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success. The survivor reported that big guns (37 and 85 millimeter) were firing at the east end of the valley each time an aircraft made a pass in that direction. These reports were verified by large black air bursts in the sky above the aircraft. Other pilots were reporting accurate 23 and 37 millimeter ground fire while SAM and Mig warnings were being broadcast almost continuously by ground control agencies.¹³³

(C) Shortly after Sandy 11 arrived and assumed On-Scene Command the weather improved somewhat. Holes developed in the south and west and the ground was observed in several places. Sandy 11 was able to fly under the clouds and narrow Bravo's position down to within approximately 50 meters. During his several passes he experienced numerous incidents of ground fire and delivered CBU and LAU on bunkers, trail network and a cave entrance which had been producing gun flashes. Sandy 11 directed his wingman to come down and join him and to discharge a white phosphorous rocket for everyone's orientation and to mark the IP (Initial Point). In spite of the continuing bad weather and active resistance, Sandy 11 planned a pick up attempt and directed the Jolly Green helicopters and Smoke aircraft to a forward holding position. During the process Sandy 11 took battle damage, developed a fuel leak, and detected an acrid odor in the cockpit and decided to depart the area. Command was assumed by Sandy 12.¹³⁴

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

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(C) Throughout the day efforts to reach the downed crew-members continued to fail. Only one aircraft, an A-1, was able to penetrate the weather and when he broke out underneath he reported there was absolutely no place to go. At approximately 1830 activities were terminated due to approaching darkness and Sandy 05 directed Bigot 02 Bravo to dig in for the night and assured him all forces would return at first light. Nail FAC's were directed to maintain surveillance over the position throughout the night while extensive preparations were made for a first light effort on 4 February 1971.¹³²

(C) However the second day was to be just as exasperating as the first. A total of 20 A-1's, eight Jolly Green helicopters, five Nail FAC's and numerous fast movers were unable to reach Bigot 02 Bravo. The first aircraft on the scene were able to converse with the survivor and ascertain that his condition and morale were good but no one was able to penetrate the weather for a close observation. Occasionally weather in the general area would break up somewhat and expose minor segments of roads and communication lines. Ordnance was requested for striking these fleeting targets which disappeared again under the weather before the ordnance arrived. The only successful strike was some CBU-49 discharged on a route segment south of Bravo's position. As more small breaks in the weather occurred Sandy 05 attempted several penetrations without

132. Ibid.

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Alpha reported that his condition was good and Bravo reported he injured his back but that he was all right. They were in rolling hills and karst, very near lines of communication, and close to a major route segment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex. There was a complete overcast and extremely low ceilings. The survivors reported enemy activity in their immediate area. From all indications they were down under extremely adverse conditions and it would take a super effort as well as good fortune to rescue them.¹³⁰

(C) Several aircraft were directed to the area immediately and Sandy 01/02 arrived at approximately 1230L. Sandy 01 took charge as On-Scene Commander and although the pilots had been able to locate the approximate objective position by electronic means, it was impossible to locate the survivors exactly due to the solid overcast weather conditions. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to penetrate the weather and fly under the clouds. Both survivors were reporting intense enemy activity near their position. At approximately 1300 Bigot 02 Alpha reported that the enemies were coming up the hill. Shortly afterwards the last reported broadcast from him was "They are shooting at me. I'm hit! Help me. Help".¹³¹

^{130.} Ibid.

^{131.} Ibid.

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BIGOT 02 ALPHA AND BRAVO SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) Despite a supreme effort by a multitude of zealous SAR crewmembers, attempts to rescue Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo were unsuccessful. The major effort lasted for four days and involved hundreds of frustrated personnel who were continually denied success by extremely adverse weather and overwhelming enemy defenses. Forces remained over the objective position around the clock and relished opportunities to break through an almost continuous cloud cover with ceilings that ranged from tree tops to 500 feet. When momentary breaks in the weather did occur eager pilots immediately challenged rugged terrain and low ceilings in attempts to reach the survivors. Each effort was met by intense enemy resistance which included everything from small arms fire to 85 millimeter Anti-Aircraft fire, SAM's (Surface to Air Missiles) and Russian built Mig aircraft. One experienced Sandy pilot described the effort as "the most frustrating, disappointing, and saddening SAR I have been on".¹²⁹

(C) On 3 February 1971 Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo bailed out of their F-4 aircraft after experiencing an undetermined malfunction. They landed in Laos at an extremely well defended area near Ban Karai Pass which is located on the border of Vietnam. Their position was determined to be 092/86 from Tacan Channel 89.

129. SARCO Report for Bigot 02A and 02B, 12 Feb '71, Document #3.

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(C) The weather was deteriorating again, Sandy 12 was running low on fuel and he suspected he had taken battle damage. Sandy 09/10 arrived and took command but Sandy 12 had to depart before he could point out the objective position for the new On-Scene Commander. It took this flight of A-1's approximately 30 minutes to locate the survivor. They also located the resistance and planned another pick up effort. Sandy 09 discharged an M-47 white phosphorous rocket which malfunctioned and failed to mark the IP (Initial Point). His second rocket would not release so he called in his wingman to mark the IP. Almost immediately after descending under the clouds Sandy 10 took battle damage from 23 millimeter ground fire and had to depart the area. Sandy 15 arrived to take command and Sandy 09 departed for low fuel. Enroute to home station he discovered that he had sustained battle damage but was able to return without further incident.¹³⁵

(C) Sandy 15 surveyed the deteriorating weather conditions and weighed the accumulated battle damage and increasing ground fire in the area of the survivor. By then it was past 1700L and already poor visibility was being handicapped by approaching darkness. Considering all these factors Sandy 15 decided it would be impossible to adequately suppress the defenses and provide a reasonable opportunity for the Jolly Green helicopter to survive a pick up attempt. Thus another frustrating day ended

135. Ibid.

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at 1745L when Sandy 15 instructed the survivor to dig in for the night and turned On-Scene Command over to Nail 52. ¹³⁶

(C) At first light on 5 February 1971 Sandy 05 returned and determined that the survivor was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue. His back did not bother him, he still had water and radios, there was presently no movement about him and no guns had moved into the area throughout the night. However the ceiling remained at tree top to 100 feet and Sandy 05 was unable to penetrate the clouds for the remainder of his time on station. Frustrated once again he turned command over to Sandy 07 and returned to Nakhon Phanom ¹³⁷ RTAFB.

(C) All of Sandy 07's attempts to penetrate the weather failed also. The weather in the general area was breaking some but conditions in the survivor's immediate area was completely unworkable. As directed, the survivor made an operations normal check at 1100L. Sometime afterwards a Nail FAC on scene reported that Bigot 02 Bravo came up on radio three times in about a five minute period. The transmissions from the survivor were excited and he was whispering into the microphone. These were the last known communications with Bigot 02 Bravo and his messages were completely unreadable. The weather remained bad and all aircraft in the area were reporting sporadic ground fire. Throughout the remainder of their period Sandy 07/08 were unable to accomplish

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

anything and turned command over to Sandy 09 prior to departing
for low fuel.¹³⁸

(C) All further attempts to contact the survivor failed. By 1400L the weather cleared up considerably and displayed the objective position. However there was no sign of Bigot 02 Bravo and the improved weather brought with it a new onslaught of ground fire. By 1700 the weather had degenerated again. Sandy 13 arrived to take over command and while he was receiving his briefing King (Airborne Command Control Center) directed all forces out of the area because several Mig aircraft had been detected heading for the area. All forces returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB to terminate another frustrating day.¹³⁹

(C) Nail FAC's maintained coverage throughout the night and failed to make contact with Bigot 02 Bravo. A modified effort was planned for the next day. Only two A-1's were launched while the remaining forces maintained ground alert. Sandy 01/02 reported to the scene and once again encountered bad weather. They flew out their station time with no evidence that Bigot 02 Bravo was alive or capable of being rescued. No other aircraft were launched specifically for the SAR effort. In a frustrating and unsuccessful attempt to rescue Bigot 02 Alpha and Bravo 44 A-1's, 18 Jolly Green helicopters and 13 Nail FAC's participated along with numerous aircraft from other sources. In addition, other Nail and Candlestick FAC's maintained a cover for the objective position throughout the nights when the SAR forces were not active.¹⁴⁰

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

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REPLY TO

ATTN OF: Major Wolcott

SUBJECT: Bigot 02 Bravo SAR

TO: SARCO

Sir:

On 5 February my call sign was Sandy 05. Captain Keeter was on my wing as Sandy 06. We were back-up for the first-light effort. We were launched by Teepee to replace Sandy 01 and 02, who aborted before take-off. We assumed their call signs and proceeded to the SAR area, arriving there shortly after first-light.

I assumed on-scene-command from Nail 45 and made radio contact with the survivor. As directed by the SARCO, I asked him a number of questions. In response I received the following answers among others.

- (1) He was still using his first radio.
- (2) He still had one canteen of water.
- (3) He was in good condition with no back problems.
- (4) He was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue.
- (5) There was no movement around him.
- (6) No guns had been moved into his position during the night.

I then asked him if he could move. When he answered in the affirmative, I recommended that he move over the ridgeline to the north of his position. We had taken most of the groundfire the previous day from the south and east, and I believed we would have a chance of rescuing him despite the inability to use fast movers if he could go over the hill. He reported that there were "Two Guns" on the ridgeline. I had not seen them the previous day, but he was certainly the expert in the area, so we told him to stay where he was.

When I asked about the ceiling, he reported it to be on the tree-tops. I then told him to turn his radio off and to come up every 30 minutes with a very short transmission. I instructed him that transmitting reduced his battery life much more than receiving.

My next move was to try to get under the overcast. When he finally reported it to be up to 100 feet, I searched every hole to the west and south for an entrance. Every attempt was thwarted by karsts which protruded into the clouds.

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After four and a half very frustrating hours I turned over the on-scene-command to Major Donaldson, Sandy 07.

Gehring, Wolcott

JOHN J. WOLCOTT, Major, USAF
Sandy 01

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FROM: 1305 (Lt Col Stone/2116)

12 Feb 1971

SUBJECT: SARCO for Report for BIGOT 02A & 02B

TO: DO

1. An unsuccessful rescue was attempted on 3-6 of February 1971 for Bigot 02A & 02B. The aircraft, an F-4, went down at approximately 1115 3 Feb 6 miles north of Delta 22. The reason for bailout is unknown however, Bigot 02B stated that there was an aircraft malfunction. This report will cover those activities relating to the SAR forces during rescue effort. All times are Thailand local.

2. Sandy 01 & 02, 03 and 04 were launched at 1145. Sandy 01 & 02 proceeded directly to the position of the survivors. Sandy 03 & 04 escorted Jolly Green 56 & 60 to an initial holding point of 100/90/89. Sandy 01 was appointed on scene commander at approximately 1230. When Sandy 01 established contact with Bigot 02A & 02B, 02A stated that he was in good shape and had no injuries. 02B stated that his back was hurt, but he was alright. Approximately 30 minutes after Sandy 01 and 02 arrived on scene, Bigot 02A stated he had movement very close to his position. Shortly thereafter he stated, "they are shooting at me, I'm hit, I'm hit. Help me! Help me!" (Atch 1) After this transmission no other contact was made with Bigot 02A. Sandy 01 & 02 attempted to penetrate the overcast, but the weather was right on top of the Karst and they were forced to climb back on top of the 6500 foot overcast. Nail 59, 23 and 41 worked in the area and also attempted to find a hole and penetrate the overcast, but their efforts were to no avail. Sandy 01 & 02 turned on scene command to Sandy 03 at 1530 and returned to base. (Atch 2).

3. Sandy 03 & 04 had been holding with the Jolly Greens and had reached bingo fuel after 30 minutes as on scene commander. Sandy 05 & 06 had been scrambled from Ubon and Sandy 07 & 08 had been scrambled from Bien Hoa. Sandy 07 & 08 assumed the role of Jolly Green escort and Sandy 05 relieved Nail 41 as on scene commander at 1630. Hobo 30, 31, 22 and 23 were diverted from their missions and proceeded to the area of the SAR. Sandy 05 was able to find a hole and attempted to penetrate the overcast. He penetrated the overcast and broke out at 500 feet above the ground. After getting down there was no place to go due to the poor visibility and the Karst hidden in the clouds. Sandy 05 climbed back on top and with Nail 63 and Wolf 04 began to pinpoint the survivors location with TACAN and DME. The fine work of Nail 63, Wolf 04, and Sandy 05 gave a very accurate location of the objective and this position was used throughout the rest of the SAR effort. Darkness forced the SAR forces to withdraw from the area. Bed down instructions were given to Bigot 02B and a check in night procedure for night coverage was established. (Atch 3)

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4. The first days effort consisted of 8 Sandy aircraft, 4 Hobo strike aircraft, 4 A-1 Smoke aircraft and 4 Nails. Also, an unknown of fast movers were available for the effort. (Atch 4)

5. Extensive preparations were made during the night for the first light effort of 4 Feb 1971. The deployed A-1 aircraft from Bien Hoa and Ubon were recovered at NKP as well as the Jolly Greens from Ubon. Four more Jolly Greens from Udorn were also deployed to NKP, giving a total of eight Jolly Green resources at NKP. Joker established 0600 as first light and briefings and take off times were based on this time. The first six Sandy pilots, two smoke pilots, four Jolly Green crews, Nail 45 and King 21 were briefed at 0400. The Sandy pilots were briefed on the call signs of Mig cap, Ironhand, Blu-52, Napo, fast mover smoke, and Pavoway. They were also informed that various other types of ordnance would be available through King 21, the AMC.

6. Overnight cap was provided Bigot 02B by the Nails and one Candle. Nail 7 contacted the survivor at 1940, 2030, and 2115. Nail 72 also reported being shot at during the night through the clouds. He described the burst one kilometer east of his position, which was 092/86/89, as black airburst similar to an airburst of a MK-82. No contact was made with the survivor from 2115 until Nail 82 made contact at 0415. The weather in the area was reported as 8/8 with tops 7000 feet. Bases were unknown.

7. The first of the SAR forces launched between 0530 & 0615. They consisted of eight Jolly Greens and four A-1 Sandy aircraft. Sandy 01 & 02 proceeded to the area of the survivor and Sandy 03 & 04 escorted the Jolly Greens to an initial holding point of 113/50/89. A final holding point was established at 091/79/89 to get the Jolly Greens closer to the survivor's position in the event a pickup was attempted. Sandy 01 & 02 arrived in the area of the survivor at approximately 0610 and relieved Candle 23 as on scene commander. Radio contact was established with Bigot 02B and he stated he was being fired on from 100 meters. The weather in the area was right on the trees and Sandy 01 & 02 were unable to penetrate the overcast. (Atch 5)

8. Sandy 05 & 06 launched at 0840. Nail 41 and Wolf 06 were also on scene. A few breaks were beginning to appear in the overcast to the South and West of the survivor's position. Sandy 05 requested Paveways and instructed Nail 41 to put them in on the route structure that could be seen through the overcast in the vicinity of Ban Karai Pass. However, before st. lkes could be put in, the weather closed in and the only ordnance that could be put in was CBU-49. SAM and MIG calls were being broadcast almost continuously. 37MM and 85MM antiaircraft fire was being directed at the SAR forces during the entire period. Wolf 06 reported RHAW indication of gun laying radar. Bigot 02B was requested to make a check of his spare radio. This he did and it checked loud and clear. Sandy 11 & 12 arrived on scene at 1315 and relieved Sandy 05 & 06. (Atch 6)

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9. Sandy 11 and 12 arrived on scene at 1315 and continued to search for a way to penetrate the overcast and pinpoint the survivors position on the ground. Sandy 11 finally was able to penetrate the 300 foot overcast, using ADF cuts from the survivors radio, and pinpoint his position. Bigot 02B reported that there was no ground fire on Sandy 11 for the first four or five passes, but he reported small arms fire on passes South of his position. The small arms fire was soon joined by 23MM from the East. Sandy 12 penetrated the overcast and reported ZPU fire. Sandy 12 put down a dud M-47 bomb on a hill west of the survivor to use as an IP for the Jolly Green. Another 23MM started shooting at this time and the fire became very accurate. Sandy 11 took a couple of hits in the left and right wing. After a look over, the battle damage was assessed as not significant and Sandy 11 instructed Sandy 12 to bring the Jolly Green under the clouds. Sandy 11 received several airbursts of 23MM directly in front of him and aborted the pickup attempt. Sandy 11 jettisoned his stores, left Sandy 12 as on scene commander and returned to NKP. (Atch 7)
10. Sandy 09 & 10 had scrambled from Da Nang at 1330 and proceeded to the area of the survivor. Sandy 09 received on scene command from Sandy 12 and instructed Smoke 41 and 42 to take the Jolly Greens back to the forward holding point. Sandy 09 located the survivor and brought Sandy 10 down through the clouds to assist him. Sandy 10 took a 23MM in his right wing and returned to base. Sandy 09 then brought Sandy 15 down, briefed him and then returned to NKP. (Atch 8)
11. Sandy 15 became the on scene commander at 1700. The weather had deteriorated to 300-500 feet. Sandy 15 appraised the ground fire situation, which consisted of ZPU, automatic weapons, and much small arms fire, and determined that it would be impossible to suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of a helicopter survive a pickup attempt. Sandy 15 gave the survivor instructions for another night on the ground and turned on scene command to Nail 52 at 1745. All SAR forces returned to base at 1800. (Atch 9)
12. The SAR effort of 4 February 1971, consisted of 16 A-1 Sandy aircraft, 4 A-1 Smoke aircraft, 8 Jolly Greens, and 5 Nails. An unknown number of Wolf FACs and fast mover strike aircraft were also used during the day. (Atch 10)
13. Overnight preparations for the effort of 5 February 1971, were similar to those of the previous night. All deployed Sandy aircraft were returned to NKP along with eight Jolly Greens. King 21 arrived NKP at 0315 and a briefing was conducted at 0400 for King 21, Sandy 01 through 06, 4 Jolly Greens and Smoke 41 & 42. The call signs of Mig cap, Ironhand, and Paveways and strike aircraft were briefed. Overnight coverage of the survivor was provided by Nail 99, 96, 76 and 68. No voice contact was made with the survivor during the night.

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14. The SAR effort of 5 Feb 1971 started with the launch of Nail 45 at 0520. Four Jolly Greens were airborne by 0555. Sandy 01 proceeded to the area and relieved Nail 45 as on scene commander. Sandy 03 and 04 escorted the Jolly Greens to the initial holding fix. Sandy 01 established voice contact with the survivor and determined that: (1) He was still using his radio (2) He still had one canteen of water (3) He was in good condition (4) He was in good spirits and optimistic about his chances for rescue (5) There was no movement around him (6) No guns had been moved into his position during the night. Sandy 01 asked Bigot 02B if he could move over the ridge line and Bigot 02 replied that there was two guns on the ridge line and he didn't think it was a good idea. Bigot 02B stated that the weather was right on the trees. Every attempt to penetrate the overcast by Sandy 01 was futile. (Atch 11)
15. Sandy 07 relieved Sandy 01 as on scene commander, established voice contact with the survivor and continued to search for a hole and an area where the ceiling would allow flight over the survivor's position. Each attempt was unsuccessful. Nail 43 and Wolf 04 were in the area and Sandy 07 requested pavement to cut the road that was visible north Ban Karai Pass. A short time after 1100 Nail 43 reported that Bigot 02B came up on the radio three times in about five minutes. Sandy 07 heard the last two transmissions which were indistinguishable, but were in an excited whispered tone. This was the last known voice contact with Bigot 02B. Sandy 07 & 08 continued to search for a way to get over the survivor's position and during the search strafed a truck on the route structure leading to the survivor's location. (Atch 12)
16. Sandy 09 assumed on scene command from Sandy 07 at 1330 and attempted to establish voice contact on all of the survival frequencies. At 1400 the weather began to break and Sandy 07 could see the survivor location. However, no voice or beeper contact could be made. Sandy 07 & 08 continued to circle the survivor's position and antiaircraft guns began to fire. This included 23MM, 37MM and 57 or 85MM. Sandy 13 and 14 were on their way to the scene and Sandy 09 started to brief them when King 21 stated Migs were in the area and suggested all SAR forces withdraw. Sandy 09, 10, 13 and 14 withdrew and returned to Base. (Atch 13 & Atch 14)
17. All SAR forces returned to NKP. The effort for the day consisted of 14 Sandys, 6 Jolly Greens, and 4 Nails. The number of fast mover strike and FAC aircraft is unknown. (Atch 15)
18. Coverage over the survivor was again provided by the Nails. No voice or beeper contact was established during the night and joker directed that a modified effort be made for the 6th of February 1971. Two Sandy A-1's would launch with four on ground alert. Six Jolly Greens and four Smoke would remain on alert at NKP. Sandy 01 and 02 launched at 0710 and proceeded to the area. The weather was again overcast and no voice or beeper contact could be established. Sandy 01 and 02 returned to base and no other Sandy aircraft were launched.
19. During this SAR effort a total of 40 Sandy aircraft flew, 18 Jolly Greens Sorties, 13 Nail Sorties and 4 Hobo Strike Sorties. (Atch 4, 10, 15, 16)

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20. This SAR effort was unsuccessful. We ask ourselves a series of questions to determine why. Those questions are: (1) was there anytime during the extended period of this effort that a pickup could have been attempted with reasonable assurance of success? (2) What were the biggest stumbling blocks to success? (3) How would we do it, if it had been done over again? (4) Would any of the Sandy low loads have any reason for self recrimination? Let's start with the first question and determine if a pickup attempt could have been made. The first time that the overcast was penetrated and the survivors position was pinpointed was approximately 1330 on 4 Feb, the second day of the SAR. Sandy 11 located the survivor and moved the Jolly Greens into a position for pickup. Sandy 11 received heavy ground fire, sustained battle damage, and was forced to withdraw (Atch 7). Sandy 09 was on scene and both 09 and 10 received battle damage (Atch 8). Sandy 15 and 16 were the last Sandy aircraft on scene on the 4th of Feb and in his statement Sandy 15 states: "It was impossible to sufficiently suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of having a helicopter survive a pickup attempt." (Atch 9). On 5 Feb the weather was penetrated, but there was no voice or beeper contact which indicated that there was no longer an objective. The environment around the survivor made it impossible for the A-1 to operate without being endangered by ground fire. A helicopter is much more vulnerable and I honestly believe that it would have been shot down. In view of these facts I do not believe a pickup could have been made. Now let's look at the stumbling blocks to success. First of all the weather was the biggest factor in this unsuccessful SAR. At no time did we have weather conditions that would allow the use of all the airpower that we had at our disposal. Another factor was the very hostile environment that the survivor was down in. The quantity and quality of antiaircraft defences made it necessary to use suppressive air power against them and without good weather this was impossible without endangering the survivor. I feel that a survivor can be picked up in a non hostile environment with bad weather or in a hostile environment with good weather. With bad weather and a hostile environment, the chances of a successful pickup are nil. How would we do the SAR if we had to do it again? First, the principals employed by the SAR forces were sound. The only point that can be made is the excessive radio transmissions made to the objective and the replies that he was expected to make. When the weather is completely unworkable, a TACAN radial and DME is close enough for Sandies. If the weather starts to break or the survivor calls and says that it is improving, then a pinpoint electronic search should be conducted. Excessive transmissions by the survivor or the SAR forces could very easily give his position away to enemy forces. Eliminating excessive transmissions not only will extend the life of the survivors radio, but may also deny the enemy information as to his position.

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Please do not misunderstand, if it is necessary to use the radio, use it. The fourth question has to be directed to all the Sandy Pilots in the wing. There has been some self recrimination by the pilots and we want to prevent a situation that could develop as a result of these feelings. After a study of all of the statements made by the Sandy Pilots, there is no doubt that each and every member of the SAR Force did everything in their power to make a successful pickup. The Sandy pilots must always remember that when the Helicopters are committed, there must be a reasonable chance of success. Although there is a feeling of "maybe" among the Sandies, all you have to do is think how you would feel if a Helicopter had been committed and been shot down. Do not rush to commit a Helicopter in the future. The basic principals of search and rescue still apply and if used will produce the desired results, crew members rescued.

HERBERT H. STONE, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

16 Atch

1. Statement for Nail 62
2. Statement for Sandy 01/02
3. Statement for Sandy 05
4. Flying Schedule
5. Statement for Sandy 01/02
6. Statement for Sandy 05/06
7. Statement for Sandy 11
8. Statement for Sandy 09
9. Statement for Sandy 15/16
10. Flying Schedule
11. Statement for Sandy 01
12. Statement for Sandy 07/08
13. Statement for Sandy 09/10
14. Statement for Sandy 13/14
15. Flying Schedule
16. Flying Schedule

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