64 by JG 73 to CH 103. Assumed control of Battlecry mission 315 at 0715Z and received the following information from King 24:

- (a) FAC on scene was Nail 64
- (b) O.S.C. was Sandy 03
- (c) Position of survivors was 225/50/103 or UTM(XC 6591). He was located in a valley at the 1400 foot level just 10 feet south of his chute.
- (d) Condition of survivor included a broken arm and leg and he lay near unconsciousness (Moving very rarely).
- (e) Enemy disposition -- hostile gun fire encircled the survivors position with 23MMs, 37MMs and a suspected 57MM in the area.

[REDACTED]

(f) S.R Resources on scene: Sandy's 03 and 04 on scene and Jolly Green's 60 and 62 holding 020/80/82.

(g) Last communication with survivor occurred at 0525Z.

(h) Weather: 40-60 broken vis 10NM altimeter 29.95. At 0715Z, Sandy 03, OSC, made 3 passes over the downed airman and no movement was observed on the part of the survivor. Jack advised at 0718Z that Sandys 05 and 06 were airborne from CH 89 and their ETA to the SAR scene was 0745Z. Also, Sandys 01 and 02 were off CH 89 at 0721Z estimating the area at 0800Z.

Since Jolly Green 64 had received intense ground fire on the initial pickup attempt, Sandy 03 and Nail 64 put in additional Fast Mover strikes to sanitize the area. The pilot of Jolly Green had indicated that most of the ground fire directed at his aircraft had come from the Northeast and Northwest quadrants relative to the survivors' position. Further, he stated that he took fire from as close as 100 feet; therefore, air strikes were concentrated North of the survivors' position.

Sandy's 05 and 06 arrived on scene at 0745Z and were directed to rendezvous with Jolly Green's 71 and 57 which had taken off from CH 77 and were estimating 270/40/77 at 0730Z. Snakes 41 and 42 arrived at 020/80/82 at 0730Z and at 0804Z Jack advised that Twiggy was being uploaded. King 23 refueled JC's 60/62 at 0830Z. Sandy 01 assumed OSC at 0832Z and at 0844Z, Jack relayed that Cobras 9 and 10 were enroute with Twiggy. Sandy's 03 and 04 RFB CH 93 ETA 0821Z.

After studying the situation on the ground, Sandy 01 elected to put in more hard ordnance strikes to further soften up the area; Cobras 9 and 10 with Twiggy were sent home because the environment was thought to be perilous.

At 0925Z, Jolly Greens 71 and 57 supported by Sandys 01, 02, 05 and 06, and Snakes 41 and 42 made a second rescue attempt. Again, the primary aircraft, this time, Jolly 71, received intense ground fire and had to withdraw with little damage to CH 103. The copilot and a P.J. were wounded while hovering over the survivor site. The pilot indicated that he let down on the survivor facing to the South with his guns pointing to the North — the previous area of fire. Subsequently, ground fire erupted from the East and South as close as 200 feet. The fire appeared to be small arms and it originated from above the ridge lines to the East and South. The pilot concluded

~~SECRET~~

that from the I.P. in, his aircraft had taken only 1 round.

Jolly Green 71 was escorted to CH 103 by JO 67 and Sandys 05 and 06. ETA 1010Z. Smokes 41 and 42 RTE CH 89 ETA 0947Z.

After the second unsuccessful attempt, Sandy 01 and Mail 12, put in further air strikes to sanitize the area to the South and East. At 0937Z, Jack advised that Twiggy would be available again in 40 minutes. Launch occurred at 1018Z aboard Cobra 11 Flight.

Sandy's 09 and 10 and Smokes 43 and 44 arrived in the area at 1023Z; Sandy 09 assumed OSC and 01 and 02 RTE CH 89 ETA 1113Z. Jack advised at 1037Z that additional Sandy resources were not available. Sandys 05 and 06 arrived back on scene at 1050Z and were directed to hold hands with Jollys 60 and 62 holding 020/60/62. Requested additional slow mover aircraft from Hillsboro, but ABCCC could not produce needed resources. At 1055Z, Twiggy was over the scene aboard Cobra 11 but was held since softening action was still in progress.

At 1058Z, JO 62 had #1 fire warning light illuminate and #1 engine was shut down. Both 60 and 62 RTE CH 89 ETA 1235Z. At 1100Z, Cobra 11 Flight was refueled. Smokes 43 and 44 expended Chap in the survivor area at 1114Z and Sandy's 05 and 06 RTE CH 89 ETA 1150Z. At 1135Z, the scene was prepared for the final last light attempt. Cobra 11 Flight was just returning from the tanker and time was not available to use them before the last light effort. The thrust was spearheaded by Sandys 09 and 10 and Smokes 43 and 44 in support of JO's 73 and 79. Jolly 73 while approaching a hover over the survivor's position was driven off by fierce fire and the aircraft withdrew to CH 103 with #1 engine shot out. The pilot and a P.J. were injured in the attempt. The crew did not see the survivor nor his chute and indicated that the ground fire erupted from beneath the helicopter as it hovered approximately 60 feet from the survivors' position. Sandy's 09 and 10 escorted the stricken 73 and sister ship, 79, to 103; King 26 monitored the escort closely until landing was effected at 1220Z. Then, Sandy's 9 and 10 RTE CH 89 at 1215Z ETA 1245Z. Mail 12 RTE CH 89 at 1149Z ETA 1220Z. King 26 headed for CH 71 arriving at 1345Z.

As a final note, with the last light effort a failure, Sandy 9 and King 26 terminated the SAR for the day. King 26 requested Comm Cap during the night to maintain electronic surveillance.

~~SECRET~~
88

~~SECRET~~

King 26 Crewmembers

SAF Forces Utilized

AC/ANC Lt Col Spilseth
CP 1 Lt Lorens
N Major McDonald
RC MSgt Koshler
FE MSgt Keel
FM TSgt Fielder
LM MSgt Patterson

Jolly Greens 60, 62, 71, 57, 73, 70
Sandy's 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10
Snakes 41, 42, 43, 44
King 23
King 26
FAC Utilized: Mail 64, 12

Strike Forces

Gunfighter 03
Falcon 81
Ringneck 95, 96
Camata 411
Garfish 501
Falcon 57

Wolfpack 26, 27
Wolfpack 38, 39
Gunfighter 60
Cobra 03
Chippy 412, 413

Sid Spilseth
SIDNEY M. SPILSETH, Lt Colonel, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

~~SECRET~~

To: Bob Lapointe, rlapointe
From: Jim Scott, INTERNET:jdsconfig@jps.net
Date: 4/7/99, 1:58 PM
Re: Thanks for the reply

Thank you for the reply upon receiving that stuff. You don't have to return the clipping on Dave Rhody. Don't know where it come from I do have a copy. The reason I sent the original is it has a base team sports standing on the back and by looking at that you may be able to figure where it came from by the units mentioned.

I will go into a couple of other things that happened while I was there that you may be able to use. You can verify/get more info on these from Swerve ie dates etc.

A Navy aircraft had been shot down just South of Tchepone Laos where the trail crosses on the evening of 12 March 71. Swerve and I were on alert the next day on the high bird. Major Frank Pehr was the-Co Pilot of the low bird Steve Rhody (Dave's son) was his #2PJ cant remember who the other PJ was. You could see the survivors parachute and he had been injured. Just as soon as they were in a hover with the #1PJ in the door on the penetrator all hell broke loose Major Pehr took a round through his thigh cutting the femoral artery. Col Brown the pilot started pulling out screaming for the Sandys to come and lead him out, but the Sandys had split to the four wind and no one came to his aid but us. I had never seen anything like that from the Sandys before nor did I ever seen them skip out again. Steve Rhody stuck his finger in the hole to help stop the blood flow. We took him back to Quang Tri where an Army dust off took him out to the Sanctuary Hospital ship we didn't know that they had closed the hospital at Quang Tri.

We went back to DaNang while another one of our 53s went in and got shot off. In the early afternoon the survivor had told the SAR forces not to try any more just Bump the hell out of him because he was just bait that they were set up around him and suckering the choppers in for an easy kill. Later in the afternoon the survivor screamed "OH MY GOD NO" and that was the last that was heard from him.

We had by now made it down to alpha 1 low and back we went. It was just dusky dark when they decided to send us in for a last ditch effort to try and get him. They briefed us that ann Al was going to drop some Blouic-52 and we should all wear our gas masks. I was the #1 PJ and told the pilot that I would stay on my gun until we were in a hover and not getting hammered. As we settled into a hover they pooped a flair above us and all hell broke loose. Henry Kirk on our high bird said it was beautiful to look at. All our mines sending solid streams of tracers and the bad guys sending all different colored tracers at us. I felt something hit my leg and about that same time the pilot Col Harry Coppertine said he had been hit and that we had an engine shot out and may be going in as we pulled off. I smelled fuel and there was smoke inside the fuselage. I looked back at Swerve and he was hammering away. The floor of the chopper was awash with some kind of liquid, the whole world was on fire and it reflected in the liquid running towards the ramp. We had smoke, fuel, and I expected next wake up dead. Thank god we were in a 53-B because no H-3 or B model would have had the power to come out. when the pilot was hit he called for the co-pilot but none of us could get him to respond. It turned out his intercom had been shot out. The pilot had been hit with shrapnel in both his arms and hands. I had it in my right leg ball.

Our drop tanks had the foam in them so we kept them on for protection. they were full of holes. "the smell" the engine wiring had been shot out "the smoke" and our 5 gallon water can had been blown to heck "the fluid"

After we got to a safe altitude and back to SVN we started clearing all the weapons. Swerve and I were standing about half way to the ramp when Swerve took his CAR -27

Pulled back to bolt to eject to round in the chamber, let it go forward and then took out the magazine out. and pulled the trigger as we always did. Thank god the barrel was pointing towards the open ramp when it shot. The plane made a few sudden jerks then the pilot asked what was that. I said cook off sir. Get with swerve and have him go over this and see how his memory sees it that is if you can or want to use any of it. Please confirm about the Sandys with him. We had seven people wounded that day.

I'll send you some more stuff that is comical later.

Scotty

----- Internet Header -----
Sender: jdsconfig@jps.net
Received: from smtp5.jps.net (smtp5.jps.net [209.63.224.55])
by hpdmgaaa.compuserve.com (8.8.8/8.8.8/HP-1.1) with ESMTP id RAA22841
for <rlapointe@compuserve.com>; Wed, 7 Apr 1999 17:58:56 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from jps.net (209.142.48.60.stk.jps.net [209.142.48.60])
by smtp5.jps.net (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id XAA12607
for <rlapointe@compuserve.com>; Wed, 7 Apr 1999 23:00:19 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <37C8D499.8261AF68@jps.net>
Date: Wed, 07 Apr 1999 14:56:41 -0700
From: Jim Scott <jdsconfig@jps.net>
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.04 [en] (Win95; U)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Bob Lapointe <rlapointe@compuserve.com>
Subject: Thanks for the reply
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

39DO

22 Mar 71

Battlecry 315 Mission

3ARRGP/3JRCC (Lt Col Rudloff)

With reference to our tele-conversation on 20 Mar 71, the following is submitted in addition to my mission narrative. On 1 Mar 71, King 24 was working the search mission for Blade 71 in the Delta area. At approximately 0351Z King 24 was notified by a Covey FAC (215?) that Hillsboro reported A7 Battlecry aircraft was down at 250/50/103. Nail 34 was on scene and reported a good chute. Because of the distance involved (approximately 265 miles) King 24 could not establish radio contact with either Hillsboro or Nail 34. Shortly thereafter, approximately 0320Z, the Covey relayed from Hillsboro that Nail 34 had radio contact with the survivor. King 24 at that time directed Hillsboro via the Covey FAC to designate Nail 34 the OSC and requested Jack to launch the SAR Forces from CH 77. King 24 then requested a MICCAP, IRON HAND, Border Clearance and additional Sandy's from CH 89 and 93. At 0328Z, King 24 received information that the survivor was injured but conscious and that Nail 34 was requesting CBU 24/29, Nape and Paveways. The reported weather in the area was 4/8 coverage and workable for Paveways. King 24 continued north and did not have radio contact with Nail 34 until approximately 0400Z. Contact was established on Hillsboro's strike frequency (UHF). At 0408Z Jack passed an ETA for Sandy 9/10 as 0435Z. Nail 34 was putting in Fast Mover strikes at this time. At approximately 0415Z another Nail FAC (47?) was up on the strike frequency and advised he had two Hobo's, 20/21 and 2 CH-53's in the area. King 24 did not have radio contact with the Hobo's, but Nail 34 advised one of the Hobo's was SAR qualified. At 0415Z, King 24 was holding 270/20-50/77. JO 64/73 ETA for holding point was established at 0435Z. Sandy 03/04 ETA was 0455Z with JO 60/62. At approximately 0434Z Nail 34 talked with the survivor and reported he was hurt but calm. He then asked King 24 where the Sandy's were. I advised him that I would get Sandy 09 up on UHF for briefing as I intended for Sandy 09 to become the OSC for the pickup attempt. There was about a 5-10 minute delay as Sandy 09 had UHF problems and I couldn't get him up for the briefing. At this point Nail may have said something about the Hobo's and I indicated the Sandy's and JO were ready as soon as I could get them up. Sandy 03 came up and said he was in the area and I believe Nail 34 said "Lets get with it" - Sandy 03 said "I'm waiting on King." I told Sandy 03 to come on in and get briefed by Nail 34, which he did. There were several Guard transmissions with the survivor, one of which was a Battlecry aircraft. At 0505Z Sandy 03 was appointed OSC and proceeded with the first pickup attempt with Sandy 04, 09/10 and JO 64/73. At no time prior to the time indicated do I recall getting information from Nail 34 that the area was permissive and that he wanted to utilize the Hobo's and CH-53's for a pickup attempt.

RONALD J. SOROKA, Major, USAF
Assistant Operations Officer

85

MAJOR FRANK PEHR MAKES A STOP AT
THE VALLEY PRIOR TO HIS
MEDEVAC BACK TO THE STATES
26 MAR 71



Pehr.jpg

13 MAR 71
SAR

MAJ PEHR IS THE 8th MEMBER OF THE
37th AARRS
TO RECEIVE A PURPLE HEART FOR
"BATTLE CRY 315"

0945 JG 65/383 LOGGED 6.1 / 11 LANDING
 1045 JG 66/24 LOGGED 7.0 5 LANDING
 1050 DARR JRCC TOTAL 25?
 1051 LINE CHECK 5X5
 1200 SSGT ARUBE OFF DUTY

13 MAR 71

12/ 2045 CAPT GRAVES ON DUTY
 2130 MAINTENANCE STATUS RELAYED TO QUEEN
 2350 STATUS TO JOKER
 13/ 0100 JG 65 AIRBORNE CH 73
 0100 ITEM 14 CL WMFKQUOR
 0228 JG-71 AIRBORNE - ~~ENROUTE 95TH~~ and ITEM 14
 0245 JG 67 AIRBORNE - ENROUTE 95TH and ITEM 14
 0320 Queen & King 24 Report A Battle Cry 313
 AIRCRAFT IS DOWN 225/50/103 OR 275/98/77
 0323 JG-71/67 enroute to AREA. A NAL FAL HAS
 CONTACT WITH THE SURVIVOR - he is OKAY.
 0325 Queen Advises CHA 89 will get mission.
 0345 Joker Advises to stand by for Launch of
 BRAVO Birds.
 0349 Queen Advises to Launch BRAVO Birds
 JG-64 (COL BROWN) - JG-73 (COPPERHEAD)
 0355 JG-64 and 73 AIRBORNE AT 77
 0402 JG 64/73 HOLDING 275/65/77
 0405 SANDY 3+4 ETA 0415
 0410 SANDY 9+10 ETA 0435
 0415 HAIL 34 BINGO 0530
 0455 SANDY 3+4 AND JG 60/62 BINGO 0600
 SANDY 9+10 AND JG 64/73 BINGO 0750

0436 King 24 requested CBU 19 From RH 89

C-437 WEATHER 4/8 COVER BASES 4M-6M VISIBILITY 10'
TERRAIN IS A VALLEY ABOUT 1400'

0440 SURVIVOR SLIGHTLY HURT BUT CALM

Q455 SURVIVOR HAS ONE BROKEN ARM & ONE BROKEN LEG

0458 SURVIVOR SAYS HE HEARS NO GROUND FIRE - WILL REPORT IT IF HE DOES

0506 SANDY 9610 HOLDING 270/80/77

0610 SURVIVOR STILL OK.

0505 | S4N04 03 OSC

0530 SOMEONE TOOK GLD FIRE & HAS PULLED OUT.

053, J.G. 71 ~~1971~~ Landed

0535	HOLDING SMOKE A1 + A2 ON GENO
------	-------------------------------

0538 PHASE ALPHA TERMINATED FOR TIME BEING

0541 RINGNECK SMOKE AVAILABLE ON REQ

0513 PHASE ALPHA IN PROGRESS AGAIN

0551 PHASE ALPHA TERMINATED DUE GROUND FIRE TAKEN BY J. G. 64

0553	TWO PEOPLE HURT ON J6 64
------	--------------------------

0555 QUEEN SAYS JG 64 GOING HOME/103

0566 ONE PERSON HURT PRETTY BAD (QUEEN STG)

0600 1st 67 - ~~Drifted~~ LANDED

0820 LAUNCHING LG. OUT OF 89

OFF: REQUESTING SMOKE.

0600 LAUNCHING 71-ABW Now

0705 | J. 671 Hondine AT 275/ /77

0806 QUEENS REQ WE LAUNCH BIRD TO T 103 WITH EXTRA
CP TO REPLACE CP ON J.G. 64 / LAUNCH J.G. 70

0611 | 26 67 ABN

0611 ^{1 CHAS} ¹⁹ ~~SNEAKY WINTER~~ 21 IS DOWN. ANOTHER ARMY CHOPPER

Is Approximate P/U. Location UNK This Time

0618 KING REQ. NARC AND OTHERS GOODIES.

0622 SANDY ^{RTA} 9:10 To 77 For Fuel

0623 A/R Computer JG 60/62 BINGO 0845

0640 L.G 70 ABN For 103 With CP

0635 MAS PEHR IN HOSPITAL @ 103 at 103

0734 SET CURTIS 16 OTHER INSURED

06349 STILL PUTTING IN FAST MOVES

1.6. 71 & 67 ON THE DECK, 67 ~~REG~~ IS REFUELING.

196

①

1023 A 23mm JUST CAME UP AND HOSED DOWN SANDIES. (LR)

1047 JG 67 CALLED QUEEN ON HF. J.G. 71 WILL BE LEFT AT CH 103
FLT ENGINEER WILL REMAIN WITH AIRCRAFT (ALSO P.S.) INJURED
P5 RETURNING TO CH 77 ON J.G. 67 CDF

1058 Phase ALPHA STARTING CDF

1059 JG 67 AIRBORNE FROM 103 AT 1055. ETA CH 77 1145 CDF

1110 JG 67 CALLED IN - SPOKE TO USS SANCTUARY - PRELIMINARY
PROGNOSIS ON MTS PEHR - FRAGMENTARY WOUNDS - NO BROKEN BONES CO.

1112 SANDY'S REPORTED LAYING IN CHOP

1124 Phase BRAVO COMMENCING

1128 KING 26 CALLED - Phase ALPHA COMPLETE.

1133 Phase BRAVO COMMENCING

1134 Phase BRAVO TERMINATED (TAKING GROUND FIRE)

1136 JG 70 CALLED ON HF - JG 73 TOOK HITS. PILOT AND P5 HIT.

1138 PILOT OF JG 73 HIT IN LEFT ARM. P5 HIT BUT EXTENT NOT
KNOWN. NOT BELIEVED SERIOUS. JG. 73 PROCEEDING TO 103. (LR)

1140 P.S. NOT SERIOUS, THEY HAVE AN ENGINE SHUT DOWN. (LR)

1145 SANDY'S HOLDING HANDS WITH LOLLIES. (LR)

1148 SET SCOTT WAS WOUNDED BUT MINOR (LR)

1152 73 DID NOT SEE THE SURVIVOR BUT DID SEE CHUTE (LR)
QUEEN BELIEVES THAT HE DID NOT COME TO A HOVER - THAT
HE WAS HIT ON THE APPROACH TO THE HOVER AND THEN SHOT
ENGINE DOWN. GLIMBOOT WAS ON DUE ENG. (LR)

1226 Capt Walker Off (LR)

1225 JG 73 DOWN @ CH 103 (LR)

1250 QUEEN CALLED TO SAY THAT J.G. 70 IS JFM
AIRBORNE AND ENROUTE TO CHAN 77 WITH
CREW OF J.G. 73. FE, PRIANTE, STAYING AT 103 W/ JG 73.

1255 FLIGHT SURVEILLANCE REQUESTED TO MEET J.G. 70 JFM

1335 J.G. -70 ON DECK 77 JFM

1410 NORMAL SAR POSTURE NOTIFY BY QUEEN. *
1400 DAAR JRCC TOTAL 35.7 *
1425 LINE CHECK SXS *
1440 SET ARISE OFF DUTY *

22 March 1971

F-4D '67-0655' 13 TFS, 432 TRW, USAF, Udorn

Maj R D Priest (survived)

Maj R L Cubberly (survived)

A flight of Phantoms was flying an escort mission for a reconnaissance aircraft over the southern provinces of North Vietnam when one of the aircraft was lost. The formation was about 10 miles southwest of Dong Hoi when a SAM was launched at the aircraft. Maj Priest's aircraft, a Falcon fast FAC Phantom, was hit by the missile and burst into flames. The crew ejected immediately and evaded capture until they could be rescued by a USAF SAR helicopter. This was the first US aircraft to be lost to an SA-2 since October 1968. The serial quoted for this aircraft is incorrect, as 67-0655 is the serial of a Minuteman ICBM.

The last mission in March took Jolly Greens 72 and 70 into North Vietnam to recover two crewmembers of Falcon 84. Although the mission started on 22 March, it was not completed until first light on 23 March. Jolly Green 72, flown by Major Donald L. Jensen, recovered both pilots in good condition. No resistance was present in the pickup area but Jolly Green 70 flown by Captain Edward D. Harrow (high bird) took heavy 37mm and 23mm fire near Bat Lake NVN. The Sandy flight did a great job on this mission.

RATLIFE DIARY

FALCON 84
22-23 MAR 71

SAR Progress - 22 March 1971

- 0800 - Falcon 84 down at 312/52/103 (17°20' N 106° 31' E)
- 0806 - JG 72/65 Airborne.
- 0830 - Sandy 11/12 Airborne. King 27 Airborne.
- 0835 - JG 62/55 Launched. Escorted by Sandy 1/2 into India Orbit.
- 0838 - Dipper 3 has contact with 84 Alpha. None with 84 Bravo.
- 0911 - Chippy 403 & Stormy 01/02 will join hands and go into area.
- 0919 - Stormy 01 On Scene Commander.
- 0925 - Weather is D-S. Stormy 01 has made 3 passes over area. No visual contact with survivors. Has drawn no fire.
- 0932 - Sandy 09/10 in area. Alpha & Bravo contact with each other.
- 0955 - Sandy 09 - bad UHF. Sandy 10 has gone in to try and locate survivors.
- 0958 - Survivors have 2 radios, 4 batteries, and smoke.
- 1025 - Sandy 09 has good contact with 84 Alpha - trying to pinpoint location, 84 Alpha reports rain in area.
- 1045 - Sandy 11 is briefing, survivors to switch to on guard. start 2000L. Every two hours - radio check, until 0600.
- 1046 - Sandy 11 On Scene Commander.
- 1050 - JG 72/65 Air Refueling.

SAR PROGRESS - FALCON 84 ALPHA AND BRAVO (23 March 1971)

- 0530H - "OWL FAC talked to 84 Alpha, who reports Westher 5000 broken. (??)
- 0615H - "SPUD" reports cloud bases 2000 -4000 feet.
- 0615H - Queen says laungh SANDY 1 & 2 to Join Jolly Greens at India Orbit.
- 0625H - Queen says launch Bravo Jollies.
- 0630H - Jolly Green 72 airborne.
- 0631H - Jolly Green 70 airborne.
- 0633H - Jolly Green 67 airborne.
- 0634H - Jolly Green 65 airborne.
- 0646H - sounded like SANDYS taking off.
- 0720H - Jollies going out 268/25/103, then North to 350/20.
Bravo Jollies holding 360/40/103.
- 0750H - Phase Alpha complete. JG 70 taking heavy AA near Bat Lake - pulling out.
- 0751H - Phase Bravo in progress on Falcoln 84 Alpha.
- 0756H - Phase Bravo completed on Falcoln 84 Alpha.
- 0757H - Phase Brove in progress on Falcoln 84 Bravo.
- 0800H - JG 72 has tally-ho on Falcoln 84 Bravo.
- 0801H - JG 70 to the South of the Fence.
- 0804H - Phase Bravo complete on Falcoln 84 Bravo.
- 0806H - JG 72, SANDY 1 & 2 egressing. Beaucoup ground fire around Bat Lake.
- 0808H - Cobra 4 flight going to escort SAR forces out of area.
- 0810H - King 23 est India Orbit at 0855H.

0811H - JG 70 intercepting JG 72 to procede out together.
0814H - STORMY flight has tally-ho on SAR forces and will escort.
0823H - AR not required.
0825H - All SAR forces over the fence.
0826H - Both survivors OK. 84 Bravo has burns on hand and small piece of
shrapnel in thumb.
0828H - Neither Jolly took hits.
0908H - JG 72 & 70 on the deck @ 77.
0909H - JG 67 & 65 on the deck @ 77.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: 1 SOS (CC)

9 Mar 71

SUBJECT: SARCO Report for Cobra A & B

TO: DO

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 26 Feb 71 for two crewmembers of Cobra 23. The aircraft, an F4D out of Phu Cat AB, RVN, went down at approximately 1415L 25 Feb 71, on the 260° radial for 43NM of Channel 103. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort. All times are Thailand local.

2. At 1430L, 25 Feb 1971, A SAR was declared for Cobra 23. (Atch 1) The aircraft was downed by enemy gunfire in the vicinity of D-12, two parachutes had been observed and radio contact had been made with both survivors. The area was extremely hostile with active firefights and continuous airstrikes being put in. Hammer FACs were controlling all activity in the area. (Atch 2)

3. At the time the SAR was declared Jack scrambled Sandy's 09/10 from Da Nang, 05/06 from MCP and directed that Sandy's 03/04 were to remain on ground alert at MCP. 05/06 were to be escorts for Jolly Greens 66/72 which were scrambled from Da Nang. Sandy's 07/08 launched from Bien Hoa on their normal redeploy and were diverted to the SAR along with Hobo's 32/33 who were RTB with ordnance due to deteriorating weather in their target area. These were the forces participating in the first day effort. (Atch 3)

4. Sandy 09/10 arrived on scene at approximately 1600L and after being briefed by Hammer 40, 09 assumed on-scene command. (Atch 4) The weather in the objective area was marginal with heavy rain showers and intermittent low ceilings. Several attempts were made to penetrate the weather in an effort to pinpoint the survivors. Heavy ground fire was observed on all attempts and about the time the general area of the survivors was determined, Sandy 10 was hit by groundfire and exited the area to check damage. The inclement weather prevented full utilization of fast mover strikes however, Hammer 62 put in any he could. Sandy 10 had determined the damage was restricted to his external tanks, which he jettisoned, so he returned to the scene. At approximately 1620L, King ordered all SAR forces out of the area due to a TPQ alert called on guard. At 1635 Sandy 10 had to RTB due to low fuel so Sandy 06 was directed to the scene as low wing. (Atch 5) The effort to pinpoint the survivors continued and as they were located Sandy 09 took several hits in the underside of his aircraft and was streaming fuel from both external tanks. He jettisoned his load and RTB'd Channel 77 at approximately 1730. Later inspection revealed in excess of 10 entry holes in the aircraft with one the size of a football in the right elevator. Sandy 06 assumed on-scene command and 05 was called down to join him. Hobo's 32 and 33 had arrived after being released from their original mission and were assigned to escort the Jollies. (Atch 6) At this time there was approx

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST LOGGED

DO NOT DESTROY

No 0251766 D-8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Only 20 minutes of light remaining so the remaining time was used to positively pinpoint the survivors and identify areas of enemy gunfire in preparation for the first light effort that was to come. Sandy 06 gave the bed-down instructions to both survivors telling them Hammer FAC's would be overhead all night and they, the survivors, should stay off their radios unless they had something important to say. Regular 1/2 or one hour check-ins would only place a needless drain on the radio batteries as well as increase the possibility of enemy capture. Sandys 06/05 remained overhead until the first night FAC, Hammer 79, arrived at which time they RTB'd channel 89.

5. Upon debriefing the Sandys it was decided that the prime fast mover ordnance for sanitizing the area would be napalm. Enemy ground troops and armor were too close to the survivors for other types. A request was made to Blue Chip for "a wall-to-wall" nape for the first light effort. Was later informed we probably wouldn't get it as it "hadn't been fragged." Also requested fast mover smoke on alert to augment our own, as Sandy 09 said it would take a lot. Also had to justify to Blue Chip our request for release from next days frag in order to support first light effort. We were directed to maintain the 4 Smokes and generate all other available A-1's as Sandys. The weather forecast for first light was 4000' broken 9000' overcast 5MI GFH. Patchy GF dissipating by 1000 local. All in all much more favorable than the first day. The briefing was coordinated through Jack for 0300 local. King 21 would land at NKP to attend. Four Jolly Greens were to be launched out of Da Nang and four Sandys from NKP. The smoke aircraft were to remain on Ground Alert.

6. The first light briefing was held at 0300 with the Ops team of King 21 present. The first 6 Sandys, 4 Smokes and NKP alert Jollys also attended. King was requested to keep all forces other than Sandy low on 127.7 VHF and 38.8 FM to eliminate the congestion encountered on the first day. In addition 38.9 FM had been very noisy with many Comers transmitting. Also requested King and Queen talk to each other on HF rather than VHF. Intelligence and weather was presented after which the leads completed their individual briefings.

7. Sandy 03/04 launched at 0438 as the initial lows and Sandy 05/06 were off at 0447 to escort the Da Nang JG's. Sandy 03/04 arrived on scene at approximately 0545, 10 minutes prior to first light. (Atch 7) They received a briefing from Hammer 40 and assumed on-scene command at first light. The weather was marginal with Alpha's position completely obscured. Bravo's position had no sooner been located than it too was obscured by a low overcast. Repeated attempts were made to find a way under the clouds but were futile. During this period Hammer 40 requested ordnance to suppress some HMG fire that had been observed. Hammer 48 directed strikes against these positions. Around 0645 the weather improved enough for Sandy 03 to go down and locate the survivors. (600' overcast) Alpha was located and contacted. During several passes over his position Alpha reported artillery fire each time. Sandy 03/04 remained in the area until approximately 0830 when they RTB'd due fuel. Sandys 05/06 arrived from the JG orbit and 05 assumed on-scene command after being briefed by 03. (Atch 8) The

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weather continued to improve and after pinpointing the survivors positions 05/06 determined what areas gunfire was coming from. Sandys 07/08 arrived approximately 0900 and 07 assumed command after briefing by 05. 05/06 then expended their ordnance in the areas of known gunfire and RTB'd. (Atch 9)

8. Sandy 07/08 continued the process of trolling for gunfire and through coordination with the survivors was able to identify areas that needed sanitizing. Working with Hammer 54, 07 would locate and mark, and 54 would FAC in fast movers with napalm. All ordnance was directly on target and the area immediately around the survivors was clear. Sandy 07 began his planning for a pickup, estimating this would be possible within an hour. An ingress-egress route was picked and trolled. Rocket or mortar fire was sighted along this route and once again Hammer 54 was utilized to direct strikes of Snake and Nape in the area. The delivery was outstanding; and "the whole area was in flames." At this time 07 requested 4 Smoke aircraft to screen off a ridgeline that was thought to conceal a 23mm emplacement. Shortly thereafter King notified 07 that 4 fast mover Smokes were on the way. Sandy 09 was brought down from the JG orbit and briefed on the plan. Sandy 09 then trolled the route from the holding point and when he received no ground fire, returned to the JG's and briefed them. At this time Sandy 10 had to RTB due to a center-line fuel tank that would not feed. He was replaced by Sandy 11 from NKP. The survivors were then briefed on the plan by Sandy 07 and told to have their smoke flares ready to fire. Hammer 54 was briefed where to lay the smoke. Everything was ready. All forces were brought up on survival channel D and the Smoke birds executed. Sandy 07 and 08 marked the IP and too far points and 07 directed 09 and 11 to bring the Jolly down the chute. Alpha was directed to pop his smoke which the Jolly saw immediately. The JG moved into the hover while Sandys 08 and 09 and 11 ran a daisy chain around him suppressing any possible gunfire. Sandy 07 held high over the pickup point directing the operations. Alpha was picked up and the JG directed towards Bravo. Bravo was told to pop his smoke and again the Jolly saw it immediately. The Jolly moved right in and Bravo was picked up in minimum time. The entire force then exited the area with the Sandys laying down ordnance. The JG departed out over friendlies and RTB'd channel 77. Sandy 07 was very low on fuel at this time and had to divert to channel 103. All other Sandys RTB'd channel 89. (Atch 10)

9. Forces generated for the first light effort were Sandys 03 through 12 and Smoke 41 through 44. Sandys 01/02 were scrambled from Ubon but did not reach the scene in time to be utilized. (Atch 11).

10. Some problems experienced on other SAR's repeated themselves here. Sandy lows must be firm in insisting that King hold all assets on frequencies other than those Sandy Low is using. Also King is going to have to stop the practice of communicating with Queen/Jack on VHF. Radio clutter from these two causes were major problems for the Sandys on the first day. When King attends the first light briefing, there isn't any problem.

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In addition Sandy Low must get the survivor up on a different channel other than guard as soon as possible. The interference from area towers, fast-mover flights using it as common for joining-up, MIG warnings, ARC lights, etc. severely hamper communications.

11. On the second day of the SAR, Queen was asked by Jack on several occasions to update the Bingo times of the on-scene Sandys. Due to limited assets and reaction time this is vital. Queen/Jack/King must respond to this request because the fuel time for Sandys can vary from 3-5 hours depending on type of activity. This oversight caused Sandy 03 and 07 to be dangerously low on fuel when recovering at NKP and Quang Tri. In addition the practice of launching maximum assets for a first light effort is not realistic. The on-scene Sandys also recommend that the fast-mover variety of Smoke be used as a last resort only. It was described as looking like that used by skywriters and wholly inadequate for the type of screen needed.

12. The name of the game from here on out is MANAGEMENT of resources. We have gone from 70 odd A-1's on station to an average of 24. Downed American aircrews no longer have 1st priority on airframes as is evidenced in this SAR. The remaining aircraft must be judiciously scheduled until such time as the OSC decides an attempt is feasible. Then, and only then, should maximum forces be committed. The Sandy Low OSC is the only one that is qualified to make this decision, not TEEFEE/JACK/QUEEN/KING/JOKER. Premature utilization of our limited resources could be fatal for the survivors.

WILLIAM J. HAGAN, Lt Colonel, USAF
RCO

- Atch 1 SARCO Log
- 2 Hammer Statement
- 3 Flying Schedule
- 4 Statement for Sandy 09/10
- 5 Statement for Sandy 05/06
- 6 Statement for Hammer 32/33
- 7 Statement for Sandy 03/04
- 8 Statement for Sandy 05/06
- 9 Statement for Sandy 07/08
- 10 Statement for Sandy 09
- 11 Flying Schedule
- 12 SARCO Log

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COBRA 23 - 25 Feb 71

HAMMER 54
Capt Peter J. Ruppert
064-32-53237R

At approximately 1530 I was working a strike just south of Delta 38 when I heard a mayday call on guard saying that Cobra 23 had been hit and was jumping out. The call also included a HME and Radial which was the 260/40 of CH 103. I at the time was on the 275/40 of 103.

I finished the airstrike and proceeded to the 260/40 to see if I could be of assistance. Upon arrival I saw many airplanes in the area so I climbed to 10,500 feet to stay out of the way. There were five additional OV 10's all Hammer Facs, at least I presumed, them to be, about 20 choppers or so and I do not know how many fast movers. Hammer 229 was working a TIC at the time as well as the SAR and I asked if I could be of help. He told me yes since he was out of rockets. I went down and took over for him. I saw both survivors chutes and plotted their position. Hammer 04 was made on-scene commander by King and I continued working the TIC. Hammer 04 RTB'd due to low fuel and H-40 relieved him. I was relieved by H-223. After landing, H-04 and myself went back out to the scene at 6:15 and H-62 along with Sandy 05 and 06 were talking to the survivor. H-62 did not know the exact location so H-04 and myself went into the area and showed Sandy's location. We were then informed by Hillsboro to clear the area to the east since they had heavy artillery going in and could not shut it off. The Sandys and we then held east for approximately 10-15 minutes. By the time we were cleared back in, it was 1900 hours. The Sandys and us made repeated passes over survivors position* but took heavy AAA which came from a tank that sat approximately 300 meters west of the survivors on top of the hill. Both survivors were talking and informed us of a lot of ground fire everytime a Sandy made a pass. The survivors called for CHOP and TWIGGY but Sandy lead told them that it was getting too late and that they should hide themselves, not to worry, that there would be a Fac over them all night, to conserve their radios and use it only if absolutely necessary and that we (Sandys) would be back at first light to pick them up. Cobra 23A's reply was that "we would not be here in the morning". The Sandys RTB'd and H-04 and myself stayed on station until H-79 (the first night Fac) came out and we showed him both survivors' positions and also where the tank was that was shooting at us. H-79 then took over on scene and we (04 & 54) RTB'd. *To Show Sandy's Position Of Survivors.

26 Feb

The first Hammer Fac to launch was H-40 and he arrived on station at 0600. He informed us that the weather was bad and that he had not made contact with the survivors. At approximately 0800 H-40 informed us that they had reestablished contact with both A & B but the weather was still too bad to work the SAR. At 0900 H-40 called us and told us to launch the next Fac for the SAR. I, H-54, launched and arrived on station at approximately 1000am. H-40 RTB'd and Sandy 05 & 06 were on station.

note: Times are Virtual Times

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atch 2

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Sandy 08 relieved 05 & 06 and 07 became on-scene commander. The weather began to clear up quite rapidly and we had about a 8-10,000' overcast. Sandys 07 & 08 proceeded to talk to the survivor and made repeated passes over their approximate position. I asked Sandy 07 if he knew where both survivors were and he said that he knew where Alpha was but not quite sure where Bravo was. I then pointed Bravo's chute out to 07 which he had not seen before. (Oh yes, Alpha had pulled his chute in about a half an hour after he ejected on the 25th and it could not be seen anymore) When the Sandys made the passes the survivors informed them that they were taking ground fire and the approximate position where it came from. The Sandys then began to sterilize the area by making repeated passes. Sandy 07 then showed me where he wanted some airstrikes put and for the next 2 1/2 hours I put airstrikes in around the survivors while the Sandys were working in close proximity of the survivors with their own ordnance. At approximately 1230 Sandy 09 & 10 checked in with the choppers and at approximately 1315 it was decided to go ahead with the pickup. Sandy 07 told me where to lay down the smoke and I then worked Ringneck 957 flight and laid the smoke down. The Sandys (4 of them) then really worked the immediate area over and the chopper (65) was then brought in from the IP. Two other Sandys were laying down CEU on both sides of the choppers route and Cobra 23A was picked up first. After Bravo was picked up the chopper exited the area by means of the same route that he entered. The whole pickup took about 15 minutes. It was a well planned and well executed mission.

PETER J. RUPPERT, Capt, USAF
HAMMER 54

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FLYING SCHEDULE

25 Feb 71

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>ATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	SANDY			
CAPT MADDEN	01		GA	UBON
MAJ DE FELICE	02		GA	UBON
1LT WILSON	03		GA	NKP - Held By Jack
LT/COL BRUSHE	04		GA	NKP - Held By Jack
LT/COL ADAMS	05	1500	3.8	
1LT TATEISHI	06	1500	3.8	On-Scene-Commander
CAPT SMITH	07	1430	5.0	FROM BIEN HOA
1LT ROUSSEL	08	1430	5.1	FROM BIEN HOA
CAPT KEETER	09	1430	3.8	On-Scene-Commander
1LT CARMICHAEL	10	1450	2.7	
	HOB0			
CAPT LORENZEN	32	1405	5.5	
MAJ DONALDSON				
COL WALSH	33	1405	5.5	
	SMOKE			
LT/COL STONE	41		GA	
1LT LYON	42		GA	
MAJ WOLCOTT	43		GA	
MAJ ROBERTS, J.	44		GA	

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SAR FOR COBRA 23A & B

STATEMENT OF SANDY 09/KEETER

25 FEB 1971

Sandy 09 & 10 were scrambled at 1455 local from Da Nang to proceed to the 268/33/ 103 where we would hold with Jolly's 66 and 72. We were told enroute that an F4 was down at 260/43 103 and there were two survivors on the ground in good shape. Hammer 40 was on-scene commander and was working fast movers around the survivors when we arrived at the orbit point at 1555. After holding with the Jolly's for 10 minutes we were instructed by King to proceed to the 260/43 for a briefing from Hammer 40 who was running low on fuel, and we arrived on scene at 1600.

The weather in the target area had become steadily worse and was totally obscured by a rain squall when we arrived. We made several attempts at penetrating the valley where they were located and finally spotted the general vicinity of the survivors. Sandy 10 was hit in the centerline drop tank on one of these passes and proceeded out of the area under the escort of Nail 62. Nail 40 and I continued to make passes over the area while taking with the survivors in an attempt at pinpointing their locations. We were drawing heavy AAA fire on all passes from ZPU, 12.5, 23mm, 37mm and AK 47 Hand-held weapons. Due to the heavy fire it was impossible to remain very long in the immediate area, and a definite pinpoint on their location was not made. We were unable, due to the weather, to work fast-mover aircraft around the survivors.

I was given on-scene command at 1615 and had Hammer 62 with me to act as FAC for any fast-mover support we were able to use and because he was familiar with the area of the survivors. The weather began to improve about 1715 and I again went back into the area to determine the location of the ground fire and to see if it would be possible to plan a pickup before darkness that evening. I had Sandy 06 as my wingman on this pass as Sandy 10 RTB'd for Bingo fuel at 1645 due to the loss of his centerline tank. As I was pointing out the survivors location to Sandy 06 I felt three sharp thumps under the airplane and observed an airburst directly in front of the aircraft. I then requested Sandy 06 to look me over as we exited the area toward the friendlies. He noticed fuel streaming from the centerline and stub tanks, and I was forced to punch them off, leaving me bingo fuel. I advised King of this and turned on-scene command to Sandy 06. I recovered at DaNang, arriving there around 1840.

JACK E. KEETER, Captain, USAF
Sandy 09

Atch 4-

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SAR FOR COBRA 23 A & B

STATEMENT OF SANDY 05/06/ADAMS/TATEISHI

25 Feb 71

At 1430 L on the 25 Feb 71, Sandy 5 & 6 were preparing to launch on their normal J-orbit when they received a call from King that an aircraft had gone down. They were instructed to rendezvous at 265/32/103. The Sandy's tookoff and were given further information to cross the route structure where the least possible chance of ground fire existed. Despite thunderstorms enroute they managed to rendezvous with the Jolly Green helicopters and provided escort for them. Sandy's 9 & 10 were on scene and on one pass Sandy 10 took ground fire and was going to return to base. King advised Sandy 6 to take over for Sandy 10 and continue the search.

Sandy 6 arrived on scene and replaced Sandy 10. The weather over the survivors made it virtually impossible for a search to start so Sandy 9 & 6 orbited south of the survivors approximate position. During this time, several probes of the survivors area were attempted when it seemed as though the weather was breaking. Air bursts were sighted periodically and ground fire was evident from the hits Sandy 10 took and the tracers coming up from the West of the survivors.

The weather broke with ceiling of 4000' msl and Sandy 9 was about to show Sandy 6 the approximate positions of the survivors when Sandy 9 reported taking ground fire. He withdrew to the South and Sandy 6 looked him over. Sandy 9 was streaming fuel from his stub tank from 2 places and from his centerline fuel tank from 3 spots. He also had holes in the wing and Sandy 6 advised Sandy 9 of his aircraft status. Sandy 9 reported to King and told King that he was going to return to base.

Sandy 6 was placed on scene commander and asked for Sandy 5 to join him. When Sandy 5 arrived on scene a FAC who knew where the survivors were attempted to show Sandy 5 & 6 where they were. On the initial pass intensive ground fire was seen and because the location of the survivors were unknown, no ordnance was expended. A scheduled arc lite was about to commence and King advised the Sandy and FAC pilots to head East.

After the strike was over Sandy's 5&6 returned to the area and took intensive ground fire from small arms, automatic weapons, AAA and a tank, West of the survivors. The Sandy's then determined that it was getting too dark for a pickup attempt and ground fire made it unfeasible. Sandy 6 then proceeded to 'bed down' the survivors and instructed them to hide well and conserve their batteries.

Sandy 6 instructed King to have the FAC'S who were on scene to be there at first light and also have some type of aircraft to be over head of the survivors if they wanted to talk.

Sandy 5&6 then returned to base through thunderstorms and landed at NKP. Upon aircraft post flight Sandy 6 had received a small arms hole in the right flap.

CHRIS M. TATEISHI, 1st Lt, USAF
Sandy 06

Atch 5

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SAR FOR COBRA 23

Callsigns - Hobo 32, Hobo 33

Crewmembers - Capt Lorenzen/Maj Donaldson, Col Walsh

Date - 25 Feb 71

On 25 Feb 71, I was scheduled for a mid-tour instrument refresher with Major Donaldson in my right seat and Col Walsh. Our mission was fragged and briefed for the Barrel Roll. About 25 minutes after takeoff, when we were checking in with ABCCC, we were advised that the weather was unworkable in the Barrel and to return to NKP with ordnance. As we approached NKP, we were advised to divert to support the SAR in progress. King 26 gave us a route to a holding point (265/32/103). We had a good view of the "beach" around Delta 45 as we flew King's briefed route to the holding point. As we approached the SAR area, we were assigned to escort Jolly Green 65 and 67 in the vicinity of Quang Tri. We escorted the Jolly Greens until our bingo time at 1800L. At about the same time, the SAR effort was postponed for the evening for darkness. We recovered at NKP, logging 5.5 apiece.

EDWARD V. LORENZEN JR, Capt USAF
HOB0 32

Atch 6

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SAR FOR COBRA 23

STATEMENT OF SANDY--STONE

I departed NKP at 0440 with Sandy 04 to proceed to the position of Cobra 23A and 23B. When I arrived on scene Hammer 40 was working Candle 21 just North of the survivor's position. After first light, I assumed on scene command from Hammer 40. He took me into the area and gave a very comprehensive briefing of the area. The weather over Alpha was right on the ground. Bravo was in the clear. After Bravo's position was located the weather then moved over him and both survivors were under a low overcast. Several attempts were made to get under the weather, but they were all futile. A ridge line North and a ridge line East of the survivors was open and Hammer 40 stated that 51 Caliber fire had been coming from these areas. Naps and high drags were requested and Hammer 48 directed strikes along these ridge lines. Just South of the survivors were two camps of ARVN tanks. The other ARVN units were west of the survivors. About 6:45 the weather over Alpha started to lift so I went South and flew up the road and reached his position. At this time the weather was 600 feet above the road, but the hills on each side of it were obscured by clouds. Cobra 23A reported artillery fire as I would pass over his position. It was probably a mortar or a rocket that was fired at me. The general position of Alpha was determined and I made 5 or 6 passes under the clouds over him and each time reported ground fire. I stayed on scene as long as possible waiting for Sandy 07, but due to low fuel I had to RTB. Sandy 05 who was escorting the Jolly Greens came up and I let Hammer 40 brief him while I returned to base. Sandy 03 and 05 landed at NKP at 0910.

HERBERT H. STONE, Lt Colonel, USAF
SANDY

Atch 7

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COBRA 23 Alpha & Bravo

STATEMENT OF SANDY 07/08 RENTZ/PHILLIPS

26 Feb 1971

Sandy 07 & 08 were scrambled to replace Sandy 03 & 04 as the low and high Sandy respectively. However, by the time we arrived over the survivors position, Sandy 03 & 04 had RTB'd to channel 89 because of low fuel and King had turned the on scene command over to Sandy 05 & 06 (Roberts P./Lyon). Sandy 05 gave me a detailed briefing on the positions of the many friendlies in the general area, the areas where he had received ground fire, and then the position of the two survivors. Sandy 05 turned over on scene command to me at about 0900 or 0915 NKP time. King informed me that Hammer 54, a Fac, was holding in the area and was available for use at anytime. Sandy 09 & 10 arrived to orbit with the Jollies. I had learned from my briefing that both the survivors were in good condition and had all the standard survival equipment. My first task, to expend Sandy 05 & 06 in the area of known ground fire around Alpha's position. My second task was to try and pinpoint both Alpha's & Bravo's position. Already knowing their approximate positions I started with Alpha. I made several low passes around and finally directly over his position. Even though I was having difficulty reading Alpha's transmission my wingman and I were able to communicate with him and mark his position by using prominent terrain features. When I made every low pass over Alpha I asked him to listen for any ground fire that may come up. On almost every pass especially when I passed over him and flew to the northwest of his position he told me he could hear what he thought to be small arms or automatic type fire. And on one of my pull-offs over the top of the ridge to the Northwest I saw flashes from what appeared to me to be a 12.7. I told Alpha to stand-by and keep his head down and that I was going to mark the ground fire with a WP rocket and if he could see the smoke to tell me if that was the area from which the ground fire was coming. Alpha's view was blocked by a small rise of ground and he could not see the smoke but he had heard the rocket hit and said it was in the right area. This area was about 75 to 150 meters Northwest of Alpha. The 12.7 was on top of the ridge that overlooked Alpha's position 300 meters away. I knew now that the whole top of the ridge above Alpha & Bravo's position would have to be sterilized. But first I wanted to pinpoint Bravo's position and check out the area in his immediate vicinity. I repeated the trolling process over Bravo who was located about 150-200 meters North Northeast of Alpha. Alpha was about $\frac{1}{4}$ way up the hill and Bravo about $\frac{1}{2}$ way up. Bravo reported negative ground fire near his location at least nothing within hearing distance. Let me say now that I saw Bravo's parachute hanging in a tree on one of my low passes and used that to help keep myself oriented to Bravo's position which was about 75 to 100 meters South of his chute down the hill.

I asked King what was available in the form of strike aircraft and King said there were two flights (Cobra?) of F-4 on station with wall to wall Napalm. I made contact with Hammer 54 who was orbiting overhead and had been watching me and asked him to direct the fast movers to expend their napalm along the top of the ridge. I put down three WP rockets to mark the area I wanted hit. Hammer 54 had a tally on Bravo's chute.

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Atch 9

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So we agreed to restrict the run-in heading from the Northwest to Southwest which paralleled the top of the ridge line. While Hammer 54 briefed the fast movers, and my wingman and I made two passes delivering rockets and CBU-25 in the area. 75 to 100 meters Northwest of Alpha. Then we held to the South while the fast movers delivered their ordnance. All of their ordnance was directly on target and the whole top of the ridge line was in flames. After the smoke cleared I made many passes along the ridge but received no ground fire and couldn't find any sign of the enemy. I also made several more passes over Alpha and he reported no ground fire.

At this time I realized that we would be ready for a pickup possibly within an hour so I began formulating a plan. There were friendly forces in the area in the form of tanks, trucks and personnel massed in three areas about 2 to 3 miles West and Southwest of the survivors. When the time came for the pickup I decided I would hold the high Jolly (J567) over the friendlies and use this as an IP for the low Jolly. I planned to pickup Alpha first and then go directly to Bravo and pick him up and exit on a reverse of the entry route. I then flew back and forth along the route and had both survivors and my wingman listening and looking for ground fire. It was at this time that my wingman called that either B-40 rockets or some type of mortar fire was fired at me from along a road about 300 meters Southeast of Alpha's position.

I wanted to conserve the Sandies ordnance to protect the helicopter during the pickup so I again contacted Hammer 54 to have him work fast movers in the area. Since my wingman had seen the area I had him mark the position for the Fac. At this point a slight delay was experienced. My wingman thinking he had WP rockets in his LAU 9's tried to mark with them. After making two unsuccessful attempts to mark with rockets I had him drop a WP bomb. We found out later that the aircraft had been loaded incorrectly with heap rockets in his LAU 59's. (Now with the target marked the Fac went to work. This time snake and Napalm was used by A-4's (?) that did an outstanding job. The whole area was in flames).

+h4+

My wingman and I thought, since some 23mm which had come up the day before may be waiting to get shot at the Jolly we would smoke off that area during the pickup. At this time I ordered four smoke birds. King, a few minutes later informed me that 4 fast movers smoke were on the way. I asked him what kind of smoke they carried and King replied that it was what I needed. I also planned to run a smoke screen Northeast and Northwest above Bravo's position to mark off the top of the ridge. The wind direction was such that neither of these screens would obscure the survivors.

I then brought Sandy 09, the escort Sandy, down to the area and left Sandy 10 with the helicopter. I pointed out the friendly position and told Sandy 09 I planned to hold the high Jolly at about 8500 MSL over them and also use a point just East of the friendlies as an IP for the low Jolly that I would mark just before the pickup started. I then showed him the position of both survivors and the areas that we had been receiving ground fire. Then with him in loose trail I flew along the proposed entry route of the helicopter to Alpha's position then to Bravo's position.

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I told him that the exit route would be the reverse of the entry. Then I sent Sandy 09 to the area of the friendlies and told him to troll for ground fire that may come up on the Jolly that was to hold there and then if no fire was received to go back to the Jollies holding point 265/25/103 and brief the Jollies on the proposed plan. At this time Sandy 10 RTB'd because of low fuel. His center-line wouldn't feed. I also realized that I may run out of fuel before a pickup could be made so I ordered two more Sandies. I told my wingman to figure out a pressure altitude and temperature and give that information to King and have them pass it on to the Jollies. And next I started to brief Hammer 54 where I wanted the smoke Southeast of Alpha. I planned to use my CBU-22 to mark off the ridge line to the North. (Sandy 11 arrived to take Sandy 10's place).

Then I told Sandy 09 & 11 to bring the Jolly to the forward holding point over the friendlies. I contacted the survivors and told them to get out a flare and get ready to ignite it when told to and to be sure and use the safety loop on the jungle penetrator. Both crewmen acknowledged. I then told Alpha that I was going to put a dud WP bomb near his position. I used this as a too far smoke for Alpha and also as the turning point to get to Bravo. I also put another dud WP bomb down as a too far point for Bravo. This bomb broke up and spread smoke making a perfect screen to protect the JG from any bad guys on the ridge that may have survived. So I did not use my CBU-22 to mark off the ridge.

Everything was ready. All the briefings had been done on VHF. Everyone was brought over the 2828 channel D. Guard channel had been too cluttered with the other aircraft. I told Hammer 54 to send in the fast mover smoke (?) on the prebrief starting point and heading. The smoke was layed. I told my wingman to get in trail with me and we layed CBU-25 along the entry route of the Jolly. I put in two WP rockets in the last position of ground fire around Alpha and told Sandy 08 to hammer that area. I climbed up over the scene, the smoke to the Southeast was blocking any big gun fire from that direction. I told Sandy 09 & 11 to bring in the Jolly and lay down ordnance continuously around him. The Jolly started his run. I told Alpha to pop his smoke. The Jolly had no trouble seeing it and moved right into the hover. Sandy 08 joined 09 & 11 in a daisy chain around the JG delivering ordnance at random making sure to stay away from Bravo's position. I held high direction traffic. With the Alpha man on board I directed JG to the direction of Bravo. The JG also had the smoke I had put down to aim for. I had Bravo man pop his smoke and directed JG to his position. The Jolly moved right into the hover and picked up Bravo. The Sandies continued delivering ordnance on the exit. I directed the JG out the exit route and instructed him to climb in a left climbing turn that positioned him over the friendlies. I was extremely low on fuel because of having to use high power setting most of the time. I turned command over to Sandy 08 and immediately headed for Gn 103 with Hammer 54 leading the way. (There are several suggestions I have in order to make the SAR force and procedures more efficient. First, since for the next 3 to 4 months we are going to have to use E+G models for SARs, I recommend that 2 more WP bombs be added to the present E model Sandy load.

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Secondly, all Sandys should be made familiar with all the different types of fast mover smoke. Thirdly, I recommend that the use of the mirror be emphasized in survival training. This is the only way to pinpoint the survivors position without exposing his position to the enemy. I was unable to see the crewmen on the ground and I did not know exactly where they were until they popped their smoke. Fourthly, I recommend that the Bingo time for an opposed SAR where the Sandy low is maneuvering at low altitude and at Max performance be changed to 3 or 3½ hours depending on his distance from channel 89.

Levy M. Rentz

LEVI M. RENTZ, Capt, USAF
SANDY 07

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STATEMENT

SAR Report/Cobra 23 A/B
26 Feb 71/Sandy 09/Lt Wilson

On this date at 0820 local, Sandy 9 and 10 launched on a SAR effort for two downed crewmen of an F-4, Cobra 23 A/B.

Immediately after take off Sandy 9 and 10 contacted King, passed on ETA and bingo time and proceeded to the designated holding point to meet and escort Jolly Green 65 and 67. Upon arrival, at approx. 0915 local, Sandy 10 could not get his centerline fuel tank to feed. A revised bingo time was then passed to King. Jolly 65 and 67 arrived at the holding point at approx. 0930 having just refueled.

At approx. 1015 local, Sandy 07 requested Sandy 09 to come down into the area for a briefing on the survivor's location. Sandy 10 remained with Jolly 65 and 67. During the briefing Sandy 07 pinpointed the survivors, pointed out friendly positions, and discussed the pick-up tactics. Sandy 09 trolled for ground fire upon request from Sandy 07 and then returned to brief the Jollys.

At approx. 1030 local Sandy 10 was forced to RTB due to his fuel state. Sandy 09 remained with the Jollys and at approx. 1100 local was joined by Sandy 11. The escorts and Jollys continued to hold until Sandy 07 requested them to proceed to the SAR area and hold over the friendly positions.

About 1140 local Sandy 07 called for the pick-up execution. Jolly 67 remained high as Jolly 65 was led in by Sandy 09. With Sandy 11 covering his tail, Cobra 23A popped his smoke and Sandys 8,9, and 11 joined in a daisy chain around him covering the Jolly and laying down ordnance. With Alfa on board, Jolly 65 proceeded to Bravos position and picked him up in like fashion. The Jolly was then egressed from the area escorted by all the Sandys.

Sandy 09 and 11 escorted the Jollys to a point just west of Ch. 103 and were then released to RTB Ch 89.

ROBERT L. WILSON, 1Lt, USAF
Sandy 09

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COBRA 23 ALPHA & BRAVO SAR

CALL SIGN: Sandy 5/6

Crew Members: Captain Roberts/Lieutenant Lyon

DATE: 26 Feb 71

FIRST LIGHT EFFORT: Launch Time — 0445 Local

Captain Rentz was originally scheduled as Sandy 05, however, he encountered AC generator problems in the arming area and Captain Roberts moved up to the Sandy 05 position. Mission was helicopter escort on the 265/25/103. Arrived on station at 0555 Local. Jolly Green 65 (Low) and 67 (High) arrived at the rendezvous at approximately 0630 Local. At approximately 0830 Local. Sandy 03 (On-Scene-Commander) reached bingo and was forced to RTB. We proceeded into the area and received a thorough briefing on the survivors' situation and best known locations. The weather was rapidly improving and so we decided to pinpoint the survivors and lay down some ordnance in their immediate area to silence the small arms and automatic weapons that they reported each time we flew over the area.

Starting with Alpha, he reported he was in excellent condition and the radio sounded very strong, so we made criss-cross low altitude passes over his area until we were positive about the position within about 15 meters. As it turns out later, the position I briefed to Captain Rentz was approximately 25 meters southeast of the actual position he was picked up at. Each time I passed over his position he called ground fire from a position over a small hill and directly west of his position.

Moving over to Bravo's position only two low altitude passes were required to pinpoint his position which turned out during the pick-up to be exact. He stated that light/sporadic gun fire was coming from somewhere north of his position, but I was not able to locate this reaction.

Sandy 07/08 (Captain Rentz) arrived in the area at this time and I began to brief him on the positions of the friendly and enemy forces and the survivors' positions as known at that time. I marked the known area of the gunfire west of Alpha's position and passed the On-Scene-Command to Captain Rentz at about 0905.

I suggested that he use our ordnance to try to quell the gunfire in the area around Alpha and he agreed. Lt Lyon and I delivered CBU-25, Rockets, and 20mm in that area before beginning to RTB.

RTB to NKP at 1005 Local — No further incident.

Philip A. Roberts, Captain, USAF
SANDY 05

Atch 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SARCO LOG

25 Feb 1971

- 1430L - Jack called - SAR declared - A Navy F-4, Potato Masher 665 down at 260/43/103. Two good chutes were observed and radio contact has been established with both survivors. Generate 4 Smokes.
- 1440L - Sandys 05/06 to launch and proceed to area to escort Da Nang Jolly Greens. Sandys 09/10 scrambled from 77.
- 1445L - Hobo 32/33 RTB'd from BR due WX. Divert to SAR effort per JACK/BLUE CHIP.
- 1450L - Advised Jack to check ARC LIGHT Schedule with Blue Chip. Have a couple that could cause trouble.
- 1445L - 3 Huey Cobras in area.
- 1508L - Sandys 07/08 redeploying from Bien Hoa diverting to scene.
- 1512L - Hammer 04 On-Scene-Commander (OSC). Reports tanks in area and moving towards survivors position. Weather 5000' scattered visibility good. Mach mach ZPU, small arms plus tanks reported. Call sign of downed aircraft now reported as Cobra 23, F-4D out of Phu Cat.
- 1536L - King 26 directed launch of King 27.
- 1545L - Sandy 09/10 in area. Sandy 09 OSC.
- 1605L - Smoke 41/42 cocked. Sandy 10 RTB'd channel 103 with battle damage, holding hands with Hammer 62.
- 1610L - Sandy 10 looked over by other aircraft and is returning to scene. Jettisoned tanks.
- 1621L - SAR forces being pulled back due TPQ alert for 270/33/103. Centralized control prevents aborting missions endangering friendlies.
- 1625L - Smoke 43/44 cocked and Ground alert.
- 1635L - Sandy 10 RTB'd 77 due to low fuel. (No external tanks)
- 1730L - Sandy 09 hit in external tanks and streaming fuel. RTB'd 77. Jettisoned tanks.
- 1745L - Smokes and Sandys released from ground alert.
- 1755L - First light effort. Survivors being bedded down.
- 1805L - Hammer PACS will be overhead all night.

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- 1822L - Sandys 05/06 ETA 89 1845 local. King 21 will be airborne control for first light and will arrive 89 0215-30 local for briefing. Tail # 220, pilot Maj DiIorenzo. Will require 20,000# JP-4.
- 1910L - Sandy 09 down @ 77. At least nine entry holes in aircraft, one size of football. Sandy 10 will RTB 89 in AM. Fast mover Smokes on alert at 77. Sandy 09 says it will take a lot of Smoke for an attempt.
- 1920L - 2255 local established for first light time. WX forecast 4000' broken 9000' overcast 5 NM GFH. Patchy GF dissipating by 0300L.
- 1950L - Jack - 4 JG's will be launched from Da Nang.
- 2050L - Called Blue Chip with request for napalm. Maj Stinson at the Chip.
- 2200L - Lt Col Bryant, Blue Chip, called and wanted to know why we needed relief from all our normal fragged sorties for the SAR. Tried to explain how short of airframes we were. He said OK but would pursue in future. Also said he didn't think we'd get our request on wall to wall napalm as it wasn't in the frag. Might get us some mixed loads.
- 0040L - Called Jack - Hammer 04, 46, 62 will be the on-scene FACS tomorrow. Sandys 03/04 will launch at 2145 local and 05/06 at 2155 local. The smokes and NKP JG's will be CD.
- 0145L - Still can't get ordnance line-up out of Blue Chip. King 21 estimating block time on the hour. Candlestick 21 and Hammer 79 were heard calling, "Beeper Beeper come up voice."
- 0215L - Received call signs and TOT's for fast mover strikes. No ordnance loads given.
- 0300L - Briefed first wave.

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SARCO LOG

26 Feb 1971

0415 Sandy 03 - (Sandy 07 soft and pilot Ambattat) (Sandy 05)
generator, so Sandy 07 soft and pilot Ambattat
Sandy 05)

0452 (FAC) OSC with King

0525 Hammer 40 (OSC)

0530 King switched plan of checking in on 127.7 and receiving 123.1 for
Sandy low and reversed it so we could monitor the Sandy low opera-
tion (Queen apparently only has 127.7)

0550 King established first radio contact day with 23/B

0553 King established first radio contact day with 23/A

0600 Jolly Green 65/67 at holding pt 10NM E of survivor.

0610 Sandy 03 OSC, (Stone) weather is D.S. Bingo Time 0200

0730 Req Bingo Time for 03 again (ans 0200)

0756 Launched 07/08 to replace 03/04 and become Sandy low

0815 Sandy 03/04 are calling Bingo now! There will be insufficient time
to get 07/08 there so I suggested move JG escorts 05/06 (Roberts)
to OSC temporarily.

0820 Launched 09/10 as JG escorts

0830 Sandy 05 OSC, WX improving, will attempt to pinpoint survivors.

0900 Sandy 05 has position of survivors W/I 10 Meters and briefing
replacements 07/08.
Radio contact with Stone says trail WX is bad enough for cover so
acft can go direct to scene.

0905 Sandy 07 (Rentz) OSC

0925 Sandy 10 (Col Rouch) can't get his C/L tank to feed - new Bingo
for him is 1030. Wanted to launch 11/12 immed. to replace 09/10.

0955 Sandy 12 aborts (no radio)

1010 Sandy 10 got his fuel feeding again but then it quit again - asked
Jack to get him released and leave 8-9 with Jolly's - need acft -
neg from King.

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SARCO LOG

1012 Blue Chip pulled 2 - H models (my next Sandy lows) for the CD barrel roll.

1015 Maint has 4 acft but Sgt Moore cannot get them to concentrate on on acft that I have to get up for my #2 JG escort. (Sandy 09 replacement)

1030 Asked Jack to reconfirm Bingo for 07/08 as 1200L

1045 Bingo confirmed as 1130. Asked Jack to launch 01/02 from UBN as Sandy low.

1115 Sandy 01/02 launched

1151 Cobra 23 Alpha picked up by JG 65

1156 Cobra 23 Bravo picked up by JG 65

1205 Sandy 09 and 11 escorted JG to CH 103 where they were released - Survivors were recovered into CH 77.

1240 Sandy 07 landed at CH 103 because of shortage of fuel. RTB to NEP 1 hr later.

1437 SAR Terminated by Queen

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FLYING SCHEDULE

26 Feb 71

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>ATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	<u>SANDY</u>			
CAPT MADDEN	01	1115	2.7	FROM UBON
MAJ DE FELICE	02	1115	2.7	FROM UBON
LT/COL STONE	03	0438	4.5	On-Scene-Commander
1LT MATHERS	04	0438	4.7	
CAPT ROBERTS, P.	05	0447	5.3	On-Scene-Commander
1LT LYON	06	0447	5.3	
CAPT RENTZ	07	0800	4.7	On-Scene-Commander
CAPT PHILIPS	08	0800	4.7	
1LT WILSON	09	0820	4.9	
COL ROUGH	10	0820	3.2	AIR ABORT
LT/COL DUNWOODY	11	0955	3.4	
CAPT TAYLOR	12			AIR GROUND
MAJ WOLCOTT	13		GA	
1LT KILAND	14		GA	
MAJ PLACE	15		GA	
CAPT STEWART	16		GA	
CAPT RENTZ	07	1445	1.0	RTN FROM QUANG TRI
	<u>SMOKE</u>			
MAJ BELT	41		GA	
LT/COL MURRAY	42		GA	
1LT TIPTON	43		GA	
CAPT MAMIYA	44		GA	

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH

1971

SURVIVORS

NAME RANK

SSN

DATE	CREW	JG	SAVE #	ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	TYPE SAVE
2	BAKKE HARROW ROGERS NARDI PECORARO MONTENAYOR	73	610	LE HANOS NHW (U.N. SAILOR)	CON SON ISLAND	MEDICAL 1 NON-CME
6	MUDD MERCHANT JOHNSON MUELEHI McDONALD HACKLEY LEWIS (AP)	71	611	TIPTON, CHARLES 4LT SANDY 04 56 SOW NKP	1639 N 106.23 E	COMBAT
23	JENSEN WALDER MCKIDNEY RATLIFF HAWCOCK KIRK SHAPIRO (AP)	72	612 613	MAJOR ROBERT D. PRIEST XXXXXXXXXX 432 TFW MAJ ROBERT L. CUBBERLY XXXXXXXXXX 432 TFW	312/32/103 North VN	2 COMBAT

TOTAL MONTHLY SAVES 4

Vietnam War Aircraft Losses

1377	6 Mar 1971	A-1H	LAOS	Tipton C. L.	1Lt	Rescued	USAF Helo				
1378	12 Mar 1971	F-100D	SVN	Jeffs C. G.	1Lt	MIA					
1379	16 Mar 1971	O-2A	LAOS	Scrivener S. R.	1Lt	KIA		Seeley D. M.	Capt	KIA	
1380	22 Mar 1971	F-4D	NVN	Priest R. D.	Maj	Rescued	USAF Helo	Cubberly R. L.	Maj	Rescued	
1381	22 Mar 1971	F-100D	LAOS	Moriarty P. G.	Capt	KIA					
1382	24 Mar 1971	OV-10A	LAOS	Butcher J. M.	1Lt	POW (returned)					
1383	26 Mar 1971	A-37	CMB	Krueger D. W.	1Lt	KIA					
1384	4 Apr 1971	F-100D	CMB	Smith J. S.	1Lt	KIA					
1385	6 Apr 1971	A-1J	LAOS	Stewart J. W.	Capt	Rescued	u Helo				
1386	11 Apr 1971	F-100D	SVN	Buerk W. C.	Capt	KIA					
1387	13 Apr 1971	F-100D	CMB	u	u	Rescued					
1388	15 Apr 1971	F-100D	SVN	Hauck J. C.	Capt	Rescued	Army				
1389	21 Apr 1971	F-4D	LAOS	u	u	Rescued		u	u	Rescued	
1390	24 Apr 1971	F-4	LAOS	Lemon J. C.	Capt	MIA		Sigafoos W. H.	1Lt	KIA	
1391	26 Apr 1971	O-2A	LAOS	Mellor G. L.	1Lt	Rescued		Fleming G. J.	1Lt	Rescued	
1392	28 Apr 1971	F-100D	SVN	Lang B. G.	1Lt	KIA					
1393	6 May 1971	F-4E	LAOS	Blissett A. S. Jr	Maj	Rescued		u	u	Rescued	
1394	4 June 1971	OV-10A	LAOS	u	u	Rescued		u	u	KIA	
1395	18 June 1971	A-1H	LAOS	White R. F.	Capt	KIA					
1396	20 June 1971	OV-10A	LAOS	Ross S. R.	Maj	Rescued		Moxon A. L.	1Lt	Rescued	
1397	27 June 1971	A-37	CMB	Jones R. W.	Capt	KIA					
1398	29 June 1971	F-4D	Sea	Ricks W. R.	Capt	Rescued		Buffkin B. D.	1Lt	Rescued	
1399	5 juli 1971	OV-10A	LAOS	Thomas D. W.	1Lt	MIA					
1400	10 juli 1971	RF-4	SVN	Wheeler R. C.	Capt	Rescued	USAF Helo	Stuermernav J. F.	1Lt	Rescued	
1401	18 juli 1971	A-1H	u	u	u	u					
1402	22 juli 1971	RF-4	CMB	Musgrove W.	LtCol	Rescued	Army Helo	Stuermeyer J. F.	1Lt	Rescued	

37th ARRS Makes Save Up North.

(Continued from Pg. 1)

"Everything happened so fast it was hard to tell exactly what was going on," recalled Major Priest. "We felt the concussion from the blast and the warning lights came on all over the instrument panel. The aircraft jerked up and we ejected."

The two pilots estimated that they landed within a quarter of a mile from each other. They immediately established radio contact and waited for the search and rescue (SAR) aircraft to come in.

"I landed in a tall tree and got hung



Major Priest

there," recalled Major Cubberly. "I could hear enemy troops on the ground below me. One of them was blowing a shrill whistle and the troops rejoined him down the hill and came back up again in two columns."

All this time the weight of the parachute was causing the tree branches to crack. "I thought the cracking noise might alert the troops below me, but they apparently didn't even notice me," related the major about the harrowing experience.

As poor weather and darkness crept over the area, the pilots prepared to spend the night there.

"Things really started happening fast



Major Cubberly

the next morning. As soon as it got light, we could see A-1 Skyraiders in the area."

"About 45 minutes later we saw the Jolly Green coming in," recalled Major Priest. "Before long they had picked me up and I was in the bird."

The rescue helicopter then went in and had the back-seater, Major Cubberly, picked up within five minutes.

Maj. Donald L. Jensen was the aircraft commander of the HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant helicopter which made the pickup.

"This was a classic SAR mission. As soon as we went up this morning, everything went like clockwork. There was no heavy opposition and we were able to get right in there and pick up the survivors," commented Capt. Glen W. Walder, the co-pilot. "It turned out just like you hope they all do."

Other crewmembers on the rescue chopper were TSgt. Carlos J. McKinney, the flight engineer and the three pararescuemen, TSgt. Henry C. Kirk, SSgt. John C. Ratliff and A1C Danny D. Hancock.

Pilots Rescued From N. Vietnam

After 15 hours on the ground in North Vietnam, two F-4 Phantom pilots were picked up by rescue crews from the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) and returned safely early Tuesday (March 23).

Majors Robert D. Priest and Robert L. Cubberly were forced to eject from their Phantom when it was hit by an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) near Don Hoi north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

While flying as an armed escort for reconnaissance aircraft, the Phantom crew successfully evaded one SAM but a second SAM exploded near the Phantom causing many of the aircraft's systems to malfunction. It shortly thereafter burst into flames.



23 MAR 71

—15 hours on ground—

Rescue crews pluck 2 from North

DA NANG — After 15 hours on the ground in North Vietnam, two F-4 Phantom pilots were picked up by rescue crews of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron and returned safely to the Republic.

Majors Robert D. Priest and Robert L. Cubberly were forced to eject from their Phantom when it was hit by an enemy surface to air missile near Dong Hoi, north of the Demilitarized Zone.

The two men had successfully evaded an earlier SAM missile during their escort mission for reconnaissance aircraft, but a second SAM exploded near them causing many of their aircraft's systems to malfunction. Shortly thereafter the plane burst into flames.

"Everything happened so fast it was hard to tell exactly what was going on," recalled Major Priest. "We felt the concussion from the SAM blast

and the warning lights came on all over the instrument panel. The aircraft jerked up and we ejected."

"I landed in a tall tree and got hung up there," said Major Cubberly. "I could hear enemy troops on the ground below me. One of them was blowing a shrill whistle and the troops rejoined him down the hill and came back up again in two columns."

All this time the weight of the parachute was causing tree branches to crack. "I thought the cracking noise might alert the troops below me, but they apparently didn't even notice me," the major continued.

As poor weather and darkness crept over the area, the pilots prepared to spend the night where they were.

"I cut down some palm leaves and made a shelter to hide in and protect me from the rain, which was pouring down by this time," related Major Priest. "But I still got soaked that night."

"Things really started happening fast the next morning. As soon as it got light, we could see A-1 Skyraiders in the area."

"About 45 minutes later we saw the Jolly Green coming in," recalled Major Priest. "Before long they had picked me up and I was in the bird."

The rescue helicopter then went in and, within five minutes, had Major Cubberly picked up.

Maj. Donald L. Jensen, Jolly Green pilot, and Capt. Glen W. Walder, co-pilot, agreed that "this was a classic SAR mission."

A 100' Lighter Plane
n12 and n13

MARCH 1971

Pacific Stars & Stripes
Friday, March 26, 1971

28 MAR 71 SAR
5

Downed in N. Vietnam, Pilots Evade Searchers

SAIGON (AP)—Two U.S. Air Force pilots told Wednesday of spending a night hiding from the enemy in North Vietnam after their F4 Phantom fighter was shot down on a reconnaissance mission.

Maj. Robert D. Priest, 38, Victorville, Calif., and Maj. Robert L. Cubberly, 33, Bowling Green, Ohio, were flying escort for a reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam Monday. A SAM missile fired at them exploded near their plane. Pilots call the long SAM missile the "Flying Telephone Pole."

"Everything happened so fast it was hard to tell exactly what

was going on," Priest said in a statement released by the headquarters of the U.S. 7th Air Force.

Cubberly said he parachuted into a tree, and could hear enemy soldiers below searching for him.

"They apparently didn't even notice me," Cubberly added, though his weight was causing the tree branches to crack.

The two pilots estimated they landed within a quarter of a mile of each other.

"I cut down some palm leaves and made a shelter to hide in and protect me from the rain, which was pouring down by that

time," Priest said. "But I still got soaked that night."

As soon as the sun rose Tuesday morning, Priest said, their emergency radios led Al Skyraider search planes to them.

"About 45 minutes later we saw the Jolly Green rescue helicopter coming in," Priest said. "Before long they had picked me up and I was in the bird."

Cubberly was picked up five minutes later.

The two were shot down at the same time that U.S. protective reaction air strikes were carried out against three antiaircraft missile sites in North Vietnam.

MAJ DON JENSEN MAKES THE
PICKUPS UP NORTH

0345 JG 72 AB
 0415 JG 65 ABN A
 0613 JG 70 & 67 ABN A
 0710 JG 72 Down 3.5 A
 0720 JG 65 Down 3.2 A
 0800 JG 67 & 70 Down A
 0800 FALCON 84 DOWN TWO GOOD CHUTE @ 312/52/103 320/53/103 A
 0806 JG 72/65 ABN (720N 106 31E) A
 0830 SANDY 11 & 12 ABN AND KING 27 ABN A
 0835 JG 62/55 LAUNCHED ESCORTED BY SANDY 1 & 2 INTO A
 INDIA ORBIT
 0838 DIPPER 03 HAS CONTACT WITH FALCON 84 "A" NONE WITH "B" A.
 0911 CHIPPY 403 AND STORMY 1 & 2 WILL JOIN HANDS TO GO A
 INTO AREA.
 0919 STORMY 01 OSC A
 0925 WX IS DS; STORMY 01 HAS MADE 3 PASSES OVER AREA
 NO VISUAL CONTACT WITH SURVIVOR HAS DRAWN NO FIRE AT
 0932 SANDY 09 & 10 IN AREA. "A" & "B" CONTACT WITH
 EACH OTHER NEW POSITION ~~WITH~~ ^{OFF} SURVIVORS 325/32/103
 AREA A FLAT MARSHLAND
 0955 SANDY 09 BAD 4HF, SANDY 10 HAS GONE IN TO TRY
 LOCATE SURVIVOR
 0958 SURVIVORS HAVE 2 RADIOS, 4 BATTERIES AND SMOKE A
 1001 JG 72/65 HOLDING 350/40/103
 1022 QUEEN WANTED TO LAUNCH BL & BH, COL COPPERTHYTE
 ADVISED COL PRINE THAT IT WOULD TAKE 50 MIN
 TO REACH THE AREA. A.
 1025 SANDY 09 HAS GOOD CONTACT WITH ALPHA MAN-
 TRYING TO PIN POINT POSITION
 84 "A" REPORTS RAIN IN AREA.
 1045 SANDY 11 IS BRIEFING SURVIVORS TO SWITCH TO ON GUARD
 START 2000L EVERY TWO HOURS RADIO CHECK, TILL 0600
 1046 SANDY 11 OSC AT THIS TIME.
 1225 HF RADIO OUT CONTACT MAINT GU #051064 A
 1255 JG 72 Down LOGGED 4.9 A
 1303 JG 65 Down LOGGED A
 1305 L. C. C. 515 A

23 MARCH 1971

0040 CAPT MERCHANT ON DUTY M
0040 POWER FAILURE IN PROGRESS. NOTIFIED QUEEN.
PASSED MX STATUS & SAR POSTURE SAME CALL. M
0025 POWER BACK ON. NOTIFIED QUEEN. M
0015 LAUNCH ALPHA BIRDS M
0015 LAUNCH SANDY 1 & 2 M
0025 LAUNCH BRAVO BIRDS M
0030 JG 70 AIRBORNE M
0031 JG 72 AIRBORNE M
0033 JG 67 AIRBORNE M
0034 JG 65 AIRBORNE M
0109 JG 70, ON THE DECK - LOGGED 2.7 M
0109 JG 72 ON THE DECK - LOGGED 2.7 M
0110 JG 67 ON THE DECK - LOGGED 2.7 M
0110 JG 65 ON THE DECK - LOGGED 2.6 M
0150 ITEM 14. EB DD AKPT LUZV M
0245 JG 67 & 70 QUICK TURN-AROUND COMPLETE M
0246 JG 72 QUICK TURN-AROUND COMPLETE M

MSN NBR A-3-014

//2304// PHASE BRAVO COMPLETE - FALCON 84 A/B F-4D
#612 MAJ ROBERT D. PRIEST (SR PILOT)
478-34-9189 432 TFWg, UDORN
#613 MAJ ROBERT L. CUBBERLY (NAV)
270-32-0794 432 TFWg, UDORN M
PICKUP POSITION 312/52/103.

0333 JG 70 AIRBORNE - for FRAG.
0348 JG 67 AIRBORNE - for FRAG.
0400 CAPT MERCHANT OFF, SSGT ARISSE ON
0401 ALERT SYSTEM TESTED.
0608 JG 70 Down LOGGED 2.6
0615 JG 67 Down LOGGED 2.6
1015 DARR JRCC TOTAL 15.9
1030 LINE CHECK SXS, SSGT ARISSE OFF Duty

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED

Changed to CONFIDENTIAL

By Authority of C-25

By E-88 (Date) 26/2/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 30 Mar 71

2 Apr 71

MISSION NUMBER: 03-007-30 Mar 71 ✓

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 24 ✓

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Apache 12-13

LOCATION: UTM WT 060 760

SAVES: 3 Combat

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 79

(S) At 0250Z, King 24 copied an emergency call on Guard from Apache 26, Apache 26 had been wounded but was okay, and there were two CH-6 helicopters down east of Phnom Penh. King could not contact Apache 26. Rustic 05, OV-10, contacted Apache 26, as well as, Baron 01, C and C UH-1, Shadow 22, AC-119, and Black Pony 12-13, OV-10. King copied the position and situation on Guard, but could not contact any of the aircraft in the area. King attempted to contact Agate/Ram Rod, EC-121, for border clearance. No contact. King proceeded from orbit to the fence while the radio operator secured border clearance from Joker at 0255Z.

King made contact with Rustic 05 at approximately 0310Z and received a briefing on the situation. Apache 12 and 13 had been shot down at UTM WT 060 760. Rustic 05 did not know if there were any survivors. Baron 01 reported that he believed there were two survivors. Rustic 05 was asked if he could use the assistance of USAF SAR forces. Rustic replied affirmative. At 0315Z, King requested Jolly Green 64-67 and Sandy 07-08 be launched from CH 75. Jolly Green 55-62 and Sandy 01-02 were requested from CH 93.

Rustic 05 was appointed On Scene Commander. He was working Black Pony 12-13 and Shadow 22 in the SAR area. King coordinated with the OSC, Ram Rod 01, and Joker for fast movers with soft ordnance.

King requested launch of King 27, alert tanker, to refuel the Jolly Greens. Joker advised that King 27 was not available, however, King 26 would be airborne.

At 0343Z, Rustic 05 reported Baron 01 was going to attempt a recovery with Shadow cover. King accepted the OSC evaluation of the situation. The decision to attempt the recovery was immediate and coordinated on a discrete FM frequency apparently. Rustic 05 asked

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~~SECRET~~

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King to standby on the radio during the attempt. At 0345Z, Rustic 05 reported that Baron 01 had recovered two survivors in good condition and that there was one more survivor on the ground.

Rustic 03 arrived and was appointed CSC at 0350Z. Shadow 22 and Black Pony 05-06 continued to suppress ground fire. The CSC and the strike aircraft reported heavy fire coming from a pagoda close to the SAR scene. At approximately 0412Z Dustoff 115 made a recovery attempt and was successful in recovering one more survivor. King called both Baron 01 and Dustoff 115 to confirm that there were four objectives, three recovered. Dustoff 115 reported that there was one more man lying on the ground 10 meters south of the wreckage nearest the pagoda. Dustoff 115 reported that his medic told him the man on the ground had burns and he could not determine if he was dead or unconscious.

Sandy 07-08 arrived in the area at 0422Z Jolly Green 64-67 arrived at 0430Z. After a briefing by Rustic 03, Sandy 07 was appointed On Scene Commander. Rustic 03 remained to serve as FAC for the mission.

Between the period 0442Z and 0604Z, A-37 Hawks and F-400 blades were used to soften the area for another recovery attempt. Enemy fire power increased during the early progress of the SAR effort. Fire from the pagoda was a continuing problem.

Sandy 01-02 arrived along with Jolly Green 55-62 at 0525Z. King 26 was not available for refueling so it was necessary for King 24 to refuel JG 55-62 enroute to the scene. At 0610Z Joker advised that the problem pagoda could be struck. King 23, west alert tanker, was requested when it was apparent that no support could be expected from King 26. King 24 completed air refueling JG 55-62.

Sandy 07 reported that he felt the area was secure for a recovery attempt at 0640Z. Jolly Green 64 attempted the recovery but was driven off by ground fire on egress. The recovery attempt was aborted and Shadow 14 moved into the area to hose down the area of concentrated ground fire. Sandy 07-08 were nearing bingo time, and expended the rest of their ordnance. Sandy 01 was appointed CSC. Sandy 07-08 were instructed to RTB and come back out ASAP.

Jolly Green 64-67 had to RTB after the recovery attempt. King 24 did not have enough fuel to refuel 64 and 67. Sandy 01 was CSC at 0720Z. The Hawks and Shadow 14 expended during this period in an attempt to eliminate the ground forces that threatened JG 64. Sandy 01-02 were approaching bingo time and expended their ordnance. Rustic 20 was appointed CSC until Sandy 07-08

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could be re-cycled. Sandy 01-02 departed for CM 73 at 0815Z. Joker approved King 24 request to leave JG 55-62 in the area with King 23. Rustic 20 put Hawk 03-04 on the target. Hawk 03 flight was particularly effective with LDA of 100/100, 100% within 5 meters.

King 23 had completed refueling JG 55-62 and was appointed AMC at 0836Z. Hawk 07-08, Blade 01-02 and Hawk 01-02 were inbound to support the mission. King 24 was Bingo and departed for CM 102 for fuel.

King 24 Crewmembers

SAR Resources

AC/AMC Capt Hoover
CP Capt Morrow
N Capt Knuth
RC TSgt Martz
FE MSgt Keel
LM SSgt Rivera

Jolly Green 64-67
Jolly Green 65-62
Sandy 07-08
Sandy 01-02
King 23, Tanker

Strike Aircraft

Other Resources

Shadow 22
Black Pony 12-13
Baron 01
Black Pony 05-06
Hawk 05-06
Hawk 07-08
Blade 07-08
Hawk 03-04
Shadow 14
Baron 03

Sealord Snake
Dustoff 115 Medevac
Ram Rod 01
Ram Rod 02
FAC
Rustic 05 OSC
Rustic 03 OSC
Rustic 04
Rustic 20 OSC

RICHARD D. HOOVER, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander



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CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Or Changed to CONFIDENTIAL
By Authority of GDS
By 958 (Date) 26/2/75

DATE: 30 Mar 71

2 Apr 71

MISSION NUMBER: 03-007-30 Mar 71 ✓

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 23 ✓

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Apache 12-15

LOCATION: UTM WT 060 760

SAVES: None

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF INFORMATION PER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED 310579

(S) At 0627Z on 30 Mar 71, King 23 was alerted for immediate launch to assist King 24 who was conducting a rescue operation for survivors of a helicopter crash in the vicinity WT 060 760. Airborne at 0650Z, King 23 proceeded directly to the scene, arriving at 0815Z and immediately descended to refuel Jolly Greens 55 and 62. At 0836Z, King 24 was forced to RTB due to bingo fuel and King 23 assumed control of the mission. At this time the situation was as follows: Three survivors had been picked up and a fourth man was lying in an open burned out area. Jolly Greens were driven off earlier by ground fire in their attempt to reach this man however, he was believed to be unconscious and Joker had directed the rescue effort to proceed under this premise. Rustic 20 was On Scene Commander (OSC) and was engaged in directing air strikes against numerous enemy troop positions in the vicinity of the downed crewmember. Jolly Greens 55/62 were assigned to a holding area and we were awaiting the return of four Sandys and two Jolly Greens that had returned to CH 73 earlier for fuel and ordnance. At 0930Z, an Apache helicopter was able to approach the SAR scene briefly and reported enemy movement within 100 meters of the man, whom he believed to be dead; air strikes continued. At 1000Z, a 51 Cal gun was spotted within 500 meters and strikes were directed against it. Friendly ground teams in the area reported they were unable to reach the crewmember due to heavy resistance in the area. Jolly Greens 64/67 were enroute, having completed their refueling at CH 73, however none of the Sandy aircraft were airborne. Joker advised that TACG was sending five Cobra gunships to the area and that they could be used to support the Jollys if the Sandys were not available. At 1045Z, Rustic 23 replaced Rustic 20 as OSC, Jolly Greens 64/67 were holding (JG 55/62 were released to RTB shortly before due to fuel), and shadow 12 (C-119 gunship was standing by to assist. The Sandys were still having difficulty in their turn around efforts at CH 73 and were not going to arrive before dark. Repeated queries to Ram Rod and Joker plus several calls on Guard were made in an effort to locate the

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Cobra gunships which were to be in the area; the attempt was unsuccessful and it became apparent that Shadow 12 would be the only support aircraft available for a possible pickup attempt. By 1110Z all known gun positions were suppressed and the only small arms fire was confined to one location approximately 100 meters from the crewmember in a tree line. Darkness was rapidly approaching and the decision was made to make one last attempt to reach the man with Shadow 12 suppressing the troops at the tree line. At 1115Z, Jolly Green 64 and 67 were maneuvering into the area when small arms fire was observed coming from a nearby pagoda (which had been neutralized earlier). We ordered the Jollys to pull off and abandon the pickup due to the possibility of further unknown ground fire with our minimum fire support. At 1117Z, as the Jollys were retreating from the area we received a call from Joker directive all forces to RTB. When queried on this they advised that communications with the Dustoff who had previously picked up the survivors confirmed that this fourth man was, in fact, deceased. All SAR forces departed the area and Rustic 23 was released as OSC.

King 23 Crewmembers	Strike Acft Used	Other Acft
AC/AIC Major Fleck	Hawk 07, 01, 23	King 24
CP 1 Lt Johnson	Blade 01, 07, 05	Rustic 20, 23 (FAC)
W Capt Dugan	Apache 16	JG 55/62/64/67
EO Sgt Conlon	Shadow 12	
FE TSgt Fielder		
LI TSgt Stone		

John J. Fleck
JOHN J. FLECK, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

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(3) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES WERE LAUNCHED OR DIVERTED:
(A) KING 24, HC-130P, DIVERTED 30/0251Z.
(B) JOLLY GREEN HH53C 64 AND 67, LAUNCHED 30/0340Z.
(C) SANDY'S 7 AND 8, A-1'S, LAUNCHED 30/0353Z.
(D) JOLLY GREENS, 55 AND 62, HH-53C, LAUNCHED 30/0353Z.
(E) SANDY'S 1 AND 2, A-1'S, LAUNCHED 30/0345Z.
(F) KING 23, HC-130P, LAUNCHED 30/0650Z.

C. PERSONNEL INFO:

(1) 4 INVOLVED/4 LOCATED/3 SAVED/1 KIA.
(2) LOCATING AGENCY, RUSTIC 05, OV-10; TIME OBJECTIVE
LOCATED, 30/0245Z; GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF RECOVERY SITE,
11-33N 105-03E.
(3) RECOVERY AGENCY AND METHOD USED TO RECOVER SAR OB-
JECTIVE:
(A) BARON 01, UH1H, LANDED AND RECOVERED 2 SURVIVORS.

PAGE 4 RUMMRSA0195 ~~SECRET~~

(3) CUSTOFF 155, UH1H, LANDED AND RECOVERED 1 SURVIVOR.
(4) DISPOSITION OF SAR OBJECTIVES: 3 SURVIVORS WERE
AIRLIFTED TO U.S. ARMY HOSPITAL AT BINH THUY, RVN. REMAINS OF
PERSON KIA WILL BE EXTRACTED BY U.S. ARMY.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:

(1) 39 ARRS 2 SORTIES/12.4 HOURS
(2) 37ARRS 4 SORTIES/13.0 HOURS
(3) 40ARRS 2 SORTIES/18.2 HOURS
(4) 55SOW 4 SORTIES/18.8 HOURS
(5) 830S 14 SORTIES/10.5 HOURS
(6) 35 TFW 8 SORTIES/14.0 HOURS
(7) NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL SORTIES FLOWN BY U.S. FIXED
WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS (UNITS UNKNOWN).

E. SAVES DATA:

(1) IDENTITY OF RESCUE COMMANDERS MAKING SAVES.
(A) BARON 01, UNKNOWN.
(B) CUSTOFF 155, UNKNOWN.
(C) KING 24, 39ARRS, CAPT HOOVER.
(2) NAMES, SERVICE AND NATIONALITY OF PERSONNEL SAVED.
3 U.S. ARMY AIRCREWMEN, NAMES UNKNOWN.

PAGE 5 RUMMRSA0195 ~~SECRET~~

(3) 3, COMBAT SAVES.

(4) 3, AIRCREW MEMBERS

F. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:

(1) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF SAR EFFORTS. AT 0250Z,
30 MAR 71, THE 3RD ARRG P JACC WAS ADVISED BY TACC THAT TWO
U.S. ARMY OH-6A HELICOPTERS WERE SHOT DOWN AT POSITION 11-33N,
105-03E. THE TWO HELICOPTERS WERE HIT BY GROUND FIRE FROM A
PAGODA IN THE AREA THEY WERE WORKING. THERE WERE AT LEAST FIVE
OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA. AT LEAST TWO PILOTS WERE REPORTED
TO BE ALIVE. KING 24, HC130P AIRCRAFT, ON PRECAUTIONARY
ORBIT AND WAS DIVERTED AT 0252Z AND ASSUMED DUTIES AS AIRBORNE

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MISSION COMMANDER. AT 0340Z, KING 24 REPORTED THAT BACON 01 HAD PICKED UP TWO OF THE FOUR JOLLY GREEN PERSONNEL IN GOOD CONDITION. AT 0420Z, KING 24 REPORTED THAT JETOFF 105 HAD PICKED UP A THIRD SURVIVOR, IN GOOD CONDITION. INITIAL INFORMATION FROM THIS SURVIVOR INDICATED THE FOURTH MAN WAS BADLY BURNED AND PROBABLY UNCONSCIOUS. THE FOURTH MAN WAS APPROXIMATELY 10 METERS FROM THE WRECKAGE OF HIS AIRCRAFT. THE 3RD ARRGP JRCC COORDINATED DIRECTLY WITH TACC FOR USA AND USAF AIR STRIKES TO SUBDUCE ENEMY FORCES IN THE AREA. INTENSE RESISTANCE WITH LIGHT

PAGE 3 RUMMRSA0195 ~~SECRET~~
WEAPONS BY THE ENEMY FORCES NECESSITATED CONTINUED AIR STRIKES TO NEUTRALIZE THE AREA. AT 0838Z KING 23 ASSUMED AIRBORNE MISSION COMMANDER DUTIES. TACTICAL AIR STRIKES CONTINUED UNTIL 1114Z WHEN WORD WAS PASSED TO JRCC BY 7AF THAT THE REMAINING U.S. ARMY CREWMEMBER WAS KIA. CONFIRMATION OF KIA STATUS WAS MADE BY ONE OF THE SURVIVORS DURING DEBRIEFING AT US ARMY HOSPITAL, BINH THUY. SAR FORCES WERE RTB'D AT 1115Z. K24 REFUELED JOLLY GREEN 55&62 ONCE. K23 REFUELED JOLLY GREEN 64&67 ONCE. US ARMY PLANS TO RECOVER REMAINS OF CREWMEMBER KIA.

GP-4

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