

17
File
SAR

20 APR 1970

FROM: 602nd SCS (C)/Lt Col Richard

SUBJECT: Iaredo 02A/B SAR

TO: DCO

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 6-7 April 1970 for Iaredo 02A/B. The aircraft, an F-4, went down at approximately 1700 at UG66653. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandy's during the rescue effort.

2. The F-4 was making a run on the interdiction point in that area and took a 37mm hit. The aircraft burst into flames and the pilots ejected immediately landing 1400 meters southeast of the interdiction point on the main supply route of that area. Hockey, a fast mover strike aircraft, took over as On-Scene Commander until the arrival of Raven-48, a T-23 PAC.

3. Sandy 03/04 were flying the Tango orbit and they were notified at 1710 to proceed to the scene. The SAR aircraft which participated in the two-day effort are as follows:

<u>Call sign</u>	<u>Pilot's Name</u>	<u>Takeoff Time</u>
6 April 1970		
Sandy 03	Lt Bullhorn	1710 (from Tango orbit) (Shot down and rescued)
04	Maj Sulley	1710 (Battle damage)
Zorro 22	Capt Holstad	1710 (divert from strike)
23	Lt Engel/Capt Crowder	1710
Sandy 05	Capt Nordhaus	1710 (divert from Nov orbit) (Battle damage)
06	Lt Miller	1710
Hobo 30	Lt Morvant	1720 (divert from strike)
31	Lt Morrison	1720
7 April 1970		
Sandy 01	Capt Nordhaus	0700
02	Lt Miller	0700
03	Lt Wylie	0710
04	Capt Keeling	0710
05	Maj Hanley	0705
06	Lt Howard	0705
07	Lt Col Lowman	0700
08	Col Hanson	0700

Sandy 09	Maj Hoffman	1025(Ground abort first try)
10	Maj Feinich	1025
11	Maj Hoffman	0745(replaced G-09)
12	Lt Coleman	0745
13	Capt Drury	1025
14	Capt Lohd	1025
15	Capt Holder	1235
16	Maj Krueger	1235
17	Capt Crowder	1235
18	Lt Col Miller	1235(IFE-rough engine)
19	Lt Wylie	1420
20	Capt Keeling	1420
Ascar 41	Maj Wilmore	1020
42	Maj Hinkle	1020(IFE-rough engine)
43	Lt Brown	1020(Sym-Ascar 44)
44	Lt Cowger	1020(IFE-rough engine)
45	Capt Bolstad	1250
46	Lt Johann	1250
47	Lt Farrington	1340
48	Lt Heusinkveld	1340
Smoke 21	Maj Aimo	0530
22	Col Morris	0530
23	Capt Bolstad	0530
24	Lt Maloney	0530
25	Lt Col Johnson	1005
26	Lt Doolittle	1005
27	Maj Aimo	1005
28	Col Morris	1005
Strike 61	Capt Madden	0525
62	Capt Skelton	0525
63	Lt Dannelly	0525
64	Lt Brown	Ground Abort
65	Capt Monroe	1000
66	Lt McAuliffe	1000
71	Capt Madden	1115
72	Capt Skelton	1115
73	Lt Dannelly	1115
74	Lt Morrison	Ground Abort

4. The area of the SAR was in one of the very worst locations of the Barrel. Just south of the main interdiction point on the east end of the Ban Ban Valley, it was studded with guns and crawling with ground troops. The main route was just a half mile or less to the north and the interdiction point perhaps three quarters of a mile to the northeast. The survivors landed on the north slope of the hills south of the road. The area is generally mountainous to the south and a mountainous plateau to the north. There were six to seven 37/23mm located within range of the survivors and 4-5 active ZFUs. Weather was not a problem the first evening - fog went down. However it held up the first-light effort until about 0800 when the low fog and stratus broke up so the SAR forces could operate.

5. When Laredo 02 went down, Hockey lead took over as On-Scene Commander. He was soon replaced by Raven 48. It is not known which of them got voice contact with the two survivors, but Sandy 03/04 re-established contact upon arrival on scene at 1725. Sandy 03 confirmed that they were all right and determined their position relative to the chutes which could be easily seen. At that time there was no movement in the survivor's area. During this time, the Sandys were taking considerable AAA and ground fire. Sandy 03 put in Zorro 2/23 but there were too many guns for the Sandys and the one slow mover flight to handle. After getting "honed" viciously on a number of passes in the area, Sandy 03 decided to hold off and wait for the arrival of more ordnance. At 1808, he took a 37mm and when his A-1 burst into flame, he attempted an extraction. The seat failed and he had to crawl over the side at a very low altitude. All was confusion for a while as shortly thereafter, Sandy 04 also took several hits of ground fire. Sandy 04 turned the situation over to Zorro 22 and RFB. Zorro 22 lead, tried to get the Jollys in as he had Sandy 03 located, but it wasn't until Sandy 05, who had just arrived from the November orbit, "latched on" to the Jolly and strongly directed him, was the rescue attempt begun. Adding to the confusion was Raven 48's constant communications with the Laredos, who had suddenly become the secondary effort. The Jolly was finally directed over the survivor and Sandy 03 successfully picked up. Sandy 05 then assumed On Scene Commander for Laredo 02. He located the chutes and while in the process of pin-pointing the survivors, also took several small arms hits. He elected to remain on scene and directed Raven 48 to FAC in a flight of fast movers on several of the guns. But at this point, it was determined that it was too dark to continue so the SAR effort was terminated and Sandy 05 bedded down the survivors with instructions to come up on the radio at 0400.

6. The first light effort was organized and Sandy 01/02 arrived on scene prior to first light. Blindbat 31 had already talked to the survivors and they were still in good condition. The area however, was covered by a blanket of low stratus. Sandy 01 tried to work through a hole but the fast mover aircraft couldn't work under the low ceiling so the effort was stalled until the weather improved. Sandy 01 was relieved by Sandy 07 at a time of improving weather. Sandy 07 spent his time locating guns, supervising the fast mover FAC killing guns and the slow mover FAC in sanitizing the ground area around the survivors. He also requested that all the standby special ordnance be launched. He passed the On Scene responsibility to Sandy 09 about 1115. Sandy 09 continued to supervise the killing of the active guns and the placement of personnel ordnance around the survivors and along the proposed ingress/egress route of the Jolly. Although he had most of the enemy activity suppressed, and the support forces in place and briefed, he was precluded from making an attempt because the Jollys had to leave midway in his tour for an air refueling. He turned over the command to Sandy 15 at approximately 1330. The guns were mostly silenced by now and both Sandy 09 and 15 had agreed that a pickup should be attempted. Sandy 15 moved the support forces close in on the south of the area so they could see it and be briefed on the proposed plan. Basically the plan was to use smoke and what CBU-30 was available (1 load) to screen off the main road on the north and the still somewhat dangerous area to the west. The Jolly would run down a valley to the marked IP and turn to a heading of 045 deg. The smoke birds laid their loads very well and Jolly followed instructions (for once) and when the first survivor, Alpha, popped his smoke, Jolly grabbed him at 12 o'clock. As Alpha went up the penetrator, Bravo popped his smoke and the Jolly moved directly to him and picked him up. The egress was successful.

7. Problems encountered:

A. This SARit was marked by a number of ground and air aborts. It required the SARCO and maintenance to work a lot harder to keep forces on station but apparently there is no solution to this problem.

B. Both Jollys on scene went to refuel at the same time. If one of the forces should go down at that time in a permissive area, no rescue chopper would be on hand to make a pickup. It may be against the principles or procedures of the Jollys to go in alone, but in some cases the option should be available.

C. Two tactics which have not been considered up till now are:

(1) When a survivor has gone down in the afternoon, or the SAR runs two days, we should arrange for either a recce photo, or a Nail photo of the area for use the next day. Recce photos would have to be couriered over here while we should be able to get immediate development locally for the 35mm Nail shots. They would help considerably in briefing the forces on the location of the survivors and enemy defenses.

(2) We should consider interdiction of main routes leading to the area and also the placing of delayed ordnance around the survivors late in the evening. Both would be positive deterrents to enemy activity during the night.


RICHARD E. RICHARD, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: 22nd Sp Op Sq/Lt Col Miller (SAR PROJECT CO)

2 May 1970

SUBJECT: Hostage Man/Cowpoke 18 SAR Report

TO: DCO

1. A partially successful Search and Rescue mission was conducted on 21 - 22 April 1970 for Hostage Man/Cowpoke 18 front and back seat occupants respectively of a Marine CV-10 which went down at 0317Z as a result of enemy groundfire. The survivors were located at 0400 for 60 NM off Channel 72. This report covers those activities related to the Sandys/Spads during the rescue effort.
2. At 0315Z, Spad 11 and 12, Capt Priestad and Lt Coleman were scrambled to the SAR area and arrived at 0345Z. They set up holding points for resources and requested fast movers to work the enemy gun positions with the local area FAC, Covey 04. Radio communication with the survivors was poor. At 0420Z Spad 05 and 06, Major DeTar and Maj Williams, were also scrambled to the area. At 0530Z Hostage Man reported enemy activity in his area and Spads 11, 12, 05 and 06 began putting 20mm and CBU-25 within 50 meters of both survivors. Neither pilot was more than 25 meters from his chute which provided good reference points. The survivors reported hearing automatic weapons fire, but troop activity had ceased. At 0645Z, Spad 11 and 12 were forced to RTB to DaNang for fuel leaving Spad 05 as On-Scene Commander. At 0715Z, Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 who had scrambled from NKP were in the SAR area and Spad 05 began briefing Sandy 01 preparatory to his assuming on-scene command. As yet, no pickup had been attempted, since groundfire was still quite heavy. Sandy 01 located two ZPU guns, and as he marked the guns, Sandy 01 was hit by at least three 37mm projectiles. He had an immediate loss of control, and the cockpit was engulfed in flames as the engine quit. Sandy 01 extracted at 0723Z. At this time, Spad 05 had to RTB to DaNang for fuel.
3. Sandy 01, although subjected to heavy small arms fire while in his descent, made a safe landing approximately 150 meters from the other two survivors. Spad 05 took Sandy 02 on his wing and dispatched Sandy 03 and 04 to escort Jolly Greens 77 and 68 into the area for an immediate attempt to pickup Sandy 01. Spad 05 used the smoke available and directed Sandy 01 to use his mirror. Although Sandy 01 did not believe his mirror to be effective because of the sun angle and terrain masking, the rescue forces stated it was very effective. Unfortunately Hostage Man and Cowpoke 18 flashed their mirrors at the same time causing some confusion. This confusion caused the Jolly to flounder in the threat area for an unnecessarily long time and as a result, the rescue helicopter was hit with groundfire and a PJ wounded. At about the same time Sandy 03 was hit and began trailing smoke. He exited the area to the south accompanied by Sandy 02 and 04. Sandy 03 was able to stay with his aircraft until reaching a relatively safe area and extracted at 0758Z. At this time the rescue force was in a

state of disarray and the problem further compounded with two more survivors on the ground. Spad 05 directed Jolly Green 68 to Sandy 03 who had landed in waist deep water in a creek. He was safely picked up at 0808Z. Spad 05 was critically short of fuel and called Sandy 05 into the area to relieve him as On-Scene Commander. While trying to point the location of Sandy 01 whose chute had been blown from the trees on the abortive rescue attempt, Spad 05 was hit by a 12.7mm API round which exploded in the cockpit. Spad 05 immediately withdrew and recovered safely at DaNang.

4. Sandy 05, Maj Martin, and Sandy 06, Lt. Miller, found Sandy 01 and the original survivors in an area of heavy growth that was surrounded by roads. The distance to the roads varied from one-half to one kilometer. All the roads were heavily defended by weapons including 37mm, 23mm, 14.5mm, 12.7mm, Quad 50s, automatic weapons and numerous small arms. The most heavily defended areas were to the north, east, and west. The southern road was the least heavily defended and thus afforded the safest direction for the pickup approach. Sandy 05 had previously pinpointed the location of Hostage Man and Cowpoke 18 from mirror signals, but he still did not have an exact position on Sandy 01. By making low passes over the area and maintaining radio communication with Sandy 01, Sandy 05 was able to establish his position, locate several guns which he had a Covey FAC work with fast mover strikes, and survey likely ingress routes for the Jolly Greens. Sandy 05 brought the rescue helicopters with Sandy escorts into an area relatively close to the survivors thus permitting them to observe the proceedings. While pointing out the ingress route to Sandy 07, Sandy 05's aircraft was hit by heavy groundfire causing a loud explosion. Sandy 06 spotted the gun which had hit Sandy 05, and 05 and 06 proceeded to silence the guns. Sandy 05 directed strikes along the ingress and egress routes, then brought the Smoke and Special stores aircraft in for the pickup briefing. His plan was to lay smoke along the roads to the north, west, and east masking the survivors and the approach route from the enemy defenses. Sandy 05 marked the area which he wanted masked with smoke rockets. The plan was for Sandy 05 and 07 to lead in Jolly Green 82 for a pickup of Sandy 01. Spad 11, who had relaunched from DaNang and was familiar with the location of the CV-10 survivors, was to bring in Jolly Green 83 for a double pickup once Sandy 01 was out. The smoke screen was perfect, and Sandy 05, 06, and 07 set up a protective daisy chain around Jolly Green 82. At this time Sandy 05's aircraft was again hit by a ripple of ground fire damaging some of his radio equipment; however, the pickup was successful and Sandy 01 was rescued at 1025Z. By this time the smoke screen had drifted over Hostage Man and Cowpoke 18, and the second Jolly Green, unable to visually acquire the survivors position, was forced to withdraw. Darkness was now rapidly approaching, and although he was below bingo fuel, Sandy 05 recognized that if a rescue was going to be successful, it would have to be attempted immediately. Only through use of position lights were the aircraft able to maintain visual contact in the fading light. Although resources were now limited, Sandy 05 felt that darkness might provide the necessary shield, so he called in Jolly Green 70, but the ground fire was too intense; the helicopter was hit and withdrew with one crewmember wounded. Sandy 05 and 06, critically short of fuel recovered at DaNang while Sandy 09 and 10 escorted the helicopters home.

5. In the interest of clarity a chronological sequence of events is provided to this point.

0317Z - Hostage Man/Cowpoke 18 reported down.
 0345Z - Spad 11 On-Scene Commander. no attempted pickup.
 0645Z - Spad 05 On-Scene Commander.
 0723Z - Sandy 01 hit and extracted.
 0750Z - Spad 05 attempted pickup of Sandy 01. Jolly Green hit, PJ wounded - unsuccessful.
 0758Z - Sandy 03 hit and extracted.
 0808Z - Spad 05 with Jolly Green 68 rescued Sandy 03.
 0810Z - Spad 05 hit, RTB'd DaNang.
 0810Z - Sandy 05 On-Scene Commander.
 1025Z - Sandy 05 with Jolly Green 82 rescued Sandy 01.
 1030Z - Rescue attempt for Hostage Man/Cowpoke 18 aborted.
 1045Z (Approximate) - Sandy 05 and Jolly Green 70 attempted pickup of OV-10 crew. J.G. 70 hit and withdrew.
 1050Z (Approximate) - All forces RTB.

6. The status of the A-1 forces at the end of the first day, 21 April was as follows:

SORTIES

GENERATED
 34

FLOWN
 32 (1 A/A)

LOSSES

Sandy 01 Acft 336

Sandy 03 Acft 070

BATTLE DAMAGE

Sandy 01 Acft 286

Sandy 05 Acft 257

Spad 05 Acft 779

(J.G. 77 or 68 W/1 WLA

J.G. 70 W/1 WLA)

NKP SORTIES RECOVERED AT DANANG

Sandy 02
 Sandy 01

Sandy 05
 Sandy 06

Sandy 07
 Sandy 08

7. Shortly after the final pickup attempt the forces RTB'd and the survivors were bedded down for the night. Planning for a first light effort began, with the Sandy role to be played by the Spads and the Sandys who had recovered at DaNang with support forces to be furnished from NKP. The initial requirement was for eight Grubby, later reduced to four, and four Smoke aircraft to be on scene at first light. No requirement was levied on the 54th GOW for Strike aircraft.

8. Spad 11, Lt Colonel Wold, Spad 12, Lt Blanchard, Spad 01, Capt Priestad, and Spad 02, Major Williams arrived on scene at 2230Z only to find the weather overcast. Intermittent radio contact was established with both survivors. At 0130Z the Spads were forced to RTB for fuel, and Grubby 31-34 also RTB to Channel 82 without expending. Smoke 21-24 as well as Sandys 01-04 had been diverted to work the Adlib SAR and were successful in recovering the one survivor. The Adlib SAR is covered in a separate report, but is mentioned here, because of the diversion of some of the resources that had previously been allocated to the Hostage Man/Cowpoke 18 SAR.

9. Spad 09, Capt Hanna and Spad 10 took on-scene command at 0130Z. The weather by this time was 4500' scattered to broken with some rainshowers in the area. Spad 09 was able to establish radio contact with Cowpoke 18 but not with Hostage Man. Cowpoke 18 reported hearing an enemy patrol to the southwest, so fast mover strikes were put in by Covey 253 and 297 around the survivor. The fast movers were not picking up ground fire, and Spad 09 made a number of low passes through the area unopposed. Spad 09 then decided to attempt a pickup and prepared and briefed his forces. Smoke 25, 26, and 27 laid the smoke screen and Spad 09 took Jolly Green 83 in for the pickup attempt. The Jolly was a little late and the smoke began to drift over the survivors. At this point the Jolly became confused and made a wrong turn losing precious time. JG 83 thought he was hit, lost the survivor in the smoke and withdrew. The Grubby flight, 36-38, had reached bingo fuel and were unavailable for the pickup attempt.

10. At 0420Z Spads 11, 12, 01, and 02 with the crews who had been on scene at first light arrived in the SAR area, and Spad 11 assumed on-scene command. From 0435Z to 0605Z, Covey 297 put in fast movers with napes, high drags, and CBW-24 on the gun positions. In addition to the Spads, Smoke 61-64, Grubby 41, 42, 45, 46 and Jolly Greens 82/83 were in the area. Nail 57, carrying a survival package was also present. Spad 11 had the Smokes execute followed by the Grubby then vectored Jolly Green 83 in for the successful rescue of Cowpoke 18 at approximately 0630Z. During the pickup Spad 01 was hit in the right wing by 23mm and caught fire. He extracted at 0645Z and was immediately picked up by Jolly Green 82. Spad 12 had taken a hit in his engine and Spad 11 escorted him back to DaNang. Spad 02 escorted Jolly Greens 82 and 83 back to DaNang also. There was no further contact with Hostage Man, and Cowpoke 18 reported that he had probably been found by the enemy patrol.

11. The chronological sequence of events for the final day of the SAR, 22 April, is as follows:

- 2230Z - Spad 11 On-Scene Commander, no pickup attempt due to weather.
- 0130Z - Spad 09 replaced Spad 11 as On-Scene Commander. Attempted pickup of Cowpoke 18 but aborted due to smoke obscuration.
- 0420Z - Spad 11 relieved Spad 09 as On-Scene Commander.
- 0630Z - Spad 11 and Jolly Green 83 successfully rescued Cowpoke 18.
- 0640Z - Spad 01 and Spad 12 took battle damage.
- 0645Z - Spad 01 extracted and was immediately rescued by Jolly Green 82.
- 0650Z - All forces RTB assuming Hostage Man had been found by the enemy.

12. The status of the A-1 Force upon completion of the SAR was as follows. The figures outside the brackets are totals for 22 April. The figures in the brackets are the totals for both days.

SORTIES

GENERATED
58 (92) (3 G/A)

FLOWN
43 (73) (1 A/A)

LOSSES

Spad 01 Aircraft 015
(3)

BATTLE DAMAGE

Spad 12 Aircraft 738
(1)

NKP AIRCRAFT RECOVERED AT DANANG/UEON

Grubby 41/42/45/46

Smoke 63/64

Spad 13/14

13. Several problems were noted on this SAR. Some are recurring and some are new.

a. FIRST-LIGHT SORTIES. It has been the practice for first light SARs to send Smoke and Grubby aircraft into the SAR area at first light even though the effort may have been heavily opposed on the previous day. It should be recognized on protracted SARs that there are several hours of softening defenses required after first light before a pickup may be attempted. Invariably the Smoke and Grubby aircraft RTB without expending. This causes an unnecessary drain on aircraft and crews.

RECOMMENDATION. On those SARs which are opposed and run into first light efforts, Smoke and Grubby aircraft should be put on alert at first light. The On-Scene Commander should anticipate the time he plans to attempt a pickup and should advise King, who in turn should relay to the 56th SOW so that the support aircraft may be launched in sufficient time. This does not apply for SARs which begin during the night and enemy defenses are unknown. In those cases the support forces should be in place at first-light or shortly thereafter for a quick pick up, if possible.

b. REQUIREMENT TO RTB TO NKP. In the case where Spad 09 attempted a pickup on 22 April, he did not have the use of the Grubby flight since they had been told to RTB to Channel 89.

RECOMMENDATION. For those SARs conducted at places far removed from home base, consideration should be given to recovering forces at the nearest suitable base with turn around capability. Facilities at the turn around base should be predetermined and prearranged. This procedure would save time on station and thus reduce the number of sorties required.

FROM: CO2nd SOG/Lt Col Richmond


1 May 1970

SUBJECT: SAR for "Ad Lib 11"

TO: DCO

1. A successful SAR was conducted on 22 April 1970 for Ad Lib 11. The aircraft, an AC-130 went down at 0220L, 22 April 1970 at 070/23/72 (UTMXC982420). This report covers those activities relating to the rescue forces during the effort.
2. The aircraft took a direct AAA hit and immediately burst into flames. Ad Lib 11 was in the rear of the plane near the ramp and barely had time to don a parachute and bail out. He suffered several severe burns about his face and body. The other crew members were presumed to be lost with the aircraft. A first-light brief was organized immediately to enable the Sandy forces to arrive there at first light. Very little information was known at the time of the briefing other than the call sign, location, and that one survivor had come up on the radio.
3. The following aircraft and pilots participated:

<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>Takeoff Time</u>	<u>Delays</u>
Sandy 01	Lt Matthews	0452L	
02	Lt Brown	0452	
03	Lt Bertrand	0455	
04	Lt Bender	0455	
Smoke 21	Col Ransom	0522	
22	Capt Kennedy	0522	
23	Capt Crowder	0522	
24	Lt Shannon	0522	
Covey 237	Unk	Unk	
Covey ?	Replaced C-237, but Sandy 01 couldn't remember C/S.		



Sandy 01/02 arrival on scene was 0600L.

4. The terrain was rollings hills creased by numerous creek and river beds. The defenses were unknown but the Covey FAC said that there were numerous ZPU, 23/37mm on a main route 5-8 miles to the north. As it turned out, there were no defenses ever discerned in the immediate area of the scene. The weather was clear of clouds but the visability was restricted to about seven miles. The winds were calm.
5. Covey 237 had established voice contact with the single survivor just prior to the arrival of Sandy 01/02 on scene. He had also located the parachute but had not been able to yet pin-point the survivor's location. Covey had also picked up some C-130-striker aircraft and a replacement FAC.

6. Sandy 01 received a briefing on the area and the location of the chute from Covey 237 upon arriving at the scene. He then took over as on scene commander and established voice contact with the survivor. Ad Lib 11 said he was generally all right, except for the burns, and that he had not detected any enemy movement in the area during the night. Sandy 01 made several passes over the area until he had definitely established the location of Ad Lib 11 a short distance up the slope from his parachute. Sandy directed the Covey PAC to put in the fast movers on several roads in the area and in general, around the survivor. He briefed the Smoke 21 flight on where he wanted their ordnance placed and Sandy 03/04 and the Jollys concerning the ingress, pickup, and egress procedures.

7. The pickup turned out to be a model pickup with the Smoke flight making a three-sided box into which the Jolly progressed from his IP. The survivor popped his smoke on command and it was immediately spotted by Jolly. The pickup was similarly uneventful, but most importantly, successful. There was no ground fire detected during the pickup operation, however Sandy 01 did take one small arms hit.

8. No problems. As Sandy 01 stated in his report, "when you have four Lieutenants running the show, how can you miss."


RICHARD E. MICHAUD, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~SECRET~~

FILED

FROM: 1808C

SUBJECT: SAR Report - Stormy 03

TO: DCO

PROJECT CORO

25 Apr 70

VEST

DO NOT DESTROY

No. 0239220

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 23 April 1970 for Stormy 03 A&M. The aircraft, an F-4, went down at approximately 0500Z at UTM 40-770000 or 010/45/72. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.
2. Stormy 03 was hit by enemy ground fire at approximately 0500Z on the 23 of April and both aircrew were required to eject shortly afterward. Very little was known prior to the initial launch of Sandy 01 & 02 due to the fact that no one actually had made contact with the survivors. Contact was made shortly afterward however and both survivors were determined to be in good shape.
3. Sandys 01 & 02 were scrambled at 0504Z and were airborne at 0520Z. At 0520Z Sandys 03 through 06 were scrambled and they were airborne at 0530Z and 0543Z. Spads 11 and 12 were scrambled from Channel 77 to escort Jolly Green 42 and 22 into the area. Two more Jolly Greens were ordered out of Channel 70 and two from Channel 108. These four additional Buffs were to rendezvous over Channel 89 and proceed into the southern November orbit area with Sandy 05 & 06 as escorts. Nail 51 was appointed On-Scene Commander and was assisted by Nail 06. No jet resources were utilized however they available on a rotating basis. Four Smoke, 4 Whippy and 4 additional Sandys were ordered generated but never participated.
4. The area where the survivors were located was hilly karst in rather dense jungle. Elevation was approximately 2800' and some 5 kilometers from any major trail segment. There was no known defenses in the immediate vicinity and a friendly ground team was established somewhere in the surrounding area. Weather at the time of the crash was low stratus with bases 300 to 400' but was starting to break up somewhat by the time Sandy 01 & 02 arrived.
5. Nail 51, being familiar with the area let down under the cloud deck and established the location of both survivors and was able to lead Sandy 01 into the area to further pinpoint their exact position. No strikes were put in the area due to the presence of friendly troops and the fact that no opposition had been encountered.
6. No action had been taken prior to the arrival of the Sandys except to locate the position of the survivors and determine their position. All necessary rescue resources were ordered by King 06 and all were enroute to the scene.
7. Sandy 01 & 02, through the aid of Nail 51, pinpointed the survivors and expended only one Willie Pete bomb to mark the location in case the weather closed in. Determining that there were no active defenses and weather improving to the point that a pick up could be made Sandy 01 called in only

~~SECRET~~

1808-70-000011 GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

one Jolly Green, 42, and had the remaining forces stay on top of the now thinning cloud deck. Mail 06 led Jolly 42 into the area and Sandy 01 directed him over the survivor. The pick up was made at 0720Z on Alpha and 0727Z on Bravo. The details of the actual pick up are described in the attached statement by Major Martin, Sandy 01.

8. There still appears to be a communication problem between the Blue Chip and the rescue forces. Initially there were too many Sandys scrambled and two of them had to egress from the scene to an area some 80 miles distant to rendezvous with the Jollys. The requirement should have been foreseen and Sandys 03 through 06 could have been sent directly to a rendezvous point with the Jolly Greens thus eliminating the confusion of trying to generate additional resources or diverting other strike aircraft from a fringed mission to do the job. The total resource requirement should have been studied then a plan made instead of the reverse.

9. The telephone system in the SAR does need redistribution so that the SARCO has an outlet to JACK. As of now the only outlet to that is on the unit by the Combat Ops duty officer. The same applies to the project line for the duty officer.

10. Since the SAR was completed with no opposition there are no awards recommended however the Mails 06 and 51 should be commended for an outstanding effort in extremely adverse weather conditions. Further Jolly Green 42 should be commended for his efforts during the actual pick up.

Wallace E. Lowman
WALLACE E. LOWMAN, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander/SARCO

2 Atchs.

1. Statement, Sandy 01
Major Martin, 1S03

2. Resources generated and used.

2

1S03-70-000011

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

CATALOGED

FROM: Sandy 01/02/1/Lt Harvey/Capt Tarnowski 09530

6 May 70
WEST

SUBJECT: SAR Report on Falcon 93 Alpha/Bravo

DO NOT

TO: SARCO/Lt Colonel Lowman/18036

No. 0239221

1. On 2 May 1970 at approximately 0910 Local a special mission into North Vietnam had been initiated calling for Sandys 01 through 04 and Jolly Greens 83 and 79 to maintain the SAR November orbit, with Spade 11 and 12 and Jolly Greens 35 and 87 on the India orbit. Sandys 01 and 02 launched at 0850 with Sandys 03 and 04 right behind us. We were on station at 0905. While monitoring the strike frequency we first received word of the downing of Falcon 93, escorting Swameo, at approximately 1040. Sandy 01 and Sandy 02 immediately proceeded toward the crash site having been given the survivors' position as 310 degree radial for 36 NM off Channel 103 by King 04, estimating a TOT of 1100 Local.
2. We were 5 minutes out from the crash site when King 04 appointed Sandy 01 as on scene commander. Spad 11 and 12 arrived on scene a couple minutes ahead of Sandy 01 and 02 and immediately started a search to locate the two survivors, Falcon 93 Alpha and Bravo. On scene command then switched from Sandy 01 to Spad 11. The survivors were located in a moderately vegetated area 10-20 feet high consisting of scrub trees and elephant grass. The area was laced with single lane roads and foot paths with a series of main transportation routes and river just 100 meters to the east and south of the survivors. The weather was clear and visibility unrestricted in the immediate survivors' area with cumulus buildups south along the mountains near the DMZ.
3. After contacting King Sandys 01 and 02 were cleared to Channel 103 to pickup Jolly Greens 35 (H-3) and 87 (H-53). We rendezvoused 15 minutes later at 1125 Local with the Jolly Greens on the 270 degree radial for 15 NM off Channel 103, escorting them to the 270 degree radial for 26 NM before turning them north. While escorting the Jolly Greens north across the DMZ, Spad 11 and 12 went Bingo fuel requiring immediate replacements. At the same time Spad 03 and 04 checked in with King King 04 reporting their position as just west of Channel 10. On scene command was again given back to Sandy 01. Within a couple of minutes I was back in the survivors' area receiving a quick briefing from Spad 11. Spad with help from Bucket (F-105) had located a chute belonging to one of the survivors of Falcon 93, but neither Alpha or Bravo's exact location had been found. Before Spad 11 egressed the area, I had them strike a gun position west of the SAR area.
4. Immediately after assuming on scene command, I made a series of low passes while talking to each survivor checking on his condition and E I E aids available. I found out that both Alpha and Bravo were in good condition and each had two flares while only Bravo had a signal mirror. No sign of troop movement could be noted on any of the roads or trails. Alpha reported that he had heard a repeated homing beacon increasing in intensity whenever he would transmit on Guard frequency. The homing beacon signal was never coming from the same

~~SECRET~~

1808-70-000013

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

place twice, but no ground movement could be heard. Bravo also reported no ground movement in his area.

5. I then initiated my search for each individual starting with Alpha. He had hidden himself in a thicket area and could not get a visual on my aircraft. He could only relate his position to me each time I passed overhead to the engine noise of my aircraft and to his chute which he said was still in the trees, giving me a vague idea of his general area. At this point I asked Bravo to come up on the radio and Alpha to standby. Before actually trying to pinpoint Bravo, Bucket, who was still overhead, came in and made a pass at what he thought to be Bravo's position. The most I could get out of it was that Bravo was also located near the one visible chute. Bravo reported having an occasional visual on my aircraft, as I flew an orbit around him. I then continued flying an ever decreasing orbit until I had his general area pinpointed. Bravo then brought out his signal mirror and was able to signal me without any problem. After picking up his signal mirror I had him continue to signal for two to three minutes until I had a good fix on his location, so that I would be able to find it again if I had to exit and reenter the area. By this time Sandy 02 was back in the survivors' area overhead, after leaving Spad 03 and 04 with Jolly Greens 35 and 37. Sandy 02 had a visual on the chute and Bravo's general area but never a visual on the signal mirror.

6. Having pinpointed Bravo's position I set out to look for Alpha again. Alpha gave his position as 15 meters southwest of his chute. Not really knowing for certain to whom the one visible chute belonged, I assumed it to be Alpha's due to the general plot I had on him and went from there. This plot put Alpha about 50 meters southwest of Bravo's position. I had figured on a radius of distance between the two survivors of from 50 to 75 meters after determining their general areas.

7. Presently we had three sets of fast movers overhead, Spads 03 and 04, escorting Jolly Greens 35 and 37, and Sandys 05 and 06 10 minutes out. At 1210 the Jolly Greens made a call stating that they would need to be air refueled at 1230 Local. The time required to escort the Jolly Greens to a refueling area, refuel, and escort them back into the SAM area would have been too long to leave the survivors on the ground, so I immediately initiated a rescue attempt.

8. To mark the area for the Spads and Jolly Greens orbiting 5 miles away I had Sandy 02 drop some CBU-22 from 3000' MSL. Since there was no FAC available, I then had Sandy 02 take the fastmovers up the main route to the north to strike. While calling for Spad 03 to come into the area I fired a WP rocket to mark the general survivors area, and from that gave Spad 03 a heading to the chute and survivors' positions. Spad 03 acquired the positions without any problem and immediately exited the area to pick up Jolly Green 35 and escort him into the area. While Spad 04 continued to orbit with Jolly Green 37, Spad 03 brought Jolly Green 35 in high over the main route to the southwest of the area and let down a couple miles west.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

9. After Spad 03 had left the area, I briefed the survivors on the pickup telling them to be ready with the smoke and radios. Bravo acknowledged, but it was not until Jolly Green 35 was in position and ready to begin his run in that Alpha came up on the radio to acknowledge my call. During this period of time I dropped two WP bombs. One 500 meters west of the survivors and another 100 meters east of Bravo. The one to the west went off armed, and the one to the east went off safe. The wind was directly out of the west causing no problem. Just before briefing Jolly Green 35 I called Sandy 02 to join us in the daisy-chain, but I got no response. I found later that Sandy 02 had been striking some trucks himself after PACing in the fast-movers. He had destroyed one truck and damaged another setting off a large POL fire when he sighted an Armored Personnel Carrier loaded with troops heading south on the main route about 250 meters north of the survivors' location. His first pass on the APC stopped it and with his succeeding passes he was able to destroy it killing the troops on board. I continued on with the pickup attempt briefing Jolly Green 35 and Spad 03 on FM and then checking them in on Guard. Using a direct run in heading of 070 degrees after reaching the IP point brought Jolly Green 35 directly into the immediate survivors' area. I had called Alpha to pop his smoke when Jolly Green 35 was 100 meters out, but since Alpha had delayed in popping it, I had the chopper hover southwest of the survivors on his run in till we had a visual on the smoke. After Alpha popped his flare and the smoke appeared, it showed him to be a good 75 meters northeast of the visible chute. I had no problem vectoring Jolly Green 35 into Alpha's immediate area. Once the chopper was almost overhead of Alpha I had him pop the night end of his flare. Jolly Green 35 by this time had a visual on Alpha and was hovering for the pickup. As soon as Jolly Green 35 had Alpha on board, I had him do a 180 degree turn to a heading of 210 degrees for 40-45 meters to Bravo's position having Bravo pop the night end of his flare. Bravo had already ignited the day end of his first flare as he heard Jolly Green 35 pass directly overhead while running in to pick up Alpha. Vectoring in Jolly Green 35 the remaining distance to Bravo's position and the successful pickup of Bravo was accomplished in a minimal amount of time. I did observe some small arms fire while making the pickups from 100 meters south of the survivors at the edge of a tree line near a storage area.

10. Egress from the area was the same as ingress except for crossing the main route to the south. We crossed to the east of the ingress route and did receive heavy and very accurate 23mm fire bursting at our altitude (5500-6000 Ft). After crossing the main route structure we continued south till crossing the DMZ then headed east out over the coast. The Jolly Greens 35 and 87 then refueled once over the water with Sandys 01 and 02 escorting them to Channel 77.

11. I feel that most everyone participating in the SAR did an outstanding job. Time seemed to be the most important factor in this SAR. I honestly believe that had Jolly Greens 35 and 87 had to leave the area and refuel that it might have been too late to rescue the survivors due to the possibility of troop movement into the area. Sandy 02 did such an outstanding job in all areas and should be commended for his work. His role as a FAC and strike aircraft in destroying the APC was indeed instrumental in allowing the SAR forces those extra few minutes to effect an almost unopposed rescue. He also handled all

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

the radio calls with King 04 before I assumed on scene commander after I lost my VHF transmitter on first entering the SAR area. Spad 11 along with the help of Bucket (F-105) had narrowed the survivors' area down and had found one of their chutes. Bucket stayed overhead the whole SAR effort aiding me innumerable times making a low pass on the survivors' location and aiding in receiving and relaying transmissions from the survivors that I was unable to receive. Spad 03 did an outstanding job in quickly locating the survivors' general area and individually bringing the choppers into the pickup area. Jolly Green 35 was also very effective and did an outstanding and professional job. He had no problems following my directions and kept radio communications at a minimum until he was in each survivors' area. He effected the pickup of each survivor in a minimum of time and covered the area without any problem. When receiving ground fire crossing the route structure he aided in calling it out whenever observed. Such professional efforts as displayed by Sandy 02, Spad 03 and Jolly Green 35 were paramount in effecting the rescue of Falcon 93 Alpha and Bravo.

12. Areas of concern involved Spad 11 accepting on scene command when he was so near Bingo fuel. This resulted in another on scene command change causing a valuable loss of time. Whether he be a Sandy or a Spad, every on scene commander has responsibilities to the survivor and must evaluate the situation judiciously. King 04 was making calls on UHF guard frequency when Spad 11 was on scene commander that should have been handled through Spad 12 on VHF. King has no need to use Guard as long as the on scene commander has a wingman with good radios. Sandy 01 and 02 should have been orbiting east of the main route structure in Laos instead of on the November orbit. It would have cut their time to on scene in half. When special missions as these are in operation any change in the Sandy schedule should be arranged prior to take-off or on station times. Refueling times for the Jolly Greens during orbit has to be worked out to increase the effectiveness of their on station time. In summary, I would like to state that even though the above problem areas were encountered, the overall rescue operations was accomplished in a most professional manner.

George C. Harvey
GEORGE C. HARVEY, 1/LT, USAF
Sandy 01

Sandy 01	1/LT Harvey, 1803	Jolly 35	Capt Tobbin
" 02	Capt Tarnowski, 1803	" "	Capt Wicks
Spad 11	1/LT Roberts, Channel 77	Bucket (F-105)	Channel 95
" 12	1/LT Engelbrechtson "	Tadchi RTAFB, Thailand	
" 03	1/LT Solomon "		
" 04	Major Williams "	Falcon 93 Alpha	Capt Bodenheim
		" Bravo	1/LT Jackman
Jolly 87	Unknown		

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: 18000/1st Lt Bender/Sandy 01

PROJECT 8 May 1970

WEST

SUBJECT: SAR Report - Nail 28

TO: 18000/SANCO

DO NOT DESTROY

No.

023916

1. A successful rescue was conducted on May 70 for Nail 28. The aircraft an OV-10, went down approximately 1800, 7 May 70 at 123/126/89. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.

2. A first light effort was pre-briefed at Channel 89 with all Sandys and Jolly Greens present. Nail 28 had taken ground fire and was on fire. He managed to get into some high ground about a mile off the route structure before jumping out. His actual position was about 10 - 15 miles east of that reported at the briefing.

3. The briefing was at 0300 and Sandys 1 & 2 launched at 0410 with 3, 4, 5, & 6 getting airborne shortly thereafter. 1 & 2 went directly to the scene while 3 & 4 escorted Jollys 60 & 56. Sandys 5 & 6 escorted Jollys 54 & 52. Nail 51 and Nail 17 arrived in the SAR area at about 0445 and Sandys 1 & 2 arrived at about 0500.

4. The general area was high ground with peaks up to 4400 feet. Weather was generally good with patchy ground fog in the area. As the SAR continued an overcast deck about 8000 feet moved into the area but was of no factor. There was one rather high ridge line (about 3500 feet) between the survivor and Route 92B. The defenses in the immediate area were expected to be nothing larger than small arms and automatic weapons.

5. Nail 51 and 17 both conducted electronic search before Sandy 01 arrived. The electronic search was continued until Nail 17 finally picked up the Survivor Beeper about 15 miles east of the original briefed position.

6. Nail 17 and 51 directed Sandy 01 into the area. Bad radios were hampering the effort but Sandy 01 finally found the area. There was no problem getting a good position on the survivor as he was still hanging in the harness and his chute was clearly visible in the green foliage. The survivor reported he was firmly caught in the trees as he had tried several times to shake his chute loose. He said his condition was good and he sounded in good spirits. The whole slope was very heavily foliated. The survivor was approximately 300 meters down a 600 meter slope. At the bottom of the slope was a stream and several cleared areas indicating signs of activity. Nail 51 reported he saw Nail 17 take small arms on one pass to the south of the scene. Sandy 01 began to troll around the area with rockets while Sandy 02 and the Nails watched for flashes and the survivor listened for gunfire. After 10 minutes of trolling nothing had been observed.

7. Sandy 01 informed King to have Sandys 01 & 04 and Jolly 40 & 56 to move into the area. Radio problems again hampered the coordination but the Nails took up the slack. Nail 51 went out to pick-up Sandys 03 & 04 and the Jollys. Nail 17 climbed over the area to an altitude where he could get TACAN positions

1805-70-000015

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

for the forces to proceed to. Sandy 03 came into the area. Sandy 01 showed him the survivor position and directed he and 04 to put ordnance down between the bottom of the slope and the survivor while the Jolly made his attempt. Sandy 01 and 02 would stay near the Jolly expending judiciously and would wait for any call of ground fire. Sandy 03 went back to bring the Jolly to the top of the ridge where he could safely hold and observe while Sandy 01 briefed for the attempt. Sandy 02 put a smoke down on the top of the ridge and the Jolly moved to this position. Sandy 01 put down a M-47 (RP) bomb about 500 meters down the slope. Earlier a temperature and pressure altitude had been obtained. The survivor was about 2900 feet. Sandy 01 directed Jolly 60 to descend down the slope toward the smoke. Passing 3500 feet the Jolly would turn back toward the slope. Jolly 60 acknowledged and started down the slope. Sandys 03 & 04 proceeded to beat up the valley. The Jolly made the turn and Sandy 01 directed the survivor to pop his smoke. Jolly 60 had no trouble picking up the smoke and chute. He moved into hover and Sandy 01 and 02 began to expend around the hovering chopper. Sandys 03 & 04 had completely smoked off the valley floor and Jolly 60 received no ground fire. Jolly 60 reported he had the survivor aboard. Sandy 01 directed him to climb back up the slope and the Sandys put ordnance around and ahead of the egressing chopper.

8. Radios proved to be our biggest problems in this effort. Several radio calls were missed by several aircraft because of bad radios. Generally, the effort was unopposed, however some ground fire was encountered as Sandy 04 took a small arms hit during the attempt.

9. The permissiveness of the area of course made the quick pick-up possible. Sandy 01 kept the survivor advised of the position of the SAR forces. Also, the conversation was directed to keep the survivor's mind on other things besides his predicament. His spirits remained high during the effort.

James E Bender

JAMES E. BENDER, 1st Lt, USAF
Sandy 01

Sandy 01 Lt Bender, 1808
Sandy 02 Lt Miller, 1808
Sandy 03 Maj Hoffman, 22808
Sandy 04 Lt Howard, 22808
Sandy 05 Lt Matthews, 602808
Sandy 06 Maj Evenston, 602808
Mail 17 Capt Wallace 23TASS
Mail 51 Capt Withers (Ubon)
Mail 28 Capt Taylor (Ubon)
Jolly Green 56
" " 60
" " 54
" " 52

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

112 8/11
22 MAY 1970 893-2
22

FROM: 602503

SUBJECT: SAR Coordinator Report Bullwhip 17 Alpha and Bravo, 19 May 1970

TO: DCO

1. A successful SAR was conducted on 19 May 1970 for Bullwhip 17 Alpha and Bravo. The aircraft, an USAF RFAC from Udorn, went down at 0710Z at 075/42/108, UTM UG 5535.
2. Bullwhip 17 received battle damage from an unknown type of antiaircraft artillery fire on Route 7 east of Ban Ban and egressed (south from the route structure) until both crewmembers were forced to eject from the aircraft. Tiger, an F-4, PAC was nearby and was able to locate Alpha's parachute which he pointed out to Zorro 44, an A-1 diverted to the scene by King.)
3. Sandy 01, 1st Lieutenant Frank B. Brown; Sandy 02, 1st Lieutenant Daniel M. McAuliffe; Sandy 03, Major G. Martin; and Sandy 04, Lt Colonel Robert S. Johnson were scrambled at 0715Z through self initiated telephone contact with the 56 SOG command post. Jolly Green Operations had not received notification of the SAR from Jack at this time. Sandys 01 and 02 were airborne at 0728Z, followed closely by Sandys 03 and 04 at 0730Z. Sandys 01 and 02 proceeded directly to the scene arriving at 0815Z. (Simultaneously Sandys 03 and 04 effected a rendezvous with Jolly Greens 63 and 52 at the fence and escorted them to a holding point near the scene.)
4. The survivors were down in a narrow valley whose floor is 2500 feet with ridge lines up to 4500 feet on both sides. There were thunderstorms and rain-showers in the area which hampered rescue forces both enroute and on-scene. Over the survivors' locations there was a broken to overcast cloud cover with bases intermittently covering the ridge line near Bravo's position. A motorable trail ran down the middle of the valley and Alpha had landed approximately 200 meters north of this trail in fairly open terrain. Bravo landed in dense jungle foliage approximately 1000 meters northwest of Alpha near the top of the ridge line. The foliage around Bravo obscured his parachute and made locating his position very difficult. Both survivors were in excellent physical condition and reported that they could detect no hostile activity around them. Neither Zorro 44 nor Sandy 01 could stimulate hostile reactions of any nature during numerous low passes through the area.
5. Zorro 44 Major Manley and Zorro 45 1st Lieutenant Reeves and 1st Lieutenant Homan were on a strike mission, when they were diverted by ABCCC to the SAR scene. King 32 instructed Zorro 44 - 45 to proceed to the SAR area and assume On-Scene-Command. Zorro 45 did not have a UHF radio, thereby making it necessary for Zorro 44 to relay many transmissions on FM and VHF. The weather was broken to overcast with rain showers and often reducing visibility to 1 NM. Terrain elevation varied from 2500' to 7500' making a VFR descent mandatory. Zorro 44 - 45 for a hole about 20 NM away from the survivors, let down beneath the clouds and returned to the scene. An F-4, Tiger, was in the area, and had located Bullwhip Alpha's chute and the approximate location of Bravo. Zorro 44 assumed On-Scene-Command at 0720Z and instructed Zorro 45 to hold west of the survivors in a clear

DO

CATALOGED

No. 023922

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

602-70-007

UNCLASSIFIED

area and coordinate with King to get the Jolly Greens or Air America choppers. One of the "chute beepers" was still activated rendering Guard frequency useless, so Delta frequency was used for the 144. Zorro 44 got radio contact with Alpha & Bravo, both were in good condition, and began to pinpoint Bravo's position. Bravo was on a mountain side, but the mountain tops were often obscured with clouds making it difficult to determine his exact location. Zorro 44 finally located Bravo in dense jungle, approximately 1000 meters northwest of Alpha. Zorro 44 - 45 were forced to jettison part of their strike ordnance to conserve fuel and gain maneuverability at low altitudes. Zorro 44 kept Bullwhip Alpha and Bravo advised of his plan and asked to be notified if any movement or ground fire was heard. Zorro 44 made repeated low passes over their position to insure their confidence and safety. At this time Zorro 45 had gone to Xiong Khounville to rendezvous with the choppers, but weather and a 37 MM gun position were present. Ingress problems. Sandy 01 and 02 arrived in the area and after pointing out Alpha's chute and Bravo's position, Zorro 44 relinquished On-Scene-Command to Sandy 01 at 0725Z. Zorro 45 notified Zorro 44 that he had 3 Air America choppers and was proceeding up the valley toward the survivors. King also advised that Sandy 3 & 4 and 2 Jolly Greens were 7 NM South of the scene.


6. Sandys 01 and 02 arrived on the scene at 0815Z and Zorro 44 immediately pointed out Alpha's parachute and Bravo's approximate position. A parachute beeper was rendering Guard channel useless so the survivors were on Delta frequency. This meant that the SAR forces had no UHF interplane frequency with which to communicate. Two Air America aircraft (call signs unknown) attempting to cross Route 7 towards the SAR area were on 123.1 and when they encountered ground fire their radio transmissions blocked VHF communications for a considerable period of time. Sandy 01 assumed on-scene command at 0825 and Zorro 44 departed the scene to rendezvous with his wingman who was escorting three Air America helicopters towards the SAR area. Sandy 01 proceeded to positively fix the location of Bravo and referenced his position with a marking rocket. At this time (0835Z) Sandy 02 advised that the Jolly Greens were now holding approximately 2 miles north of the scene. Sandy 01 instructed Sandy 03 to join on his wing so that he could be shown the desired ingress path for the Jolly Greens and the survivors' exact locations. With King, 4 Sandys, 2 Jollys, Air America helicopters, and 2 Zorros on VHF 123.1, communications became a significant problem. In an attempt to learn further details King came up on Delta, the survivors' frequency, Sandy 01 instructed King to stay off this frequency and that contact would be made in a short time on VHF. While Sandy 01 was pointing out Bravo's position to Sandy 03, Zorro 44 arrived with Hotels 54 and 70, two H-34 Air America helicopters, and Hotel Fox, a UH-1 Air America helicopter. Hotel 54 called for Alpha to pop his smoke and Hotel 54 immediately entered a hover over the survivor. Hotel Fox sighted Sandy 01's marking rocket and as he hovered Bravo was instructed to pop his smoke. Alpha was on board Hotel 54 at 0840Z, however there was some delay in recovering Bravo when Hotel Fox's hoist failed to reel in after the survivor was on the penetrator. Sandys 01, 02, 03, and Zorro 44 flew a protective chain around the scene as the difficulty was sorted out. Finally Bravo was instructed to get off of the penetrator which he did with much reluctance. Hotel 70 entered a hover as Hotel Fox withdrew and Bravo was safely on board at 0855Z. Zorro 44 and 45 was released at this time and Sandys 01 and 02 escorted the three Air America helicopters to Lima 20 Alternate and RPT'd to Channel 89.

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

UNCLASSIFIED

7. This was a relatively easy SAR since there was no opposition from hostile forces and numerous rescue forces were able to reach the scene in a relatively short period of time. Several problem areas could have been critical on an opposed SAR launch. First, Jack did not notify Jolly Green operations of the SAR until 5 minutes after the 56 SOG Command Post was advised of the event. This could have meant excessive delay in getting the Sandys airborne had they not learned of the SAR from the SARCO. Secondly, the chute beeper should be discontinued from use in Southeast Asia as it made SAR UHF primary of no use since 2828 had to be monitored constantly. The third recommendation is that Air America helicopters be kept off 123.1 VHF if contact can be maintained with them on FM of UHF. Finally, it is not clear why the rescue had to be delayed while King obtained approval for Sandy 1 to utilize Air America resources.


ALBERT E. MEYERS, Major, USAF
SAR Coordinator

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: Major Preyas

24 June 1970

SUBJECT: SAR for Mail 42

TO: DCO

1. A successful rescue was conducted on 20 Jun 70 for Mail 42. The aircraft, an OV-10, went down at 1250L, 20 Jun 70 at TG980375 (035/15/108). This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.

2. The OV-10 crashed because of a mid-air, possibly aggravated by a ground fire hit, with an F-4.

3. The following aircraft participated:

Sandy 01	Lt Col Richard	1315	
02	Capt Hull	"	
03	Capt Hanna	1317	
04	Capt Shannon	"	
05	Maj Martin	1405	
06	Lt Doolittle	"	
Smoke 31	Col Crosby	1503	(Did not reach area
32	Capt Skelton	"	before pickup)
33	Maj Wernosh	"	
34	Lt Paine	"	
Waffle 41	Lt Howard	1520	(Did not reach area
42	Lt Col Kilbride	"	before pickup)
43	Maj Place	"	
44	Lt Engel	"	
Strike 61	Lt Townsend		Not scrambled - these were
62	Lt Rock		the last aircraft to be
63	Lt Partington		loaded.
64	Lt Donaldson		
65	Lt Dannelly		
66	Lt Wilson		
Jolly Green 54	Capt Weeks		Made pickup as low bird
61	Unk		
Hobo 46	Maj Boonhardt		Diverted from strike mission
47	Lt Doolittle		
Zorro 22	Lt Maloney		
23	Lt Tetrish		
	Capt Kennedy (IP)		
24	Maj Van Meter		
25	Lt Wilson		
36	Lt Miller		
37	Maj Frisch (IP)		

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

0239223

CATALOGED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~SECRET~~

4. The SAit area was on the southwestern edge of the PDJ with an altitude of approximately 4000 ft. The survivor was located on a small ridgeline, with a valley and a higher ridgeline located between his location and the PDJ. The OV-10 had impacted about 1 mile out on the PDJ on the crest of a low hill. The general area was mountainous with another high ridgeline to the west of the survivor and lower hills and some valleys to the south and southeast. The weather was marginal in the area precluding the use of fast movers and requiring all the SAit forces to stay generally about 2-3000 ft AGL. The area was also known to contain several NVA headquarters and troop concentrations. Four primary areas of intense ground fire were suppressed - one about 100 yards down the ridgeline from the survivor and three about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the south-east across a small valley.

5. Upon notification of the MAYDAY, King 32 diverted to the scene along with Raven 26, 21, 29, Mail 07, Hobo 46/47, and Zorro 22/23. FFH, F12, and H34, all Air America choppers, were also diverted to the scene, but arrived about 30 min later because of an erroneous position given for the SAR area. Some fast movers were also diverted in, but were later released because they could not work in the marginal weather conditions. Three attempts were made by the AA choppers to get in and make a pickup, however the ground fire was too intense and two of the choppers and Raven 26 took multiple hits by small arms and automatic weapons. They made emergency recoveries at site 98.

6. Upon arriving at the scene Sandy 01 was appointed On Scene Commander by King 32. With the departure of Raven 26, the exact location of N-42 was not exactly known among the other Ravens. Sandy 01 joined with R-21 and they began to make low passes to identify the position, but the heavy ground fire again proved hazardous for R-21 and he was directed to hold out of its range. After several passes the survivor was pin-pointed and R-21 was directed to put the remaining ordinance of the four A-1s in on the ground fire. Sandy 01/02/03 got about determining the ingress/egress route and the pickup plans. However, upon the completion of the faccing of the A-1s, R-21 picked up ground fire from three other locations which would have been within range of the Jolly Green's flight path. King advised that four more A-1s (two flights of Zorros) were in the area and Sandy 01 had Raven 21 and N-07 (who had also seen the ground fire) mark the areas. Raven 21 was winchester on rockets so Sandy 01 directed R-29 to FAC in the Zorros. In coordination with N-07, Sandy 01 picked a new ingress/egress route for the choppers and Sandy 02 and 03 put down a IP M-47 and a "you've gone too far" M-47 marker for the Jolly Green. The A-1s were just about winchester at this time and Sandy 01, when advised by King that the next resources were still 45 min away, decided to implement the attempt immediately.

7. Sandy 03 was briefed on the ingress/egress route and he in turn briefed the Jollys. Sandy 02 was briefed on the placement of his CRU-22 and the all forces brought up to guard. A quick general briefing of how the operation was to go and the execution order was given. Sandy 01 laid his smoke between the survivor and the high, possibly threatening, ridge to the north and Sandy 02 put his to the south of the survivor to screen off the three areas of ground fire there. More smoke was needed in that line and Sandy 04 was directed to put his there also. The Jolly was right over the IP on time and the survivor was told to pop his smoke. The Jolly's heading was straight at the survivor and all Sandy 01 had to do was to tell him to slow down and stop, and he ended up in a hover 25 feet to the left of the survivor. Jolly called out some ground fire from the original location and the Sandys and the PJ with the M-60 suppressed it.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Later reports from helicopters holding overhead had three other areas firing at the Sandys but no hits were taken by the SAM force during the pickup and egress. Pickup was at 1520.

Albert E. Pross

ALBERT E. PROSS, Major, USAF
SAM Coordinator

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: SARCO (Lt Col Johnson) 1st SOS

7 July 1970

SUBJECT: SAR REPORT - Fat Capper 07

TO: 56th SOW (DCO)

I. A successful rescue was conducted on 30 June 1970 for FAT CAPPER 07. The aircraft, an OV - 10, went down at 1340 L/30 June 1970 at XD 620 605. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.

II. The OV - 10 (Nail 44) was shot down by ground fire at approximately 1340L. There was no beeper or voice from Nail 44 (front seater). FAT CAPPER 07 (back seater) came up on his radio and stated he was in bad physical condition. The SAR effort was launched immediately.

III.	Call Sign	Pilot	A/B time	Arr on Scene
Sandy	01	KENNEDY	1658	N/A
	02	CONGER		
	03	KRUEGER	1524	1604
	04	SUTTON		
	05	PREYSS	1415	1455
	06	WARESH		
Spad	11	WILLIAMS	1345	1430
	12	BROWN		
	01	BOLSTAD	1330	1400
	02	LURDY		
	03	MORRISON	1600	1640
	04	MORGAN		
Jolly Green	21	BLACKWOOD	1400	1445
	65	HOLCOMB	"	"
	54	SCHNEIDER	1353	1435
	57	THOMPSON	"	"
	24	ELKINGTON	1550	1635
	64	HOLCOMB		"
Nail	50	HALL	1145	N/A
	57	HEFT	1455	1530
Strike	40	HANLEY	1630	1710
	41	WOLCOTT		
	42	MARTIN		
	43	PLACE		
	21	MCNEIL	1711	N/A
	22	SHANNON		"
	23	RICHARD	1712	"
	24	KISSLER		"
Smoke	31	MORRIS	1515	1555
	32	SENKO	"	"

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
226322
O 239222
No

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified aft . 12 years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

33	HINKLE	1645	1625
34	KILBRIDE	"	"
Waffle 44	FRISON	1623	1703
45	KASBEHR	1634	1714 11 Mins. Flat Tail Wheel
46	LUCK	1619	1659
47	HICKS	"	"

Sandy 01 and 02 were on alert at Ubon at the direction of HIGTS. Sandy 03 through 06 were at NKP. The Spads were from DaNang.

IV. The location of the survivor was less than one kilometer south of a main infiltration route which was in good repair and under moderate use by enemy forces. The general terrain was mountainous, however the survivor was located in an area of low ridges and intersecting valleys. Several hundred meters to the east of the survivor was a large flat bottomed valley which had very little vegetation or other ground cover. Large mountains rose to the east of this valley. The ridges and valleys to the north west and south of the survivor were approximately thirty percent covered by trees and other vegetation. The survivor reported an unknown number of enemy troops in the immediate area. Heavy calibre automatic weapon fire and hand held gun fire was received from the covered areas north, west and south of the survivor. The weather in the area was three to four tenths low cumulous clouds, with bases at approximately 1,000 feet. The cloud cover was drifting to the northeast slowly and at times covered the position of the survivor. During phase A of the rescue the cloud coverage over the survivor was about four tenths. The surface wind was approximately 4 to 6 knots from the southwest. The survivors position was in heavy tropical vegetation on the north slope of an east-west ridge. At the base of the slope, approximately 50 meters from the survivor was a small stream with the survivors parachute visible lying across the stream.

V. The first aircraft on scene after the crash was Covey 296, who attempted the first pick-up utilizing an Army "click". Next on scene were Spads 01/02 who diverted from a "Prairie Fire" mission. Nail 50 and Nail 57 arrived at the same time. An attempted pick-up was made with Spad 01/02 as "on scene commander" utilizing Jolly Green 21, a Hitnoy out of DaNang. This attempt was unsuccessful when Jolly Green 21 received heavy ground fire and had his hydraulic system shot out plus numerous other hits throughout the aircraft. Spad 01 developed radio problems and Nail 57 assumed "on scene command". Spad 01/02 had already expended all their ordnance and proceeded to escort Jolly Green 21 back to channel 103. Spads 11 and 12 were also scrambled to the area. Spad 11 lost his radio transmitters which later proved to be caused by his helmet connection. Spad 12 was not Sandy low load qualified, so Nail 57 remained as OSC and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Spads 11 and 12 returned to base. Sandys 03/06 arrived on scene with Jolly Green 54 and 57 from NKP. Sandys 03/04, from NKP were not on scene yet because of the radio problems and early RTE of the Spad flight had not been anticipated.

Mail 57 and 030 made the third pick-up attempt utilizing Jolly Green 54 with Sandys 03/06 as escort. Smoke 31/32 were on scene and were instructed to lay a smoke screen which they put down in parallel rows running east and west on the north and south side of the survivor. Jolly Green 54 made an approach to the survivor from the west but had to pull off when the smoke drifted over the survivor and visual contact with the ground was lost. The rescue chopper moved a short distance away, waited about five minutes for the smoke to clear and then proceeded back in for another attempted pick-up. On this attempt, heavy ground fire was received and Jolly Green 54 took a hit from large calibre heavy automatic weapon fire and/or a (Rocket Propelled Grenade). The aircraft made violent maneuvers with its engines on fire and crashed approximately one quarter mile from the survivors position.

VI. It was during the third pickup attempt that Sandy 03/04 arrived on scene. There was considerable confusion and a high sense of urgency at the scene. Because an attempted rescue was in progress, Sandy 03/04 informed King and the Nail FAC that they were available and maintained a position where they could observe the progress of the attempted pick-up.

Throughout these events King was very busy coordinating information with the on scene commanders and marshalling SAR resources to the area. Fast mover strike aircraft were being held high over the scene and ready to be used. Additional SAR resources were scrambled as needed after initial attempts failed and resources were depleted.

When Sandy 03 observed the chopper crash, he called King informing him that Jolly Green 54 had crashed with no apparent chance of survivors. Sandy 03 personally assumed "on scene command" and received a briefing on the exact position of the survivor by the FAC as they flew over the survivor to assess the situation. Sandy 03 then directed the Nail FAC to call for "fast mover" strike aircraft and proceed to suppress the suspected gun positions west of the survivor. While the FAC put in air strikes on the enemy positions, Sandy 03/04 held to the west. A call was made to King to organize the resources for another rescue attempt. Another set of Jolly Green helicopters, with their escort, were directed to a holding point. Slow mover aircraft with smoke and special ordnance were also positioned at holding points close to the area. Sandy 03 informed King that he had devised a plan for pickup and that he would continue air strikes at the gun positions under the FACs control. When the strikes finished, a smoke screen would be laid west of the survivor running Northeast to Southwest into the direction of the surface wind masking off the area of the gun threat. Special ordnance would be laid immediately west of the smoke screen. Four slow mover strike aircraft would conduct a continuous diversionary strike immediately west of the smoke while the Jolly Green made his approach from the east. King acknowledged the plan and designated Sandy 03 as "on scene commander".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

At the completion of the fast mover air strikes Sandy 03 again went low over the scene to survey the situation. The decision was made to attempt another pickup. Spad 03, the Jolly Green escort, was called into the area while Sandy 03 briefed him on the survivors position and the entry route for the Jolly Green. Smoke lead and Waffle lead were also brought into the and shown the position that the smoke screen would be laid. A general briefing was given to all forces on UHF radio. The respective flight leads were then sent back out to organize their flights and then Sandy 03 called all resources to come up on UHF guard and check in.


Timing would be critical and all events had to begin with the laying of the smoke screen. When all forces were ready and the Jolly Green on his way in, the command to execute the smoke was given. The smoke was put down and formed a very effective screen. Sandys 03/04 added their smoke to fill in where smoke was needed. At this time Sandy 03 and Spad 03 talked the Jolly Green into the survivors position where the survivor directed him on the final approach with his radio. During the pick-up Sandy 03/04 and Spad 03/04 conducted a daisy chain around the Jolly Green expending rockets, CBU and 20MM, while to the west, the slow mover strike aircraft conducted a continuous diversionary strike also suppressing possible guns in the area.

The rescue was successful, though the Jolly Green did receive some ground fire and took several hits on his egress from the area. Sandy 04 also received a 50 calibre hit in the tail of his aircraft.

VII. Problems encountered during the SAR:

1. Coordinating command and control.
2. Release of prairie fire alert aircraft to the SAR effort by Heavy-Hook.
3. Communications.
4. Deviation of normal Sandy alert posture at N.E.P.
5. Late launch of Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04.
6. Too much congestion and extra bodies in the SARCO's Command Post.

All of these problem areas have been thoroughly covered in meetings with the DCO and recommended solutions will be in effect in the near future.


ROBERT S. JOHNSON, Lt Col, USAF
Commander