

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25+26 FEB 71

COBRA 23 ALPHA AND BRAVO SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) Search and Recovery forces encountered intense resistance and marginal weather during a two day effort which resulted in the successful rescue of Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo. The two F-4 crewmembers ejected in hostile territory after sustaining battle damage. They landed at 260/43 from Tacan Channel 103 (Quang Tri Air Base, RVN) near Delta 12, a major interdiction point on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The incident occurred in mid afternoon and the weather was marginal. By the time SAR forces started to arrive the weather had degenerated to the extent that the objective area was completely obscured by a rain squall. Bad weather, approaching darkness and intense enemy resistance prevented a pick up that day and caused a great deal of apprehension among the survivors who were well aware of their precarious position. When the downed crewmembers were informed that they would have to wait for a first light pick up, Cobra 23 Alpha replied "We won't be here in the morning".¹⁵⁴

(C) Hammer 62, a FAC (Forward Air Controller) was working a strike just south of the objective position and diverted at approximately 1530L to provide assistance. When he arrived there were already five other Hammer FAC's on scene as well as about 20 helicopters. Hammer 62 located both survivors' parachutes and pointed them out to Sandy 09 who assumed On-Scene Command when he

154. SARCO Report for Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo, Document #8.

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arrived at 1600L. During low passes to determine the exact position of the survivors, both aircraft received intense ground fire from small arms, automatic weapons, anti-aircraft equipment and a tank parked on a hill about 300 meters to the west. During one pass Sandy 09 received battle damage and departed the area. After landing he determined that the aircraft had numerous holes shot in it and one hole in the right elevator was the size of a football.¹⁵⁵

(C) Sandy 06 took charge as On-Scene Commander and by this time the weather had deteriorated making it virtually impossible to continue the search. Successive passes met with intense resistance. Poor visibility and approaching darkness made it impossible to pin point Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo's positions. The survivors were given bed down instructions and efforts for that day terminated. Meanwhile at TeePee (Command and Control Center at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB) plans were being formulated for the major effort that would commence at first light of the next morning.¹⁵⁶

(C) The next morning, 26 February 1971, Sandy 03/04 departed for the scene at 0440L. Upon arrival Sandy 03 took charge as On-Scene Commander and relieved Hammer 40, a night FAC who had been monitoring the survivors' positions. Sandy 03 was able to locate the exact position of Cobra 23 Bravo but Alpha's area was obscured by very low clouds. Several sources of enemy resistance

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

were located on ridge lines in the area. A FAC, Hammer 48, directed strikes by fast movers (jet aircraft) on these positions in an effort to sterilize the area. The weather remained marginal and Sandy 03/04 had to depart for low fuel prior to pin pointing both positions. ¹⁵⁷

(C) Sandy 05 took over as On-Scene Commander and soon the weather improved enough to permit positive identification of the downed crewmembers' positions. During each pass over the survivors the aircraft were subjected to enemy ground fire. Sandy 05/06 expended all of their ordnance on enemy positions prior to turning On-Scene Command over to Sandy 07 at approximately 0900L. ¹⁵⁸

(C) Sandy 07/08 continued the sterilization process by locating resistance, marking it and striking enemy positions. The A-1's struck at positions near the survivors and four F-4's were called in to strike a ridge line which supported many gun emplacements. The F-4's dropped napalm and the top of the entire ridge line went up in flames. No resistance was encountered from this area during the remainder of the effort. As the resistance diminished, Sandy 07 formulated a pick up plan which would take place within an hour. The Jolly Green helicopters would come in from the southwest over a friendly position about three miles from the survivors. Smoke would be used to mask off suspected enemy positions and obscure the survivors. The IP (Initial Point) and

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

objective points would be marked and Sandy 09/10 would escort the low Jolly Green in for the pick up and back out the reverse route.¹⁵⁹

(C) The pick up was executed and the effort went as planned. Hammer 54 controlled smoke placement which was provided by F-4 aircraft. Three A-1's escorted the Jolly Green helicopter and sterilized his path. Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo expended their signal flares on command and were easily located. The survivors were picked up very quickly and the Jolly Green exited over the planned route and departed for DaNang Air Base, RVN. The Search and Recovery for Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo was successfully completed¹⁶⁰ and the effort was terminated at 1437L.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

Jolly Greens 64 and 73 were alerted on 19 February that Covey 275 had crashed west of Channel 77. Both helicopters proceeded to the scene where they were joined by the SAR force. No chutes were observed and no beeper could be heard. The cockpit seemed to be intact so it was decided that a pararescueman should be lowered to determine if there were survivors. This was accomplished and both Jolly Greens returned to Da Nang Afd, RVN.

On 25 February 71, Cobra 23 was shot down at 263 degrees for 43 miles off Channel 103. Jolly Greens 66 and 72 were scrambled from Da Nang and were placed in a holding point west of Channel 103. Jolly Greens 65 and 71 were later scrambled to the area. Weather and night fall prevented a pickup attempt so all SAR forces were returned to base. A first light effort was planned for the next morning. All SAR forces were reassembled in the area the next morning but the rescue was delayed until hostile forces could be eliminated. At 1230 Local the area was ready and the pickup of both crewmembers was successful. The low bird, Jolly Green 65 flown by Captain Bakke did take several hits from small arms fire during the rescue.

The last mission for February occurred on the 27th. The pilot of a Navy aircraft, call sign Chippie 414, bailed out feet wet off of Channel 69. Jolly Greens 72 and 71 scrambled to the scene and a successful water pickup was accomplished. Heavy fog in the area made this recovery very difficult.

SECRET

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DATE: 25 Feb 71

27 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: A-3-009-25 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 26 (COBRA 23)

LOCATION: 260/43/CH 103

STATUS: None, Mission Suspended until 26 Feb 71

(S) KING 26, flying east orbit, received May Day call from Cobra 24 at 0722Z. He stated that Cobra 23 alpha and bravo had ejected at 260/43/CH 103 and that he saw two good chutes. At 0728Z, Hammer 04 was appointed On-Scene-Commander (OSC) and stated he had contact with both survivors who reported they were okay. They were down approximately 300-600 meters SE of firebase 31 which was then being overrun by the enemy and numerous TIC actions were in progress. During the following 30 minutes Hammer 04 attempted to organize the SAR for the crewmembers while he and other FAC's were directing air strikes in the immediate vicinity in support of the friendly ground troops. Jolly Greens (4), Sandys (6) were requested at 0733Z; smoke and CBU upload were directed plus MIG CAP, IRONHAND with border clearance. At 0810Z, Hammer 40 assumed OSC replacing Hammer 04 who was bingo fuel. Weather in the SAR area was rapidly deteriorating and low clouds hampered the rescue effort for the survivors who were reported to be approximately 1000' on the east side of a hill. Hammer 40 worked some fast movers with snake and nape in an attempt to suppress heavy ground fire from small arms, automatic weapons and several enemy tanks that were closing in on the firebase. Numerous air bursts were also observed from suspected AAA, both 23MM and 37MM. At 0900Z, Sandys 09 and 10 were on scene receiving a briefing from Hammer 40 when Sandy 10 took a hit and decided to RTB Channel 103 escorted by Hammer 62. King 27 was airborne at 0906Z enroute to the scene to act as backup A/C and standby for possible A/R. At 0910Z, Sandy 10 returned to the scene after determining that his damage was not too severe. At 0915Z a TPQ alert in the vicinity of the SAR scene was broadcast which was shut OFF through Queen. At 0930Z Sandy 10 again took ground fire, dropped his fuel tank and was forced to RTB Channel 77; Sandy 06 was then directed to the scene as a replacement. As of 0945Z the weather was looking grim and ground fire/air bursts were still heavy, however the survivors reported everything okay. At 0957Z, Hammer 62 was hit with no serious problems. At 1004Z Sandy 09 declared the area to be unworkable and the survivors were advised to stay well hidden. At 1026Z, Sandy 09 received multiple hits in his stub and centerline tanks and was streaming fuel; he

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GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years.

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On 26 October 1968, at 10:00 hours, the aircraft were advised to proceed to the target area. A heavy artillery warning that we were unable to stop. At 10:00, Sandy 01 observed the heavy arty dropping and stated the survivors were in place and he was returning to the base. The weather began to improve slightly about this time, however it was still in the order of a consideration and the survivors were not advised. At 10:00 it was decided to suspend the mission until 01:00 flight and all 28 forces were released to R/B. The survivors were advised to shut down and conserve their radios. Hammer 01 was scheduled to provide to the area all night and attempt to suppress some of the heavy arty, including tank, while also harassing the enemy ground troops. All On-scene-Journalers and Hammer FACs involved did an outstanding job in the attempted rescue which was severely compromised due to numerous TIF's, unfavorable weather, and extremely heavy ground fire. That no other aircraft were lost during this period is a tribute to the flying ability and courage of all involved.

King 26 Crewmembers

AC/ACC Major Fleck
CP L/C Spilseth
CP L/C Foster
1R Capt Seeger
H Major McGill
FO MGt Kochler
FB MGt Tempa
LM Sgt Carroll

King 27 Crewmembers

AC Capt Kennard
CP Lt Johnson
N Capt Smith
RC MGt Jones, G.
FB Tgt Turner
LM Sgt Rivera

Resources Utilized

King 26
King 27
Jolly Green 65, 66, 67, 72
Sandy 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10
Hobo 32, 33
FACs: Hammer 04, 40, 62, 23, 25, 54
Fast Movers: Gunfighter 24, 31, 02
Army Resources: Grips 25, 26 (flights of Snicks & Cobras)

Resources available but not used

Alcon 81, 83 Kingneck 214
Cobra 01, 09
Fungus Flight
Stormy 02
Wolf 07

JOHN J. FLECK, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

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GROUP-4

Declassified in 3 years

17 Feb 71

2 Mar 71

179 1st BATTAL 1st AIRBORNE DIVISION 17 Feb 71

179 1st BATTAL 1st AIRBORNE DIVISION 17 Feb 71

179 1st BATTAL 1st AIRBORNE DIVISION 17 Feb 71

LOCATION: 16-42-15N 106-25-30E

REMARKS: 2 Combat

(S) On 25 Feb 71 at 1100G the Airborne Mission Commander (AMC) of King 23 was notified by 1st Co. Wells (Jack) that his crew was assigned a first light mission for the following day. The SAR briefing was to be held at 1100G at 25/0000G. Objective of the SAR were two survivors of a F4E, Call Sign Cobra 23, who had ejected from their aircraft at 25/0714Z after receiving enemy groundfire. The position of the survivors was given as 203/43/103, UTM-XD 519467, GRSREF 16-42-15N 106-25-30E. This position plotted out to a position 100 meters from a dirt road paralleling a small stream, 4 1/2 NM north of Route 9. The area was extremely hostile with heavy troops in contact (TIC). A friendly firebase 1000 meters north of the survivors had been overrun by the enemy during the initial SAR effort on the 25th. The enemy in the area were supported by tanks, large calibre machineguns and 20MM AAA. Darkness fell before a pickup could be made. At that time Cobra 23 Alpha and Bravo were instructed to dig in for the night and be prepared for a first light effort the following morning. The survivors were briefed that aircraft would be over their position during the entire night. They were not to use their survival radios, thus conserving the batteries, unless it was absolutely necessary.

At 25/2122Z King 21 was airborne from 30G enroute to the SAR area. King 21 arrived at its orbit position of 250/5-40/103 at 25/2155Z. Radio contact was established with Hammer 77 (FAC) and Candle 22 (Flareship) who were over the SAR scene. They reported that they had not had contact with Cobra 23 Alpha or Bravo. Hammer 77 reported that there were many enemy troops in a valley north of LZ 31 about 2 kilometers from the survivors. He reported visual sighting of an enemy tank with a 40mm Gun, 51 calibre machine guns and extensive small arms fire. Weather in the area was reported by Hammer 77 as 3,000 MSL broken 6 miles visibility with some patches of ground fog. Handy 03, 04 arrived in the area and after a thorough

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Declassified at 3 year interval
Declassified at 12 years

King 21 was advised by Queen that King 21 was On Stand-
by at 25/2200Z. Sandy 03 then attempted contact with
the survivors on 25/2200Z, with no success. At 25/2245Z Sandy 03
requested King 21 attempt contact with the survivors. After sev-
eral attempts King 21 established radio contact with Cobra 23 Bravo
at 25/2250Z and with Alpha at 25/2253Z. Both survivors reported
that they were in good condition, but there was extensive enemy
movement in their area. King 21 advised both survivors that Sandy
03 was over the area and that the entire SAR effort had commenced.
Shortly thereafter Sandy 03 established contact with the survivors.

About this time King 21 was advised by Queen that King 21 would be
the tanker aircraft. Also, JG 67 was enroute to CH 103 to drop off
a crew and would then RTB CH 77 and stand alert. King 21 requested
that JG 67 remain at CH 103 and JG 65 be launched from CH 77 to CH
103. This would put the helicopters only 43 miles from the SAR and
greatly expedite the recovery when the area was permissive. Queen
concurred and JG 65 was launched to CH 103 at 25/2235Z. At 25/2300Z
it was decided that JG 71 and 72 would go to CH 103 and stand alert
and JG 65 and 67 would orbit at the holding point, which was 265/25/
103. The helicopters were joined by Sandy 05 and 06 at the holding
point.

The weather in the area was good, but fog over the survivors pre-
vented Sandy 03 from pinpointing the survivors. During this period
airstrikes were put in by the Hammer PAC's to suppress enemy move-
ment in the area. The fog started lifting at 26/0200 and the OSC
began pinpointing the survivors. Ground fire was seen on each pass.
During the entire SAR effort Arc Light strikes were fraggged in as
close as 4NM from the survivors. Through close coordination with
all SAR Forces the SAR effort was able to continue. Enemy trucks
were seen coming down the road from the north by several area PAC.
These were attacked by air strikes.

After numerous airstrikes in the SAR area the OSC, Sandy 07 con-
sidered the area permissive for a SAR attempt. At 26/0405Z King 21
directed that JG 71 and 72 be launched as backup for JG 65 and 67.
At 26/0430Z Navy A-4 aircraft put in smoke to block the SAR objec-
tive from the enemy. Both survivors reported they were in fine
shape. Phase Alpha was begun at 26/0440Z. JG 65 picked up Cobra
23 Alpha at 26/0450Z and Cobra 23 Bravo at 26/0453Z. During the
pickup JG 65 received 13 hits from enemy ground fire. At 26/0455Z
JG 65 was clear of the area and all forces were directed to RTB by
King 21.

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King 24 should have performed the normal King 21 orbit as planned. King 27 should have been reached to provide tank-
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Downgraded at 3 year interval
Declassified at 10 year interval

King 21 Crewmembers

AC/413 Major Delorenzo
 PW 1 Lt Kallender
 CP Major Regale
 W Capt Dugan
 RC Sgt Wisniewski
 FE MSgt Hartman
 FE TSgt Crozier
 LP SSgt Hoover

King 26 Crewmembers

AC Capt Frank
 PW Major Felmsley
 W Capt Thomas
 RC SSgt Swinson
 FE MSgt Wallace
 FE TSgt Lamb
 LM MSgt Patterson
 LM SSgt Barnett
 LM SSgt Gartland

On Scene Commanders

Sandy 03 (2926Z-0125Z)
 Sandy 05 (0135Z-0210Z)

Sandy 07 (0210Z-0455Z)

SAR Resources

King 21, 26
 Sandy 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, and 12 (A-1)
 30 65, 67, 71, 72, 57 and 60 (HS-53)

Smoke Aircraft

Ringneck 951 Flight (A-4)

Ringneck 953 Flight (A-4)

VAC Aircraft

Wolf 03 (F-4)

Hammer 40, 43, 54, 77, and 84 (OV-10)

Strike Aircraft (Expendable Ordnance)

Gunfighter Flights 01, 03, 34, 42 (F-4)

Cobra Flights 03, 25 (F-4)

Ringneck 207 Flight (A-4)

Did Not Expend Ordnance

Gunfighter Flights 40, 44, 93 (F-4)

Hockey Flight (F-4)

Chippy Flights 400, 412 (A-7)

Jerry 303 Flight (A-7)

Ringneck 201 Flight (A-4)

Jazz Flight (F-4)

Banyon Flight (F-4)

Other Forces

Candle 22 (Flareship)

Robert A. Delorenzo

ROBERT A. DELORENZO, Major, USAF

Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander



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COBRA 23 - 25 Feb 71

HAMMER 54
Capt Peter J. Ruppert
064-32-53237R

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At approximately 1530 I was working a strike just south of Delta 38 when I heard a mayday call on guard saying that Cobra 23 had been hit and was jumping out. The call also included a HME and Radial which was the 260/40 of CH 103. I at the time was on the 275/40 of 103.

I finished the airstrike and proceeded to the 260/40 to see if I could be of assistance. Upon arrival I saw many airplanes in the area so I climbed to 10,500 feet to stay out of the way. There were five additional OV 10's all Hammer Facs, at least I presumed, then to be, about 20 choppers or so and I do not know how many fast movers. Hammer 229 was working a TIC at the time as well as the SAR and I asked if I could be of help. He told me yes since he was out of rockets. I went down and took over for him. I saw both survivors chutes and plotted their position. Hammer 04 was made on-scene commander by King and I continued working the TIC. Hammer 04 RTB'd due to low fuel and H-40 relieved him. I was relieved by H-223. After landing, H-04 and myself went back out to the scene at 6:15 and H-62 along with Sandy 05 and 06 were talking to the survivor. H-62 did not know the exact location so H-04 and myself went into the area and showed Sandy's location. We were then informed by Hillsboro to clear the area to the east since they had heavy artillery going in and could not shut it off. The Sandys and we then held east for approximately 10-15 minutes. By the time we were cleared back in, it was 1900 hours. The Sandys and us made repeated passes over survivors position* but took heavy AAA which came from a tank that sat approximately 300 meters west of the survivors on top of the hill. Both survivors were talking and informed us of a lot of ground fire everytime a Sandy made a pass. The survivors called for CHOP and TIGGY but Sandy lead told them that it was getting too late and that they should hide themselves, not to worry, that there would be a Fac over them all night, to conserve their radios and use it only if absolutely necessary and that we (Sandys) would be back at first light to pick them up. Cobra 23A's reply was that "we would not be here in the morning". The Sandys RTB'd and H-04 and myself stayed on station until H-79 (the first night Fac) came out and we showed him both survivors' positions and also where the tank was that was shooting at us. H-79 then took over on scene and we (04 & 54) RTB'd. *To Show Sandy's Position Of Survivors.

26 Feb

The first Hammer Fac to launch was H-40 and he arrived on station at 0600. He informed us that the weather was bad and that he had not made contact with the survivors. At approximately 0800 H-40 informed us that they had reestablished contact with both A & B but the weather was still too bad to work the SAR. At 0900 H-40 called us and told us to launch the next Fac for the SAR. I, H-54, launched and arrived on station at approximately 1000am. H-40 RTB'd and Sandy 05 & 06 were on station.

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08 relieved 05 & 06 and 07 became on-scene commander. The weather began to clear up quite rapidly and we had about a 8-10,000' overcast. Sandys 07 & 08 proceeded to talk to the survivor and made repeated passes over their approximate position. I asked Sandy 07 if he knew where the survivors were and he said that he knew where Alpha was but not quite sure where Bravo was. I then pointed Bravo's chute out to 07 which he had not seen before. (Oh yes, Alpha had pulled his chute in about a half an hour after he ejected on the 25th and it could not be seen anymore) When the Sandys made the passes the survivors informed them that they were taking ground fire and the approximate position where it came from. The Sandys then began to sterilize the area by making repeated passes. Sandy 07 then showed me where he wanted some airstrikes put and for the next 2 1/2 hours I put airstrikes in around the survivors while the Sandys were working in close proximity of the survivors with their own ordnance. At approximately 1230 Sandy 09 & 10 checked in with the choppers and at approximately 1315 it was decided to go ahead with the pickup. Sandy 07 told me where to lay down the smoke and I then worked Ringneck 957 flight and laid the smoke down. The Sandys (4 of them) then really worked the immediate area over and the chopper (65) was then brought in from the IP. Two other Sandys were laying down CBU on both sides of the choppers route and Cobra 23A was picked up first. After Bravo was picked up the chopper exited the area by means of the same route that he entered. The whole pickup took about 15 minutes. It was a well planned and well executed mission.

PETER J. RUPPERT, Capt, USAF
HAMMER 54

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FLYING SCHEDULE

25 Feb 71

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>ALT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	SANDY			
CAPT MADDEN	01		GA	UBON
MAJ DE FELICE	02		GA	UBON
1LT WILSON	03		GA	NKP - Held By Jack
LT/COL BRUSHE	04		GA	NKP - Held By Jack
LT/COL ADAMS	05	1500	3.8	
1LT TATEISHI	06	1500	3.8	On-Scene-Commander
CAPT SMITH	07	1430	5.0	FROM BIEN HOA
1LT ROUSSEL	08	1/30	5.1	FROM BIEN HOA
CAPT KEETER	09	1430	3.8	On-Scene-Commander
1LT CARMICHAEL	10	1450	2.7	

	ROBO		
CAPT LORENZEN	32	1405	5.5
MAJ DONALDSON			
COL WALSH	33	1405	5.5

	SMOKE	
LT/COL STONE	41	GA
1LT LYON	42	GA
MAJ WOLCOTT	43	GA
MAJ ROBERTS, J.	44	GA

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FLYING SCHEDULE

26 Feb 71

<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>ATE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	SANDY			
CAPT MADDEN	01	1115	2.7	FROM UBON
MAJ DE FELICE	02	1115	2.7	FROM UBON
LT/COL STONE	03	0438	4.5	On-Scene-Commander
1LT MATHERS	04	0438	4.7	
CAPT ROBERTS, P.	05	0447	5.3	On-Scene-Commander
1LT LYON	06	0447	5.3	
CAPT RENTZ	07	0800	4.7	On-Scene-Commander
CAPT PHILIPS	08	0800	4.7	
1LT WILSON	09	0820	4.9	
COL ROUGH	10	0820	3.2	AIR ABORT
LT/COL DUNWOODY	11	0955	3.4	
CAPT TAYLOR	12			AIR GROUND
MAJ WOLCOTT	13		GA	
1LT KILAND	14		GA	
MAJ PLACE	15		GA	
CAPT STEWART	16		GA	
CAPT RENTZ	07	1445	1.0	RTN FROM QUANG TRI
	SMOKE			
MAJ BELT	41		GA	
LT/COL MURRAY	42		GA	
1LT TIPTON	43		GA	
CAPT MAMIYA	44		GA	

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FROM: 1 SOS (CC)

9 Mar 71

SUBJECT: SARCO Report for Cobra A & B

TO: DO

DECLASSIFIED

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 26 Feb 71 for two crewmembers of Cobra 23. The aircraft, an F4D out of Phu Cat AB, RVN, went down at approximately 1415L 25 Feb 71, on the 260° radial for 43NM of Channel 103. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort. All times are Thailand local.
2. At 1430L, 25 Feb 1971, A SAR was declared for Cobra 23. (Atch 1) The aircraft was downed by enemy gunfire in the vicinity of D-12, two parachutes had been observed and radio contact had been made with both survivors. The area was extremely hostile with active firefights and continuous airstrikes being put in. Hammer FACs were controlling all activity in the area. (Atch 2)
3. At the time the SAR was declared Jack scrambled Sandy's 09/10 from Da Nang, 05/06 from NKP and directed that Sandy's 03/04 were to remain on ground alert at NKP. 05/06 were to be escorts for Jolly Greens 66/72 which were scrambled from Da Nang. Sandy's 07/08 launched from Bien Hoa on their normal redeploy and were diverted to the SAR along with Hobo's 32/33 who were RTB with ordnance due to deteriorating weather in their target area. These were the forces participating in the first day effort. (Atch 3)
4. Sandy 09/10 arrived on scene at approximately 1600L and after being briefed by Hammer 40, 09 assumed on-scene command. (Atch 4) The weather in the objective area was marginal with heavy rain showers and intermittent low ceilings. Several attempts were made to penetrate the weather in an effort to pinpoint the survivors. Heavy ground fire was observed on all attempts and about the time the general area of the survivors was determined, Sandy 10 was hit by groundfire and exited the area to check damage. The inclement weather prevented full utilization of fast mover strikes however, Hammer 62 put in any he could. Sandy 10 had determined the damage was restricted to his external tanks, which he jettisoned, so he returned to the scene. At approximately 1620L, King ordered all SAR forces out of the area due to a TPQ alert called on guard. At 1635 Sandy 10 had to RTB due to low fuel so Sandy 06 was directed to the scene as low wing. (Atch 5) The effort to pinpoint the survivors continued and as they were located Sandy 09 took several hits in the underside of his aircraft and was streaming fuel from both external tanks. He jettisoned his load and RTB'd Channel 77 at approximately 1730. Later inspection revealed in excess of 10 entry holes in the aircraft with one the size of a football in the right elevator. Sandy 06 assumed on-scene command and 05 was called down to join him. Hobo's 32 and 33 had arrived after being released from their original mission and were assigned to escort the Jollies. (Atch 6) At this time there was approximately

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