[redacted]

FROM: 13OS (Lt Col Stone/2116) 12 Feb 1971

SUBJECT: SARCO for Report for BIGOT 02A & 02B

TO: DO

1. An unsuccessful rescue was attempted on 3-6 of February 1971 for Bigot 02A & 02B. The aircraft, an F-4, went down at approximately 1115 3 Feb 6 miles north of Delta 22. The reason for bailout is unknown however, Bigot 02B stated that there was an aircraft malfunction. This report will cover those activities relating to the SAR forces during rescue effort. All times are Thailand local.

2. Sandy 01 & 02, 03 and 04 were launched at 1145. Sandy 01 & 02 proceeded directly to the position of the survivors. Sandy 03 & 04 escorted Jolly Green 56 & 60 ton an initial holding point of 100/90/89. Sandy 01 was appointed on scene commander at approximately 1230. When Sandy 01 established contact with Bigot 02A & 02B, 02A stated that he was in good shape and had no injuries. 02B stated that his back was hurt, but he was alright. Approximately 30 minutes after Sandy 01 and 02 arrived on scene, Bigot 02A stated he had movement very close to his position. Shortly thereafter he stated, "they are shooting at me, I'm hit, I'm hit. Help me! Help me!" (Atch 1) After this transmission no other contact was made with Bigot 02A. Sandy 01 & 02 attempted to penetrate the overcast, but the weather was right on top of the Karst and they were forced to climb back on top of the 6500 foot overcast. Nail 59, 23 and 41 worked in the area and also attempted to find a hole and penetrate the overcast, but their efforts were to no avail. Sandy 01 & 02 turned on scene command to Sandy 03 at 1530 and returned to base. (Atch 2)

3. Sandy 03 & 04 had been holding with the Jolly Greens and had reached bingo fuel after 30 minutes as on scene commander. Sandy 05 & 06 had been scrambled from Ubon and Sandy 07 & 08 had been scrambled from Bien Hoa. Sandy 07 & 08 assumed the role of Jolly Green escort and Sandy 05 relieved Nail 41 as on scene commander at 1630. Hobo 30, 31, 22 and 23 were diverted from their missions and proceeded to the area of the SAR. Sandy 05 was able to find a hole and attempted to penetrate the overcast. He penetrated the overcast and broke out at 500 feet above the ground. After getting down there was no place to go due to the poor visibility and the Karst hidden in the clouds. Sandy 05 climbed back on top and with Nail 63 and Wolf 04 began to pinpoint the survivors location with TACAN and DME. The fine work of Nail 63, Wolf 04, and Sandy 05 gave a very accurate location of the objective and this position was used throughout the rest of the SAR effort. Darkness forced the SAR forces to withdraw from the area. Bed down instructions were given to Bigot 02B and a check in night procedure for night coverage was established. (Atch 3)

[redacted]

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
CATALOGED
DO NOT DESTROY
No. 0251762

4. The first days effort consisted of 8 Sandy aircraft, 4 Hobo strike aircraft, 4 A-1 Smoke aircraft and 4 Nails. Also, an unknown of fast movers were available for the effort. (Atch 4)

5. Extensive preparations were made during the night for the first light effort of 4 Feb 1971. The deployed A-1 aircraft from Bien Hoa and Ubon were recovered at NKP as well as the Jolly Greens from Ubon. Four more Jolly Greens from Udorn were also deployed to NKP, giving a total of eight Jolly Green resources at NKP. Jokor established 0600 as first light and briefings and take off times were based on this time. The first six Sandy pilots, two smoke pilots, four Jolly Green crews, Nail 45 and King 21 were briefed at 0400. The Sandy pilots were briefed on the call signs of Mig cap, Ironhand, B-52, Napo, fast mover smoke, and Paveway. They were also informed that various other types of ordnance would be available through King 21, the AMC.

6. Overnight cap was provided Bigot 02B by the Nails and one Candle. Nail 7 contacted the survivor at 1940, 2030, and 2115. Nail 72 also reported being shot at during the night through the clouds. He described the burst one kilometer east of his position, which was 092/86/89, as black airburst similiar to an airburst of a MK-82. No contact was made with the survivor from 2115 until Nail 82 made contact at 0415. The weather in the area was reported as 8/8 with tops 7000 feet. Bases were unknown.

7. The first of the SAR forces launched between 0530 & 0615. They consisted of eight Jolly Greens and four A-1 Sandy aircraft. Sandy 01 & 02 proceeded to the area of the survivor and Sandy 03 & 04 escorted the Jolly Greens to an initial holding point of 113/50/89. A final holding point was established at 091/79/89 to get the Jolly Greens closer to the survivors position in the event a pickup was attempted. Sandy 01 & 02 arrived in the area of the survivor at approximately 0610 and relieved Candle 23 as on scene commander. Radio contact was established with Bigot 02B and he stated he was being fired on from 100 meters. The weather in the area was right on the trees and Sandy 01 & 02 were unable to penetrate the overcast. (Atch 5)

8. Sandy 05 & 06 launched at 0840. Nail 41 and Wolf 06 were also on scene. A few breaks were beginning to appear in the overcast to the South and West of the survivors position. Sandy 05 requested Paveways and instructed Nail 41 to put them in on the route structure that could be seen through the overcast in the vicinity of Ban Karai Pass. However, before strikes could be put in, the weather closed in and the only ordnance that could be put in was CBU-49. SAM and MIG calls were being broadcast almost continously. 37MM and 85MM antiaircraft fire was being directed at the SAR forces during the entire period. Wolf 06 reported RHAW indication of gun laying radar. Bigot 02B was requested to make a check of his spare radio. This he did and it checked loud and clear. Sandy 11 & 12 arrived on scene at 1315 and relieved Sandy 05 & 06. (Atch 6)

9. Sandy 11 and 12 arrived on scene at 1315 and continued to search for a way to penetrate the overcast and pinpoint the survivors position on the ground. Sandy 11 finally was able to penetrate the 300 foot overcast, using ADF cuts from the survivors radio, and pinpoint his position. Bigot 02B reported that there was no ground fire on Sandy 11 for the first four or five passes, but he reported small arms fire on passes South of his position. The small arms fire was soon joined by 23MM from the East. Sandy 12 penetrated the overcast and reported ZPU fire. Sandy 12 put down a dud M-47 bomb on a hill west of the survivor to use as an IP for the Jolly Green. Another 23MM started shooting at this time and the fire became very accurate. Sandy 11 took a couple of hits in the left and right wing. After a look over, the battle damage was assessed as not significant and Sandy 11 instructed Sandy 12 to bring the Jolly Green under the clouds. Sandy 11 received several airbursts of 23MM directly in front of him and aborted the pickup attempt. Sandy 11 jettisoned his stores, left Sandy 12 as on scene commander and returned to NKP. (Atch 7)

10. Sandy 09 & 10 had scrambled from Da Nang at 1330 and proceeded to the area of the survivor. Sandy 09 received on scene command from Sandy 12 and instructed Smoke 41 and 42 to take the Jolly Greens back to the forward holding point. Sandy 09 located the survivor and brought Sandy 10 down through the clouds to assist him. Sandy 10 took a 23MM in his right wing and returned to base. Sandy 09 then brought Sandy 15 down, briefed him and then returned to NKP. (Atch 8)

11. Sandy 15 became the on scene commander at 1700. The weather had deteriorated to 300-500 feet. Sandy 15 appraised the ground fire situation, which consisted of ZPU, automatic weapons, and much small arms fire, and determined that it would be impossible to suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of a helicopter survive a pickup attempt. Sandy 15 gave the survivor instructions for another night on the ground and turned on scene command to Nail 52 at 1745. All SAR forces returned to base at 1800. (Atch 9)

12. The SAR effort of 4 February 1971, consisted of 16 A-1 Sandy aircraft, 4 A-1 Smoke aircraft, 8 Jolly Greens, and 5 Nails. An unknown number of Wolf FACs and fast mover strike aircraft were also used during the day. (Atch 10)

13. Overnight preparations for the effort of 5 February 1971, were similiar to those of the previous night. All deployed Sandy aircraft were returned to NKP along with eight Jolly Greens. King 21 arrived NKP at 0315 and a briefing was conducted at 0400 for King 21, Sandy 01 through 06, 4 Jolly Greens and Smoke 41 & 42. The call signs of Mig cap, Ironhand, and Paveways and strike aircraft were briefed. Overnight coverage of the survivor was provided by Nail 99, 96, 76 and 68. No voice contact was made with the survivor during the night.

14. The SAR effort of 5 Feb 1971 started with the launch of Nail 45 at 0520. Four Jolly Greens were airborne by 0555. Sandy 01 proceeded to the area and relieved Nail 45 as on scene commander. Sandy 03 and 04 escorted the Jolly Greens to the initial holding fix. Sandy 01 established voice contact with the survivor and determined that: (1) He was still using his radio (2) He still had one canteen of water (3) He was in good condition (4) He was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue (5) There was no movement around him (6) No guns had been moved into his position during the night. Sandy 01 asked Bigot 02B if he could move over the ridge line and Bigot 02 replied that there was two guns on the ridge line and he didn't think it was a good idea. Bigot 02B stated that the weather was right on the trees. Every attempt to penetrate the overcast by Sandy 01 was futile. (Atch 11)

15. Sandy 07 relieved Sandy 01 as on scene commander, established voice contact with the survivor and continued to search for a hole and an area where the ceiling would allow flight over the survivor's position. Each attempt was unsuccessful. Nail 43 and Wolf 04 were in the area and Sandy 07 requested paveway to cut the road that was visible north Ban Karai Pass. A short time after 1100 Nail 43 reported that Bigot 02B came up on the radio three times in about five minutes. Sandy 07 heard the last two transmissions which were indistinguishable, but were in an excited whispered tone. This was the last known voice contact with Bigot 02B. Sandy 07 & 08 continued to search for a way to get over the survivor's position and during the search strafed a truck on the route structure leading to the survivor's location. (Atch 12)

16. Sandy 09 assumed on scene command from Sandy 07 at 1330 and attempted to establish voice contact on all of the survival frequencies. At 1400 the weather began to break and Sandy 07 could see the survivor location. However, no voice or beeper contact could be made. Sandy 07 & 08 continued to circle the survivor's position and antiaircraft guns began to fire. This included 23MM, 37MM and 57 or 85MM. Sandy 13 and 14 were on their way to the scene and Sandy 09 started to brief them when King 21 stated Migs were in the area and suggested all SAR forces withdraw. Sandy 09, 10, 13 and 14 withdrew and returned to Base. (Atch 13 & Atch 14)

17. All SAR forces returned to NKP. The effort for the day consisted of 14 Sandys, 6 Jolly Greens, and 4 Nails. The number of fast mover strike and FAC aircraft is unknown. (Atch 15)

18. Coverage over the survivor was again provided by the Nails. No voice or beeper contact was established during the night and joker directed that a modified effort be made for the 6th of February 1971. Two Sandy A-1's would launch with four on ground alert. Six Jolly Greens and four Smoke would remain on alert at NKP. Sandy 01 and 02 launched at 0710 and proceeded to the area. The weather was again overcast and no voice or beeper contact could be established. Sandy 01 and 02 returned to base and no other Sandy aircraft were launched.

19. During this SAR effort a total of 40 Sandy aircraft flew, 18 Jolly Greens Sorties, 13 Nail Sorties and 4 Hobo Strike Sorties. (Atch 4, 10, 15, 16)

20. This SAR effort was unsuccessful. We ask ourselves a series of questions to determine why. These questions are: (1) was there anytime during the extended period of this effort that a pickup could have been attempted with reasonable assurance of success? (2) What were the biggest stumbling blocks to success? (3) How would we do it, if it had been done over again? (4) Would any of the Sandy low leads have any reason for self recrimination? Let's start with the first question and determine if a pickup attempt could have been made. The first time that the overcast was penetrated and the survivors position was pinpointed was approximately 1330 on 4 Feb, the second day of the SAR. Sandy 11 located the survivor and moved the Jolly Greens into a position for pickup. Sandy 11 received heavy ground fire, sustained battle damage, and was forced to withdraw (Atch 7). Sandy 09 was on scene and both 09 and 10 received battle damage (Atch 8). Sandy 15 and 16 were the last Sandy aircraft on scene on the 4th of Feb and in his statement Sandy 15 states: "It was impossible to sufficiently suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of having a helicopter survive a pickup attempt." (Atch 9). On 5 Feb the weather was penetrated, but there was no voice or beeper contact which indicated that there was no longer an objective. The environment around the survivor made it impossible for the A-1 to operate without being endangered by ground fire. A helicopter is much more vunerable and I honestly believe that it would have been shot down. In view of these facts I do not believe a pickup could have been made. Now let's look at the stumbling blocks to success. First of all the weather was the biggest factor in this unsuccessful SAR. At no time did we have weather conditions that would allow the use of all the airpower that we had at our disposal. Another factor was the very hostile environment that the survivor was down in. The quantity and quality of antiaircraft defences made it necessary to use suppressive air power against them and without good weather this was impossible without endangering the survivor. I feel that a survivor can be picked up in a non hostile environment with bad weather or in a hostile environment with good weather. With bad weather and a hostile environment, the chances of a successful pickup are nil. How would we do the SAR if we had to do it again? First, the principals employed by the SAR forces were sound. The only point that can be made is the excessive radio transmissions made to the objective and the replies that he was expected to make. When the weather is completely unworkable, a TACAN radial and DME is close enough for Sandies. If the weather starts to break or the survivor calls and says that it is improving, then a pinpoint electronic search should be conducted. Excessive transmissions by the survivor or the SAR forces could very easily give his position away to enemy forces. Eliminating excessive transmissions not only will extend the life of the survivors radio, but may also deny the enemy information as to his position.

Please do not misunderstand, if it is necessary to use the radio, use it. The fourth question has to be directed to all the Sandy Pilots in the wing. There has been some self recrimination by the pilots and we want to prevent a situation that could develop as a result of these feelings. After a study of all of the statements made by the Sandy Pilots, there is no doubt that each and every member of the SAR Force did everything in their power to make a successful pickup. The Sandy pilots must always remember that when the Helicopters are committed, there must be a reasonable chance of success. Although there is a feeling of "maybe" among the Sandies, all you have to do is think how you would feel if a Helicopter had been committed and been shot down. Do not rush to commit a Helicopter in the future. The basic principals of search and rescue still apply and if used will produce the desired results, crew members rescued.

HERBERT H. STONE, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

16 Atch

1. Statement for Nail 62
2. Statement for Sandy 01/02
3. Statement for Sandy 05
4. Flying Schedule
5. Statement for Sandy 01/02
6. Statement for Sandy 05/06
7. Statement for Sandy 11
8. Statement for Sandy 09
9. Statement for Sandy 15/16
10. Flying Schedule
11. Statement for Sandy 01
12. Statement for Sandy 07/08
13. Statement for Sandy 09/10
14. Statement for Sandy 13/14
15. Flying Schedule
16. Flying Schedule

S T A T E M E N T

NARRATIVE FROM SANDY 09 & 30
SAR for BIGOT 07B

I was scrambled from Da Nang at 1330 local NKP time. I proceeded to the Jolly holding point and took the Jolly escort from Sandy 07 at 1440. Approximately ten minutes later Sandy 11 sent his wingman up to take Jolly Green 57 down to the area to attempt a pickup. Sandy 11 said the weather was too low for all four Sandys to work with the Jolly during the pickup; so myself and my wingman (Sandy 10, Capt Hawes) stayed with the high Jolly in the holding area. As Sandy 12 took the Jolly down, Sandy 11 stated a 23mm had just opened up on him and he had taken a hit. Sandy 12 gave the Jolly to Smoke 41 & 42 to escort back to the holding area. Sandy 12 then went to escort his leader back. Sandy 11 had not briefed the next low Sandy yet, and after stating he could RTB alone he sent Sandy 12 back to show me the area. The next scheduled Sandy low was not in the area yet, so I left Smoke 41 & 42 to escort the Jollys and I went down with 12 to look over the area and get briefed. My wingman held above the low ceiling until I was ready for him to come down. As we approached the survivors area Sandy 12 had an airburst go off very close to him and he thought he had damage. We left the immediate area and I checked him over. He appeared to be ok but was low on fuel. We attempted to relocate the survivors area but due to the low ceiling we could not. At this point Sandy 12 RTB'd because of low fuel and I became the on scene commander. The weather at this time was minimum workable but I had to go through the process of relocating the survivor. I conducted an electronic search above the clouds, then dropped down underneath for a visual fix. After approximately 30 minutes I located the survivor. During this time I had relocated a 37mm and also took fire from a ZPU approximately 400 meters south of the survivor. The 37mm could not depress his fire enough to be a real threat since he was almost ½ mile east of the area. After trolling for ground fire and checking an ingress/egress route, I determined that the ZPU could be avoided using terrain masking. No ground fire was observed along the selected route. I attempted to mark an IP, but M-47 did break open. My second WP bomb would not release. At this point I went back on top to pick up my wingman and have him mark with his M-47's. The weather had gone overcast and I had to rely on my knowledge of the terrain to make an IFR letdown. Once under the weather I showed my wingman the area and route and we were preparing to mark the IP. My wingman made a turn south of the survivor, near the road, and took a 23mm hit in the wing. He jettisoned his load and headed west toward NKP with me in trail. After determining he was able to RTB alone, I took Sandy 15 (Maj Keeler) down and showed him the area and briefed him. I then had to RTB due to low fuel. It was about 1700 local at that time. Enroute to NKP I discovered I had taken some hits from the ZPU. No major damage and RTB was uneventful.

[redacted]

STATEMENT

NARRATIVE FROM SANDY 09 & 10
SAR for BIGOT 02B (CONT'D)

During the time I worked with Bigot 02B he sounded fit and in reasonable spirits with no bad guys in his immediate area.

MICHAEL W. SMITH, Captain, USAF
SANDY 09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SANDY 15/16 SAR REPORT

Sandy 15/16 (Maj Keeler /Lt Kiland) were launched at 1450 4 Feb 71 to escort two Jolly Greens to the initial holding point and to the final holding point as required. Approximately 10 minutes after launch the On Scene Commander (OSC), Sandy 11, took hits which forced him to RTB. He was in the process of setting up for a pickup attempt.

OSC was then turned over to Sandy 12, who called Sandy 15 for an ETA to the survivors area so he could brief Sandy 15 on the situation and release OSC to Sandy 15. Since Sandy 15 was some distance out and and Sandy 12 was short of fuel, Sandy 09 and 10 were relieved from Jolly escort duty and briefed on the survivors position. Sandy 09 then took over as OSC. Smoke 41-44 then became the Jolly escorts.

Sandy 09 found the survivor and proceeded to get his forces together for a pickup attempt. While he was briefing his wingman, the wingman took a 23mm round in the right wingtip and had to jettison his ordnance and RTB.

Sandy 09 then took Sandy 15 under the weather and pointed out the survivor and a proposed ingress route for the Jolly Greens. Sandy 15 took over OSC at 1700.

The weather was now overcast with bases approximately 2800' to 3000' MSL which gave a 300' to 500' ceiling to work under. After looking the area over and observing ZPU fire, automatic weapons fire and much small arms fire in the vicinity of the survivor, Sandy 15 decided it was impossible to sufficiently suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of having a helicopter survive a pickup attempt. Sandy 15 then gave instructions to the survivor for another night in the weeds. Sandy 15 turned OSC over to Nail 52 at 1745 local and returned to Base.

WALTER D. KEELER, Major, USAF
SANDY 15

JOHN W. KILAND, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FLYING SCHEDULE

4 Feb 1971

PILOT	SANDY	TARGET	TIME	REMARKS
Schaffer	01	0535	4.2	On Scene Commander
Singer	02	0535	4.2	
Hagan	03	0542	4.7	On Scene Commander
Col. Rouch	04	0542	4.7	
Donaldson	05	0540	4.9	On Scene Commander
Mathers	06	0540	4.9	
Young	07	0940	5.4	
Anderson	08	0940	5.4	
Smith	09	1328	4.0	On Scene Commander Battle Damage
Hawes	10	1328	3.6	IFE-Battle Damage Hole in Wing
Wolcott	11	1210	3.3	On Scene Commander IFE-Battle Damage
Rentz	12	1210	4.0	On Scene Commander Suspected Battle Damage
Place	13	1505	3.4	
Maddon	14	1505	3.4	
Keeler	15	1447	3.7	On Scene Commander Escort JB 54 & 56
Kiland	16	1447	3.7	
Lyon Smoke	41	1418	3.4	
Miller	42	1418	3.4	
Adams	43	1455	3.4	
Witte	44	1455	3.4	
Yarger Nail	45	0605	4.6	
Col. Rouch	23	1500	2.7	
McCaslin	41	0925	4.6	
Brahmer	51	1215	2.5	IFE-Low Oil Pressure
Chenovey	52	1430	4.7	
Carmen J G	54	1430	3.8	
Callihan	56	1430	3.8	
Block	57	1032	7.1	
McGeorge	60	1032	7.1	
Callihan	62	0530	6.0	
Carmen	55	0530	6.0	
McGeorge	60	0615	1.4	
Reilly	61	0615	1.4	

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Major Wolcott

SUBJECT: Bigot 02 Bravo SAR

TO: SARCO

Sir:

On 5 February my call sign was Sandy 05. Captain Keeter was on my wing as Sandy 06. We were back-up for the first-light effort. We were launched by Teepee to replace Sandy 01 and 02, who aborted before take-off. We assumed their call signs and proceeded to the SAR area, arriving there shortly after first-light.

I assumed on-scene-command from Nail 45 and made radio contact with the survivor. As directed by the SARCO, I asked him a number of questions. In response I received the following answers among others.

(1) He was still using his frist radio.

(2) He still had one canteen of water.

(3) He was in good condition with no back problems.

(4) He was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue.

(5) There was no movement around him.

(6) No guns had been moved into his position during the night.

I then asked him if he could move. When he answered in the affirmative, I recommended that he move over the ridgeline to the north of his position. We had taken most of the groundfire the previous day from the south and east, and I believed we would have a chance of rescuing him despite the inability to use fast movers if he could go over the hill. He reported that there were "TWO Guns" on the ridgeline. I had not seen them the previous day, but he was certainly the expert in the area, so we told him to stay where he was.

When I asked about the ceiling, he reported it to be on the tree-tops. I then told him to turn his radio off and to come up every 30 minutes with a very short transmission. I instructed him that transmitting reduced his battery life much more than receiving.

My next move was to try to get under the overcast. When he finally reported it to be up to 100 feet, I searched every hole to the west and south for an entrance. Every attempt was thwarted by karsts which protruded into the clouds.

[redacted]

[redacted]

After four and a half very frustrating hours I turned over the on-scene-command to Major Donaldson, Sandy 07.

John J. Wolcott

JOHN J. WOLCOTT, Major, USAF
Sandy 01

[redacted]

STATEMENT

SANDY 07 & 08 - MAJ DONALDSON/Lt Col Hagan - 5 Feb 71

Sandy 07 & 08 were launched at 0950 local to assume on scene command of the SAR. We replaced Sandy 01 and 02. Wolf 04 and Nail 43 were the FACS. Weather in the area was undercast from 10 miles west of the survivor's position all the way to the east and north. Tops at 4500' to 5000' and the bottoms at 2200' to 2400'. Contact with the survivor had been established by Sandy 01 and he stated he was in good spirits. Only hourly contact was being used to conserve Bravo's batteries.

Soon after arriving in the area we began looking for holes in the undercast in which to go underneath to search for a route whereby we could find the survivor and begin to suppress the heavy groundfire of the previous day. Several bursts of 23mm were noted north of Bravo's position. We We stationed the Nail right over the survivor's position, backed off to the northwest about five miles and had the Nail give us hold-downs on UHF in order to get a DF to the survivor. We found several thin spots in the undercast and let down to 3000' indicated, hoping to break out in one of the valleys. The highest marked terrain in the area was 2800'. This procedure was unsuccessful due to low weather. Next we went down near the route structure where it was beginning to break up, let down VFR to the valley floor and proceeded back north in hopes of finding a usable route. This too was unsuccessful because the bottoms of the clouds at 2200' to 2400' met the rising terrain approximately two klicks from Bravo's position. We again placed the Nail over Bravo's position and attempted the DF steer technique from the southeast and the north. We could never break out of the weather even though we descended to 3000' indicated.

Much of the route structure was now visible to the south and we requested the Wolf FAC to get some paveways to cut the road north of Ban Karai Pass. This ordnance was requested about 1030 local but to my knowledge was not on scene until about 1300 local. At 1100 local the survivor checked in as briefed and we continued to look for a route to his location. Sometime after local 1100, the Nail said he heard Bravo come up on the radio three times in about five minutes. Sandy 07 heard the last two of these transmissions and it sounded as if Bravo was excited and was whispering into the microphone. This was the last known voice contact with Bravo.

We again left the Nail holding high so he could listen for Bravo's transmissions and also give us DF steers while we were underneath the overcast.

[redacted]

STATEMENT

SANDY 07 & 08 (CONT'D)

At approximately 1230 local we decided to fly east under the weather until we came to a segment of the route structure that was south of Bravo's position and led directly north to the small trail he was thought to be on. At a point about two klicks south of Bravo we found a large IDP where the road went through a narrow valley. We attempted to turn north just short of the IDP but the weather came down to the top of the karst at 2200' indicated.

Sandy 07 then flew over toward the IDP with the intentions of perhaps flying right up the road. He noted a truck on the road in the IDP and about that time Sandy 08 called out airbursts right off 07's tail. The truck in the IDP was noted to also be firing some type of automatic weapon. Sandy 07 shot both Lau 3 pods into the IDP and strafed the truck with 20mm. As he neared the pass he could look to the north and see that the clouds again met the valley floor about 500 meters north of the pass. This final bit of discovery prove that the weather in the survivor's area was unworkable.

At 1300 local, Sandy 07 & 08 had to climb back on top and go to loiter power due to low fuel. They were relieved at approximately 1325 local by Sandy 09 & 10.

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S T A T E M E N T

On Feb 5 at 12:40 local, Sandy's 09 & 10 took off to proceed to the area of the SAR for Bigot 02B. We arrived overhead at about 1:20 local and received a briefing from Sandy 07. He said they had lost contact with the survivor at 11:30 and the weather was too bad to get under to work. At 1330 Sandy 09 took on scene command. For about a half an hour we tried to raise Bigot 02 on guard and bravo, charlie, and delta channel without any luck. At 14:00 the weather broke and we could see the survivor's position clearly. About this [illegible]. From [illegible] the survivor [illegible] and we received 140 [illegible] Also East of his position we received very accurate 37[illegible] and 57 or 55[illegible]. We continued circling the survivor's position the rest of the day with no contact. At 16:30 the weather got bad again. At 17:00 Sandy 13 arrived on scene. I started to brief him and King called and said that migs were coming toward our area and suggested the SAR forces R.T.B. Sandy 9 & 10 landed at 17:35.

JAMES C. PAINE, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 09

EDWARD V. LORENZEN, Captain, USAF
SANDY 10

[redacted]

STATEMENT

SANDY 13 & 14 REPORT DUNWOODY/TILTON

Sandy 13 & 14 launched from [redacted] at 1605 local in support of Bigot 02B SAR on 5 Feb 71. Climb and enroute to the 092degree/86/89 were normal. When I approached the area contact was made with Sandy 09 - the on scene commander. Sandy 09 briefed me on 123.1 on the situation. 02B had not responded to any calls by further voice or beeper since approximately 1[redacted]am, [redacted]day. I was briefed on all SAR forces present. The Hail was on scene, and Jolly Green 60 flight with Sandy's 11 & 12 were at the forward holding point. No Mig Cap or Iron Hand or Wolf FAC were available. At approximately 1645 local I took on scene command. Sandy 09 flight RTB'd to CH 89. The weather was 7/8 overcast at approximately 5,000 feet over the survivor with another broken deck at 8500 feet. I briefed the Hail to go to 11,500 feet directly over the survivor and to try contact with 02B on A, B, C, D frequencies. Since the Hails radios were superior, I hoped that contact could be made better this way. I then decided to keep Sandy 14 high while I tried to get below the weather in the area of the survivor. As we made descent - Mig call over Guard indicated Migs in the proximity. King told us to pull all SAR forces back to CH 89. At approximately 1730 local we had to RTB.

RICHARD H. DUNWOODY, Lt Colonel, USAF
SANDY 13

CHARLES L. TILTON, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 14

CONFIDENTIAL

FLYING SCHEDULE

5 Feb 1971

PILOT	STANDBY	TARGET	TIME	REMARKS
Wolcott	01	0552	5.1	On Scene Commander
Koster	02	0552	5.1	
Stone	03	0557	6.3	
Oberlin	04	0557	6.3	
Delt	05	1055	4.9	
Col. Walsh	06	1055	4.9	
Donaldson	07	0940	4.4	On Scene Commander
Hagan	08	0940	4.4	
Paine	09	1247	4.4	On Scene Commander
Lorenzen	10	1247	4.4	
Roberts, P.	11	1500	2.3	
Wilson	12	1500	2.3	
Dunwoody	13	1610	2.5	On Scene Commander
Tipton	14	1610	2.5	
Williams J_G	61	0535	7.2	
Block	62	0535	7.2	
Strayer	55	0600	5.1	
Carmen	60	0600	5.1	
Callahan	56	1236	6.1	
Reilly	57	1236	6.1	
Yarger Mail	45	0520	4.9	
Col. Rouch	23	0855	5.2	
Gibson.	49	1230	4.9	
Latham	47	1425	4.2	

[redacted]

FLYING SCHEDULE*

6 Feb 1971

PILOT	SAUDY	TAKEOFF	TIME	REMARKS
Rentz	01	0710	4.7	On Scene Commander
Lyon	02	0710	4.7	

* Nails were on scene all day monitoring

[redacted]
NARRATIVE

FROM: 23TASS, 1st Lt David W. Jensen/3205 3 Feb 71

SUBJECT: SAR for Biget 02

TO: 1st SOS (LtCol Herbert Stone)

When I arrived on scene at 0445Z Nail 59 and Wolf 04 were looking for Biget 02. Wolf 04 located his position by flying over the survivor and asking him when he was overhead since the weather was completely undercast. I contacted Biget 02 Alpha also by flying over his position. The position was fixed on the 092° radial at 86 DME off of channel 89. The Sandys and Nails both took a few rounds of AAA but nothing close since they were shooting up through the clouds. Biget 02 Alpha said he could hear small arms firing, then while I was talking to him he said, "I'm taking fire, I'm hit, help! help!, I give up, I give up, I give up!". This was the last transmission from Alpha. I assumed by the sound of his voice that he was surrounded completely and that they had him.

Biget 02 Bravo said he was on a hill side about 50 meters up from his parachute. He said he could hear voices at what he thought was about 100 meters away. I was relcived by Nail 63 at 0850Z and RTB to channel 89. The TACAN position plotted in the Karst off of the route segment, however I believe they were relatively close to the lines of communication since they got to Biget 02 Alpha so quickly.

David W. Jensen

DAVID W. JENSEN, 1st Lt, USAF
23rd TASS/Nail 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

NARRATIVE FOR BIGOT 02A & 02B

Bigot 02 A&B (First Day) Sandy 01/02 Lyon/Miller

We received the word to scramble for the SAR at approximately 1130. I arrived on scene at around 1230 and immediately was appointed on - scene-commander by King 21.

I contacted 02 A&B and found out they were in good shape but had movers around them. The weather was completely overcast to 6500ft. I made an attempt to get under the overcast but failed. I had been talking to the survivors for about 30 minutes when Alpha called and said the activity was increasing around him. About 5 minutes later he said they were coming up the hill, "They are shooting at me. I'm hit, I'm hit. Help me. Help." That was the last contact I had with him. We tried to no avail to get under the weather but the clouds were laying on the Karst Tops. For the rest of the afternoon we kept tabs on Bigot 02 Bravo, just hoping for a break in the cloud deck.

Nail 59, 23 and 41 worked with us throughout the afternoon. They did an outstanding job of coordination between King and Hillsboro on the fragging of aircraft to the scene as well as ordering the ordnance they thought might be needed if the weather broke.

At approximately 1530 I called Sandy 03, who was holding with the Jolly Greens, to brief him on the situation. Lt Miller and I then RTB'd because of low fuel.

THOMAS J. LYON, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 01

JOHN H. MILLER, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 02

[redacted]

STATEMENT

SAR REPORT SANDY 05 Lt WILSON
Bigot 02 3 Feb 71

Launched from Ubon at 1539 & arrived on scene at approximately 1630. Nail 41 was in the area but was just about to RTB. N-41 briefed me & Nail 63 who had also just arrived in the area.

N-63 was first to have contact with 02Bravo & relayed his transmissions to me. The few times I was in contact with Bravo he came in very broken & N-63 relayed for me.

The weather in the area was overcast with approximately a 300' - 500' ceiling. At one time I managed to get down through a hole in the cloud cover only to find no place to go underneath.

Coordinating with N-63 and Wolf 04 (an F-4 FAC) we "pinpointed" Bravos's position using the sound of our aircraft as we correlated with Bravo on the radio. In this way we determined a Tacan radial & DME.

At approximately 1830 I made a last transmission to Bravo to dig in for the night & assured him we'd be back at first light. We RTB'd 89 upon instruction from King.

ROBERT L. WILSON, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 05

CONFIDENTIAL

FLYING SCHEDULE

3 Feb 1971

PILOT	CALLSIGN	TAKEOFF	TIME	REMARKS
Lyon	01	1145	4.7	On Scene Commander
Miller	02	1145	4.7	
Paine	03	1145	5.2	On Scene Commander
De Felice	04	1145	5.2	
Wilson	05	1530	3.7	On Scene Commander
Oberlin	06	1530	3.7	
Roberts, P.	07	1443	3.8	
Lorenzen	08	1443	3.8	
Adams Smoke	41	1520	2.6	
Lowe	42	1520	2.6	
Belt	43	1520	2.6	
White	44	1520	2.6	
McCaslin Hail	41	1240	5.3	
Musick	63	1528	3.7	
Applegate	59	0850	5.1	On Scene Commander
Jensen	62	1115	5.2	On Scene Commander
Dunwoody Hobo	30	1150	5.9	
Phillips	31	1150	5.9	
Tipton	22	1305	4.2	
Carmichael	23	1305	4.2	

[redacted]

STATEMENT

SANDY 01 & 02 1LT SCHAFFER/CAPT SINGER 4 Feb 1971

Sandy 01 & 02 launched at 0535 local in support of Bigot 02B. We arrived on scene and began an electronic search for the survivor. Sandy 01 assumed on scene command from Candle 23. Nail 457 arrived shortly and he along with the Sandies continued the electronic search. Radio contact was established with Bigot 02B and he said he had people shooting at him from 100 m away. The weather in the area was right down on the trees, so the Sandies could not get under it. Nail 457 tried to get under the weather but could not find a decent hole. Bigot 02B then reported everything was quiet. The Sandies then orbited with the Nail waiting for a break in the weather. No breaks came, so at 0930 local we turned over on scene command to Sandy 05 & 06 and RTB'd.

GARY W. SCHAFFER, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 01

MICHAEL D. SINGER, Capt, USAF

[redacted]

STATEMENT

SANDY 05 & 06 1LT MATHERS/MAJ DONALDSON 4 Feb 1971

Sandy 05 & 06 were launched at 0840 local to assume on scene command from Sandy 01 & 02. On scene arrival to survivor's location was uneventful. Weather was undercast beginning about 10 miles west of 02 Bravo's position and all the way to the east. A few breaks were noted south and west of Bravo. Sandy 01 gave a good briefing and showed us on the TACAN 091° radial at 86½ NM where we could contact the survivor. Nail 41 and Wolf 06 were also at the scene.

Some of the route structure could be seen through the clouds in the immediate area of Ban Karai Pass and I requested the Nail put in some paveways to cut the road. The ordnance was requested and showed up an hour later but was not put in due to weather having obscured the target in the interim. This same situation happened several times in the next four hours. The only ordnance we could put in was some CBU-49 directly on the road south of 02 Bravo. Sandy 05 then decided to explore some breaks in the weather in hopes of being able to get under the weather and more accurately spot the survivor. All attempts to do this failed because of low clouds and karst that extended up to nearly 3,000 feet.

About 1200 the survivor called and said the big guns at the east end of the valley were firing each time we made a pass in that direction. At first he called out the 37mm fire and later he said an 85mm was firing. The Wolf Fac verified the 85mm due to the large black airbursts above him. The 37mm was being fired through the clouds and was not accurate. SAM and MIG warnings were being broadcast almost continously. Sandy 05 asked the Ironhand flight to patrol the area for RHAW indications of gun laying radar. None was reported. Sandy 05 & 06 continued to probe the area for an egress route to 02 Bravo and also made sure Wolf and Nail did not query 02 Bravo too often thereby using up his batteries. Bravo 02 was requested by King to make a check of his spare radio and it was checked OK.

About 1315 local Sandy 11 & 12 arrived on scene and immediately reported fairly accurate 23mm fire. Sandy 05 briefed Sandy 11 on the situation and showed him the TACAN location of the survivor. The 23mm and 37mm fire was being reported alsmost continuously by Sandys, the Nail and the Wolf Facs. On scene command was passed to Sandy 11 at approximately1330.

ROBERT J. DONALDSON, Maj, USAF
SANDY 05

JAMES I. MATHERS, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 06

[redacted]

[redacted]

ATTN: MAJ WOLCOTT

SUBJECT: SAR FOR BIGOT 02 BRAVO

TO: SARCO

Sir:

I would like to preface my report with a brief remark or two.

This was the most frustrating, disappointing, and saddening SAR I have been on. Sandy pilots have written a long, proud, and gallant history of rescue in Southeast Asia, but this unsuccessful SAR for Bigot 02 Bravo unfortunately does not belong to this proud heritage. The mission of the Sandy/Jolly team is to extract downed airmen from the very clutches of the enemy. We have been reasonably successful in the past. Our proven capability to accomplish this mission has made a significant contribution to the high morale of combat pilots in Southeast Asia.

But we didn't accomplish this mission on the 4th of February - we didn't save 02 Bravo. I personally receive very little consolation from hearing: "Well, one has to expect to lose one every now and then," or "Well, the weather and existing defenses just didn't permit an attempt," or even worse "We did all we could." After talking with 02 Bravo for two days, listening to undaunted courage and appreciating his cool professionalism, I grew to respect him and to become emotionally attached to him. I am damned sorry that we couldn't rescue him. I shall always remember February 4th, 1971, as a very sad day in my life.

What follows is a narrative description of my part in the SAR for Bigot 02 Bravo:

My call sign was Sandy 11. I launched on 4 February about noon to replace the present On-Scene-Commander, Sandy 05. Captain Rentz, Sandy 12, was my wingman. He was also Low Lead qualified and was a tremendous asset.

When we assumed OSC, the weather and poor voice contact with the survivor were the two primary obstacles to a successful SAR. Overcast skies which were reported to be only about 300 feet over the survivor had forced the abandonment of all previous attempts to visually acquire 02 Bravo. About 30 minutes after my arrival the weather began to improve somewhat; some holes began to develope to the south and west, and we could see the ground in several places.

Poor and irregular contact with 02 Bravo made effective communication with him very difficult. When we did hear him, he sounded as though he was in the bottom of a barrel. We asked him to remove the acoustical coupler, but I did not hear his response. He still sounded the same when I did hear him again.

Apparently 02 Bravo could hear me clearly all the time. Wolf 04, who happened to be a classmate of 02 Bravo, stated that he was

[redacted]

answering all of my transmissions. The Wolf relayed all calls to me. He then began an electronic search for 02 Bravo. When he got station passage, he lit his AB's and asked 02 Bravo if he "could hear the Wolf." 02 Bravo responded that he could and that he had seen the Wolf through a thin hole. Wolf 04 brought me over to the area and pointed out the hole, an elongated trough through which the ground was clearly visible.

I asked 02 Bravo if he could hear my aircraft, and he responded that he could, though he couldn't see me. I asked him for a hold-down, proceeded to the trough in the clouds and let down. The hole disappeared just before I got under the overcast, but Bravo said he had about 300 feet, so I continued IFR a couple of seconds more before breaking out. I lost contact with 02 Bravo during the descent, so I turned around and again asked for a hold-down. After several moments of getting no response, I finally got a solid DF indication, followed it until getting station passage, and then reversed course. After several such passes I felt that I had a general idea of his location. Terrain in his vicinity consisted of rolling hills with karst formations to the north and east, flatter country with good roads to the south, and rugged mountainous terrain to the West. There were definite signs of human life to the east and south, but none to the west, so I decided that the west would be safe for bailout.

The weather was a severely limiting factor. The visibility was probably no more than three miles in haze, and the ceiling varied from about 300 feet over the tops of the hills to about 900 feet over the valley floors. I didn't see any karts or mountains touching the clouds.

02 Bravo was in good spirits. He was in good condition and seemed to be relieved to have an aircraft in sight overhead.

I spent some time trying to fix his exact location. He was extremely difficult to understand, and I lost contact with him when I would fly on the back side of the hill upon which he was situated. Because of the difficulty I had understanding him, I finally had to resort to questions which he could answer with a "Roger" or "Negative."

I finally narrowed his location down to one brown area on a particular hill. It matched his description of a clearing with a standing dead tree. I got station passage every time I passed it, and he told me that he was at my 9 o'clock several times when I passed it to the right. I felt that I had pin-pointed his position to within about 50 meters and that it would be safe to expend ordnance around him if needed. I did not locate his parachute, though I saw several flare parachutes in the area. I believe he stated that "they" had pulled his parachute down from the trees.

When I asked about ground fire, he said that I hadn't taken any on the first 4-5 passes, but that I was taking small arms and automatic weapons on every pass south of his position. This made sense because

there was a small road south of him which ended up in the trees. There were several bunkers and gun pits around the road, but I didn't see any guns or any ground fire.

I told him to turn off his radio unless I took ground fire, in which case I wanted him to tell me immediately with a "Roger, Roger, Roger." When he would indicate that I was taking ground fire, I would query him about its location and type. He told me of a ZPU to the southwest and "something bigger" to the east. I finally saw the ZPU (or at least the tracers) on one pass to the south. He was behind the aircraft and didn't seem to be very accurate. I then began to see the "something bigger" in the form of several 23mm airbursts. They were generally out in front of the aircraft or off to the left as I made a left turn. I can only speculate that the gunner was used to fast movers and led me too much.

I pickled off some CBU on the road south of 02 Bravo. I then covered the bunkers and a trail network as well as I could with two cans of CBU. 02 Bravo reported that the SA/AW continued, though it was considerably reduced in volume.

On one pass when I had a LAU 3 pod set up to hit this area again, I looked off to the east just in time to see a 23mm muzzle flash. Prior to this time he had only shot at me from behind. I emptied out the pod in the direction of the cave which was producing the flashes. The first couple of rockets missed badly because I had "G"s on the aircraft, but I'm fairly certain that the last two or three were within several meters. The gun must've been well protected, because it continued firing. I broke off and returned to 02 Bravo, deciding to avoid the area to the east as much as possible.

I was now getting 23mm fire on almost every pass near the survivor, generally as I turned to the north. The fire usually consisted of about three airbursts several hundred meters off my left wing or off the nose.

I then called Captain Rentz down for assistance. He found a hole and did a fine job of locating me with DF steers. I tried to show him the approximate location of the survivor. As he made his first pass over the position, I saw the ZPU send tracers behind him. They were very low trajectory, and I could not determine their source, though I suspect they came from a road to the southwest.

Captain Rentz also took some 23mm airbursts off his left wing. The airbursts continued, but we did not see the ZPU again.

I had tried earlier to mark a hill with a dud WP bomb. This was to be both an IP for the Jolly Greens and a reference point for the next OSC in the event we had to depart. I couldn't get mine to break

apart, but Capt Rentz laid a perfect mark right on top of the hill. It stayed there as long as we were on-scene. I then called King and asked that the Jollies and Smokes come to a forward holding point.

By this time we had two 23's firing on us. 02 Bravo continued to call ground fire on every circuit around his position. I picked up a couple of small hits in the left and right wing and asked Sandy 12 to look me over. He didn't see any fuel or oil leak so we continued.

My initial plan was to use the Smoke aircraft to screen off the 23's to the east and southeast with one line and the ZPU to the southwest with another line. After thinking about it for a minute or two, however, I changed my mind about the Smoke aircraft. The following factors entered into this decision:

(1) There was very little working room under the cloud deck and it would have been impossible to work more then 2 aircraft and helicopter.

(2) I didn't want to have the Smokes shot down in their straight and level delivery run (one was an E with no visibility out the right side).

(3) I believed I could put down an adequate screen with my CBU-22.

About this time the accuracy of the 23mm gunners seemed to improve. They didn't lead so much anymore and I found myself dodging their airbursts from time to time. I went to max power somewhere in here and concentrated more on moving the aircraft. I also saw my first RPG's about then - two of them about a mile north of the survivor. They were well below me and off to the side.

I sent Sandy 12 to pick up the Jolly Green and bring him under the clouds. I wanted the other Jolly to stay above the clouds and wanted Sandy 09 and 10 to remain with the high Jolly in the event we got a MIG warning. I expended the rest of my CBU-25 and rockets near the road to the south of the survivor while Capt Rentz escorted the Jolly down through a hole.

I briefed the survivor on how to use his smokes and how to get on the penetrator. I planned my smoke screen to the east and south and was about to execute this and give the Jolly a briefing when I looked in my rear view mirror and saw fuel streaming (probably from the stub tank). About that time several 23 airbursts went off in front of me and I flew through their little puffs. The shrapnel had already fallen as I hit the smoke. I guess I panicked at the acrid smell I got and told King I had fuel streaming and smoke in the cockpit. He told me to "get out of there" and I concurred. I didn't know whether I'd taken damage, and I didn't like the smell, so

[redacted]

I pulled off my ordnance and climbed through the clouds, returning to NKP without incident. Captain Rentz remained behind and became the new OSC.

John J. Wolcott

JOHN J. WOLCOTT, Major, USAF
Sandy 11

BIGOT 02 ALPHA AND BRAVO SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) Despite a supreme effort by a multitude of zealous SAR crewmembers, attempts to rescue Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo were unsuccessful. The major effort lasted for four days and involved hundreds of frustrated personnel who were continually denied success by extremely adverse weather and overwhelming enemy defenses. Forces remained over the objective position around the clock and relished opportunities to break through an almost continuous cloud cover with ceilings that ranged from tree tops to 500 feet. When momentary breaks in the weather did occur eager pilots immediately challenged rugged terrain and low ceilings in attempts to reach the survivors. Each effort was met by intense enemy resistance which included everything from small arms fire to 85 millimeter Anti-Aircraft fire, SAM's (Surface to Air Missiles) and Russian built Mig aircraft. One experienced Sandy pilot described the effort as "the most frustrating, disappointing, and saddening SAR I have been on."[129]

(C) On 3 February 1971 Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo bailed out of their F-4 aircraft after experiencing an undetermined malfunction. They landed in Laos at an extremely well defended area near Ban Karai Pass which is located on the border of Vietnam. Their position was determined to be 092/86 from Tacan Channel 89.

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129. SARCO Report for Bigot 02A and 02B, 12 Feb 71, Document #3.

Alpha reported that his condition was good and Bravo reported he injured his back but that he was all right. They were in rolling hills and karst, very near lines of communication, and close to a major route segment of the Ho Chi Minn Trail complex. There was a complete overcast and extremely low ceilings. The survivors reported enemy activity in their immediate area. From all indications they were down under extremely adverse conditions and it would take a super effort as well as good fortune to rescue them.[130]

(C) Several aircraft were directed to the area immediately and Sandy 01/02 arrived at approximately 1230L. Sandy 01 took charge as On-Scene Commander and although the pilots had been able to locate the approximate objective position by electronic means, it was impossible to locate the survivors exactly due to the solid overcast weather conditions. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to penetrate the weather and fly under the clouds. Both survivors were reporting intense enemy activity near their position. At approximately 1300 Bigot 02 Alpha reported that the enemies were coming up the hill. Shortly afterwards the last reported broadcast from him was "They are shooting at me. I'm hit! Help me. Help".[131]

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130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.

(C) Throughout the day efforts to reach the downed crewmembers continued to fail. Only one aircraft, an A-1, was able to penetrate the weather and when he broke out underneath he reported there was absolutely no place to go. At approximately 1830 activities were terminated due to approaching darkness and Sandy 05 directed Bigot 02 Bravo to dig in for the night and assured him all forces would return at first light. Nail FAC's were directed to maintain surveillance over the position throughout the night while extensive preparations were made for a first light effort on 4 February 1971.[132]

(C) However the second day was to be just as exasperating as the first. A total of 20 A-1's, eight Jolly Green helicopters, five Nail FAC's and numerous fast movers were unable to reach Bigot 02 Bravo. The first aircraft on the scene were able to converse with the survivor and ascertain that his condition and morale were good but no one was able to penetrate the weather for a close observation. Occasionally weather in the general area would break up somewhat and expose minor segments of roads and communication lines. Ordnance was requested for striking these fleeting targets which disappeared again under the weather before the ordnance arrived. The only successful strike was some CBU-49 discharged on a route segment south of Bravo's position. As more small breaks in the weather occured Sandy 05 attempted several penetrations without

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132. Ibid.

success. The survivor reported that big guns (37 and 85 millimeter) were firing at the east end of the valley each time an aircraft made a pass in that direction. These reports were verified by large black air bursts in the sky above the aircraft. Other pilots were reporting accurate 23 and 37 millimeter ground fire while SAM and Mig warnings were being broadcast almost continuously by ground control agencies.[133]

(C) Shortly after Sandy 11 arrived and assumed On-Scene Command the weather improved somewhat. Holes developed in the south and west and the ground was observed in several places. Sandy 11 was able to fly under the clouds and narrow Bravo's position down to within approximately 50 meters. During his several passes he experienced numerous incidents of ground fire and delivered CBU and LAU on bunkers, trail network and a cave entrance which had been producing gun flashes. Sandy 11 directed his wingman to come down and join him and to discharge a white phosphorous rocket for everyone's orientation and to mark the IP (Initial Point). In spite of the continuing bad weather and active resistance, Sandy 11 planned a pick up attempt and directed the Jolly Green helicopters and Smoke aircraft to a forward holding position. During the process Sandy 11 took battle damage, developed a fuel leak, and detected an acrid odor in the cockpit and decided to depart the area. Command was assumed by Sandy 12.[134]

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133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.

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(C) The weather was deteriorating again, Sandy 12 was running low on fuel and he suspected he had taken battle damage. Sandy 09/10 arrived and took command but Sandy 12 had to depart before he could point out the objective position for the new On-Scene Commander. It took this flight of A-1's approximately 30 minutes to locate the survivor. They also located the resistance and planned another pick up effort. Sandy 09 discharged an M-4" white phosphorous rocket which malfunctioned and failed to mark the IP (Initial Point). His second rocket would not release so he called in his wingman to mark the IP. Almost immediately after descending under the clouds Sandy 10 took battle damage from 23 millimeter ground fire and had to depart the area. Sandy 15 arrived to take command and Sandy 09 departed for low fuel. Enroute to home station he discovered that he had sustained battle damage but was able to return without further incicent.[135]

(C) Sandy 15 surveyed the deteriorating weather conditions and weighed the accumulated battle damage and increasing ground fire in the area of the survivor. By then it was past 1700L and already poor visibility was being handicapped by approaching darkness. Considering all these factors Sandy 15 decided it would be impossible to adequately suppress the defenses and provide a reasonable opportunity for the Jolly Green helicopter to survive a pick up attempt. Thus another frustrating day ended

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135. Ibid.

CONFIDENTIAL

at 1745L when Sandy 15 instructed the survivor to dig in for the night and turned On-Scene Command over to Nail 52.[136]

(C) At first light on 5 February 1971 Sandy 05 returned and determined that the survivor was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue. His back did not bother him, he still had water and radios, there was presently no movement about him and no guns had moved into the area throughout the night. However the ceiling remained at tree top to 100 feet and Sandy 05 was unable to penetrate the clouds for the remainder of his time on station. Frustrated once again he turned command over to Sandy 07 and returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB.[137]

(C) All of Sandy 07's attempts to penetrate the weather failed also. The weather in the general area was breaking some but conditions in the survivor's immediate area was completely unworkable. As directed, the survivor made an operations normal check at 1100L. Sometime afterwards a Nail FAC on scene reported that Bigot 02 Bravo came up on radio three times in about a five minute period. The transmissions from the survivor were excited and he was whispering into the microphone. These were the last known communications with Bigot 02 Bravo and his messages were completely unreadable. The weather remained bad and all aircraft in the area were reporting sporatic ground fire. Throughout the remainder of their period Sandy 07/08 were unable to accomplish

136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.

anything and turned command over to Sandy 09 prior to departing for low fuel.[138]

(C) All further attempts to contact the survivor failed. By 1400L the weather cleared up considerably and displayed the objective position. However there was no sign of Bigot 02 Bravo and the improved weather brought with it a new onslaught of ground fire. By 1700 the weather had degenerated again. Sandy 13 arrived to take over command and while he was receiving his briefing King (Airborne Command Control Center) directed all forces out of the area because several Mig aircraft had been detected heading for the area. All forces returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB to terminate another frustrating day.[139]

(C) Nail FAC's maintained coverage throughout the night and failed to make contact with Bigot 02 Bravo. A modified effort was planned for the next day. Only two A-1's were launched while the remaining forces maintained ground alert. Sandy 01/02 reported to the scene and once again encountered bad weather. They flew out their station time with no evidence that Bigot 02 Bravo was alive or capable of being rescued. No other aircraft were launched specifically for the SAR effort. In a frustrating and unsuccessful attempt to rescue Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo 44 A-1's, 18 Jolly Green helicopters and 13 Nail FAC's participated along with numerous aircraft from other sources. In addition, other Nail and Candlestick FAC's maintained a cover for the objective position throughout the nights when the SAR forces were not active.[140]

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138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.

A last-light run-in was attempted but was aborted when both helicopters took hits from heavy small arms fire. One Pararescue man was wounded in this attempt. A first-light effort on 2 January resulted in a successful rescue of both crewmembers.

(S) BIGOT 02: On 3 February, two crewmembers of an F-4D bailed out of Banḳari[2] Pass near the NVN border. 40th ARRS Jolly Greens were scrambled from both Nakhon Phanom Airfield[3] and Ubon RTAFB[4]. Low ceilings precluded any attempt that day. A maximum effort SAR was planned on the 4th with 8 Jolly Greens in place at NKP for a first-light effort. HH-53 BUFFs were on continuous airborne orbit from pre-dawn to darkness on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of February. Continued low ceilings and bad weather conditions in the area precluded any rescue attempts. After all radio contact was lost with the survivors at noon on the 6th, and no weather improvement forecast, the active participation of the 40th ARRS ceased. The force of tired and disappointed crews were returned to Udorn that night.

(S) DUDLEY 02: On 16 February, two crewmembers of an F-D bailed out in eastern Laos. Two Jolly Greens scrambled and both crewmembers were rescued less than two hours after bailout.

(S) WITCHDOCTOR 05: On 5 March, an Army UH-1 helicopter was shot down in eastern Laos with 7 people on board. A last-light run-in was attempted but intensive AAA and small arms fire precluded any rescues. The survivors were rescued by a U.S. Army ground team on 7 March.

[redacted]

DATE: 3 Feb 71 9 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-004-3 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Night 02 Sreve

LOCATION: 17-18-30N 106-09-30E

SAVES: None

(S) King 21 Airborne from CH 70 at 2210Z — on scene at 2245Z. King 21 orbit 120/16-60/CH 89. At 2300Z I contacted Nail 68 who was orbiting over the reported survivors position but did not have voice contact. He reported several clicks (carrier waves) on Guard in response to his calls but no pattern, w[illegible] or keeper. The weather in the area was reported as overcast, tops 4000 to 4500 with a broken layer 7000 to 8000 MSL. At 2330Z Nail 63 arrived and relieved Nail 68. Numerous attempts were made to contact Night 02-3 on Guard and Emergency Delta Frequencies. Several times during the morning clicks could be heard on Guard and at one time a 15 second hold down was heard. Sandy 1 and 2 arrived at 0040Z and Sandy 1 was appointed on scene commander. At 0130Z Night 02 was advised to turn off his radio for 3 hours to conserve the battery. At 0430Z further attempts to make contact were futile with the exception of a few mike clicks. The weather in the area remained the same throughout the day — bases of 2000 to 2500 ft MSL with clouds touching treetops and rain in the area of the survivor. All SAR forces remained on the ground and a radio watch was maintained but no positive response. King 21 departed the orbit at 1100Z, landing at CH70 at 1140Z.

Night coverage had been arranged for by Jack and instructions were relayed to Nail 33 to maintain listening watch — if contact was established, have survivor attempt to move Northeast and conserve his radio until the weather improved.

[redacted]

[illegible] intervals.



KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/AMC	Major	DeLorenzo
P	Major	Benson
CP	Capt	Gealta
N	Major	McGill
RO	Sgt	Schuetz
FE	TSgt	Wigginton
LM	MSgt	Patterson

Resources

Nail 68 (OSC until 0040Z)
Sandy 1 (OSC 0040Z until 0435Z)
Nail 23 (OSC 0435Z until 0535Z)
Nail 41 (OSC 0535Z until 0840Z)
Nail 33 (OSC 0840Z until relieved)
Sandy 01, 02 (A-1)
Nail 68, 63, 23, 41, 33 (OV-10)
Wolf 05 (RF-4)

Robert A. DeLorenzo

ROBERT A. DELORENZO, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

[redacted]

DATE: 4 Feb 71 10 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-004-3 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02 Brave

LOCATION: 17-18-30N 106-09-30E

SAVES: None

(S) 4 Feb 71, King 21 airborne from CH 70 at 3/1930Z. Enroute to CH 89 for a 3/2100Z briefing with the Sandies and Jolly Greens. Landed at CH 89 at 3/2015Z.

Departed CH 89 at 3/2215Z on scene at 3/2225Z King 21 orbit 180/16-40/ 89. At 3/2240Z I contacted Candlestick 23 who was orbiting over the survivor, but had not had voice contact with Bigot 02 Brave during his orbit period. I asked him to give me a weather report for the area. He reported that the cloud cover over the survivor was overcast with a higher broken layer of clouds the tops of the overcast was at 4500-5000 ft MSL and the higher layer base was at 8000 MSL with the tops running from 9500 ft MSL to 11500 ft MSL. At 3/2250Z Candlestick 23 made radio contact with Bigot 02 Brave. The survivor reported that he was in good condition. At 3/2300Z Nail 45 arrived on scene and at 3/2300Z Sandy 1 and 2 arrived on scene. They received a briefing by Candlestick 23 and King 21. Candlestick 23 was RTB'd at 3/2315Z. Sandy 01 was appointed on scene commander at 3/2320Z with the understanding that if the weather conditions lifted permitting Strike aircraft to operate in the area the on scene command responsibility would revert to the Nail aircraft. This was highly acceptable to Sandy 01.

The remainder of the days activities were spent in trying to pinpoint the survivors position. The closest position arrived at was the same as that given in the briefing, which was 091/86 1/2/89. The ceilings over the survivor never got higher than 300-400 AGL. Only a few openings in the weather occurred during the entire day which only permitted using two Strike flights. The Sandies were able to get below the ceiling and operate in the survivors area. The area was extremely hostile and the Sandies received ground fire from small arms, HMG, and 23MM. At 4/0900Z Sandy 09, who was then the on scene commander, thought that he might be able to get one Jolly into the survivor and attempt the pickup. This action was decided to be to risky when Sandy 10 received extensive battle damage from ground fire while surveying the proposed run in route for the Jolly. The days activities were terminated at

[redacted]

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years.

[redacted]

[redacted]

4/1050Z. Nail 52 remained on scene to maintain contact with Eight 02 Bravo. Explicit instructions were given to conserve his survival radio battery. Check in times were established for on the hour.

The only problem area, aside from weather conditions, during the days activities was concern over the Mig Cap that was to be provided the SAR Forces. The Navy Mig Cap did not check in with King 21 and it was impossible to determine if in fact there was a Mig Cap until late into the days activities when we were advised that the Navy was providing Mig Cap holding feet wet under Red Crowns control. It is my recommendation that these resources must check in with the King Aircraft giving there position, time on station and Bingo Time. Also, if they are to be maintaing a communications with another agency the King aircraft must have this information. During the days activities King 21 received 7 Mig and 8 SAM calls.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/ABC	Major	DeLorenzo
P	Major	Benson
CP	Col	Pinyerd
N	Major	McGill
RO	Sgt	Schuets
FE	TSgt	Wigginton
LM	MSgt	Patterson

KING 23 Crewmembers(Tanker)

AC	Capt	Nash
CP	Capt	Fletcher
N	Major	Metz
RO	Sgt	Souder
FE	MSgt	Yogodzinski
LM	SSgt	Hoover

ON Scene Commanders

Sandy 01	2320-0215Z
Sandy 05	0215-0600Z
Sandy 11	0600-0830Z
Sandy 09	0830-0955Z
Sandy 15	0955-1045Z
Nail 52	1045Z Until relieved

SAR Resources

King 21, 23
Jolly Green 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62
Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 (A-1)
Smoke 41, 42, 43, 44 (A-1)

FAC Aircraft

Nail 45, 41, 51, 52, 99 (OV-10)
Wolf 02, 06, 04, 03 (RF-4)

IRON HAND

Bison
Hotbox Brave 01 Flight (F-105)
Mallard 21, Flight
Ashcan 01 Flight
Alamo 01 Flight

BDCM
Moreo Flight

[redacted]

intervals.

[redacted]

MIG CAP

Garfish 501, Flight (Navy)
Battleory 310, Flight (F-4)
Pageboy Flight (Navy)
Gunfighter 51 (F-4)
Sundown 101, Flight (Navy)
Eagle 313, Flight
Papa Flight (F-4)

STRIKE AIRCRAFT

Pealer 49, Flight (Expended)
Wolfpack 31, Flight(Expended) (F-4)

The following aircraft did not expend.

Battleory 304, Flight (F-4)
Bennett Flight (F-4)
Gunfighter 40 Flight (F-4)
Gunfighter 42 Flight (F-4)
Maynard 469 Flight (F-4)
Electron 500 Flight (A-6)
Battleory 311 Flight (F-4)
Cobra 05 Flight (F-4)
City Desk 205, Flight (F-4)
Eagle Flight (F-4)
Wolfpack 21 Flight (F-4)
Battleory 30[illegible] Flight (F-4)
Canasta 405 Flight (A-7)
Banyan 01 Flight (F-4)
Peller 32 Flight
Miller 02 Flight (F-4)

Robert A. DeLorenzo

ROBERT A. DELORENZO, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

[redacted]

[redacted]

DATE: 2 Feb 71 15 Feb 72

MISSION NUMBER: 3-004-2 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02

LOCATION: 092/86/89

SAVES: None

(S) King 22 received a distress call From Nail 59 at about 0418Z, 2 Feb 71. Nail 59 stated that Bigot 02 had gone down while putting in a strike in the vicinity of 100/88/89. He was attempting to gain contact with the survivors on the ground. King 21 took Mission Command at this point and appointed Nail 59 as the on scene commander. Jack was notified at this time of a possible SAR effort and the SAR forces were alerted. A few minutes later Nail 59 reported contact with both survivors on the ground. Contact was established with Bigot 02A and he stated that he had no injuries and was all right. The SAR forces were launched from CH 89 and CH 93 at this time. Wolf 06 (fast mover FAC) was in the area and was assisting Nail 59 to locate the survivors. The weather in the area was completely undercast with the bases running from 800 ft. to 2500 ft. and the tops were at 6000 ft. Attempts were made by both Nail 59 and Wolf 06 to get under the cloud deck to locate the position of the survivors. King 21 requested border clearance, MIG CAP, Iron Hand, and ELINT coverage due to the hostile environment of the SAR scene. The weather became the prime factor for rescueing the survivors. The bases of the clouds were down on the tops of the karst. At approximately 0530Z, Bigot 02A said, "I'm hit!", "I'm hit, Help! Help! I'm going to give up." Sandy 01 then made several attempts to get under the weather to assist the survivors on the ground. He was unable to find any place to get under the clouds where he could work his way into the area of the survivors. Further discussion between Sandy 01 and Bigot 02B gave the location of the Bravo man as 50 meters north of his chute and that he had 2 radios only and no spare batteries. Sandy 01 and Wolf 06 were reporting scattered AAA fire but that the air bursts were not accurate as they were firing through the clouds. Bigot 02B was advised at this time to come up only every half hour unless he was in trouble. At 0637Z Bravo stated that bad guys were within 100 meters of him and he could hear voices. No attempt was made to put in any strikes as the area continued to be completely

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

overcast. Bigot 02B stated that the bases were approximately 300 ft. King 21 and Sandy 01 discussed the possibility of using Tudgey to protect the Brave man if necessary. We decided we would only use it as a last resort. At 0855Z, Sandy 03 took over as on scene commander. At 0920Z, Sandy 03 RTB'd to CH 39 with a rough running engine. Nail 41 was appointed OSC until Sandy 05 could arrive at the SAR scene. The Sandys and Nail and Wolf FAC's continued to monitor the weather and the condition of the survivor. At 1130Z, Nail 69 was set up as the first of the CAPCOM for the SAR scene for the entire night. All SAR forces were returned to base.

KING 21 Crewmembers			SAR Forces
AC/AMC	Major	Jones	King 21
CP	Major	Regele	King 23
CP	1Lt	Bedwell	Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07 and 08
N	Capt	Moore	Jolly Greens 60, 56, 58, 57, 55 and 62
BO	SSgt	Hunt	Nails 59, 62, 41 and 63
FE	TSgt	Wilson, E.	Wolfs 06, 01 and 04
LM	SSgt	Simmons	

ROBERT E. JONES, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

SECRET

GROUP 4

[redacted]

DATE: 4 Feb 71 15 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: 3-004-2 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02

LOCATION: 092/86/89

SAVES: None

(S) A first light SAR effort was planned for the third day to rescue Bigot 02B. Nail 45 was the first aircraft to arrive on scene at 2250Z and he was appointed as On Scene Commander (OSC). Nail 45 made a first light weather evaluation and the area was reported completely overcast. There was no ceil[illegible] as the clouds were observed to go to the surface at some point and the tops over Bigot 02B was 4800 ft. Sandy 01 arrived on scene at [redacted]Z and he took over as OSC. Wolf 01 was also in the area to assist the Sandy's and Nail FAC's. At 0010Z, Bigot 02B stated that he was okay and had water and 3 flares. He was using his second radio. Bravo stated at 0156Z there were troops to the south of him and that the clouds were at the tops of the trees. There were breaks starting to appear south east and south west of the SAR scene. By 0245Z the tops of the clouds over Bravo were down to 4250Xft. At 0305Z, Bravo stated that he had moved from Kansas City to Omaha. The weather continued the same with breaks appearing in the overcast. Sandy 07 was appointed OSC at 0318Z. At 1405Z, Bigot 02B sounded like he was whispering on the radio. No definite message was received at this time as it was unintelligible. This was the last positive radio contact made with Bigot 02B. The weather continued the same for the next two hours with no further progress made. Sandy 09 reported ground fire in the area but no one took any hits. Continuous attempts were made to get either voice contact or a beeper from Bravo. Sandy 07 made repeated attempts to get under the overcast. He was unable to remain under the overcast and reach the area of the survivor. At 0625Z, Sandy 09 was appointed as OSC. Attempts were made on all SAR frequencies to contact the Bravo man. The weather started to break overhead the SAR scene at 0638Z. The aircraft on the scene at the time were unable to make any visual sighting of the survivor. At approximately 0655Z, a noise, beeper, voice was heard on 243.0. None of the aircraft monitoring were able to distinguish what was said or who had said it. The weather had started to move back into the area again. A beeper was heard at 0721Z and again at 0725Z. King 21 advised Sandy 09 to try to get a shiney from [redacted].

[redacted]

GROUP-4
[illegible] intervals,
[illegible] 12 years.

[redacted]

No shiney observed from the area. Sandy 09 reported 37 MM fire from the area. At 0800Z clouds started to move back into the area. Authenticators were requested from Jack at 0805Z. By 0832Z, the entire area was overcast again. An 85 MM gun had begun to fire at 0812Z. At 0850Z the 85 MM had fired a second time. At this time we began receiving Bandit calls from Squid and Crab. The SAR forces were moved to the west. At 1000Z, all SAR forces were directed to RTB. The last positive voice contact made with Bigot 02B was at 0325Z when he stated that he was all right. He had sounded calm and confident on all voice contact up to that time.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/AMC	Major	Jones
CP	Major	Regele
CP	1Lt	Bedwell
N	Capt	Moore
RO	SSgt	Hunt
FE	TSgt	Wilson, E
LM	TSgt	Simmons

SAR Forces

King 21
King 23
Sandys 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, [illegible], 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, and [illegible]
Jelly Green 61, 62, 60, 56
Nail 45, 59, 47, 23
Wolf 01, 02, 03, 04

ROBERT E. JONES, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

The alpha crewmember from Gunfighter 13 was not recovered.

On 20 January 71 while Jolly Greens 77 and 71 were flying locally they observed a ball of fire in the air and then saw two parachutes descending feet wet two miles east of Monkey Mountain. Both helicopters immediately went to the scene and recovered the crew of Gunfighter 03. The aircraft commanders of Jolly Green 70 and Jolly Green 71 were Major Mudd and Captain Gary Hoven. Major Mudd made the 600th save recovered by the 37ARRS on this mission.

On 6 February 71 while Jolly Greens 65 and 73 were on orbit they were advised by Queen that a South Vietnamese UH1H, call sign Butterfly 063 was down 109 degrees for 18 miles off Channel 69. Five persons were on board. Both helicopters departed for the scene and were joined by Sandy aircraft. After the Sandy aircraft prepared the area Jolly Green 65 recovered the five South Vietnamese crewmembers. Jolly Green 65 was flown by Major Ryland R. Dreibelbis. This may have been the first recovery of Vietnamese personnel by Jolly Green forces.

On 9 February 71 a Medevac mission was completed by Jolly Green 77, which was on alert at Bien Hoa. A woman was hemorrhaging at Con Son Island and required evacuation to medical facilities. The evacuation to Saigon was without incident. The aircraft commander of Jolly Green 77 was Captain Donald G. Beattie.

37th Crew Saves Five Vietnamese

Rescue crews from the 37th ARRS here picked up five Vietnamese Air Force crew members last Saturday after their UH-1E 'Huey' helicopter went down approximately 12 miles east-southeast of Hue.

It was believed to be the first time that VNAF personnel had been rescued by the 37th.

The five rescued men, all from the VNAF's 213th Helicopter Squadron, were 1st. Lt. Ngoc Tran Van, an instructor pilot, 2d Lts. Boi Hoang and Nhiep Dang, two student pilots; Sgt. Bat Mai Van, the crew chief, and Capt. Hao Do Huu, a passenger.

After their rescue, the VNAF airmen and the rescue crew received a traditional hosing down to welcome them to Da Nang, much to the surprise of the Vietnamese airmen.

(Continued on Pg. 5)

VNAF Rescued

(Continued from Pg. 1)

U.S. Air Force Maj. Ryland R. Driebelbis was the aircraft commander of the HH-53 "Buff" that brought the VNAF airmen in. The co-pilot was Capt. Harlton I. Bakke and PJ's (pararescuemen) on the crew were MSgt. Gordon C. Bailey and AlC James W. Meulch. Crew chief was SSgt. Robert H. Rogers.

Operating out of Da Nang, two A-1 Skyraiders from the 56th Special Operations Wing, at NKP Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand flew as protective escort for the rescue aircraft.

The Huey went down in an abandoned rice paddy just inland from the coast of the South China Sea, according to Major Driebelbis. "They apparently had mechanical problems and had to land in the paddy. When we got to the scene they were on top of the chopper and we just dropped the penetrator down and pulled them up one by one."

The Skyraider pilots said they saw what appeared to be a crane-type helicopter coming on the scene to retrieve the Huey.

Living up to their motto, "That Others May Live", the men of the 37th have made 605 'saves' since coming to Da Nang in [illegible].

500	JG 77 Landed AT S. H	
	Logged 4.0 2- Landings	DS
635	JG 65 & JG 73 IN SAR	
	E/O/T BUTTER fly 063 UNAC	
	~~#34~~ CUH1 Down AT 325/25/77	
	~~#5~~ Aboard	
645	Going INTO phase Brand —	
	JG 65 Low bird	RS
655	PHASE BRAVO COMPLETED FIVE PKKUP'S #601 #602 #603 #604 #605	
0800	MISSION NO. A-3-004 6 FEB 71 Closed	
0715	JG 65 ON the Deck 3.3 SAR	DS
	JG 73 on the deck 3.7 ASN	DS
1058	DAAR JRCC TOTAL 15.9	
1100	LINE CHECK SXS SSGT ARISPE OFF	
~~1130~~	6 Feb - Queen is calling it Combat Saws.	
	A004 6 Feb	DS

7 FEB

2040	MAJ HEIGES ON DUTY	
2145	STATUS PASSED TO QUEEN	
0405	Maj Heiges off Msgr Switch on Route	DS
1000	NRG flying Time FOR DAAR	DS
1015	Line Check 5-5	DS
1020	In SSgt Left w/ Duty	DS

8 FEB

2040	MAJ Posey ON DUTY	cef
2120	STATUS PASSED TO QUEEN	cef
2309	ITEM 14 RCVD	cef
2345	OPS STATUS PASSED	cef
0045	JG 73 ASN ETE 0430	cef

FEBRUARY 1971

DATE	CREW	JG	SAVE #	SURVIVORS NAME RANK SSN ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	TYPE SAVE
6	DREIBELBIS	65	601	NGOC, TRAN-VAN 1/LT	16-18SN 108.00E	5 COMBAT
	BAKKE		602	BOI, HOANG 2/LT		
	ROGERS		603	NHIEP DANG 2/LT	UH1H	
	BAILEY		604	BAT MAI VAN, SSGT	SOUTH V.N.	
	MUELCHI		605	HÀO ĐỖ-HỮU, CPT.	MSN II A-3-004	
26	BAKKE	65	607	HEDDRICH, DAVID R. CAPT [redacted] 37 TFW	106.26 E 16 42 N. COBRA 23 F-4	2 COMBAT
	WEIMER		608			
	MCKINNEY					
	NARDI			McLAUGHLIN, THOMAS M. 1/LT [redacted] 37 TFW		
	CURTIS					
27	WAMMER	72	609	McCarthy, PAUL F. [redacted] CMDR. "KITTY HAWK"	017/17/ 69 CHIPPIE 44 (A-7)	1 COMBAT FEET WET.
	FRIED					
	ROGERS					
	SCHWARTZ					
	KIRK					
09	BEATTIE	77	606	NAME UNKN V.N. WOMAN PREGNANT & HEMORRAGING	GON SON ISLAND MSN # 03-003 FEB	1 MED EVAC 1 NON COMB
	KOMICH					
	BURCHFIELD					
	SMITH					
	HANCOCK					

MONTHLY TOTAL 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
Or Changed to CONFIDENTIAL
By Authority of DoD 5200.1R
By _____ (Date) ~~12 Feb~~ 24 Mar 71

DATE: 8 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-005-8 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Raven 25

LOCATION: 030/12/108

SAVES: 1 Combat

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 79

(S) At 0625Z Cricket (ABCCC) notified King 21 that a Raven 25 was down at 040/14/108. King 21 contacted Schlitz Flight which was overhead the survivor on Guard and got a more accurate position of 030/12/108. Schlitz Lead advised that Raven 23 and 21 were overhead the downed pilot and in radio contact with him. Jolly Green's 61 and 55 were launched, along with their A-1 escorts from CH 89 and the Jolly's and Sandy's from 93 were put on cockpit alert. The CH 89 Jolly's were airborne at 0634Z. Raven 21 was contacted and made on scene commander at 0630Z and he advised that the pilot was in a clearing in mountainous terrain and was okay and not in any immediate danger from hostile forces. Air America Helicopters Foxtrot Hotel and 96 Whiskey were in the immediate area. Raven 21 vectored 96 Whiskey in for a successful pickup at 0640Z. SAR forces and Hobo 22 and Falcon 81 which had been orbiting overheadin case they were needed, were RTB'd at 0645Z. 96 Whiskey brought the survivor to 20 Alternate.

KING 21 Crewmembers			Resources
AC/AMC	Capt	Parsons	Jolly Green's 61 and 55
P	Capt	Gealta	Hobo 22 Flight
CP	1LT	Hedrick	Schlitz Flight
N	Major	Schnegelberger	Falcon 81 Flight
RO	SSgt	Swinson	Raven 21 and 23
FE	TSgt	Powell	Foxtrot Hotel
LM	SSgt	Robinson	96 Whiskey

Melvin L. Parsons

MELVIN L. PARSONS, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

587
A
54102

DO

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
Or Changed to CONFIDENTIAL
By Authority of DOD 5200.1R
By _____ (Date) Dec 74

ARRS	1
INFO	CYS
DO	1
DOC	1
CSS	1

T 002+
TTSZYUW RUMOSRA0197 0391204-SSSS--RUWTBMA.
ZNY SSSSS
RUMFRBA-T-CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUHGOSA-T- CTF SEVEN SEVEN POINT ZERO
O 081145Z FEB 71
FM OL-B 3 ARRGP UDORN RTAFB THAI
TO RUEFHGA/CSAF/AFXOTZB
RUHHAFA/PACAF HICKAM AFB HI/DOH
RUWTBMA/HQ ARRS/COMD POST/SCOTT AFB IL
INFO RUHHHGA/CINCPAC/CC/HAWAII
RUHHARA/41ARRWG HICKAM AFB HI/DOC
RUEKAAA/AFEOC FT RITCHIE MD
RUWTFCA/USAFMPC/DPMCS/RANDOLPH AFB TE
RUCNAFA/HQ USAF ALTERNATE MAXWELL AFB AL
RUWTBMA/MAC/MACCP/SCOTT AFB IL
RUMUHTA/MACV/SAIGON RVN
RUMMPSA/7AF TAN SON NHUT AB RVN/CC/DO/DOO/IN/DOCT/DP
RUMMRSA/3ARRGP TAN SON NHUT AB RVN
ZEN/7/13TACC UDORN RTAFB THAI
ZEN/41ARRS UDORN RTAFB THAI
RUMORIA/56SOW NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI
RUMOUJA/AIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
RUMUJNA/OL-A 3 ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 74

PAGE 2 RUMOSRA0197 S E C R E T
RUMOUAA/3RARRS CAM RANH BAY AB RVN
RUMORUA/ATEW UDON RTAFB THAI
RUMFRHA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUHGOSA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN PT ZERO
ST
S E C R E T JOPREP JIFFY/OL-B, 3 ARRGP/RESCUE 010/08061?Z FEB 71
1. RESCUE OPENING/CLOSING REPORT 8 FEBRUARY 1971.
2. MISSION NUMBER B-3-005-08 FEBRUARY 1971.
3. SITUATION: DOWNED AIRCREW MEMBER
   A. DESCRIPTION OF SAR OBJECTIVE
      (1) T-28D-5/49-1600/GRAY/RAVEN 25
      (2) FLIGHT PLAN - TACTICAL
      (3) PILOT - 1LT JAMES H. HIX JR.
          ADDRESS - DET 1 56 SOW UDORN RTAFB THAILAND
      (4) POB - 1
      (5) WEATHER IN AREA - CLEAR, VIS 10 P US
      (6) SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT - USAF STANDARD
      (7) LAST KNOWN POSITION - 1919N 103-01E.
   B. ACTIONS TAKEN:
      (1) CONTROLLING AGENCY - OL-B, 3ARRGP

PAGE 3 RUMOSRA0197 S E C R E T
      (2) TIME NOTIFIED - OL-B, 3A ARRGP NOTIFIED OF SAR [illegible]
          08/0817Z BY KING 21 (HC-130)
      (3) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES ALERTED:
          (A) 3G ARRS AT [illegible]

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED



2/2

(-) 56 SOW AT 08/0619Z
(C) 40 ARRS AT 08/0619Z
(4) TIME SAR FORCES LAUNCHED:
(A) 1 HC-130, 39ARRS DIVERTED AT 08/0617Z
(B) 2 HH-53'S, 40ARRS LAUNCHED AT 08/0636Z

C. PERSONNEL INFORMATION
(1) 1 PERSON INVOLVED, 1 LOCATED, 1 RECOVERED, 1 SAVED
(2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED YY RAVEN 25 (O-1) AT 08/0617Z COORDINATES 1919N 10301E.
(3) AIR AMERICAL HUEY HELICOPTER, C/S 96W LOWERED JUNGLE PENETRATOR AND PICKED UP SURVIVOR
(4) SURVIVOR TAKEN TO LS 98 (LAOS)

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:
(1) 39 ARRS - 1 SORTIE FOR 0.5 HOURS.
(2) 40 ARRS - 2 SORTIES FOR 0.6 HOURS

E. SAVES DATA: 1 COMBAT SAVE

PAGE 4 RUMOSRA0197 S E C R E T
(1) RCC MAKING SAVE - AIR AMERICA HELICOPTER PICKED UP SURVIVOR. KING 21, AIRBORNE MISSION COMMANDER, COORDINATED PICK UP. RCC OF KING 21 WAS CAPT MELVIN L. PARSONS, 39 ARRS.
(2) PERSONNEL SAVED: 1LT JAMES H. HIX JR.
(A) SERVICE - USAF; NATIONALITY - USA
(B) COMBAT SAVE
(C) AIRCREW MEMBER

F. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:
A COUPLE OF MINUTES PRIOR TO 08/0617Z FEBRUARY 1971, RAVEN 26 (T-28) ENCOUNTERED AN ENGINE OVERSPEED. CAUSE OF OVERSPEED UNDETERMINED. ENGINE STARTED TO DISINTEGRATE THEREFORE PILOT BAILED OUT. RAVEN 23 (O-1) WAS ON SCENE AND WITNESSED A 'GOOD CHUTE'. RAVEN 25 LANDED NEAR A LINE OF TREES ON A RIDGE ABOUT 3000 FT ELEVATION. KING 21 DIVERTED TO THE SAR SCENE AND NOTIFIED OL-B TO LAUNCH SAR FORCES. THE 40ARRS/56SOW WERE NOTIFIED TO LAUNCH THE JOLLY GREENS AND SNADYS. AT 08/0645Z, AN AIR AMERICA HUEY HELICOPTER C/S 96W, APPEARED ON THE SCENE, LOWERED HIS JUNGLE PENETRATOR PICKED UP THE SURVIVOR AND DEPARTED THE AREA. JOLLY GREEN'S 61/55 HAD LAUNCHED BUT WERE IMMEDIATELY RTB'D. SURVIVOR RECEIVED A SLIGHT LACERATION

PAGE 5 RUMOSRA0197 S E C R E T
ON THE LEFT CHEEK AND RIGHT KNEE. HE WAS TAKEN TO TO LS 98. THE SAR AREA WAS HOSTILE. KING 21 ASSUMED AMC DUTIES AT 08/0617Z, DIRECTED THE SAR EFFORT, AND RETURNED TO THE NORMAL ORBIT AT 08/0642Z. NEGATIVE AIR REFUELINGS. GP-4
BT
#0197

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



IMMEDIATE

The alpha crewmember from Gunfighter 13 was not recovered.

On 20 January 71 while Jolly Greens 77 and 71 were flying locally they observed a ball of fire in the air and then saw two parachutes descending feet wet two miles east of Monkey Mountain. Both helicopters immediately went to the scene and recovered the crew of Gunfighter 03. The aircraft commanders of Jolly Green 70 and Jolly Green 71 were Major Mudd and Captain Gary Hoven. Major Mudd made the 600th save recovered by the 37ARRS on this mission.

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On 9 February 71 a Medevac mission was completed by Jolly Green 77, which was on alert at Bien Hoa. A woman was hemorrhaging at Con Son Island and required evacuation to medical facilities. The evacuation to Saigon was without incident. The aircraft commander of Jolly Green 77 was Captain Donald G. Beattie.

9 FEB MEDEVAC

(B) At 1125Z [illegible] was scrambled by STOR[illegible] as directed by JO[illegible] for an ARCOMED evac of a [illegible]ment Vietnamese woman in critical condition at Con Son Island. [illegible] 27 was off the blocks at 1[illegible] LZ and airborne at 1142Z. Initial intentions were to intercept JOLLY GREEN 77 who was launching from Bien Hoa. The initial intercept point of 170/30/102 at 1203Z was revised when JG 77 advised he was proceeding direct to Con Son. Accordingly K 27 arrived overhead Con Son as JG 77 touched down on a mid-town soccer field which had been lighted by vehicles parked on the perimeter. The patient was onloaded and K 27 proceeded to escort JG 77 to Vung Tau as instructed at launch. However, enroute to Vung Tau JOKER advised a change in destination to Long Binh. Upon crossing the Coast Line K 27 and JG 77 contacted Wide Minnow for Med Evac information. Shortly afterwards Wide Minnow advised us that no OB/Gyn was available at Long Binh and suggested JG 77 consider landing at 3rd Field Hospital, Saigon. After evaluation of this alternative and discussion with JOKER regarding a night landing on a very small helipad JOKER directed JG 77 to land at Tan Son Nhut and transfer the patient to an ambulance. JG 77 landed at Tan Son Nhut at 1[illegible]Z and K 27 was cleared to RTB to CH 71.

I would like to point out that the Radio Operator on duty at JOKER did an outstanding job throughout this mission. What appeared to be a rather simple and straightforward task for K 27 and JG 77 deteriorated into a series of last minute changes in destination and handling instructions for the patient whose condition was described as critical. The calm, professional manner in which the JOKER Radio Operator passed requests and instructions back and forth among the Rescue Forces involved was exceptional.

A similar tip of the KING Crown is extended to the JOKER duty officer and his crew for their very rapid and efficient handling of all the last minute changes involved in the mission. Between approximately 1605Z when Wide Minnow advised Long Binh was not OR/Gyn manned and 1625Z when JG 77 landed at Tan Son Nhut there were at least five (5) actions requiring JOKER'S coordination with Air Force and Army agencies. The simple fact that JG 77 was able to continue to Tan Son Nhut without an enroute delay or loiter for completion of all the ground coordination reflects the efficiency of JOKER'S efforts.

SAR Forces Utilized

3ARRGp (7AF JRCC)
KING 27
JOLLY GREEN 77
MARKET TIME NAVAL VESSEL, CALL SIGN CAVIAR

KING 27 Crewmembers

AC/AMC	Major	Felmley
CP	1Lt	Crielly
N	Major	Good
RO	MSgt	Jones, C.
FE	SSgt	Gagnon
LM	TSgt	Stone

JERRY J. FELMLEY, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

DATE: 11 Feb 71 16 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: A-3-005-11 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 26

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Cobra 04

LOCATION: Mai Loc

SAVES: 1 Combat

(C) At 0720Z King 26 picked up a faint May Day on Guard from Dustoff 707. Dustoff 707 was contacted and he reported a Cobra was down in the vicinity of Mai Loc and he saw one chute. Trail 24 came up on Guard and said he saw the survivor and the wreckage. Cobra 03 was overhead and reported it was Cobra 04 that was down. Trail 24 was appointed On Scene Commander at 0730Z and was in contact with several Army choppers in the area, including Dustoff 502, Cozy 10 and 25, Gunfighter 14 and Charlie Horse 45. Jolly Green's and Sandy's from CH 77 were requested through Queen and the King Alert Aircraft through STOKER. At 0745Z Trail 21 assummed OSC and Trail 24 RTB'd for low fuel. Trail 24 reported just beforehis departure that an unidentified Army helicpter picked up the Alpha man and that he was okay, but did not know if the Bravo man was able to get out of the downed aircraft. Trail 21 contacted some friendly ground troops in the area and they reported that the wreckage was insight and was in a well secured area. King requested Trail 21 to see if the wreckage could be checked for the Bravo man. Charlie Horse 45A was able to land at the scene of the wreckage and he positively determined that the Bravo man was in the aircraft. SAR Forces were RTB'd at approximately 0815Z.

KING 26 Crewmembers			Resources
AC/AMC	Capt	Parsons	Jolly Green 72 and 67
CP	Capt	Gealta	King 26
N	Major	Schnegelberger	Trail 21 and 24
RO	Sgt	Souder	Cozy 10 and 25
FE	MSgt	Ellis	Gunfighter 14(Cobra Gunship)
LM	TSgt	Mc Pheeters	Gunfighter 1 Flight (F-4)
			Ringneck 466 Flight
			Charlie Horse 45, 45A

Melvin L Parsons

MELVIN, L. PARSONS, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

PT 00387
OTTCZYUW RUMUJNA0095 0440145-CCCC--RUWTBMA.
ZNY CCCCC
O 130110Z FEB 71
FM OL A 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
TO RUEFHQA/CSAF/AFXOTZB
RUHEAKA/PACAF HICKHAM AFB HI/DOH
RUATBMA/HQ ARRS SCOTT AFB ILL/COMMAND POSI
INFO RUCEAAA/HQ USAF ALT MAXWELL AFB AL
RUWTBMA/MAC/MAOCCP
RUMMRSA/7AF TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC/DO/DOO/IN/DOCT/DP
RUHHABA/41ARRWG HICKHAM AFB HI/DOC
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC/CC
RUMUHTA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUEKAAA/AFEOC FT RITCHIE MD
RUMFRBA/CTF 77
RUHGOYA/CTG 77.0
RUMOJAA/39ARRS CAM RANH BAY AB RVN
RUMMRSA/3ARRGP TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/JRCC
RUWTFSA/USAFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TEXAS/DPMCS
RUMMRSA/38ARRS TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC
RUMOSRA/OL B 3ARRGP UDORN RTAFB THAILAND

OPR	CYS
ARRS	1
INFO	CYS
DO	4
DOC	1
CSEH	1
	1

PAGE TWO RUMUJNA0095 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INFO RUMUJBA/37ARRS DANANG AB RVN
RUMOGOA/C CO 101 AVN VN HUE PHU BAI RVN
RUMUJGA/12TFW PHU CAT RVN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/JOPREP JIFFY/OL-A, 3ARRGP/RESCUE 005/
13/0100 FEB 71.
1. RESCUE CLOSING REPORT 13 FEB 71
2. MISSION NUMBER: A-3-005-11 FEB 71
3. SITUATION: RECOVERY OF DOWNED CREW MEMBER.
C. PERSONNEL INFO:
(1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED-2 PERSONS LOCATED, 1 PERSON SAVED, 1 PERSON DECEASED.
(2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED BY 'C' TROOP, 17TH CALVARY AT 12/0525 FEB 71 COORDINATES 16-41N 106-58E.
(3) RECOVERY BY GROUND PARTY.
(4) BODY TAKEN TO DANANG AB MORTUARY.
G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:
(1) THE BODY OF THE SECOND CREW MEMBER WAS RECOVERED BY THE 17TH CALVARY REGIMENT, HUE, PHU BAI. THE BODY HAS BEEN TAKEN TO THE MORTUARY AT DANANG AB RVN. MISSION CLOSED. GP-4
BT
#0095

NNNN

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 77

MESSAGE NOTIFICATION	
Individual Contacted:	G.S.
Local Time and Date:	0145 13 FEB 71

[redacted]

IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

****
* [redacted] *
****

PT 00522
OTTCZYUW RUMUJNA0101 0440921-CCCC--RUWTBMA.
ZNY CCCCC
O 130915Z FEB 71
FM OL-A, 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
TO RUEFHQA/CSAF/AFXOTZB
RUHEAKA/PACAF HICKAM AFB HI/DOH
RUWTBMA/HQ ARRS, SCOTT AFB ILL/COMMAND POST
INFO RUCEAAA/HQ USAF ALT MAXWELL AFB AL
RUWTBMA/MAC/MAOCCP
RUMMRSA/7AF THA SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC/DO/DOO/IN/DOCT/DP
RUHHABA/41ARRWG HICKAM AFB HI/DOC
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC/CC
RUMUHTA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUEKAAA/AFEOC FT RITCHIE MD
RUMFRBA/CTF 77
RUHGOSA/CTG 77.0
RUMOJAA/39ARRS CAM RANH BAY RVN
RUMMRSA/3ARRGP TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/JRCC
RUWTFJA/USAFMPC, RANDOLPH AFB, TEXAS/DPMCS
RUMMRSA/38ARRS TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC
RUMOSRA/OL-B, 3ARRGP, UDORN RTAFB, THAILAND
RUMUJBA/37ARRS, DANANG AB RVN

OPR	CYS
ARRS	1
INFO	CYS
DO	4
DOC	1
CSGH	1
	17

PAGE 2 RUMUJNA0101 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUMLMJA/C CO. 101 AVN BN, HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
RUMUJGA/12TFW, PHU CAT, RVN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/JOPREP JIFFY/OL-A, 3ARRGP/RESCUE 005/
13/0900 FEB 71.
1. RESCUE REOPENING/CLOSING REPORT 13 FEB 71.
2. MISSION NUMBER: A-3-005-11 FEB 71.
3. SITUATION: RECOVERY OF DOWNED AIRCREW MEMBERS.
   A. DESCRIPTION OF SAR OBJECTIVE:
      (1) F-4/CAMOFLAGED/COBRA 04
      (2) TACTICAL
      (3) PILOT: CAPT FORD, MAYNARD, [redacted] 12TFW, PHU CAT B RVN
      (4) POB - 2
      (5) WEATHER 3000 SCATTERED, 6 MILES VISIBILITY
      (6) SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT: AIR FORCE STANDARD
      (7) LAST KNOWN POSITION: 16-41N, 106-58E
   B. ACTIONS TAKEN:
      (1) CONTROLLING AGENCY, OL-A, 3ARRGP, NOTIFIED AT 0525Z 12 FEB 71 BY IDASC THAT BODY OF BRAVO MAN WAS LOCATED IN

MESSAGE ROUTING
Individual Contacted: G.S
Local Time and Date: 0500 13 FEB 71

PAGE 3 RUMUJNA0101 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WRECKAGE AND AN ARMY TEAM WILL RECOVER THE REMAINS.
      (2) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES ALERTED:
         (A) 2 BRIGADE, 17 CALVARY , 101 ABN, HUE-PHU BAI
RVN.

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
[illegible] 31 DEC 77

IMMEDIATE

****
* C O N F I D E N [redacted] *
****

MEDIATE

**********CONFIDENTIAL**********
* [redacted] *
****

PT 00522

2/2

(3) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES WERE LAUNCHED OR DIVERTED:
(A) NONE
C. PERSONNEL INFO:
(1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED - 2 PERSONS LOCATED, 1 PERSON SAVED, 1 PERSON DECEASED.
(2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED BY 'C' TROOP, 17TH CALVARY AT 12/0525 FEB 71 COORDINATES 16-41N, 106-58E.
(3) RECOVERY BY GROUND PARTY.
(4) BODY TAKEN TO DANANG AE MORTUARY.
D. FLYING ACTIVITY:
(1) NONE
E. NO ADDITIONAL SAVES.
G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:
(1) THE BODY OF THE SECOND CREW MEMBER WAS RECOVERED BY THE 17TH CALVARY REGIMENT, HUE, PHU BAI. THE BODY HAS BEEN TAKEN TO THE MORTUARY AT DANANG, RVN. MISSION CLOSED. (THIS

MESSAGE CORRECTS REPORT 13/0100 FEB 71)
GP-4
BT
#0101

NNNN≠

IMMEDIATE

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* C O N F I D E N T I A L *
****

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

FT 00026
OTTCZYYY RUMUJNA0079 0421320-CCCC--RUWTBMA.
ZNY CCCCC ZFD
O 111238Z FEB 71
FM OL A 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
TO RUEFHQA/CSAF/AFXOTZB
RUHEAKA/PACAF HICKHAM AFB HI/DOH
RUWTBMA/HQ ARRS SCOTT AFB ILL/COMMAND POST
INFO RUCEAAA/HQ USAF ALT MAXWELL AFB AL
RUWTBMA/MAC/MAOCCP
RUMMRSA/7AF TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC/DO/DOO/IN/DOCT/DP
RUHHABA/41ARRWG HICKHAM AFB HI/DOC
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC/CC
RUMUHTA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUEKAAA/AFEOC FT RITCHIE MD
RUMFRBA/CRF 77
RUHGOSA/CTG 77.0
RUMOJAA/39ARRS CAM RANH BAY AB RVN
RUMMRSA/3ARRS TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/JRCC
RUWTFJA/USAFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TEXAS/DPMCS
RUMMRSA/38ARRS TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC
RUMOSRA/OL B 3ARRGP UDORN RTAFB THAILAND
RUMUJBA/37ARRS DANANG AB RVN

1/3

OPR	CYS
ARRS	1
INFO	CYS
DO	4
DOC	1
CSEH	1

PAGE 2 RUMUJNA0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUMLMJA/C CO 101 AVN BN HUE PHU BAI RVN
RUMUJGA/12TFW PHU CAT RVN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L JOPREP JIFFY/OL-A, 3ARRGP/RESCUE 005/
11/0720 FEB 71.
1. MISSION OPENING/SUSPENDING REPORT 11 FEB 71.
2. MISSION NUMBER: A-3-005-11 FEB 71.
3. SITUATION: RECOVERY OF DOWNED CREW MEMBR:
A. DESCRIPTION OF SAR OBJECTIVE:
(1) F-4/CAMOFLAGED/COBRA 04.
(2) TACTICAL.
(3) PILOT: FORD, CAPT, [redacted] 12TFW; (FIRST NAME AND MIDDLE INITIAL NOT AVAILABLE)
(4) POB - 2.
(5) WEATHER 3,000 THOUSAND SCATTERED, 6 MILES VISIBILITY.
(6) SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT: AIR FORCE STANDARD.
(7) LAST KNOWN POSITION: 16-41N 106-58E.
B. ACTIONS TAKEN:
(1) CONTROLLING AGENCY, OL-A, 3 ARRGP, NOTIFIED AT 11/0720 FEB 71 BY COBRA 04 THAT COBRA 04 WAS BAILING OUT.

MESSAGE NOTIFICATI
Individual Contacted:
Local Time and Date:

PAGE 3 RUMUJNA0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(2) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES ALERTED:
(A) 39ARRS AT 11/0720 FEB 71
(B) 37ARRS AT 11/0723 FEB 71
(C) 56SOW AT 11/0723 FEB 71
(3) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES WERE LAUNCHED OR DIVERTED:

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 77

IMMEDIATE

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* C O N F I D E N T I A L *
****

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

2/3

(A) 39ARRS AT 11/0720 - K-26, C-130P
(B) 37ARRS AT 11/0720 - JG 67/72, HH-53
(L TYSOW AT 11/0739 - SANDY 9/10, A1-E

C. PERSONNEL INFO
(1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED - 1 PERSON LOCATED, RECOVERED, SAVED, 1 PERSON MISSING.
(2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED BY DUSTTES 707 AT 11/0720 FEB 71 COORDINATES 16-41N 106-58E.
(3) RECOVERY BY US ARMY HELO, COZY 10, USING ROPE AND ALUMINUM LADDER.
(4) CAPT FORD TAKEN TO 18TH SURGICAL HOSPUL, QUANG TRI.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:
(3) RECOVERY BY US ARMY HELO, COZY 10, USING ROPE AND ALUMINUM LADDER.
(4) CAPT FORD TAKEN TO 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL, QUANG TRI.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:
(1) 39ARRS - 1 SORTIE FOR .8 HOURS.
(2) 37ARRS - 2 SORTIES FOR 1.6 HOURS.
(3) 56SOW - 2 SORTIES FOR .8 HOURS.

PAGE 4 RUMUJNA0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L
E. RCC MAKING SAVE: PARSONS, M.L., CAPT, 538364363, 39ARRS.
39ARRS CREDITED WITH 1 COMBAT AIRCREWMEMBER SAVE.
G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:
(1) AT 11/0720 FEB 71 OL-A, 3ARRGP (QUEEN) INTERCEPTED A MAYDAY CALL ON GUARD FROM COBRA 04 ADVISING HE WAS EJECTING DUE TO DAMAGE FROM HOSTILE FIRE. THE EJECTION WAS CONFIRMED BY A DUSTOFF 707 AND KING 26 (HC-130P) DUSTOFF 707 RELAYED POSTIVE SIGHTING OF ONE CHUTE. COBRA 04 CRASHED AT PSN 16-41N 106-58E AND BEGAN TO BURN. AREA WEATHER WAS 3 THOUSAND SCATTERED VISIBILITY 6 MILES. JOLLY GREEN 72H-53) WAS AIRBOURNE AND DEVERTED AT 11/0725. JOLLY GREEN 67 (HH-53) LAUNCHED AT 11/0747. SANDY 9 & 10 (A-1E) LAUNCHED AT 110739 AND PROCEEDED TO SAR AREA. KING 26 (C130P) ASSUMED AIRBORNE CONTROL AT 11/0720 AND APPOINTED TRAIL WR ON SCENE COMMANDER AT 11/0740. THE AREA WAS REPORTED AS HOSTILE AND KING 26 REQUESTED FIGHTER SUPPORT. GUNFIGHTER 1 & 2 (F-4E) 366TFW WERE SCRAMBLED AT 11/0741. ONE SURVIVOR WAS REPORTED PICKED UP BY COZY 10(UH-1) AT 11/0730. KING 26 CONFIRMED PICK UP OF SURVIVOR BY COZY 10 (UH-1) AND ADVISED SURVIVOR WAS BEING TAKEN TO THE 18TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL AT QUANG TRI. SURVIVOR WAS REPORTED IN GOOD CONDITION. KING 26 REPORTED AREA

PAGE 5 RUMUJNA0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECURED AT 11/0745 AND THAT A LOH WAS INVESTIGATING THE BURNING WRECKAGE. INVESTIGATION DEFINETLY ESTABLISHED SECOND CREW MEMBER WAS STILL IN THE COCKPIT AND WAS DECEASED. JOLLY GREEN 67 & 72 AND SANDY 9 & 10 ARRIVED IN THE AREA AT 11/0750. A SECOND INVESTIGATION OF THE WRECKAGE WAS MADE BY CHARLEY HOUSE 45A (LOH) TO POSITIVELY ESTABLISH STATUS OF SECOND CREW MEMBER. CHARLEY HOUSE 45A REAFIRMED THE CREW MEMBER WAS DECEASED AT 11/0805. ALL

IMMEDIATE [redacted] SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

P. 00026

FORCES WERE RELEASED AT 11/0806. GUNFIGHTER 1 & 2 WERE NOT YET AIRBORNE AND DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAR. INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM IDASC, CAPT LOCHMILLER, THAT AN RVN GROUND PARTY HAD REACHED THE WRECKAGE AND REPORTED NO BODY IN THE WRECKAGE. THIS INFORMATION WAS DOUBLE CHECKED. THE GROUND PARTY DID NOT HAVE AN AMERICAN ADVISOR AND WERE TO UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ACRAFT TO IDENTIFY TYPE OR CONFIRM AIRCRAFT SER NO., HOWEVER FELT THAT IT WAS HE WRECKAGE OF COBRA 04 SINCE IT WAS STILL HOT. RECONFIRMATION OF THE MISSING BODY WAS MADE. THE FORCES WERE UNABLE TO STATE WHETHER THE EJECTION SEAT WAS OR WAS NOT IN THE AIRCRAFT. US FORCES FROM 24 CORPS AND IDASC HAVE BEEN REQUESTED THE INVESTIGATE. MISSION SUSPENDED PENDING CLARIFICATION AND RELIABLE INFORMATION. THE AIRREFUELING WAS ACCOMPLISHED. (JOLLY GREEN

PAGE 6 RUMUJNA0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L
72 AND KING WYLM TOTAL FLYING ACTIVITIES SEE ITEM 3D.
GP-4
BT
#0079

NNNN≠

DUDLEY 02 ALPHA AND BRAVO SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) On 16 February 1971 at 0950L a call was received by TeePee that an F-4 aircraft had sustained battle damage from small arms and was enroute to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB for an emergency landing. Sandy 03,04, 05, and 06 were immediately alerted for take off. At 0955L the two F-4 crewmembers ejected from their aircraft and landed in a trail network in midst of karst hills and caves. Their position was 083/42 from Tacan Channel 89, an area near the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. By 1135L Dudley 02 Alpha and Bravo were safely rescued.[141]

(C) Sandy 05/06 launched first and proceeded direct to the objective scene. Sandy 03/04 followed and escorted Jolly Green 63/61 to a forward holding point at 100/30 from Tacan Channel 89. When Sandy 03 arrived at the objective area several Nail FAC's and F-4 aircraft were already present and had located the approximate position of the survivors. Both crewmembers reported their condition was good and that there was no evidence of enemy activity in the area. Sandy 05 observed the many trails leading to caves in the karst and decided to make a few trolling passes. In an effort to provoke ground fire he made hot passes with 20 millimeter gunfire directed to cave entrances. However no ground fire was observed and the area was considered to be permissive.[142]

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141. SARCO Report for Dudley 02 A/B, 19 Feb 71, Document #4.
142. Ibid.

(C) The IP (Initial Point) and objective area were identified and a routine pick up was planned. Dudley 02 Alpha was picked up safely at 1122L and up to this point all operations were "quite normal" as planned. However when the Jolly Green helicopter departed Alpha's position on the planned heading of 110 degrees he was unable to locate Bravo's position. Bravo was directed to expend his signal flare and all forces were surprised to find his location was 500 meters from Alpha on a heading of 240 degrees. There was an unusually long 13 minute period between picking up the two crewmembers and during that time Jolly Green 63 took an undetermined amount of small arms ground fire.[143]

(C) The confusion over Bravo's exact position was the result of a series of unusual circumstances. His general position had been located electronically. Sandy 05 believed he knew the exact location of Bravo under the jungle canopy. He told Bravo to sound off when his A-1 was exactly overhead and then proceeded to the suspected area. Just when Sandy 05 passed over what he thought was the survivor's position Sandy 06 flew over Bravo's actual location and the survivor sounded off. Unfortunately the two positions were several hundred meters apart and caused serious delay in Bravo's pick up. However the effort ended happily and all forces returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB without further incident.[144]

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143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.

DATE: 16 Feb 71 22 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-006-16 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Dudley 02 A&B

LOCATION: 17-30N, 105-27E

SAVES: 2 Combat

(C) At approximately 0950L, King 21 received a call on UHF Guard from Wolf 04. Wolf stated he and Dudley lead were in escort with Dudley 02. Dudley 02 had taken battle damage and his aircraft was on fire and falling apart. King 21 requested a May Day squawk and a position from Wolf 04. About 0953L, Dudley 02 Alpha and Bravo ejected. Wolf 04 and Dudley lead had both chutes in sight. A call on Guard Channel by King 21 brought a response from Nails 27, 72, 34, and 112. All were in the general area of Dudley 02 Alpha and Bravo and Nail 27 said he had both chutes in sight. King 21 appointed Nail 27 as the On Scene Commander (OSC) and requested he pass general condition and UTM positions of the survivors when they reached the ground. All four Nail aircraft were overhead the survivors; Nail 34 stated there was some activity within 250 meters of Alpha — One strafe pass by Nail 34 eliminated the ground activity. Both Bravo and Alpha reported no guns or ground activity in their immediate area, and that both were in good condition. Approximately 1050L, Sandy's 5 and 6 arrived on scene and Sandy 5 assumed on scene command. Sandy 5 advised King 21 that the area was relatively quiet, and the fast mover strike aircraft available at that time would not be required. By 1100L, Jolly Green 61 and 63 and Sandy's 3 and 4 were in the area. By 1120L, the pickup phase was under way on the Alpha man with Jolly Green 63 making the attempt. The pickup phase on both men was complete by 1135L. King 21 advised the SAR forces to RTB and JG 63 and 61 were to proceed to CH 93 with the two survivors.

Comments: A post flight inspection of JG 63 revealed that he had taken several hits from small arms fire. Since the area appeared relatively quiet, Sandy 5 elected not to expend any ordinance during the pickup phase. In the future, I would like to see all pickup attempts covered by active ordinance, to preclude any further exposure of the Jolly Greens to ground fire. It has become increasingly apparent that the enemy is with-holding his fire until the Jolly Greens enter a hover and become a more vulnerable target.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years.

[redacted]

[illegible]	Capt.	Parmeter
[illegible]	Capt.	Pettit
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Sgt.	Jones
[illegible]	Sgt.	Mathews
[illegible]	Sgt.	Richardson

Forces Utilized

Sandy's 3, 4, 5, 6
King 21
Jolly Greens 61, 63, 62, 59
Wolf 04
Nail's 27, 72, 112, 34
Dudley 01
Falcon 91, 92, 87, 88
Cobra 45, 46
Gunfighter 60, 61
Scuba Flight
Olds Flight

JOHN S. JAHNKE, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

DO

RCS ARS V-6 Report

16 February 1971

3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

DATE: 16 February 1971

MISSION NUMBER: D-3-606 16 February 1971

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 63

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Dudley 02 ARP .

LOCATION: 1722N - 10529E

SAVES: 2 Combat Saves

SUMMARY OF SAR MOTION:

1. (C) Jolly Green 63 (I) and Jolly Green 61 (M) were launched [illegible] at 16/0310Z. We initially headed out the 120° radial of [illegible] to the fence where we held for 5 minutes while awaiting [illegible]. this time period we were instructed by King 21 to proceed out the [illegible] and hold at 20 miles. Enroute to this holding area Sandy 03 and [illegible] with us and proceeded to the survivors location, which was originally [illegible] at 080°/39/89. Sandy 3 and 4 arrived as our escort just [illegible] at the initial holding point. After relaying to the holding [illegible] that the holding point be moved to 080/35/89 in order to get out [illegible] tion. While we were in this area we heard that the PAGs on scene had [illegible] people in the area and that the Alpha man had reported small [illegible]. We also heard that Hail 34 had strafed the area and a cave [illegible] cave. Shortly after moving to this holding point, we were [illegible] Sandy 3 to move up to 079°/47/89. Upon arrival at this point [illegible] area of karst. We were in this area for about 20 minutes when [illegible] for Sandy 3 to come in to see the survivor's location and establish [illegible] approach plan. Prior to this a live M-79 bomb was dropped to [illegible] showed up excellently. The run-in heading to Dudley 02A was [illegible] from 1 to 3 a heading of 200° and at a distance of about 50 [illegible]. King 3 sent Sandy 3 back to the holding area for us and the run [illegible] finished at approximately 0431Z. A heading of 120° was held [illegible] 3's and we maneuvered as necessary to stay fast and fast. [illegible] of the returns briefly as we passed over a road. Sandy 3 told us [illegible] slow down in plenty of time. The Alpha man was told to pop his [illegible] prior to us reaching the other side of the ridge of karst where he was [illegible].

[illegible] we cross over the ridge we immediately saw his smoke and [illegible] veered the helicopter so we were as close to the steep cliff [illegible] We were in about a 100 foot hover. The pressure [illegible] We had Alpha on board at 0421 and we turned to 100° heading [illegible] Bravo man. We hover taxied in that direction and turned up [illegible] the burst. We did not see Bravo, but we did see a piece of [illegible] tangled in the top of a large tree. As we were searching this [illegible] the smoke from Bravo's plane at a heading of about 190° and a distance of about 1 Km. The area between us and the area was open field. We [illegible] the smoke as rapidly as possible and then began a series of [illegible] directions from Sandy 5 and the Bravo man. The result was a series of tightening circles until we located him at the base of [illegible] We seemed to be fairly exposed so we hovered as low into the trees as possible. Our hover was at about 125 feet. (The flight engineer spotted him because of his white tee shirt showing above his flight suit). We had the Bravo man on board at 0433 and began our exit. Sandy 5 told us to head straight ahead (about 275°) and keep down on the burst. After we left the immediate area we climbed up to 10,000 feet MSL to clear the [illegible] haze. Both survivors were in good shape and the aircraft [illegible] well on our evacuation. King 21 asked us about the survivors' [illegible] where they wanted to go. We told them they were both feeling [illegible] a return to Channel 89 was desired. Shortly there after King 21 directed JG 63 and 61 as well as JG 62 and 55 to TFE to Channel 93. Because of the condition of the survivors and the apparent condition of the aircraft, I saw no reason at that time to insist on a return to Channel 89. Arrival to Ch 93 we noticed a few stray holes in the aircraft, but nothing in the way of structural damage was noted. We landed at Ubon at 0610Z. After shut down, inspection revealed hits in one main rotor blade, one tail rotor blade, tail rotor drive shaft, and swash plate assemble. There were also several hits in the doghouse and rear of the aircraft. At no time during the mission were we aware of any ground fire hitting the aircraft. The only fire [illegible] was for a few seconds on the runin.

2. Crew Composition:

JG 63
AC Capt Charles R. Hagernjelm,
CP Maj George T. Macdonald,
FE SSgt Fredrick A. Moorehouse,
PJ Sgt Henry L. Ochse,
PJ TSgt John A. Smith,
AP SSgt Rodney L. Olsen,

JG 62
AC Capt Dan E. Williams,
CP Maj Jerry R. Thompson,
FE SSgt Wayne P. Lotey,
PJ TSgt Billy R. David[illegible],
PJ SSgt Richard A. Wallace,

3. Survivors:

Major William C. Allen
Lt Colonel William R. Cox

CHARLES R. HAGERNJELM, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO CATALOGED
DO NOT DESTROY
No 025 1963

FROM: 13OS (Lt Col Adams/2754

SUBJECT: SARCO Report for Dudley 02 A/B

TO: DO

1. A successful rescue was made for Dudley 02 A/B on 16 Feb 71. The aircraft, an F-4, sustained battle damage and enroute to NKP, both survivors were forced to bail out at approximately the 083/42/89. This report will cover the activities relating to the SAR. All times are Thailand local.

2. A call was received at 0950 that a battle damage aircraft was going to recover at NKP. At 0955 both crew members ejected. At 1004 both crew members touched down and their position was noted by an accompanying F-4 and reported to King. Sandy 03, 04, 05 and 06 were alerted to launch prior to the crew members reaching the ground. Because a Hot Cargo aircraft was blocking the arming area, an 8 to 10 minute delay occurred on the launch and Sandy 05 and 06 got airborne first at 1018. He was directed by King to proceed directly to the bail out area. Sandy 03 and 04 airborne, at 1020, were directed to escort Jolly Green 63 and 61, airborne at 1010, to a holding point of 100/30/89. Nail 11, 27, 112, 72, 34, and the accompanying F-4 were all in the immediate area of the bail out. Sandy 05 became OSC at approximately 1040. Sandy 01 and 02 at Ubon and Sandy 09 and 10 at Da Nang were placed in cockpit alert and two Jolly Greens at Ubon were launched to hold on the November orbit to act as backup.

3. Both crew members were immediately contacted and reported their condition as good without any evidence of enemy in the area. Sandy 05 believed he had a good location on both survivors. After trolling the area for gunfire and firing his 20mm near some cave entrances in a Karst, he decided a non contested SAR was at hand. Dudley 02/A was picked up first at 1122 without complication. Dudley 02/B was picked up by the same Jolly Green at 1135 after spending 13 minutes searching for his exact position. (see atch II)

4. The position of Dudley 02/B was not known exactly. The reason for this is explained in Atch II. This is further reason for emphasis to be made for Sandy low to be absolutely sure of the survivors position prior to expending ordnance and prior to committing the Jollys for the pick up. It is quite conceivable that the extended time in the hover, searching for 02/B, resulted in Jolly Green 63 receiving unnecessary gunfire. The comments made by Sandy 05 and 03 pertaining to the King aircraft calling a stop to the ordnance is also noteworthy. The assistance given to Sandy low by King is unquestioned. However, King overstepped his position by giving direction to Sandy low when he and only he is in the best position to determine the actions required. We are actually at a trade off since the exact location of 02/B was misunderstood and excessive ordnance delivery could have hurt the survivor. At the same time, the cessation of ordnance delivery, as ordered by King, probably contributed to endangering the crew of the Jolly Green.

5. Four Sandys and 2 Jollys were launched in direct support of the mission with two other Jollys holding in the November orbit as relief, if needed. (see atach I)

ROBERT S. ADAMS, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

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[redacted]

FLYING SCHEDULE

PILOT	RANK	TAKEOFF	REMARKS
Donaldson	05	1018	Expend 20mm
Kiland	06	1018	No Expend
Wilson	03	1020	JG Escort
Stewart	04	1020	JG Escort
	JOLLY GREEN		
	63	1010	Low Jolly
	61	1010	High Jolly

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STATEMENT

NARRATIVE FOR DUDLEY 02/A-B

In order to make this report both factual and comprehensive, I would like to present it from two different standpoints. I will first discuss it from an objective viewpoint including specific facts and happenings in chronological order. I will then present my personal opinions and thoughts.

At approximately 1000 hours local time Sandys 03, 04, 05, and 06 were scrambled in support of a downed F-4, Dudley 02. Sandy 03 and 04 were delayed momentarily and followed Sandy 05 and 06 out to the arming area. Sandy 05 and 06 launched first and were proceeding to escort the Jollys (as briefed) when Sandy 03 and 04 became airborne about 5 minutes later. At this time King directed Sandy 05 and 06 to the scene to act as low element. Sandys 03 and 04 then assumed escort responsibilities and joined the Jollys at the briefed holding area. At approximately 1110 local, Sandy 03 requested Jollys and escort to proceed to the SAR area. This was accomplished and upon arriving, Sandy 03 descended into the area for a briefing from Sandy 05. During this briefing tactics and responsibilities were discussed. Sandy 05 showed Sandy 03 the survivors location and did so a second time upon request from Sandy 03. Sandy 03 then returned to join Sandy 04 and Jolly 63 to brief them on the pick-up. About 1139 local the execution signal was given. Jolly 63 made his run in led by Sandy 03 with Sandys 04 and 06 covering his flank. Dudley 02 Alfa was spotted quickly and was recovered with little difficulty. The Sandys were not expending ordnance in accordance with King's request. At this point some confusion arose as to the exact position of Bravo. Momentarily, however, he was spotted and though the Jolly was forced to hover for some 10 minutes, Bravo was safely extracted. No ground fire was reported by the Sandys, Jolly, or survivors. The SAR forces then egressed the area and returned to their respective bosses. Down time for the Sandys was 1200 local.

In my opinion, though successful, this SAR was very poorly executed. I attribute this to myself, Sandy 05, and King. First of all I don't think King should have switched element responsibilities. In the event of delays or aborts, then yes this is in order. However, with both elements airborne, within 5 minutes of each other, I disagree. Jollys and Sandys briefed together, but as individual elements each with its own responsibilities. Techniques and tactics discussed here aid in a smooth coordinated effort.

The exact location of Bravo was not known until he popped his smoke. Just a bit late if you're putting down ordnance everywhere but where you think he is. Fortunately, we were not. This mistake on the Sandys part could have cost Bravo his life.

Now we come to the worst decision of the day, and who makes it but the airborne relay center known as King. "Do not expend ordnance during the pick-up". Perhaps this was passed to King via Jack. I don't know. I do know King passed it to the Sandys. In an area known to be controlled by the enemy, laced with roads and trail networks, and where only 30 minutes before a Nail FAC strafed and killed an enemy soldier, King announces the aforementioned statement.

Attch III

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What his reason was for making this decision is unknown to me. King, of all involved, does not have the knowledge or authority to make a tactical decision of this nature. I fault myself as well as Sandy 05 for not telling him so the moment he said it. The Sandy firepower might have prevented the numerous small arms hits that Jolly 63 took.

ROBERT L. WILSON, Lt
Sandy 03

[redacted]

STATEMENT

NARRATIVE FOR DUDLEY 02A & 02B

Dudley 02 A&B Sandy 05/06 Donaldson/Kiland

Sandy 05 and 06 were scrambled to escort the Jolly Greens on the Dudley 02 A&B SAR, but were diverted to be on-scene command because 05 and 06 had gotten airborne eight minutes ahead of Sandy 03 and 04.
Sandy 05 and 06 proceeded directly to 080/39 off chanel 89 actual position was 081/for 47 NM and after multiple radio failures finally established contact with Nail 27 who had the survivors' position well marked. Nail 34 and Nail 72, along with Wolf 04 were also at the scene. Due to the great number of aircraft in the area it was almost a case of too much help. 02 Alpha was very easy to spot because his chute was visible near the edge of the karst. But when it came time to pin point Bravo's position a series of misidentifications between Sandy 05 and whatever FAC was talking, led Sandy 05 to believe Bravo was about 500 meters from Alpha on a heading of about 110°. Sandy 05 then asked Bravo, who was in heavy jungle, to tell him when he heard Sandy 05 fly right overhead. Sandy 05 then flew over the position he believed Bravo to be in and, sure enough, Bravo said, "your're right over me now". But actually it was Sandy 06 who was passing over him. Therefore, Bravo was actually 500 meters ffom Alpha on a heading of about 240°. This caused considerable problems during the pick-up phase. Sandy 05 noticed many roads and trails leading to caves in the surrounding karst and decided to hose several of them down to see if he could troll up some groundfire. He made two passes firing 20mm at the caves.
After the second pass King called and said to stop strafing because it would give away the survivors' position and the strafe was not needed. This, I feel, was a major error on King's part. Sandy Lead is the only one who can make the determination that an area is to be considered peaceful or hostile. This one had all the earmarks of a potentially bad area. We have had two many helicopters lost or shot up because people thought the area was safe. As it turned out the Jolly took nemerous small arms hits sometime during one, or both, of the pick-ups.
The Jollys were brought onto the scene and briefed along with Sandy 03 and 04. A holding point was established over some karst about 3 miles northwest of the SAR site. The run-in to Alpha was as directed and the pick up went quickly. However, the previous mountainous confusion about Bravo's position was not rectified until Sandy 06 saw Bravo's smoke come up and he diverted Jolly 63 into the proper area. It took nearly 10 minutes from Alpha's pick up to positively spot Bravo. The rest went smoothly.

ROBERT J. DONALDSON, Major, USAF
Sandy 05

JOHN W. KILAND, 1st Lt, USAF
Sandy 06

Attch II

[redacted]

A last-light run-in was attempted but was aborted when both helicopters took hits from heavy small arms fire. One Pararescue man was wounded in this attempt. A first-light effort on 2 January resulted in a successful rescue of both crewmembers.

(S) BIGOT 02: On 3 February, two crewmembers of an F-4D bailed out of Bankari[2] Pass near the NVN border. 40th ARRS Jolly Greens were scrambled from both Nakhon Phanom Airfield[3] and Ubon RTAFB[4]. Low ceilings precluded any attempt that day. A maximum effort SAR was planned on the 4th with 8 Jolly Greens in place at NKP for a first-light effort. HH-53 BUFFs were on continuous airborne orbit from pre-dawn to darkness on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of February. Continued low ceilings and bad weather conditions in the area precluded any rescue attempts. After all radio contact was lost with the survivors at noon on the 6th, and no weather improvement forecast, the active participation of the 40th ARRS ceased. The force of tired and disappointed crews were returned to Udorn that night.

(S) DUDLEY 02: On 16 February, two crewmembers of an F-D bailed out in eastern Laos. Two Jolly Greens scrambled and both crewmembers were rescued less than two hours after bailout.

(S) WITCHDOCTOR 05: On 5 March, an Army UH-1 helicopter was shot down in eastern Laos with 7 people on board. A last-light run-in was attempted but intensive AAA and small arms fire precluded any rescues. The survivors were rescued by a U.S. Army ground team on 7 March.

MISSION B-3-006, 16 FEB 1971 PICKUP

Top, left to right: Captain Charles Hagerhjelm, Aircraft Commander; Lt Colonel Cox, survivor; Major W. C. Allen, survivor; Major G. McDonald, Co-pilot. Bottom: (left to right) Sgt Henry L. Ochse, Pararescueman; SSgt Frederick Moorhouse, Flight Engineer; and TSgt John A. Smith, Pararescueman.

1350	13 Nov 1970	RF-4C	NVN	Wright D. I.	Maj	KIA		Bancroft W. W. Jr	1Lt	KIA
1351	20 Nov 1970	F-105G	LAOS	Kilgus D. W.	Maj	Rescued	USAF HH53	Lowry C. T.	Capt	Rescued
1352	23 Nov 1970	OV-10A	CMB	Brooks D. L.	Maj	Rescued	u Helo	Bellefeuille G. B.	SSgt	Rescued
1353	1 Dec 1970	F-4E	LAOS	Robinson J. R.	Capt	Rescued		Boulet D. A. II	1Lt	Rescued
1354	12 Dec 1970	O-2A	LAOS	Duckett T. A.	1Lt	MIA		Skinner O. G.	Maj	MIA
1355	12 Dec 1970	B-57	LAOS	u	u	Rescued		u	u	Rescued
1356	12 Dec 1970	F-100D	CMB	u	u	Rescued				
1357	19 Dec 1970	F-4D	LAOS	Rotz D. H.	Capt	Rescued		Louis W. K.	1Lt	Rescued
1358	21 Dec 1970	RF-4C	LAOS	Nullis M. M.	1Lt	Rescued	USAF Helo	Rush A. F.	Maj	Rescued
1359	24 Dec 1970	A-1E	LAOS	Lundy A. L.	Maj	KIA				
1360	28 Dec 1970	OV-10A	LAOS	Smith J. L.	Capt	KIA		u	Sgt	KIA
1361	2 Jan 1971	F-4E	LAOS	Wier H. D.	Capt	Rescued	USAF Helo	Brown R. K.	1Lt	Rescued
1362	3 Jan 1971	F-4E	LAOS	Ayres J. H.	Maj	KIA		Stratton C. W.	Capt	MIA
1363	17 Jan 1971	F-4E	Sea	Mirrer R. H.	Maj	KIA		Siderius J. D.	Maj	Rescued
1364	20 Jan 1971	F-4E	SVN	Warner D. A.	Capt	Rescued	USAF	Kiefer H. E.	Maj	Rescued
1365	27 Jan 1971	F-100D	CMB	Neil J. M.	Capt	KIA				
1366	28 Jan 1971	OV-10A	CMB	Lineberger H. B.	Maj	MIA				
1367	31 Jan 1971	O-2A	SVN	Hoenninger	1Lt	Rescued	Army Helo	Platt P. R.	1Lt	Rescued
1368	1 Feb 1971	A-37	CMB	Harris J. C.	1Lt	KIA				
1369	3 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Standerwick R. L.	LtCol	MIA		Gotner N. A.	Maj	POW (retur
1370	11 Feb 1971	F-4D	SVN	Ford M. W. Jr	Capt	Rescued	Army	Eisenbeisz R. A.	1Lt	KIA
1371	16 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Cox W. R.	LtCol	Rescued	USAF	Allen W. C.	Maj	Rescued
1372	16 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Pattillo R. N.	Maj	MIA		Hoskins C. L.	Capt	KIA
1373	19 Feb 1971	O-2A	LAOS	Hull J. L.	1Lt	KIA		Fernandez W. M.	Sgt	KIA
1374	20 Feb 1971	O-1F	SVN	Peacock P.	1Lt	Rescued	USAF Helo			
1375	25 Feb 1971	F-4D	SVN	Somers R. K.	Maj	KIA		Talley J. S.	Capt	Rescued
1376	25 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Hedditch	Capt	Rescued	USAF Helo	McLaughlin	1Lt	Rescued

HOTEL 71 SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) On 17 February 1971 at approximately 1510L an Air America H-34 helicopter crashed in Northern Laos as a result of enemy ground fire damage. All personnel were safely rescued although one individual was wounded during the effort. The aircraft made an emergency crash landing at 358/115 from Tacan Channel 108 and set down intact on the crest of a hill in thickly forested rolling terrain. Intelligence reports indicated the area was defended by many Chinese Communists and Pathet Lao with weapons ranging from small arms all the way up to 57 and 100 millimeter anti-aircraft equipment. In addition there were reports of Fan-Song and Fire-Can radars, SAM's (Surface to Air Missiles) and frequently observed Mig aircraft.[145]

(C) All available resources were directed to the scene although many of the aircraft were not able to fly the great distance (approximately 240 miles) in time to assist the SAR effort. The first aircraft from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB to reach the objective area were Sandy 03/04 who had been diverted from an orbit near Tacan Channel 108. They arrived at approximately 1640L and were greeted by three Air America helicopters, a Pilatus Porter, a Beech G18 and Raven 12 flying an O-1 aircraft. At this time Sandy 03 replaced Raven 12 as On-Scene Commander.[146]

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145. SARCO Report for Hotel 71, 23 Feb 71, Document #6.
146. Ibid.

propaganda meetings where they claimed to soon start operations to expell all Americans and all Thai traitors.[112]

(C) Mr. Tee, probably the best known local insurgent leader, made several appearances boasting of gains and offering advice to the terrorists. One source reported that he accompanied Mr. Tee to a jungle area known as Don Ma-1 to meet with a company of Communist forces which crossed over from Laos and included some Laotian trained Thais. On another occasion Mr. Tee met in a jungle area with a large group of Laos and Thai troops who were to be deployed to many villages. Reports soon followed that villagers saw armed insurgents in various dress and uniforms. Some of them displayed "Tor Por Tor" (The Liberation Armed Forces of Thailand) on their clothing and others wore Mao Tse Tung medals. Many spoke with a Laos dialect. The insurgent introduced one source to an expert in guerrilla warfare and two nurses and said they came from North Vietnam to train local soldiers. Mr. Tee reportedly advised the insurgents to avoid clashes with police and military authorities, it would be necessary to preserve and save strength for the present.[113]

(C) Probably the most significant development was the reports of financial aid. One source said that North Vietnam sent 11 million baht ($550,000 US) to Vietnamese in Thailand for support of activities in Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon and Udorn

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112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.

[redacted]

(C) The helicopter was observed on several low passes. The door was open and the aircraft appeared to be empty. Raven 12 made several more low passes to search for survivors. On one pass he observed a crewmember come out from a group of bushes and wave his hands. This man was immediately shot and, although severely wounded, was able to crawl back to cover. On succeeding passes two more suvivors were spotted and Sandy 03 decided to attempt a pick up with the resources already available.[147]

(C) Hotel 63, an Air America H-34 helicopter which had been escorting the downed aircraft, was directed in for the pick up. He was able to rescue the wounded man and one other survivor. He immediately departed for Luang Prabang to obtain medical assistance for the seriously injured survivor. Next the fourth survivor showed himself and Sandy 03 requested one of the Air America Huey Slick helicopters to pick up the remaining men. He agreed and at 1737L all four personnel had been rescued.[148]

(C) This Search and Recovery was severly handicapped because the downed crewmembers had no survival radios or any means of electronic communications. Fortunately the recovery forces were unopposed and the incident occurred in an area where the survivors could be spotted and observed visually. In addition the SAR forces had been briefed that only three persons were on board the downed helicopter. The fourth person could have been neglected if the aircraft had crashed in a hostile environment or in an

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147. Ibid.
148. Ibid.

area concealed by jungle canopy.[149]

(C) At 1940L the SAR was terminated. Jolly Green 61 was diverted to Luang Prabang to Med-Evac the wounded survivor. Sandy 03/04 and Raven 12 remained to expend their ordnance on the source of ground fire which originally damaged the helicopter and all other forces returned to their home stations.[150]

[redacted]

FROM: 1st SOS (CC) 23 Feb 71

SUBJECT: SAR60 Report for Hotel 71

TO: CO

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 17 Feb 71 for Hotel 71. The aircraft, an Air America H34 Helicopter, went down at approximately 1510 local, 17 Feb 71, 115 N North of Lima Site 98. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.

2. Sandys 03, 04, 05 and 06 had launched on their scheduled times for the "F" and "J" orbits. 03 and 04 were [redacted] of LS 98 when notified by King of the downed aircraft. Hotel 71 had been downed by enemy gunfire.

3. Other forces scrambled/diverted were Sandys 05 and 06 from "J" orbit, Sandys 09 and 10 returning from Da Nang; Nobos 20 and 21, Prairie Fire assets scrambled in support of SAR; Nail 14 diverted in-flight; and Jolly Greens 54 and 61, scrambled from UKP, and 62 and 65 scrambled from Ubon. Launch and enroute times shown in attachment 1. In addition there were 5 Air America helicopters, a porter, a Beech G18 and a Raven 12 on-scene.

4. Hotel 71 had set down intact on the crest of a hill in thickly forested rolling terain. The weather was clear with visibility 6+. A paved highway was clearly visible a short distance to the northwest. Defenses in that area were briefed as many CHICOM and Pathet Lao, small arms, automatic weapons, 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 23mm, 57mm, 100mm, Fan Song and Fire-Can Radars, SAM's and MIG threat. In addition there were Chinese Engineer battalions working on the road.

5. Sandys 03 and 04 arrived on-scene at approximately 1640 local. After receiving a briefing from Raven 12 Sandy 03 assumed on-scene command. The Raven and the Sandys made several low passes examining the helicopter and looking for survivors. On one of the passes one survivor showed himself but was promptly wounded. Two other survivors were then sighted. The Sandys then laid down CBU-25, 20mm and 7.62mm in preparation for a pickup attempt. Hotel 65 was directed in and picked up 2 of the survivors including the wounded man. This aircraft then departed immediately for Luang Prabang for medical assistance. One of the remaining helicopters, 964, then proceeded in and picked up the remaining 2 survivors. It was later reported that the helicopters received "massive ground-fire" during the efforts. (See Atch 2) As 964 departed the area the Sandys expended the remainder of their ordnance in the area. At 1742 all forces were directed to RTB with one exception. Jolly Green 61 was directed to LS 54 for possible Medevac of the wounded survivor. (See Atch 3) At 1940 local the SAR was terminated by Jack.

PROJECTED FROM CATALOGUE
DO NOT DESTROY
No 0251764

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. It was confirmed twice that there were only 3 persons on board the downed aircraft. [illegible] been observed we could have quite possibly left [illegible]. The location and distance of the crash site proved to be a major problem area in that, the majority of the SAR forces never arrived. The lack of radio communications with the survivors could have been disastrous. Recommend the importance of the use of emergency survival radios be restressed to all aircrews operating in Theater.

WILLIAM J. HAGAN
Lt Colonel USAF
SARCO

[redacted]

FLYING SCHEDULE

Pilot	Call Sign	T/O	ATE	Remarks
Capt Koster	Sandy 03	1440	4.7	On Scene Commander
Maj De Felice	04	1440	5.0	
Maj Bishop	05	1435	4.1	
Colonel Walsh	06	1435	4.3	
Lt Colonel Dunwoody	09	1600	3.0	From Da Nang
1LT Rousnel	10	1600	3.0	From Da Nang
1LT Paine	Hobo 20	1633	2.7	
Capt Stewart	21	1633	2.7	

S T A T E M E N T

SARCO LOG - 17 Feb 1971

1545L - Lt Colonel Wells from Jack called to say: (1) Sandys 03 & 04, and 05 & 06 had been directed to the crash site. (2) Jolly Greens 54 & 61 were directed to scramble from UKP. (3) UKP was to generate 4 Smoke aircraft. (4) The downed aircraft was an Air America H34, callsign H-71. Location 340/94/108. Coordinates TA2982.

1552L - Sarco advised Jack that we only had one in-commission A-1 for Smoke request. (Acft 215). Also advised Jack of 2 Prairie Fire assets, Hobos 20/21 that they might try to get released to SAR. Also requested MIGCAP and IRONHAND at that time.

1556L - Intelligence advises not to go too far Northwest of reported location due to heavy AAA with Firecan/Fansong radars. Passed to Jack.

1600L - Jolly Greens 54/61 airborne.

1606L - Fowler Flight, 2F4E's enroute. On scene Forces have no contact with survivors but downed helicopter visually checked intact and O.K.

1615L - Prairie Fire, Hobos 20/21, released and scrambled to SAR. Site location 342° for 42 minutes from 108.

1617L - Jack advised 360/60/108 will be holding point for Jollies. Nail 19 arrived on scene. New location of site now 350/115/108.

1620L - Ubon Jolly Greens scrambled by King. Jolly Greens 62/65.

1625L - King 25 scrambled.

1635L - Two T-28's with Strike ordnance enroute. New position - 016° for 10 clics from site at TJ 4716.

1639L - Sandys 03/04 on-scene. Hotel 73 over site and has visual on 3 survivors.

1645L - Sandys 09/10 estimating on scene 1815L with Bingo of 1930L. Jolly Green 65 estimating Pakse 1800L with Bingo of 1930L. Raven 12 On-Scene-Commander. Sandys 03/04 Bingo 2000L.

1715L - Sandy 03 On-Scene-Commander. Sandys striking around area of survivors.

1720L - One survivor spotted. Has been shot. May be O.K. Second survivor spotted.

1725L - Aircraft H-63 will attempt Phase "B" on 2 survivors.

1731L - One badly wounded survivor picked up. Another picked up. Hotel 63 going to LS54 due to low fuel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SARCO LOG - 17 Feb 1971 (CONT'D)

1735L - Third survivor sighted and Phase B being attempted. One Jolly Green going to LS54 for possible MedEvac.

1737L - Picked up two survivors, one indigenous. Aircraft 96W made pickup.

1742L - Jack directs - (1) All Sandies RTB channel 89. (2) All Jollys RTB channel 70 except 61 going to LS54 for MedEvac. (3) Several helicopters reported receiving "massive ground fire".

1940L - SAR terminated.

S T A T E M E N T

SAR FOR HOTEL 71

Hotel 71 (an H34 chopper) went down on the 350° radial for 115NM off Cil03 at approximately 1510 local, 1[illegible] Feb 71. We (Sandy 03 & 04/Keeter and De Felice) were enroute to T-Orbit and were approximately 120°/35/108 when the chopper went down. As soon as King 22 established the chopper's location, we proceeded north and arrived on-scene at 1640 local. There was at least 20 minutes lost after the Mayday call (incidentally, this call was made by Hotel 63, the wingman) before King established any fix on their position. This explains our delay in arriving on-scene. King 22 was very busy throughout the drive up to the area in assembling numerous fast movers to act as strike birds, coordinating with Brigham for tanker support, etc. We received no briefings from King 22 at any time as to what type of aircraft were on-scene, who was in command, or what type of resistance the SAR was meeting. We got the information we needed, but had to pick it out piece by piece.

Arrived on-scene around 1640 local and observed numerous aircraft circling the crash site, which was on the crest of a North/South ridgeline about 1 mile South of a river. I observed Raven 12 (O-1), Hotel 63 (H34), 2 Huey Slicks (Air America), a Pilatus Porter, and a Beach C18 (Air America). Raven 12 was on-scene commander. Everyone was talking at once on Air America Common, 119.1. After sometime I was able to get everyone up 123.1 so that King could listen to the events and I then assumed on-scene command. We were also using 259.0 for a common UHF and all the fast movers were available on it. The survivors had no radios.

Raven 12 showed me the crash site. We (Raven 12, and Sandies 3 & 4) made numerous low passes over the crash and determined the choppers door to be open and the chopper empty. On one of the low passes Raven 12 observed one survivor (wearing a grey shirt) come out of a small brush and start waving his hands. The Sandies then held high to protect Raven 12 who went low in an attempt to find the other three. It was on this pass that Raven 12 called "He has been hit"; "They have shot him", referring to the first survivor that showed himself to us. The next pass indicated the man to be wounded but still able to crawl for cover. About this time, two of the remaining survivors showed themselves and we immediately decided to send Hotel 63 (the other H34) in for pickup. We picked up two of them, one of whom was the wounded survivor. After Hotel 63 vacated the area for Luang Parabang and medical attention, the fourth survivor showed himself to Raven 12 and we immediately asked one of the Air America Huey Slicks (Call sign was Tango Foxtrot, I believe) to make an attempt at pickup. He agreed and picked up both remaining survivors.

[redacted]

STATEMENT

SAR FOR HOTEL 71 (CONT'D)

No ground fire was observed during any of the pickups. Prior to the pickups we put down light ordnance around the crash site as a deterrent. We used CBU-25 in the valleys on either side of the North/South Ridgeline and 20mm and 7.62 Minigun to the North and South of the crash. After everyone left the area, we put down the rest of the ordnance on board in areas where the FAC, Raven 12, thought the ground fire had come that downed the chopper. The Sandies then RTB'd at 1745 local.

JACK E. KEETER, Capt, USAF
SANDY 03

were 11 total CH-3's authorized and assigned during the period.[179]

(S) The CH-3 helicopters continued to be used largely for support missions and training sorties. One of its major functions was to perform night reconnaissance in the areas adjacent to the Base. This mission was known as Knife 47 and reported increasing numbers of apparent overt operations by unknown armed men clad in black pajamas. On one occasion Knife 47 aided in a rescue by picking up a crewmember who had bailed out of an AC-119 Gunship.* The better performing and larger CH-53 was used more in the X-Ray and Prairie Fire tactical combat mission role.[180]

Prairie Fire:

(S) The Prairie Fire mission, which primarily involved infiltration/exfiltration of Study and Observation Groups (SOG), continued to be extremely hazardous. One CH-53 was lost to enemy ground fire while attempting to hover over a particularly dangerous HLZ (Helicopter Landing Zone) on 18 February 1971. During that month there were a total of four Prairie Fire missions and all were subjected to enemy resistance. In March there were five infiltration missions and three of them turned into emergency exfiltrations as a result of intense enemy ground fire and large numbers of enemy personnel in the area. The mission was flown to support the Army and HLZ's were selected deep in enemy controlled areas and often

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179. 21st SOS Historical Cata Records, Jan-Mar 71, Tab B, Appendix V, and 56th SPOPWG Monthly Maintenance Summary, Jan-Mar 71, Document #15.

* See Volume I, Chapter III, Search and Recovery for more information.

180. 21st SOS Historical Data Records, Jan-Mar 71, Tab B, Appendix V.

where helicopter operations could easily be observed by the enemy. Such actions appeared unwise because first, they subjected the aircraft and team to extreme hazards, and secondly, because many of the missions failed to accomplish their assigned task when the team had to be lifted out immediately after being infiltrated. The more successful Prairie Fire missions used HLZ's located on high terrain (4,000 to 6,000 feet). These altitudes were out of the efficient operating range for the smaller CH-3 but the CH-53's were well suited for the operations.[181]

X-Ray:

(S) The 21st Special Operations Squadron was very active in the X-Ray mission during the quarter. Larger and larger operations were encountered and the unit referred to them as "Mass Gaggles". One such operation was the largest mission ever launched by the Knife Squadron at Nakhon Phanom RTAFBB and included 16 of the total 20 aircraft available. That day 1,555 troops and 9,300 pounds of cargo were moved and the aircraft were greeted by rockets in the landing zone area. Fortunately the rockets were unguided, inacurate, and no helicopters were damaged. Another Mass Gaggle used six CH-53's and six CH-3's to move 1,100 troops and their support cargo in less than four hours. The mission terminated with an impressive 12 ship flyby at home station.[182]

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181. Ibid.
182. Ibid.

KNIFE 34 SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) Quick reaction by the crew of Knife 33 resulted in the immediate rescue of the crew and passengers of Knife 34 when it crashed on a combat mission 18 February 1971. The two CH-53 helicopters were being escorted by two A-1 aircraft, Hobo 22/23. Knife 33 had completed off-loading its passengers and was waiting for Knife 34 which developed engine problems, possibly as a result of enemy ground fire. At 1105L Hobo 22 saw the helicopter suddenly go out of control and crash into the HLZ (Helicopter Landing Zone). There were no fires or explosions associated with the crash.[151]

(C) Hobo 22 immediately assumed On-Scene Command and other SAR forces were alerted. Sandy 01/02 were flying a special orbit near the objective area and were diverted to the scene. All other forces remained on alert for immediate launch.[152]

(C) Knife 33 had been hovering approximately two miles from the scene of the crash and immediately drove in and used a jungle penetrator to pick up the crewmembers and passengers. The helicopter was down in hilly terrain with tall trees and weather was not a factor. All the survivors were picked up approximately 20 minutes after the crash and the SAR was terminated at 1128L. Knife 33 recovered at Ubon RTAFB and the other forces returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. No enemy resistance was reported during the rescue effort although Knife 34 reported ground fire during their initial penetration.[153]

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151. SARCO Report for Knife 34, 23 Feb 71, Document #5.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: 1SOS (Lt Col Dunwoody/2754) 23 February 1971

SUBJECT: SARCO REPORT FOR KNIFE 34

TO: DO

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 18 February 1971, for Knife 34. The aircraft, a CH-53, went down 0405Z/ 18 Feb 1971 at approximately 2 miles south of D-44. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys/Hobos during the rescue effort.

2. Knife 33 and 34 launched at 0235Z with Hobo's 22 and 23 as escort on a fragged infill mission. The mission went as briefed with Knife 33 accomplishing the first infill. At 0405Z Hobo 22 and 23 were covering the infill for Knife 34 on his HLZ. Hobo 22 stated, "suddenly I saw knife 34 go out of control and crash on the HLZ". Knife 33, holding 2 miles from the crash site, now headed directly to the scene. Hobo 22 notified King 24 and gave the location of crash and requested the SAR forces be alerted. Due to the nature of the terrain on the HLZ, Knife 33 used his penetrator to pickup the survivors. In approximately 10 to 15 minutes all survivors were on board with 3 survivors injured. Hobo 22 flight escorted Knife 33 to Ubon for a successful recovery. The Hobo flight then returned to NKP.

3. All SAR forces were alerted by 0410Z. Sandy 01 and 02 were flying a special orbit near the "Rooster Tail" and diverted to the scene. The SARCO briefed Sandys 03 and 04 and told to maintain ground alert until needed. Sandy's 05 and 06 at UBON were also briefed for a possible launch. All fragged A-1 missions at NKP were put on a temporary hold and Blue Chip was requested to release Hobo 20 flight for smoke loads. At 0426Z knife 33 made his pickup and the SAR terminated at 0428Z. Sandy 01 and 02 never reached the scene and returned to their orbit. All missions at NKP went back to normal operations.

4. Weather was no factor in the HLZ areas. The terrain was hilly with tall trees in the HLZ area. Hobo 22 and 23 never observed enemy ground fire at any time. Knife 34 crew later debriefed that ground fire was heard during their infill.

5. No problems or difficulties were experienced in the SAR effort. Hobo 22 recommended that all Nails/Misty/Jets/ etc. be rebriefed on the importance of staying clear of the HLZ and particulary when a SAR is in progress.

Richard H. Dunwoody

RICHARD H. DUNWOODY, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

SAR FORCES

HOBO 22	Captain James Madden	ON SCENE COMMANDER
HOBO 23	Captain Roy Hamiya	
NAIL 53	Lt Ted Stuckley	
KING 24		
KNIFE33	Maj [illegible].Adkins	
SANDY 01	Lt Alan Young	
SANDY 02	Lt Ralph Anderson	

Jolly Greens 64 and 73 were alerted on 19 February that Covey 275 had crashed west of Channel 77. Both helicopters proceeded to the scene where they were joined by the SAR force. No chutes were observed and no beeper could be heard. The cockpit seemed to be intact so it was decided that a pararescueman should be lowered to determine if there were survivors. This was accomplished and both Jolly Greens returned to Da Nang Afld, RVN.

On 25 February 71, Cobra 23 was shot down at 263 degrees for 43 miles off Channel 103. Jolly Greens 66 and 72 were scrambled from Da Nang and were placed in a holding point west of Channel 103. Jolly Greens 65 and 71 were later scrambled to the area. Weather and night fall prevented a pickup attempt so all SAR forces were returned to base. A first light effort was planned for the next morning. All SAR forces were reassembled in the area the next morning but the rescue was delayed until hostile forces could be eliminated. At 1230 Local the area was ready and the pickup of both crewmembers was successful. The low bird, Jolly Green 65 flown by Captain Bakke did take several hits from small arms fire during the rescue.

The last mission for February occurred on the 27th. The pilot of a Navy aircraft, call sign Chipple 414, bailed out feet wet off of Channel 69. Jolly Greens 72 and 71 scrambled to the scene and a successful water pickup was accomplished. Heavy fog in the area made this recovery very difficult.

18 FEB 71

2045	CAPT WEIMER ON DUTY	RW.
2140	STATUS TO QUEEN - RADIO CHECK HA	RW.
2330	STATUS TO JOKER	RW.
0210	KF Set EB Read ZJESCRNP (AT)	RW.
0220	Request for carrying 3 King Pilots to be dropped off AT CAM RAHN by BIEN HOA Shuttle Meet HERE AT 0745	RW.
0230	JG 73 Airborne	RW.
0232	JG 66 AIRBORNE	RW.
0302	JG 65 AIRBORNE	RW
0405	Capt Weimer OFF Duty, SSGT ARLIPE ON ALERT SYSTEM TESTED	RW
0622	JG 73 DOWN LOGGED 4.0 TNG.	AR
0640	JG 66 DOWN. LOGGED 4.3 FRAG.	AR
0659	JG 65 DOWN. LOGGED 4.0 FRAG.	AR
0855	JG 73 AIRBORNE TNG	AR
1255	JG 73 DOWN LOGGED. - 4.1	AR
1326	DAAR JRCC TOTAL: 19.4	AR
1330	LINE CHECK 5X5	AR
1330	JG 67/365 BIEN HOA LOGGED 3.0/19/ TNG	AR
1400	SSGT ARLIPE OFF DUTY	AR

19 FEB 71

2045	MAJ HOLLINGSWORTH ON	
2359	OPS STATUS PASSED	
0030	JG 70 (B/H) ABN ETE 3+45	
0310	ITEM 14 TI (IS) BE (IR) TIDJ CREW	
0355	MAJ Hollingsworth off Night Switch on	DS
0400	JG 70 ARR B.H.	DS
0430	JG 67 ABN Fm TAN SON NHUT To B.H. ETA 0450	DS
0430	Convoy 275 Down @ 234/30/69	
0640	BRAVO Crew on alert	DS
0641	Fm Queen That JG [illegible] for	

0643 Z	Several choppers going in & check the wreckage	KS
0800 Z	phase ALFA STARTED	DS
0805 Z	Sandy 09 OSC	DS
0810 Z	Jollys are moving into AREA	
0812 Z	Ground team reports 2 pob's KIA One in wreckage + one clear of wreckage.	KS
0820 Z	JG 64 has sent one PJ down all is quiet.	KS
0836 Z	JG 64 has Recovered one pob - other Tangled in wreckage.	KS
0837 Z	JG 64 has the Army Team will drop off at 69	DS
0840 Z	JG64 bringing body to ch 77	DS
0830 Z	JG 64 on the deck 4.3	DS
0930 Z	JG 73 on the deck 4.0	DS
1000 Z	MSN NBR for above is A3006 19 Feb 71	DS
1040	JG72 DOWN LOGGED 4.6	AL
1145	JG65 DOWN LOGGED	AL
1200	LINE CHECK JX5	AL
1215	DAAR DEC TOTAL: 20.9	AL
1230	SS at ARISE OFF DUTY	AL
2045	20 Feb Maj Posey on duty	CP
2130	STATUS PASSED TO QUEEN	CP
2208	362 HAC TS problems moving to Spare	CP
2335	Called Status to JOKER	CP

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

FT 00074
OTTCZYUW RUMUJNA0135 0501024-CCCC--RUWTBMA.
ZNY CCCCC
O 191017Z FEB 71
FM OL-A, 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
TO RUEFHQA/CSAF/AFXOTZB
RUHEAKA/PACAF HICKAM AFB HI/DOH
RUWTBMA/HQ ARRS, SCOTT AFB ILL/COMMAND POST
INFO RUCEAAA/HQ USAF ALT MAXWELL AFB AL
RUWTBMA/MAC/MAOCCP
RUMMRSA/7AF TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC/DO/DOO/IN/DOCT/DP
RUHHABA/41ARRWG HICKAM AFB HI/DOC
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC/CC
RUMUHTA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUEKAAA/AFEOC FT RITCHIE MD
RUMFRBA/CTF 77
RUHGOSA/CTG 77.0
RUMOJAA/39ARRS CAM RANH BAY AB RVN
RUMMRSA/3ARRGP TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/JRCC
RUWTFJA/USAFMPC, RANDOLPH AFB, TEX/DPMCS
RUMMRSA/38ARRS TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC
RUMUJBA/37ARRS DANANG AFLD RVN
RUMOSRA/OL-B, 3ARRGP, UDORN RTAFB THAILAND

PAGE 2 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUMUJBA/20TASS DANANG AFLD RVN
RUMOREA/56SOW NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB, THAILAND
RUMHHCT/101 AVN BN, HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/JOPREP JIFFY/OL-A, 3ARRGP/RESCUE 006/
19/1000 FEB 71.
1. RESCUE OPENING/CLOSING REPORT 19 FEB 71.
2. MISSION NUMBER: A-3-006-19 FEB 71.
3. SITUATION: RECOVERY OF DOWNED CREW MEMBERS.
   A. DESCRIPTION OF SAR OBJECTIVE:
      (1) O-2/CAMOFLAGED/COVEY 275.
      (2) TACTICAL
      (3) PILOT: HULL, JAMES L., 1/LT, 20TASS, DANANG AF, RVN.
      (4) POB - 2.
      (5) WEATHER: 5500 BROKEN, VISIBILITY 5 MILES.
      (6) SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT: AIR FORCE STANDARD.
      (7) LAST KNOWN POSITION: 107-18E 16-06N
   B. ACTIONS TAKEN:
      (1) CONTROLLING AGENCY, OL-A, 3ARRGP, NOTIFIED AT 0620/
19 FEB 71 BY COVEY 268 THAT HE SAW CRASH SITE OF COVEY 275.

PAGE 3 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
      (2) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES ALERTED:
         (A) 39ARRS AT 19/0620 FEB 71.
         (B) 37ARRS AT 19/0620 FEB 71.
         (C) 56 SOW AT 19/0620 FEB 71.
      (3) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES WERE LAUNCHED OR DIVERTED:
         (A) 39ARRS AT 19/0621 FEB 71 - HC-130P.

DOCP

OPR	CYS
HRRS	1
INFO	CYS
DO	4
DOC	1
DOH	1
	7

1/2

6

MESSAGE NOTIFICATION
Individual Contacted: SAT PAYNE
Local Time and Date: 0620 19 FEB 71

5

Classified by
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 77

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

[redacted]

IMMEDIATE

(L)

PT 00074

(B) 37ARRS AT 19/0650 FEB 71 - HH-53C.
(C) 56SOW AT 19/0705 FEB 71 - A1-H.

C. PERSONNEL INFO:
(1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED - 2 PERSONS LOCATED, 2 PERSONS DECEASED, 1 PERSON RECOVERED.
(2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED BY COVEY 268 AT 0620Z/19 FEB 71 COORDINATES 107-18E 16-06N.
(3) RECOVERY BY JUNGLE PENETRATOR.
(4) BODY OF OBSERVOR TAKEN TO DANANG AF, RVN.

2/2

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:
(1) 39ARRS - 1 SORTIE FOR 2.3 HOURS.
(2) 37ARRS - 2 SORTIES FOR 4.6 HOURS.
(3) 56SOW - 2 SORTIES FOR 4.5 HOURS.
(4) 101ST AVN BN - 3 SORTIES FOR 3.2 HOURS.

PAGE 4 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(5) 20TASS - 2 SORTIES FOR 5.4 HOURS.

E. NO SAVES.

G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:
(1) AT 19/0620Z FEB 71, OL-A RECEIVED A CALL FROM COVEY 268 (O-2) THAT HE HAD SPOTTED WRECKAGE OF COVEY 275 (O-2) AT 107-18E, 1606N. KING 26 (HC-130P) WAS DIVERTED TO THE SCENE AND BECAME AIRBORNE MISSION COMMANDER AND COVEY 268 - ON SCENE COMMANDER AT 0621Z. JOLLY GREENS 64/73 (HH-53) WERE AIRBORNE AT THIS TIME. SANDYS 9/10 (A1-H) WERE PLACED ON COCKPIT ALERT AT 0620Z. THERE WAS NO BEEPER HEARD FROM AREA. COVEY 268 SAID COCKPIT WAS INTACT AND HAD NOT BURNED, HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF SURVIVORS. JOLLY GREENS 64/73 WERE DIVERTED TO SCENE AT 0650Z. SANDYS 9/10 WERE AIRBORNE TO SCENE AT 0705Z. SNOOPY 02 (UH-1) FROM 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION INSERTED A 4 MAN GROUND TEAM TO EXAMINE WRECKAGE AT 0740Z. PILOT AND OBSERVOR WERE FOUND TO BE KIA. SANDY 9 BECAME OSC AT 0750Z. JG64 WAS UTILIZED TO RECOVER GROUND PARTY AND BODY OF OBSERVOR AT 0820Z. BODY OF PILOT WAS TRAPPED IN WRECKAGE. JG64 WAS UTILIZED BECAUSE JUNGLE CANOPY PREVENTED SNOOPY 02 FROM RECOVERING THE TEAM. ONE PJ WAS DEPLOYED. BODY OF OBSERVOR RETURNED TO DANANG AF, RVN. NEGATIVE AIR REFUELINGS.

PAGE 5 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(2) TOTAL FLYING ACTIVITY: SEE ITEM 3D.

GP-4
BT
#0135

NNNN≠

[redacted]

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

****
* C O N F I D E N T I A L *
****

PT 00183
OTTCZYUW RUMUJNA0135 0501024-CCCC--RUWTBMA.
ZNY CCCCC
O 191017Z FEB 71
FM OL-A, 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
TO RUEFHQA/CSAF/AFXOTZB
RUHEAKA/PACAF HICKAM AFB HI/DOH
RUWTBMA/HQ ARRS, SCOTT AFB ILL/COMMAND POST
INFO RUCEAAA/HQ USAF ALT MAXWELL AFB AL
RUWTBMA/MAC/MAOCCP
RUMMRSA/7AF TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC/DO/DOO/IN/DOCT/DP
RUHHABA/41ARRWG HICKAM AFB HI/DOC
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC/CC
RUMUHTA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUEKAAA/AFEOC FT RITCHIE MD
RUMFRBA/CTF 77
RUHGOSA/CTG 77.0
RUMOJAA/39ARRS CAM RANH BAY AB RVN
RUMMRSA/3ARRGP TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/JRCC
RUWTFJA/USAFMPC, RANDOLPH AFB, TEX/DPMCS
RUMMRSA/38ARRS TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN/CC
RUMUJBA/37ARRS DANANG AFLD RVN
RUMOSRA/OL-B, 3ARRGP, UDORN RTAFB THAILAND

PAGE 2 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RUMUJBA/20TASS DANANG AFLD RVN
RUMOREA/56SOW NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB, THAILAND
RUMHHCT/101 AVN BN, HUE-PHU BAI, RVN
BT
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19/1000 FEB 71.
1. RESCUE OPENING/CLOSING REPORT 19 FEB 71.
2. MISSION NUMBER: A-3-006-19 FEB 71.
3. SITUATION: RECOVERY OF DOWNED CREW MEMBERS.
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      (3) PILOT: HULL, JAMES L., 1/LT, 20TASS, DANANG AF, RVN.
      (4) POB - 2.
      (5) WEATHER: 5500 BROKEN, VISIBILITY 5 MILES.
      (6) SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT: AIR FORCE STANDARD.
      (7) LAST KNOWN POSITION: 107-18E 16-06N
   B. ACTIONS TAKEN:
      (1) CONTROLLING AGENCY, OL-A, 3ARRGP, NOTIFIED AT 0620/
19 FEB 71 BY COVEY 268 THAT HE SAW CRASH SITE OF COVEY 275.

PAGE 3 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
      (2) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES ALERTED:
         (A) 39ARRS AT 19/0620 FEB 71.
         (B) 37ARRS AT 19/0620 FEB 71.
         (C) 56 SOW AT 19/0620 FEB 71.
      (3) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES WERE LAUNCHED OR DIVERTED:
         (A) 39ARRS AT 19/0621 FEB 71 - HC-130P.

IMMEDIATE

****
* C O N F I D E N T I A L *
****

21 FEB 1 14 34

1/2

OPR	OKS
ARRS	/
INFO	CYS
DO	4
DOC	1
CSAF	1
	7

Classified by
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 78

MESSAGE NOTIFICATION
Individual Contacted: Ltr Encl
Local Time and Date: 21/0

IMMEDIATE [redacted]

BT 00183

(B) 37ARRS AT 19/0650 FEB 71 - HH-53C.
(C) 56SOW AT 19/0705 FEB 71 - A1-H.

C. PERSONNEL INFO:
(1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED - 2 PERSONS LOCATED, 2 PERSONS DECEASED, 1 PERSON RECOVERED.
(2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED BY COVEY 268 AT 0620Z/19 FEB 71 COORDINATES 107-18E 16-06N.
(3) RECOVERY BY JUNGLE PENETRATOR.
(4) BODY OF OBSERVOR TAKEN TO DANANG AF, RVN.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:
(1) 39ARRS - 1 SORTIE FOR 2.3 HOURS.
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PAGE 4 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(5) 20TASS - 2 SORTIES FOR 5.4 HOURS.

E. NO SAVES.

G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:
(1) AT 19/0620Z FEB 71, OL-A RECEIVED A CALL FROM COVEY 268 (O-2) THAT HE HAD SPOTTED WRECKAGE OF COVEY 275 (O-2) AT 107-18E, 1606N. KING 26 (HC-130P) WAS DIVERTED TO THE SCENE AND BECAME AIRBORNE MISSION COMMANDER AND COVEY 268 - ON SCENE COMMANDER AT 0621Z, JOLLY GREENS 64/73 (HH-53) WERE AIRBORNE AT THIS TIME. SANDYS 9/10 (A1-H) WERE PLACED ON COCKPIT ALERT AT 0620Z. THERE WAS NO BEEPER HEARD FROM AREA. COVEY 268 SAID COCKPIT WAS INTACT AND HAD NOT BURNED, HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF SURVIVORS. JOLLY GREENS 64/73 WERE DIVERTED TO SCENE AT 0650Z. SANDYS 9/10 WERE AIRBORNE TO SCENE AT 0705Z. SNOOPY 02 (UH-1) FROM 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION INSERTED A 4 MAN GROUND TEAM TO EXAMINE WRECKAGE AT 0740Z. PILOT AND OBSERVOR WERE FOUND TO BE KIA. SANDY 9 BECAME OSC AT 0750Z. JG64 WAS UTILIZED TO RECOVER GROUND PARTY AND BODY OF OBSERVOR AT 0820Z. BODY OF PILOT WAS TRAPPED IN WRECKAGE. JG64 WAS UTILIZED BECAUSE JUNGLE CANOPY PREVENTED SNOOPY 02 FROM RECOVERING THE TEAM. ONE PJ WAS DEPLOYED. BODY OF OBSERVOR RETURNED TO DANANG AF, RVN. NEGATIVE AIR REFUELINGS.

PAGE 5 RUMUJNA0135 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(2) TOTAL FLYING ACTIVITY: SEE ITEM 3D.

GP-4
BT
#0135

NNNN

IMMEDIATE [redacted]

[redacted]

DATE: 25 Feb 71 1 Mar 71

MISSION NUMBER: A-3-008-25 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 24

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Gunfighter 44

LOCATION: 34 NM from CH 103(130/34/CH 103)

SAVES: 1 Combat

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 77

(C) At 0236Z King 24 overheard a broken radio transmission from Danang Tower talking to Gunfighter 44 about a Mayday. King 24 contacted Danang Tower and learned that Gunfighter 44 had called Mayday 34 NM out of CH 103 with the front seater incapacitated and battle damage on the aircraft. The backseater was flying the aircraft and proceeding to CH 77. King 24 attempted to contact Gunfighter 44 with negative results while also establishing communications with Panama for radar positions on the distressed aircraft. No escort aircraft were available. Gunfighters position was 130°/34/CH103 heading south. Queen launched JG 66 and 72 and Sandies 9 and 10 at 0238Z and relayed that Gunfighter's controlling agency had directed him to proceed to CH 87(Phu Cat) for attempted landing or bailout due to better weather there.

King 24 attempted contact several times with Gunfighter 44 on Guard and on his company frequency with negative results. King 24 contacted Phu Cat approach control and requested launch of Pedro and emergency equipment be standing by. Gunfighter 44 came up on Phu Cat approach control's frequency and King 24 established communications with the aircraft at 0252Z; Phu Cat had positive radar contact and began issuing vectors. Gunfighter 44 confirmed that the front seater was totally incapacitated and that he was proceeding to CH 87 for bailout over the field.

At 0302Z a Guard transmission relayed that two good chutes were sighted, and Phu Cat relayed loss of radar contact with Gunfighter 44 at 065°/12.5/CH 87. King 24 went out on Guard for any aircraft near that position to contact King. Lucky 15 and Bulldog 21, two Army med-evac choppers, came up on radio about 5 NM north of the bailout position proceeding in that direction. At 0308Z King 24 assumed on-scene-commander and talked to Gunfighter 44 Bravo who reported that he and the Alpha man were both on the beach and that he was all right. Bravo said that he was walking to Alpha to check

[redacted]

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals.,
Declassified after 12 years.

[redacted]

him over.

At 0311Z Bulldog 21 and Lucky 15 spotted Gunfighter 44 Alpha and Bravo and dropped in to make the pickup. Bravo was on Bulldog 21 and Alpha was on Lucky 15. Lucky 15 reported that the Alpha man was dead. Both choppers proceeded to Phu Cat to the hospital and landed at 0330Z.

King 24 Crewmembers		SAR Forces
AC/AMC	Capt Nader	King 24
CP	Capt Petit	JG 66, 72
N	Capt Thomas	Sandies 9., 10
RO	TSgt Martz	
FE	MSgt Yogodzinski	Additional Forces
LM	SSgt Richardson	
		Lucky 15
		Bulldog 21

Alfred H. Nader Jr.

ALFRED H. NADER, Jr, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

1250	LINE CHECK SX5	
1305	DAAR JRCC TOTAL 17.3	
1315	SSGT ARISE OFF DUTY	

25 FEB 71

2045	MAJ MUND ON DUTY	JFM
2130	STATUS TO QUEEN	JFM
2330	3RD GP SUPPLY CALLED. WANTS SUPPLY STATUS ON NORM AIRCRAFT (2400/4952)	
	MAINTENANCE CONTROL NOTIFIED.	JFM
2335	RF - AR/WAEN PYRV	JFM
2400	STATUS TO JOKER	JFM
0238	GUNFIGHTER 44 F4 AC HAS BEEN SHOT NAV TRYING TO BRING AIRCRAFT IN. POSITION 150/34/103 FEET WET.	
0247	JG 66 & 72 AIRBORNE	
0250	GUNFIGHTER 44 HEADED TOWARD CHANNEL 87	
0257	QUEEN ADVISED THAT JOLLY GREEN 66 & 72 PROCEEDING TO PHUCAT TO BACK UP PEDROS ON PICKUP	JFM
0305	PILOT AND NAV PUNCHED OUT 065/13/87	JFM
0315	PILOT AND NAV PICKED UP BY LUCKY-15 - PROCEEDING TO PHUCAT	JFM
0320	REPORT LUCKY-15 HAS ALPHA MAN AND BULLDOG-21 HAS BRAVO MAN	JFM
0417	JG 65 FCF	
0415	JG 73 TNG	
0618	JG 65 DOWN LOGGED 21	
0635	JG 72 DOWN LOGGED 4.0	
0710	JG 66 DOWN LOGGED 4.3	
0735	JOLLY'S ALEAH ALERTED	
0725	~~POSITION~~ ~~CORBA 24~~ DOWN 2 GOOD CHUTES POSITION 260/43/103	
	CORBA 24 ~~RECOVERED~~ AT HOSTILE AREA	

13A

IMMEDIATE

********** * C[redacted] **********

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OTTCZYUW RUMUJNA0179 0570640-CCCC--RUWTBMD RUWTBMA.
ZNY CCCCC
O 250605Z FEB 71
FM OL-A 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
TO RUEFHQA/CSAF AFXOTZB
RUHEAKA/PACAF HICKHAM AFB HI DOH
RUWTBMD/HQ ARRS COMMAND POST SCOTT AFB ILL
INFO RUCEAAA/HQ USAF ALT MAXWELL AFB AL
RUWTBMA/MAC MAOCCP
RUMMRSA/7AF CC DO DOO IN DOCT DP TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
RUHHABA/41ARRWG DOC HICKHAM AFB HI
RUHHHQA/CICNPAC CC
RUMUHTA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUEKAAA/AFEOC FT RITCHIE MD
RUMFRBA/CTF 77
RUHGOSA/CTG 77.0
RUMOJAA/39ARRS CAM RANH BAY AB RVN
RUMMRSA/3ARRGP TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN JRCC
RUWTFJA/USAFMPC DPMCS RANDOLPH AFB TEX
RUMMRSA/38ARRS CC TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
RUMUJGA/DET 13, 38ARRS PHU CAT AB RVN
RUMOREA/56SOW NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAILAND

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 116
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 9 OCT 77

OPR	CYS
ZRK	1
INFO	CYS
DO	4
DOC	1
CSAF	1
	2

PAGE 2 RUMUJNA0179 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INFO RUMOSRA/OL-B 3ARRGP UDORN RTAFB THAILAND
RUMUJBA/37ARRS DANANG AB RVN
RUMUHAA/1ST AVN BRIGADE LONG BINH RVN
RUMUJBA/366TH TFW DANANG AB RVN
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/JOPREP JIFFY/OL-A 3ARRGP/RESCUE 008/
0400 25 FEB 71.
1. RESCUE OPENING/CLOSING REPORT 25 FEB 71.
2. MISSION NUMBER: A-3-008-25 FEB 71
3. SITUATION: RECOVERY OF DOWNED AIRCREW MEMBERS.
   A. DESCRIPTION OF SAR OBJECTIVE:
      (1) F-4C/66-8691/CAMOFLAGED/GUNFIGHTER 44.
      (2) TACTICAL
      (3) PILOT: RICHARD K. SOMERS, MAJOR, 390TFS, DANANG AB RVN
      (4) POB - 2
      (5) WEATHER: 4,500 SCATTERED, GOOD VISIBILITY.
      (6) SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT: USAF STANDARD
      (7) LAST KNOWN POSITION: 1403N 10914E.
   B. ACTIONS TAKEN:
      (1) CONTROLLING AGENCY, OL-A, 3ARRGP, NOTIFIED AT 0235

PAGE 3 RUMUJNA0179 C O N F I D E N T I A L
25 FEB 71 BY PANAMA RADAR THAT GUNFIGHTER 44 WAS HIT, THE PILOT
WAS INCAPACITATED AND THE BACKSEATER WAS FLYING THE AIRCRAFT.
      (2) FOLLOWING SAR FORCES ALERTED:
         (A) 39ARRS AT 0236 25 FEB 71.
         (B) 37ARRS AT 0236 25 FEB 71.

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(C) 56SOW AT 0236 25 FEB 71.
(D) DET 13, 38ARRS, AT 0250 25 FEB 71.
(3) FOLLWOING SAR FORCES WERE LAUNCHED OR DIVERTED:
(A) 39ARRS AT 0236 25 FEB 71 - K-26, C-130P
(B) 37ARRS AT 0245 25 FEB 71 - JG 66/72, HH-53
(C) 56SOW AT 0249 25 FEB 71 - SANDY 9/10, A1-H
(D) DET 13, 38 ARRS AT 0305 25 FEB 71 - PEDRO 33/34, HH-43.

C. PERSONNEL INFO:
(1) 2 PERSONS INVOLVED - 2 PERSONS LOCATED, 2 RECOVERED 1 SAVED, 1 DECEASED.
(2) SAR OBJECTIVE LOCATED BY BULLDOG 21 AND LUCKY 15 AT 0314 25 FEB 71 COORDINATES 1403N 10814E.
(3) RECOVERY BY ARMY HELICOPTER, LANDED BY DOWNED AIRCREW FOR PICK-UP.

PAGE 4 RUMUJNA0179 C O N F I D E N T I A L
(4) BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL AT PHU CAT AB RVN.

D. FLYING ACTIVITY:
(1) 39ARRS - 1 SORTIE FOR 0.8HOURS.
(2) 37ARRS - 2 SORTIES FOR 1.0 HOURS.
(3) 56SOW - 2 SORTIES FOR 1.0 HOURS.
(4) DET 13, 38ARRS - 2 SORTIES FOR 0.9 HOURS.

E. RCC MAKING SAVES CAPT A. NADER, 39ARRS. 1 PERSON SAVED JOHN S. TALLEY, 390TFS, DANANG AB, RVN. 39ARRS CREDITED WITH 1 COMBAT, AIRCREW MEMBER SAVE. 129TH HELICOPTER ASSAULT SQUADRON CREDITEDQITH 1 COMBAT AIRCREW MEMBER SAVE.

G. SUMMARY OF SAR ACTIONS:
(1) AT 0235 25 FEB 71, OL-A RECEIVED A CALL FROM PANAMA RADAR THAT GUNFIGHTER 44 (F-4C) WAS HIT BY ENEMY FIRE AND THAT THE BRAVO MAN (BACKSEATER) WAS FLYING THE AIRCRAFT. THE ALPHA MAN (FRONTSEATER) WAS INCAPACITATED AND UNABLE TO FLY THE AIRCRAFT. THE 366TH COMMAND POST DIRECTED GUNFIGHTER 44 TO CONTINUE TO PHU CAT AB BECAUSE OF BETTER WEATHER. THE DESISION WAS MADE BY 366TH TFW CP TO HAVE THE CREW BAILOUT OVER THE COAST NORTH EAST OF PHU CAT. AT 02357 JG 66 AND 72 (HH-53) SANDY 9 AND 10 (A1-H)

PAGE 5 RUMUJNA0179 C O N F I D E N T I A L
AND K-24 (C-130P) WERE NOTIFIED. K-24 BECAME MISSION COMMANDER (AMC) AT THAT TIME. THE JG'S AND SANDY' PROCEEDED TOWARD PHU CAT. THE JRCC AT TAN SON NHUT ALERTED DET 13 PEDRO'S 33 AND 34 (HH-43) AT PHU CAT FOR A POSSIBLE PICK-UP. AT 0305Z OL-A RECEIVED WORD THAT THE CREW HAD BAILED OUT. 2 GOOD CHUTES WERE OBSERVED AND REPORTED AT 0309Z. THE CREW LANDED ON THE BEACH 11 MILES NORTHEAST OF PHU CAT (1403N 10914E). BULLDOG 21 AND LUCKY 15 (BOTH UH-1H MED EVACS) WERE FLYING IN THE AREA, SAW THE CHUTES AND LANDED NEXT TO THE CREW MEMBERS. BULLDOG 21 PICKED-UP THE BRAVO MAN AND REPORTED HIM IN GOOD CONDITION. LUCKY 15 PICKED-UP THE ALPHA MAN AND REPORTED HIM DOA. BOTH WERE TAKEN TO PHU CAT HOSPITAL. ALL SAR

[redacted]

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

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* C O N F I D E N T I A L *
********** ********** **********

PT 00414

FORCES WERE THEN RTR. THERE WERE NO REFUELINGS. THE 39ARRS AND THE 129TH HELICOPTER ASSAULT COMPANY ARE CREDITED WITH 1 COMBAT AIRCREW MEMBER SAVE.

(2) TOTAL FLYING ACTIVITY: SEE ITEM 30.

GP-4
BT
#0179

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CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(SECOND OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

JOSEPH S. STANALAND

Staff Sergeant Joseph S. Stanaland distinguished himself by extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight as a HH-53 Rescue Helicopter Pararescue and Recovery Technician, 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand on 25 February 1971. On that date, Sergeant Stanaland flew an extremely hazardous mission deep into hostile territory in an attempt to rescue an American pilot downed by hostile fire. In spite of adverse weather conditions and the constant threat of hostile fire, Sergeant Stanaland accomplished this highly intricate and hazardous mission in support of free world forces combatting aggression. The professional competence, aerial skill, and devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Stanaland reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

The second Phantom lost on this day was taking part in a night mission in the same area. Capt Hedditch was making his third pass on a target near Ban Tampanko when his aircraft was struck by ground fire. In this instance both the crew ejected successfully and were rescued by a USAF helicopter.

Sunday, August 25, 2002 (2).jpg

25 February 1971

F-4D 66-8691 366 TFW, USAF, Da Nang
Maj Richard Keith Somers (KIA)
Capt J S Talley (survived)

Again, two Phantoms were shot down during two unrelated Steel Tiger missions in southern Laos. Maj Somers was bombing enemy troops in contact with friendly forces near Ban Tampanko, 17 miles southwest of Khe Sanh. The aircraft was hit in the cockpit at 1,000 feet on its fourth pass. Maj Somers may have been wounded or his ejection seat damaged, as he did not follow Capt Talley out of the aircraft. The WSO was subsequently rescued by a USAF helicopter.

F-4D 65-0637 12 TFW, USAF, Phu Cat
Capt Hedditch (survived)
1Lt T McLaughlin (survived)

Sunday, August 25, 2002.jpg

Jolly Greens 64 and 73 were alerted on 19 February that Covey 275 had crashed west of Channel 77. Both helicopters proceeded to the scene where they were joined by the SAR force. No chutes were observed and no beeper could be heard. The cockpit seemed to be intact so it was decided that a pararescueman should be lowered to determine if there were survivors. This was accomplished and both Jolly Greens returned to Da Nang Afld, RVN.

On 25 February 71, Cobra 23 was shot down at 263 degrees for 43 miles off Channel 103. Jolly Greens 66 and 72 were scrambled from Da Nang and were placed in a holding point west of Channel 103. Jolly Greens 65 and 71 were later scrambled to the area. Weather and night fall prevented a pickup attempt so all SAR forces were returned to base. A first light effort was planned for the next morning. All SAR forces were reassembled in the area the next morning but the rescue was delayed until hostile forces could be eliminated. At 1230 Local the area was ready and the pickup of both crewmembers was successful. The low bird, Jolly Green 65 flown by Captain Bakke did take several hits from small arms fire during the rescue.

The last mission for February occurred on the 27th. The pilot of a Navy aircraft, call sign Chippie 414, bailed out feet wet off of Channel 69. Jolly Greens 72 and 71 scrambled to the scene and a successful water pickup was accomplished. Heavy fog in the area made this recovery very difficult.

COBRA 23 ALPHA AND BRAVO SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) Search and Recovery forces encountered intense resistance and marginal weather during a two day effort which resulted in the successful rescue of Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo. The two F-4 crewmembers ejected in hostile territory after sustaining battle damage. They landed at 260/43 from Tacan Channel 103 (Quang Tri Air Base, RVN) near Delta 12, a major interdiction point on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The incident occurred in mid afternoon and the weather was marginal. By the time SAR forces started to arrive the weather had degenerated to the extent that the objective area was completely obscured by a rain squall. Bad weather, approaching darkness and intense enemy resistance prevented a pick up that day and caused a great deal of apprehension among the survivors who were well aware of their precarious position. When the downed crewmembers were informed that they would have to wait for a first light pick up, Cobra 23 Alpha replied "We won't be here in the morning".[154]

(C) Hammer 62, a FAC (Forward Air Controller) was working a strike just south of the objective position and diverted at approximately 1530L to provide assistance. When he arrived there were already five other Hammer FAC's on scene as well as about 20 helicopters. Hammer 62 located both survivors' parachutes and pointed them out to Sandy 09 who assumed On-Scene Command when he

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154. SARCO Report for Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo, Document #8.

arrived at 1600L. During low passes to determine the exact position of the survivors, both aircraft received intense ground fire from small arms, automatic weapons, anti-aircraft equipment and a tank parked on a hill about 300 meters to the west. During one pass Sandy 09 received battle damage and departed the area. After landing he determined that the aircraft had numerous holes shot in it and one hole in the right elevator was the size of a football.[155]

(C) Sandy 06 took charge as On-Scene Commander and by this time the weather had deteriorated making it virtually impossible to continue the search. Successive passes met with intense resistance. Poor visibility and approaching darkness made it impossible to pin point Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo's positions. The survivors were given bed down instructions and efforts for that day terminated. Meanwhile at TeePee (Command and Control Center at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB) plans were being formulated for the major effort that would commence at first light of the next morning.[156]

(C) The next morning, 26 February 1971, Sandy 03/04 departed for the scene at 0440L. Upon arrival Sandy 03 took charge as On-Scene Commander and relieved Hammer 40, a night FAC who had been monitoring the survivors' positions. Sandy 03 was able to locate the exact position of Cobra 23 Bravo but Alpha's area was obscured by very low clouds. Several sources of enemy resistance

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155. Ibid.
156. Ibid.

[redacted]

were located on ridge lines in the area. A FAC, Hammer 48, directed strikes by fast movers (jet aircraft) on these positions in an effort to sterilize the area. The weather remained marginal and Sandy 03/04 had to depart for low fuel prior to pin pointing both positions.[157]

(C) Sandy 05 took over as On-Scene Commander and soon the weather improved enough to permit positive identification of the downed crewmembers' positions. During each pass over the survivors the aircraft were subjected to enemy ground fire. Sandy 05/06 expended all of their ordnance on enemy positions prior to turning On-Scene Command over to Sandy 07 at approximately 0900L.[158]

(C) Sandy 07/08 continued the sterilization process by locating resistance, marking it and striking enemy positions. The A-1's struck at positions near the survivors and four F-4's were called in to strike a ridge line which supported many gun emplacements. The F-4's dropped napalm and the top of the entire ridge line went up in flames. No resistance was encountered from this area during the remainder of the effort. As the resistance diminished, Sandy 07 formulated a pick up plan which would take place within an hour. The Jolly Green helicopters would come in from the southwest over a friendly position about three miles from the survivors. Smoke would be used to mask off suspected enemy positions and obscure the survivors. The IP (Initial Point) and

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157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.

objective points would be marked and Sandy 09/10 would escort the low Jolly Green in for the pick up and back out the reverse route.[159]

(C) The pick up was executed and the effort went as planned. Hammer 54 controlled smoke placement which was provided by F-4 aircraft. Three A-1's escorted the Jolly Green helicopter and sterilized his path. Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo expended their signal flares on command and were easily located. The survivors were picked up very quickly and the Jolly Green exited over the planned route and departed for DaNang Air Base, RVN. The Search and Recovery for Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo was successfully completed and the effort was terminated at 1437L.[160]

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE SILVER STAR

TO

EUGENE L. NARDI

Technical Sergeant Eugene L. Nardi distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force near Khe Sanh, Republic of Vietnam, on 26 February 1971. On that date, as a Pararescue Technician on an HH-53 Rescue Helicopter, Sergeant Nardi's efforts culminated in the rescue of two United States Air Force aircrewmen from certain death or capture by hostile armed forces. With full knowledge of the extent of hostile fire in the area and complete disregard for his own personal safety, and despite the helicopter's receiving numerous hits by ground fire, Sergeant Nardi exposed himself to the hostile fire throughout the rescue effort to provide suppressive fire, preventing much greater damage to the helicopter, and insuring the safe rescue of the downed airmen. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Sergeant Nardi has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE SILVER STAR

TO

MICHAEL A. CURTIS

Airman First Class Michael A. Curtis distinguished himself by gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force near Kh[illegible] Sanh, Republic of Vietnam, on 26 February 1971. On that date, as a Pararescue Specialist on an HH-53 Rescue Helicopter, Airman Curtis' efforts culminated in the rescue of two United States Air Force aircrewmen from certain death or capture by hostile armed forces. With full knowledge of the extent of hostile fire in the area and complete disregard for his own personal safety, and despite the helicopter's receiving numerous hits by ground fire, Airman Curtis exposed himself to the hostile fire throughout the rescue effort to provide suppressive fire, preventing much greater damage to the helicopter, and insuring the safe rescue of the downed airmen. By his gallantry and devotion to duty, Airman Curtis has reflected great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

2 Rescued Pilots Describe Ordeal in Laos

DA NANG Vietnam (AP) — Two U.S. fighter pilots described Friday night how they huddled on a Laotian hillside for nearly 23 hours while North Vietnamese troops who shot them down overran a South Vietnamese fire base a half mile away.

Their F4 Phantom fighter-bomber exploded in flames Thursday while dropping napalm on enemy tanks and gun emplacements attacking Hill 31, a South Vietnamese airborne battalion fire base eight miles inside Laos.

The two crewmen ejected and used their emergency radios to direct air strikes on the attacking force while North Vietnamese soldiers searched for them in the bushes.

Talking with news men at an officers' club in Da Nang several hours after their rescue, Capt. David R. Hedditch, 28, Hamilton, Mont., and Lt. Thomas M. McLaughlin, 24, Melrose, Mass., both said "we thought we were dead men" when North Vietnamese searchers came within 10 feet of their separate hiding places.

"We were called out in a mission over Laos Thursday afternoon, refuel in the air over Thailand and returned to Laos when the forward air controller —FAC—told us to stand by for a strike on Hill 31," said Hedditch, the aircraft commander.

"I made my first napalm pass to mark the target, my wingman made corrections and I made a second nape strike. As I was pulling out, the bird went out of control, pitched upward and then the whole cockpit turned red. I knew we had been hit and were on fire, but I don't know what hit us."

McLaughlin, his backseater, ejected first. They parachuted 2,000 feet and landed on a hillside near the fire base.

Faces smeared with mud for camouflage, the men remained separated for the next 22½ hours until their rescue by a Jolly Green Giant helicopter Friday afternoon.


"All I could find was some knee high grass to hide in," said Hedditch. "I heard some noise, shut off my radio and just froze. Then I saw two North Vietnamese soldiers walking around looking for me.

"After that I talked with an FAC and he assured us we would get as much air cover as they could lay on. Tom was also on the radio, so I knew he was all right, but we didn't dare move toward each other."

McLaughlin said he landed about 20 yards from an enemy mortar.

"I could hear the gun crew talking in between rounds as they fired at the fire base," he said. "Both of us heard tanks, continuous small-arms fire and a 37mm antiaircraft gun working on the choppers overhead. fir-

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26 FEB 71

... me to pop a smok
when the Jolly Green came in
and I threw it away from m
down the hillside so the NV
wouldn't open up on my posi

37th Rescues 2-Laos

After what was possibly the longest 22 hours of their lives, two USAF jet fighter pilots were pulled out of heavily enemy-infested territory recently, by crews from the 37th ARRS.

Capt. David R. Hedditch and 1st Lt. Thomas M. McLaughlin, both F-4 Phantom pilots from Phu Cat AB, punched out of their aircraft after it was shot down by enemy fire near the Laotian city of Tchepone.

That event started a chain-reaction which was to become one of the most heavily contested search and rescue (SAR) missions in the history of the war.

With the enemy sometimes within 20 meters of his position, Captain Hedditch managed to lay low and evade his would-be captors while A-1E Skyraiders and jet

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fighters pounded the area to silence the enemy ground fire so that rescue choppers could get in.

Lieutenant McLaughlin, who was approximately a half-mile away from his fellow pilot, said that the enemy was so close to his position that at one time while hiding in a bush; "I was practically looking at two of them face-to-face. I reached for my weapon and then froze in my position. Amazingly they didn't spot me and about five minutes later they started moving down the hill. I didn't know whether I was going to have to shoot it out with them or what."

Aided by A-1 Skyraiders and jet fighters, the "Buffs" stood a steady vigilance over the area while attempts were made to silence the enemy guns.

Around noon of the second day, the area had been saturated enough for the rescue chopper to come in and pick up the downed men.

The crew of the rescue chopper were, Capt. Karlton I. Bakke, aircraft commander; Capt. John R. Weimer, Jr., the co-pilot; TSgt. Carlos J. McKinney, the flight engineer; and TSgt. Eugene L. Nardi and A1C Michael J. Curtis, the PJ's (pararescuemen).

FEBRUARY 1971

DATE	CREW	JG	SAVE #	NAME RANK SSN ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	TYPE SAV
6	DREIBELBIS	65	601	NGOC, TRAN-VAN V/LT	16-18SN 108.00E	5 COMBAT
	BAKKE		602	BOI, HOANG 2/LT		
	ROGERS		603	NHIEP DANG 2/LT	UH1H	
	BAILEY		604	BAT MAI VAN, SGT	SOUTH V.N.	
	MUELCHI		605	HÀO ĐỖ-HỮU, CPT.	MSN II A-3-004	
26	BAKKE	65	607	HEDDRICH, DAVID R. CAPT [redacted] 37 TFW	106.26 E 16 42 N. COBRA 23 F-4	2 COMBAT
	WEIMER		608			
	McKINNEY					
	NARDI					
	CURTIS			McLAUGHLIN, THOMAS M. V/LT [redacted] 37 TFW		
27	WAMMER	72	609	McCarthy, PAUL F. [redacted] CMDR. "KITTY HAWK"	017/17/ 69 CHIPPIE 414 (A-7)	1 COMBAT FEET WET
	FRIED					
	ROGERS					
	SCHWARTZ					
	KIRK					
09	BEATTIE	77	606	NAME UNKN V.N. WOMAN PREGNANT & hemorraging	CON SON ISLAND MSN # 03-003 FEB	MED EVA 1 Non Com
	KOMICH					
	BUECHFIELD					
	SMITH					
	HANCOCK					

MONTHLY TOTAL 9

Destroy Red Tank

Phantoms Aid Downed Pilots

DA NANG AFLD, Vietnam (Special) — The skill of two Air Force F4 Phantom fighter-bomber crews from the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing here made the jungle cover useless to an enemy tank that was attempting to foil a search and rescue operation.

A pilot of one of the Phantoms, 1st Lt. John D. Laboulliere, commented on the unusual action: "We were flying to a combat support mission in an area in Laos where ARVN ground troops were engaged in Operation Lam Son 719. As we approached the area we heard another F4 crewman already over the target saying, 'Lead, lead, you're on fire!'

"There was a slight pause and then we heard the forward air controller (FAC) say, 'I see one chute. . . . see the other one.'"

The Phantom pilot explained the mission. When a search and rescue (SAR) is in progress "only necessary planes are dropped," explained the lieutenant. "The SAR is of the utmost importance.

"There was intense ground fire, and so as we were working the area, the FAC was trying to get the location of the two downed pilots.

"The FAC saw two tanks coming up a road in the area. At first, we had a hard time spotting them because of the haze in the area. Also, there were numerous helicopters in the area and we had to watch out for them.

"The tanks started on the trail to where the two parachutes had been spotted. So we made a pass, and the lead aircraft opened up on them with 20mm cannons.

"The lead aircraft then came in for a second bomb pass. We let [illegible] in and dropped [illegible] cover. The FAC then had us pull up high while he checked out the position of the two [illegible] Laboulliere.

"At this time we were low on gas and had to return to base," he added. The Phantoms left the area but other aircraft were [illegible] the scene.

When the crewmembers returned to Da Nang, they learned that they had been credited with destroying one of the tanks. The next day, after one of the rescue SAR missions in recent months, the two downed pilots were picked up by rescue [illegible] from the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron here at DaNang.

When he learned that the pilots had been rescued, Laboulliere remarked, "I was really elated. I heard that they [illegible] out — it must've been hell down there."

PACIFIC
STARS AND STRIPES

AN AUTHORIZED UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATION
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2 Rescued Pilots Describe Ordeal in Laos

DA NANG, Vietnam (AP) — Two U.S. fighter pilots described Friday night how they huddled on a Laotian hillside for nearly 23 hours while North Vietnamese troops who shot them down overran a South Vietnamese fire base a half mile away.

Their F4 Phantom fighter-bomber exploded in flames Thursday while dropping napalm on enemy tanks and gun emplacements attacking Hill 31, a South Vietnamese airborne battalion fire base eight miles inside Laos.

The two crewmen ejected and used their emergency radios to direct air strikes on the attacking force while North Vietnamese soldiers searched for them in the bushes.

Talking with news men at an officers' club in Da Nang several hours after their rescue, Capt. David R. Hedlitch, 28, Hamilton, Mont., and Lt. Thomas M. McLaughlin, 24, Melrose, Mass., both said "we thought we were dead men" when North Vietnamese searchers came within 10 feet of their separate hiding places.

"We were called out in a mission over Laos Thursday afternoon, refuel in the air over Thailand and returned to Laos when the forward air controller —FAC—told us to stand by for a strike on Hill 31," said Hedlitch, the aircraft commander.

"I made my first napalm pass to mark the target, my wingman made corrections and I made a second nape strike. As I was pulling out, the bird went out of control, pitched upward and then the whole cockpit turned red. I knew we had been

hit and were on fire, but I don't know what hit us."

McLaughlin, his backseater, ejected first. They parachuted 2,000 feet and landed on a hillside near the fire base.

Faces smeared with mud for camouflage, the men remained separated for the next 22½ hours until their rescue by a Jolly Green Giant helicopter Friday afternoon.

"All I could find was some knee high grass to hide in," said Hedditch. "I heard some noise, shut off my radio and just froze. Then I saw two North Vietnamese soldiers walking around lookin' for me.

"After that I talked with the FAC and he assured me we would get as much air power as they could lay on. Tom was also on the radio, so I knew he was all right, but we didn't dare move toward each other."

McLaughlin said he landed about 20 yards from an enemy mortar.

"I could hear the gun crew talking in between rounds as they fired at the fire base," he said. "Both of us heard tanks, continuous small arms fire and a 37mm antiaircraft gun working on the choppers overhead. There was a hell of a lot of firing out there."

Rescue helicopters were repeatedly driven off by intense enemy fire, and as dusk fell Thursday night the forward air controller hovering overhead told them they would have to spend the night in Laos.

"Right then I figured we were dead," Hedditch said. "It started raining, freezing rain, and it continued through the night. I was stiff and sore from lying in the same position all the time.

At first light Friday, fighter bombers joined the protective air pattern, flying 75 sorties continuously for eight hours to keep the North Vietnamese away from their downed buddies.

"The FAC decided to try another pickup at 1215 (12:15 p.m.)" said Hedditch. "He put a smoke flare right by me to mark the position. It soared the hell out of me. He told me to pop a smoke when the Jolly Green came in, and I threw it away from me down the hillside so the NVA wouldn't open up on my position. I knew they were watching.

"The chopper hovered about 25 feet away and I scampered toward it. I really expected to be shot, but we didn't take any fire. I just grabbed that sling and prayed as they hauled me up. The guys were too busy to say a word to me as I came in.

"As soon as I climbed in, I went to the back of the chopper with my .45, hoping to lose some bad guys while we headed to pick up Tom."

When the helicopter dropped down again to pick up McLaughlin, it came under withering fire, taking 13 direct hits.

"Those 15 to 25 seconds were an eternity as they pulled me up on the sling," said McLaughlin. "It's an experience I never want to face again."

Hedditch continued: "When I saw Tom come in, I just crawled over and embraced him. I can't even remember what we said because of the rotor noise.

"We just held on to each other, we were so damn glad to see each other. Then we sat back and counted the bullet holes."

7AF AFNS 10 MAR 71 VOL 3 #10 P16 36 FEB/11 DMR

Downed pilots spend 'longest 22 hours'

DA NANG AFLD — After what was possibly the longest 22 hours of their lives, two jet fighter pilots were pulled out of heavily infested enemy territory recently by rescue crews of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron.

Capt. David R. Hedditch and 1st Lt. Thomas M. McLaughlin, F-4 Phantom crew members at Phu Cat AB, bailed out of their aircraft after it was hit by enemy fire near the Laotian city of Tchepone. That event started a chain reaction which was to become one of the most heavily contested search and rescue efforts in SEA during recent months.

With the enemy sometimes within 20 meters of his position, Captain Hedditch managed to lay low and evade his would-be captors while A-1 Skyraiders and jet fighters pounded the area to silence the enemy ground fire so that rescue choppers could get in.

Lieutenant McLaughlin, who was approximately half a mile away from his fellow pilot, said that the enemy was so close to his position that at one



Captain Hedditch

time while hiding in a bush he was "practically looking at two of them face-to-face." I reached for my weapon and then froze in my position. Amazingly they didn't spot me and about five minutes later they started moving on down the hill.

Hindered by heavy enemy ground fire and poor weather conditions, the rescue efforts were unsuccessful the first day. But with the first light of the new day the rescue aircraft were once again airborne and headed for the area.

"Around noon the area had been saturated enough for us to come in," recalled Capt. John R. Weimer Jr., HH-53 co-pilot. "We were still receiving ground fire, but once we found the survivors, the ground fire was not so intense that we could not stay there."

Said Capt. Carlton I. Bakke, rescue helicopter commander, "We came in at treetop level and picked up this aircraft commander (Captain Hedditch) first. We saw his smoke marker and spotted him right away and had him pulled up within two or three minutes.

"We then had to go over a little ridge to get the back seater. We aimed for his smoke and again we were about two or three minutes in a hover. Just as he was coming in the door we started receiving more ground fire and more hits. We got out low and fast and we received more ground fire."

Lieutenant McLaughlin recalled that when he saw the rescue chopper coming in, "I left everything I had sitting there and scrambled through the



U.S. Air Force Photos by TSgt. Robert Minsky

Lieutenant McLaughlin

trees, falling down and tripping in the elephant grass, trying to get to that penetrator which hit the ground about the time I got to it.

"Once I got on the penetrator, it seemed like forever before I got in the aircraft, with all the firing going on around me. But I guess they were shooting at the chopper and not me."

366 TFW - DA NANG
"THE GUNFIGHTERS"

Gunfighter Gazette

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5 'Jollys' Earn Medals



Recipients of the Silver Star Medal, from left, A1C Steve Rhody, Capt. John R. Weimer, TSgt. Eugene Nardi, and TSgt. Carlos J. McKinney II, pose in front of an HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant helicopter. The medals were presented recently by Gen. Jack J. Catton, commander of Military Airlift Command. Missing from photo is A1C Michael Curtis, recipient of two medals, who has returned to the United States. (U.S. Air Force Photo)

Six Silver Star Medals were presented to five members of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron here recently, in recognition of their "gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force."

The five are: Capt. John R. Weimer Jr., an HH-53 "Super Jolly Green Giant" helicopter aircraft commander; TSgt. Carlos J. McKinney II, flight engineer; TSgt. Eugene L. Nardi, A1C Michael Curtis and A1C Steve Rhody, pararescuemen.

Presenting the medals at the ceremony was Gen. Jack J. Catton, commander of Military Airlift Command, of which the 37th ARRS is a subordinate unit.

Captain Weimer, Sergeant McKinney, Sergeant Nardi and Airman Curtis were crew members on the same "Super Jolly Green Giant" when, on February 26, near Khe Sanh, Republic of Vietnam, their efforts culminated in the rescue of two U.S. Air Force aircrewmen from "certain death or

(See Story Page 2)

General Catton presents six Silver Stars to Jolly Greens

Silver Stars Presented

(Continued from Page 1)

capture by hostile armed forces," according to citations read at the ceremony.

The citations further stated, "all crew members exposed themselves to hostile fire throughout the rescue effort, "with full knowledge of the extent of hostile fire in the area and complete disregard for (their) personal safety, and despite the helicopter's receiving numerous hits by ground fire."

Airman Curtis was doubly honored during the ceremony, receiving two Silver Stars. The second was in recognition of his performance on Mar. 13, near Tchepone, Laos, when he and Airman Rhody were again involved in a rescue attempt.

Airman Rhody exposed himself to ground fire on the rescue hoist twice outside a door of the helicopter while descending to help a wounded survivor on the ground until withering ground fire crippled the helicopter and wounded two crewmembers, (Airman Curtis was one of these) making continued rescue efforts impossible.

Airman Curtis manned his gun position, continuing to expose himself to ground fire after being wounded, until the helicopter safely departed the scene.

Captain Weimer, 30, a native of San Bernardino, Calif., is a graduate of Springfield Senior High, Akron, Ohio. He has since attended Ohio University in Athens, and Central Michigan University at Wurtsmith AFB, Mich. He was commissioned in the Air Force in 1962 under the Aviation Cadet program.

He is married to the former Edith R. McClellan of West Blockton, Ala. The couple has three children: Donna, 8; Gloria, 6 and Gary, 5.

A native of Mirimar, Fla., Sergeant Nardi, 33, has attended Bethel Park High School, Bethel Park, Pa., and Broward County Junior College, Fla.

The 12-year Air Force veteran has served 32 months in the Republic of Vietnam as a pararescueman. He was formerly assigned to the 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing at Richards-Gebaur AFB, Mo.

Sergeant McKinney is from New Braunfels, Tex. He is married to the former Cynthia F. Jung, also from New Braunfels. They have one child, Michael, 11.

Airman Curtis has returned to the United States, having completed his tour in the Republic. He graduated from Boston English High School, Boston, in 1969.

Airman Rhody has attended Radford High School, Hawaii, and the University of Hawaii.

He was assigned at Eglin AFB, Fla., prior to coming to Da Nang.

25 February 1971

F-4D 65-0637 12 TFW, USAF, Phu Cat
Capt Hedditch (survived)
1Lt T McLaughlin (survived)

The second Phantom lost on this day was taking part in a night mission in the same area. Capt Hedditch was making his third pass on a target near Ban Tampanko when his aircraft was struck by ground fire. In this instance both the crew ejected successfully and were rescued by a USAF helicopter.

25 FEB 71

2045	MAJ MUND ON DUTY	JA
2130	STATUS TO QUEEN	JA
2330	3RD GP SQUAD CALLED. WANTS STATUS ON NORM AIRCRAFT (2400/4952) MAINTENANCE CONTROL NOTIFIED.	JA
2335	RF - AR/WAEN PYRV	JA
2400	STATUS TO JOKER	JA
0238	GUNFIGHTER 44 F4 AC HAS BEEN SHOT NAV TRYING TO BRING AIRCRAFT IN. POSITION 150/34/103 FEET WET.	
0247	JG 66 & 72 AIRBORNE	
0250	GUNFIGHTER 44 HEADED TOWARD CHANNEL 87	
0257	QUEEN ADVISED THAT JOLLY GREEN 66 & 72 PROCEEDING TO PHUCAT TO BACK UP PEDROS ON PICKUP	JA
0305	PILOT AND NAV PINCHED OUT 065/13/87	JA
0315	PILOT AND NAV PICKED UP BY LUCKY-15 - PROCEEDING TO PHUCAT	JA
0320	REPORT LUCKY-15 HAS ALPHA MAN AND BULLDOG-21 HAS BRAVO MAN	JA
0417	JG 65 FCF	
0419	JG 73 TNG	
0618	JG 65 DOWN LOGGED 21	
0635	JG 72 DOWN LOGGED 40	
0710	JG 66 DOWN LOGGED 43	
0735	JOLLY'S AL & AH ALERTED	
0725	~~RESCUE CANCEL ETA~~ ~~CORBA 24~~ DOWN 2 GOOD CHUTES POSITION 260/43/103 CORBA 24 ~~RETURNED~~ ~~AT~~. HOSTILE AREA	
0745	JG 66 & 72 AIRBORNE	
0813	JG 73 DOWN LOGGED	
0835	BL & BH ALERTED JG 65 & 67	
0843	JG 65 & 67 AIRBORNE	

25 Feb (con't)

0848	TWO SURVIVORS IN A TRENCH SURROUNDED BY CHARLIE, FAST MOVERS WORKING AREA.
0905	SANDY 10 TOOK A HIT RTB CH103
0910	SANDY 10 OK RETURNING TO SCENE
0928	SANDY'S 9&10 HOLDING WEST OF AREA WEATHER HAS DETERIORATED SO THEY CANNOT LOCATE SURVIVORS
0932	HAMMER 62 HAS TALKED TO BOTH SURVIVORS BOTH STILL OK.
0941	SANDY 10 RTB CH 77 TOOK HIT IN FUEL TANK, LOST ALL FUEL
0942	SANDY 09-05C - ONE HR TO BINGO
0942	SANDY'S 07-08 ON SCENE
0947	WX BAD AREA UNWORKABLE
0956	SANDY 09 TALKING TO SURVIVORS TRY TO PIN PT POSITION
1005	SANDY 09 SAYS CONSIDERABLE GROUND FIRE FROM ACROSS ROAD ALSO AIR BURST (23 OR 37) CAN NOT PIN POINT GROUND DUE TO WX SUGGEST PUTTING SURVIVOR'S TO BED - EACH HAS TWO RADIO'S & BATTERIES.
1010	SURVIVORS REPORT THEY ARE WELL HIDDEN NO CLOSE MOVEMENT.
1030	SANDY 09 RTB CH 77 TOOK HIT IN FUEL TANK.
1040	ARTILLERY WARNING 268/49/103
1045	WEATHER LIFTING, GOING TO MAKE ATTEMPT.
1048	Hammer 62 SPOTS ARTILLERY CLEAR OF SURVIVORS.
1050	JG 77 / 785 LOGGED 4.0 - 7 LANDINGS BIEN HOA
1058	JG 66 & 72 RTB CH 77. JG 66 HAS CONTROL PROBLEMS.
1100	SANDY 06 PUTTING SURVIVORS TO BED.
1103	JG 65 & 67 CLEARED TO RTB
1107	JG 66 ETA 1155
1250	JG 67 DOWN LOGGED - ___
1300	JG 66 LOCATED AT CH 69 103 HFCS OUT RS
1355	JG 65 DOWN DJ
1400	JG 67 DOWN DS
1500	MISSION # IS D3 009 25 FEB DS

2245	COBRA 24 - CONT'D - KING 21, 4 SANDY'S & 2 CANDLESTICKS IN AREA NO CONTACT WITH SURVIVORS.	DRC
2246	JG 65 AIRBORNE FOR CH 103	DS
2255	BOTH SURVIVORS ARE UP	DS
2257	BRAVO CREWS LAUNCHED	DS
~~23~~ 2300	SANDY'S - HAVE CONTACT WITH SURVIVORS	DS
~~23~~ 2308	JG 72 AIRBORNE	DS
~~23~~ 2308	JG 71 NO GO MGB CHIP LITE	DS
~~23~~ 2309	JG 72 WILL BE HELD ON THE GROUND AT CH 103 AS BACK UP FOR ALFA BIRDS	DS
~~23~~ 2335	SANDY 03 REPORTS SMALL ARMS FIRE IN THE AREA	DRC
~~23~~ 2343	SANDY 03 THINKS HE HAS A PRETTY GOOD FIX ON BRAVO MAN'S POSITION	DRC
0745	JG 65 & 67 IN THE AREA WITH SANDY 5 & 6	
~~23~~ 0746	JG 71 AIRBORNE	DRC
2357	BRAVO MAN REPORTS ENEMY TROOPS CLOSING IN ON HIS POSITION	DRC
0002	JG 57 & 60 WILL BE ON "N" ORBIT AT 0025	DRC
0010	ACFT 788 READY FOR GROUND RUN AT 0845H	DRC
0030	WEATHER MOSTLY CLEAR ALTHOUGH PATCHY GROUND FOG IS OBSCURING SURVIVORS POSITION AT THIS TIME	DRC
0055	JG 66 AIRBORNE 0050 FROM CH 103	
0130	SANDY 3 & 4 BINGO - RTB 77	DRC
0140	SANDY 5 OSC - THINKS WEATHER IS OK TO START OPERATIONS	DRC
0145	JG 64 ON the Deck LOGGED 1.0	DS
0210	SANDY 7 OSC - HAS ALPHA & BRAVO LOCATED STARTING TO WORK THE AREA	DRC
0330	RINGNECK FLIGHT WITH SMOKE WILL BE IN THE AREA AT 0335	DRC
0400	KING 21 REQUESTS JG 72 & 71 BE LAUNCHED FROM CH-103 HOLD - 262/35/103	DRC
0410	KING 24 WILL REFUEL AT CH 77 - ETA 0445 COORDINATING MINIMUM GROUND TIME	DRC
0440	PHASE ALPHA	DRC
0442	PHASE BRAVO MSN NBR A3-009	DRC
0452	PHASE BRAVO COMPLETE ON ALPHA #607	
0457	PHASE BRAVO ON BRAVO — COMPLETE! #608	DRC

Jolly Greens 64 and 73 were alerted on 19 February that Covey 275 had crashed west of Channel 77. Both helicopters proceeded to the scene where they were joined by the SAR force. No chutes were observed and no beeper could be heard. The cockpit seemed to be intact so it was decided that a pararescueman should be lowered to determine if there were survivors. This was accomplished and both Jolly Greens returned to Da Nang Afld, RVN.

On 25 February 71, Cobra 23 was shot down at 263 degrees for 43 miles off Channel 103. Jolly Greens 66 and 72 were scrambled from Da Nang and were placed in a holding point west of Channel 103. Jolly Greens 65 and 71 were later scrambled to the area. Weather and night fall prevented a pickup attempt so all SAR forces were returned to base. A first light effort was planned for the next morning. All SAR forces were reassembled in the area the next morning but the rescue was delayed until hostile forces could be eliminated. At 1230 Local the area was ready and the pickup of both crewmembers was successful. The low bird, Jolly Green 65 flown by Captain Bakke did take several hits from small arms fire during the rescue.

The last mission for February occurred on the 27th. The pilot of a Navy aircraft, call sign Chipple 414, bailed out feet wet off of Channel 69. Jolly Greens 72 and 71 scrambled to the scene and a successful water pickup was accomplished. Heavy fog in the area made this recovery very difficult.

The aircraft commander of Jolly Green 72 who made the pick-up was Captain David H. Wammer.

The month of March started off with a Medevac from Con Son island to Long Binh hospital. On 2 March 71 the Jollys at our FOL were notified that a Vietnamese Seaman was very ill at Con Son. Jolly Greens 73 and 66 were dispatched to the island for the evacuation. The mission was completed without incident. The aircraft commander of the Jolly Green making the evacuation was Captain Karlton I. Bakke.

On 6 March 71 Jolly Greens 71 and 64 were holding west of Channel 103 in preparation for an attempted pickup of seven survivors of an Army helicopter which was shot down. One of the Sandy aircraft preparing the area was hit by ground fire and the pilot was forced to bail out. Jolly Green 71, flown by Major Mudd, observed the bailout and immediately recovered the pilot. Other Jolly Greens from the 37 ARRS took over the Witchdoctor mission but all attempts to rescue the seven survivors by helicopter were unsuccessful due to hostile fire. A ground team did recover the seven men the next day.

On 13 March 71 the 37 ARRS had a most eventful but unsuccessful day. A Navy A-7, call sign Battle Cry 315, was shot down at a position 225 degrees for 50 miles from Channel 103. The pilot of the A-7 had ejected and was injured. Voice contact was established with the survivor and the SAR was initiated. Jolly Greens 64 and 73 departed Channel 77 for the area. Sandy aircraft began working the area and small arms fire was observed.

FEBRUARY 1971

DATE	CREW	JG	SAVE #	NAME RANK SSN ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	TYPE SAV
6	DREIBELBIS	65	601	NGOC, TRAN-VAN V/LT	16-18SN 108.00E	5 COMBAT
	BAKKE		602	BOI, HOANG 2/LT		
	ROGERS		603	NHIEP DANG 2/LT	UH1H	
	BAILEY		604	BAT MAI VAN, SGT	SOUTH V.N.	
	MUELCHI		605	HÀO ĐỖ-HỮU, CPT.	MSN II A-3-004	
26	BAKKE	65	607	HEDDRICH, DAVID R. CAPT [redacted] 37 TFW	106.26 E 16 42 N. COBRA 23 F-4	2 COMBAT
	WEIMER		608			
	McKINNEY					
	NARDI					
	CURTIS			McLAUGHLIN, THOMAS M. V/LT [redacted] 37 TFW		
27	WAMMER	72	609	McCarthy, PAUL F. [redacted] CMDR. "KITTY HAWK"	017/17/69 CHIPPIE 44 (A-7)	1 COMBAT FEET WET
	FRIED					
	ROGERS					
	SCHWARTZ					
	KIRK					
09	BEATTIE	77	606	Name UNKN V.N. WOMAN PREGNANT & hemorrasing	CON SON ISLAND MSN # 03-003 FEB	1 MED EVA 1 NON COM
	KOMICH					
	BUECHFIELD					
	SMITH					
	HANCOCK					

MONTHLY TOTAL 9

0655	MSN NO. A-3-009 25 FEB 71	AE
1050	DAAR JRCC 25 FEB TOTAL: 37.5	
	26 FEB TOTAL: 20.5	AE
1053	LINE CHECK SAS	AE
1100	SSGT ARISPE OFF DUTY	AE

27 FEB 71

2045	CAPT CLARK - ON DUTY	DRC
2130	STATUS TO QUEEN	DRC
2302	SCRAMBLE ALPHAS ON CHIPPY 414 - NAVY - A-7 -	
	HAS GOOD CHUTE - 05/16/69	DRC
2310	ALPHAS - JG 72 & 71 AIRBORNE	DRC
2335	PJ IN THE WATER JG 72 MAKING PICKUP	DRC
2345	PICKUP COMPLETE ETA 0002 #1609 MSN NBR A3-010	
2355	REVISED ETA FOR JG 72 IS 0010	DRC
0010	JG 72 ON THE DECK LOGGED 1.0	DRC
0030	JG 71 ETA 0045 - A-1	DRC
0045	STATUS TO JOKER	DRC
0057	JG 71 ON THE DECK LOGGED 1.8	DRC
0130	JG 66 AIRBORNE FOR CH 73	DRC
0115	WORDS FOR ITEM 14 FROM QUEEN	DRC
0117	Mission Number is A 3 010 - 26 Feb 71	DS
0237	MAJ LEE - 1972 USAF COMM SQDN REQUESTS 2 SEATS ON TRAINING FLIGHT - TUESDAY	DRC
0240	FROM JOKER - PEDRO'S WILL HAVE A PART TO TAKE TO CH 73 - TUESDAY	DRC
0300	39TH MAINT OFFICER CALLED CAPT LINDELL. HAS PACKAGE ADDRESSED TO 37TH - BIEN HOA NOTIFIED TO PICK IT UP AT CH 71 IF POSSIBLE.	DRC
0315	JG 70 AIRBORNE 0300 CH 73 ETA 71 0440	DRC
0400	MSGT Smith ON Duty	DS
	TA 71 [illegible]	DS

Navy Pilot Gets 'Quick' Rescue

A U.S. Navy A-7 pilot was rescued 16 miles northeast of Hue early last Saturday morning after mechanical problems forced him to eject from his aircraft.

Cmdr. Paul F. McCarthy was picked up by an HH-53 DUFF from the 37th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron at 7:45 a.m. after floating in the South China Sea for half an hour.

"We were flying a mission over Laos when the aircraft suddenly began to lose fuel," related Commander McCarthy. "I turned around and headed for water as fast as I could with my wingman tagging along to keep me in sight."

"Once I was in the water I didn't have long to wait, in no time at all I was aboard the chopper and heading into Da Nang."


Capt. David H. Wammer, commander of the helicopter that plucked McCarthy out of the water, termed the rescue difficult because of the weather conditions.

"It was strictly instrument weather all the way out," he commented. "There was thick fog all the way down to the deck and no way to see the water unless we dropped below 100 feet."

"Once we located the area it was no trouble to find the downed pilot. He was really prepared and gave us a big orange smoke flare as soon as we were close."

"Most of the trouble came when I tried to hover over the raft. We put smokes out to establish a reference point for maintaining a steady hover, but had to drop a lot lower than normal in order to keep them in sight. It took four tries to finally establish a hover over the survivor. From then on it was routine."

Upon landing at Da Nang, the already-drenched Commander McCarthy received the traditional hosing down, signifying a successful rescue.



U.S. Air Force Photo by Sgt. D

After directing air strike against enemy target, forward air controller in O-2 Super Skymaster checks bomb damage. FAC is member of Det. 1, 2 cal Air Support Squadron at Phu Cat AB.

27 FEB 71 SAR

Super Jolly rescues Navy pilot from br

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"We were flying an air mission over Laos when the aircraft suddenly began to lose fuel," related Commander McCarthy. "I turned around and headed for water as fast as I could with my wing man tagging along to keep me in sight. Once I was in the water I didn't have long to wait. In no time at all I was aboard the chopper and heading into Da Nang."

Air Force Capt. David H. Wammer, commander of the helicopter that plucked Commander McCarthy out of the water, termed the rescue as "difficult" because of weather conditions. "It was strictly instrument weather all the way out," he said. "There was thick fog all the way down to the deck and no way to see the water unless we dropped below a hundred feet.

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7th AF Su warns on

HQ 7AF — The physic heroin were explained Dr. (Col) John N. Dun professional services in Air Force Surgeon's offic

Commenting on the drug, Dr. Dunn stated one 'great high' with her usually the first time it