

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FROM: 130S (Lt Col Stone/2116)

12 Feb 1971

SUBJECT: SARCO for Report for BIGOT 02A & 02B

TO: DO

1. An unsuccessful rescue was attempted on 3-6 of February 1971 for Bigot 02A & 02B. The aircraft, an F-4, went down at approximately 1115 3 Feb 6 miles north of Delta 22. The reason for bailout is unknown however, Bigot 02B stated that there was an aircraft malfunction. This report will cover those activities relating to the SAR forces during rescue effort. All times are Thailand local.
2. Sandy 01 & 02, 03 and 04 were launched at 1145. Sandy 01 & 02 proceeded directly to the position of the survivors. Sandy 03 & 04 escorted Jolly Green 56 & 60 to an initial holding point of 100/90/89. Sandy 01 was appointed on scene commander at approximately 1230. When Sandy 01 established contact with Bigot 02A & 02B, 02A stated that he was in good shape and had no injuries. 02B stated that his back was hurt, but he was alright. Approximately 30 minutes after Sandy 01 and 02 arrived on scene, Bigot 02A stated he had movement very close to his position. Shortly thereafter he stated, "they are shooting at me, I'm hit, I'm hit. Help me! Help me!" (Atch 1) After this transmission no other contact was made with Bigot 02A. Sandy 01 & 02 attempted to penetrate the overcast, but the weather was right on top of the Karst and they were forced to climb back on top of the 6500 foot overcast. Nail 59, 23 and 41 worked in the area and also attempted to find a hole and penetrate the overcast, but their efforts were to no avail. Sandy 01 & 02 turned on scene command to Sandy 03 at 1530 and returned to base. (Atch 2)
3. Sandy 03 & 04 had been holding with the Jolly Greens and had reached bingo fuel after 30 minutes as on scene commander. Sandy 05 & 06 had been scrambled from Ubon and Sandy 07 & 08 had been scrambled from Bien Hoa. Sandy 07 & 08 assumed the role of Jolly Green escort and Sandy 05 relieved Nail 41 as on scene commander at 1630. Hobo 30, 31, 22 and 23 were diverted from their missions and proceeded to the area of the SAR. Sandy 05 was able to find a hole and attempted to penetrate the overcast. He penetrated the overcast and broke out at 500 feet above the ground. After getting down there was no place to go due to the poor visibility and the Karst hidden in the clouds. Sandy 05 climbed back on top and with Nail 63 and Wolf 04 began to pinpoint the survivors location with TACAN and DME. The fine work of Nail 63, Wolf 04, and Sandy 05 gave a very accurate location of the objective and this position was used throughout the rest of the SAR effort. Darkness forced the SAR forces to withdraw from the area. Bed down instructions were given to Bigot 02B and a check in night procedure for night coverage was established. (Atch 3)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. The first days effort consisted of 8 Sandy aircraft, 4 Hobo strike aircraft, 4 A-1 Smoko aircraft and 4 Nails. Also, an unknown of fast movers were available for the effort. (Atch 4)

5. Extensive preparations were made during the night for the first light effort of 4 Feb 1971. The deployed A-1 aircraft from Bien Hoa and Ubon were recovered at NKP as well as the Jolly Greens from Ubon. Four more Jolly Greens from Udorn were also deployed to NKP, giving a total of eight Jolly Green resources at NKP. Joker established 0600 as first light and briefings and take off times were based on this time. The first six Sandy pilots, two smoko pilots, four Jolly Green crews, Nail 45 and King 21 were briefed at 0400. The Sandy pilots were briefed on the call signs of Mig cap, Ironhand, Blu-52, Napo, fast mover smoko, and Paveway. They were also informed that various other types of ordnance would be available through King 21, the AMC.

6. Overnight cap was provided Bigot 02B by the Nails and one Candle. Nail 7 contacted the survivor at 1940, 2030, and 2115. Nail 72 also reported being shot at during the night through the clouds. He described the burst one kilometer east of his position, which was 092/86/89, as black airburst similar to an airburst of a MK-82. No contact was made with the survivor from 2115 until Nail 82 made contact at 0415. The weather in the area was reported as 8/8 with tops 7000 feet. Bases were unknown.

7. The first of the SAR forces launched between 0530 & 0615. They consisted of eight Jolly Greens and four A-1 Sandy aircraft. Sandy 01 & 02 proceeded to the area of the survivor and Sandy 03 & 04 escorted the Jolly Greens to an initial holding point of 113/50/89. A final holding point was established at 091/79/89 to get the Jolly Greens closer to the survivor's position in the event a pickup was attempted. Sandy 01 & 02 arrived in the area of the survivor at approximately 0610 and relieved Candle 23 as on scene commander. Radio contact was established with Bigot 02B and he stated he was being fired on from 100 meters. The weather in the area was right on the trees and Sandy 01 & 02 were unable to penetrate the overcast. (Atch 5)

8. Sandy 05 & 06 launched at 0840. Nail 41 and Wolf 06 were also on scene. A few breaks were beginning to appear in the overcast to the South and West of the survivor's position. Sandy 05 requested Paveways and instructed Nail 41 to put them in on the route structure that could be seen through the overcast in the vicinity of Ban Karai Pass. However, before st. lkes could be put in, the weather closed in and the only ordnance that could be put in was CBU-49. SAM and MIG calls were being broadcast almost continuously. 37MM and 85MM antiaircraft fire was being directed at the SAR forces during the entire period. Wolf 06 reported RHAW indication of gun laying radar. Bigot 02B was requested to make a check of his spare radio. This he did and it checked loud and clear. Sandy 11 & 12 arrived on scene at 1315 and relieved Sandy 05 & 06. (Atch 6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. Sandy 11 and 12 arrived on scene at 1315 and continued to search for a way to penetrate the overcast and pinpoint the survivors position on the ground. Sandy 11 finally was able to penetrate the 300 foot overcast, using ADF cuts from the survivors radio, and pinpoint his position. Bigot 02B reported that there was no ground fire on Sandy 11 for the first four or five passes, but he reported small arms fire on passes South of his position. The small arms fire was soon joined by 23MM from the East. Sandy 12 penetrated the overcast and reported ZPU fire. Sandy 12 put down a dud M-47 bomb on a hill west of the survivor to use as an IP for the Jolly Green. Another 23MM started shooting at this time and the fire became very accurate. Sandy 11 took a couple of hits in the left and right wing. After a look over, the battle damage was assessed as not significant and Sandy 11 instructed Sandy 12 to bring the Jolly Green under the clouds. Sandy 11 received several airbursts of 23MM directly in front of him and aborted the pickup attempt. Sandy 11 jettisoned his stores, left Sandy 12 as on scene commander and returned to NKP. (Atch 7)
10. Sandy 09 & 10 had scrambled from Da Nang at 1330 and proceeded to the area of the survivor. Sandy 09 received on scene command from Sandy 12 and instructed Smoke 41 and 42 to take the Jolly Greens back to the forward holding point. Sandy 09 located the survivor and brought Sandy 10 down through the clouds to assist him. Sandy 10 took a 23MM in his right wing and returned to base. Sandy 09 then brought Sandy 15 down, briefed him and then returned to NKP. (Atch 8)
11. Sandy 15 became the on scene commander at 1700. The weather had deteriorated to 300-500 feet. Sandy 15 appraised the ground fire situation, which consisted of ZPU, automatic weapons, and much small arms fire, and determined that it would be impossible to suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of a helicopter survive a pickup attempt. Sandy 15 gave the survivor instructions for another night on the ground and turned on scene command to Nail 52 at 1745. All SAR forces returned to base at 1800. (Atch 9)
12. The SAR effort of 4 February 1971, consisted of 16 A-1 Sandy aircraft, 4 A-1 Smoke aircraft, 8 Jolly Greens, and 5 Nails. An unknown number of Wolf FACs and fast mover strike aircraft were also used during the day. (Atch 10)
13. Overnight preparations for the effort of 5 February 1971, were similar to those of the previous night. All deployed Sandy aircraft were returned to NKP along with eight Jolly Greens. King 21 arrived NKP at 0315 and a briefing was conducted at 0400 for King 21, Sandy 01 through 06, 4 Jolly Greens and Smoke 41 & 42. The call signs of Mig cap, Ironhand, and Paveways and strike aircraft were briefed. Overnight coverage of the survivor was provided by Nail 99, 96, 76 and 68. No voice contact was made with the survivor during the night.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. The SAR effort of 5 Feb 1971 started with the launch of Nail 45 at 0520. Four Jolly Greens were airborne by 0555. Sandy 01 proceeded to the area and relieved Nail 45 as on scene commander. Sandy 03 and 04 escorted the Jolly Greens to the initial holding fix. Sandy 01 established voice contact with the survivor and determined that: (1) He was still using his radio (2) He still had one canteen of water (3) He was in good condition (4) He was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue (5) There was no movement around him (6) No guns had been moved into his position during the night. Sandy 01 asked Bigot 02B if he could move over the ridge line and Bigot 02 replied that there was two guns on the ridge line and he didn't think it was a good idea. Bigot 02B stated that the weather was right on the trees. Every attempt to penetrate the overcast by Sandy 01 was futile. (Atch 11)
15. Sandy 07 relieved Sandy 01 as on scene commander, established voice contact with the survivor and continued to search for a hole and an area where the ceiling would allow flight over the survivor's position. Each attempt was unsuccessful. Nail 43 and Wolf 04 were in the area and Sandy 07 requested paveaway to cut the road that was visible north Ban Karai Pass. A short time after 1100 Nail 43 reported that Bigot 02B came up on the radio three times in about five minutes. Sandy 07 heard the last two transmissions which were indistinguishable, but were in an excited whispered tone. This was the last known voice contact with Bigot 02B. Sandy 07 & 08 continued to search for a way to get over the survivor's position and during the search strafed a truck on the route structure leading to the survivor's location. (Atch 12)
16. Sandy 09 assumed on scene command from Sandy 07 at 1330 and attempted to establish voice contact on all of the survival frequencies. At 1400 the weather began to break and Sandy 07 could see the survivor location. However, no voice or beeper contact could be made. Sandy 07 & 08 continued to circle the survivor's position and antiaircraft guns began to fire. This included 231M, 371M and 57 or 85M. Sandy 13 and 14 were on their way to the scene and Sandy 09 started to brief them when King 21 stated Migs were in the area and suggested all SAR forces withdraw. Sandy 09, 10, 13 and 14 withdrew and returned to Base. (Atch 13 & Atch 14)
17. All SAR forces returned to NKP. The effort for the day consisted of 14 Sandys, 6 Jolly Greens, and 4 Nails. The number of fast mover strike and FAC aircraft is unknown. (Atch 15)
18. Coverage over the survivor was again provided by the Nails. No voice or beeper contact was established during the night and joker directed that a modified effort be made for the 6th of February 1971. Two Sandy A-1's would launch with four on ground alert. Six Jolly Greens and four Smoke would remain on alert at NKP. Sandy 01 and 02 launched at 0710 and proceeded to the area. The weather was again overcast and no voice or beeper contact could be established. Sandy 01 and 02 returned to base and no other Sandy aircraft were launched.
19. During this SAR effort a total of 40 Sandy aircraft flew, 18 Jolly Greens Sorties, 13 Nail Sorties and 4 Hobo Strike Sorties. (Atch 4, 10, 15, 16)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20. This SAR effort was unsuccessful. We ask ourselves a series of questions to determine why. These questions are: (1) was there anytime during the extended period of this effort that a pickup could have been attempted with reasonable assurance of success? (2) What were the biggest stumbling blocks to success? (3) How would we do it, if it had been done over again? (4) Would any of the Sandy low loads have any reason for self-recrimination? Let's start with the first question and determine if a pickup attempt could have been made. The first time that the overcast was penetrated and the survivors position was pinpointed was approximately 1330 on 4 Feb, the second day of the SAR. Sandy 11 located the survivor and moved the Jolly Greens into a position for pickup. Sandy 11 received heavy ground fire, sustained battle damage, and was forced to withdraw (Atch 7). Sandy 09 was on scene and both 09 and 10 received battle damage (Atch 8). Sandy 15 and 16 were the last Sandy aircraft on scene on the 4th of Feb and in his statement Sandy 15 states: "It was impossible to sufficiently suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of having a helicopter survive a pickup attempt." (Atch 9). On 5 Feb the weather was penetrated, but there was no voice or beeper contact which indicated that there was no longer an objective. The environment around the survivor made it impossible for the A-1 to operate without being endangered by ground fire. A helicopter is much more vulnerable and I honestly believe that it would have been shot down. In view of these facts I do not believe a pickup could have been made. Now let's look at the stumbling blocks to success. First of all the weather was the biggest factor in this unsuccessful SAR. At no time did we have weather conditions that would allow the use of all the airpower that we had at our disposal. Another factor was the very hostile environment that the survivor was down in. The quantity and quality of anti-aircraft defences made it necessary to use suppressive air power against them and without good weather this was impossible without endangering the survivor. I feel that a survivor can be picked up in a non hostile environment with bad weather or in a hostile environment with good weather. With bad weather and a hostile environment, the chances of a successful pickup are nil. How would we do the SAR if we had to do it again? First, the principals employed by the SAR forces were sound. The only point that can be made is the excessive radio transmissions made to the objective and the replies that he was expected to make. When the weather is completely unworkable, a TACAN radial and DME is close enough for Sandies. If the weather starts to break or the survivor calls and says that it is improving, then a pinpoint electronic search should be conducted. Excessive transmissions by the survivor or the SAR forces could very easily give his position away to enemy forces. Eliminating excessive transmissions not only will extend the life of the survivors radio, but may also deny the enemy information as to his position.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Please do not misunderstand, if it is necessary to use the radio, use it. The fourth question has to be directed to all the Sandy Pilots in the wing. There has been some self recrimination by the pilots and we want to prevent a situation that could develop as a result of these feelings. After a study of all of the statements made by the Sandy Pilots, there is no doubt that each and every member of the SAR Force did everything in their power to make a successful pickup. The Sandy pilots must always remember that when the Helicopters are committed, there must be a reasonable chance of success. Although there is a feeling of "maybe" among the Sandies, all you have to do is think how you would feel if a Helicopter had been committed and been shot down. Do not rush to commit a Helicopter in the future. The basic principals of search and rescue still apply and if used will produce the desired results, crew members rescued.

HERBERT H. STONE, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

16 Atch

1. Statement for Nail 62
2. Statement for Sandy 01/02
3. Statement for Sandy 05
4. Flying Schedule
5. Statement for Sandy 01/02
6. Statement for Sandy 05/06
7. Statement for Sandy 11
8. Statement for Sandy 09
9. Statement for Sandy 15/16
10. Flying Schedule
11. Statement for Sandy 01
12. Statement for Sandy 07/08
13. Statement for Sandy 09/10
14. Statement for Sandy 13/14
15. Flying Schedule
16. Flying Schedule

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

NARRATIVE FROM SANDY 09 & 30
SAR for BIGOT 62B

I was scrambled from Da Nang at 1330 local NKP time. I proceeded to the Jolly holding point and took the Jolly escort from Sandy 07 at 1440. Approximately ten minutes later Sandy 11 sent his wingman up to take Jolly Green 57 down to the area to attempt a pickup. Sandy 11 said the weather was too low for all four Sandys to work with the Jolly during the pickup; so myself and my wingman (Sandy 10, Capt Hawes) stayed with the high Jolly in the holding area. As Sandy 12 took the Jolly down, Sandy 11 stated a 23mm had just opened up on him and he had taken a hit. Sandy 12 gave the Jolly to Hooks 41 & 42 to escort back to the holding area. Sandy 12 then went to escort his leader back. Sandy 11 had not briefed the next low Sandy yet, and after stating he could RTB alone he sent Sandy 12 back to show me the area. The next scheduled Sandy low was not in the area yet, so I left Hooks 41 & 42 to escort the Jollys and I went down with 12 to look over the area and get briefed. My wingman held above the low ceiling until I was ready for him to come down. As we approached the survivors area Sandy 12 had an airburst go off very close to him and he thought he had damage. We left the immediate area and I checked him over. He appeared to be ok but was low on fuel. We attempted to relocate the survivors area but due to the low ceiling we could not. At this point Sandy 12 RTB'd because of low fuel and I became the on scene commander. The weather at this time was minimum workable but I had to go through the process of relocating the survivor. I conducted an electronic search above the clouds, then dropped down underneath for a visual fix. After approximately 30 minutes I located the survivor. During this time I had relocated a 37mm and also took fire from a ZPU approximately 400 meters south of the survivor. The 37mm could not depress his fire enough to be a real threat since he was almost $\frac{1}{2}$ mile east of the area. After trolling for ground fire and checking an ingress/egress route, I determined that the ZPU could be avoided using terrain masking. No ground fire was observed along the selected route. I attempted to mark an IP, but M-47 did break open. My second WP bomb would not release. At this point I went back on top to pick up my wingman and have him mark with his M-47's. The weather had gone overcast and I had to rely on my knowledge of the terrain to make an IFR letdown. Once under the weather I showed my wingman the area and route and we were preparing to mark the IP. My wingman made a turn south of the survivor, near the road, and took a 23mm hit in the wing. He jettisoned his load and headed west toward NKP with me in trail. After determining he was able to RTB alone, I took Sandy 15 (Maj Keeler) down and showed him the area and briefed him. I then had to RTB due to low fuel. It was about 1700 local at that time. Enroute to NKP I discovered I had taken some hits from the ZPU. No major damage and RTB was uneventful.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

EXTRACTIVE FROM SANDY 09 & 10
SAR for BIGOT 02B (CONT'D)

During the time I worked with Bigot 02B he sounded fit and in reasonable spirits with no bad guys in his immediate area.

MICHAEL W. SMITH, Captain, USAF
SANDY 09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SANDY 15/16 SAR REPORT

Sandy 15/16 (Maj Keeler / 1Lt Kiland) were launched at 1450 4 Feb 71 to escort two Jolly Greens to the initial holding point and to the final holding point as required. Approximately 10 minutes after launch the On Scene Commander (OSC), Sandy 11, took hits which forced him to RTB. He was in the process of setting up for a pickup attempt.

OSC was then turned over to Sandy 12, who called Sandy 15 for an ETA to the survivors area so he could brief Sandy 15 on the situation and release OSC to Sandy 15. Since Sandy 15 was some distance out and and Sandy 12 was short of fuel, Sandy 09 and 10 were relieved from Jolly escort duty and briefed on the survivors position. Sandy 09 then took over as OSC. Smoke 41-44 then became the Jolly escorts.

Sandy 09 found the survivor and proceeded to get his forces together for a pickup attempt. While he was briefing his wingman, the wingman took a 23mm round in the right wingtip and had to jettison his ordnance and RTB.

Sandy 09 then took Sandy 15 under the weather and pointed out the survivor and a proposed ingress route for the Jolly Greens. Sandy 15 took over OSC at 1700.

The weather was now overcast with bases approximately 2800' to 3000' MSL which gave a 300' to 500' ceiling to work under. After looking the area over and observing ZPU fire, automatic weapons fire and much small arms fire in the vicinity of the survivor, Sandy 15 decided it was impossible to sufficiently suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of having a helicopter survive a pickup attempt. Sandy 15 then gave instructions to the survivor for another night in the weeds. Sandy 15 turned OSC over to Nail 52 at 1745 local and returned to Base.

WALTER D. KEELER, Major, USAF
SANDY 15

JOHN W. KILAND, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLYING SCHEDULE

4 Feb 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>SARBY</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Schaffer	01	0535	4.2	On Scene Commander
Singer	02	0535	4.2	
Hagan	03	0542	4.7	On Scene Commander
Col. Rouch	04	0542	4.7	
Donaldson	05	0540	4.9	On Scene Commander
Mathers	06	0540	4.9	
Young	07	0740	5.4	
Anderson	08	0740	5.4	
Smith	09	1328	4.0	On Scene Commander
Hawes	10	1328	3.6	Battle Damage IFE-Battle Damage Hole in Wing
Wolcott	11	1210	3.3	On Scene Commander
Rentz	12	1210	4.0	IFE-Battle Damage On Scene Commander
Place	13	1505	3.4	Suspected Battle Damage
Maddon	14	1505	3.4	
Keebler	15	1447	3.7	On Scene Commander
Kiland	16	1447	3.7	Escort JB 54 & 56
Lyon	<u>Snoko</u> 41	1418	3.4	
Miller	42	1418	3.4	
Adams	43	1455	3.4	
Witte	44	1455	3.4	
Yarger	<u>Nail</u> 45	0605	4.6	
Col. Rouch	23	1500	2.7	
McCaslin	41	0725	4.6	
Brahmer	51	1215	2.5	IFE-Low Oil Pressure
Chenovey	52	1430	4.7	
Carmen	<u>J G</u> 54	1430	3.8	
Callihan	56	1430	3.3	
Block	57	1032	7.1	
McGeorge	60	1032	7.1	
Callihan	62	0530	6.0	
Carmen	55	0530	6.0	
McGeorge	60	0615	1.4	
Reilly	61	0615	1.4	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Major Wolcott
SUBJECT: Bigot 02 Bravo SAR
TO: SARCO

Sir:

On 5 February my call sign was Sandy 05. Captain Keeter was on my wing as Sandy 06. We were back-up for the first-light effort. We were launched by Teepees to replace Sandy 01 and 02, who aborted before take-off. We assumed their call signs and proceeded to the SAR area, arriving there shortly after first-light.

I assumed on-scene-command from Nail 45 and made radio contact with the survivor. As directed by the SARCO, I asked him a number of questions. In response I received the following answers among others.

- (1) He was still using his frist radio.
- (2) He still had one canteen of water.
- (3) He was in good condition with no back problems.
- (4) He was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue.
- (5) There was no movement around him.
- (6) No guns had been moved into his position during the night.

I then asked him if he could move. When he answered in the affirmative, I recommended that he move over the ridgeline to the north of his position. We had taken most of the groundfire the previous day from the south and east, and I believed we would have a chance of rescuing him despite the inability to use fast movers if he could go over the hill. He reported that there were "TWO Guns" on the ridgeline. I had not seen them the previous day, but he was certainly the expert in the area, so we told him to stay where he was.

When I asked about the ceiling, he reported it to be on the tree-tops. I then told him to turn his radio off and to come up every 30 minutes with a very short transmission. I instructed him that transmitting reduced his battery life much more than receiving.

My next move was to try to get under the overcast. When he finally reported it to be up to 100 feet, I searched every hole to the west and south for an entrance. Every attempt was thwarted by karsts which protruded into the clouds.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

After four and a half very frustrating hours I turned over the on-scene-command to Major Donaldson, Sandy 07.

John J. Wolcott

JOHN J. WOLCOTT, Major, USAF
Sandy 01

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SANDY 07 & 08 - LTJ DONALDSON/Lt Col Hagan - 5 Feb 71

Sandy 07 & 08 were launched at 0950 local to assume on scene command of the S&M. We replaced Sandy 01 and 02. Wolf 04 and Nail 43 were the F&CS. Weather in the area was undercast from 10 miles west of the survivor's position all the way to the east and north. Tops at 4500' to 5000' and the bottoms at 2200' to 2400'. Contact with the survivor had been established by Sandy 01 and he stated he was in good spirits. Only hourly contact was being used to conserve Bravo's batteries.

Soon after arriving in the area we began looking for holes in the undercast in which to go underneath to search for a route whereby we could find the survivor and begin to suppress the heavy groundfire of the previous day. Several bursts of 23mm were noted north of Bravo's position. We stationed the Nail right over the survivor's position, backed off to the northwest about five miles and had the Nail give us hold-downs on UHF in order to get a DF to the survivor. We found several thin spots in the undercast and let down to 3000' indicated, hoping to break out in one of the valleys. The highest marked terrain in the area was 2800'. This procedure was unsuccessful due to low weather. Next we went down near the route structure where it was beginning to break up, let down VFR to the valley floor and proceeded back north in hopes of finding a usable route. This too was unsuccessful because the bottoms of the clouds at 2200' to 2400' met the rising terrain approximately two clicks from Bravo's position. We again placed the Nail over Bravo's position and attempted the DF steer technique from the southeast and the north. We could never break out of the weather even though we descended to 3000' indicated.

Much of the route structure was now visible to the south and we requested the Wolf F&C to get some paveways to cut the road north of Ban Karai Pass. This ordnance was requested about 1030 local but to my knowledge was not on scene until about 1300 local. At 1100 local the survivor checked in as briefed and we continued to look for a route to his location. Sometime after local 1100, the Nail said he heard Bravo come up on the radio three times in about five minutes. Sandy 07 heard the last two of these transmissions and it sounded as if Bravo was excited and was whispering into the microphone. This was the last known voice contact with Bravo.

We again left the Nail holding high so he could listen for Bravo's transmissions and also give us DF steers while we were underneath the overcast.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SANDY 07 & 08 (CONT'D)

At a proximately 1230 local we decided to fly east under the weather until we came to a segment of the route structure that was south of Bravo's position and led directly north to the small trail he was thought to be on. At a point about two clicks south of Bravo we found a large IDF where the road went through a narrow valley. We attempted to turn north just short of the IDF but the weather came down to the top of the karst at 2200' indicated.

Sandy 07 then flew over toward the IDF with the intentions of perhaps flying right up the road. He noted a truck on the road in the IDF and about that time Sandy 08 called out airbursts right off 07's tail. The truck in the IDF was noted to also be firing some type of automatic weapon. Sandy 07 shot both Lau 3 pods into the IDF and strafed the truck with 20mm. As he neared the pass he could look to the north and see that the clouds again met the valley floor about 500 meters north of the pass. This final bit of discovery prove that the weather in the survivor's area was unworkable.

At 1300 local, Sandy 07 & 08 had to climb back on top and go to loiter power due to low fuel. They were relieved at approximately 1325 local by Sandy 09 & 10.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S T A T E M E N T

On Feb 5 at 12:40 local, Sandy's 09 & 10 took off to proceed to the area of the SAR for Bigot 02B. We arrived overhead at about 1:20 local and received a briefing from Sandy 07. He said they had lost contact with the survivor at 11:30 and the weather was too bad to get under to work. At 1330 Sandy 09 took on scene command. For about a half an hour we tried to raise Bigot 02 on guard and bravo, charlie, and delta channel without any luck. At 14:00 the weather broke and we could see the survivor's position clearly. About this time we had a message from the survivor. From that point on the survivor was in contact and we received 130 rounds of 81MM. Also East of his position we received very accurate 37MM and 57 or 85MM. We continued circling the survivor's position the rest of the day with no contact. At 16:30 the weather got bad again. At 17:00 Sandy 13 arrived on scene. I started to brief him and King called and said that migs were coming toward our area and suggested the SAR forces R.T.B. Sandy 9 & 10 landed at 17:35.

JAMES C. PAINE, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 09

EDWARD V. LORENZEN, Captain, USAF
SANDY 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SANDY 13 & 14 REPORT

DUNWOODY/TILTON

Sandy 13 & 14 launched from USA at 1605 local in support of Bigot 02B S&H on 5 Feb 71. Climb and enroute to the 092degree/36/89 were normal. When I approached the area contact was made with Sandy 09 - the on scene commander. Sandy 09 briefed me on 123.1 on the situation. 02B had not responded to any calls by further voice or beeper since approximately 11am, ~~approximately~~. I was briefed on all SAR forces present. The Mail was on scene, and Jolly Green 60 flight with Sandy's 11 & 12 were at the forward holding point. No Mig Cap or Iron Hand or Wolf FAC were available. At approximately 1645 local I took on scene command. Sandy 09 flight RTB'd to CH 89. The weather was 7/8 overcast at approximately 5,000 feet over the survivor with another broken deck at 3500 feet. I briefed the Mail to go to 11,500 feet directly over the survivor and to try contact with 02B on A, B, C, D frequencies. Since the Mails radios were superior, I hoped that contact could be made better this way. I then decided to keep Sandy 14 high while I tried to get below the weather in the area of the survivor. As we made descent - Mig call over Guard indicated Migs in the proximity. King told us to pull all SAR forces back to CH 89. At approximately 1730 local we had to RTB.

RICHARD H. DUNWOODY, Lt Colonel, USAF
SANDY 13

CHARLES L. TILTON, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FIXING SCHEDULE

5 Feb 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>SNDY</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Wolcott	01	0552	5.1	On Scene Commander
Kector	02	0552	5.1	
Stone	03	0557	6.3	
Oberlin	04	0557	6.3	
Delt	05	1055	4.9	
Col. Walsh	06	1055	4.9	
Donaldson	07	0940	4.4	On Scene Commander
Hagan	08	0940	4.4	
Paine	09	1247	4.4	On Scene Commander
Lorenzen	10	1247	4.4	
Roberts, P.	11	1500	2.3	
Wilson	12	1500	2.3	
Dunwoody	13	1610	2.5	On Scene Commander
Tipton	14	1610	2.5	
Williams	J_G 61	0535	7.2	
Block	62	0535	7.2	
Strayer	55	0600	5.1	
Carmen	60	0600	5.1	
Callahan	56	1236	6.1	
Reilly	57	1236	6.1	
Yarger	Mail 45	0520	4.9	
Col. Rouch	23	0855	5.2	
Gibson.	49	1230	4.9	
Latham	47	1425	4.2	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLYING SCHEDULE*

6 Feb 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>SAL.DY</u>	<u>TAKEOFF</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Rentz	01	0710	4.7	On Scene Commander
Lyon	02	0710	4.7	

* Nails were on scene all day monitoring

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NARRATIVE

FROM: 23TASS, 1st Lt David W. Jensen/3205

3 Feb 71

SUBJECT: SAR for Biget 02

TO: 1st SOS (LtCol Herbert Stone)

When I arrived on scene at 0445Z Nail 59 and Wolf 04 were looking for Biget 02. Wolf 04 located his position by flying over the survivor and asking him when he was overhead since the weather was completely undercast. I contacted Biget 02 Alpha also by flying over his position. The position was fixed on the 092° radial at 86 DME off of channel 89. The Sandys and Nails both took a few rounds of AAA but nothing close since they were shooting up through the clouds. Biget 02 Alpha said he could hear small arms firing, then while I was talking to him he said, "I'm taking fire, I'm hit, help! help! I give up, I give up, I give up!". This was the last transmission from Alpha. I assumed by the sound of his voice that he was surrounded completely and that they had him.

Biget 02 Bravo said he was on a hill side about 50 meters up from his parachute. He said he could hear voices at what he thought was about 100 meters away. I was relieved by Nail 63 at 0850Z and RTB to channel 89. The TACAN position plotted in the Karst off of the route segment, however I believe they were relatively close to the lines of communication since they got to Biget 02 Alpha so quickly.

David W. Jensen

DAVID W. JENSEN, 1st Lt, USAF
23rd TASS/Nail 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

NARRATIVE FOR BIGOT 02A & 02B

Bigot 02 A&B (First Day) Sandy 01/02 Lyon/Miller

We received the word to scramble for the SAR at approximately 1130. I arrived on scene at around 1230 and immediately was appointed on - scene-commander by King 21.

I contacted 02 A&B and found out they were in good shape but had movers around them. The weather was completely overcast to 6500ft. I made an attempt to get under the overcast but failed. I had been talking to the survivors for about 30 minutes when Alpha called and said the activity was increasing around him. About 5 minutes later he said they were coming up the hill, "They are shooting at me. I'm hit, I'm hit. Help me. Help." That was the last contact I had with him. We tried to no avail to get under the weather but the clouds were laying on the Karst Tops. For the rest of the afternoon we kept tabs on Bigot 02 Bravo, just hoping for a break in the cloud deck.

Nail 59, 23 and 41 worked with us throughout the afternoon. They did an outstanding job of coordination between King and Hillsboro on the fraggging of aircraft to the scene as well as ordering the ordnance they thought might be needed if the weather broke.

At approximately 1530 I called Sandy 03, who was holding with the Jolly Greens, to brief him on the situation. Lt Miller and I then RTB'd because of low fuel.

THOMAS J. LYON, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 01

JOHN H. MILLER, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SAR REPORT SANDY 05 Lt WILSON
Bigot 02 3 Feb 71

Launched from Ubon at 1530 & arrived on scene at approximately 1630. Nail 41 was in the area but was just about to RTB. N-41 briefed me & Nail 63 who had also just arrived in the area.

N-63 was first to have contact with 02Bravo & relayed his transmissions to me. The few times I was in contact with Bravo he came in very broken & N-63 relayed for me.

The weather in the area was overcast with approximately a 300' - 500' ceiling. At one time I managed to get down through a hole in the cloud cover only to find no place to go underneath.

Coordinating with N-63 and Wolf 04 (an F-4 FAC) we "pinpointed" Bravos's position using the sound of our aircraft as we correlated with Bravo on the radio. In this way we determined a Tacan radial & DME.

At approximately 1830 I made a last transmission to Bravo to dig in for the night & assured him we'd be back at first light. We RTB'd 89 upon instruction from King.

ROBERT L. WILSON, 1LT, USAF
SANDY.05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLYING SCHEDULE

3 Feb 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>SANDY</u>	<u>TAKOFF</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Lyon	01	1145	4.7	On Scene Commander
Miller	02	1145	4.7	
Paine	03	1145	5.2	On Scene Commander
De Police	04	1145	5.2	
Wilson	05	1530	3.7	On Scene Commander
Oberlin	06	1530	3.7	
Roberts, P.	07	1443	3.8	
Lorenzen	00	1443	3.8	
Adams	Smoke 41	1520	2.6	
Lowe	42	1520	2.6	
Bolt	43	1520	2.6	
Witte	44	1520	2.6	
McCaslin Hail	41	1240	5.3	
Musick	63	1528	3.7	
Applegate	59	0850	5.1	On Scene Commander
Jensen	62	1115	5.2	On Scene Commander
Dunwoody Hobo	30	1150	5.9	
Phillips	31	1150	5.9	
Tipton	22	1305	4.2	
Carmichael	23	1305	4.2	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SANDY 01 & 02 1LT SCHAFFER/CAPT SINGER

4 Feb 1971

Sandy 01 & 02 launched at 0535 local in support of Bigot 02B. We arrived on scene and began an electronic search for the survivor. Sandy 01 assumed on scene command from Cudde 23. Nail 457 arrived shortly and he along with the Sandies continued the electronic search. Radio contact was established with Bogot 02B and he said he had people shooting at him from 100 m away. The weather in the area was right down on the trees, so the Sandies could not get under it. Nail 457 tried to get under the weather but could not find a decent hole. Bigot 02B then reported everything was quiet. The Sandies then orbited with the Nail waiting for a break in the weather. No breaks came, so at 0930 local we turned over on scene command to Sandy 05 & 06 and KTB'd.

GARY W. SCHAFFER, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 01

MICHAEL D. SINGER, Capt, USAF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S T A T E M E N T

SANDY 05 & 06 1LT MATHERS/MAJ DONALDSON

4 Feb 1971

Sandy 05 & 06 were launched at 0640 local to assume on scene command from Sandy 01 & 02. On scene arrival to survivor's location was uneventful. Weather was undercast beginning about 10 miles west of 02 Bravo's position and all the way to the east. A few breaks were noted south and west of Bravo. Sandy 01 gave a good briefing and showed us on the TACAN 091° radial at 86½ NM where we could contact the survivor. Nail 41 and Wolf 06 were also at the scene.

Some of the route structure could be seen through the clouds in the immediate area of Ban Kari Pass and I requested the Nail put in some paveways to cut the road. The ordinance was requested and showed up an hour later but was not put in due to weather having obscured the target in the interim. This same situation happened several times in the next four hours. The only ordinance we could put in was some CBU-49 directly on the road south of 02 Bravo. Sandy 05 then decided to explore some breaks in the weather in hopes of being able to get under the weather and more accurately spot the survivor. All attempts to do this failed because of low clouds and karst that extended up to nearly 3,000 feet.

About 1200 the survivor called and said the big guns at the east end of the valley were firing each time we made a pass in that direction. At first he called out the 37mm fire and later he said an 85mm was firing. The Wolf Fac verified the 85mm due to the large black airbursts above him. The 37mm was being fired through the clouds and was not accurate. SAM and MIG warnings were being broadcast almost continuously. Sandy 05 asked the Ironhand flight to patrol the area for RHAW indications of gun laying radar. None was reported. Sandy 05 & 06 continued to probe the area for an egress route to 02 Bravo and also made sure Wolf and Nail did not query 02 Bravo too often thereby using up his batteries. Bravo 02 was requested by King to make a check of his spare radio and it was checked OK.

About 1315 local Sandy 11 & 12 arrived on scene and immediately reported fairly accurate 23mm fire. Sandy 05 briefed Sandy 11 on the situation and showed him the TACAN location of the survivor. The 23mm and 37mm fire was being reported almost continuously by Sandys, the Nail and the Wolf Facs. On scene command was passed to Sandy 11 at approximately 1330.

ROBERT J. DONALDSON, Maj, USAF
SANDY 05

JAMES I. MATHERS, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF: TO
ATTN: MAJ WOLCOTT

SUBJECT: SAR FOR BIGOT 02 BRAVO

TO: SARCO

Sir:

I would like to preface my report with a brief remark or two.

This was the most frustrating, disappointing, and saddening SAR I have been on. Sandy pilots have written a long, proud, and gallant history of rescue in Southeast Asia, but this unsuccessful SAR for Bigot 02 Bravo unfortunately does not belong to this proud heritage. The mission of the Sandy/Jolly team is to extract downed airmen from the very clutches of the enemy. We have been reasonably successful in the past. Our proven capability to accomplish this mission has made a significant contribution to the high morale of combat pilots in Southeast Asia.

But we didn't accomplish this mission on the 4th of February - we didn't save 02 Bravo. I personally receive very little consolation from hearing: "Well, one has to expect to lose one every now and then," or "Well, the weather and existing defenses just didn't permit an attempt," or even worse "We did all we could." After talking with 02 Bravo for two days, listening to undaunted courage and appreciating his cool professionalism, I grew to respect him and to become emotionally attached to him. I am damned sorry that we couldn't rescue him. I shall always remember February 4th, 1971, as a very sad day in my life.

What follows is a narrative description of my part in the SAR for Bigot 02 Bravo:

My call sign was Sandy 11. I launched on 4 February about noon to replace the present On-Scene-Commander, Sandy 05. Captain Rentz, Sandy 12, was my wingman. He was also Low Lead qualified and was a tremendous asset.

When we assumed OSC, the weather and poor voice contact with the survivor were the two primary obstacles to a successful SAR. Overcast skies which were reported to be only about 300 feet over the survivor had forced the abandonment of all previous attempts to visually acquire 02 Bravo. About 30 minutes after my arrival the weather began to improve somewhat; some holes began to develop to the south and west, and we could see the ground in several places.

Poor and irregular contact with 02 Bravo made effective communication with him very difficult. When we did hear him, he sounded as though he was in the bottom of a barrel. We asked him to remove the acoustical coupler, but I did not hear his response. He still sounded the same when I did hear him again.

Apparently 02 Bravo could hear me clearly all the time. Wolf 04, who happened to be a classmate of 02 Bravo, stated that he was

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

answering all of my transmissions. The Wolf relayed all calls to me. He then began an electronic search for 02 Bravo. When he got station passage, he lit his AB's and asked 02 Bravo if he "could hear the Wolf." 02 Bravo responded that he could and that he had seen the Wolf through a thin hole. Wolf 04 brought me over to the area and pointed out the hole, an elongated trough through which the ground was clearly visible.

I asked 02 Bravo if he could hear my aircraft, and he responded that he could, though he couldn't see me. I asked him for a hold-down, proceeded to the trough in the clouds and let down. The hole disappeared just before I got under the overcast, but Bravo said he had about 300 feet, so I continued IFR a couple of seconds more before breaking out. I lost contact with 02 Bravo during the descent, so I turned around and again asked for a hold-down. After several moments of getting no response, I finally got a solid DF indication, followed it until getting station passage, and then reversed course. After several such passes I felt that I had a general idea of his location. Terrain in his vicinity consisted of rolling hills with karst formations to the north and east, flatter country with good roads to the south, and rugged mountainous terrain to the West. There were definite signs of human life to the east and south, but none to the west, so I decided that the west would be safe for bailout.

The weather was a severely limiting factor. The visibility was probably no more than three miles in haze, and the ceiling varied from about 300 feet over the tops of the hills to about 900 feet over the valley floors. I didn't see any karsts or mountains touching the clouds.

02 Bravo was in good spirits. He was in good condition and seemed to be relieved to have an aircraft in sight overhead.

I spent some time trying to fix his exact location. He was extremely difficult to understand, and I lost contact with him when I would fly on the back side of the hill upon which he was situated. Because of the difficulty I had understanding him, I finally had to resort to questions which he could answer with a "Roger" or "Negative."

I finally narrowed his location down to one brown area on a particular hill. It matched his description of a clearing with a standing dead tree. I got station passage every time I passed it, and he told me that he was at my 9 o'clock several times when I passed it to the right. I felt that I had pin-pointed his position to within about 50 meters and that it would be safe to expend ordnance around him if needed. I did not locate his parachute, though I saw several flare parachutes in the area. I believe he stated that "they" had pulled his parachute down from the trees.

When I asked about ground fire, he said that I hadn't taken any on the first 4-5 passes, but that I was taking small arms and automatic weapons on every pass south of his position. This made sense because

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

there was a small road south of him which ended up in the trees. There were several bunkers and gun pits around the road, but I didn't see any guns or any ground fire.

I told him to turn off his radio unless I took ground fire, in which case I wanted him to tell me immediately with a "Roger, Roger, Roger." When he would indicate that I was taking ground fire, I would query him about its location and type. He told me of a ZPU to the southwest and "something bigger" to the east. I finally saw the ZPU (or at least the tracers) on one pass to the south. He was behind the aircraft and didn't seem to be very accurate. I then began to see the "something bigger" in the form of several 23mm airbursts. They were generally out in front of the aircraft or off to the left as I made a left turn. I can only speculate that the gunner was used to fast movers and led me too much.

I picked off some GRU on the road south of 02 Bravo. I then covered the bunkers and a trail network as well as I could with two cans of GRU. 02 Bravo reported that the SA/AW continued, though it was considerably reduced in volume.

On one pass when I had a LAU 3 pod set up to hit this area again, I looked off to the east just in time to see a 23mm muzzle flash. Prior to this time he had only shot at me from behind. I emptied out the pod in the direction of the cave which was producing the flashes. The first couple of rockets missed badly because I had "G"s on the aircraft, but I'm fairly certain that the last two or three were within several meters. The gun must've been well protected, because it continued firing. I broke off and returned to 02 Bravo, deciding to avoid the area to the east as much as possible.

I was now getting 23mm fire on almost every pass near the survivor, generally as I turned to the north. The fire usually consisted of about three airbursts several hundred meters off my left wing or off the nose.

I then called Captain Rentz down for assistance. He found a hole and did a fine job of locating me with DF steers. I tried to show him the approximate location of the survivor. As he made his first pass over the position, I saw the ZPU send tracers behind him. They were very low trajectory, and I could not determine their source, though I suspect they came from a road to the southwest.

Captain Rentz also took some 23mm airbursts off his left wing. The airbursts continued, but we did not see the ZPU again.

I had tried earlier to mark a hill with a dud WP bomb. This was to be both an IP for the Jolly Greens and a reference point for the next OSC in the event we had to depart. I couldn't get mine to break

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

apart, but Capt Rents laid a perfect mark right on top of the hill. It stayed there as long as we were on-scene. I then called King and asked that the Jollies and Smokes come to a forward holding point.

By this time we had two 23's firing on us. 02 Bravo continued to call ground fire on every circuit around his position. I picked up a couple of small hits in the left and right wing and asked Sandy 12 to look me over. He didn't see any fuel or oil leak so we continued.

My initial plan was to use the Smoke aircraft to screen off the 23's to the east and southeast with one line and the ZPU to the southwest with another line. After thinking about it for a minute or two, however, I changed my mind about the Smoke aircraft. The following factors entered into this decision:

- (1) There was very little working room under the cloud deck and it would have been impossible to work more than 2 aircraft and helicopter.
- (2) I didn't want to have the Smokes shot down in their straight and level delivery run (one was an E with no visibility out the right side).
- (3) I believed I could put down an adequate screen with my CBU-22.

About this time the accuracy of the 23mm gunners seemed to improve. They didn't lead so much anymore and I found myself dodging their airbursts from time to time. I went to max power somewhere in here and concentrated more on moving the aircraft. I also saw my first RPG's about then - two of them about a mile north of the survivor. They were well below me and off to the side.

I sent Sandy 12 to pick up the Jolly Green and bring him under the clouds. I wanted the other Jolly to stay above the clouds and wanted Sandy 09 and 10 to remain with the high Jolly in the event we got a MIG warning. I expended the rest of my CBU-25 and rockets near the road to the south of the survivor while Capt Rents escorted the Jolly down through a hole.

I briefed the survivor on how to use his smokes and how to get on the penetrator. I planned my smoke screen to the east and south and was about to execute this and give the Jolly a briefing when I looked in my rear view mirror and saw fuel streaming (probably from the stub tank). About that time several 23 airbursts went off in front of me and I flew through their little puffs. The shrapnel had already fallen as I hit the smoke. I guess I panicked at the acrid smell I got and told King I had fuel streaming and smoke in the cockpit. He told me to "get out of there" and I concurred. I didn't know whether I'd taken damage, and I didn't like the smell, so

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I pulled off my ordnance and climbed through the clouds, returning to NKP without incident. Captain Kentz remained behind and became the new OSC.

John J. Wolcott

JOHN J. WOLCOTT, Major, USAF

Sandy 11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIGOT 02 ALPHA AND BRAVO SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) Despite a supreme effort by a multitude of zealous SAR crewmembers, attempts to rescue Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo were unsuccessful. The major effort lasted for four days and involved hundreds of frustrated personnel who were continually denied success by extremely adverse weather and overwhelming enemy defenses. Forces remained over the objective position around the clock and relished opportunities to break through an almost continuous cloud cover with ceilings that ranged from tree tops to 500 feet. When momentary breaks in the weather did occur eager pilots immediately challenged rugged terrain and low ceilings in attempts to reach the survivors. Each effort was met by intense enemy resistance which included everything from small arms fire to 85 millimeter Anti-Aircraft fire, SAM's (Surface to Air Missiles) and Russian built Mig aircraft. One experienced Sandy pilot described the effort as "the most frustrating, disappointing, and saddening SAR I have been on."¹²⁹

(C) On 3 February 1971 Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo bailed out of their F-4 aircraft after experiencing an undetermined malfunction. They landed in Laos at an extremely well defended area near Ban Karai Pass which is located on the border of Vietnam. Their position was determined to be 092/86 from Tacan Channel 89.

129. SARCO Report for Bigot 02A and 02B, 12 Feb 71, Document #3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

93

Alpha reported that his condition was good and Bravo reported he injured his back but that he was all right. They were in rolling hills and karst, very near lines of communication, and close to a major route segment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex. There was a complete overcast and extremely low ceilings. The survivors reported enemy activity in their immediate area. From all indications they were down under extremely adverse conditions and it would take a super effort as well as good fortune to rescue them.¹³⁰

(C) Several aircraft were directed to the area immediately and Sandy 01/02 arrived at approximately 1230L. Sandy 01 took charge as On-Scene Commander and although the pilots had been able to locate the approximate objective position by electronic means, it was impossible to locate the survivors exactly due to the solid overcast weather conditions. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to penetrate the weather and fly under the clouds. Both survivors were reporting intense enemy activity near their position. At approximately 1300 Bigot 02 Alpha reported that the enemies were coming up the hill. Shortly afterwards the last reported broadcast from him was "They are shooting at me. I'm hit! Help me. Help".¹³¹

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) Throughout the day efforts to reach the downed crew-members continued to fail. Only one aircraft, an A-1, was able to penetrate the weather and when he broke out underneath he reported there was absolutely no place to go. At approximately 1830 activities were terminated due to approaching darkness and Sandy 05 directed Bigot 02 Bravo to dig in for the night and assured him all forces would return at first light. Nail FAC's were directed to maintain surveillance over the position throughout the night while extensive preparations were made for a first light effort on 4 February 1971.¹³²

(C) However the second day was to be just as exasperating as the first. A total of 20 A-1's, eight Jolly Green helicopters, five Nail FAC's and numerous fast movers were unable to reach Bigot 02 Bravo. The first aircraft on the scene were able to converse with the survivor and ascertain that his condition and morale were good but no one was able to penetrate the weather for a close observation. Occasionally weather in the general area would break up somewhat and expose minor segments of roads and communication lines. Ordnance was requested for striking these fleeting targets which disappeared again under the weather before the ordnance arrived. The only successful strike was some CBU-49 discharged on a route segment south of Bravo's position. As more small breaks in the weather occurred Sandy 05 attempted several penetrations without

132. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

success. The survivor reported that big guns (37 and 85 millimeter) were firing at the east end of the valley each time an aircraft made a pass in that direction. These reports were verified by large black air bursts in the sky above the aircraft. Other pilots were reporting accurate 23 and 37 millimeter ground fire while SAM and Mig warnings were being broadcast almost continuously by ground control agencies.¹³³

(C) Shortly after Sandy 11 arrived and assumed On-Scene Command the weather improved somewhat. Holes developed in the south and west and the ground was observed in several places. Sandy 11 was able to fly under the clouds and narrow Bravo's position down to within approximately 50 meters. During his several passes he experienced numerous incidents of ground fire and delivered CBU and LAU on bunkers, trail network and a cave entrance which had been producing gun flashes. Sandy 11 directed his wingman to come down and join him and to discharge a white phosphorous rocket for everyone's orientation and to mark the IP (Initial Point). In spite of the continuing bad weather and active resistance, Sandy 11 planned a pick up attempt and directed the Jolly Green helicopters and Smoke aircraft to a forward holding position. During the process Sandy 11 took battle damage, developed a fuel leak, and detected an acrid odor in the cockpit and decided to depart the area. Command was assumed by Sandy 12.¹³⁴

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) The weather was deteriorating again, Sandy 12 was running low on fuel and he suspected he had taken battle damage. Sandy 09/10 arrived and took command but Sandy 12 had to depart before he could point out the objective position for the new On-Scene Commander. It took this flight of A-1's approximately 30 minutes to locate the survivor. They also located the resistance and planned another pick up effort. Sandy 09 discharged an M-47 white phosphorous rocket which malfunctioned and failed to mark the IP (Initial Point). His second rocket would not release so he called in his wingman to mark the IP. Almost immediately after descending under the clouds Sandy 10 took battle damage from 23 millimeter ground fire and had to depart the area. Sandy 15 arrived to take command and Sandy 09 departed for low fuel. Enroute to home station he discovered that he had sustained battle damage but was able to return without further incident.¹³⁵

(C) Sandy 15 surveyed the deteriorating weather conditions and weighed the accumulated battle damage and increasing ground fire in the area of the survivor. By then it was past 1700L and already poor visibility was being handicapped by approaching darkness. Considering all these factors Sandy 15 decided it would be impossible to adequately suppress the defenses and provide a reasonable opportunity for the Jolly Green helicopter to survive a pick up attempt. Thus another frustrating day ended

135. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

at 1745L when Sandy 15 instructed the survivor to dig in for the night and turned On-Scene Command over to Nail 52.¹³⁶

(C) At first light on 5 February 1971 Sandy 05 returned and determined that the survivor was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue. His back did not bother him, he still had water and radios, there was presently no movement about him and no guns had moved into the area throughout the night. However the ceiling remained at tree top to 100 feet and Sandy 05 was unable to penetrate the clouds for the remainder of his time on station. Frustrated once again he turned command over to Sandy 07 and returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB.¹³⁷

(C) All of Sandy 07's attempts to penetrate the weather failed also. The weather in the general area was breaking some but conditions in the survivor's immediate area was completely unworkable. As directed, the survivor made an operations normal check at 1100L. Sometime afterwards a Nail FAC on scene reported that Bigot 02 Bravo came up on radio three times in about a five minute period. The transmissions from the survivor were excited and he was whispering into the microphone. These were the last known communications with Bigot 02 Bravo and his messages were completely unreadable. The weather remained bad and all aircraft in the area were reporting sporadic ground fire. Throughout the remainder of their period Sandy 07/08 were unable to accomplish

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

anything and turned command over to Sandy 09 prior to departing
for low fuel. ¹³⁸

(C) All further attempts to contact the survivor failed. By 1400L the weather cleared up considerably and displayed the objective position. However there was no sign of Bigot 02 Bravo and the improved weather brought with it a new onslaught of ground fire. By 1700 the weather had degenerated again. Sandy 13 arrived to take over command and while he was receiving his briefing King (Airborne Command Control Center) directed all forces out of the area because several Mig aircraft had been detected heading for the area. All forces returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB to terminate
another frustrating day. ¹³⁹

(C) Nail FAC's maintained coverage throughout the night and failed to make contact with Bigot 02 Bravo. A modified effort was planned for the next day. Only two A-1's were launched while the remaining forces maintained ground alert. Sandy 01/02 reported to the scene and once again encountered bad weather. They flew out their station time with no evidence that Bigot 02 Bravo was alive or capable of being rescued. No other aircraft were launched specifically for the SAR effort. In a frustrating and unsuccessful attempt to rescue Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo 44 A-1's, 18 Jolly Green helicopters and 13 Nail FAC's participated along with numerous aircraft from other sources. In addition, other Nail and Candlestick FAC's maintained a cover for the objective position throughout the
nights when the SAR forces were not active. ¹⁴⁰

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

A last-light run-in was attempted but was aborted when both helicopters took hits from heavy small arms fire. One Pararescue man was wounded in this attempt. A first-light effort on 2 January resulted in a successful rescue of both crewmembers.

(S) BIGOT 02: On 3 February, two crewmembers of an F-4D bailed out of Banhari² Pass near the NVN border. 40th ARRS Jolly Greens were scrambled from both Nakhon Phanom Airfield³ and Ubon RTAFB⁴. Low ceilings precluded any attempt that day. A maximum effort SAR was planned on the 4th with 8 Jolly Greens in place at NKP for a first-light effort. HH-53 BUFFs were on continuous airborne orbit from pre-dawn to darkness on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of February. Continued low ceilings and bad weather conditions in the area precluded any rescue attempts. After all radio contact was lost with the survivors at noon on the 6th, and no weather improvement forecast, the active participation of the 40th ARRS ceased. The force of tired and disappointed crews were returned to Udorn that night.

(S) DUDLEY 02: On 16 February, two crewmembers of an F-D bailed out in eastern Laos. Two Jolly Greens scrambled and both crewmembers were rescued less than two hours after bailout.

(S) WITCHDOCTOR 05: On 5 March, an Army UH-1 helicopter was shot down in eastern Laos with 7 people on board. A last-light run-in was attempted but intensive AAA and small arms fire precluded any rescues. The survivors were rescued by a U.S. Army ground team on 7 March.

GROUP 4

Page 6 of 10
100-100-100
100-100-100

DATE: 3 Feb 71

9 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-004-3 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Rigit 02 Bravo

LOCATION: 17-18-30N 106-09-30E

SAVES: None

(S) King 21 Airborne from CM 70 at 2210Z -- on scene at 2240Z. King 21 orbit 12D/16-60/CM 89. At 2240Z I contacted Nail 68 who was orbiting over the reported survivors position but did not have voice contact. He reported several clicks (carrier waves) on Guard in response to his calls but no pattern, voice or beeper. The weather in the area was reported as overcast, tops 4000 to 4500 with a broken layer 7000 to 8000 MSL. At 2330Z Nail 63 arrived and relieved Nail 68. Numerous attempts were made to contact Rigit 02-B on Guard and Emergency Delta Frequencies. Several times during the morning clicks could be heard on Guard and at one time a 15 second hold down was heard. Sandy 1 and 2 arrived at 0640Z and Sandy 1 was appointed on scene commander. At 0130Z Rigit 02 was advised to turn off his radio for 3 hours to conserve the battery. At 0430Z further attempts to make contact were futile with the exception of a few mike clicks. The weather in the area remained the same throughout the day -- bases of 2000 to 2500 ft MSL with clouds touching treetops and rain in the area of the survivor. All SAR forces remained on the ground and a radio watch was maintained but no positive response. King 21 departed the orbit at 1140Z, landing at CM 70 at 1140Z.

Night coverage had been arranged for by Jack and instructions were relayed to Nail 33 to maintain listening watch -- if contact was established, have survivor attempt to move Northwest and conserve his radio until the weather improved.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/AME Major DeLorenzo
P Major Benson
CP Capt Gealta
N Major McGill
RC Sgt Schmitt
FE TSgt Wigginton
LM MSgt Patterson

Resources

Nail 68 (OSC until 0040Z)
Sandy 1 (OSC 0040Z until 0435Z)
Nail 23 (OSC 0435Z until 0535Z)
Nail 41 (OSC 0535Z until 0840Z)
Nail 33 (OSC 0840Z until relieved)
Sandy 01, 02 (A-1)
Nail 68, 63, 23, 41, 33 (OV-10)
Wolf 05 (RF-4)

Robert A. DeLorenzo

ROBERT A. DELORENZO, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 4 Feb 71

10 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-004-3 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02 Brave

LOCATION: 17-18-30N 106-09-30E

SAVES: None

(S) 4 Feb 71, King 21 airborne from OH 70 at 3/1930Z. Enroute to OH 89 for a 3/2100Z briefing with the Sandies and Jolly Greens. Landed at OH 89 at 3/2015Z.

Departed OH 89 at 3/2215Z on scene at 3/2225Z King 21 orbit 180/16-40/89. At 3/2240Z I contacted Candlestick 23 who was orbiting over the survivor, but had not had voice contact with Bigot 02 Brave during his orbit period. I asked him to give me a weather report for the area. He reported that the cloud cover over the survivor was overcast with a higher broken layer of clouds the tops of the overcast was at 4500-5000 ft MSL and the higher layer base was at 8000 MSL with the tops running from 9500 ft MSL to 11500 ft MSL. At 3/2300Z Candlestick 23 made radio contact with Bigot 02 Brave. The survivor reported that he was in good condition. At 3/2300Z Mail 45 arrived on scene and at 3/2300Z Sandy 1 and 2 arrived on scene. They received a briefing by Candlestick 23 and King 21. Candlestick 23 was RTB'd at 3/2330Z. Sandy 01 was appointed on scene commander at 3/2320Z with the understanding that if the weather conditions lifted permitting Strike aircraft to operate in the area the on scene command responsibility would revert to the Mail aircraft. This was highly acceptable to Sandy 01.

The remainder of the days activities were spent in trying to pinpoint the survivors position. The closest position arrived at was the same as that given in the briefing, which was 091/86 1/2/89. The ceilings over the survivor never got higher than 300-400 AGL. Only a few openings in the weather occurred during the entire day which only permitted using two Strike flights. The Sandies were able to get below the ceiling and operate in the survivors area. The area was extremely hostile and the Sandies received ground fire from small arms, GPU, and RUM. At 4/0900Z Sandy 09, who was then the on scene commander, thought that he might be able to get one Jolly into the survivor and attempt the pickup. This action was decided to be too risky when Sandy 10 received extensive battle damage from ground fire while surveying the proposed run in route for the Jolly. The days activities were terminated at

~~SECRET~~

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 10 year intervals,
Declassified on 12 years.

4/1050Z. Mail 52 remained on scene to maintain contact with Bigot 02 Bravo. Explicit instructions were given to conserve his survival radio battery. Check in times were established for on the hour.

The only problem area, aside from weather conditions, during the days activities was concern over the Mig Cap that was to be provided the SAR Forces. The Navy Mig Cap did not check in with Ring 21 and it was impossible to determine if in fact there was a Mig Cap until late into the days activities when we were advised that the Navy was providing Mig Cap holding feet wet under Red Crown's control. It is my recommendation that these resources must check in with the King Aircraft giving their position, time on station and Ring Time. Also, if they are to be maintaining a communications with another agency the King aircraft must have this information. During the days activities King 21 received 7 Mig and 8 SAM calls.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/ADC Major DeLorenzo
P Major Benson
CP Col Pinyard
N Major McGill
RO Sgt Schuets
FE TSgt Wigginton
LM MSgt Patterson

KING 23 Crewmembers (Tanker)

AC Capt Nash
CP Capt Fletcher
N Major Metz
RO Sgt Souder
FE MSgt Yegodinski
LM SSgt Hoover

On Scene Commanders

Sandy 01 2320-0215Z
Sandy 03 0215-0600Z
Sandy 11 0600-0830Z
Sandy 09 0830-0955Z
Sandy 15 0955-1045Z
Mail 52 1045Z Until relieved

SAR Resources

King 21, 23
Jelly Green 54, 55, 56, 57, 60,
61, 62
Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07,
08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16 (A-1)
Snake 41, 42, 43, 44 (A-1)

FAC Aircraft

Mail 45, 41, 51, 52, 99 (OV-10)
Wolf 02, 06, 04, 03 (RF-4)

ESCH

Mereo Flight

IRON HAND

Bison
Hathox Bravo 01 Flight (F-105)
Mallard 21, Flight
Ashean 01 Flight
Alamo 01 Flight

66
Intervals

MIG CAP

Garfish 501, Flight (Navy)
Battleery 310, Flight (F-4)
Pageboy Flight (Navy)
Gunfighter 51 (F-4)

Sundown 101, Flight (Navy)
Eagle 313, Flight
Papa Flight (F-4)

STRIKE AIRCRAFT

Peeler 49, Flight (Expend)

Wolfpack 31, Flight(Expend) (F-4)

The following aircraft did not expend.

Battleery 304, Flight (F-4)
Bennett Flight (F-4)
Gunfighter 40 Flight (F-4)
Gunfighter 42 Flight (F-4)
Maynard 469 Flight (F-4)
Electron 500 Flight (A-6)
Battleery 311 Flight (F-4)
Cobra 05 Flight (F-4)

City Desk 205, Flight (F-4)
Eagle Flight (F-4)
Wolfpack 21 Flight (F-4)
Battle cry 30 Flight (F-4)
Canasta 405 Flight (A-7)
Banyan 01 Flight (F-4)
Peller 32 Flight
Miller 02 Flight (F-4)

Robert A. DeLorenzo

ROBERT A. DELORENZO, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

SECRET

GROUP-4
Intervals,
1-12-60

DATE: 2 Feb 71

15 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: 3-004-2 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02

LOCATION: 092/86/89

SAVES: None

(S) King 21 received a distress call from Nail 59 at about 0418Z, 2 Feb 71. Nail 59 stated that Bigot 02 had gone down while putting in a strike in the vicinity of 100/88/89. He was attempting to gain contact with the survivors on the ground. King 21 took Mission Command at this point and appointed Nail 59 as the on scene commander. Jack was notified at this time of a possible SAR effort and the SAR forces were alerted. A few minutes later Nail 59 reported contact with both survivors on the ground. Contact was established with Bigot 02A and he stated that he had no injuries and was all right. The SAR forces were launched from CH 89 and CH 93 at this time. Wolf 06 (fast mover PAC) was in the area and was assisting Nail 59 to locate the survivors. The weather in the area was completely undercast with the bases running from 800 ft. to 2500 ft. and the tops were at 6000 ft. Attempts were made by both Nail 59 and Wolf 06 to get under the cloud deck to locate the position of the survivors. King 21 requested border clearance, MIG CAP, Iron Hand, and ELINT coverage due to the hostile environment of the SAR scene. The weather became the prime factor for rescuing the survivors. The bases of the clouds were down on the tops of the karst. At approximately 0530Z, Bigot 02A said, "I'm hit!", "I'm hit, Help! Help! I'm going to give up." Sandy 01 then made several attempts to get under the weather to assist the survivors on the ground. He was unable to find any place to get under the clouds where he could work his way into the area of the survivors. Further discussion between Sandy 01 and Bigot 02B gave the location of the Bravo man as 50 meters north of his chute and that he had 2 radios only and no spare batteries. Sandy 01 and Wolf 06 were reporting scattered AAA fire but that the air bursts were not accurate as they were firing through the clouds. Bigot 02B was advised at this time to come up only every half hour unless he was in trouble. At 0637Z Bravo stated that bad guys were within 100 meters of him and he could hear voices. No attempt was made to put in any strikes as the area continued to be completely



SECRET

SECRET


overcast. Bigot 02B stated that the bases were approximately 300 ft. King 21 and Sandy 01 discussed the possibility of using Tagger to protect the Brave man if necessary. We decided we would only use it as a last resort. At 0855Z, Sandy 03 took over as on scene commander. At 0920Z, Sandy 03 RTB'd to CH 29 with a rough running engine. Mail 41 was appointed OSG until Sandy 05 could arrive at the SAR scene. The Sandys and Mail and Wolf PAC's continued to monitor the weather and the condition of the survivor. At 1130Z, Mail 69 was set up as the first of the CAPCOM for the SAR scene for the entire night. All SAR forces were returned to base.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/AMC Major Jones
CP Major Regale
CP 1Lt Bodwell
N Capt Moore
BO SSgt Hunt
FE TSgt Wilson, E.
LM SSgt Simmons

SAR Forces

King 21
King 23
Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04, 09, 06,
07 and 08
Jelly Greens 60, 56, 58, 57,
55 and 62
Mails 59, 62, 41 and 63
Wolfs 06, 01 and 04


ROBERT E. JONES, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

DATE: 4 Feb 71

13 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: 3-004-2 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02

LOCATION: 092/86/89

SAVES: None

(S) A first light SAR effort was planned for the third day to rescue Bigot 02B. Nail 45 was the first aircraft to arrive on scene at 2250Z and he was appointed as On Scene Commander (OSC). Nail 45 made a first light weather evaluation and the area was reported completely overcast. There was no ceiling as the clouds were observed to go to the surface at some point and the tops over Bigot 02B was 4800 ft. Sandy 01 arrived on scene at 2300Z and he took over as OSC. Wolf 01 was also in the area to assist the Sandy's and Nail FAC's. At 0010Z, Bigot 02B stated that he was okay and had water and 3 flares. He was using his second radio. Bravo stated at 0156Z there were troops to the south of him and that the clouds were at the tops of the trees. There were breaks starting to appear south east and south west of the SAR scene. By 0245Z the tops of the clouds over Bravo were down to 4250ft. At 0305Z, Bravo stated that he had moved from Kansas City to Omaha. The weather continued the same with breaks appearing in the overcast. Sandy 07 was appointed OSC at 0318Z. At 1405Z, Bigot 02B sounded like he was whispering on the radio. No definite message was received at this time as it was unintelligible. This was the last positive radio contact made with Bigot 02B. The weather continued the same for the next two hours with no further progress made. Sandy 09 reported ground fire in the area but no one took any hits. Continuous attempts were made to get either voice contact or a beeper from Bravo. Sandy 07 made repeated attempts to get under the overcast. He was unable to remain under the overcast and reach the area of the survivor. At 0625Z, Sandy 09 was appointed as OSC. Attempts were made on all SAR frequencies to contact the Bravo man. The weather started to break overhead the SAR scene at 0638Z. The aircraft on the scene at the time were unable to make any visual sighting of the survivor. At approximately 0655Z, a noise, beeper, voice was heard on 243.0. None of the aircraft monitoring were able to distinguish what was said or who had said it. The weather had started to move back into the area again. A beeper was heard at 0721Z and again at 0725Z. King 21 advised Sandy 09 to try to get a shiney from [unclear].

S [unclear]

GROUP-4

No shikey observed from the area. Sandy 09 reported 37 MM fire from the area. At 0800Z clouds started to move back into the area. Authenticators were requested from Jack at 0805Z. By 0832Z, the entire area was overcast again. An 85 MM gun had begun to fire at 0812Z. At 0850Z the 85 MM had fired a second time. At this time we began receiving Bandit calls from Squid and Crab. The SAR forces were moved to the west. At 1000Z, all SAR forces were directed to RTB. The last positive voice contact made with Bigot 02B was at 0325Z when he stated that he was all right. He had sounded calm and confident on all voice contact up to that time.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/AMC Major Jones
CP Major Regels
CP 1Lt Badwell
N Capt Moore
RO SSgt Hunt
FE TSgt Wilson, E
LN TSgt Simmons

SAR Forces

King 21
King 23
Sandys 01, 02, 03, 04, 05,
06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12,
13, and 14
Jelly Green 61, 62, 60, 56
Mail 45, 59, 47, 23
Wolf 01, 02, 03, 04


ROBERT E. JONES, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

The alpha crewmember from Gunfighter 13 was not recovered.

On 20 January 71 while Jolly Greens 77 and 71 were flying locally they observed a ball of fire in the air and then saw two parachutes descending feet wet two miles east of Monkey Mountain. Both helicopters immediately went to the scene and recovered the crew of Gunfighter 03. The aircraft commanders of Jolly Green 70 and Jolly Green 71 were Major Mudd and Captain Gary Hoven. Major Mudd made the 600th save recovered by the 37ARRS on this mission.

On 6 February 71 while Jolly Greens 65 and 73 were on orbit they were advised by Queen that a South Vietnamese UH1H, call sign Butterfly 063 was down 109 degrees for 18 miles off Channel 69. Five persons were on board. Both helicopters departed for the scene and were joined by Sandy aircraft. After the Sandy aircraft prepared the area Jolly Green 65 recovered the five South Vietnamese crewmembers. Jolly Green 65 was flown by Major Ryland R. Drelbelbis. This may have been the first recovery of Vietnamese personnel by Jolly Green forces.

On 9 February 71 a Medevac mission was completed by Jolly Green 77, which was on alert at Bien Hoa. A woman was hemorrhaging at Con Son Island and required evacuation to medical facilities. The evacuation to Saigon was without incident. The aircraft commander of Jolly Green 77 was Captain Donald G. Beattie.

37th Crew Saves Five Vietnamese

Rescue crews from the 37th ARRS here picked up five Vietnamese Air Force crew members last Saturday after their

UH-1E 'Huey' helicopter went down approximately 12 miles east-southeast of Hue. The five rescued

men, all from the VNAF's 213th Helicopter Squadron, were 1st. Lt. Ngoc Tran Van, an instructor pilot, 2d Lt. Boi Hoang and Nhiep Dang, two student pilots; Sgt. Bat Mai Van, the crew chief, and Capt. Hao Do Huu, a passenger.

After their rescue, the VNAF airmen and the rescue crew received a traditional hosing down to welcome them to Da Nang, much to the surprise of the Vietnamese airmen.

(Continued on Pg. 5)

VNAF Rescued

(Continued from Pg. 1)

U.S. Air Force Maj. Ryland R. Driebelbis was the aircraft commander of the HH-53 "Buff" that brought the VNAF airmen in. The co-pilot was Capt. Karlton I. Bakke and PJ's (pararescuemen) on the crew were MSgt. Gordon C. Bailey and ALC James W. Meulch. Crew chief was SSgt. Robert H. Rogers.

Operating out of Da Nang, two A-1 Skyraiders from the 56th Special Operations Wing, at NKP Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand flew as protective escort for the rescue aircraft.

The Huey went down in an abandoned rice paddy just inland from the coast of the South China Sea, according to Major Driebelbis. "They apparently had mechanical problems and had to land in the paddy. When we got to the scene they were on top of the chopper and we just dropped the penetrator down and pulled them up one by one."

The Skyraider pilots said they saw what appeared to be a crane-type helicopter coming on the scene to retrieve the Huey.

Living up to their motto, "That Others May Live", the men of the 37th have made 605 'saves' since coming to Da Nang in 1964.

6 Feb

500 JG 77 Landed AT B. H
 logged 4.0 2-landings DS
 635 JG 65 + JG 73 IN SAR
 Effort BUTTER fly 063 UNAR
~~1234~~ Down AT 325/25/77
 45 Aboard
 645 Going INTO phase Bravo —
 JG 65 Low bird
 655 PHASE BRAVO COMPLETED FIVE PICKUP'S #601 #602 #603 #604 #605
 0800 MISSION NO. A-3-004 6 FEB 71 Closed
 0715 JG 65 on the beach 3.3 SAR DS
 JG 73 in the beach 3.7 MSN 1X
 1058 DATA JRC TOTAL 15.9 A
 1100 Line Check 5X5 SSAT ARISE off Be
~~1230~~ 6 Feb - Queen is calling it Combat SAUS.
 A004 6 Feb DS

7 FEB

2040 MAJ HEIGES ON DUTY RA
 2145 STATUS PASSED TO QUEEN RA
 0405 MAJ Heiges off MSgt Smith on duty DS
 1000 Neg flying time for DATA DS
 1015 Line Check 54-5 DS
 1020 MSgt Smith off duty DS

8 FEB

2040 MAJ Posey ON DUTY Cof
 2130 STATUS PASSED TO QUEEN Cof
 2309 ITEM 14 RCV'd Cof
 2345 OPS STATUS PASSED Cof
 0045 JG 73 ABN ETE 4130 Cof

FEBRUARY

1971

SURVIVORS

NAME RANK

SSN

DATE	CREW	JG	SAVE #	ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	TYPE SAVE
6	DREIBELBIS	65	601	NGOC, TRAN-VAN ^{1/LT}	14-185N	5 COMBAT
	BAKKE		602	BOI, HOANG ^{2/LT}	108.00E	
	ROGERS		603	NHIEP DANG ^{2/LT}	UH1H	
	BAILEY		604	BAT MAI VAN, ST	SOUTH V.N.	
	MUELCHE		605	HÀO ĐỒ-HỮU, CAPT.	MSN II A-3-004	
26	BAKKE	65	607	HEDDRICH, DAVID R.	106.26 E 16 42 N.	2 COMBAT
	WEIMER		608	CAPT. XXXXXXXXXX 37 TFW	COBRA 23 F-4	
	McKINNEY			MCLAUGHLIN, THOMAS M. ^{1/LT} XXXXXXXXXX 37 TFW		
27	WAMMER	72	609	McCarthy, PAUL F. XXXX	017/17/69	1 COMBAT
	FRIED			CMDR. "KITTY HAWK"	CHIPPIE 44 (A-7)	
	ROGERS					
	SCHWARTZ					
	KIRK					
09	BEATTIE	77	606	NAME UNKN	60N 50N	MED EVAC
	KOMICH			V.N. WOMAN	ISLAND	
	BURCHFIELD			PREGNANT & hemorrhaging	MSN # 03-003 FEB	1 Non Come
	SMITH					
	HANCOCK					

MONTHLY TOTAL 9