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MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT

DATE: 30 July 1970

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-037 29 July 1970

DECLASSIFIED

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: Jolly Green 30 (HH-3E) and Jolly Green 65 (HH-53C)

MISSION OBJECTIVE: Hobo 20 (A-1 USAF)

LOCATION: 17°12'N 106°10'E

SAVES: 1 Combat Save

1. (C) The 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron was notified of a first light effort for Hobo 20 at 0200H by Queen. At 0445H Jolly Green 30 (Low) and Jolly Green 64 (High)(HH-53) launched from Channel 77 enroute to a holding area 292/50/103. Spad 11 and 12 (A-1H's) launched approximately 5 minutes later to proceed to the area and assume on scene command. Spads 01 and 02 (A-1H's) launched to escort Jolly Green 30 and Jolly Green 64 to the area. At 0525H Jolly Green 64 aborted due to AFCS amplifier problems. Jolly Green 30 and Spads 01 and 02 proceeded to hold feet wet off Channel 103. At 0725H Jolly Green 30 and Spads 01 and 02 landed at Channel 69 to refuel. Jolly Green 30 launched from Channel 69 at 0755H after refueling and was joined by Jolly Green 65 who had been launched as a replacement for Jolly Green 64. Jolly Green 30 and 65 proceeded to hold feet wet off Channel 103 until being directed to return to Channel 69 to assume ground alert. Jolly Green 30 and 65 landed at Channel 69 at 0855H. After refueling, Jolly Green 30 and 65 launched for the SAR area at 0955H, and arrived in the orbit 295/51/103 at 1115H. At approximately 1215H Jolly Green 30 lost the UHF radio and notified King 24 (HC-130P). At 1245H Jolly Green 30 and 65 departed the orbit, escorted by Spad 01 and 02, having been directed to proceed to Channel 89 for repairs. Enroute to Channel 89 both Jolly Green 30 and Jolly Green 65 air refueled with King 27 (HC-130P), then landed at Channel 89 at 1345H. After completing repairs, Jolly Green 30 and Jolly Green 65 were directed to launch for the SAR area and were airborne from Channel 89 at 1555H. Enroute to the area, escorted by Sandy 15 and 16 (A-1H's), Jolly Green 30 and 65 rendezvoused with Jolly Green 50 and 61 (HH-53's) and King 30 (HC-130P). After topping off all tanks, Jolly Green 30 and 65 accompanied by Sandy 15 and 16 and Jolly Green 50 and 61 proceeded to the SAR area and began holding at 100/90/89. At 1810H Jolly Green 30 was given a briefing on the area and told to prepare for a pickup attempt. The briefing was completed and all checklists completed. The tips were dropped at the IP and called away. At 1840H Jolly Green 30 descended to treetop level and began a run in on a

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GROUP 4
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intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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heading of 290° at 120 - 125kts. The run in was marked extremely well by smoke rockets and the survivors were under suppressive fire. As Jolly Green 30 reached the last smoke we began to slow down and were advised the survivor was over the next ridge. Upon topping the ridge, the survivor's smoke was spotted by the Pilot and Flight Engineer, and the survivor advised he was a little to the left of his smoke. A steep approach was made down the ridge and a hover of approximately 30 feet was entered directly over the survivor. The penetrator was lowered directly to the survivor with only minor hover corrections being needed. The survivor quickly strapped in and was lifted clear of the ground. After the survivor was almost at the aircraft some oscillation developed and the survivor struck the aircraft, but was uninjured. He was quickly brought aboard by the Flight Engineer and Pararescue Technician. An immediate right turn was made and a maximum performance takeoff was made over the ridge and egress was made out the same route as the run in had been made on. On the way out, at about 1845H, the Flight Engineer reported ground fire from a ridgeline, and both he and the Pararescue Technician returned fire with the M-60 machine guns. The Flight Engineer's M-60 jammed after firing a few rounds and he picked up a CAR-15 and returned fire with it. No hits were taken by Jolly Green 30. After clearing the immediate area a climb was started and the Pararescue Technician checked the survivor and found him in very good condition. Jolly Green 30 was directed to take the survivor to Channel 89 and another refueling was made with King 30 en-route to Channel 89. Final landing was made at Channel 89 at 1945H. Weather was not a factor in the actual pickup, but had delayed preparation of the area due to broken clouds during the day. Three air refuelings were made.

2. 8/23.2/37ARRS/HH-3E/HH-53C; 12/49.0/40ARRS/HH-53B/C; 32/138/56 SOW/A-1E; 6/33.3/39 ARRS/HC-130

3. N/A

4. N/A

5. Pararescueman was not deployed. He did check the survivor for injuries and found him to be all right.

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6. Jolly Green Crews

Jolly Green 30

AC Major George C. Hitt
CP Major Howard G. Stalnecker
FE SSgt Joseph J. Vai
PJ TSgt John F. Heitsch

DECLASSIFIED Jolly Green 65

AC Major Albert E. Palmer
CP Capt Donald G. Beattie
FE TSgt James M. Barnes
PJ MSgt Malcom E. Williams
PJ SSgt Gary T. Osborne

Jolly Green 64

AC Lt Col Royal A. Brown, Jr.
CP Capt Otto G. Gammill, Jr.
FE Sgt John C. Kriletich
PJ TSgt Lewis Craig
PJ SSgt Curtis W. Phythian

George C Hitt

GEORGE C. HITT, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander JG 30

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #11

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: 29 JUL 70 1 August 1970

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-037-29 JUL 70 (Part 1)

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 24

LOCATION: 295/64/103, 096/87/89, 058/94/99, UTM: XE 229021

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: HOBO 20 (A-1)

SAVES: 1 Combat

1. (C) King 24 departed Ch 83 at 2030Z/28 July for a first light effort on Hobo 20 (A-1) whose position had been briefed as 096/87/89 in the immediate vicinity of Ban Karai Pass. Prior to departure, King 24 had requested MIG CAP, Iron Hand, and Elint resources for the SAR effort from JOKER via telecon. Candlestick 25 (C-123 flare ship) was On-Scene Commander (OSC) when King 24 arrived in the area (2130Z) and had maintained voice contact with Hobo 20 during the night. Candlestick 25 reported that the survivor was in good shape and refined his position to be 293/65/103. Spad 11 & 12 arrived in the area and Spad 11 was appointed OSC at 2200Z after a thorough briefing from Candlestick 25 and King 24. At 2215Z MIG CAP was on station (090/70/89) and Iron Hand was enroute. Nail 22 & 57 were in the area for FAC purposes and to assist in locating the survivor. A discrete frequency of 324.7 was established with Invert and Moonbeam/Hillsborough supplied fast mover resources for strike purposes as required. SAR forces used UHF 364.2/VHF 142.75 for primary frequencies and "C" frequency was established as primary strike frequency. Eastern SAR forces were instructed to orbit at 292/51/103 and Western SAR forces orbited at 096/75/89. Smoke and Ravish resources were uploaded and held available for immediate launch. Due to the extremely hostile environment, considerable "softening-up" and "gun-killing" strikes were anticipated prior to committing SAR resources for pick-up of the survivor.

2. (C) Shortly after first light, the survivor's chute was located in the trees at UTM XE 229021. Hobo 20 stated that he had moved approximately 50 - 100 meters from his chute. At 2342Z Hobo 20 reported enemy movement near his chute and at 2355Z the chute disappeared from the trees. Nail 22 & 57 were putting in fast mover strikes to silence 23MM, 37MM, 57MM and smaller automatic weapons which were firing. Hobo 20 was instructed to come up on his radio on the hour and half-hour or anytime he discerned movement in his immediate area. King 27 (in the area for tanker purposes) was briefed, along with other SAR forces, to assume control of any secondary SAR effort which might develop and to utilize UHF 282.8. King 21, on normal western orbit, was also available for refueling or SAR purposes if required and was briefed accordingly.

3. (C) Weather in the area intermittently denied use of strike resources but continuous strikes were made as the weather permitted. The survivor's elevation was approximately 1000 feet and temperature was 28-30° C.

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Strikes continued throughout the morning to silence guns and cut roads. King 27 conducted eight air refuelings (37,500 lbs off load) and recovered at Ch 89 for fuel; thence, he returned to orbit for further A/R purposes. Sandy and Spad resources were also cycled in and out of Ch 89 for refueling purposes. Nail 22 & 57 were replaced by Nail 46 & 06 at 0010Z. Nail 46 & 06 were later replaced by Nail 37 & 36 at 0415Z. Chronological use of OSCs: Spad 11 at 2200Z; Sandy 03 at 0008Z; Spad 01 at 0300Z, and Nail 37 at 0415Z (until he could adequately brief Sandy 05 who then assumed OSC).

4. (U) King 26 arrived in the general area at 0500Z and after briefing by King 24 assumed Airborne Mission Command (AMC) responsibility at 0550Z. King 30 replaced King 27 as airborne tanker. During King 24's tenure as AMC the following resources were controlled: 12 Jolly Greens (3 of which aborted at Ch 77), 6 Spads, 10 Sandys, 6 Nail FACs, 72 fast mover resources and 3 King aircraft. (See listing of resources below.) Outstanding and invaluable assistance was received from Invert controllers, and Hemlock. All six Nail FACs did outstanding jobs and displayed high degrees of professionalism and dedication.

5. (C) Resources Available or Used:

SAR FORCES:

King 24 (AMC)
King 27 (Airborne Tanker)
King 21 (Back-up)
King 26 (Replaced King 24)
King 30 (Replaced King 27)

Sandys 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07,
08, 09, 10 (Sandy 01 aborted
due rough engine)
Spads 11, 12, 01, 02, 15, 16
Jolly Greens 27 (aborted, fuel leak),
66 (aborted, electrical fire),
64 (aborted AFCS problems),
65, 56, 63, 61, 50, 30, 55, 53.

King 27 refueled Jolly Green 30,
65, 56, 63, 61 (twice) & 50 (twice).

FACs:

Nail 22, 57, 46, 06, 37, 36
Wolf 04, 03 (Not Used)

ELINT:

Dwell (EB66)

STRIKE FORCES: (Several flights cycled to tanker and returned.)

Garlic 1 (2 F4s, MIG CAP)
Garlic 3 (2 F4s, expended)
Gunfighter 01 (2 F4s)
Newark 1 (2 F105s, expended)
Newark 3 (2 F105s)
Holloway 304 (4 A4s)
Clincher (2 A4s)
Raccoon 1 (2 F105s, expended)
Raccoon 3 (2 F105s)
Scuba 1 (2 F4s)
Scuba 3 (2 F4s, expended)
Wolfpack 31 (2 F4s, cycled to tanker
3 times and finally expended PW's
at 0540Z.)

Wolfpack 21 (2 F4s)
Wolfpack 11 (2 F4s, expended)
Wolfpack 41 (2 F4s, expended)
Rancho 1 (2 F4s)
Shorty (2 F105s)
Rancho 3 (2 F4s)
Oxteam (2 F4s)
Hatbox 1 (2 F105s, expended)
Hatbox 3 (2 F105s, expended)
Metric 1 (2 F105s, expended)
Metric 3 (2 F105s)
Mallard 1 (2 F105s, expended)
Mallard 3 (2 F105s, expended)
Greasy 1 (2 F105s)
Greasy 3 (2 F105s)

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39th ARRSq History, Jul - Sep 70

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #11-2

6. (U) King Crewmembers:

King 24

AMC/AC	MAJ POWELL
CP	CPT BAUMANN
NN	CPT BURD
RO	AIC SOUDER
FE	MSG HOLMAN
FE	MSG WALLACE
LM	MSG CORNELL

King 27

AO	LTC HATFIELD
CP	MAJ KIMMEL
NN	CPT BOGNER
RO	SSG HOLLUMS
FE	TSG BUSHKOPFSKY
FE	TSG MITCHELL
LM	SSG RICHARDSON

Charles E. Powell

CHARLES E. POWELL, Major, USAF

Airborne Mission Commander/Aircraft Commander

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #11-3

DATE: 29 JUL 70

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-037 JUL 70 (Part 2)

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 26

LOCATION: XE 229021 096/87/89

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: HOBO 20

SAVES: 1 Combat

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1. (U) King 26 launched from Ch 83 at 0350Z to relieve King 24 as Airborne Mission Commander (AMC) for this mission. King 26 arrived in the area at 0520Z and received a thorough briefing from King 24. We assumed AMC at 0550Z.
2. (C) Just after assuming control, Spad 01 the On-Scene Commander (OSC), RTB'd for fuel. He did not have time to adequately brief his replacement, Sandy 05, so Nail 37 was appointed OSC until he had an opportunity to brief Sandy 05. Nail 37 had been working with Spad 01 and was thoroughly familiar with the situation. He was directing air strikes against known and suspected gun positions in the area. At the same time, he had Nail 36 directing strikes to interdict roads in the area. The weather in the area improved steadily and strikes were put in continually.
3. (C) The survivor stated that he was in good condition but that he had no water, had lost his spare batteries and his survival radio batteries were growing weak. His flares were in good condition.
4. (C) King 27 left for Ch 83 at 0542Z and was replaced by King 30 who performed refuelings for the remainder of the mission. Nail 49 arrived on scene at 0721Z and took over direction of fast-mover strikes from Nail 37 at 0755Z. Sandy 05 was appointed OSC at that time. Smoke 31 & 36 were launched at 0815Z and Ravish 41 & 44 were airborne at 0830Z. Nail 49 had a survival kit to deliver to the survivor but both agreed that it should not be deployed since dropping would betray the survivor's position.
5. (C) Continual airstrikes were still being put in by Nail 36, 37, 49 and Wolf 02 to cut roads and silence guns. Sandy 11 relieved Sandy 05 as OSC at 0830Z and at 0900Z stated that the area was still not safe for slow-movers. At 0910Z all SAR forces were moved to 100/80/89 to be closer to on-scene. At 0930Z the Sandies entered and started to troll the area. They began taking fire immediately. Strikes continued to go in. At 1011Z Nail 49 reported that all big guns should be gone. One minute later a new 37mm position was spotted and quickly silenced.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #11-4

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6. (C) At 1023Z, it was determined that the area was permissive and a pick-up should be attempted. Ravish and Smoke flights entered the area. Jolly Green 30 went in as low bird with Jolly Green 65 as high bird. Jolly Green 30 completed the pick-up at 1045Z with virtually no ground resistance. All SAR forces RTB'd to Ch 89. King 30 topped off Jolly Green 30 enroute.

7.(C) Forces Involved:

SAR Forces Used

Jolly Green 30, 65, 55, 53, 50, 61
 Sandy 01, 02, 05, 06, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16
 Spad 01, 02
 Smoke 31, 36
 Ravish 41, 44
 King 26
 King 27 (8 A/R - 37,500# offload)
 King 30 (5 A/R - 16,000# offload)

FAC Resources

Nail 26, 36, 37, 49
 Wolf 01, 02

Strike Forces Utilized:

Mallard Flight (2 F-105)
 Wolf Pack Flight (2 F-4)
 Greasy 3 & 4 (2 F-105)
 Killer 1 & 2 (2 F-4)
 Locket Flight (2 A-4)
 Oxteam 1 & 2 (2 F-4D)
 Killer 3 & 4 (2 F-4)
 Redtop 1 & 2 (2 F-4E)
 Redtop 3 & 4 (2 F-4E)
 Hooper Flight (2 F-4D)
 Falcon 85 (2 F-4)
 Cobra 9 (2 F-4)
 Ekee Flight (2 F-4)
 Granny Flight (2 F-4D)
 Falcon 71 (2 F-4)
 Musket (2 F-4)
 Barfly Flight (3 F-4)
 Gasser Flight (3 F-4)

Strike Forces Not Utilized:

Gunfighter Flight (3 F-4)
 Bass Flight (2 F-4)
 Miller Flight (2 F-4E)
 Falcon 73 (2 F-4)
 Falcon 75 (2 F-4)

8. (C) Particularly noteworthy during this mission was the outstanding performance of all FACs and especially Nail 37 & 49. The cooperation rendered by Hillsboro (ABCCO) and Invert (GCI) in securing and controlling strike aircraft aided immeasurably in bringing this mission to a successful conclusion.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #11-5

9. (U) King Crewmembers:

King 30

AC MAJ COUGHRAN
CP LTC ALLGOOD
NN CPT FOLLMER
RO MSG KOEHLER
FE MSG BOSMANS
FE TSG SUMNER
LM TSG TILLMAN

King 27

AC LTC HATFIELD
CP MAJ KIDMEL
NN CPT BOGNER
RO SSG HOLLUMS
FE TSG BUSHKOPSKY
FE TSG MITCHELL
LM SSG RICHARDSON

King 26

AMC/AC MAJ CONWAY
CP LTC SPILSETH
CP CPT KENNARD
NN CPT SULLIVAN
RO SGT WISNOSKI
FE MSG HUESMANN
FE TSG RAPER
LM SSG WATERS

JAMES E. CONWAY, Major, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander/Aircraft Commander

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DATE: 29 JUL 70

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-037 JUL 70 (Part 2)

AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION: KING 26

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 12 Dec 16

DECLASSIFIED

GROUP 1

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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6. (C) At 1023Z, it was determined that the area was permissive and a pick-up should be attempted. Ravish and Smoke flights entered the area. Jolly Green 30 went in as low bird with Jolly Green 65 as high bird. Jolly Green 30 completed the pick-up at 1045Z with virtually no ground resistance. All SAR forces RTB'd to Ch 89. King 30 topped off Jolly Green 30 enroute.

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7. (C) Forces Involved:

SAR Forces Used

Jolly Green 30, 65, 55, 53, 50, 61
Sandy 01, 02, 05, 06, 09, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16
Spad 01, 02
Smoke 31, 36
Ravish 41, 44
King 26
King 27 (8 A/R - 37,500# offload)
King 30 (5 A/R - 16,000# offload)

FAC Resources

Nail 26, 36, 37, 49
Wolf 01, 02

Strike Forces Utilized:

Mallard Flight (2 F-105)
Wolf Pack Flight (2 F-4)
Greasy 3 & 4 (2 F-105)
Killer 1 & 2 (2 F-4)
Locket Flight (2 A-4)
Oxteam 1 & 2 (2 F-4D)
Killer 3 & 4 (2 F-4)
Redtop 1 & 2 (2 F-4E)
Redtop 3 & 4 (2 F-4E)
Hooper Flight (2 F-4D)
Falcon 85 (2 F-4)
Cobra 9 (2 F-4)
Ekee Flight (2 F-4)
Granny Flight (2 F-4D)
Falcon 71 (2 F-4)
Musket (2 F-4)
Barfly Flight (3 F-4)
Gasser Flight (3 F-4)

Strike Forces Not Utilized:

Gunfighter Flight (3 F-4)
Bass Flight (2 F-4)
Miller Flight (2 F-4E)
Falcon 73 (2 F-4)
Falcon 75 (2 F-4)

8. (C) Particularly noteworthy during this mission was the outstanding performance of all FACs and especially Nail 37 & 49. The cooperation rendered by Hillsboro (ABCCC) and Invert (GCI) in securing and controlling strike aircraft aided immeasurably in bringing this mission to a successful conclusion.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year interval
Declassified after 12 years

DATE	CREW	G. H. NUMBER	SAVING NUMBER	NAME RANK SERIAL NUMBER ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	JULY 1970 UNDER FIRE
11 July 13	COPPERTHIT BEATTIE DAVENPORT KRIKETCH OSBORNE REISIG	67	582	CAPT. RON RASMUSSEN U.S.M.C. HMS-11, MAG 11 1st MAW FPO 96602	230/29/69 PLAYBOY 45A A-4	YES
11 JULY	HOLCOMB WAMMER ERICKSON SCOTT HEITSCH HEITSCH	65	583	1/LT. WALLACE W. MILLS U.S.M.C. 0103191 HMS-11, MAG-11 1st MAW FPO 96602	230/29/69 PLAYBOY 45B A-4	YES
12 July	BROWN, R BEATTIE ERICKSON SCOTT CRAIG	64	584	CAPT. RAYMOND L. RIGEL 305 44 5236 497 TFS UBON 585 L/C PENNINGTON 497 TFS UBON	283/54/109 DIPPER 01 F-4	NO
29 July 113	HITT STALNECKER VAI HEITSCH	30	588	MAJ. PETTER LEE 1st SOS NKP	295/63/103 HOB0 20 A-1	YES

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PRIORITY

31/10052
56TH SP OP WG/NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

13AF/DSA/DO/DM/CLARK AB PI

INFO: 7/13AF/DSA/DO/DM/UDORN RTAFB THAI

7AF/DOC/TAN SON NHUT AB RVN FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

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Subject: Commander's 48 Hour Mishap Analysis Report. (U)

Hobo 20, A-1H, SN 52-135263, flown by Major Peter B. Lee, of the 1st Sp Op Sq, 56 Sp Op Wg, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, crashed at 172N 10609E on 28 July 1970 at 2356 (G). Major Lee extracted successfully and was recovered by Jolly Green 30 on 29 July 1970 at 1743 (G). Hobo 20 was the lead A-1 with Hobo 21 as wingman. Normal intelligence, operations and weather briefings were conducted at TUOC. Hobo 20 flight took off at 2215 (G) 28 July 70 on a fragged night strike mission in Steel Tiger. Flight was fragged to Candle 23 for Juliet area. Hobo 20 was directed to hold on the 120 degree radial at 50 to 60 nautical miles off Channel 89. Hobo 20 flight was diverted from holding pattern to work with Nail 81 in Foxtrot.

Jul

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DCMM
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RMS
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PRECEDENCE

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area (Delta 22). The Nail flared the target (trucks) and cleared Hobo flight for strike. Standard night A-1 tactics were employed with Hobo 20 striking while Hobo 21 held high. Hobo 20 made two (2) passes using M-36's. He then changed with Hobo 21 while Hobo 21 made 4 passes expending M-36's and BLU 32's. The flight then changed again and Hobo 20 made 2 passes dropping BLU 32's. He made 2 additional passes firing 20MM. On the 2nd 20MM pass Hobo 20 broke right and down to avoid intense 37MM anti aircraft fire. He next turned left and initiated a climb. Altitude at start of climb was 4,500 ft. At 5,500 ft pilot reported that he was hit once in the right wing and again in the aft fuselage area. The aircraft pitched down (negative G's). Pilot pulled stick aft but got no response. Loss of rudder control was also noted. Pilot next attempted unsuccessfully to contact wingman on UHF radio. The aircraft continued to dive out of control. Pilot jettisoned canopy with emergency jettison switch, locked shoulder harness and pulled "D" ring. Altitude at this time was approximately 4,000 ft. Yankee extraction system functioned as designed. Hobo 20 did not see the gun that shot him down but Hobo 21 reported 37MM firing at him at the time. Hobo 21 reported observing seven (7) 37MM anti aircraft guns firing during the

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1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PHONE

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attack. Major Lee reported many 37MM gun positions firing while he was on the ground. Pilot pick-up was made by a HH-3C and brought back to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. Pilot received only minor cuts and bruises. Weather and crew rest were not a factor. Maj Lee has completed 6 months in SEA, and has flown 99 combat missions in the A-1. There was no significant maintenance history on the lost A-1. This is a combat loss due to intense and accurate hostile fire. GP-4

UCC

TUC

1503

21503

22503

602503

605503

DCM

DCMN

FMS

AHS

MMS

SA

DXI

DSG

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DD FORM 173-1

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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EVASION AND RECOVERY REPORT
RECOVERED INDIVIDUAL

PART I - BACKGROUND

NAME: Petter B. Lee

GRADE: Major

SERVICE NO: [REDACTED]

TYPE AIRCRAFT: A-1H (Hobo, 20)

CREW POSITION: Pilot

EXPERIENCE IN ACFT: 330 Hours 99 Combat missions

SURVIVAL/E&E TRAINING: Arctic Survival School, Ladd AFB; TAC Sea Survival School, Homestead AFB; USA Survival School, Fairchild AFB; PACAF Jungle Survival School, Clark AB; Theater Indoctrination Briefing, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB.

SURVIVAL/E&E EQUIPMENT: Standard vest, plus two extra radio batteries, one water bottle, and a personal survival kit containing fishhooks, line, pins, and waterproof matches.

PREMISSION BRIEFING: On 28 July 1970, Hobo 20 and 21 flight was fraggged as an armed reconnaissance mission in the Steel Tiger operating area. They were briefed on safe areas enroute and in the target area, enemy defenses, E&E code letters, and the CBU-30 codeword. Authentication data were on-file.

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO INCIDENT: On 28 July 1970, Hobo 20 launched from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB as lead aircraft of a two ship formation. They were fraggged as a night armed reconnaissance mission to the Juliette Sector of Steel Tiger, with instructions to contact the FAC Candlestick 23. This FAC had no targets, and Hobo flight was directed to hold on the 120/50 off Channel 89. Nail 81 reported sighting five trucks in the Foxtrot area near Delta 22, and Moonbeam



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diverted Hobo 20 and 21 to the Nail for strike. Maj. Lee described the circumstances as follows:

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"We could see the target clearly, and expended all of our napalm and M-36's on the trucks, destroying one. Some Navy fastmovers then checked in with only a small amount of play time, so we moved out while they bombed the target. After they completed their attack, we went back to finish expending our CBU-14 and 20 MM. I was hit on my third strafing pass."

PART II: DESCRIPTION OF EMERGENCY

Maj. Lee described the emergency as follows: "While pulling out from my third strafing pass I was hit by two 37 MM shells, one in the right wing and one in the aft part of the fuselage. This was at approximately 2356 local. I was in a turn at the time, heading east at about 140 knots airspeed, climbing through 5500 feet. The airplane bucked from both hits, and pitched down. I tried to contact my wingman on the radio, to tell him I was hit and bailing out, but the radio was dead. I had no control over the elevators or rudder, it seemed as if the cables were broken. As I passed through 4500 feet, I locked the shoulder harness, jettisoned the canopy, and pulled the extraction handle." Maj Lee bailed out at 484 XE228020 (171215N - 1060915W).

PART III: EJECTION/BAILOUT

Maj. Lee described his extraction as follows: "My body position was not the best, as I was looking down at the extraction handle rather than having my head back. Helmet and oxygen mask were on, chin strap fastened, with the visor up. The helmet stayed on during extraction. There was no tumbling and the effect of windblast was slight. I was pulled straight up and out of the aircraft (Yankee Extraction System) with the chute deployment being automatic. I was still holding on to the extraction handle with both hands after the chute opened; this probably prevented my arms from flailing. There was some oscillation, but not much.

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I maintained orientation at all times and could see both the river and my aircraft going down, and since I was drifting toward the river I made the four-line cut. The descent took from one to one and one-half minutes. I thought I was much higher than I actually was, so I decided to start my beeper transmitting to let my wingman know I had bailed out. I opened the vest pocket to make sure the radio was set in the beeper position, and this is when I touched down. I couldn't see the ground. As I touched I landed on my feet, pitched forward slightly and caught myself on the side of a steep hill with my hands. I did not fall down at all. As I pitched forward the radio fell out of the open vest pocket, and I lost my two spare radio batteries which were also in the pocket, although I didn't discover this loss until later. The radio itself was tied to the vest with a lanyard.

"I did not deploy the seat pack. The landing was very smooth, in fact it surprised me. I sustained no injuries during extraction, descent, or landing. During the extraction, I lost my water bottle from the pocket of my flying suit, as I had failed to zip the pocket closed after removing a map from it. I also lost some pencils and pens from the pencil pocket."

PART IV: INITIAL ACTION ON GROUND

Maj. Lee described his initial actions on the ground as follows: "As soon as I got on the ground, while I still had the parachute harness on, I picked up the radio and called my wingman. After establishing contact I told him I was OK, and he told me to head away from the chute and hide. I said I would call back in fifteen minutes. I had removed my helmet and placed it at my feet so I could talk on the radio. I must have moved around a bit as I had some difficulty finding it after I got out of my chute.

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"I would say I was still in a state of shock at that time, and I would tell anyone who has a wingman shot down that the first words he says to the survivor can be most important, as at this point he will do exactly what you tell him to do. You might just step by step help him out, tell him to get out of his chute and find a hiding place.

"As I got out of my chute I knew I wanted to get away from the river and the road (912B), and move in a southerly direction up a ridge. I started climbing uphill on all fours to make sure I didn't go running off a cliff. I moved for approximately 200 yards. This took about two hours, with a stop every fifteen minutes to contact my wingman. I used the ear-piece to keep the radio noise down, all during the night and next day I found this to be extremely helpful in my communications, especially when there was ordnance going off or airplanes flying overhead.

"I dug in on top of the ridgeline. Most of the vegetation in the area was light to heavy brush, no trees. Nothing was higher than five or six feet. I had taken with me my vest and helmet, leaving the parachute and seat pack behind. About half way up the ridge I stopped to make a radio call, and I propped my helmet against a log. When I reached to pick it up, it rolled down the hill and I decided not to go back for it. I figured it wouldn't give away the direction of my travel as it landed near my chute.

"Mosquitoes, flies and ants were a problem, and it was quite dry with no sources of water visible. I had no injuries other than a small scratch on the forehead sustained while climbing up the ridge.

"There was enemy activity all around. When I got to the top of the ridge and dug in, things were quiet for quite a while and then I heard voices and talking from what I found out the next morning was a gun position to the north-east of me. Later on I heard trucks rolling into the area: they seemed to be

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laboring under quite a load, and knowing that the terrain was fairly flat along the river bottom they were probably pulling a load or bringing extra guns in. I also heard a tracked vehicle which came in the area or was taken off a flatbed, and it sounded like it was digging or possibly making a gun emplacement. I was not able to conceal myself as well as I would have liked, the cover was quite sparse. Consequently I was quite worried about the enemy troops. I got into an area of brush where, if the enemy approached, I could see the brush moving from quite a distance away and move to one side or the other of a small hill and possibly stay out of sight. During the night I heard shouts and gunfire from perhaps $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile away, well up on the other side of the ridgeline. The closest that any of the enemy troops got to me was when they found my parachute. I could hear that, but not see it, the next morning. I could hear excited voices when they found the chute; they immediately fanned out and started firing their guns in the brush. At one time I heard a voice in English say 'American Pilot you're surrounded, give yourself up'. That was the only time I heard it. They never actually came up the ridge where I was, but at one time during the bombing of the gun positions the troops came up the hillside just to get away from the bombing itself.

"Having flown over the area I knew the SAR was going to be difficult, possibly lasting two or three days. For this reason I started using the radio less and less, so that the batteries would last longer."

PART V: SAR OPERATIONS

Maj. Lee described the SAR operations as follows: "At 0430 local they were on their way, and at 0445 local they were overhead. My contact during the day was with the Nails rather than the Sandy lead, as they were working on other frequencies."

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"Evidently guns had been moved into the area during the night, as there were 57 MM guns directly in front of me, firing single rounds with a large muzzle blast, while the 37 MM guns were firing clips of four or seven rounds. The 23 MM guns were quite evident further on down the line, sounding like machine guns. By using my lensatic compass I could get a bearing on the guns directly in front of me, and pass the information to the Nails when they fired. It required an average of four heavy strikes on each position to silence the guns, and even more for those in caves. I had a problem differentiating between gunfire and delayed CBU going off and also between the WP smoke rockets fired by the Nails to mark targets and 37 MM guns firing. About one o'clock in the afternoon small arms and automatic weapons began firing at all the aircraft as they came through. About 1500 local all the big guns seemed to be silenced, and the SAR moved down to the ground to take care of the small arms and map out the plans for the pickup. The A-1's worked the top of the ridge to the south of me, and the fastmovers came in with CBU and worked the ridge on the north side of the river, and very effectively silenced the rest of the small arms fire. At approximately 1630 local the pickup attempt began when the smoke screen was laid down on both sides of me, forming a corridor for the chopper to reach my position. The Jolly Green came into view about 150 meters away, when he came over the ridge. I got into radio contact with him at this time, and popped my smoke. I guided him in by radio to a hover about 20 feet from my position, then walked to the penetrator and got on. I abandoned my parachute and seat pack on scene."

PART VI: DEBRIEFING OFFICER'S COMMENTS

None

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CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS

The quarter 1 July to 30 September 1970 was a quiet period for the 40th ARRSq as far as rescue missions were concerned. This was due to the rainy season and resultant decrease in strike missions. The 40th did participate in one SAR¹ mission with a first light effort on 29 July. Six of our Buffs² were involved, however the actual pick up was made by an HH-3 from the 37th ARRSq.

(S) Several changes were made in the deployment posture during the quarter. The deployment of two aircraft a day to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB³ continued, however these aircraft were fragged to fly the Tango⁴ orbit instead of the November⁵ orbit. The alert commitment continued at Udon RTAFB⁶ however the method of deployment changed several times. As of the end of the quarter two aircraft and crews rotate every third day. The first two days the crews are on 15 minute ground alert and on the third day they fly the Juliett⁷ orbit and return to Udorn after the orbit. New crews deploy the following day. Although not fragged, we established a backup alert crew and aircraft to fall in on either orbit if one of the scheduled aircraft aborts.

The assigned pilot strength declined considerably during the quarter. As of the end of the quarter there were 26 pilots assigned versus an authorized strength of 38 (67% manned). Based on projected inboundis this situation will not be greatly improved until December.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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planning and security search for the survivors. Ascertaining that the area was void of enemy activity, he marked the area limits with smoke, and vectored the Jolly Green into position over Dipper 01 Alpha. When the penetrator was raised after a sufficient time lapse, Alpha was not on it.

(C) The pick-up for Bravo was then completed without incident.

(C) The On-Scene Commander faced a difficult decision at this point. It was highly possible that Alpha had been captured and the enemy was laying a trap to inflict losses on the SAR forces. The A-1s went into a daisy chain formation, the Jolly Green returned to Alpha's position, and a pararescue team was lowered for a ground search.

(C) The team quickly located Alpha and discovered he was severely injured. There was obvious damage to his legs and back and he was unconscious. The Jolly Green displayed outstanding airmanship by hovering perfectly still for thirty-five minutes while the rescue was accomplished.

(C) The area was free of hostile forces and the only reasonable explanations of Alpha's injuries was that panic caused him to run after the penetrator and fall off a cliff; or perhaps, he was hiding in a tree and was blown out or fell out on the initial approach of the Jolly Green.

(C) On 29 July 1970, a successful SAR for Hobo 20 was conducted.²²

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Hobo 20 was the lead A-1H of a two ship strike formation. He was downed at 2356 L, 28 July 1970, by enemy 37 millimeter AAA fire while striking hostile supply trucks at XE 225 015, one of the most heavily defended route segments, of the Steel Tiger theater.

(C) Once again, plans and preparations were made for a first light effort. 56th Special Operations Wing resources consisted of eight Spad sorties from DaNang; ten Sandy sorties, (four gas sorties, and six smoke sorties) all from Nakhon Phanom.

(C) The survivor recognized the landing area to be exceptionally dangerous and spent his first two hours on the ground crawling and climbing away from his parachute landing site. He was able to maintain radio contact with a night Forward Air Controller who kept the survivor advised of rescue efforts. During the night, Hobo 20 heard large scale enemy activity, truck loads of troops and supplies to prepare for the morning recovery efforts. The survivor finally located a suitable hiding place and bedded down for the night.

(C) With first light, the SAR forces were in the area, but the weather was completely undercast and unworkable. About 1000 L the sky began to clear and fast moving aircraft were called in to strike the enemy gun positions. The defenses of the area were exceptionally heavy, running the entire range from small arms to 57 millimeter AAA. Strikes on these positions continued most of the afternoon.

(C) Sandy 11 was the On-Scene Commander and sustained battle



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damage during the afternoon's activities, but remained on the site to direct the SAR. After continuous pounding of enemy positions, and with daylight diminishing, Sandy 11 decided to attempt an initial pick-up. He directed four A-1s to deliver area denial and personnel incapacitating ordnance around the survivor. Smoke was then delivered to provide a screen for the helicopter run in. All available aircraft then provided suppressive fire and the Jolly Green was directed perfectly into position and Hobo 20 successfully extracted at 1725 L.

(C) On 28 July, Spad 01 and 02 were scrambled from ground alert posture at DaNang to conduct an armed escort mission. The aircraft departed at 1130 L and proceeded enroute to the assigned area. Approximately 60 NM from DaNang while flying at 6,500 feet, Spad 02 flown by Major Otis C. Morgan experienced a propeller regulator problem. After attempting normal corrective action, he jettisoned his external stores and started a return to base. He was unable to maintain altitude and was forced into a shallow dive.²³

(C) About 30 miles from DaNang, Major Morgan realized he would be unable to land and elected to fly the disabled A-1 to the coast and eject over the water. As Spad 02 reached an altitude of 2,500 feet, Spad 01 advised 02 to abandon the aircraft. Major Morgan jettisoned the canopy, but his extraction system failed. Spad 01 began reading the manual bail out procedures, but Major Morgan's aircraft entered a steep right bank and impacted the ground in

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known enemy territory at 1530H, 1600H.²⁴

(C) Spads 11/12 were launched immediately from DaNang for the possible SAR, while Spad 02 remained over the scene. After determining the area was secure, Jolly Green 64 rescue helicopter recovered the remains from the downed aircraft.²⁵

1st Special Operations Squadron:

(S) The mission of the 1st Special Operations Squadron was to provide direct and close air support to all allied ground forces in southeast Asia and to accomplish such other missions as directed by higher headquarters. Specifically, these missions included air cover and close air support for ground operations, direct air strikes on tactical targets, escort for special missions, armed reconnaissance and search and rescue.²⁶

(S) The quarterly flying time accumulated by the Hobos was 2,730.8 hours, during 1,002 sorties. This total reflected an unusual 1,730 flying hour decrease over the previous three month period. The actual sortie completion total was from a scheduled 1,674 sorties in the Skyraider aircraft. Bad weather accounted for the majority of sorties cancelled.

(S) The night strike role of the Hobos was discontinued as of 17 August, for an indefinite period. However, 18 night missions were flown during the remainder of the quarter.

(S) The deactivation of the 22nd Special Operations Squadron

~~SECRET~~

James M. Dixon

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30 April 2002

Mr. Robert LaPointe
7440 Margaret Circle
Anchorage, AK 99518


Dear Bob:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to purchase your history of PJs In Vietnam. It is great to see that someone has been motivated to chronicle the selfless deeds of such a uniquely heroic and exclusive group.

It was my honor and privilege to serve as C.O. of the 40th ARRS at Udorn, Thailand (Aug 67-Aug 68). This unit introduced the HH-53B to its initial combat role. I am glad to say that we suffered no losses of aircraft or personnel, despite working out the bugs in a new bird, while simultaneously performing upgrade training and flying combat missions. Without question, we had great PJs whom I considered to be the cream of the crop. Great guys, one and all, and I hope to see them recognized in the book.

I will be looking forward to reading this special history, and reliving some great memories.

Sincerely,



James M. Dixon
Lt. Col. USAF (Ret)

Email address: jdix42@attbi.com