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DUDLEY 02 ALPHA AND BRAVO SEARCH AND RECOVERY

(C) On 16 February 1971 at 0950L a call was received by TeePee that an F-4 aircraft had sustained battle damage from small arms and was enroute to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB for an emergency landing. Sandy 03, 04, 05, and 06 were immediately alerted for take off. At 0955L the two F-4 crewmembers ejected from their aircraft and landed in a trail network in midst of karst hills and caves. Their position was 083/42 from Tacan Channel 89, an area near the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. By 1135L Dudley 02 Alpha and Bravo were safely rescued.¹⁴¹

(C) Sandy 05/06 launched first and proceeded direct to the objective scene. Sandy 03/04 followed and escorted Jolly Green 63/61 to a forward holding point at 100/30 from Tacan Channel 89. When Sandy 03 arrived at the objective area several Nail FAC's and F-4 aircraft were already present and had located the approximate position of the survivors. Both crewmembers reported their condition was good and that there was no evidence of enemy activity in the area. Sandy 05 observed the many trails leading to caves in the karst and decided to make a few trolling passes. In an effort to provoke ground fire he made hot passes with 20 millimeter gunfire directed to cave entrances. However no ground fire was observed and the area was considered to be permissive.¹⁴²

141. SARCO Report for Dudley 02 A/B, 19 Feb 71, Document #4.
142. Ibid.

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(C) The IP (Initial Point) and objective area were identified and a routine pick up was planned. Dudley 02 Alpha was picked up safely at 1122L and up to this point all operations were "quite normal" as planned. However when the Jolly Green helicopter departed Alpha's position on the planned heading of 110 degrees he was unable to locate Bravo's position. Bravo was directed to expend his signal flare and all forces were surprised to find his location was 500 meters from Alpha on a heading of 240 degrees. There was an unusually long 13 minute period between picking up the two crewmembers and during that time Jolly Green 03 took an undetermined amount of small arms ground fire.¹⁴³

(C) The confusion over Bravo's exact position was the result of a series of unusual circumstances. His general position had been located electronically. Sandy 05 believed he knew the exact location of Bravo under the jungle canopy. He told Bravo to sound off when his A-1 was exactly overhead and then proceeded to the suspected area. Just when Sandy 05 passed over what he thought was the survivor's position Sandy 06 flew over Bravo's actual location and the survivor sounded off. Unfortunately the two positions were several hundred meters apart and caused serious delay in Bravo's pick up. However the effort ended happily and all forces returned to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB without further incident.¹⁴⁴

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

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Vietnam War Aircraft Losses

1350	13 Nov 1970	RF-4C	NVN	Wright D. I.	Maj	KIA		Bancroft W. W. Jr	1Lt	KIA
1351	20 Nov 1970	F-105G	LAOS	Kilgus D. W.	Maj	Rescued	USAF HH53	Lowry C. T.	Capt	Rescued
1352	23 Nov 1970	OV-10A	CMB	Brooks D. L.	Maj	Rescued	u Helo	Bellefeuille G. B.	SSgt	Rescued
1353	1 Dec 1970	F-4E	LAOS	Robinson J. R.	Capt	Rescued		Boulet D. A. II	1Lt	Rescued
1354	12 Dec 1970	O-2A	LAOS	Duckett T. A.	1Lt	MIA		Skinner O. G.	Maj	MIA
1355	12 Dec 1970	B-57	LAOS	u	u	Rescued		u	u	Rescued
1356	12 Dec 1970	F-100D	CMB	u	u	Rescued				
1357	19 Dec 1970	F-4D	LAOS	Rotz D. H.	Capt	Rescued		Louis W. K.	1Lt	Rescued
1358	21 Dec 1970	RF-4C	LAOS	Nullis M. M.	1Lt	Rescued	USAF Helo	Rush A. F.	Maj	Rescued
1359	24 Dec 1970	A-1E	LAOS	Lundy A. L.	Maj	KIA				
1360	28 Dec 1970	OV-10A	LAOS	Smith J. L.	Capt	KIA		u	Sgt	KIA
1361	2 Jan 1971	F-4E	LAOS	Wier H. D.	Capt	Rescued	USAF Helo	Brown R. K.	1Lt	Rescued
1362	3 Jan 1971	F-4E	LAOS	Ayres J. H.	Maj	KIA		Stratton C. W.	Capt	MIA
1363	17 Jan 1971	F-4E	Sea	Mirrer R. H.	Maj	KIA		Siderius J. D.	Maj	Rescued
1364	20 Jan 1971	F-4E	SVN	Warner D. A.	Capt	Rescued	USAF	Kiefer H. E.	Maj	Rescued
1365	27 Jan 1971	F-100D	CMB	Neil J. M.	Capt	KIA				
1366	28 Jan 1971	OV-10A	CMB	Lineberger H. B.	Maj	MIA				
1367	31 Jan 1971	O-2A	SVN	Hoenninger	1Lt	Rescued	Army Helo	Platt P. R.	1Lt	Rescued
1368	1 Feb 1971	A-37	CMB	Harris J. C.	1Lt	KIA				
1369	3 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Standerwick R. L.	LtCol	MIA		Gotner N. A.	Maj	POW (retur
1370	11 Feb 1971	F-4D	SVN	Ford M. W. Jr	Capt	Rescued	Army	Eisenbeisz R. A.	1Lt	KIA
1371	16 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Cox W. R.	LtCol	Rescued	USAF	Allen W. C.	Maj	Rescued
1372	16 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Pattillo R. N.	Maj	MIA		Hoskins C. L.	Capt	KIA
1373	19 Feb 1971	O-2A	LAOS	Hull J. L.	1Lt	KIA		Fernandez W. M.	Sgt	KIA
1374	20 Feb 1971	O-1F	SVN	Peacock P.	1Lt	Rescued	USAF Helo			
1375	25 Feb 1971	F-4D	SVN	Somers R. K.	Maj	KIA		Talley J. S.	Capt	Rescued
1376	25 Feb 1971	F-4D	LAOS	Hedditch	Capt	Rescued	USAF Helo	McLaughlin	1Lt	Rescued

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STATEMENT

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NARRATIVE FOR DUDLEY 02/A-E

In order to make this report both factual and comprehensive, I would like to present it from two different standpoints. I will first discuss it from an objective viewpoint including specific facts and happenings in chronological order. I will then present my personal opinions and thoughts.

At approximately 1000 hours local time Sandys 03, 04, 05, and 06 were scrambled in support of a downed F-4, Dudley 02. Sandy 03 and 04 were delayed momentarily and followed Sandy 05 and 06 out to the arming area. Sandy 05 and 06 launched first and were proceeding to escort the Jollys (as briefed) when Sandy 03 and 04 became airborne about 5 minutes later. At this time King directed Sandy 05 and 06 to the scene to act as low element. Sandys 03 and 04 then assumed escort responsibilities and joined the Jollys at the briefed holding area. At approximately 1110 local, Sandy 05 requested Jollys and escort to proceed to the SAR area. This was accomplished and upon arriving, Sandy 03 descended into the area for a briefing from Sandy 05. During this briefing tactics and responsibilities were discussed. Sandy 05 showed Sandy 03 the survivors location and did so a second time upon request from Sandy 03. Sandy 03 then returned to join Sandy 04 and Jolly 63 to brief them on the pick-up. About 1130 local the execution signal was given. Jolly 63 made his run in led by Sandy 03 with Sandys 04 and 06 covering his flank. Dudley 02 Alfa was spotted quickly and was recovered with little difficulty. The Sandys were not expending ordnance in accordance with King's request. At this point some confusion arose as to the exact position of Bravo. Momentarily, however, he was spotted and though the Jolly was forced to hover for some 10 minutes, Bravo was safely extracted. No ground fire was reported by the Sandys, Jolly, or survivors. The SAR forces then egressed the area and returned to their respective bosses. Down time for the Sandys was 1200 local.

In my opinion, though successful, this SAR was very poorly executed. I attribute this to myself, Sandy 05, and King. First of all I don't think King should have switched element responsibilities. In the event of delays or aborts, then yes this is in order. However, with both elements airborne, within 5 minutes of each other, I disagree. Jollys and Sandys briefed together, but as individual elements each with its own responsibilities. Techniques and tactics discussed here aid in a smooth coordinated effort.

The exact location of Bravo was not known until he popped his smoke. Just a bit late if you're putting down ordnance everywhere but where you think he is. Fortunately, we were not. This mistake on the Sandys part could have cost Bravo his life.

Now we come to the worst decision of the day, and who makes it but the airborne relay center known as King. "Do not expend ordnance during the pick-up". Perhaps this was passed to King via Jack. I don't know. I do know King passed it to the Sandys. In an area known to be controlled by the enemy, laced with roads and trail networks, and where only 30 minutes before a Nail PAC strafed and killed an enemy soldier, King announces the aforementioned statement.

Attach III

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What his reason was for making this decision is unknown to me. King, of all involved, does not have the knowledge or authority to make a tactical decision of this nature. I fault myself as well as Sandy 05 for not telling him so the moment he said it. The Sandy firepower might have prevented the numerous small arms hits that Jolly 63 took.

ROBERT L. WILSON, Lt
Sandy 03

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FROM: 1505 (Lt Col Adams/2754)

SUBJECT: SARCO Report for Dudley 02 A/B

TO: DO



1. A successful rescue was made for Dudley 02 A/B on 16 Feb 71. The aircraft, an F-4, sustained battle damage and enroute to NKP, both survivors were forced to bail out at approximately the 083/42/89. This report will cover the activities relating to the SAR. All times are Thailand local.
2. A call was received at 0950 that a battle damage aircraft was going to recover at NKP. At 0955 both crew members ejected. At 1004 both crew members touched down and their position was noted by an accompanying F-4 and reported to King. Sandy 03, 04, 05 and 06 were alerted to launch prior to the crew members reaching the ground. Because a Hot Cargo aircraft was blocking the arming area, an 8 to 10 minute delay occurred on the launch and Sandy 05 and 06 got airborne first at 1018. He was directed by King to proceed directly to the bail out area. Sandy 03 and 04 airborne, at 1020, were directed to escort Jolly Green 63 and 61, airborne at 1010, to a holding point of 100/30/89. Nail 11, 27, 112, 72, 34, and the accompanying F-4 were all in the immediate area of the bail out. Sandy 05 became OSC at approximately 1040. Sandy 01 and 02 at Ubon and Sandy 09 and 10 at Da Nang were placed in cockpit alert and two Jolly Greens at Ubon were launched to hold on the November orbit to act as backup.
3. Both crew members were immediately contacted and reported their condition as good without any evidence of enemy in the area. Sandy 05 believed he had a good location on both survivors. After trolling the area for gunfire and firing his 20mm near some cave entrances in a Karst, he decided a non contest-ed SAR was at hand. Dudley 02/A was picked up first at 1122 without compli-cation. Dudley 02/B was picked up by the same Jolly Green at 1135 after spending 13 minutes searching for his exact position. (see atch. II)
4. The position of Dudley 02/B was not known exactly. The reason for this is explained in Atch II. This is further reason for emphasis to be made for Sandy low to be absolutely sure of the survivors position prior to expend-ing ordnance and prior to committing the Jollys for the pick up. It is quite conceivable that the extended time in the hover, searching for 02/B, resulted in Jolly Green 63 receiving unnecessary gunfire. The comments made by Sandy 05 and 03 pertaining to the King aircraft calling a stop to the ordnance is also noteworthy. The assistance given to Sandy low by King is unquestioned. However, King overstepped his position by giving direction to Sandy low when he and only he is in the best position to determine the actions required. We are actually at a trade off since the exact location of 02/B was misunder-stood and excessive ordnance delivery could have hurt the survivor. At the same time, the cessation of ordnance delivery, as ordered by King, probably contri-buted to endangering the crew of the Jolly Green.
5. Four Sandys and 2 Jollys were launched in direct support of the mission with two other Jollys holding in the November orbit as relief, if needed. (see atach I)

ROBERT S. ADAMS, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

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FROM: 180S (Lt. Col. Dunwoody/2754)

23 February 1971

SUBJECT: SARCO REPORT FOR KNIFE 34

TO: DO

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 18 February 1971, for Knife 34. The aircraft, a CH-53, went down 0405Z/ 18 Feb 1971 at approximately 2 miles south of D-44. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys/Hobos during the rescue effort.
2. Knife 33 and 34 launched at 0235Z with Hobo's 22 and 23 as escort on a fraggged infill mission. The mission went as briefed with Knife 33 accomplishing the first infill. At 0405Z Hobo 22 and 23 were covering the infill for Knife 34 on his HLZ. Hobo 22 stated, "suddenly I saw knife 34 go out of control and crash on the HLZ". Knife 33, holding 2 miles from the crash site, now headed directly to the scene. Hobo 22 notified King 24 and gave the location of crash and requested the SAR forces be alerted. Due to the nature of the terrain on the HLZ, Knife 33 used his penetrator to pickup the survivors. In approximately 10 to 15 minutes all survivors were on board with 3 survivors injured. Hobo 22 flight escorted Knife 33 to Ubon for a successful recovery. The Hobo flight then returned to NKP.
3. All SAR forces were alerted by 0410Z. Sandy 01 and 02 were flying a special orbit near the "Rooster Tail" and diverted to the scene. The SARCO briefed Sandys 03 and 04 and told to maintain ground alert until needed. Sandy's 05 and 06 at UBON were also briefed for a possible launch. All fraggged A-1 missions at NKP were put on a temporary hold and Blue Chip was requested to release Hobo 20 flight for smoke loads. At 0426Z knife 33 made his pickup and the SAR terminated at 0428Z. Sandy 01 and 02 never reached the scene and returned to their orbit. All missions at NKP went back to normal operations.
4. Weather was no factor in the HLZ areas. The terrain was hilly with tall trees in the HLZ area. Hobo 22 and 23 never observed enemy ground fire at any time. Knife 34 crew later debriefed that ground fire was heard during their infill.
5. No problems or difficulties were experienced in the SAR effort. Hobo 22 recommended that all Nails/Misty/Jets/ etc. be rebriefed on the importance of staying clear of the HLZ and particularly when a SAR is in progress.

Richard H. Dunwoody

RICHARD H. DUNWOODY, Lt Colonel, USAF
SARCO

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DC

RCS ARS V-6 Report

3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

16 February 1971

DATE: 16 February 1971

MISSION NUMBER: D-3-006 16 February 1971

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 63

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Dudley 02 AXB

LOCATION: 1722N - 10529E

SAVES: 2 Combat Saves

SUMMARY OF SAR ACTION:

1. (C) Jolly Green 63 (I) and Jolly Green 61 (H) were launched from Ch 89 at 16/0310Z. We initially headed out the 120° radial of Ch 89 until we came to the fence where we held for 5 minutes while awaiting Sandy escort. During this time period we were instructed by King 21 to proceed out the 090° radial and hold at 30 miles. Enroute to this holding area Sandy 05 and 06 caught up with us and proceeded to the survivors location, which was originally located at 0800/39/89. Sandy 3 and 4 arrived as our escort just prior to our arrival at the initial holding point. After arriving at the holding point we suggested that the holding point be moved to 085/35/89 in order to get off a route section. While we were in this area we heard that the FACs on scene had observed people in the area and that the Alpha man had reported small arms fire. We also heard that Nail 34 had strafed the area and a body had been moved into a cave. Shortly after moving to this holding point. We were instructed by Sandy 5 to move up to 079°/47/89. Upon arrival at this point we held over an area of karst. We were in this area for about 10 minutes when Sandy 5 called for Sandy 3 to come in to see the survivor's location and establish an approach plan. Prior to this a live M-P bomb was dropped to mark the IP. This showed up excellently. The runin heading to Dudley 02a was briefed as 130° and from A to B a heading of 100° and at a distance of about 500 meters. Sandy 5 sent Sandy 3 back to the holding area for us and the runin was initiated at approximately 0415Z. A heading of 130° was held as we passed the IP and we maneuvered as necessary to stay low and fast. Ground fire was observed and returned briefly as we passed over a road. Sandy 3 told us when to slow down in plenty of time. The Alpha man was told to pop his smoke just prior to us reaching the other side of the ridge of karst where he was located.

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As we came over the ridge we immediately saw his smoke and course. We recovered the helicopter so we were as close to the scene as possible. We were in about a 100 foot hover. The pressure altitude was 1100-1200. We had Alpha on board at 0421 and we turned to 100° heading to pick up the Bravo man. We hover taxied in that direction and turned up a small bank in the karst. We did not see Bravo, but we did see a piece of old parachute tangled in the top of a large tree. As we were searching this area we saw the smoke from Bravo's plane at a heading of about 190° and a distance of about 1 Km. The area between us and the area was open field. We moved to the smoke as rapidly as possible and then began a series of seemingly conflicting directions from Sandy 5 and the Bravo man. The result was on series of tightening circles until we located him at the base of a very large tree. We seemed to be fairly exposed so we hovered as low into the trees as possible. Our hover was at about 125 feet. (The flight engineer spotted him because of his white tee shirt showing above his flight suit). We had the Bravo man on board at 0433Z and began our exit. Sandy 5 told us to head out straight ahead (about 275°) and keep down on the karst. After we had exited the immediate area we climbed up to 10,000 feet MSL to clear weather and haze. Both survivors were in good shape and the aircraft seemed to be flying well on our evacuation. King 21 asked us about the survivors' condition and where they wanted to go. We told them they were both feeling fine and that a return to Channel 89 was desired. Shortly thereafter King 21 cleared JG 63 and 61 as well as JG 62 and 55 to RTB to Channel 93. Because of the condition of the survivors and the apparent condition of the airplane, I saw no reason at that time to insist on a return to Channel 89. Enroute to Ch 93 we noticed a few stray holes in the aircraft, but nothing in the way of structural damage was noted. We landed at Ubon at 0610Z. After shut down, inspection revealed hits in one main rotor blade, one tail rotor blade, tail rotor drive shaft, and swash plate assemble. There were also several hits in the doghouse and rear of the aircraft. At no time during the rescue were we aware of any ground fire hitting the aircraft. The only fire sighted was for a few seconds on the runin.

2. Crew Composition:

JG 63

AC Capt Charles R. Hagerhjelm,
CP Maj George T. Macdonald,
FE SSgt Fredrick A. Moorehouse
PJ Sgt Henry L. Ochse,
PJ TSgt John A. Smith,
AP SSgt Rodney L. Olsen,

JG 61

AC Capt Dan E. Williams,
CP Maj Jerry R. Thompson,
FE SSgt Wayne F. Lstey,
PJ TSgt Billy R. Davidson,
PJ SSgt Richard A. Wallace

3. Survivors:

Major William C. Allen
Lt Colonel William R. Cox

CHARLES R. HAGERHJELM, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

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DATE: 16 Feb 71

22 Feb 71

MISSION NUMBER: B-3-006-16 Feb 71

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: King 21

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Dudley 02 A&B

LOCATION: 17-30N, 105-27E

SAVES: 2 Combat

(C) At approximately 0950L, King 21 received a call on UHF Guard from Wolf 04. Wolf stated he and Dudley lead were in escort with Dudley 02. Dudley 02 had taken battle damage and his aircraft was on fire and falling apart. King 21 requested a May Day squawk and a position from Wolf 04. About 0953L, Dudley 02 Alpha and Bravo ejected. Wolf 04 and Dudley lead had both chutes in sight. A call on Guard Channel by King 21 brought a response from Nails 27, 72, 34, and 112. All were in the general area of Dudley 02 Alpha and Bravo and Nail 27 said he had both chutes in sight. King 21 appointed Nail 27 as the On Scene Commander (OSC) and requested he pass general condition and UTM positions of the survivors when they reached the ground. All four Nail aircraft were overhead the survivors; Nail 34 stated there was some activity within 250 meters of Alpha -- One strafe pass by Nail 34 eliminated the ground activity. Both Bravo and Alpha reported no guns or ground activity in their immediate area, and that both were in good condition. Approximately 1050L, Sandy's 5 and 6 arrived on scene and Sandy 5 assumed on scene command. Sandy 5 advised King 21 that the area was relatively quiet, and the fast mover strike aircraft available at that time would not be required. By 1100L, Jolly Green 61 and 63 and Sandy's 3 and 4 were in the area. By 1120L, the pickup phase was under way on the Alpha man with Jolly Green 63 making the attempt. The pickup phase on both men was complete by 1135L. King 21 advised the SAR forces to RTB and JG 63 and 61 were to proceed to CH 93 with the two survivors.

Comments: A post flight inspection of JG 63 revealed that he had taken several hits from small arms fire. Since the area appeared relatively quiet, Sandy 5 elected not to expend any ordinance during the pickup phase. In the future, I would like to see all pickup attempts covered by active ordinance, to preclude any further exposure of the Jolly Greens to ground fire. It has become increasingly apparent that the enemy is with-holding his fire until the Jolly Greens enter a hover and become a more vulnerable target.

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GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years.

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King 21 Crewmembers

AC/AMC	Capt	Parmeter
CP	Capt	Petit
N	Major	Good
RO	MSGT	Jones
FE	TSgt	Mathews
LN	ESgt	Richardson

Forces Utilized

Sandy's 3, 4, 5, 6
King 21
Jelly Greens 61, 63, 62, 55
Wolf 04
Nail's 27, 72, 112, 34
Dudley 01
Falcon 91, 92, 87, 88
Cobra 45, 46
Gunfighter 60, 61
Scuba Flight
Olds Flight



JOHN S. PARMETER, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander/Airborne Mission Commander

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GROUP-4

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A last-light run-in was attempted but was aborted when both helicopters took hits from heavy small arms fire. One Pararescue man was wounded in this attempt. A first-light effort on 2 January resulted in a successful rescue of both crewmembers.

(S) BIGOT 02: On 3 February, two crewmembers of an F-4D bailed out of Bankari² Pass near the NVN border. 40th ARRS Jolly Greens were scrambled from both Nakhon Phanom Airfield³ and Ubon RTAFB⁴. Low ceilings precluded any attempt that day. A maximum effort SAR was planned on the 4th with 8 Jolly Greens in place at NKP for a first-light effort. HH-53 BUFFs were on continuous airborne orbit from pre-dawn to darkness on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of February. Continued low ceilings and bad weather conditions in the area precluded any rescue attempts. After all radio contact was lost with the survivors at noon on the 6th, and no weather improvement forecast, the active participation of the 40th ARRS ceased. The force of tired and disappointed crews were returned to Udorn that night.

(S) DUDLEY 02: On 16 February, two crewmembers of an F-D bailed out in eastern Laos. Two Jolly Greens scrambled and both crewmembers were rescued less than two hours after bailout.

(S) WITCHDOCTOR 05: On 5 March, an Army UH-1 helicopter was shot down in eastern Laos with 7 people on board. A last-light run-in was attempted but intensive AAA and small arms fire precluded any rescues. The survivors were rescued by a U.S. Army ground team on 7 March.

GROUP 4

During the period of 1 January to 31 March 1971
the following were the only
after 10 years

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STATEMENT

NARRATIVE FOR DUDLEY 02A & 02B

Dudley 02 A&B Sandy 05/06 Donaldson/Kiland

Sandy 05 and 06 were scrambled to escort the Jolly Greens on the Dudley 02 A&B SAR, but were diverted to be on-scene command because 05 and 06 had gotten airborne eight minutes ahead of Sandy 03 and 04. Sandy 05 and 06 proceeded directly to 080/39 off channel 89 actual position was 081/for 47 NM and after multiple radio failures finally established contact with Nail 27 who had the survivors' position well marked. Nail 34 and Nail 72, along with Wolf 04 were also at the scene. Due to the great number of aircraft in the area it was almost a case of too much help. 02 Alpha was very easy to spot because his chute was visible near the edge of the karst. But when it came time to pin point Bravo's position a series of misidentifications between Sandy 05 and whatever FAC was talking, led Sandy 05 to believe Bravo was about 500 meters from Alpha on a heading of about 110°. Sandy 05 then asked Bravo, who was in heavy jungle, to tell him when he heard Sandy 05 fly right overhead. Sandy 05 then flew over the position he believed Bravo to be in and, sure enough, Bravo said, "your're right over me now". But actually it was Sandy 06 who was passing over him. Therefore, Bravo was actually 500 meters from Alpha on a heading of about 240°. This caused considerable problems during the pick-up phase. Sandy 05 noticed many roads and trails leading to caves in the surrounding karst and decided to hose several of them down to see if he could troll up some ground-fire. He made two passes firing 20mm at the caves. After the second pass King called and said to stop strafing because it would give away the survivors' position and the strafe was not needed. This, I feel, was a major error on King's part. Sandy Lead is the only one who can make the determination that an area is to be considered peaceful or hostile. This one had all the earmarks of a potentially bad area. We have had too many helicopters lost or shot up because people thought the area was safe. As it turned out the Jolly took numerous small arms hits sometime during one, or both, of the pick-ups. The Jollys were brought onto the scene and briefed along with Sandy 03 and 04. A holding point was established over some karst about 3 miles northwest of the SAR site. The run-in to Alpha was as directed and the pick up went quickly. However, the previous mountainous confusion about Bravo's position was not rectified until Sandy 06 saw Bravo's smoke come up and he diverted Jolly 63 into the proper area. It took nearly 10 minutes from Alpha's pick up to positively spot Bravo. The rest went smoothly.

ROB. F. J. DONALDSON, Major, USAF
Sandy 05

JOHN W. KILAND, 1st Lt, USAF
Sandy 06

Attch II

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