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S T A T E M E N T

SANDY 13 & 14 REPORT

DUNWOODY/TIPTON

Sandy 13 & 14 detached from H&A at 1605 local in support of Bigot 02B Salt on 5 Feb 71. Climb and enroute to the 092degree/36/89 were normal. When I approached the area contact was made with Sandy 09 - the on scene commander. Sandy 09 briefed me on 123.1 on the situation. 02B had not responded to any calls by further voice or beeper since approximately 11am, ~~the previous day~~. I was briefed on all SAR forces present. The Nail was on scene, and Jolly Green 60 flight with Sandy's 11 & 12 were at the forward holding point. No Mig Cap or Iron Hand or Wolf FAC were available. At approximately 1645 local I took on scene command. Sandy 09 flight RTB'd to CH 89. The weather was 7/8 overcast at approximately 5,000 feet over the survivor with another broken deck at 3500 feet. I briefed the Nail to go to 11,500 feet directly over the survivor and to try contact with 02B on A, B, C, D frequencies. Since the Nails radios were superior, I hoped that contact could be made better this way. I then decided to keep Sandy 14 high while I tried to get below the weather in the area of the survivor. As we made descent - Mig call over Guard indicated Migs in the proximity. King told us to pull all SAR forces back to CH 89. At approximately 1730 local we had to RTB.

RICHARD H. DUNWOODY, Lt Colonel, USAF
SANDY 13

CHARLES L. TIPTON, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 14

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STATEMENT

On Feb 5 at 12:40 local, Sandy's 09 & 10 took off to proceed to the area of the SAR for Bigot 02B. We arrived overhead at about 1:20 local and received a briefing from Sandy 07. He said they had lost contact with the survivor at 11:30 and the weather was too bad to get under to work. At 1330 Sandy 09 took on scene command. For about a half an hour we tried to raise Bigot 02 on guard and bravo, charlie, and delta channel without any luck. At 14:00 the weather broke and we could see the survivor's position clearly. About this time we received 130 pounds of 13.4. Also East of his position we received very accurate 37.4 and 57 or 85.4. We continued circling the survivor's position the rest of the day with no contact. At 16:30 the weather got bad again. At 17:00 Sandy 13 arrived on scene. I started to brief him and King called and said that migs were coming toward our area and suggested the SAR forces R.T.B. Sandy 9 & 10 landed at 17:35.

JAMES C. PAINE, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 09

EDWARD V. LORENZEN, Captain, USAF
SANDY 10

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STATEMENT

SANDY 15/16 SAR REPORT

Sandy 15/16 (Maj Keeler /Lt Kiland) were launched at 1450 4 Feb 71 to escort two Jolly Greens to the initial holding point and to the final holding point as required. Approximately 10 minutes after launch the On Scene Commander (OSC), Sandy 11, took hits which forced him to RTB. He was in the process of setting up for a pickup attempt.

OSC was then turned over to Sandy 12, who called Sandy 15 for an ETA to the survivors area so he could brief Sandy 15 on the situation and release OSC to Sandy 15. Since Sandy 15 was some distance out and and Sandy 12 was short of fuel, Sandy 09 and 10 were relieved from Jolly escort duty and briefed on the survivors position. Sandy 09 then took over as OSC. Smoke 41-44 then became the Jolly escorts.

Sandy 09 found the survivor and proceeded to get his forces together for a pickup attempt. While he was briefing his wingman, the wingman took a 23mm round in the right wingtip and had to jettison his ordnance and RTB.

Sandy 09 then took Sandy 15 under the weather and pointed out the survivor and a proposed ingress route for the Jolly Greens. Sandy 15 took over OSC at 1700.

The weather was now overcast with bases approximately 2800' to 3000' MSL which gave a 300' to 500' ceiling to work under. After looking the area over and observing ZU fire, automatic weapons fire and much small arms fire in the vicinity of the survivor, Sandy 15 decided it was impossible to sufficiently suppress the ground fire and have a good probability of having a helicopter survive a pickup attempt. Sandy 15 then gave instructions to the survivor for another night in the weeds. Sandy 15 turned OSC over to Nail 52 at 1745 local and returned to Base.

WALTER D. KEELER, Major, USAF
SANDY 15

JOHN W. KILAND, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 16

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FLYING SCHEDULE

4 Feb 1971

PILOT	SANDY	TARGET	TIME	REMARKS
Schaffer	01	0535	4.2	On Scene Commander
Singer	02	0535	4.2	
Hagan	03	0542	4.7	On Scene Commander
Col. Rouch	04	0542	4.7	
Donaldson	05	0540	4.9	On Scene Commander
Hathors	06	0540	4.9	
Young	07	0940	5.4	
Anderson	08	0940	5.4	
Smith	09	1328	4.0	On Scene Commander
Hawes	10	1328	3.6	Battle Damage IFE-Battle Damage Hole in Wing
Wolcott	11	1210	3.3	On Scene Commander
Rentz	12	1210	4.0	IFE-Battle Damage On Scene Commander
Place	13	1505	3.4	Suspected Battle Damage
Madden	14	1505	3.4	
Kecler	15	1447	3.7	On Scene Commander
Kiland	16	1447	3.7	Escort JB 54 & 56
Lyon	Smoko 41	1418	3.4	
Miller	42	1418	3.4	
Adams	43	1455	3.4	
Witte	44	1455	3.4	
Yargor	Nail 45	0605	4.6	
Col. Rouch	23	1500	2.7	
McCaslin	41	0925	4.6	
Brahmer	51	1215	2.5	IFE-Low Oil Pressure
Chenovey	52	1430	4.7	
Carmen	J G 54	1430	3.8	
Callihan	56	1430	3.8	
Block	57	1032	7.1	
McGeorge	60	1032	7.1	
Callihan	62	0530	6.0	
Carmen	55	0530	6.0	
McGeorge	60	0615	1.4	
Reilly	61	0615	1.4	

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FLYING SCHEDULE

5 Feb 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>SNDY</u>	<u>TAKOFF</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Wolcott	01	0552	5.1	On Scene Commander
Keeter	02	0552	5.1	
Stone	03	0557	6.3	
Oberlin	04	0557	6.3	
Belt	05	1055	4.9	
Col. Walsh	06	1055	4.9	
Donaldson	07	0740	4.4	On Scene Commander
Hagan	08	0740	4.4	
Paine	09	1247	4.4	On Scene Commander
Lorenzen	10	1247	4.4	
Roberts, P.	11	1500	2.3	
Wilson	12	1500	2.3	
Dunwoody	13	1610	2.5	On Scene Commander
Tipton	14	1610	2.5	
Williams	J_G 61	0535	7.2	
Block	62	0535	7.2	
Strayer	55	0600	5.1	
Carmen	60	0600	5.1	
Callahan	56	1236	6.1	
Reilly	57	1236	6.1	
Yarger	Nail 45	0520	4.9	
Col. Rouch	23	0355	5.2	
Gibson.	49	1230	4.9	
Latham	47	1425	4.2	

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FLYING SCHEDULE*

6 Feb 1971

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>SAL/DY</u>	<u>TAKEOFF</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Rentz	01	0710	4.7	On Scene Commander
Lyon	02	0710	4.7	

* Nails were on scene all day monitoring

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STATEMENT

On Feb 5 at 12:40 local, Sandy's 09 & 10 took off to proceed to the area of the SAR for Bigot 02B. We arrived overhead at about 1:20 local and received a briefing from Sandy 07. He said they had lost contact with the survivor at 11:30 and the weather was too bad to get under to work. At 1330 Sandy 09 took on scene command. For about a half an hour we tried to raise Bigot 02 on guard and bravo, charlie, and delta channel without any luck. At 14:00 the weather broke and we could see the survivor's position clearly. About this time we had a 1000 ft ceiling. From that altitude if the survivor's position we received 150 pounds of 33mm. Also East of his position we received very accurate 37mm and 57 or 85mm. We continued circling the survivor's position the rest of the day with no contact. At 16:30 the weather got bad again. At 17:00 Sandy 13 arrived on scene. I started to brief him and King called and said that migs were coming toward our area and suggested the SAR forces R.T.B. Sandy 9 & 10 landed at 17:35.

JAMES C. PAINE, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 09

EDWARD V. LORENZEN, Captain, USAF
SANDY 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SANDY 05 & 06 1LT MATHERS/1LT DONALDSON

4 Feb 1971

Sandy 05 & 06 were launched at 0840 local to assume on scene command from Sandy 01 & 02. On scene arrival to survivor's location was uneventful. Weather was overcast beginning about 10 miles west of 02 Bravo's position and all the way to the east. A few breaks were noted south and west of Bravo. Sandy 01 gave a good briefing and showed us on the TACAN 091° radial at 86½ NM where we could contact the survivor. Nail 41 and Wolf 06 were also at the scene.

Some of the route structure could be seen through the clouds in the immediate area of Ban Kawai Pass and I requested the Nail put in some paveways to cut the road. The ordinance was requested and showed up an hour later but was not put in due to weather having obscured the target in the interior. This same situation happened several times in the next four hours. The only ordinance we could put in was some CBU-49 directly on the road south of 02 Bravo. Sandy 05 then decided to explore some breaks in the weather in hopes of being able to get under the weather and more accurately spot the survivor. All attempts to do this failed because of low clouds and karst that extended up to nearly 3,000 feet.

About 1200 the survivor called and said the big guns at the east end of the valley were firing each time we made a pass in that direction. At first he called out the 37mm fire and later he said an 85mm was firing. The Wolf Fac verified the 85mm due to the large black airtursts above him. The 37mm was being fired through the clouds and was not accurate. SAM and MIG warnings were being broadcast almost continuously. Sandy 05 asked the Ironhand flight to patrol the area for RHAW indications of gun laying radar. None was reported. Sandy 05 & 06 continued to probe the area for an egress route to 02 Bravo and also made sure Wolf and Nail did not query 02 Bravo too often thereby using up his batteries. Bravo 02 was requested by King to make a check of his spare radio and it was checked OK.

About 1315 local Sandy 11 & 12 arrived on scene and immediately reported fairly accurate 23mm fire. Sandy 05 briefed Sandy 11 on the situation and showed him the TACAN location of the survivor. The 23mm and 37mm fire was being reported almost continuously by Sandys, the Nail and the Wolf Facs. On scene command was passed to Sandy 11 at approximately 1330.

ROBERT J. DONALDSON, Maj, USAF
SANDY 05

JAMES I. MATHERS, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATEMENT

SANDY 01 & 02 1LT SCHAFER/CAPT SINGER

4 Feb 1971

Sandy 01 & 02 launched at 0535 local in support of Bigot 02B. We arrived on scene and began an electronic search for the survivor. Sandy 01 assumed on scene command from Candle 23. Nail 452 arrived shortly and he along with the Sandies continued the electronic search. Radio contact was established with Bogot 02B and he said he had people shooting at him from 100 m away. The weather in the area was right down on the trees, so the Sandies could not get under it. Nail 452 tried to get under the weather but could not find a decent hole. Bigot 02B then reported everything was quiet. The Sandies then orbited with the Nail waiting for a break in the weather. No breaks came, so at 0930 local we turned over on scene command to Sandy 05 & 06 and RTB'd.

GARY W. SCHAFER, 1LT, USAF
SANDY 01

MICHAEL D. SINGER, Capt, USAF

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A last-light run-in was attempted but was aborted when both helicopters took hits from heavy small arms fire. One Pararescue man was wounded in this attempt. A first-light effort on 2 January resulted in a successful rescue of both crewmembers.

(S) BIGOT 02: On 3 February, two crewmembers of an F-4D bailed out of Bankari² Pass near the NVN border. 40th ARRS Jolly Greens were scrambled from both Nakhon Phanom Airfield³ and Ubon RTAFB⁴. Low ceilings precluded any attempt that day. A maximum effort SAR was planned on the 4th with 8 Jolly Greens in place at NKP for a first-light effort. HH-53 BUFFs were on continuous airborne orbit from pre-dawn to darkness on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of February. Continued low ceilings and bad weather conditions in the area precluded any rescue attempts. After all radio contact was lost with the survivors at noon on the 6th, and no weather improvement forecast, the active participation of the 40th ARRS ceased. The force of tired and disappointed crews were returned to Udorn that night.

(S) DUDLEY 02: On 16 February, two crewmembers of an F-D bailed out in eastern Laos. Two Jolly Greens scrambled and both crewmembers were rescued less than two hours after bailout.

(S) WITCHDOCTOR 05: On 5 March, an Army UH-1 helicopter was shot down in eastern Laos with 7 people on board. A last-light run-in was attempted but intensive AAA and small arms fire precluded any rescues. The survivors were rescued by a U.S. Army ground team on 7 March.

GROUP 4

During period of 1 Jan to 31 Mar 1971
40th ARRSq
40th ARRSq

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 2 Feb 71

15 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: 3-004-2 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02

LOCATION: 092/86/89

SAVES: None

(S) King 21 received a distress call from Nail 59 at about 0415Z, 2 Feb 71. Nail 59 stated that Bigot 02 had gone down while putting in a strike in the vicinity of 100/88/89. He was attempting to gain contact with the survivors on the ground. King 21 took Mission Command at this point and appointed Nail 59 as the on scene commander. Jack was notified at this time of a possible SAR effort and the SAR forces were alerted. A few minutes later Nail 59 reported contact with both survivors on the ground. Contact was established with Bigot 02A and he stated that he had no injuries and was all right. The SAR forces were launched from CH 89 and CH 93 at this time. Wolf 06 (fast mover FAC) was in the area and was assisting Nail 59 to locate the survivors. The weather in the area was completely undercast with the bases running from 800 ft. to 2500 ft. and the tops were at 6000 ft. Attempts were made by both Nail 59 and Wolf 06 to get under the cloud deck to locate the position of the survivors. King 21 requested border clearances, MIG CAP, Iron Hand, and KLINE coverage due to the hostile environment of the SAR scene. The weather became the prime factor for rescuing the survivors. The bases of the clouds were down on the tops of the karst. At approximately 0530Z, Bigot 02A said, "I'm hit!", "I'm hit, Help! Help! I'm going to give up." Sandy 01 then made several attempts to get under the weather to assist the survivors on the ground. He was unable to find any place to get under the clouds where he could work his way into the area of the survivors. Further discussion between Sandy 01 and Bigot 02B gave the location of the Bravo man as 50 meters north of his chute and that he had 2 radios only and no spare batteries. Sandy 01 and Wolf 06 were reporting scattered AAA fire but that the air bursts were not accurate as they were firing through the clouds. Bigot 02B was advised at this time to come up only every half hour unless he was in trouble. At 0637Z Bravo stated that bad guys were within 100 meters of him and he could hear voices. No attempt was made to put in any strikes as the area continued to be completely

~~SECRET~~

63

GROUP-4
Downed at 2 hour intervals.
Location: 100/88/89

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

overcast. Bigot 02B stated that the bases were approximately 300 ft. King 21 and Sandy 01 discussed the possibility of using Twiggy to protect the Bravo man if necessary. We decided we would only use it as a last resort. At 0855Z, Sandy 03 took over as on scene commander. At 0920Z, Sandy 03 RTB'd to CH 29 with a rough running engine. Nail 41 was appointed OSC until Sandy 03 could arrive at the SAR scene. The Sandys and Nail and Wolf F4G's continued to monitor the weather and the condition of the survivor. At 1130Z, Nail 69 was set up as the first of the CAPCOM for the SAR scene for the entire night. All SAR forces were returned to base.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AC/AME Major Jones
CP Major Regale
CP Lt4 Redsell
N Capt Moore
BO SSgt Hunt
FE TSgt Wilson, E.
LN SSgt Simmons

SAR Forces

King 21
King 23
Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06,
07 and 08
Jelly Greens 60, 56, 50, 57,
55 and 62
Nails 59, 62, 41 and 63
Wolfs 06, 01 and 04


ROBERT E. JONES, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

~~SECRET~~

64

GROUP-4

Downing every 2 hour intervals.
Every 12 hours.

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 4 Feb 71

10 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-004-3 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02 Brave

LOCATION: 17-18-30N 106-09-30E

SAVES: None

(S) 4 Feb 71, King 21 airborne from OH 70 at 3/1930Z. Enroute to OH 89 for a 3/2100Z briefing with the Sandies and Jolly Greens. Landed at OH 89 at 3/2015Z.

Departed OH 89 at 3/2215Z on scene at 3/2225Z King 21 orbit 180/18-40/89. At 3/2240Z I contacted Candlestick 23 who was orbiting over the survivor, but had not had voice contact with Bigot 02 Brave during his orbit period. I asked him to give me a weather report for the area. He reported that the cloud cover over the survivor was overcast with a higher broken layer of clouds the tops of the overcast was at 4500-5000 ft MSL and the higher layer base was at 8000 MSL with the tops running from 9500 ft MSL to 11500 ft MSL. At 3/2250Z Candlestick 23 made radio contact with Bigot 02 Brave. The survivor reported that he was in good condition. At 3/2300Z Mail 45 arrived on scene and at 3/2300Z Sandy 1 and 2 arrived on scene. They received a briefing by Candlestick 23 and King 21. Candlestick 23 was RTB'd at 3/2315Z. Sandy 01 was appointed on scene commander at 3/2330Z with the understanding that if the weather conditions lifted permitting Strike aircraft to operate in the area the on scene command responsibility would revert to the Mail aircraft. This was highly acceptable to Sandy 01.

The remainder of the days activities were spent in trying to pinpoint the survivors position. The closest position arrived at was the same as that given in the briefing, which was 091/86 1/2/89. The ceilings over the survivor never got higher than 300-400 AGL. Only a few openings in the weather occurred during the entire day which only permitted using two Strike flights. The Sandies were able to get below the ceiling and operate in the survivors area. The area was extremely hostile and the Sandies received ground fire from small arms, RPG, and SAM. At 4/0900Z Sandy 09, who was then the on scene commander, thought that he might be able to get one Jolly into the survivor and attempt the pickup. This action was decided to be too risky when Sandy 10 received extensive battle damage from ground fire while surveying the proposed run in route for the Jolly. The days activities were terminated at

~~SECRET~~

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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4/1090Z. Mail 52 remained on scene to maintain contact with Night 02 Bravo. Explicit instructions were given to conserve his survival radio battery. Check in times were established for on the hour.

The only problem area, aside from weather conditions, during the days activities was concern over the Mig Cap that was to be provided the SAR Forces. The Navy Mig Cap did not check in with King 21 and it was impossible to determine if in fact there was a Mig Cap until late into the days activities when we were advised that the Navy was providing Mig Cap holding feet wet under Red Cross control. It is my recommendation that these resources must check in with the King Aircraft giving their position, time on station and Ring Time. Also, if they are to be maintaining a communications with another agency the King aircraft must have this information. During the days activities King 21 received 7 Mig and 8 SAM calls.

KING 21 Crewmembers

AG/AMC Major DeLorenzo
P Major Benson
CP Col Pinyard
H Major McGill
RO Sgt Schuets
FE TSgt Wigginton
LM MSgt Patterson

KING 23 Crewmembers(Tanker)

AC Capt Nash
CP Capt Fletcher
H Major Mats
RO Sgt Souder
FE MSgt Yagodinski
LM SSgt Hoover

On Scene Commanders

Sandy 01 2320-0215Z
Sandy 05 0215-0600Z
Sandy 11 0600-0830Z
Sandy 09 0830-0955Z
Sandy 15 0955-1045Z
Mail 52 1045Z Until relieved

SAR Resources

King 21, 23
Jelly Green 54, 55, 56, 57, 60,
61, 62
Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07,
08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16 (A-1)
Smoke 41, 42, 43, 44 (A-1)

FAC Aircraft

Mail 45, 41, 51, 52, 99 (OV-10)
Wolf 02, 06, 04, 03 (RF-4)

IRON HAND

Bison
Hotbox Brew 01 Flight (F-105)
Mallard 21, Flight
Ashean 01 Flight
Alamo 01 Flight

EECH

Merco Flight

~~SECRET~~

GROUP-4

66 owned at 3 year intervals.
Declassified or 12 yrs.

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 4 Feb 71

10 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-004-3 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Bigot 02 Brave

LOCATION: 17-18-30N 106-09-30E

SAVES: None

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.