

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96237

REPLY TO
ATTN OFF 400 (Capt Bell/2687)

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report #23-078-5 Dec 69 (U)

13 December 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DOWNGRADED TO

EX. ORDER 11652

Classified by ~~OLD 3 FNR/64~~
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 77

to: 3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted LAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd
11 Jul 68.

2. (S) JG 76 and 72 were scrambled from backup alert at Ch 70 at approx 1035L, 5 Dec 69 on the Boxer 22 SAR effort. We were airborne at approx 1050L, and proceeded the site via Ch 89, where we picked up an A-1 escort to accompany us into the area. We arrived in the SAR area at about 1215L and were placed in an orbit position 5NM west over a karst area, along with JG 09 and 17 and two Sandys for escort. In very short order JG 09 was called in to make an attempt, but was forced to abandon the attempt with radio problems and by ground fire. JG 17 immediately assumed low position and attempted a pickup, but was driven off by intense ground fire. JG 76 assumed low position and waited while ordnance was delivered in the area to silence the ground fire. At this point JG 76 had been airborne for nearly three hours and began preparation for A/R with King 3. Before rendezvous was effected for the A/R, Sandy Lead called for another attempt, so preparation for A/R was discontinued and an immediate descent was started to the SAR site. Sandy Lead briefed JG 76 to approach from the WNW at high speed and low altitude, which we did. We began to pick up ground fire from the top of the karst about a mile and a half from the survivors positions, and were under fire of varying intensity until we exited the area. ALC Davison was the first to spot and return fire from the #3 gun position. He fired almost continuously until fatally wounded. Breaking out of the karsted area over the open valley the ground fire dropped off momentarily, then increased tremendously. The Sandys were dropping CBU and firing 20MM cannon shells into the karst face and ground all around as close as within 100 ft of us. The flight engineer mistook a string of CBU's going off as really heavy ground fire and called for me to abort the attempt. He immediately realized his mistake and called for me to continue. I had started to roll right to exit the area, but reversed the roll violently and continued the approach. This placed me directly over Boxer 22A at high speed, headed directly into a karst face infested with gun positions. I began a series of hard, violent turns directly over the Alpha man while descending to about fifty feet over the trees in the area. During this time I saw one tracer round of large caliber pass off the right side, but my main attention was directed to surveying the area below for the lowest possible area to hover near the survivor. JG 76 was nearly in a hover at this point, and I had decided to let down into the river bed to make the pickup. JG 76 was just coming out of translational lift when the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3-078

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 20
GROUP 1
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals, declassified
after 12 years
13

40 ARRS Mission Reports
AFHRA catalog #
K318.2411-5
69/02/22 – 69/12/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

entire crew called that ground fire was increasing, and it really erupted; through the noise of the engines, rotors and our own mini-guns, it sounded like we were caught in a pop-corn machine. At the same time #2 gun was expended and the gunner began firing his M-16 out the door. As JG 76 began to sink below the level of the barren trees into the river bed we received multiple hits in the fuselage and the rotor system. The aircraft began to vibrate badly and I knew if we received more hits like we just had, JG 76 would be shot down. Power was applied and we began exit of the area. As I approached the karst face on the western side of the valley I could see numerous caves along the bases of the karsts which the crew said held gun positions that were firing on us. During egress from the valley Sgt Corcoran called that ALC Davison had been badly hit. I instructed them to give him aid and we would RTB to Ch 89. Shortly afterward Sgt Corcoran called again that ALC Davison was dead, having taken a small arms round through his head. Sgt Corcoran then inspected the aircraft for battle damage. He found numerous holes in the fuselage and right aux tank, and a small but steady hydraulic leak in the forward cabin area. The aircraft was vibrating moderately as climb was entered at 80 kts once safely out of the area, so different speeds were tried to see how it would affect the vibration. At about 105 to 110 kts the vibration disappeared. This speed was then maintained back to Ch 89. About 30 miles from Ch 89 the utility hydraulic system failed as a result of the hydraulic leak. We began to review bail out procedures and discussed the system affected by utility hydraulic system failures. A shallow approach to a running landing was made at Ch 89. This type approach was selected in lieu of a hover landing due to the unknown extent of the damage to the rotor system, which might not be able to sustain a hover landing. Wheel brakes failed to function on landing roll, so the rotor system was used to stop the aircraft. Later inspections revealed the aircraft had taken severe hits in three rotor blades, swash plate, and utility hydraulic system in addition to numerous holes in the fuselage and one crewman KIA.

3. (U) Jolly Green 76 Crewmembers were:

AC: Capt Holly G. Bell, [REDACTED]
CP: Capt Martin W. Weeks, [REDACTED]
FE: Sgt James E. Corcoran, [REDACTED]
RS: ALC David M. Davison, [REDACTED] (KIA)
RS: Sgt Douglas W. Crowder, [REDACTED]
AP: Sgt Lawrence R. Brown, [REDACTED]

HOLLY G. BELL, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

Classification (cancelled/changed to UNCLASS)
effective on 20 JUN 83, under the authority of
CSAF/NOSE, by M. J. J. J.
NSG 10/18/82 AP'S

AD 69 2820

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96237



REPLY TO 40 (Capt Brown/2687)
ATTN OF

11 DEC 1969

SUBJECT:

Mission Narrative Report 40 ARRGp 11 Dec 69 (U)

DOWNGRADED TO

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.

CONFIDENTIAL ON Baps 13
IAW EX. ORDER 11652

3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 77

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) At 1050, 5 Dec 69, following the launch of the East Albert crews, the standby crew was advised to prepare an aircraft for launch and assume an alert posture. The crew readied JG 69 and were launched at 1140, with orders to join JG 77 east of Ch. 89 and contact Jack for further instructions. JG 69 was airborne at 1150 and rendezvoused with JG 77 over Ch. 89 at approximately 1300. The two aircraft were ordered to proceed to a holding area at 090/55/89 and to contact King 3 for refueling. Both Jolly Greens contacted King 3 and proceeded to take on all full load. Then they proceeded to the area previously assigned by King 1, and assumed a holding orbit. The two aircraft stayed in orbit from 1330 to 1500. During the orbit, JG 69 requested the survivors position twice; Jolly Green 77 made the same request three times, both received negative information. Also during this period, the crew monitored UHF, VHF, and FM radios and was able to determine that the survivors were in a valley with a river in the middle and sheer Karsts on each side. It appeared that the valley was heavily defended, with gun implacements in caves in both walls. It also became evident from the radio transmissions that the guns included small arms, automatic weapons, ZPU, 23mm, and 37mm. At approximately 1500L, Sandy 5, the on-scene-commander called repeatedly for a Jolly Green, using no specific call sign. Knowing that JG 69 was the primary helicopter in the area, the crew responded to the call, giving their present position. Sandy requested that JG 69 move to 082/62/89. JG 69 started for the new position, informing JG 77 of their intentions and present radio frequencies. Sandy 5, kept requesting the Jolly Greens position and 69 responded that he was overhead and requested a briefing of the area and plan of action. Sandy 5 replied with a layout of the valley and the survivors position, which Jolly Green 69 could not spot as he was still at 10,000 ft. and above a thin cloud deck at approx. 6500 ft. Sandy 5 said that he wanted JG 69 to come in from the north and JG 69 requested which side of the valley to descend on. JG 69 was informed to descend on the east side and he started to spiral down over the karst to the east of the survivors. The pre-SAR and Descent check lists had been accomplished enroute to the survivors position and before landing was completed during the descent. [Gas masks were donned as part of the Pre-SAR Check list] On descending beneath the clouds, the crew of JG 69 could see the valley plainly and spotted one of the parachutes. At this time JG 69 began taking ground fire from the west. The pilots chose to come off the karst at minimum altitude, fly between 2 karst, just to the north of the

2-3-078

15-6-2845

AD 69-2849

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals: declassified
at 6 years

dt 8

691113

Classification (cancelled) (changed to

...under the authority of

C.S. AE/YOOS

M. D. S.

NSG 108562 Apr 25

[REDACTED] C

3. (U) Jolly Green 69 Crew Members were:

AC: Captain Jerald A. Brown [REDACTED] 4

CP: Captain Donald Y. Thompson, [REDACTED]

FE: Sgt Truman W. McDonald, [REDACTED] 8

RS: Sgt James E. Nash, [REDACTED]

RS: MSgt Ronald R. Jeczala, [REDACTED]

AP: SSgt Charles J. Howard, [REDACTED]

Jerald A. Brown

JERALD A. BROWN, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 963237

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 400 (Maj Crupper/2687)

11 DEC 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69 (U)

TO: 3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRS 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) On 5 Dec 69 at 1400, JG 79L and JG 68H were scrambled from a forward ground alert at Ch 113 to head for the SAR area located 093/48/89. Both Jolly's were airborne at 1410 with an ETA to the SAR area of 1545. Jack briefed the position of survivor as east of Rt 23 on the bend in the river, with Sandy 5 as OSC and SAR freq as 259.0 UHF and 47.8 FM. JG flight was briefed to come out 090 radial off of Ch 89 and contact JG 69 and 77 for pickup information when 35 nm out. We were also briefed that due west was the best emergency exit and that there were numerous 23 mm and 37 mm gun positions north of SAR area. Enroute to SAR area bingo fuel was completed, preliminary power requirements were computed and the crew briefed. Applicable parts of the pre-SAR checklist was completed. While enroute we learned the call sign of the downed aircrew (Box 22 Alpha & Bravo) approximately 60 yards apart on opposite sides of the river. Both were reported in good condition with Bravo having a cut on the forehead. As we approached Ch 89 we were briefed to fly out the 080 radial to be intercepted and escorted by Hobo 10 and to orbit between 52 and 55. This placed us north and well clear of other Jollys orbiting approximately 085°, 55 to 58 nm off Ch 89. We arrived in the SAR area at approximately 1540, were briefed by JG 72 and 77 on pressure altitude and temp and completed and/or rechecked, bingo fuel, power requirements and SAR checklist, and made final preparations for possible pickup since JG 69 has just been severely hit and was trying to RTB. At this time Sandy 5, OSC relinquished OSC to Sandy 7, because he felt he couldn't hack it. Radio traffic at this time became very excessive with the change of OSC and trying to locate JG 69. One of the Sandys had reported a fire in the aft section of JG 69. JG 77 located JG 69 and escorted him out. To my knowledge no attempt was made by the Sandys to JG 69 in sight. All effort appeared to be immediately diverted back to the survivor. Sandy 7 made the decision to use more ordnance until just prior to sunset and make a final attempt just prior to sunset. There were still four Jollys in the area and a check was made to determine if JG 79 and 68 were the next in, and Sandy 7 was briefed on our holding position. This was about 1650 and we were told to move our orbit to the 085° for 52 nm off Ch 89. At approximately 1710, Sandy 5 joined up with us, and we were again briefed to ingress on a easterly heading and egress westerly and not to go very far north or south. The exact location of the survivor was not known by JG 79 at that time, but the two Willy Pete Smokes at each end of the valley were in site.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

We were to descend low and come in over the karst as low as possible. The easterly heading headed us directly for the smoke on the west side. At this time we were in a 2500 fpm rate of descent at approximately 150 kts indicated. Sandy 5 was told that I was heading for the smoke and he advised immediately to go north of the smoke. A left turn was made and immediately a solid wall of tracers from the 10 o'clock to the 2 o'clock position noted three to five yards in front of the aircraft. I would guess our altitude to be between 2000 and 3000 feet. An immediate right turn and climb was started. Tracers were passing all around the aircraft and we were immediately hit in the belly of the aircraft, on the cargo hook, with a 37 mm blast. The blast knocked the #1 PJ down and blasted a piece of flooring six inches wide and four feet long up into the cockpit. Initial indications were a lurch in the aircraft, no control or vibrations, the #2 generator light came on, the first stage servo pressure dropped to zero, and the #2 engine fire light came on. The turn to 270° and climb was continued at approximately 2000 fpm and 110 kts. We leveled off at 9000 feet. The flight engineer advised of a heavy hydraulic leak coming from aft right side of the main transmission, the #2 main fuel line was punctured and spraying fuel into the cabin. The AP held his hand over the hole to keep fuel from spraying into the cabin. The VHF, FM and HF radios were inoperative and the CP could only monitor either interphone or UHF, but not both. We were unable to break in on the SAR freq because Sandy 7 immediately called for another Jolly Green. With no radio contact we headed for Ch 89, squawked 3-77 and tuned to UHF GCI Freq. GCI gave us "pigeons" to homeplate and got us a OV-10 FAC (Nail 24) to escort us home. After things had settled down we determined that our initial fire warning light was caused by the late evening sunlight; the landing gear was never retracted since we didn't know the extent of the damage and we had a down and locked indication. Enroute Nail 24 moved in to check us for damage and said we had a hole approximately 2' x 4' in the bottom of the aircraft, but said he saw very little leakage. JG 79 continued to Ch 89, made a VFR recovery and landing. A quick inspection after landing indicated a large hole in the cargo area, and numerous holes through #1 engine cowling, one hole through tail pipe, the aft section had several holes up and down the tail rotor drive shaft, and numerous fragment holes in left side of aircraft. Complete and detailed inspection was prevented because of darkness.

3. (U) The SAR effort on a whole was handled very good considering the terrain and location. However, it was absolutely asinine to run one Jolly Green in right behind another who has just been shot up without trying to put more ordnance in the area to silence the guns. This BUFF has proven to be an extremely sturdy and reliable helicopter but it's not invincible. Recommend that in future SAR efforts that Joker monitor this area and challenge the decision to run Jolly after Jolly into known gun positions. Further, recommend that efforts be made to procure some type of polyurethane foam wrap to minimize or self-seal main fuel lines. Because of Sandys request to immediately call in another Jolly, JG 68 was unable to provide escort for JG 79. The two bird concept had paid off in the past when another Jolly Green BUFF was shot down, but it will only work if we stay together.

4, (U) Jolly Green 79 Crew was:

AC: Major Jerry A. Crupper, [REDACTED]

CP: Captain Stephen R. Olsen, [REDACTED]

FE: SSgt Jack L. Hartman, [REDACTED]

RS: ALC Terry E. Caffery, [REDACTED]

RS: Sgt Charles L. Colbert, [REDACTED]

AP: 1/Lt Jackie R. Craft, [REDACTED]

Jerry A. Crupper
JERRY A. CRUPPER, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

#10

440 (Waf Barthold/2687)

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69 (U)

Dec 69 DOWNGRADED TO
CONFIDENTIAL JDB/RTB
EX. ORDER 11 52

3 ARRGp (JREC)
APO 96307

Classified by OL2 3088
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.

1. (U) This report ~~DECLASSIFIED ON~~ 21 Dec 77 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) The crews of JG 79L and 68H were ordered to scramble from alert status at LS 20A at 1350L, 5 Dec 69. The two aircraft were airborne at 1405L and proceeded direct to Ch 89 then to 093/48/89. Both aircraft arrived at holding point 070/52-55/80 at approximately 1525L. Sandy 5 was On Scene Commander (OSC). At 1530L, JG 69 reported a hit in his pickup approach and an aircraft fire in his tail section. He left the area with JG 77 as an escort. At 1600L, Sandy 7 assumed OSC and did an excellent job of trying to reorganize the SAR force and establish a plan of action. At 1658L, JG 79 and 68 were moved closer to the survivors (Boxer 22 A&B) location. It was decided that JG 79 and 68 would attempt pick up at 1715L. Both aircraft had sufficient fuel to make the pick up and return to Ch 89, so A/R was not requested. At 1710L, JG 79 and 68 began the approach to the survivor. About 2 miles from the survivor, JG 79 received heavy ground fire and direct hits. JG 79 aborted the approach and then returned to Ch 89. JG 68 also aborted the approach, but at 1715L started a second approach along a different route. On the second approach JG 68 selected a route low over a karst ridge north of the valley where JG 79 had been hit. The heading was 090. Prior to reaching the end of the karst ridge Sandy 7 requested we turn right 30°. As we came across the edge of the karst toward the river the survivors parachute was spotted near the river. We started picking up tracer fire from the karst on the left and right as we descended between these hills. Our mini guns returned this fire and silenced some of these guns. The survivor was spotted about 25 meters north of his parachute. He had used the night end of his flare and was waving it. He was standing near a group of small trees that had foliage, the other trees in the area were without foliage. As I was slowing to a hover (20-30 kts) approximately 150 feet from the survivor, the entire area lit up with tracers from the left and right, both from the karst and ground. The Flight Engineer said we were taking hits. I started a go-around while jinking and jerking away from the streams of tracers. We continued across the river behind a karst hill while climbing. The flight controls got very stiff during the evasive action, which I think was caused by the rapid control movement bleeding off servo pressure. Sandy 7 instructed us to turn to a heading of 270°. As we climbed out over the karst on this heading we crossed into the valley that JG 79 had previously taken ground fire. Again ground fire was received continuously until we were

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ 2-3-078-088

AD-68-2817
GROUP 4
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
after 12 years
at 10

691113

approximately 5 mi west of the survivor. Our mini guns returned the fire until #1 and #2 were out of ammunition. The #3 gun had jammed and the Pararescueman came to the door and fired his M-16 out the right side. JC 68 returned to Ch 29 and landed at 1800L. Post flight inspection revealed one rotor blade had been hit.

3. (U) The crew of Jolly Green 68 was:

AC Barthold, Hubert W., Major,

CP Schaneberg, LeRoy C., Captain,

FE Lohrenzel, David C., SSgt,

SS Brooks, Steven D., Sgt,

RE Wilson, John E., SSgt. :

SIGNED

HUBERT W. BERTHOLD, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO
ATTN OF 400 (Capt. Carty/2687)

11 Dec 69

SUBJECT Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69 (U)

TO 3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) JG 76L and JG 72H were alerted at 1037L, 5 Dec 69 to scramble for Boxer 22 down ar 085/62/89. We were off at 1045L proceeding to the area. JG 72 had to land at Ch 89 to fasten an access panel that was open. Prior to landing a request was made to Shoestring that they meet the aircraft with an M-60 machine gun for added firepower. After two minutes on the ground, we were off Ch 89 at 1113 to join JG 76 and two A1-E's for escort to the orbit area 088/48-58/89. When we arrived on scene JG 09 and 37 were already in orbit and preparing for a pickup attempt. Numerous Sandy's, Hobo's and other slow movers were FAC'ing fast movers in at the time. Sandy called for JG 09 to make a pickup attempt. JG 09 experienced channelizing on guard freq and had to pull out on the entry as he received ground fire. JG 37 then began an approach into the area, but received heavy ground fire right over the survivors and had to exit the area. Additional strikes were called in to soften the area. JG 76 moved to be in position for any future attempts. We had been in the air for almost 3 hours and were preparing for A/R with King when Sandy Lead said they were ready for another try. JG 76 approached the area from the NNW at high speed just on top of the karst. JG 72 had moved its orbit to the east to be in position to watch and monitor JG 76's attempt. JG 76 called that he was receiving ground fire as he let down towards the valley floor. The Sandys were setting up a "daisy chain" around JG 76 as he approached the area of the survivors. JG 76 got directly over Boxer 22A when heavy ground fire erupted from all sides. JG 76 received numerous hits in the blades and began an immediate egress to the west. JG 76 reported one crewmember seriously wounded and a bad hydraulic leak. JG 72 had left its orbit position by this time and was flying a close tail position on JG 76 who was to RTB to Ch 89. JG 76 reported failure of the utility hydraulic system so JG 72 moved in a little closer in case of bailout or emergency crash landing. JG 76 landed at Ch 89 at 1425L, and JG 72 proceeded to A/R with King over Ch 89 waiting for escort from Sandy 7 and 8, who were to take off at 1445L. A/R was completed at 1440L and departure from Ch 89 to the SAR area began at 1445L. Enroute to the orbit area we decided to orbit 088/50-60/89. We were in orbit until JG 69 made an attempt at 1530. He had to egress the area at 1530, because of the heavy ground fire. Sandy reported JG 69 was on fire and to bailout, but they didn't have enough altitude. JG 72 immediately began a descent to cover JG 69. JG 69 finally got the fire out, but reported he was in very bad shape and was contemplating either a crash landing or bailout.

78

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 5 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

While JG 72 was escorting JG 69 we discovered that JG 77 had already positioned himself behind JG 69 so JG 72 went back to an orbit position. We decided to move our orbit position north of the main EW road out of the pass. JG 17, who had come on the scene, then flew high cover for JG 72. As we crossed the EW road we received 7-10 rounds of 37 mm at 10,500' just 50 yards to our 3 o'clock position. Safely across the road we joined JG 79 and JG 68 in orbit at 070/45-52/89 with JG 17 flying high cover for JG 72. At 1645L, Sandy Lead called for JG 79 and JG 68 to cross the EW road and come in for an attempted pickup. JG 79 came into the survivors area at 1710 and had to exit at 1712 due to intense and accurate ZPU, 23 mm and 27 mm anti-aircraft fire. JG 79 was hit in the bottom fuselage by 37 mm and declared an emergency. He was covered by a Mail FAC as he returned to Ch 89. JG 68 now began an immediate descent into the SAR area for another attempt. He was covered by JG 72. JG 68 had to pull out due to the intense ground fire. Darkness was becoming an ever increasing factor as the Sandys tried to suppress the ground fire. It was decided that JG 72 would make one final attempt with JG 17 as high cover. At 1715L, JG 72 started a high speed entry over the karst into the valley area. On entry we lost sight of Sandy 8 and wound up letting down into the wrong area. Finally JG 72 saw smoke billowing from the SAR area two karsts over. JG 72 started receiving ground fire as we began our let down to the survivor. A tactical approach with a hard left turn put JG 72 20 feet away from the survivor. At this time, very intense ground fire erupted from five different positions around JG 72. All the aircraft gunners yelled simultaneously that we were taking hits. The well entrenched enemy troops had opened up from their caves and had JG 72 caught in a cross fire of ZPU, 23 mm and 37 mm anti-aircraft gunfire. We had to leave the area trying to egress to the WNW over the high karst. The guns were really on us now, and only maximum power, jinking and jaggging of the aircraft kept it from receiving serious damage. We were so low on the high speed exit that we almost hit the karst to the west as it was completely dark now. Upon exiting the area JG 72 climbed for altitude. At this time JG 72 was asked if we would fly cover while JG 17 made a final pickup attempt. JG 72 advised against making another attempt because it was dark and JG 72's guns were either jammed or out of ammo. JG 17 decided not to go in. JG 72 returned to Ch 89 with JG 17 as escort. JG 72 made an approach to a hover not knowing wheather any tires had been shot out. An uneventful landing occurred at 1815L. After 7.5 hours of flying JG 72 had sustained 12 hits and two rotor blades had to be changed.

3. (U) Jolly Green 72 Crewmembers were:

AC: Capt Donald L. Carty, [REDACTED]

CP: Capt Robert M. Horne, [REDACTED]

FE: MSgt Maurice F. Tasker, [REDACTED]

FE: MSgt William J. Warren, [REDACTED] 9 (41 ARRWg)

RS: TSgt Jack D. Moran, [REDACTED]

RS: Sgt Anthony J. McFarr, [REDACTED]

Donald L. Carty
DONALD L. CARTY, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander.

400 (Capt Reeder/2687)

11 DEC 1969

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69

3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.
2. (S) The JG 77 crew was put together and placed on standby after the primary and backup Fast Jollys had been launched on SAR for Boxer 22 A&B, both down in the Mugia Pass area. We were high bird for JG 69B. At the time we were scrambled JG 69 was having engine start problems but we were instructed to launch anyway. We were airborne at 0530Z and enroute. JG 77 arrived at the Fence at 0633Z and held for rendezvous with JG 69L. JG 69 and 77 joined at 0640Z and crossed the Fence. King had suggested we orbit at 093/48/89, but upon checking our maps we found that to be directly above a route structure and selected an area of 090/48/89. JG 77 had been scrambled with a partial fuel load and required A/R, so JG 77 and 69 rendezvoused with King 2 on the 090° radial between 20 and 40 DME, at 9000 feet, and topped off. Enroute to the holding area we asked King 1 for a SAR briefing and a position of the survivors, having been scrambled from Ch 70 without a briefing. King told us to standby until he could give us a more position location. Twice more before JG 69 was called down for the pickup effort we asked King 1 for a position or location of survivors and both times received the same reply. The only information we were able to gather from radio chatter was that Boxer 22A had a possible broken ankle, that two HH-3 Jollys had made attempts, being driven away by hits from ground fire, and RTB'd for battle damage. While in orbit we also heard JG 76 call battle damage, stating that he was RTB'ing to Ch 89 with one severely wounded PJ on board. We also heard the Sandy Lead call 23 MAF from a cave SE of the area and ground fire from caves in a karst SW of the area. Sandy Lead directed strikes, trolled for ground fire, then directed the deployment of CBU-19 and called in JG 69. We still had not received any position report on the survivors up to this time. We did observe some A-1's flying low over the terrain NE of us and moved toward them, remaining at high altitude due to flak bursts in our proximity: several right behind us and JG 69. As we started to circle over the A-1's, a Nail said, "They're right below you, Jolly's." We had already completed our SAR, Descent and Before Landing Checklist, and had our masks on. The Flight Engineer had estimated our hovering values based upon estimated terrain and temp/wind figures, which later proved very close. JG 69 began dumping fuel and descending, at about 0825Z. Sandy gave him an approach route down the river bed from NW to SE and advised that the survivors were 60-70 meters north of the river bend on

400-69-0034

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

[REDACTED]

opposite sides of the river. The elevation of the site was about 2200', the temp about 26°C. Since JG 69 was the first to attempt a NW/SE approach, I decided to descend to about 5000' (2800' above the site elevation) to attempt to decoy enemy attention from the low Jolly. We lost him momentarily behind a cloud, then at 0830Z heard Sandy call "JG 69, turn 180° north do a 180 north." About 0813Z Sandy called "JG 69, you're on fire, your tails on fire, turn west over the karst and bail out." We immediately turned and started to intercept JG 69 so that we could be on top for any assistance he might require. Sandy advised him twice more to head west for bail out and then went back to the mission. I attempted to raise contact with JG 69 on each radio but received no reply. We didn't see JG 69 until the FE spotted his smoke cloud and almost immediately after, saw the burning Jolly, down low, headed for the karst. We were about 1/4 mile behind JG 69 at 4000' and began to pickup ground fire. JG 69 continued to climb out to the west issuing great quantities of gray smoke with us jinking behind him. We took continuous ground fire for about 10 to 15 miles west until we climbed above 8500 feet. When we initially began to be shot at, one round burst in the #1 PJ window position, the concussion knocking him across the cabin and set-up a moderate to severe main rotor vibration. The ground fire consisted mainly of tracer and 23 MM, which was coming up between and bursting around both aircraft. Throughout the egress of JG 69 and 77, my PJ's and FE called the direction from which the intense ground fire was issuing with such pinpoint accuracy that we were able to jink away and as later inspection revealed sustained negative battle damage. As we climbed through 9000', JG 69's smoke appeared to dissipate and he seemed to be under control although he did appear to be oscillating in pitch, roll and yaw attitudes and appeared to be having some control problems. I advised King 1 of his apparent problems and that I was going to Invert freq to clear us in to Ch 89. King indicated there was some radio contact with JG 69 and told me to stay his freq to the Fence. We stayed close on JG 69's left and I instructed my crew to look him over to see if we could determine to some extent his damage. About 20 minutes after we initiated our egress the smoke discontinued and the fire appeared to be out. We could see a gaping burned out area where the ramp door had been and wiring and what appeared to be straps fluttering like spaghetti from the radio rack area. We observed one of the m-ni-gun chutes fall off, and occasionally other pieces of debris floated out of the backend. We could see paint cooked off around the whole upper fuselage above the ramp, and the FE and PJ's said they could see a shiny spot in the main rotor blade disk. I suspected a casualty in the #3 gun position and advised King 1 that I was going to Invert then changed freq. Invert advised me that JG 69 was on Approach Control freq and turned us over to them also. We contacted JG 69 on that freq and gave our observation of his damage, advised him that his landing gear appeared to be down safe, and asked if he was experiencing any control difficulties. He replied just an occasional yaw kick. We escorted him back to Ch 89, followed him to a safe touchdown and then landed at 0925Z.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We had no contact with Sandy after egressing the SAR area, but from about 30 DME out of Ch 89 until we crossed the Fence, we observed an A-1 flying high to our right. Assume it was Hobo escort for JC 69.

3. (U) The crew of Jolly Green 77 was:

AC: Reeder, Dan L., Capt, [REDACTED]

CP: Griffith, Tedd N., Capt, [REDACTED]

FE: Perry, Henry A., MSgt [REDACTED]

RS: Lester, William E., TSgt, [REDACTED]

RS: Hunt, James A., SSgt, [REDACTED]

SIGNED

DAN L. REEDER, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AIRSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 400 (Capt Sichterman/2687)

11 DEC 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69 (U)

TO: 3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

DOWNGRADED TO
CONFIDENTIAL ON 3 APR 73
EX. ORDER 11552

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) The evening of 5 Dec 69 the crew of JG 77 was notified that there would be a first light effort the next morning on Boxer 22 A&B. The morning of 6 Dec 69 we were picked up at the Officers Club at 0215 and picked up our equipment at the squadron. We boarded a C-47 and left Ch 70 at 0305 landing at Ch 89 about 0350. We put our gear on the aircraft and pilots and PJ's went to a briefing at TUOC. After the briefing we returned to the aircraft where the FE had completed the pre-flight. At approx 0530 Jack ordered us to launch and we went to the aircraft and started the checklist. Shortly after Jack put us on a hold but being familiar with Jack's operation we continued the checklist and were ready when the next order to launch was given. We couldn't establish radio contact with JG 72 and since there was a possibility of shielding we (JG 77) took off at 0555L and orbited near the Fence waiting for JG 72. We joined up with Sandy 03, 04, JG 72, JG 27 and JG 03 heading out the 105° radial. When we got to about 70 nm we turned north and orbited in the area of 085° radial, 65 to 75 nm. Around 0930L we refueled with King 3, taking on about 5000# of fuel. We returned to the area and continued orbiting. Around 1145, the Sandys decided the area of the survivor was safe enough and sent us in. We came in on a heading of about 265 and after descending to about 2000' we held over a karst area just southeast of the survivor. When Sandy 03 gave the word we went west and descended until we were about 100' over the valley floor. When we reached the river we made a right turn and started slowing. The Sandys said we overshot the survivor and we made a right 180° turn rolling out on a southerly heading. We were slowing and coming into a hover. The CP had the survivor on the left side of the aircraft. The survivor was shouting "You're over me Jolly Green, you're over me". The PJ on the ramp started calling ground fire and fired his mini-gun. We started a pull out and the caution light indicating loss of first stage hydraulic pressure came on. We made a left turn and started climbing out to the east. We continued the climb to 8000' and started back to Ch 89 using the same route we came in on. We landed at 1305L and found a first stage hydraulic line shot out and a hole in a main rotor blade.

Classified by 40 ARRGp

CONFIDENTIAL

LOCATION

EX. ORDER 11652

DOWNGRADED AT TWO

EX. ORDER 11652

DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 77

2-3-078
AD 64-2849

400-67-0028

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
interval declassified
after 12 years

ARRGp 691113

at 5

3. (U) Jolly Green 77 Crewmembers were:

AC: Captain Edward J. Sichterman, [REDACTED]

CP: Lt Colonel Charles H. King Jr., [REDACTED]

FE: SSgt Stephen L. Lebeau, [REDACTED]

RS: MSgt Rodney D. Ohman, [REDACTED]

RS: Sgt James B. Gerwert, [REDACTED]

AP: Sgt Ronald D. Surratt, [REDACTED]

ONED

EDWARD J. SICHTERMAN, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96237



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 400 (Lt Col Catlin/2687)

13 DEC 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69(U)

TO: 3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) JG 77L and 72H departed Ch 89 at 2300Z/5 Dec 69. JG 27 and 03, the HH-3 backup flight departed immediately afterwards. JG 72 was picked up by Sandy 3 and 4 at the fence and escorted to the orbit area (085/65-70/89) arriving at approximately 2345Z. We orbited this position at 9000' until 0200Z, departed the orbit for refueling with King 3 and returned to orbit at 0300Z. We continued to orbit while strikes were going into the area. At 0445Z Sandy Lead, the OSC, briefed JG 77 that CBU-19 and smoke would be put in around the survivor's position. He would then put a W/P marker on the eastern side of the river. JG 77 was to approach the marker from the east, then make a hard right turn to a heading of 330° and the survivor (Boxer 22 Bravo) would be located 150 meters to the northwest. JG 77 started his descent at 0450Z, because of interference on UHF, VHF 123.1 mh was used for the pickup attempt. JG 77 sighted the survivor at 0459Z but was hit immediately, losing first stage hydraulic pressure. He exited the area reporting ground fire from the north. Approximately three minutes later the smoke screen previously laid down by the Sandys achieved its peak protection point. Sandy Lead called and said that "if we wanted maximum screening protection now was the time to go in". An immediate approach and "run in" was started. While descending into the area we received approximately 30 rounds of suspected 37mm as well as ZPU fire from a cave in the karst 1/2 to 1 mile SSE of the survivor's position. The #1 gun was fired at the position. On reaching the turning point a right turn to the north was made. Altitude at this time was about 500' AGL, and the aircraft was in a high speed descent. Approaching the survivor's chute, Sandy Lead advised us to slow down. The previously briefed position of the survivor was "by his chute". Terrain adjacent to the chute allowed for a wheel height hover which afforded maximum protection from the smoke screen. During the "run in" extensive ground fire was received from all sides. Our gunners returned the fire throughout the approach and hover. Once established in a hover adjacent to the chute the crew was asked if anyone had spotted the survivor. A negative report was received from all positions eventhough the rotor wash was causing the survivor's chute to blow into the river. A hovering turn was then accomplished so as to allow

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

SECRET

all crewmembers to scan. At the completion of a 360° turn the tail gunner spotted the survivor at the six o'clock position approximately 20 yards away. Rearward flight was begun under direction of the tail gunner while the hoist was being lowered. Immediately after commencing the rearward flight the #1 gunner began to lay down suppressive type fire. After approximately six to ten yards of rearward flight had been completed a jolt was felt, accompanied by a slight yaw and a moderate tail vibration. An interphone transmission was made to the crew requesting a damage assessment. However, the noise from the #1 gun made the interphone inaudible. Three more attempts were made to contact the tail gunner before the #1 gun ceased fire long enough for the tail gunner to report that the tail section was vibrating severely. The recovery attempt was abandoned and a departure to the southwest was begun at approximately 0510Z. The lateral vibration limited climb out performance to 300 f/m at 50-60 kts. JG 27 and Sandy 9 joined for escort. JG 27 recommended an immediate landing. He advised that the tail of our helicopter was shaking violently and it appeared that it had taken a hit in the vicinity of the intermediate gear box. The tail gunner advised he could see no hole in the tail but one or two of the tail rotor blades were out of track. There were no abnormal instrument readings at this time but the tail section continued to vibrate. Sandy 9 recommended a clearing 90° to our right and we started an approach to the point. As power and RPM were reduced the vibration became less severe allowing the approach to be abandoned. A heading to Ch 89 was established. Additional ground fire was taken when crossing the route structure at about 3000' AGL. A slow climb was established to an altitude of 8500'. The trip to Ch 89 with the escort of JG 27 and Sandys 9 and 10 was uneventful, a landing was made at 0645Z.

3. (U) The SAR effort was a magnificent one, culminating in the successful rescue of Boxer 22B. There are no words appropriate to describe the elation felt by the "troops". A few points: (a) The gas mask used by JG crews is totally inadequate. (it is better than nothing) Visibility is restricted and the existing interphone connector is all most impossible to install without removing your helmet for an excessive period of time. (b) Presently, it is virtually impossible to use the interphone system when guns are firing. The noise level is just overwhelming. We are going to evaluate several ideas which have been submitted to correct the problem. The principal one being to modify the HL33C/AIC headset with oxygen mask fittings which will allow for easy helmet attachment.

(U) The Jolly Green 72 Crew was:

AC: Lt Col Frank S. Catlin
 CP: Maj John H Gill
 FE: SSgt. Donald LaBarre
 RS: Sgt Robert L. Harris
 RS: TSgt Donald R. Snyder

Frank S. Catlin
 FRANK S. CATLIN, Lt Colonel, USAF
 Aircraft Commander

~~SECRET~~

400 (Maj Smith/2687)

11 DEC 1969

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69

3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) On 5 December 1969, Boxer 22, an F-4 was shot down over Mugia Pass just south of Ban Phanop. Position of survivors was given as 085/62/89. An all day effort ensued with several attempts made to pickup the survivors. At darkness on 5 Dec, four crews alerted for first light effort. Crews proceeded to Ch 89 staging base at 0230L, 6 Dec 69, JG 68 was assigned backup for two HH-53's and two HH-3E's which proceeded to scene at 0600L. Two HH-53's committed to the pickup. Both received battle damage. JG 68 and 15 launched for scene at 1212L. Proceeded to SAR area on the 100° radial. A Shotgun A-1 rendezvoused with JG 68 and 15 as escort to the holding area. Sandy 11 was OSC at time. Sandy 13 was holding and briefed JG 68 and 15 of situation. Sandys and fast movers were working the area. Sandy 11 then briefed JG 68 as to intentions on next try. The intent was to box the survivor with CBU-22 and mask the effort from the surrounding guns. Only two Hobo aircraft were in the area uploaded with CBU-22. Sandy 11 called for more and was advised that it would take at least one hour before more could be uploaded and be on scene. Sandy 11 then decided to expend the two which were available and make a try. The smoke was laid down from south to north along the west river bank and from south to north along the east side of the river, 20 yards east of the river bank. This gave a trough for JG 68 to come into and pickup the survivor while being masked from both sides. JG 68 began an approach down over the karst and into the valley and down the trough. The survivor had been told to pop a smoke flare as JG 68 started his approach. This he did not do. The survivor came up on guard and said JG 68 had passed over his position. JG 68 immediately executed a 180° turn and located the smoke flare that Boxer 22B had lit. JG 68 moved over the smoke flare but could not locate the survivor. JG 68 remained in a hover approximately two minutes without being able to spot the survivor. By this time, the rotor wash was dispersing the smoke around JG 68. JG 68 began taking ground fire from both sides. A loud bang and thump was heard and the crewmembers in the rear of the aircraft reported that JG 68 had been hit. Ground fire was being received from all around, and with the survivor not in sight, JG 68

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years~~SECRET~~

40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY

Classified (cancelled) (changed to) **DECLASS**
effective on **11-4-15**, under the authority of **CSAE/VDOS 2**, by **M-APAC 3**
MSJ 101856Z APR 15

REPLY TO
ATTN: 400 (Capt Sanderson/2687)

11 DEC 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report # 2-3-037-5 Dec 69 (U)

DOWNGRADED TO
CONFIDENTIAL **APR 13**
IAW EX. ORDER 11652

TO: 3ARRGP(JRCC)
APO 96307

Classified by **OLG 3-2-66P**
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO

1. (U) This report was submitted to IAW ARJEM 55-2/3, IARRGP Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) Jolly Green 76 was notified to launch from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB at 1435 local. Information received just prior to launch indicated that JG 76 would be cover aircraft for Jolly Green 03 (Low) and 19 (High), who would be attempting pickup of Boxer 22 Bravo as soon as the area was considered sterilized. JG 76 was airborne at 1445, and proceeded to the SAR holding point via the prebriefed route, as the King aircraft was too busy with immediate SAR preparations to provide updated instructions. JG 76 reached the holding point at approximately 1545, and subsequently monitored the unsuccessful recovery attempt of Jolly Green 03. JG 76 departed holding to intercept 03 and 19, who had both declared an emergency due to battle damage. JG 76 returned to the holding area when 03 and 19 reported control of their aircraft, and King advised they had been intercepted and escorted by another aircraft. At approximately 1710, King advised Sandy 17 (Lead) that JG 76 would be the primary recovery aircraft, with JG 77 as cover aircraft. JG 76 made final preparations for a recovery attempt, and the crew was briefed while the Sandy aircraft delivered more ordnance on the area. At 1730, Sandy 15 explained in detail the ingress route to be used, and marked the turning points with smoke. At 1745, Sandy 17 directed JG 76 to begin a descent for the recovery area, and asked that he be notified when JG 76 was three minutes from the survivor's position. At a point four miles short of the survivor and 150 feet altitude, Sandy 17 was so notified. JG 76 was then advised to hold just short of the final turning point (approximately 1/2 mile from the survivor's position) at low altitude while the final ordnance deliveries were completed. At 1800, Sandy 15 directed JG 76 to begin a final approach to the survivor's position. JG 76 rounded the final turning point and began a slow search up the river under instructions from Sandy 15 and 17. Sandy 17 directed the survivor to ignite his flare when JG 76 was approximately 200 yards out, and then vectored JG 76 directly to the survivor's position. Visibility was extremely limited due to the darkness and smoke, but the flare was visible from 100 yards. JG 76 slowed to a hover just short of the survivor. While approaching the hover, the #1 gunner advised several times to "Pull Out", as briefed to do if AA fire was observed close to the aircraft. The #1 and #3 mini-guns were active. The pilot had not observed groundfire, and asked for hoist instructions from the engineer. The engineer had already lowered the hoist, with a seat extended and a safety strap out, and evidently began instructions, but the #1 gunner again advised to "Pull Out" several times. JG 76 began take-off and egress.

2-3-078
GROUP 4
Declassified at 3 year intervals, declassified after 12 years
AD 69-2849
at 14

~~REDACTED~~

During egress, the engineer reported no visible battle damage, and JG 76 turned back to make another recovery attempt. As JG 76 approached the survivor's position, his flare was not visible, and the engineer reported that he could not sight the survivor. Ground references for hover and to locate the survivor were practically non-existent due to smoke and darkness. During this approach, groundfire from heavy AA weapons was observed at all crew positions. JG 76 began egress, and was vectored from the area by Sandy 17. Finding no apparent battle damage, rendezvous and escort with another aircraft was not considered necessary, and return to base was uneventful. JG 76 landed at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB at 1840, with 20 minutes fuel remaining.

3. (U) Several problem areas encountered that might have been eliminated by better briefing and coordination of aircrews were:

* a. JG 76 moved too close to the SAR area just prior to the recovery attempt, and was subjected to approximately 70 rounds of probable 37mm fire, with airburst above and below, behind and to either side of the aircraft. Although the altitude was 10,500 feet, bursts were observed within 200 feet of the aircraft. This was unnecessary exposure, and resulted from departing the established holding area.

* b. JG 76 made the recovery attempts with the top anticollision light on. [The co-pilot was unable to reach the switch with his gas mask on.]

c. Holding at low altitude, during dusk or darkness, in and around high karst is extremely hazardous. It was necessary to remain very low to be shielded from heavy AA fire within one-half mile, and holding was required for about eight minutes.

d. Conflicting and simultaneous vectors were received from Sandy 15 (escort aircraft) and Sandy 17 (lead) during portions of the final approach. It should be established beforehand who will vector the Jolly Green when escort is no longer possible on final approach. This problem resolved itself during the last two hundred yards of the approach, and during egress.

e. No ordnance was delivered during ingress or egress, although it was requested. Ordnance may have delayed the firing of the heavy AA long enough to effect the pick-up.

f. Communications with Sandy aircraft during the recovery attempt was on 259.0, and the survivor was only on "Guard." JG 76 should have directed all forces to "Guard" frequency just prior to ingress.

4. (U) Some particularly effective tactics used were:

a. Sandy 15 marked ingress and egress route with smoke, and explained exactly what altitudes and airspeeds to use. This was especially helpful due to the partial light conditions.

b. King directed discrete holding altitudes for all forces. With a large number of aircraft and a limited safe holding area, this is definitely worthwhile.

c. During vectors to the survivor, the Sandy aircraft gave approximate distances. This was essential for airspeed control, and to preclude overrunning the survivor.

5. (U) Jolly Green 76 Crew Members were:

AC - Captain Gary F. Sanderson, [REDACTED]

CP - Captain John C. Cody, [REDACTED]

FE - SSgt Thomas D. Blakoney, [REDACTED]

RS - Sgt Arthur M. Davis, [REDACTED]

RS - SSgt John J. Eldridge, [REDACTED]

Gary F. Sanderson
GARY F. SANDERSON, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96237



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 400 (Lt Col Shipman/2687)

11 DEC 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report #2-3-078-5 Dec 69 (U)

TO: 3 ARRGp (JRCC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 11 Jul 68.

2. (S) Two JG crews departed Ch 70 at 0305L, 7 Dec 69 on a C-47 aircraft for Ch 89. An Intel briefing was received upon arrival and JG 77L and 76H were airborne from Ch 89 at 0548L and proceeded by the recommended route to the pre-briefed holding area. Holding was established at 0633L at 115/78/89 while the ALE's and fast movers put ordnance around the survivor's position. The OSC moved the holding area for JG 77 to 090/69/89 at 0707L and briefed on the rescue procedure. At 0848L, JG 77 started the approach and was directed to the survivor's position by Sandy 1. Due to the extensive smoke screen put down for cover, JG 77 was unable to reach the survivor without going IFR and facing the possibility of hitting the karst and trees. JG 77 departed the area and at 0926L started air-refueling with King 7 at 110/55/89. JG 77 and 76 returned to holding. JG 77 briefed the OSC, assumed by Sandy 7, on the visibility problems and also on the camouflaged vehicle spotted near the river bank by one of the JG 77 PJ's. More ordnance was put into the area and at 1135L, Sandy 7 briefed the next plan of action and JG 77 was moved to a closer and lower holding position. At 1148L, JG 77 started the second attempt following directions and rocket smoke from the Sandys. Both sides of the river, which the survivor was to be on, was walled with smoke forming a valley up the river to the survivor's position. JG 77 did not locate the survivor, overran his position, and was told by the Sandy to make a 180° turn. After completing the turn, both JG pilots spotted the survivor at the river's edge. A 15 to 20 foot hover was established over the survivor, the rescue hoist with penetrator lowered, and the survivor was brought on board JG 77 at 1152L. JG 77 rapidly departed the area escorted by and under the directions and cover of the ALE's.

3. (S) The JG 77 crewmembers sighted many hostile forces dug into holes along the river bank while proceeding at a low altitude of 50 to 60 feet to the survivor's position. Little gun fire was seen coming from these positions apparently due to the effects on them by the magnitude of ordnance expended by the ALE's and JG 77. While in the hover for pickup, a JG 77 PJ sighted from 20 to 30 hostile personnel in the trees within 40 to 50 feet of the survivor and JG 77. The trees provided very little cover for them and it was assumed by the crew that they climbed the trees thinking they could escape the CBU. The PJ fired his M-16 into the trees and witnessed several of the enemy falling

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

CHAPTER II

Operations and Training

Operations

(S) (GP 3) The good weather and resultant clear skys of the dry season brought a marked increase in combat activity during October, November and December. Our activity increased proportionally. Detachment One made fourteen combat saves, one non-combat rescue and one medical evacuation during this period. Det 1 was tasked with maintaining 15 minute alert two days out of three, flying the last two and a half hours of daylight on airborne alert in the November Orbit area, with the 40th ARRS from Udorn taking the third day. On that third day the 40th ARRS would send two HH-53s to this station at first light and they would be on 15 minute alert until the last two and a half hours of daylight, when they would fly airborne alert in the November Orbit area and recover at their home station. Det 1 was on 30 minute back-up alert on this day. Det 1 was also tasked with one of its HH-3E's on 45 minute alert during the hours of darkness for in-country rescues and medical evacuation missions. Due to mechanical difficulties encountered with the HH-53 and battle damage incurred on two HH-53s during the Boxer 22 mission, Det 1 HH-3Es were often required to fill in for the HH-53s on that third day.

(S) (Gp 3) Det 1, 40 ARRS was the scene of operations and staging area for three significant missions during this quarter. Our HH-3E, Jolly Green 19, attempted to make a pickup of Knife 61 and 62, downed by hostile ground fire at Muong Phine, Laos on 6 Oct. He received extensive damage from hostile ground fire as he was attempting to land there to rescue the aircrews and was forced to depart the area and return to base. Two HH-53s from 40th ARRS here on back-up alert were launched and after delivery of considerable ordnance by Sandy and Hobo aircraft, were able to effect a rescue of the eight aircrew members and a large number of indigenous personnel. They recovered here at our base. Two of the recovered aircrew had been wounded.

(S) (Gp 3) On the second significant mission HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn were launched from our station to back-up 37th ARRS HH-3Es engaged in a mission on Misty 11 on 24 Oct. HH-53s were staged out of our facilities here during that SAR mission. This mission is covered later in Combat Saves.

(S) (Gp 3) The third significant rescue effort and the most extensive and costly to date was the Boxer 22 mission on 5, 6 and 7th of Dec. Our HH-3Es, Jolly Green 37 and 09 were the initial Jolly Greens to go on the mission. The two Boxer 22 pilots were downed near Ban Phan Hop, Laos, a very heavily defended area near the North Vietnamese border. HH-53s, Jolly Green 76 and 72 were launched from Udorn directly to a near-by holding point to back-up Jolly Greens 37 and 09. HH-53s, Jolly Green 77 and 09 were sent to be staged out of this base, but were needed prior to landing here and continued on to the SAR area. Jolly Green 37 started in for a rescue attempt, but was called off due to intense antiaircraft fire. Jolly Green 09 then made an attempt at a rescue but received intense ground fire and hastily evacuated the area.

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

5

He over-stressed the transmission and engines and returned to base on that account. Jolly Green 17, one of our HH-3E's, was launched at this time to join Jolly Green 37, however Jolly Green 37 returned to base with Jolly Green 09. Jolly Green 76 made the next attempt, but received heavy ground fire, killing one of his crew members and causing him to depart the area and return to base. HH-53's, Jolly Greens 68 and 79 were launched, now to be airborne backup. Three HH-3Es from 37th ARRS, Jolly Greens 03, 27 and 15, and two A-1Hs, Spad 13 and 14, all from Da Nang RVN arrived here to supplement our forces in this intensifying mission. HH-53, Jolly Green 69, was next to try, but received a direct hit from large caliber antiaircraft and Jolly Green 77 escorted him back to our base. HH-3Es, Jolly Green 03 and 27 were launched to go to the SAR area at this time. Jolly Green 17 and 72 were holding near the SAR area and reported being fired on by 37MM antiaircraft guns. Jolly Green 79 went in for an attempt but received hits from ground fire and departed. Jolly Green 68 went in next and had the survivor in sight, but was driven off by ground fire before he could attempt to pick-up. Jolly Green 72 now went in for an attempt, but was also driven off by ground fire. Darkness prevented any further attempt this day and the survivors were told to dig in for the night.

A first light effort was planned for the morning with two HH-53s, Jolly Green 77 and 72 going first and HH-3Es. Jolly Green 03 and 27 airborne as backup. Radio contact was made with Boxer 22 rear seater, but contact with the man out of the front seat was lost. Ordnance was put in all morning by both jet aircraft and Sandys before deciding to have the Jolly Greens attempt a rescue again. It was almost noon before Sandy One felt it was safe enough to bring in the Jolly Greens. Jolly Green 77 was the first to try on the second day but was hit and lost part of his control system and was forced to leave the area. Jolly Greens 68 and 15 were launched to be airborne backup now. Jolly Green 72 went in for a try, but due to poor visibility in the smoke, he struck a tree with his rotor blades and incurred enough damage that he had to return to base. Jolly Green 19 was launched to take the place of Jolly Green 27, who escorted Jolly Green 77 to this base. Jolly Green 68 made the next attempt with negative results, being driven off by ground fire. Jolly Green 76 was launched into the cycle at this time and Jolly Green 07 followed shortly. The survivor was being shot at and mortar rounds were landing near his position. He reported that there were people getting near him. More ordnance was delivered and Jolly Green 03 went in to attempt a pickup, but received hits from ground fire and was forced to depart without making the rescue even though the survivor had him in sight. Jolly Green 68 had returned to base and been repaired and was launched again to the SAR area. Jolly Green 76 went in for a last light attempt and was driven off. The survivor was advised to dig in for another night. Early the next morning the SAR forces were again in contact with the survivor and identified him properly. Jolly Green 77 and 76 were launched as the primary recovery aircraft with Jolly Green 25 and 27 airborne backup. After considerable amount of ordnance had been put in, Jolly Green 77 went

SECRET

DET 1, 40th ARRS 4/69

in for a try but the visibility was too poor in the smoke and he aborted the attempt, however he reported that he didn't receive ground fire, which was a good sign. Jolly Green 77 went out and air refueled with King and after more ordnance had been put in and the smoke cleared away from the survivor, was able to go in and finally pickup the survivor. This terminated the longest and most difficult rescue effort yet attempted.

Combat Saves

(C) Maj Ted L. Smith in Jolly Green 19 started off the month with the rescue of Laredo 01. Laredo 01, an F4, was hit by antiaircraft fire and was trying to make it back to Udorn RTAFB Thailand for an emergency landing, but was unable to make it all the way. He did manage to fly the crippled aircraft into friendly Thailand. Major Smith was an instructor pilot on a training flight with two pilots and an engineer on board. He was monitoring his radios and heard of the damaged aircraft heading to Udorn, which was near his position. He vectored toward the course of Laredo 01 and came into the bailout area, as the pilots of Laredo 01 were forced to eject by this time. With the directions heard from King 1, Major Smith was able to locate the survivor, Capt Ronald Gielegem and hoisted him on board. A helicopter from another unit was also in the area and made the pick-up of the other pilot who bailed out of Laredo 01.

Jolly Green 19

IP Major Ted L. Smith
P Capt Joseph R. Brown+
P Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Ronnie L. Painter

(S) (GP-3) On 8 Oct, an F4, Boxer 61, was hit over Southern Laos and the rear pilot ejected and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. In the process of locating the Boxer 61 survivor, two FAC aircraft, Nail 07 and Nail 78 were involved in a midair collision. Nail 07, an OV-10, bailed out immediately and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. Nail 78, an O2, was able to fly to Savannakhet Laos, but due to the severe damage incurred during the midair collision, was unable to control the aircraft during the landing phase and crashed on the airfield there. Jolly Green 37 and 17 launched and proceeded to Savannakhet, Jolly Green 37 was detained by mechanical difficulties, but Jolly Green 17 proceeded on and Jolly Green 37 caught up later. Jolly Green 17 arrived at Savannakhet shortly after the crash and picked-up the two survivors, one of them being a local national observer. The other man was the pilot, 1Lt James C. Searcy, 426-92-6879, from the 23rd TASS.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn.