

400 (Capt Bell/2687)

3 October 1969

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-055-1 Oct 69

3ARRGP (JSARC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARBSM 55-2/
3ARRGPSUP 1, dated 11 July 1968.

2. (U) On 1 October 1969, JG 68 and crew was enroute from Ch 89 to Ch 70 after completing a TDY deployment to Ch 89. Approximately 10 nm out of Ch 70, a May Day call was made on guard channel by Laredo 01. Laredo 01 reported being hit by ground fire and stated his intention of returning to Ch 70. An F-105 (Bull Whip 11) joined Laredo 01 as escort. JG 68 continued inbound to Ch 70 and landed while monitoring the progress of Laredo 01. Shortly after JG 68 landed Bull Whip 11 transmitted that 01 was on fire and the crew was ejecting. JG 68 completed discharge of the passengers and scrambled for the area where Laredo 01 reported ejection. JG 68 was vectored to the area by "Brigham" and King 1. JG 68 arrived on scene approximately 35 minutes after takeoff. JG 19 and a 21st SOS CH-3 arrived in the area at the same time. JG 19 was instructed by King 1 to pickup O1A and was vectored to his location. King 1 then cleared JG 68 to pickup O1B and furnished vectors to his position. JG 68 established contact with O1B on guard approximately 1 nm from his reported position and instructed him to use a M-13 flare to pinpoint his position. O1B's was in a small village with open rice paddies on the east side. Tall trees were scattered throughout the village. Considering the hazards of a hoist pickup versus the survivors boarding from the ground, danger to structures and inhabitants in the village from rotor down wash and the availability of a suitable landing site (rice paddies flooded in depths varying approximately 6 to 18 inches), JG 68 elected to land in the rice paddies to effect the recovery. A paddy that appeared to be the least flooded was selected for landing. A PJ was deployed to assist O1B to the aircraft. After O1B boarded JG 68, an uneventful return to Ch 70 was effected.

3. (U) The survivor was: 1st Lt Zesinger, George (NMI), 432TRW, APO 96237

4. (U) The rescue crew of JG 68 was:

AC: BELL, HOLLY G., Capt,

CP: HORNE, ROBERT M., Capt,

DET 1, 40th ARRS 4/69

in for a try but the visibility was too poor in the smoke and he aborted the attempt, however he reported that he didn't receive ground fire, which was a good sign. Jolly Green 77 went out and air refueled with King and after more ordnance had been put in and the smoke cleared away from the survivor, was able to go in and finally pickup the survivor. This terminated the longest and most difficult rescue effort yet attempted.

Combat Saves

(C) Maj Ted L. Smith in Jolly Green 19 started off the month with the rescue of Laredo 01. Laredo 01, an F4, was hit by antiaircraft fire and was trying to make it back to Udorn RTAFB Thailand for an emergency landing, but was unable to make it all the way. He did manage to fly the crippled aircraft into friendly Thailand. Major Smith was an instructor pilot on a training flight with two pilots and an engineer on board. He was monitoring his radios and heard of the damaged aircraft heading to Udorn, which was near his position. He vectored toward the course of Laredo 01 and came into the bailout area, as the pilots of Laredo 01 were forced to eject by this time. With the directions heard from King 1, Major Smith was able to locate the survivor, Capt Ronald Gielegem and hoisted him on board. A helicopter from another unit was also in the area and made the pick-up of the other pilot who bailed out of Laredo 01.

Jolly Green 19

IP Major Ted L. Smith
P Capt Joseph R. Brown+
P Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Ronnie L. Painter

(S) (GP-3) On 8 Oct, an F4, Boxer 61, was hit over Southern Laos and the rear pilot ejected and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. In the process of locating the Boxer 61 survivor, two FAC aircraft, Nail 07 and Nail 78 were involved in a midair collision. Nail 07, an OV-10, bailed out immediately and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. Nail 78, an O2, was able to fly to Savannakhet Laos, but due to the severe damage incurred during the midair collision, was unable to control the aircraft during the landing phase and crashed on the airfield there. Jolly Green 37 and 17 launched and proceeded to Savannakhet, Jolly Green 37 was detained by mechanical difficulties, but Jolly Green 17 proceeded on and Jolly Green 37 caught up later. Jolly Green 17 arrived at Savannakhet shortly after the crash and picked-up the two survivors, one of them being a local national observer. The other man was the pilot, 1Lt James C. Searcy, [REDACTED] from the 23rd TASS.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn.

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DET 1, 40th ARRS 4/69

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+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn.

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1400 DC5 69-4068

DATE: 1 Oct 69

8 October 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-059-01 Oct 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 1

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Laredo 01 (F4)

LOCATION: 030/70/70

SAVES: 2 Combat


Classified by 25
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 75

1. (X) 0244Z Laredo 01 reported trouble with his utility hydraulic pressure and PC 2. He was at that time 050/52/100 and proceeding to CH 70. King 1 alerted the SAR forces at L98 for possible SAR. About 0249Z, King 1 de-alerted L98 forces and called the CH 70 SAR forces to cockpit alert. Cookie 01 and Wingen were escorting Laredo 01. Air America Hotel 44 and Hobo 22 covered Laredo 01 while he was in the hostile area in the event they would be needed.
2. (X) 0251Z Cookie 01 reported Laredo 01 was on fire, position 032/68/70. At 0252Z, Laredo 01 Alpha and Bravo bailed out and Cookie 01 and 02 were following two good chutes.
3. (X) 0303Z Cookie 01 reported both Alpha and Bravo safely on the ground and that he was talking to both pilots, both reported that they were in good condition. Laredo "B" landed in the trees northeast of a small village (032/68/70) Laredo "A" landed in the trees about 100 meters east of a road and was remaining in his chute (031/64/70). King 1 informed both pilots that rescue forces were enroute and to stay put until these forces arrived. Bullwhip relieved Cookie and remained until survivors were picked up.
4. (X) 0305Z Knife 14 called offering assistance and was told to vector 332 for 40 miles from CH 67. About this time Jolly Green 19 called reporting he was enroute to the scene. Jolly Green 68 was enroute from CH 70 ETA 0320Z. Knife 14 and Jolly Green 19 arrived 0320Z.
5. (U) 0323Z Jolly Green 19 was over Alpha and commenced pick-up. King 1 vectored Jolly Green 68 to Bravo who was by this time with the villagers near a rice paddy. 0326Z Jolly Green 68 picked up Bravo and both Jolly Greens were enroute to CH 70.
6. (U) 0332Z, King 1 commenced refueling Jolly Green 68 while enroute to CH 70.
7. (X) Problem area: Jack "directed" that Knife 14 not make the pick-up. I believe that the Airborne Mission Commander is in the best position to evaluate which available helicopter should make the pick-up.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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8. (U) King 1 Crewmembers:

AC Maj Smith

CP Maj Robson

N Capt Baker

RO AIC Conlon

FE MSgt Kilgore

FE TSgt Godwin

LM SSgt Wallen

AMC Lt Quinn


JAMES C. QUINN, Lt, USCG
Airborne Mission Commander

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the area was one kilometer northeast of point Delta on the main route structure. However, the survivor's actual location was on a ridge line running east to west four kilometers southwest of Tchepone or 52NM SSE of the briefed area. The actual terrain was predominately high rolling hills covered by jungle foliage.⁵⁵

(S) War Ace 300 was finally picked up by Jolly Green 70 at 0845 hours. This was a delay of 2½ hours due to an indefinite fix on the survivor's location. In order that time could be saved in a SAR effort, it was suggested that an aircraft with direction finding capability be diverted or launched to pinpoint the survivor's location during the hours of darkness.⁵⁶

(S) Further details of the SAR effort for War Ace 300 can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report which is included as supporting document 44.

(S/NF) Another successful rescue was conducted for Knife 61 and 62 on 6 October. The aircraft, two CH-3 helicopters, went down at 1115 hours at Muong Phine, a short takeoff and landing (STOL) airstrip located at XD094233.⁵⁷

(S) At 1200 hours, Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 were ordered on cockpit alert. The Sandys were airborne and

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SAR Efforts:

(S) During this reporting period the 56th Special Operations Wing participated in 14 search and rescue efforts. Several of these could well have been the largest efforts every made by the Air Force to rescue down crew members.

(S) The first SAR effort of the quarter took place on 2 October as wing Sandy forces and Jolly Greens accomplished a successful rescue for U.S.N. War Ace 300, an A-7,
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that went down during the night.

(S) At 2 a.m. on 2 October, the Wing Sandy force was alerted for a first light effort. Due to congestion in the arming area, Sandy 03 and 04 had to takeoff before Sandy 01 and 02 could be armed. After Sandy 03 became airborne, Sandy 04 aborted his takeoff, left the runway, and his aircraft exploded. This accident closed the runway and resulted in fatal injuries to the pilot, 1st Lt. Donald R. Moore, 602nd Special Operations Squadron. The accident
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also prevented Sandy 01 and 02 from launching.

(S) The crews were briefed that the terrain was predominately flat with some rolling hills and karst, and that

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56 Special Operations Wing

SAR Report (War Ace 300)

3 AARs (30)

1. (S) A successful rescue was conducted on 2 October for U.S.M. War Ace 300. The aircraft, an A-7, went down during the night. After rescue, the pilot reported that he had abandoned the aircraft because of a sudden loss of oil pressure and immediate engine seizure. The failure of the ram air turbine removed any possibility of an emergency position report prior to ejection. During the night, "Moonbeam", the AOCOC, approximated the pilots position as 110°/85 Channel 89 based on radio contact with the pilot. This report covers the activities of the Sandy's during the rescue effort.

2. (U) At 0800 on the 2nd of October, the Sandy force was alerted for a first light effort with an 0830 TWC briefing. Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 were scheduled for takeoff as flights of two at 0450 and 0500 respectively. Due to congestion in the arming area, Sandy 03 and 04 had to takeoff before Sandy 01 and 02 could be armed. After Sandy 03 became airborne, Sandy 04 aborted his takeoff and left the runway. This accident closed the runway and resulted in fatal injuries to the pilot. It also prevented the takeoff of Sandy 01 and 02. After learning of the situation, King requested three aircraft from Danang. Spads 11, 12, and 13 were scrambled. Meanwhile, Sandial relayed instructions from Joker for Jolly Green 70 and 71 to hold in a safe area, and for Sandy 03 to initiate the effort alone. Sandy 03 arrived in the briefed area at 0549 hours. Mail 20 was the only other HKP based aircraft actually involved in the rescue effort. Sandust 40, 41, 42, and 43; and Sandy 01, 02, 05, and 06 were launched but did not reach the scene before pickup.

3. (S) The briefed terrain was predominately flat with some rolling hills and some karst. The area was one kilometer northeast of point Delta on the main route structure. Defenses were briefed as automatic weapons and possible 37MM anti-aircraft guns. The weather was a high broken condition with good visibility. The survivor's actual location was on a ridge line running East to West four kilometers southwest of Tekepone. This position was 52NM SSE of the briefed area. The actual terrain was predominantly high rolling hills covered by jungle foliage. The actual weather was 2,000' broken. Actual defenses included automatic weapons, and both 23MM and 37MM anti-aircraft positions.

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4. (3) Arriving in the pre-briefed area, Sandy 03 found Mail 20 directing a Stormy aircraft in low afterburner passes in an area ten miles west from the survivor's briefed position. King had authorized the action to put the survivor up on the radio. After some discussion, King confirmed the pre-briefed coordinates as the correct position as passed by ADESC.

5. (8) Mail 20 remained in the vicinity until the survivor's rescue. He assisted in both the electronic and visual search. After an exhaustive search of the immediate area of Delta and Delta 79, Sandy 03 began to make an ever increasing circle. Concluding that the survivor's radio had failed, Sandy 03 alternated between high altitude electronic search and low altitude visual search over all the ridges. He completed several enlarging circuits covering the area from Delta 18 in the north to Delta 73 in the west and to Delta 77 in the south. Just after a call on guard for War Ace 300 to come up with either voice or beeper, King reported that his special equipment in the rear of the aircraft had picked up a signal. He heard nothing on the radio. There was approximately 0745 to 0800, 2 to 2½ hours after initiating the search. By this time, the Spads had arrived. They held south at the 120°/75 Channel 89. They initiated an electronic search from the holding pattern. At this time, King was the only aircraft receiving the survivor's radio. His plots were indefinite. They ranged from 120°/65 to 120°/85 from Channel 89. Since these plots were in the vicinity of the Spad's holding point, they checked the new plots. Since Sandy 03 had previously been in this area and received no response, he continued to the south-southeast. While skirting the west side of Tehenone, Sandy 03 heard the survivor for the first time. War Ace 300 told King that he heard an aircraft engine to his east. At this time, all the A-1's turned west. The survivor then reported an aircraft overhead. Sandy 03 jockeyed his throttles and War Ace 300 identified Sandy 03 as being over his position. Sandy 03 gave King and the Spads his position, 121°/101 Channel 89. Because of dense trees, Sandy 03 could not see the survivor. Since his UHF/OF had failed, Sandy 03 made several low passes to pinpoint the survivor's position by engine sound. At this point, King appointed Sandy 03 as the "on-scene commander". Spad 11 joined as Sandy 03's Wingman. Sandy 03 had Spad 12 and 13 hold high to the west of the survivor's position. The survivor was in good physical condition. He had two radios, three flares, a mirror, and pen run flares. He reported no movement or noise in his area. As Sandy 03 started a series of low, slow passes around the survivor's position, the survivor reported ground fire to the south of his position. Sandy 03 and Spad 11 struck several times up and down the ridge and valley to the south of the survivor. On subsequent passes, the survivor reported no further ground fire. Sandy 03 then placed an unarmed M-47 smoke bomb 100 meters north of the survivor. This provided a persistent mark of the survivor's position for the helicopter run-in.

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6. (S) At about 0845 hours, Sandy 03 called Jolly Green 71 in from his holding position, 10 miles southwest. Jolly Green 71 experienced a VHF guard channel failure. Sandy 03 called for Jolly Green 70. Since a cloud deck obscured the survivor's position, some difficulties were experienced. Sandy 03 gave Jolly Green 70 a "BOM" to the survivor's position. He provided terrain shielding to avoid exposure to ground fire from the south. When the Jolly Green was one-half mile out, Sandy 03 had the survivor pop his day smoke flare. As the Jolly approach the survivor's position, he stopped momentarily at the survivor's perch. This was about 100 yards from the survivor's position. As he moved forward, Jolly Green 70 sighted the survivor's smoke drifting out of the tree tops. Sandy 03 passed on-scene command to Jolly Green 70. Although the smoke had drifted somewhat in coming up through the trees, War Fox 300 reported the helicopter overhead. He was instructed to pop the night end of his flare. Jolly Green 70 was in the lower Fox about two minutes and expressed the area to the west. This provided terrain shielding for the helicopter as it accelerated to climb speed. Sandy 03 and the Spads had formed a daisy chain and had provided cover for the helicopter during run-in, pickup, and egress. All aircraft were safely enroute to NKP at 0900 hours.

7. (S) As noted above, this rescue was not effected until 0845 hours when hostiles were already moving into the jungle area. This effort was delayed by 2 1/2 hours due to an indefinite fix of the survivor's position. Many of the advantages of a first light effort were lost. To preclude similar problems on future night bailouts, we recommend that an aircraft with direction finding capability be diverted or launched to pinpoint the survivor's location during the hours of darkness.

8. (U) The Sandy forces were:

Sandy 01	Major Day	22803
Sandy 02	1Lt Holman	22803
Sandy 03	Major Monk	602303
Sandy 04	1Lt Moore	602303
Sandy 05	Major Alfred	1303
Sandy 06	Major Knox	1303
Sawdust 40	1Lt Castagno	1303
Sawdust 41	1Lt Harvey	1303
Sawdust 42	Major Martin	1303
Sawdust 43	1Lt Townsend	1303

DANIEL E. THOMP, Colonel, USAF
Asst Deputy Commander for Operations
Sandy Coordinator

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File 07 140
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96237

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 400 (Captain Carty/2687)

3 Oct 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report 2-3-060-2 Oct 69

TO: 3 ARRGp (JSARC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1, dated 11 July 1968.

2. (S) At approximately 0200L, 2 Oct 69 the crew of Jolly Green 71 (Low) and Jolly Green 70 (High) were alerted to prepare for a "First Light Effort". The SAR Briefing was initially scheduled for 0400L and then was rescheduled for 0330L. The briefing was a normal SAR briefing. I would recommend that for pre-planned SAR efforts, more attention should be devoted to planning safe routes to and returning from the SAR areas. The briefing team should have this information plotted in TACAN coordinates on the SAR maps prior to the briefing. JG 71 and JG 70 were to launch with Sandy 3 and 4 for escort. Sandys 1 and 2 were to launch and locate the survivor. There was some question of launch time. JG 71 and JG 70 were airborne at 0450L with Sandys 3 and 4 starting their take off at approximately the same time. Sandy 3, JG 70 and JG 71 got airborne and were climbing when we heard Sandy 4 tell departure control that he was aborting. Sandy 4 was asked if he wanted the barrier and his reply was a calm "negative". About two or three minutes later, the Pararescueman on JG 70 reported a fire on the runway followed almost immediately by several ordnance explosions. Sandy 1 and 2 informed Sandy 3 and KING that they could not launch because the runway was blocked and stated that they would attempt to get clearance for a take off from the parallel taxiway. JG 71 and JG 70 crossed the fence at 0558L with Sandy 3 for escort. JG 71 and JG 70 established a holding orbit at 0530L at 115/67/89 and waited for the survivor to be contacted. After the orbit was established Sandy 3 and Nail 20 proceeded to the estimated position of the survivor at 110/85/89. At 0600L, Spad 11, 12 and 13 were launched from Channel 77 and estimated to be on station at 0700L. At 0650L, KING 4 reported a possible weak contact with the survivor and estimated the position as 120/65/89. At 0705L, JG 70 reported what appeared to be a chute at 115/61/89. Sandy 3 took a look and the chute was just a flare chute. At 0745L, good voice contact was established with the survivor and his position was determined to be somewhere south of Tohepene on the 120° or 121° radial from Channel 89. At 0803L, Sandy 3 got a definite location of 121/102/89. In the meantime JG 71 and JG 70 had requested AR and KING 1 came down and completed the AR at 0815L.

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Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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JG 71 and JG 70 were cleared into the area and arrived at a position about 4 miles south of the survivor at 0825L. JG 71 descended to 6000 feet and dumped some fuel. JG 70 held at 9500 feet. Both JG 71 and JG 70 stayed over a broken cloud deck that had bases at 3500 feet and tops about 4500 feet. The estimated elevation of the survivor was 2000 feet with an OAT of 21°C. At 0832L, the survivor reported that he heard ground fire as Sandy 3 went by. At 0840L, Sandy 3 and the survivor thought that it was safe for JG 71 to come in for a pick up. JG 71 started in for the pick up and contact was made on Guard Frequency. While descending through 3000 feet the UHF radio started to cycle and contact could not be regained on manual or preset positions. Sandy 3 called on FM and again requested JG 71 to call on Guard. After Sandy 3 was advised that the UHF was inoperative he requested that JG 70 attempt the pick up. At 0845L, JG 70 dumped fuel and started a descent. Sandy 3 had thoughtfully marked a position near the survivor with an unarmed "WP" bomb. At 0850L, JG 70 spotted a chute in the trees and made his approach and in the meantime the survivor was asked to "Pop his smoke". As JG 70 started to hover near the chute (which was then determined to be another flare chute) his crew reported that the orange smoke was coming up through the trees at about 100 feet in the 9 O'Clock position. JG 70 moved over and at 0853L, the Flight Engineer reported that he had the survivor in sight. At 0855L, the survivor was on board the helicopter and egress was made to the west and up into the clouds. JG 71 and JG 70 returned to Channel 89 with Sandy 3 and Spads 11, 12 and 13 for escort. The survivor was in excellent shape. Jg 71 and JG 70 landed at Channel 89 at 0950L to complete the SAR effort. Coordination between the SAR forces was excellent. The survivor reported that he had glided much further than he had though the aircraft would glide. His complete power failure prevented him from accurately determining his bailout position. His location on the ground was in dense jungle growth surrounded by 3500 foot hills on all sides. His location made radio transmission and reception very unlikely unless the aircraft flew directly overhead. The 19 mile difference between the briefed position and the survivor actual position complicated the SAR effort. The survivor had two radios. Again the military services should do away with the white parachute canopy for flares. The flare parachute should be camouflaged or constructed of some material that would disengrate rapidly after deployment of the chute.

3. (U) The survivor was Lt. Penn E. Mallowney, USN, Service Number 68872 and was assigned to CVA-64.

4. (U) The rescue crews were:

Jolly Green 70 (H)

AC Capt. Donald L. Carty,
CP Capt. Edward G. D. Bright,
FE SSgt. Aron P. Hodges,
RS MSgt. Edward M. Willis,
RS SSgt. James A. Hunt,

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Jolly Green 71 (I.)

AC Capt. Gary L. Nelsen,
CP Capt. John H. Hartman,
FE TSgt. Leo R. Bringman,
RS ALC David M. Davison,
RS ALC Brenton D. Schicker,
AP Sgt Lawrence R. Brown,

Donald L. Carty
DONALD L. CARTY, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #1

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MISSION NARRATIVE 1-3-77 6 Oct 69

(U) At 0510Z, 6 Oct the 37th ARRS was notified that there was a seriously injured American seaman aboard the USS Grasp, located at 15-47N, 111-12E, (095/174/77) with a possible broken neck. At that time, the training crew was notified of the mission and an on-load of 5600 lbs of fuel and necessary litter and rescue equipment was placed aboard Jolly Green 21. The hospital was notified and Dr. Dennis B. Bealick and Dr. Emery J. Hopp were scheduled for the mission. Take off was accomplished at 0600Z and a scramble tactical IFR clearance was used to depart DaNang. Weather was as low as $\frac{1}{4}$ nautical miles visibility and less than 300 feet ceiling for most of the flight. They broke out of the weather at 130 nautical miles (NM) east of DaNang. New information came in that the injured seaman was in a litter with no movement of his right arm, no feeling in either shoulder, and he had a wound at the base of his neck. Also that the seaman was located on the canopy of the Fan Tail of the USS Norwitch Victory, and not the USS Grasp. With the assistance of King 6, they were able to DF the Norwitch Victory. After dumping some fuel in order to hover out of ground effect, and determining the wind, Jolly Green 21 went into a hover over the stern of the Norwitch Victory and lowered the Rescue Specialist (RS) to the fan tail. Jolly Green 21 then pulled off while Sgt Bullock secured the seaman in the litter and tied on guide ropes to assist the litter on its ride up. He then called Jolly Green 21 to make the pick up. Conditions for hover were: A temperature of 26 degrees centigrade, sea level altitude, a wind of 050 degrees at 10 NM, and a hover height of 100 feet. The pick up was made from 0810Z to 0815Z. A second seaman was also recovered due to an extremely smashed finger. His condition was good, but he did require medical attention. Jolly Green 21 then departed the area and immediately refueled with King 6 in order to have sufficient fuel to return to DaNang. The A/R took place from 0825Z to 0830Z and again Jolly Green 21 went IFR for the trip back. They landed at NSA Hospital at 0940Z to discharge the two seamen and then terminated the mission at 0950Z at DaNang AB.

(U) Special credit should be given to King 6 whose assistance made the mission successful. Crew coordination among the rescue crew was outstanding, when marginal weather conditions prevailed, along with minimum fuel status due to the distance out to sea.

(U) The non-combat save was: Seaman Sylvan M. Ulrey, B86-68-33
The recovered seaman was: Seaman Donald W. Sivits, 694-62-97

(U) Crew involved:

JOLLY GREEN 21

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AC	Maj	John F. Deghnee
P	Capt	Robert W. Packer
P	Capt	Kenneth T. Kelley
FE	Sgt	Robert J.P. Laframboise
RS	Sgt	Harry C. Bullock
FS	Capt	Dennis B. Bealick
FS	Capt	Emery J. Hopp

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

CHAPTER II

Operations and Training

Operations

(S) (GP 3) The good weather and resultant clear skies of the dry season brought a marked increase in combat activity during October, November and December. Our activity increased proportionally. Detachment One made fourteen combat saves, one non-combat rescue and one medical evacuation during this period. Det 1 was tasked with maintaining 15 minute alert two days out of three, flying the last two and a half hours of daylight on airborne alert in the November Orbit area, with the 40th ARRS from Udorn taking the third day. On that third day the 40th ARRS would send two HH-53s to this station at first light and they would be on 15 minute alert until the last two and a half hours of daylight, when they would fly airborne alert in the November Orbit area and recover at their home station. Det 1 was on 30 minute back-up alert on this day. Det 1 was also tasked with one of its HH-3E's on 45 minute alert during the hours of darkness for in-country rescues and medical evacuation missions. Due to mechanical difficulties encountered with the HH-53 and battle damage incurred on two HH-53s during the Boxer 22 mission, Det 1 HH-3Es were often required to fill in for the HH-53s on that third day.

(S) (Gp 3) Det 1, 40 ARRS was the scene of operations and staging area for three significant missions during this quarter. Our HH-3E, Jolly Green 19, attempted to make a pickup of Knife 61 and 62, downed by hostile ground fire at Muong Phine, Laos on 6 Oct. He received extensive damage from hostile ground fire as he was attempting to land there to rescue the aircrews and was forced to depart the area and return to base. Two HH-53s from 40th ARRS here on back-up alert were launched and after delivery of considerable ordnance by Sandy and Hobo aircraft, were able to effect a rescue of the eight aircrew members and a large number of indigenous personnel. They recovered here at our base. Two of the recovered aircrew had been wounded.

(S) (Gp 3) On the second significant mission HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn were launched from our station to back-up 37th ARRS HH-3Es engaged in a mission on Misty 11 on 24 Oct. HH-53s were staged out of our facilities here during that SAR mission. This mission is covered later in Combat Saves.

(S) (Gp 3) The third significant rescue effort and the most extensive and costly to date was the Boxer 22 mission on 5, 6 and 7th of Dec. Our HH-3Es, Jolly Green 37 and 09 were the initial Jolly Greens to go on the mission. The two Boxer 22 pilots were downed near Ban Phan Hop, Laos, a very heavily defended area near the North Vietnamese border. HH-53s, Jolly Green 76 and 72 were launched from Udorn directly to a near-by holding point to back-up Jolly Greens 37 and 09. HH-53s, Jolly Green 77 and 69 were sent to be staged out of this base, but were needed prior to landing here and continued on to the SAR area. Jolly Green 37 started in for a rescue attempt, but was called off due to intense antiaircraft fire. Jolly Green 09 then made an attempt at a rescue but received intense ground fire and hastily evacuated the area.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

File 943-1

440 [Capt Nelsen/2687]

9 October 1969

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-061-6 Oct 69 [U]

55

3ARRRP [JSARC]
APO 96307

1. [U] This report is submitted in accordance with ARREM 55-2/
3ARRRP SUP 1, dated 11 July 1968.

2. [S] On 6 Oct 69 the Buffs JG 71 and 72 were on backup alert at channel 89 when JG 19 and JG 36 were scrambled on this SAR mission. At approximately 1630L JG 36 developed hydraulic problems and retired to CR 89. JG 71 and JG 72 were scrambled at 1630L and airborne at 1635L. While enroute to the SAR area radio conversation monitored on VHF indicated that another recovery attempt was underway with JG 19. At 1645L JG 19 reported taking hits and breaking off the attempt with a generator out. It was now apparent that 71 and 72 were primary for the rescue. Immediate preparations were begun enroute because circumstances indicated that there would be insufficient time after arrival in the SAR area because of the rapidly approaching sunset and because the Sawdust A/C were running low on fuel. Sandy 5 was contacted at 1705L and he directed 71 and 72 into an orbit 6 N.M. Northwest of the area. Sandy 7 directed Sawdust flight to deploy at 1724 and briefed 71 and 72 to move into an orbit position 4 N.M. Northeast, the direction from which the approach would be made. Sandy 7 determined that JG 71 was ready for the attempt, then briefed on the procedures to be used. JG 71 was directed to descend to 2,000 AGL and be ready for an immediate approach to the site when cleared. Sandy 7 cleared JG 71 in at 1733. JG 71 switched to UHF guard and contacted Knife 61 Alpha on final. Knife 61 Alpha talked JG 71 down to the landing site, and provided excellent information on obstructions, enemy fire, etc. JG 71 landed and loaded 16 indigenous and 5 USAF survivors aboard. At 1738L JG 71 was airborne after dropping the external tanks to reduce aircraft weight. Within 20 seconds Knife 62B called on UHF guard, and advised that there were 3 USAF survivors still at the site. Sandy 7 asked JG 72 if he was ready to come in for the pickup. JG 72 reported on final and contacted 62B on guard. JG 72 landed at 1740L and was airborne at 1743L with 3 USAF survivors.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

400-0104

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

144

The SAR forces were RTB'ed to channel 89 and the Sandies proceeded to expend all ordnance on the enemy. JG 72 had received ground fire and a severe vibration was caused by the impacting mortar rounds and a hit through the Main Rotor Blade. JG 17 launched from CH 89 to intercept and escort JG 72 back to CH 89. This rescue attempt was successful because of 2 major actions. The first was because of the excellent and positive control of all forces by Sandy 7 and the second was due to the precise and overall coverage of the enemy forces with CBU-19. Although the enemy had approached to within 50 - 75 feet the anti-riot characteristic of the gas prevented them from effectively using either the mortars or their individual weapons.

3. [U] Total Survivors - 54 combat saves.

Taylor, C. D., Major, 21 SOS

Silva, T. D., Lt Col, 21 SOS

Conran, P. J., Major, 21 SOS

Costa, P. L., Capt, 21 SOS

Reynolds, K. G., MSgt, 21 SOS

Franklin, W. T., TSgt, 21 SOS

Ramsey, H. L., TSgt, 21 SOS

Cossiboom, C. W., SSgt, 21 SOS

Plus 46 Foreign military personnel

2

460-0104

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

4. [U] The rescue crews were:

JOLLY GREEN 71 [LOW]

AC: Bell, Holly G., Capt,

CP: Sanderson, Gary F., Capt,

FE: Hartman, Jack L., SSgt,

RS: Wilson, John E., SSgt,

RS: Gargano, Anthony R., SSgt,

AF: Whitted, Jeffery H., AIC,

JOLLY GREEN 72 [HIGH]

AC: Nelsen, Gary L., Capt,

CP: Wegman, James H., Capt,

FE: LeBeau, Stephen L., SSgt,

RS: Moran, Jack D., SSgt,

RS: McFerr, Anthony J., Sgt,

Gary L. Nelsen
GARY L. NELSEN, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

Holly G. Bell
HOLLY G. BELL, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

3

- GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

400-0104

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40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

6

This has also been a period of marked increase in rescue activity. The month of October started the dry season in South East Asia, making infiltration routes passable once again. The resupplying of the anti-aircraft positions made possible by the improving travel conditions was the primary reasons for this increase. The following paragraphs enlarge upon the missions we had.

The first real rescue of the quarter was a first light effort on 2 October.⁴ A Navy A-4 pilot bailed out at 121/102/89.⁵ The effort was marred by the crash of an A-1 aircraft on the runway at NKP during the scramble. Bad communications with the survivor also contributed to the difficulty encountered in this mission. The UHF Guard radio was lost on the low bird⁶ as he made his approach to the survivor but a successful pickup was finally made by the high bird. The survivor was taken to NKP in excellent shape.

The mission of 6 October has to be the most unusual one of the 40th's history.⁷ After two Ch-3 helicopters were brought down by hostile ground fire at 124/95/89⁸ the BUFFS went in and picked up forty six (46) foreign military personnel and

4. Mission Narrative 2-3-060, page 52

5. Gazeteer, page 17

6. Most SAR missions are flown with two HH-53 aircraft. The high bird covers the pickup aircraft (low bird) in case he is forced down.

7. Mission Narrative 2-3-061, page 55

8. Gazeteer, page 17

UNCLASSIFIED

40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

7

eight (8) USAF crew members. Forty three (43) of the forty six people rescued were brought out by the low bird. This is an undisputed record for the HH-53 aircraft.

Another unique mission occurred on 8 October when three downed crew members were rescued by the combined efforts of two BUFFS.⁹ The Jolly Greens were scrambled to a position 66 miles on the 340° radial of Ch 72¹⁰ where the low bird picked up the two crew members of an OV-10. The most important event of these two pickups occurred during the second rescue when the electrical control of the hoist was shot out and the Flight Engineer had to complete the hoist operation manually.¹¹ Because of the damaged hoist the high bird was called in to pick up the back seater of the downed F-4. This survivor was hanging upside down by his ankle in the trees and the Pararescuemen (PJ) had to go down the hoist to bring him up.

The only unsuccessful rescue attempt of the quarter for the BUFFS occurred on 24 October.¹² The BUFFS were scrambled to a point 25 miles on the 055° radial of Ch 72¹³ where the two crewmembers of a F-100 had bailed out. A HH-3E from Ch 89¹³ had already made a pickup attempt but was driven off

9. Mission Narrative 2-3-062, page 57

10. Gazeteer, page 17

11. Under normal conditions the hydraulic system of the hoist is controlled electrically. If this system is lost, a manual hydraulic backup system can be used.

12. Mission Narrative 1-3-079, page 61

13. Gazeteer, page 17

UNCLASSIFIED



6Oct69#2.jpg
Owner John Wilson

SSgt John Wilson
PJ

MSgt Anthony Gargano
PJ

Capt Gary Sanderson
Co-Pilot

A1C Jeff Whitted
Photog

SSgt Jack Hartman
FE

Capt Holly Boell
Pilot



6OCT69# 2

UNCLASSIFIED

40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

39

Crew of high bird on 6 Oct mission. Kneeling from left Capt Gary L. Nelsen, Capt James H. Wegman. Standing from left SSgt Stephen L. LeBeau, TSgt Jack D. Moran, and Sgt Anthony J. McFarr.



6 OCT 69

UNCLASSIFIED

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40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

37

Crew of low bird on 6 Oct mission. From left MSgt Anthony R. Gargano, Capt Gary F. Sanderson, SSgt John E. Wilson, Capt Holly G. Bell, and SSgt Jack L. Hartman.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 3RD AIRSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96367


REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

13 December 1969

TO: Commander, 40th ARRSq

1. It affords me a great deal of professional and personal pride to forward the attached letters from Brigadier General Brooks and Colonel Shockley to the aircrews of Jolly Green 71 and 72 on 6 October 1969.
2. It is a great tribute to these rescuemen that they, through superior performance and valiant disregard for their own safety, successfully effected the pickup of the aircrews and passengers of the two "Knife" helicopters.
3. To the preceeding correspondence I add my sincere congratulations and appreciation to these outstanding men.


MALCOLM C. FRAZEE Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, 410, 8 Dec 69
w/3 Atchs.

FROM: 21st Special Ops Sq (C)

27 October 1969

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: 3 Aerosp Resc and Recovry Gp (C)

1. We, the members of the 21st SOS, would like to extend our sincere appreciation for the outstanding work completed by 40th ARRS, Det 2 on 6 October 1969. On that date, two of our helicopters and eight of our people were down in enemy territory for a period of about six hours. During this time they were under constant attack from enemy forces of unknown strength. The successful rescue of these eight individuals was a direct result of the highly professional work of your people operating with great courage in close proximity to well trained and equipped enemy troops. The 21st SOS is most grateful to the officers and men of the 40th ARRS, Det 2 and would like to extend to them our thanks and appreciation for a job well done.

2. In particular, the members of the 21st SOS would like to thank Capt Bell and Capt Nelson and their crews who were instrumental in the rescue of Knife 61 and 62. It was through their efforts that one of the most remarkable rescues in the history of ARRS was accomplished successfully. Captain Bell, who was the first HH-53 into the LZ, landed about 50 meters from the survivors. Captain Bell's aircraft was then subjected to intense ground fire, including a mortar barrage. During this period of time, the friendly indigenous force rushed the rear of Captain Bell's helicopter completely blocking the rear ramp. Since access to the aircraft was denied to the 8 Americans they then attempted to enter through the side door. The lower half of this door was in the up position and was used as a mount for the minigun. Lifting the wounded over this door and by the minigun proved to be a difficult task since the opening was located a good 5 to 6 ft from the ground. The Americans handled this in an orderly manner, still it took a considerable amount of time. It is to Captain Bell's credit that he remained in the LZ as long as possible to complete this daring and successful rescue. However, due to the press of bodies at the rear ramp and the loading of wounded at the forward door, it was impossible for 3 Americans to gain entrance to the aircraft and were left behind. Captain Nelson, upon being notified of the presence of the 3 individuals, immediately made an approach into the LZ and landed about 100 meters away from the survivors. Sgt McFarr the PJ immediately jumped off the aircraft to aid the survivors who appeared to be staggering due to the effects of CBU-19. Sgt McFarr provided covering fire with his M-16 until he ran out of ammunition, then aided the survivors into the aircraft. Sgt Moran, who was manning the AFT ramp minigun, saw six hostile troops jump up and attempt to either capture or in some way harm the running and staggering survivors. Through his quick action these hostile troops were incapacitated and the rescue was completed successfully.

The 21st SOS would, with heart felt gratitude for a debt that can never be repayed, like to thank the 40th ARRS, Det 2 for the professionalism and heroism these crews displayed while under intense hostile fire. With complete disregard for their own personal safety they proved the compassion they have for comrades in dire trouble.



THEODORE D. SILVA, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 41ST AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY WING (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96353.



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

41C

8 December 1969

SUBJECT:

Letter of Appreciation

TO:

Commander
3d ARRGp

1. It is a pleasure for me to forward the attached letter from Brigadier General Brooks concerning the impressive Rescue mission performed on 6 October 1969 by the crews of "Jolly Green 71" and "Jolly Green 72."
2. The actions of both "Jolly Green" crews in pursuing the rescue of Knife 61 and 62 were true examples of our Rescue objective "That Others May Live." These actions should serve as an example of courage for all Rescue personnel to follow.
3. Please give my personal congratulations to both "Jolly Green" crews on the success of their mission.
4. The ARRS Certificate of Appreciation for Captain Jackson L Hudson has been withdrawn from this package and is being forwarded under separate cover.


THOMAS L SHOCKLEY, Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
LTR, ARCCO, 28 Nov 69,
w/2 atch

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE (MAC)
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225



28 November 1969

REPL TO
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Outstanding Performance and Achievement

TO: 41 ARRWg

1. It is with a full measure of pride that I forward the attached letter of appreciation from Lt Colonel Theodore D. Silva, Commander 21st Special Operations Squadron, USAF, and the letter regarding the outstanding personal conduct of Captain Jackson L. Hudson, 602nd Special Operations Squadron, USAF.
2. I concur with your recommendation concerning Captain Jackson L. Hudson. An Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service Certificate of Achievement is attached for presentation to Captain Hudson. Please extend my special thanks to him for fulfilling the "On Scene Commander" role in such an absolutely outstanding manner.
3. We are all immensely proud of the Rescue Forces that participated in the memorable 6 October 1969 mission. I was privileged to be present at the official mission critique, and there learned first hand of the professional competence exhibited by all Air Force personnel and the soundness of our rescue concepts and procedures.
4. This particular mission represented a true "pay-off" for all the hours spent in unit and individual training, and mission motivation required to successfully accomplish an exceedingly difficult mission. The results are most deserving of special recognition for the personnel who made it possible. Please convey my personal regards to the officers and airmen listed below:

JOLLY GREEN 71

AC Bell, Holly G, Captain
CP Sanderson, Gary F, Captain
FE Hartman, Jack L, SSgt
RS Gargano, Anthony, MSgt
RS Wilson, John E, SSgt
Photographer Whitted, Jeffery L, A1C

JOLLY GREEN 72

AC Nelson, Gary L, Captain
CP Wegman, James H, Captain
FE Lebda, Steven L, SSgt
RS Moran, Jack D, SSgt
RS McFarr, Anthony J, Sgt

Allison C. Brooks

ALLISON C. BROOKS, Brig Gen, USAF 3 Atch
Commander

1. Ltr, Col Silva
2. Ltr, Col Campbell
3. ARRS Cert of Appr

7 wld

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

JOHN E. WILSON

Staff Sergeant John E. Wilson distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as an HH-53B Pararescue Specialist in Southeast Asia on 5 December 1969. On that date, Sergeant Wilson and his fellow crewmembers attempted the rescue of two downed American Airmen from one of the most heavily defended hostile areas in Southeast Asia. Sergeant Wilson provided suppressive fire to protect the helicopter until the crew was forced to leave the area with severe battle damage. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Wilson reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(SECOND OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

JOHN E. WILSON

Staff Sergeant John E. Wilson distinguished himself by extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight as an HH-53 Pararescue Specialist, 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, on 8 August 1969. On that date, Sergeant Wilson flew an extremely hazardous mission through adverse weather conditions to rescue two American airmen downed deep in hostile territory. Although under the constant threat of hostile ground fire, Sgt Wilson descended to the ground, voluntarily, to splint the broken leg of one of the survivors and assist him on board the aircraft. Through his personal bravery and energetic application of his knowledge and skill, he significantly contributed to the successful accomplishment of this dangerous mission. The professional competence, aerial skill, and devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Wilson reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

**CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF
THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
TO**

JOHN E. WILSON

Staff Sergeant John E. Wilson distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as an HH-53 Rescue Crewmember on 6 October 1969. On that date, Sergeant Wilson courageously participated in the successful extraction of five downed American aircrew members and forty-six indigenous Army troops from an area under direct attack from hostile forces. He provided suppressive fire to protect both his fellow crewmembers and the survivors, and voluntarily exposed himself to heavy ground fire while helping the survivors to board the helicopter as mortars were impacting within fifteen yards of their position. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Wilson reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE AIR MEDAL

[FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER]

TO

JOHN E. WILSON

Staff Sergeant John E. Wilson distinguished himself by meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight as a Pararescue/Recovery Specialist in Southeast Asia on 27 June 1969. On that date, Sergeant Wilson participated in the successful evacuation of 111 personnel from a remote site that was being overrun by rapidly advancing hostile forces. His actions made possible the rescue of these friendly forces from within the grasp of the opposing forces. The professional skill and airmanship displayed by Sergeant Wilson reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

UNCLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET~~

39th ARRSq History, Oct - Dec 69

DATE: 6 Oct 69

13 October 1969

Supporting Document 3

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-061-6 Oct 69 (Part 2 of 2 Parts)

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 2 Report

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Knife 61 & 62 (OH-3 Helicopters)

LOCATION: 122/92/89, XD095279

SAVES: 56 Combat (48 Indigenous, 8 American)

1. () After takeoff from Udorn, we proceeded to the SAR scene, arriving in the area at 0640Z. Sandy 1 & 2, Sandy 3 & 4, Jolly Green 36 & 19, and Jolly Green 71 & 72 were on scene, with Sandy 1 acting as on-scene-commander. Nail 29 was acting as the FAC putting in air strikes on enemy troops.

2. () At 0700Z we descended and refueled Jolly Green 19 & 36, giving them each 2,000 lb of fuel. Refueling completed at 0729Z. At this time King 1 was Bingo fuel and RTB. Minutes prior, Blue Chip (we understand) made the decision that only Americans and wounded were to be picked up, leaving approximately 47 troops on the ground. This decision was questioned by both King 1 and 2. Because all personnel on the ground was felt to be tantamount to condemning them to certain capture or death. It was also felt by all forces on scene that when a chopper did set down that it would be overwhelmed by the survivors and that it would be impossible to deny them entry due to sheer weight of numbers. This later proved to be the case. At this time Joker ordered Jolly Green 71 & 72 to RTB to Channel 89. This was also questioned due to the need of backup helicopters should something happen to disable Jolly Green 19 & 36. Joker again ordered the RTB of 71 & 72 and they left the area.

3. () At 0930Z, after several airstrikes in the area, Sandy 1 began to move the forces in for a pickup attempt. The plan was for Jolly Green 19 to go in and pickup the Americans and wounded and Jolly Green 36 to provide cover. While moving in, personnel were observed on the road approximately 1 mile north of the crash site. While we attempted to identify these personnel the Jolly Greens exited the area. After lengthy discussions with, Smokey (AIRA Savanakhhet), and Top Hat, a ground advisor to friendly troops, it was determined that these were not friendly troops approaching. More flights of fast and slow movers were put in, sometimes striking to within 10 meters of the survivors. At 0940Z Knife 61 reported a lull in enemy activity and the Jolly Greens moved in for another attempt. At this time Jolly Green 36 reported a serious hydraulic leak in his transmission and that he would have to RTB immediately.

39-69-175

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

39th AFS History, Oct - Dec 69, Reporting Document 3

Jolly Green 19 said he would remain in the area if we could provide top cover for him. Helicopter PFH, Air America, was monitoring SAR UHF frequency and immediately offered his help. As 19 and PFH moved in and 19 went into a hover, 19 began receiving ground fire, taking hits, losing a generator and pulling out. Sandy 3 & 4 were designated to escort 19 and 36 back to CH 89, since they were out of ordinance.

4. Sandy 5 & 6 and 7 & 8 arrived on scene at 1000Z. Sandy 7 was designated as On-Scene-Commander. Fortunately Jolly Green 71 and 72 arrived on scene at 1015Z, being relaunched from CH 89. Sandy 1 was Bingo fuel and RTB after briefing Sandy 7. At 1035Z, Sawdust 40 thru 43, CBU 19 equipped aircraft, were moved into the area and expended. Sandy 5 thru 8 formed their protective daisy chain and continually expended while Jolly Green 71 & 72 moved in. As Jolly Green 71 set down at the crash site he was overwhelmed by 47 indigenous and 5 Americans who somehow managed to board the helicopter. As Jolly Green 71 pulled out, Knife 61B came up on guard and announced that he and his two companions would also like a ride out. Jolly Green 72 immediately came in and picked up the last three survivors. Knife 61B later said that all people who were alive had been picked up.

5. After the pickup, Sandy 7 decided to destroy the one remaining Knife helicopter, the other one had been hit by enemy mortar fire and was burning fiercely. After the chopper had been disabled, all forces departed.

6. Resume of forces:

Available Fighters Not Used	Fighters Expended	Other Forces
Simmer (F-4)	Marlin (F-105)	Helicopter PFH
Shako (F-4)	Spad 40 (A-1)	Raven 31
Bass (F-4)	Sandy 1-4 (A-1)	Nail 29
Magic Stone (Unk)	Sandy 5-8 (A-1)	
Gar Fish (F-4)	Sawdust 40-43 (A-1)	
Banyon (F-4)		
Eagle Green (T-28)		

7. (U) Crewmembers:

AMC	Cpt Harris	FE	TSgt Tucker
AC	Lt Col LaDou	FE	SSgt Shorey
CP	Maj Riggert	LM	MSgt Hauglie
N	Cpt Bonck	RO	Sgt Roland

John A. Harris

JOHN A. HARRIS, Captain, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander

39-69-135

~~SECRET~~

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED

Sandy Coordinator

SAR Report (Knife 61, 62) (U)

5650Mg (000)

1. (S) A successful rescue was conducted on the 6th of October for Knife 61 and Knife 62. The aircraft, two CH-3 helicopters, went down at 1115 hours on 6 October 1969 at Muong Phine, a short takeoff and landing (S.T.O.L.) airstrip located at XC094233. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.
2. (S) The Knife helicopters were engaged in an infil of friendly indigenous troops to support friendly operations in the Muong Phine area. They had been using this S.T.O.L. airstrip for a landing zone (L.Z.) for three days in support of the Junction City Operation. Normally, friendly troops were in position around the L.Z. before the helicopter came in for landing. On 6 October, friendly troops had not reached the landing zone. After several low passes over the airstrip; an aircraft, "Montana", indicated that the situation appeared normal and advised to proceed with the landing. Hobo 22 and 23, two A-1 escort aircraft, led the first helicopter into L.Z. Nothing appeared unusual until Knife 61 was about to touchdown. At that point, very accurate machine gun fire hit one of his engines. A go-around was attempted but was impossible. Knife 61 crash landed on the runway at approximately 1115. Knife 61 reported ground fire from the northwest. The escort aircraft struck this area. After multiple passes on the enemy position, Hobo 22 made several low passes down the runway and no ground fire was reported. Assuming that the resistance was sporadic and had been silenced, an attempt was made by Knife 62 to pickup the crew of Knife 61. As Knife 62 went into a hover, heavy and accurate fire from the south hit his engines and the second helicopter was also forced to crash land. Eight USAF aircrewmembers and 52 indigenous troops were down.
3. (S) At 1200 hours, Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 were ordered on cockpit alert. The Sandys were airborne and enroute to the scene at 1215 hours. They arrived on scene at 1300 hours. Hobo 22, 23, 24, and 25 were already on scene with Mail 29 as the supporting FAC. In addition to the above, the following aircraft were involved: 4 A-4's, 3 F-4's, 1 F-100, 3 F-105's, 18 A-1's, 2 HH-3's, and 2 HH-53's.

DCV-95 0110

UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

4. (S) The landing zone was the Eastern portion of a 500' S.T.O.L. airstrip. The airstrip is located to the west southwest of the intersection of Route 23 and 9. To the north, east, and west of the road were dense trees and heavy foliage. The southern boundary was a river with a thick tree line along the banks. The survivors had taken up a position in the open at the east end of the strip between the two downed helicopters. The hostile forces had previously constructed trench and bunker positions in the treeline surrounding the airstrip. It was from these positions that small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, and rockets were being fired into the survivors' position. The distance to this treeline varied but was approximately 75 meters to the north, 40 meters to the east, 75 meters to the south, and 200 meters to the west. Mortars were being fired from the dense trees northeast and west during the effort. The original weather was approximately 10,000' overcast with occasional light rain. This deteriorated to 2500' overcast. Visibility was somewhat reduced in the showers but remained workable for the most part.
5. (S) Prior to the arrival of the Sandy's Hobo22 was "on-scene commander." Nail 29 was acting as a FAC. Nail 29 directed some jet strikes. After Knife 62 was shot down, strikes were continued based on directions received from the survivors on the ground.
6. (S) The Sandy's received a thorough briefing from Hobo 22. This briefing identified the position and numbers of the survivors, the direction of the last incoming fire, and UHF Channels in use. King designated Sandy 01 as the "on-scene commander" at 1315 hours. Since ground fire was still incoming from three of the L.Z.'s four sides, the area obviously required much more ordnance. Sandy 01 requested more resources from King. Nail 29 was well versed in the situation and continued to put resources in at Sandy 01's direction. Although each series of strikes temporarily silenced the ground fire in one area, ground fire immediately started from another area. Sandy 01 prepared to move the helicopter closer several times only to have ground fire begin again. After each series of strikes, enemy soldiers would move closer to the positions of Knife 61 and 62 utilizing foxholes and entrenched positions inside the treelines. Sandy 01 requested soft ordnance capable of pinpoint delivery close to the survivors' position. Specifically, Sandy 01 asked King for A-1's loaded with CBU-14 and rockets. As Sandy 01 prepared to request use of CBU-19 (Sawdust), his alternatives were further limited. First, the two HH-53 helicopters launched to support the effort were withdrawn. The reason for this was not known to the on-scene force.
- a. Information available at the Wing Command Post was that the indigenous force was directed to be left overnight to secure the airstrip, consequently the rescue was directed by higher authority to be limited to the two downed helicopter crews. Then, Jolly Green 36 had to return to base with mechanical problems. This prevented the use of sawdust because all 60 men could not be recovered with one HH-3.

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Nor could they be left incapacitated by the CHU-19 and at the mercy of the enemy. The expected reaction of the friendly indigenous survivors if only one small helicopter landed was unknown. Because he had only one helicopter available, Sandy 01 had to positively ascertain through "Montana," that the indigenous troops knew and accepted the fact that only the American and indigenous wounded were to be picked up when the single helicopter came in to land. Since there was no interpreter on the ground, it required almost an hour to obtain confirmation. Montana reported that other friendly troops in the area were moving to reinforce the indigenous survivors. At this time, the ground fire slackened except for one area to the northeast at the junction of the two roads. In this area, men appeared in the open during one of the lulls as if they were the friendlies trying to join forces. However, once the survivors on the ground exposed their position, these troops began to fire on the friendlies. Rockets and mortar rounds now landed with increased accuracy on the known position of the survivors. Sandy 01 and 02 delivered CHU-14 and rockets to the northeast within 30 meters of the friendlies. This silenced the area. After a strike to the East on mortar positions, Knife 61 reported that all was quiet. After trolling on many passes and receiving no fire, Sandy 01 still felt it was not fully secure, but Jolly Green 19 was within 10 minutes of his bingo fuel time. Sandy 01 decided to bring in Jolly Green 19, who was briefed to come in high over the two downed helicopters and to let down between them. Because of the fire which had come from the Northeast, he elected to set down on the western-most portion of the airstrip. As he was about to touch down, a heavy machine gun opened up from the northwest. Jolly Green 19 pulled out to the west suffering several hits. At this time, mortar and small arms fire began to rake the survivors position. Sandy 01 again requested soft ordnance. Sandy 01 also requested more helicopters, Sawdust, and replacements for Sandys 01 through 04 who were low on fuel and ordnance. Jolly Green 19 reported that he had everything under control and that he did not need an escort to Channel 89. Sandy 07 and 08 arrived at 1700. Sandy 01 briefed Sandy 07 who became on-scene commander. Sandys 01 through 04 then expended the rest of their ordnance and returned to Channel 89. The situation when Sandy 07 took over as on-scene commander was critical. Enemy forces were firing at the survivors from the east, south, and west. At 1710, Knife 61 reported to Sandy 07 that two Americans had just been wounded. At that time, Jolly Green 71 and 72 were enroute to the scene and Sandy 05 and 06 were escorting them. Sandy 07 immediately requested that Sawdust aircraft be launched to be available if more Sawdust was needed. The earlier flights were getting low on fuel. Sandy 07 and 08 made low passes on the enemy positions. They delivered CHU-14 and rockets, and strafed to within 20 feet of the survivors who continually requested even closer ordnance delivery. Knife 61 called fire from all points of the compass and a mortar round hit one of the downed helicopters. The helicopter burned and was completely destroyed. After each of the passes by Sandy 07 and 08, Knife 61 would report all quiet. However, after several minutes, he would again report incoming fire. Apparently the

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enemy's strength was such that as each wave would be silenced by Sandy 07 and 09, a new wave would move into position. With darkness only 30 minutes away, there was no time for further delay in attempting a rescue. Sandy 07 believed that if the rescue was not made by midnight the enemy would overrun the survivors position. Sandy 07 assigned Sandust 40 as the Sandust flight commander and briefed him to lay down four strips of Sandust forming a box around the survivors' position. As soon as Jolly Green 71 and 72 reached their holding point to the east, Sandy 07 briefed them to make their approach from the northeast and land between the two downed CH-3s. When all forces were in position, Sandy 07 cleared Sandust 40 in and picked up Jolly Green 71 in his orbit to the east. Initially, Sandy 07 provided voice instructions to Jolly Green 71. As the helicopter approached the L.Z., Knife 61 provided directions. The four Sandust aircraft laid the CH-19 perfectly and all four Sandys joined in laying suppressive fire on all sides of the L.Z. Jolly 71 was on the ground approximately two minutes. He then exited the area to the northeast. Knife 628 came up on the radio as Jolly 71 expressed the area and informed Sandy 07 that three Americans had been left behind in the rush of the indigenous troops to board the helicopter. Sandy 07 called in Jolly Green 72. With no hesitation, Jolly Green 72 made his approach and landing. The Sandys kept up constant ordnance delivery around the L.Z. Jolly Green 72 was on the ground less than one minute. At 1755, all SAR forces were safely out of the area and enroute to Channel 89. A total of 46 indigenous and eight American survivors had been recovered. Knife 628 was the last man to leave the L.Z. and reported that no one alive was left. Approximately six indigenous dead were left behind.

7. (6) The difficulties encountered by the Sandy forces were as follows:

a. The initial withdrawal of the HH-53 helicopters coupled with mechanical difficulties and battle damage to the HH-3's resulted in a span of 30 minutes when no helicopters were on scene.

b. The failure of attempts to obtain soft ordnance almost resulted in the friendly positions being overrun before the rescue could be completed.

c. Lack of communication with indigenous troops on the ground and uncertainty as to their actions in the event only one helicopter landed were delaying factors.

d. There was no method of distinguishing between friendly and hostile forces on the ground.

e. The tactics and discipline of the enemy forces were effective. The enemy held his fire until the helicopters were in a vulnerable position and then fired accurately.

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f. The enemy showed tenacity in repeatedly attacking the survivors, even in the face of heavy casualties inflicted by overwhelming air strikes.

8. (3) Based on experience gained during this recovery, the following recommendations are made:

a. The lack of current and accurate intelligence on friendly and enemy strength and disposition not only generated the SAR originally but also complicated the subsequent rescue attempt. Recommendations on procedures for improved intelligence are highly sensitive in nature and have been addressed in separate correspondence.

b. Delay in transmitting the on-scene commander's requests for soft ordnance were excessive. Although the operational command channels for military activity in this area were complex, improved procedures for passing such requests in a more timely manner are needed.

c. The intelligence uncertainties about friendly/enemy strengths and dispositions further delayed the final decision to expend CEU-19. It is recommended that CEU-19 equipped aircraft be launched concurrent with the rescue aircraft when an opposed SAR of this magnitude develops. Four rather than two CEU-19 aircraft should be generated and launched simultaneously.

d. Withdrawal of reserve rescue helicopters should not be made until the rescue has been completed.

9. (C) Sandy forces who participated in this effort were as follows:

Sandy 01 Major Monk
02 Capt Mischoff
03 Major Moffatt
04 Lt Bertrand
05 Major Dayton
06 Lt Homan
07 Capt Hudson
08 Lt George

Daryl E. Tripp

DARYLE E. TRIPP, Colonel, USAF
Sandy Coordinator

Cy to: 7AF (DO)
7/13AF (DO)

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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V. NARRATIVE

On 30 September 1969 aircraft 67-14721 incurred battle damage which caused it to crash in the Planne de Jarres near LIMA Site 98. From 1 October through 3 October it was stripped of all unnecessary weight and on 3 October it was moved to LIMA Site 98 by a US Army CH-54 Flying Crane. On 4 October Major Bruce L. Athon, Captain Fred A. Berger, SSgt Roy O. Adams and Sgt William J. Costello from the FOL escorted the Army CH-54 crane back to LIMA Site 98 (20A) in an effort to return the crippled helicopter to Udorn RTAFB. Due to turbulence causing severe oscillation of the helicopters, the Army crew was forced to jettison the CH-3 5.6 miles south of LIMA Site 98, resulting in its complete destruction. During the hookup at LIMA Site 98, the CH-3 was blown off its shoring, forcing Sgt Costello to jump from the helicopter and break his arm.

On 1 October 1969, Major Henry M. Enterline, Captain Wayne R. Bevan, Sgt Jack C. Barber and SSgt Harry M. Spivey on a TACAN support mission to channel 99 were diverted by King to rescue a downed Misty FAC, but the pickup was made by an HH-3.

On 3 October Major Robert R. Arnau, Lt Col William C. Hartman, TSgt Maurice D. Stagers and TSgt Homer L. Ramsey were low bird in a flight of three CH-3's on an emergency exfiltration of a forward reconnaissance team. The team had been under hostile fire, but Spads suppressed it before the helicopter went in to make the pickup and the aircraft received no hits. On the same day, six Knife helicopters transported 201 Laotian troops and 13,550 pounds of cargo from the SGU Camp to Muong Phine.

The next day, 6 October, Major Claret D. Taylor, Lt Col Theodore D. Silva, MSgt Kenneth G. Reynolds and SSgt Clarence W. Cossiboom were shot down on an almost identical mission carrying twenty-six Laotian troops from a LIMA Site, Northeast of Saravan to Muong Phine. The FAC and the A-1's had both flown low over the landing zone and although the troops which were supposed to be there were not, it was deemed safe to land. Major Taylor was just approaching a hover when ground fire struck the aircraft. An immediate departure was attempted, but the aux servo and the number one engine had been shot out and the single engine capability was inadequate. Major Taylor bent the helicopter around in a tight 360° turn to set it back down on the original site. The helicopter was evacuated and air strikes commenced to protect the downed helicopter crew.

Major Philip J. Conran, Captain Peter L. Costa, TSgt Homer L. Ramsey, and TSgt Wilburn T. Franklin in the second helicopter orbited until fuel became critical. Ground fire had practically ceased and Major Conran reasoned, in spite of having an unarmed helicopter, that the best course of action would be to go in and let off his twenty-six Laotian troops and try to get the other crew out. In that way there would be fifty-two troops on

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8. Ops-6 Report
 9. Letters of Appreciation
 10. Forms 642

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the ground to hold off the enemy. A most probable safe route in was decided upon by Major Conran and the Hobos, but the helicopter began taking hits as he started the final approach. The primary servo was shot out on the approach and as the other crew was entering the helicopter, the transmission oil was shot out. The helicopter was evacuated and Major Conran and MSgt Reynolds primarily set up a defensive perimeter with the Laotians while Lt Col Silva and Maj Taylor acted as ground FAC's directing air strikes. Learning that the M-60's were still on the lead helicopter, Maj Conran took a Laotian and fetched them back to the defensive perimeter in spite of the hostile fire. One had jammed in the air and was unusable; the other jammed after 750 rounds due to the mud and dirt.

The SAR effort was initiated and continued for approximately six hours until finally "sawdust" was used in a final attempt to get the crews out before nightfall. In the middle of the afternoon, an HH-3 piloted by Captain Langham of the 40th ARRS, Det 1, landed to attempt a pickup, but received numerous hits in the engine and transmission area and was forced to depart due to the battle damage before a rescue could be accomplished. During the afternoon, Lt Col Silva was wounded in the back dangerously close to his spine and Major Conran received a leg wound. An HH-53 Buff piloted by Captain Bell of the 40th ARRS was the first to be able to land and rescue personnel. All the Laotian troops rushed into the rear of the helicopter leaving the Americans to go to the side door well above the ground. Sgt McFarr and Sgt Moran, the PJ's, provided covering fire while the wounded were helped aboard. The 54 survivors picked up by Captain Bell established a USAF record for the number of personnel to be rescued by one helicopter. With the heavily loaded helicopter, Captain Costa, Sgt Ramsey and Sgt Cossiboom were inadvertently left behind on the ground. Learning of the three Americans still on the ground, Capt Nelson in the second HH-53 immediately came down and picked them up. Thanks to the intensive efforts of the 40th ARRS, the 1st SOS and numerous other units, all crewmembers were returned safely. The wounded were med-evacuated to Udorn by Captain Leslie Swanson and Lt Col Hulbert Weitzel. For his heroic actions that day, Major Conran was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor. The rest of the crewmembers were recommended for Silver Stars.

The support mission to carry Laotian troops from the SGU camp to Muong Phine on 7 October was cancelled.

Major James C. Hughes, Lt Col William C. Girard, TSgt Charles B. Maxwell and SSgt Harvey A. Meltzer completed an emergency medical evacuation from "B" Comp., 809th Bat on 8 Oct. On 9 Oct four Knife CH-3's transported 169 Laotian troops and 1200 pounds of cargo from the SGU camp to Muang Phalang.

On 12 October Captain Aubrey M. Culp, Lt Col Hulbert F. Weitzel, SSgt Lawrence M. Dreyer and SSgt Clarence W. Cossiboom were low bird in a flight of three which successfully completed an emergency exfiltration of a forward reconnaissance team from a landing zone requiring a fifteen foot hover at 4300 feet pressure altitude and 21°C outside air temperature. The weather was so poor that only one A-1 was able to go down with the helicopter and the FAC. It was later determined that the rescue was possible only because they were riding a 20 knot wind. For his outstanding airmanship, Capt Culp was recommended for a Distinguished Flying Cross.

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Maj. Bruce L. Athon, Capt. Fred A. Berger, SSgt. Roy O. Adams and Sgt. William J. Costello from the FOL at Udorn RTAFB escorted the Army CH-54 crane back to Lima Site 98 (20A) in an effort to return the crippled helicopter to
142
Udorn RTAFB.

(S) Turbulence enroute caused severe oscillation of the helicopters, and the Army crew was forced to jettison the CH-3 5.6 miles south of the Lima Site, resulting in its complete destruction. During the hookup at Lima Site 98, the CH-3 blew off its shoring, and Sergeant Costello was forced to jump from the helicopter. The fall
143
broke his arm.

(S) Maj. Robert R. Arnau, Lt. Col. William C. Hartman, Technical Sergeants Maurice D. Stagers and Homer L. Ramsey were low bird in a flight of three CH-3s on an emergency exfiltration of a forward reconnaissance team on 3 October. The team had been under hostile fire, but Spads suppressed it before the helicopters went in to make the pickup and the aircraft took no hits. On the same day, six Knife helicopters transported 201 Laotian troops and 13,550 pounds of cargo from the SGU camp at Muong Phine.

(S) On 6 October, Lt. Col. Theodore D. Silva, squadron commander; Maj. Claret D. Taylor, MSgt. Kenneth G. Reynolds

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and SSgt. Clarence W. Cossiboom were shot down on an almost identical mission as the one stated in the previous paragraph. The team carried 26 Laotian troops from a Lima Site northeast of Saravan to Muong Phine.

(S) The FAC and A-1s had both flown low over the landing zone and although the troops which were supposed to be there were not, it was deemed safe to land. Major Taylor was just approaching a hover when ground fire struck the aircraft. An immediate departure was attempted, but the aux servo and the number one engine had been shot out and the single engine capability was inadequate. Major Taylor bent the helicopter around in a tight 360 degree turn to set it back down on the original site. The helicopter was evacuated and air strikes commenced to protect the downed helicopter crew.

(S) Maj. Philip J. Conran, Capt. Peter L. Costa, and Technical Sergeants Ramsey and Wilburn T. Franklin in the second helicopter orbited until fuel was critical. Ground fire had practically ceased and Major Conran reasoned, in spite of having an unarmed helicopter, that the best course of action would be to go in and let off his 26 Laotian troops and try to get the other crew out. In that way there would be 52 troops on the ground to hold off the enemy.

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(S) A most probable safe route in was decided upon by Major Conran and the Hobos, but the helicopter took hits as he started the final approach. The primary servo was shot out on the approach and as the other crew entered the helicopter, the transmission oil was shot out. The helicopter was evacuated and Major Conran and Sergeant Reynolds set up a defensive perimeter with the Laotians while Colonel Silva and Major Taylor acted as ground FACs directing air strikes.

(S) Learning that the M-60s were still on the lead helicopter, Major Conran took a Laotian and fetched them back to the defensive perimeter in spite of the hostile fire. One gun jammed in the air and was unusable and the other jammed after 750 rounds due to the mud and dirt.

(S) A SAR effort was initiated and continued for approximately six hours until finally CBU-19 was used in a final attempt to get the crews out before nightfall. In the middle of the afternoon, an HH-3 piloted by Captain Langham of the 40th AARS, Det 1, landed to attempt a pickup, but received numerous hits in the engine and transmission area and was forced to depart due to battle damage before a rescue could be accomplished.

(S) During the afternoon, Colonel Silva was wounded

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in the back dangerously close to the spine and Major Conran received a leg wound. An HH-53 BUFF piloted by Captain Bell of the 40th ARRS was the first to land and rescue personnel. All the Laotian troops rushed into the rear of the helicopter leaving the Americans to go to the side door ¹⁴⁴ well above the ground.

(S) Sergeants McFarr and Moran, the PJs, provided covering fire while the wounded were helped aboard. The 54 survivors picked up by Captain Bell established a USAF record for the number of personnel to be rescued by one helicopter. With the heavily loaded helicopter, Captain Costa, and Sergeants Ramsey and Cossiboom were inadvertently left behind on the ground. Learning of the three Americans still on the ground, Captain Nelson in the second HH-53 immediately came down and picked them up.

(S) The wounded were medevaced to Udorn RTAFB by Capt. Leslie Swanson and Lt. Col. Hulbert Weitzel. For his heroic actions that day, Major Conran was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor.

(S) On 12 October, Colonel Weitzel, Capt. Aubrey M. Culp, and Staff Sergeants Lawrence M. Dreyer and Cossiboom were low bird in a flight of three which successfully com-

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the area was one kilometer northeast of point Delta on the main route structure. However, the survivor's actual location was on a ridge line running east to west four kilometers southwest of Tchepone or 52NM SSE of the briefed area. The actual terrain was predominately high rolling hills covered by jungle foliage.⁵⁵

(S) War Ace 300 was finally picked up by Jolly Green 70 at 0845 hours. This was a delay of 2½ hours due to an indefinite fix on the survivor's location. In order that time could be saved in a SAR effort, it was suggested that an aircraft with direction finding capability be diverted or launched to pinpoint the survivor's location during the hours of darkness.⁵⁶

(S) Further details of the SAR effort for War Ace 300 can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report which is included as supporting document 44.

(S/NF) Another successful rescue was conducted for Knife 61 and 62 on 6 October. The aircraft, two CH-3 helicopters, went down at 1115 hours at Muong Phine, a short takeoff and landing (STOL) airstrip located at XD094233.⁵⁷

(S) At 1200 hours, Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 were ordered on cockpit alert. The Sandys were airborne and

enroute to the scene at 1215 hours. They arrived on scene at 1300 hours and joined Hobo 22, 23, 24, and 25 who were already there with Nail 29 as the supporting FAC. In addition to the above, the following aircraft were involved: four A-4's; three F-4's; one F-100; three F-105's; eighteen⁵⁸ A-1's; two HH-3's; and two HH-53's.

(S) The landing zone was the eastern portion of a 500 foot STOL airstrip. The airstrip is located to the west southwest of the intersection of Routes 23 and 9. Dense trees and heavy foliage covered the area to the north, east and west of the road. The southern boundary was a river with a thick tree line along the banks. The choppers were unloading friendly indigenous troops for an infil mission. Both choppers took hits from a well-planned enemy ambush and crashed in a clear area close to the STOL strip. The survivors took up a position in the open at the east end of the strip between the two downed helicopters.⁵⁹

(S) Prior to the arrival of the Sandy's, Hobo 22 was on-scene commander while Nail 29 directed some jet strikes. After Knife 62 was shot down, strikes were continued based⁶⁰ on directions received from the survivors on the ground.

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(S) The Sandy's received a thorough briefing from Hobo 22. This briefing identified the position and numbers of the survivors, the direction of the last incoming fire, and UHF channels in use. Since ground fire was still incoming from three of the LZ's four sides, the area required much more ordnance. Nail 29 was well versed in the situation and continued to put resources in at Sandy 01's direction. Several times, Sandy 01 tried to move in helicopters only to be⁶¹ met by ground fire.

(S) As Sandy 01 prepared to request use of CBU-19 (Sawdust), his alternatives were further limited. First, the two HH-53 helicopters launched to support the effort were withdrawn. The reason for this was not known to the⁶² on-scene force. '

(S) Information available at the Wing Command Post was that the indigenous force was directed to be left overnight to secure the airstrip, consequently the rescue was directed by higher authority to be limited to the two downed helicopter crews. Then, Jolly Green 36 had to return to base with mechanical problems. This prevented the use of CBU-19 because all 60 men could not be recovered by one HH-3. Nor

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could they be left incapacitated by the CBU-19 and at the
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mercy of the enemy.

(S) With only one helicopter available, Sandy 01 had to positively ascertain through "MONTANA" that the indigenous troops knew and accepted the fact that only the American and indigenous wounded were to be picked up when the single helicopter came in to land. Since there was no interpreter on the ground, it required almost an hour to obtain
64
confirmation.

(S) Sandy 07 and 08 arrived on scene at 1700 hours. Sandy 01 through 04 then expended the rest of their ordnance and returned to Channel 89. The situation when Sandy 07 took over as on-scene commander was critical. Enemy forces were firing at the survivors from the east, west and south. At 1710, Knife 61 reported to Sandy 07 that two Americans had just been wounded. At that time, Jolly Green 71 and 72 were enroute to the scene and Sandy 05 and 06 were escort-
65
ing them.

(S) After putting in more ordnance and with darkness only 30 minutes away, there was no time for further delay in attempting a rescue. Sandy 07 believed that if the rescue was not made by nightfall the enemy would overrun
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the survivors position.

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(S) Sandy 07 assigned Sawdust 40 as the Sawdust flight commander and briefed him to lay down four strips of Sawdust forming a box around the survivor's position. As soon as Jolly Green 71 and 72 reached their holding point to the east, Sandy 07 briefed them to make their approach from the northeast and land between the two downed CH-3s.⁶⁷

(S) Jolly 71 was on the ground approximately two minutes. He then exited the area to the northeast. Knife 62B came up on radio as Jolly 71 egressed the area and informed Sandy 07 that three Americans had been left behind in the rush of indigenous troops to board the helicopter.⁶⁸

(S) Sandy 07 called in Jolly 72. With no hesitation, Jolly 72 made his approach and landing and was on the ground less than one minute. At 1755, all SAR forces were safely out of the area and enroute to Channel 89. A total of 46 indigenous and eight American survivors had been recovered. Knife 62B was the last man to leave the LZ and reported that no one alive was left.⁶⁹

(S) The difficulties encountered by the Sandy forces⁷⁰ were as follows:

a. The initial withdrawal of the HH-53 helicopters coupled with mechanical difficulties and battle damage to the HH-3s resulted in a span of 30 minutes when no helicopters were on the scene.

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b. The failure to obtain soft ordnance almost resulted in the friendly positions being overrun before the rescue could be completed.

c. Lack of communications with indigenous troops on the ground and uncertainty as to their reactions in the event only one helicopter landed were delaying factors.

d. There was no method of distinguishing between friendly and hostile forces on the ground.

e. The tactics and discipline of the enemy forces were effective. The enemy held his fire until the helicopters were in a vulnerable position and then fired accurately.

f. The enemy showed tenacity in repeatedly attacking the survivors, even in the face of heavy casualties inflicted by overwhelming airstrikes.

(S) Based on experience gained during this recovery,
71
the following recommendations were made:

a. The lack of current and accurate intelligence on friendly and enemy strength and disposition not only generated the SAR originally but also complicated the subsequent rescue attempt.

b. Delay in transmitting the on-scene commander's request for soft ordnance were excessive. Although the operational command channels for military activity in this area

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were complex, improved procedures for passing such requests in a more timely manner were needed.

c. The intelligence uncertainties about friendly/enemy strengths and dispositions further delayed the final decision to expend CBU-19. It was recommended that aircraft equipped with CBU-19 be launched concurrent with the rescue aircraft when an opposed SAR of this magnitude develops. Four, rather than two, CBU-19 aircraft should be generated and launched simultaneously.

d. Withdrawal of reserve rescue helicopters should not be made until the rescue has been completed.

(U) Further details of this SAR effort can be found in the 21st Special Operations Historical report, Appendix V, Tab B; and Rescue Narrative report, which is attached as support document 46.

(S) Two days later, on 8 October, another successful SAR was conducted for Nail 07A and B plus Boxer 61B. Nail 07, an Ov-10, went down at 0653Z and Boxer 61B bailed out at approximately 0645Z.⁷²

(S) Boxer 61B bailed out after his aircraft experienced battle damage. "KING" initially received word of Boxer 61B's bailout and directed Nail 07 to the rescue area to search

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FROM: 37(0)

10 Oct 1969

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-078-3 Oct 69)

TO: 37C

3rd ARRGp (JSARC)

IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 Jun 68.

2. At 0710Z Jolly Green 42, Capt Hoilman Aircraft Commander, was notified by Queen that Boxer 1, an F-4 pilot was downed approximately 297 degrees 25 miles from Channel 77. 0715Z, Jolly Green 42 was airborne enroute to scene. No problems were encountered on the scramble. Enroute to scene, Jolly Green 42 had a gear malfunction in that the nose gear would not retract. After cycling the gear three or four times, it was determined that the malfunction could not be corrected. It was decided this would not interfere with the rescue. At 0716Z Jolly Green 04, Capt Garcia, Aircraft Commander, was airborne as high cover bird for Jolly Green 42. King 6 was contacted and a corrected heading to scene was received. The survivors position was now estimated as 117 degrees 15 miles from Channel 77. This proved to be a fairly accurate fix. At 0724Z voice contact was established between Jolly Green 42 and the survivor. Boxer 1 notified Jolly Green 42 that he had visual contact on the helicopter. 0725Z Jolly Green 42 established visual contact with the survivor, made a low pass and dropped a smoke marker. Another low pass was made and the Rescue Specialist was deployed. The survivor left his raft at this time. Jolly Green 42 then established a hover just downwind of the survivor while the Rescue Specialist prepared the survivor for the pick up. Upon receiving the signal from the Rescue Specialist, a water landing was made and Jolly Green 42 taxied to the survivor. At this time the sea was coming from approximately the three o'clock position, swells were estimated at 6 to 8 ft with a period of approximately 4 seconds. A stable position was established with the survivor and Rescue Specialist at the base of the refueling probe. The Rescue Specialist took hold of the anchor lanyard and wrapped his legs around the ladder. The Flight Engineer took hold of the "horse collar" which the Rescue Specialist had used to tow the survivor, and attempted to bring the survivor aboard the aircraft. At this point high seas washed the survivor and the Rescue Specialist away from the door about 5 feet. They swam back to the door and made a second attempt to board the aircraft. Since the survivor was offering absolutely no assistance, the Flight Engineer was still unable to pull the survivor into the aircraft (the survivor stated afterwards that he had been trained not try to help the rescue crewmembers get him aboard the aircraft). Due to a strong current and rough seas the Rescue Specialist was again unable to hold on to the ladder long enough to get the survivor on board. This time the two were washed under the right sponson, and the aircraft was immediately lifted into a hover. The AC then decided to make the pick up from a hover. Considerable difficulty was encountered hovering over the survivor due to the wind direction, current flow, and rough seas, despite the fact that two hover references were available (smoke and the half-sunk life raft). The wind was in the 10 o'clock position from the aircraft. The sea swells rolled across from the 2 o'clock position and the sea current apparently came from the 7 o'clock

position. Each time a stable hover was established, the survivor appeared to drift to the left rear, under the aircraft until the Flight Engineer lost sight of him. Finally, the Rescue Specialist was able to grab the hoist and fasten it to the horse collar on the survivor. An uneventful hoist pick up was made by Jolly Green 42 at 0735Z and the survivor was determined to be in good condition. At this point the AC determined that a sea landing would be the quickest and safest way to pick up the Rescue Specialist. A sea landing was accomplished with the waves approaching the aircraft from the 11 o'clock position. The Rescue Specialist approached the aircraft from the two o'clock position and had no problem climbing aboard at 0738. He had a 4 inch cut on his lower right back which he apparently received when he was washed under the right sponson. The Rescue Specialist immediately examined the survivor and determined that he had abrasions on his left temple and apparent difficulty moving his right shoulder, but did not need any special medical care. The entire time elapse from sighting the survivor to picking up the Rescue Specialist was approximately 13 minutes. All crew members performed flawlessly as briefed. The copilot did an outstanding job of communicating with King, the survivor and the crew, and gave excellent navigation to the survivors position, as well as taking copious notes covering every detail of the rescue and monitoring all instruments. The Flight Engineer performed his job correctly in every phase as he had been briefed. He did an especially good job dropping smokes and keeping the pilots informed of the survivors position and condition. The Rescue Specialist did an outstanding job in turbulent and rough seas, especially since he was receiving minimum help from the survivor. He was completely prepared for his job and made the rescue possible in the minimum amount of time. Lessons learned and to be emphasized:

- a. A sea landing is the quickest and safest rescue if conditions permit, however it is more important to land with the swells approaching the aircraft 20 to 30 degrees off the nose than to land into the wind.
- b. When the survivor is at the door of the aircraft, hook on to him with the hoist cable first and then try to pull him in, using the hoist if necessary (this procedure would have avoided the survivor being washed away from the aircraft two times and eventually washing under the sponson).

After all crew members were aboard, Jolly Green 42 returned directly to Channel 77. An ambulance was requested to meet the aircraft at the 37th ARRSq ramp, and Queen notified of survivor condition and pertinent times. The ambulance met Jolly Green 42 at 0740Z and took both the survivor and the Rescue Specialist to the hospital for treatment. Jolly Green 04 landed at 0750Z.

3. Survivors Name: Capt Neal A. Jacobs, USAF. Organization: 558 TFS, Camranh Bay.

4. Jolly Green Crew Members:

JOLLY GREEN 42

AC	CAPT	CHARLES W. HOILMAN
CP	LT(JG)	ROBERT RITCHIE
FE	SSGT	JAMES E. SMITH
RS	SGT	EDWARD K. RENDELL

JOLLY GREEN 04

AC	CAPT	MIGUEL GARCIA
CP	CAPT	LAWRENCE A. MARINO
FE	SSGT	JAMES H. JENEREAUX
RS	SGT	WAYNE L. FISK

5. Recommendations:

a. All ACs should get training in moderate seas so their first experience will not be during an actual pick up.

b. Flight Engineers should be instructed to hook the hoist cable to the survivor at the first possible moment, then bring him aboard the aircraft, using hoist if necessary.

Charles W. Hoilman Jr.

CHARLES W. HOILMAN JR., Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander

10/1/68

JOLLY GREEN GIANTS
MAKE 497TH PICKUP

800T 69 SAR

DA NANG AB, Republic of Vietnam (7AF)--A pilot from the 559th Tactical Fighter Squadron AB recently became the 497th rescue for the personnel of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron here.

The rescued pilot, U.S. Air Force Captain Neil Jacobs, flew his crippled F-4 Phantom more than 100 miles prior to bailing out about 10 miles east of Da Nang City. The other crewman bailed out over the target area when the aircraft was damaged. He was picked-up by another rescue helicopter crew.

Captain Charles W. Hailman Jr., Mays Landing, N.J., HH-3 Jolly Green helicopter commander said, "We received notification that the F-4 was going down and we took off immediately. In 10 minutes, we were over the area where the pilot went down. Thirteen minutes after he hit the water, we had him in the helicopter.

his orange smoke signal kit and we went in for the pick-up. On the first pass we dropped a pararescueman to aid the pilot and get rid of the life raft prior to the actual pick-up."

Staff Sergeant James E. Smith, flight engineer, Olathe, Kan., said, "After we dropped the pararescueman, we landed in the water. The seas were running pretty rough with waves 8 to 10 feet high. On the first attempt, the pararescueman and pilot swam to the aircraft, but the current was so swift, they were pulled under the helicopter.

"To avoid injuring the two personnel, Capt. Hailman hovered the aircraft and I lowered the hoist and brought the pilot on board. Then we picked up the pararescueman," he concluded.

This was the first pickup for Capt. Hailman and the second for both Lt. (J.G.) Ritchie and SSgt. Smith.



SEARCHER

NEWSLETTER OF THE 41ST AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY WING

Vol. II No. 12

December 1969

PACAF RP 64-1

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SEARCHER

December 1969

JOLLY GREEN MISSION

37th PULLS PILOT FROM OCEAN, MARKS 497th SAVE

DA NANG AB, Republic of Vietnam—A pilot from the 558th Tactical Fighter Squadron AB recently became the 497th rescue for the personnel of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron here.

The rescued pilot, Capt. Neil Jacobs, flew his crippled F-4 Phantom more than 100 miles prior to bailing out about 10 miles east of Da Nang City. The other crewman bailed out over the target area when the aircraft was damaged. He was picked up by another rescue helicopter crew.

Capt. Charles W. Hoilman Jr., HH-3 Jolly Green Giant helicopter pilot, said,

"We received notification that the F-4 was going down and we took off immediately. Within 10 minutes, we were over the area where the pilot went down. Thirteen minutes after he hit the water, we had him in the helicopter.

Lt. Robert T. Ritchie, a Coast Guard exchange pilot with the 37th ARRSq, commented, "The downed flyer spotted us before we saw him in the water. He directed us to his position. When we spotted him, he popped his orange smoke signal kit and we went in for the pick-up. On the first pass we dropped a pararescuer to aid the pilot and get rid of the life raft prior to the actual pick-up."

SSgt. James E. Smith, flight engineer said, "After we dropped the pararescuer, we landed in the water. The seas were running pretty rough with waves 8 to 10 feet high. On the first attempt, the pararescuer and pilot swam to the aircraft, but the current was so swift, they were pulled under the helicopter.

"To avoid injuring the two personnel, Capt. Hoilman hovered the aircraft and I lowered the hoist and brought the pilot on board. Then we picked up the pararescuer," he concluded.

This was the first pickup for Captain Hoilman and the second for both Lieutenant Ritchie and Sergeant Smith.

8 OCT 69 SARC

37 ARRSq History, Oct-Dec 1969

29

A SATISFIED CUSTOMER

This is Captain Neal A. Jacobs, USAF, after he was rescued on 8 October 1969. This mission is summarized on page 13, and the complete mission narrative is contained in Supporting Document # 2, page 42.



FILE = JACOBS 69

8 OCTOBER 69

RELATIVE DESCRIPTION (Description of the act, achievement or service, including specific dates, places and facts. If additional space is required, use plain 8 x 10 1/2 bond paper, the last sheet of which must be signed by the recommending individual in addition to the signature on this sheet.)

On 8 October 1969 at 1255, the crew of Jolly Green 79 and Jolly Green 72 were dispatched from a forward operating location in response to a distress call from an aircraft, Boxer 61. Both Jolly Green 79, under the command of Major Crumpler, and Jolly Green 72, under the command of Captain Reeder, were airborne at 1407 from Hahn Airfield to the survivors location. Notification prior to take-off indicated the Bravo man of Boxer 61, who had been ejected when the aircraft took a direct hit over the target area and was down southeast of Hahn Airfield. Shortly after take-off, Wing 22 advised the SAR forces that Mail 07, an OV-10, was also down in the same area following a mid-air collision with an C-2; both were Forward Air Control aircraft. All had been searching for Boxer 61's.

Sandy 03 and 04 joined up with Jolly Green 79 and Jolly Green 72, and proceeded to a SAR area, arriving at 1455. Sandy 01 and 02 were already in the area; they had no survivors located, and had trolled for ground fire. Sandy 01 had taken one of the survivors and had put ordnance in the area. The two survivors were believed to be Mail 07 and 08, using the call sign Box 09; at that time, it was not known that three survivors were on the ground.

During radio contact with Boxer 61's and realizing his critical condition, Major Crumpler elected to descend immediately for a pickup attempt. Sandy 03 took a look at the area and directed Jolly Green 79 to a ridge line running north and south, where survivors were located. While Captain Reeder remained in a high orbit, Major Crumpler made a high speed descent and spotted the smoke from the wreckage of the OV-10 on the western side of the ridge. Initially Jolly Green 79 was unable to locate the survivor and repeatedly asked him for radio directions, but received no response. Jolly Green 79 directed Jolly Green 79 to make a 180° hovering turn and move approximately 100 yards on a 100° heading from the hover position. At this time the survivor popped a flare, which appeared behind Jolly Green 79. Another 180° hovering turn was made and Major Crumpler moved directly to the survivor. Jolly Green 79 was in a hover 14 and the survivor was on board at 1518.

The second survivor then popped a smoke flare and was spotted at Jolly Green 79's 9 o'clock position, about 30 yards away. Major Crumpler immediately hovered to the 9 o'clock position. The survivor was in good shape and had moved to a large rock. The hoist was established and hoist started down. When the hoist was almost within reach of the survivor, Jolly Green 79 started taking ground fire. Major Crumpler immediately moved the hover into the tree tops and the Sandy's were notified. The exact location of the ground fire was not known. The hover was maintained and the survivor was able to get the penetrator, but the hoist had been damaged by the ground fire and Sgt. 1, the Flight Engineer, was unable to raise the penetrator electrically. He manually switched to emergency override and was able to get the survivor on board the aircraft. No further ground fire was taken, primarily because the Sandy's were

3 NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF INDIVIDUAL INITIATING RECOMMENDATION
 LT COLONEL, USAF
 NAME

27. SIGNATURE

SIGNED

COMMENTS

1. JER

DESCRIPTION (Citation and supporting statements or other official documents)

Citation

(Con't) Item 25, AF Form 642, Recommendation for the Distinguished Flying Cross for Captain Dan L. Reeder, [REDACTED].

laying ordnance, in a "daisy chain" around the hovering helicopter. The second survivor was on board at 1520 and Major Crupper departed the area on a northwest heading.

Just prior to getting the two downed airmen on board, it was determined that three survivors were on the ground. The two survivors picked up by Major Crupper had both been from Mail 07. As Jolly Green 79 climbed to altitude, Sandy 01 had made contact with and was pin pointing the position of Boxer 61B. Because of the hoist malfunction, the third pickup was turned over to Jolly Green 72 and Captain Reeder was directed to descend to 5000 feet by Sandy 01, as he attempted to locate Boxer 61B. Boxer 61B advised that he had utilized all of his smoke signals, and was suspended upside down in a tree with a broken leg and on the verge of passing out. Jolly Green 72 immediately was cleared and Captain Reeder began to descend. Boxer 61B's position was approximately 1.5 nms north of Mail 07's position on the west side of a ridge line running north and south. Over the radio, Boxer 61B kept repeating that he was upside down and about to pass out.

As he approached the ridge, from the west, Captain Reeder was told to go left about 50 yards. He turned northwest and Boxer 61B said, "You're going away from me, turn toward me". Sandy 01 advised him to give the Jolly a direction; and Boxer 61B said to turn right. Captain Reeder turned back towards the ridge and saw an orange chute beneath an over hanging tree about 50 yards away. He hovered to it and turned into the wind.

Sgt Willis, one of the Paramedics, knowing the survivor's condition, had volunteered to go down on the hoist and was prepared for immediate lowering. Sgt Lohrengel, the Flight Engineer, skillfully directed Captain Reeder over the survivor and lowered the hoist with Sgt Willis aboard. ~~As the Paramedic started down, Sandy 01 advised that Jolly Green 72~~ was taking ground fire from his one through three o'clock position along the ridge, and proceeded to lay down anti-personnel ordnance about 100 yards to the right of the helicopter. Captain Reeder attempted to turn to bring Jolly Green 72's "B" gun into effective position, but due to the wind, estimated at 20 to 30 kts. the northerly heading, parallel to the ridge, had to be maintained. Sporadic small arms fire could be seen coming from the trees on the ridge line, but due to the Sandy's continuous and effective laying of ordnance, throughout the entire time Jolly Green 72 was in hover, the ground fire was ineffective. As Captain Reeder established a hover, Boxer 61B said, "You're over me", and passed out. Sgt Willis explained later that Boxer 61B was suspended by his left ankle, which was wedged between a limb and the trunk of a tree. He was upside down with his head approximately two feet off the ground completely supported by his trapped left ankle. His right knee also appeared to be broken. Sgt Willis attached a line from his harness to the survivor's chute risers to prevent him from falling and physically broke the trapping limb from the

(Con't) Item 25, AF Form 642, Recommendation for the Distinguished Flying Cross for Captain Dan L. Reader, [REDACTED]

tree. Sgt Willis then carried Boxer GIB back to and held him on the forest penetrator as Sgt Lohrengel raised them both back up to the helicopter.

During the time, in excess of 10 minutes, that Sgt Willis was on the ground, Sgt Lohrengel provided precise directions to Captain Reader, who maintained an almost motionless hover. This allowed the hoist cable to remain extended, ready for immediate pickup.

Captain Thompson, kept the engine torques ratched and advised Captain Reader of the engine performance throughout the extended hover. He also kept the SAR forces informed of the mission progress over the radio and scanned the area to the left of the aircraft for gun fire.

Sgt Schicker, the second Pararescuer aboard Jolly Green 72, manned the #3 gun, scanning the area to the rear for ground fire. He left his gun, as Sgt Willis and the survivor reached the door of the aircraft to help Sgt Lohrengel get the survivor on board. Then as Sgt Willis caught his breath, Sgt Schicker immediately went to work treating the semi-conscious survivor. He set the survivor's broken right leg and left ankle. Sgt Schicker also administered an "IV" to prevent shock.

Captain Reader exited the area to the west and climbed to join up with Jolly Green 79, who had maintained a high orbit, providing cover for Jolly Green 72. After join up, the Sandy's escorted Jolly Green 79 and Jolly Green 72 back to Hekkon Phnom.

Throuth, battle damage and the survivors' conditions were passed to King 02. Jolly Green 79 had a fuel leak in the right auxiliary tank and numerous bullet holes. After Jolly Green 72 retracted the landing gear during climb out, the unsafe warning horn sounded and could not be reset. ~~An attempt to pull the circuit breaker was made, but the head broke off; so~~ to ease communications strain, the landing gear was lowered. The Pararescuer man treating the survivor stated he was going into deep shock from his extremely painful injuries, so to ease aircraft vibrations and reduce his pain, an attempt to retract the gear was made but it would not come up. Suspecting battle damage, Captain Reader left the gear down and advised Jolly Green 79 that Jolly Green 72 would need to hover and have rear pins installed before landing. After the rear pins were inserted by the ground crew at Chumel 89, Jolly Green 72 landed and the survivor evacuated by helicopter at 1600. [REDACTED] transferred his two survivors to the ambulance at 1620.

Post flight inspection revealed that Jolly Green 79 had taken 11 hits throughout the aft cabin and blades and that Jolly Green 72 had only one hit, a small arms round that was stopped by a metal ammunition box, placed on the aft ramp.

(Con't) Item 25, AF Form 642, Recommendation for the Distinguished Flying Cross for Captain Dan L. Reeder, [REDACTED]

in the rescue of three downed American airmen, in that they descended into a known hostile area, before it was proved permissive. In order to rescue a downed crewmember who was within minutes of death, I recommend the following awards: To MSgt Edward M. Willis, Pararescue Specialist, The Silver Star; to Captain Dan L. Reeder, Aircraft Commander; Captain Donald Y. Thompson, Co-pilot; SSgt David C. Lohrengel, Flight Engineer; Sgt Brenton D. Schicker, Pararescue Specialist, The Distinguished Flying Cross.

AC: Captain Dan L. Reeder, [REDACTED]

CP: Captain Donald Y. Thompson, [REDACTED]

FE: Staff Sergeant David C. Lohrengel, [REDACTED]

RS: Master Sergeant Edward M. Willis, [REDACTED]

RS: Sergeant Brenton D. Schicker, [REDACTED]

JULY 72
HH-53
40 ARRS
UODRN

GENS

CHARLES R. CAMPBELL, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

From: Bubbasgym@aol.com <Bubbasgym@aol.com>
To: rgwillis@backroads.net <rgwillis@backroads.net>
Date: Saturday, January 30, 1999 9:50 PM
Subject: No Subject

At 6:05 AM -0400 10/8/98, Bubbasgym@aol.com wrote:

>October 8, 1969 ---

>

>29 years ago I was shot down in Laos. I ended up floating down unconscious in
>my parachute and catching my ankle in a limb. I hung upside down, passing in
>and out of consciousness for two hours.

>

>Then, Red Willis and the rescue helicopter showed up. Red is a
pararescueman.

>It's a group of all volunteer, all enlisted men whose motto is -- "That
others

>may live." They live it.

>

>Once they found me, Red immediately dropped to the jungle floor -- in the
>midst of constant gunfire. He ran over, freed me from the tree, carried me to
>the pick up line and held me while they raised us to the helicopter. The
whole

>time he shielded my body with his.

>

>And he did all of this on his birthday.

>

>Happy birthday, Red Willis.

>May we all live our lives fully.

>May we all live our lives that others may live.

>

>Spound reveille!

(My daughter wrote this in response to my letter)

Red Willis:

I want to write a thank you - you could never comprehend:

A gratitude expressed from the gut of my soul. .

29 years ago, you saved a man from death - you covered him without even
knowing what was to come for yourself. At the time, you were saving one
man, at the risk of your own life - Something of a man more noble than
anyone I have ever known next to Jesus. . . However, Red, you don't
understand - or at least you cannot see - the hundreds of lives you saved
when saving one; because the one you rescued in a tree has saved others
because of you. . . I want to tell you that I owe you my life, I owe you
my everything and I don't even know you. . . I love the man in the tree
more than myself, and I have been the woman in the tree, and he has
imitated your behavior. . . he has shielded my body from the bullets that

1/30/99

life so often hurls at us relentlessly . . . Captain David Stevenson is my Father, but more importantly, my daddy. . . I love him so much it hurts me inside in the sweetest way I've known, and the limp he has carried which started that fated day, your birthday, Vietnam - is precious, and reminds me of your sacrifice, and the miracle that you don't even know you took part in. . . Thank you. . .

AnneMarie Stevenson - over and out.

UNCLASSIFIED

128

DATE: 8 Oct 69

13 October 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-062-08 Oct 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 2

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Boxer 61 (F4), Nail 37 (F4-10), Nail 78 (F-2)

LOCATION: 117/96/89

SAVES: 5 Combat

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 73

1. (C) At 0651Z, King 2 received a MAYDAY over 213.0 from Boxer 61. At the same time, Nail 78 called a MAYDAY for the same aircraft reporting an ejection from the aircraft. It was determined that Boxer 61B had ejected while Boxer 61A remained with the aircraft in an attempt to recover at Danang. King 2 proceeded to the distress scene requesting the launch of Jolly Greens and Sandies. Nail 78 reported a good chute in sight but no radio contact. A Nail 36, Nail 07 and Nail 12 were also in the area. Nail 78 reported that he was low on fuel as was Nail 12. Nail 36 stated that he had three hours of fuel so he was appointed On-Scene-Commander by King 2.
2. (C) Nail 36 reported heavy air traffic in the area and requested King 2 to clear the area of all other traffic. At 0659Z, radio contact was established with Boxer 61B now landing in the trees reporting that he had a broken leg. Some confusion existed inasmuch as the survivor gave the call sign of 09. At 0659Z, a mid-air collision between Nail 07 and Nail 78 occurred in the vicinity of Boxer 61B. Two crewmen from Nail 07 ejected while Nail 78 attempted to fly to Nakhon Phanom, escorted by Nail 12. The copilot on King 2 followed his progress toward NKP while directing Jolly Green 17 and 37 to Nail 78 should a recovery become necessary. Nail 36 established radio contact with Nail 07A and 07B after their ejection and landing. Both were reported in good condition.
3. (C) By 0700Z, Stormy 04, an F-4 FAC, and Misty 51, an F-100 FAC, were in the area lending their assistance. These two FAC aircraft were alternately cycled on and off tanker to keep one readily available. No enemy action was as yet reported by the three survivors. At 0715Z, Fast Mover support was requested as the SAR area was reported to be a known enemy area. Weather in the SAR area was VFR with a temperature of 30 degrees C and terrain elevation of 1250 feet. The survivors were within 2 kilometers of one another. From 0720Z through 0743Z, several radio contacts were established with the survivors advising them the Jolly Greens were on the way. Additionally, it was determined through TOPHAT, a CAS aircraft, that friendly forces were in a clash somewhere south of the survivors and were attempting to advance to the survivors. The survivors were reporting ground movement 100 meters to the west of their position with sporadic ground fire. A confirmed enemy position was given as XD224425 approximately 300 meters northeast

DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 73

UNCLASSIFIED

of the survivors. Due to friendly forces operating in the area and only sporadic ground fire being reported, Nail 36 did not deem it advisable to put in any strikes at this time.

4. (C) At 0751Z, it was reported that a SALAD flight was being scrambled to assist if needed. The survivors were reporting machine gun fire 100 meters from their position. At 0753Z, Sandy 01 was on scene being appointed On-Scene-Commander. Prior to arrival on scene, the Sandy Flight was updated with on scene information over VHF. Sandy 01 communicated with the survivors establishing procedures for utilization of marker flares for recovery identification. It was decided that Boxer 61B alias 09 be picked up first due to his physical condition. However, due to his use of the 09 call sign, it was difficult to isolate just which aircraft he ejected from. Sandy 01 and flight guided Jolly Greens 79, low bird and 72, high bird, to the positions. The Nail 07 survivors were picked up by Jolly Green 79 who reported he would be unable to pickup the third due to a hoist malfunction. Jolly Green 72 was now to become involved in the recovery of 09, who was difficult to locate and was now calling the forces on his emergency radio. King 2 was the only aircraft who could read 09 and he was becoming delirious. He kept repeating that he was hanging upside down in a tree in his harness with a broken leg and was about to pass out. He was directed to remain in his chute, alternately broadcast a one minute beeper for Sandy 01 to use for homing and then to come up voice for further instructions. After two cycles of beeper and voice he was finally located and picked up by Jolly Green 72 at 0832Z. From his last name, it was finally determined that he was the back seater of Boxer 61. The forces were given an RTE to Nakhon Phanom at 0834Z with a heading and escort by King 2.

5. (U) Forces utilized for the recovery:

<u>PAC</u>	<u>SAR</u>	<u>RESCAP</u>
Nail 36	King 2	Shako (F-4 flight of 2)
Misty 51	Sandies 1, 2, 3, 4	Manual 21 (A-4 flight of 2)
Stormy 04	Jolly Greens 79 & 72	Litter 71 (F-100 flight of 4)
Tophat	Salad 40, 41, 42, 43	Litter 81 (F-100 flight of 4)

6. (C) Nail 78 crashed short of a runway while enroute to NKP. However, Jolly Green 17 picked up both pilots from the scene, returning them to NKP. The King 2 co-pilot performed in an outstanding manner during this mission, managing RESCAP resources for the Nail 07/Boxer 61 portion of the mission while monitoring and assisting in the pickup of the crew of Nail 78. The performance by the King 2 radio operator was also outstanding in that he effectively fulfilled all requirements of this complex mission in an errorless and exemplary manner.

7. (C) Problem Areas:

a. The entire mission had to be conducted on UHF Guard Channel, 243.0. Effective radio contact with the SAR forces could not be maintained on primary SAR frequency, 259.0. This interfered with the King 1 recovery of Boxer 61 Alpha.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
 Downgraded at 6 year interval
 Declassified after 12 years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

b. It is felt that one insignificant question was posed by the Rescue Coordination Center during the mission. With Boxer 61 Bravo suspended upside down in his parachute in the tree with a broken leg stating that he was about to pass out, the rather irrelevant question: "What kind of tree is he hanging in?" was received by the radio operator. In light of the mission at hand, the ANG did not feel that the question was significant enough to ask in this situation.

c. Due to the position of the survivor (Boxer 61B) in relation to the Sandies and Jolly Greens, communications between them were ineffective. The only agency that could effectively communicate with the survivor was King 2. Suggest, that if terrain and hostilities permit, the King aircraft orbit directly over the scene to permit at least one effective means of communication between the survivors and SAR forces.

8. (U) Crewmembers:

ANG Maj Kendall	RO SSgt Barboa
AG Capt Adelman	FE MSgt Smallwood
CP 1Lt Schlichter	FE TSgt Myers
N Maj Begley	LM SSgt Gately

Robert N. Kendall

ROBERT N. KENDALL, Major, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander

UNCLASSIFIED

129

DATE: 8 Oct 69

14 October 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 1-3-078 8 Oct 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 6

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Boxer 61

LOCATION: 117/15/77

SAVES: 1 Combat

1. (C) At 0658Z King 6 received a Mayday from Boxer 61. He had taken a shell through the windscreen, and had sustained other unidentified damage, and was trying to reach CH 77. Wingman Boxer 62 escorted 61, who caught fire, to feet wet off CH 77 where he ejected. (See Mission Number M2-3-062-8 Oct 69 for Boxer B)
2. (C) At 0712Z we scrambled Jolly Green 42L and OA, Spads 11 and 12, from CH 77. Boxer 61 ejected at 0617Z, 117/15/77. At 0721Z, King 6 established voice contact with and obtained a tracker bearing to the survivor. He was in his raft, in good shape, but unable to see either the water-borne burning wreckage or land.
3. (C) At 0723Z Jolly Green OA & 42L arrived, establishing visual contact at 0725Z. Jolly Green 42 lowered his PJ and brought Boxer 61A aboard at 0730Z. Survivor was uninjured and confirmed that Boxer 61B had bailed out west of CH 77.
4. (U) Jolly Green 42 returned to CH 77 and landed at 0742Z while Jolly Green OA remained and attempted to destroy the raft.
5. (U) No Air Refueling Required.
6. (U) The controller at Panama did outstanding work. On his own initiative he cleared all traffic from the ejection area which was solid IMC down to 700 feet. He simultaneously took all other than SAR forces off the UHF frequency while vectoring us to the area thus insuring uncluttered GCI communications throughout the mission.

7. (U) Crewmembers:

APC Majr Richards
AC Lt Quinn
CP Maj Simpson
N Capt Baker

RO SSgt Broome
FE MSgt Kilgore
FE MSgt Bloom
LM TSgt Holmes

Classified by 0213ARABP
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 75

JAMES A. RICHARDS, Major, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 2 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

were complex, improved procedures for passing such requests in a more timely manner were needed.

c. The intelligence uncertainties about friendly/ enemy strengths and dispositions further delayed the final decision to expend CBU-19. It was recommended that aircraft equipped with CBU-19 be launched concurrent with the rescue aircraft when an opposed SAR of this magnitude develops. Four, rather than two, CBU-19 aircraft should be generated and launched simultaneously.

d. Withdrawal of reserve rescue helicopters should not be made until the rescue has been completed.

(U) Further details of this SAR effort can be found in the 21st Special Operations Historical report, Appendix V, Tab B; and Rescue Narrative report, which is attached as support document 46.

(S) Two days later, on 8 October, another successful SAR was conducted for Nail 07A and B plus Boxer 61B. Nail 07, an Ov-10, went down at 0653Z and Boxer 61B bailed out at approximately 0645Z.⁷²

(S) Boxer 61B bailed out after his aircraft experienced battle damage. "KING" initially received word of Boxer 61B's bailout and directed Nail 07 to the rescue area to search

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED 40

while the Sandys were enroute. Nail 07 located the survivors and was orbiting their position when he collided with Nail 78 who was also looking for the survivors. Boxer 61A flew his damaged aircraft to Da Nang where he abandoned it over the Gulf of Tonkin. Nail 78 subsequently crash-landed at Savannakhet. Nail 36 then arrived on scene and located the downed aircrews and remained on scene until the arrival of the Sandys.⁷³

(S) The Sandy force was alerted for scramble at 0702Z by Jolly Green operations. Sandy 01 through 04 were airborne at 0715Z. They arrived in the rescue area and relieved Nail 36 who had located the survivors. Jolly Green⁷⁴ 79 and 72 were both used for the pickups.

(S) The survivors were located on the side of a ridge line two miles east of Route 09 and three miles south of Delta 11. The surrounding area was heavily forested with occasional clearings. There were no large guns in the immediate area; however, small arms were experienced during the pickup. Weather was 3,000 scattered, visibility unlimited, and not considered a factor in this rescue. Two companies of enemy troops were reported to be moving into the rescue area from Route 90.⁷⁵

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

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41

(S) Boxer 61B was injured and Sandy 01 elected to try for an immediate pickup as 61B reported he was upside down in a tree and about to pass out. Sandy 01 made several low passes over the area. No ground fire was observed or reported by the survivors. Boxer 61B was told to pop a smoke flare. One was observed and Jolly Green 79 went in for the pickup.
76

(S) Sandy 01 then requested Nail 07 to pop a smoke flare. One was observed 50 meters behind the hovering helicopter which went in for the second pickup. With the survivors onboard, the force began to RTB when Nail 36 said, "There are three of them!" This was the first indication given to the rescue force of a combat photographer in the rear seat of Nail 07's aircraft. Both survivors were questioned and the Sandys discovered that Nail 07A and B were rescued but the injured Boxer 61B was still hanging upside down in a tree somewhere in the area.
77

(S) Weak voice contact was made with Boxer 61B. He was out of flares now because he used them earlier when the rescue force was picking up the Nails. His smoke was not observed because he was too far from the immediate area. Boxer 61B was able to tell Sandy 01 when he was over

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42

his position and Sandy 01 vectored in Jolly Green 72. A
PJ was lowered and recovered 61B from the tree where he
78
had passed out.

(S) The major problem encountered was the misinformation concerning the number of survivors. This situation caused a great deal of confusion about who was popping flares. As a result 61B was left upside down in a tree with two broken legs for 19 minutes longer than necessary. This could have been fatal to 61B as voice contact was the only way he was located and he passed out while the PJ was on the way down for the pickup. Nail 07B did not have a radio and popped a flare as soon as he saw 07A going up the penetra-
79
tor which was exactly when Sandy 01 asked 61B to pop a flare.

(S) It was recommended that the standard operating procedure be reiterated whereby the controlling agency contacts the unit responsible for the flying activities of the downed aircraft to determine the number and call signs of
80
the personnel onboard.

(U) Further details of this SAR effort can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report, support document 47.

(S) On 24 October, a successful rescue was conducted
81
for Misty 11A and B, and a pararescueman from Jolly Green 28.

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DET 1, 40th ARRS 4/69

in for a try but the visibility was too poor in the smoke and he aborted the attempt, however he reported that he didn't receive ground fire, which was a good sign. Jolly Green 77 went out and air refueled with King and after more ordnance had been put in and the smoke cleared away from the survivor, was able to go in and finally pickup the survivor. This terminated the longest and most difficult rescue effort yet attempted.

Combat Saves

(C) Maj Ted L. Smith in Jolly Green 19 started off the month with the rescue of Laredo 01. Laredo 01, an F4, was hit by antiaircraft fire and was trying to make it back to Udorn RTAFB Thailand for an emergency landing, but was unable to make it all the way. He did manage to fly the crippled aircraft into friendly Thailand. Major Smith was an instructor pilot on a training flight with two pilots and an engineer on board. He was monitoring his radios and heard of the damaged aircraft heading to Udorn, which was near his position. He vectored toward the course of Laredo 01 and came into the bailout area, as the pilots of Laredo 01 were forced to eject by this time. With the directions heard from King 1, Major Smith was able to locate the survivor, Capt Ronald Gielegem and hoisted him on board. A helicopter from another unit was also in the area and made the pick-up of the other pilot who bailed out of Laredo 01.

Jolly Green 19

IP Major Ted L. Smith
P Capt Joseph R. Brown+
P Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Ronnie L. Painter

(S) (GP-3) On 8 Oct, an F4, Boxer 61, was hit over Southern Laos and the rear pilot ejected and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. In the process of locating the Boxer 61 survivor, two FAC aircraft, Nail 07 and Nail 78 were involved in a midair collision. Nail 07, an OV-10, bailed out immediately and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. Nail 78, an O2, was able to fly to Savannakhet Laos, but due to the severe damage incurred during the midair collision, was unable to control the aircraft during the landing phase and crashed on the airfield there. Jolly Green 37 and 17 launched and proceeded to Savannakhet, Jolly Green 37 was detained by mechanical difficulties, but Jolly Green 17 proceeded on and Jolly Green 37 caught up later. Jolly Green 17 arrived at Savannakhet shortly after the crash and picked-up the two survivors, one of them being a local national observer. The other man was the pilot, 1Lt James C. Searcy, [REDACTED], from the 23rd TASS.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn.

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DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

Jolly Green 17 (Low)

AC Capt Marshall B. Nash
 CP Capt John J. Livengood+
 FE Sgt Brian W. Murray
 RS TSgt Lehman L. Booher
 RS SSgt Roy D. Bloebaum

Jolly Green 37 (High)

AC Capt Leonard D. Fialko
 CP Capt Joseph R. Brown Jr.
 FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
 RS Sgt Robert J. Sully
 RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) An F-100, Misty 11, was shot down in Southern Laos on 24 Oct. HH-3E's were launched out of the 37th ARRS at Da Nang RVN to rescue the two downed pilots. One of the pilots had a broken leg and a pararescue man was lowered to help retrieve him. At this time the 37th ARRS Jolly Green received many hits and had to depart, only to be forced by the damage he had received to crash land about a mile away. His high helicopter was right there to pick up the crew except for the pararescue man they put down with the pilot with the broken leg. He was left on the ground when his helicopter was forced away. The crew was returned to Da Nang and the crashed helicopter was destroyed to prevent it falling into enemy hands. HH-53's from the 40th ARRS at Udorn attempted a rescue, but were damaged and driven off by hostile ground fire. Two more HH-3E's from the 37th ARRS had arrived on the scene and one of them was able to pick up the pararescue man and the pilot with the broken leg, but was driven off by ground fire before he could get to the other pilot. Weather was moving through the area and caused a delay in the proceedings. The 37th HH-3E that was high aircraft attempted a rescue of the second pilot of Misty 11 but was driven off by ground fire. After considerable smoke was put in, Major Smith in Jolly Green 19 was next. Fortunately he did not receive any ground fire, as a considerable amount of hover time was required to locate the second Misty 11 pilot, Capt Jack K. Clapper, [REDACTED] He was rescued without further incident and the SAR was terminated.

Jolly Green 19 (Low)

AC Maj Ted L. Smith
 CP Maj Edward B. Robbins
 FE SSgt Robert E. Hunt
 RS MSgt Paul L. Jenkins
 RS Sgt Leland H. Sorensen

Jolly Green 09 (High)

AC Capt Phillip O. Pfanschmidt
 CP Capt David M. Barber+
 FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
 RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) Jolly Green 17 and 19 were flying local training missions on 1 Nov. We are allowed to use our alert aircraft for training on days that we back-up the HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn. A Mayday call was heard and the position where Firefly 27 had bailed out was given by his wingman, Firefly 26. This was in northern Laos near the Thailand border. Firefly 26 came to meet Jolly Green 17 and lead him to the survivor. The survivor, Maj Peter D. Williams, [REDACTED], 602nd SOS, was located after a few minutes and hoisted on board Jolly Green 17.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn

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J.L.
CP
YJ

490 [Major Crupper/2687]

11 October 1969

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-062-8 Oct 1969

3ARRGp [JSARC]

AP0 96307

1. [U] This report is submitted in accordance with AIRRM 55-2/
3ARRGp Sup 1, dated 11 July 1968.

2. [S] On 8 October 1969 at 1355 while eating lunch at NKP Officers Club, JG 79 and 72 were scrambled. Both JG 79 and 72 were airborne at 1407L from NKP enroute to site. Notification prior to takeoff indicated that the Bravo man for an F-4, Boxer 61, was downed at 340°/66/72. Shortly after takeoff King 2 advised us that Nail 07 was also down in the same area following a mid-air collision. Sandy 3 and 4 joined up with JG 79 and 72 at 120°/25/89. Estimate time of arrival for Jolly Greens in the SAR area was 1500 hours. Enroute altitude was varied from 8,500' to 10,000' to the SAR area. The route structure was crossed at the recommended crossing point 109/82/89. Generally the route to the area was direct. JG 79, 72 and Sandy 3 and 4 arrived in the area at 1455L. Sandy 1 and 2 were in the area and had 2 survivors located and had trolled for ground fire. Sandy one had taken a hit and had put ordinance in the area. The two survivors were believed to be Nail 07 and Boxer 61 [who was using the call sign Box 09]. At that time it was not known that three survivors were on the ground. Sandy 3 took a look at the area and JG 79 was directed to the ridge line where the survivors were located. While JG 72 remained in a high orbit, JG 79 made a high rate of descent and pickup the smoke from the wreckage along the western side of a ridge running North and South. As we pulled into the area Sandy 1 directed us to the survivor. Initially we were unable to locate the survivor and repeatedly asked the survivor for radio directions with no response. Sandy 1 directed JG 79 to make a 180° hovering turn and move approximately 50 yards on a 100° heading from the hover position. Still no survivor in sight. At this time the survivor popped a smoke which was exactly off our tail position. Another 180° hover turn was made and JG 79 moved directly to the survivor. He was located in heavy wooded area and the hoist had to be threaded to him, the flight engineer laid the penetrator right next to him. In spite of the broken leg he was able to get on board the penetrator. JG 79 was in a hover at 1514L and the survivor was on board at 1518L.

400-0107

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
DATE 10/10/00

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The second survivor then topped a smoke and was spotted at our 5 o'clock position about 30 yards. JG 72 immediately hovered over to the pick up point. The survivor was in good shape and had moved to a large rock. The hover was established and hoist started down. With the hoist almost within reach of the survivor JG 72 started taking ground fire. The hover was immediately lowered into the tree tops and Sandy's notified. The exact location of the ground fire was not known. The hover was maintained and the survivor got aboard the penetrator. The flight engineer was unable to raise the hoist electrically and had to go to emergency manual over ride. It was later determined that a round had damaged the hoist. No further ground fire was taken, primarily because of Sandys laying down ordinance in a daisy chain around us. The second survivor, Nail 07, was on board at 1520L and JG 72 departed on a NW heading. Just prior to getting Nail 07 on board it was determined that three survivors were on the ground. As JG 72 pulled up to altitude Sandy 1 was pin pointing the position of Boxer 61. Because of the hoist malfunction the third pickup was turned over to JG 72. JG 72 was directed to descend to 5000' by Sandy 1 at 1525L during attempt to locate Boxer 61B. Boxer 61B advised he had utilized all of his smoke signals and was suspended upside down in a tree with a broken leg, about to pass out. JG 72 immediately was cleared and began descent while Sandy located approximate position of survivor. Boxer 61B's position was approximately 1.5 KMs north of Nail 07 positions at the west base of ridge line running North - South. 1 Km out Sandy 1 started giving JG 72 heading vectors. Boxer 61B kept repeating he was upside down and about to pass out, over the radio. As JG 72 approached the ridge from the West we were told to go left about 50 yards. JG 72 turned to North - West as Boxer said "Your going way from me, turn toward me". Sandy 1 advised him to give the Jolly a direction, and he said to turn right. JG 72 turned back in toward the ridge and then saw an orange chute panel beneath an over hanging tree about 50 yards to my right. We hovered over to it and turned to Northerly heading into the wind. The PJ was advised he would have to go down and was lowered on the hoist. The trees were about 170 ft high. As the PJ started down Sandy 1 advised JG 72 was taking ground fire from our one through three o'clock along the ridge, and proceeded to lay down anti-personnel ordinance about 100 yards to our right. I attempted to turn in hover to bring my #3 gun to effective position but, due to wind estimated at 20 to 30 kts and no heading hold, the Northerly hover heading, parallel to the ridge was maintained. JG 72 was over the survivor and the PJ out the door at 1530, and on the ground at 1531. Sporadic small arms fire could be seen coming from the trees on the ridge line but due to Sandys continuous and effective laying of ordinance through-out the entire time JG 72 was in hover the ground fire was for the most part in effective. Shortly after JG 72 established a hover over Boxer 61B, he passed out.

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The PJ stated later that Boxer 61B was suspended by his left ankle, wedged in the crotch between tree limb and trunk, upside down with his head approximately 2 feet off the ground. His right knee appeared to be broken. The PJ attached a line from chute risers to survivor to prevent him from falling then manually broke the trapping limb from the tree. Then carried him back to and held him on the forest penetrator as we raised them both back up and on board the chopper at 1543. Sandy 1 was asked for heading out; he gave us a Westerly heading and we cleared the area at 1546. JG 72 had survivor on board at 1543L and was clearing the area and climbing. JG 79 remained in high orbit and both JG 79 and 72 and Sandys departed the area on 205° heading for HWP. After join up the Sandys escorted JG 79 and 72 back to HWP. Enroute battle damage and survivors conditions were passed to King 2. JG 79 had fuel leak in right auxiliary tank and numerous bullet holes. After JG 72 retracted landing gear during climb out, the unsafe gear warning horn came on and could not be reset. An attempt to pull circuit breaker was made but head broke off. So to ease communications strain landing gear was re-lowered. The PJ treating survivor stated he was going into deep shock from extreme pain of injuries. To ease aircraft vibrations and reduce his pain, and we attempted to retract the gear, but the gear would not come up. Suspecting battle damage, JG 72 left the gear down and advised the lead Jolly Green that JG 72 would need to hover and have gear pins installed before landing. The PJs administered an IV to the survivor enroute. After gear pins were inserted by ground crew at Ch 89, JG 72 landed and the survivor evacuated by ambulance at 1630. JG 79 landed and transferred the two survivors to the ambulance at 1620. Post flight inspection revealed our only hit was a small arms round that was stopped by a metal flare box, placed on the aft ramp, right side. Post flight damage assessment revealed that JG 79 had taken eleven hits of small arms caliber. Exact locations and description submitted on battle damage report. During debrief JG 72 indicated that ground fire was observed being directed at JG 79 all during the pickup of the first survivor, however, no hits were taken during the first pickup.

3. [U] The survivors rescued by JG 79 were:

Mail 07 [OV10] Pilot 23 TASS, James Swisher, 1/Lt, USAF

Mail 07 Bravo [Photographer backseater] Robert Michell, USAF

[U] The survivor rescued by JG 72 was:

Box 61 Bravo [F-4 Back seater], 12TFW, David L. Stevenson, Capt, USAF

400-0107

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4. [U] The rescue crews were:

JOLLY GREEN 79 [LOW]

AC: CRUPPER, JERRY A., Major,

CP: MATERR, ALAN, Lt Colonel,

FE: HODGES, AROH P., SSgt,

RS: HUNT, JAMES A., SSgt,

RS: BEASLEY, RICHARD G., Sgt.,

AP: WHITTER, JEFFERY L., AIC,

JOLLY GREEN 72 [HIGH]


AC: REEDER, DAN L., Capt,

CP: THOMPSON, DONALD Y., Capt,

FE: LOHRENGEL, DAVID C., SSgt,

RS: WILLIS, EDWARD M., MSgt,

RS: SCHICKER, BRENTON D., Sgt,


JERRY A. CRUPPER, Major USAF

Aircraft Commander

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37 ARRSg History, Oct-Dec 1969

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A SATISFIED CUSTOMER

This is Captain Neal A. Jacobs, USAF, after he was rescued on 8 October 1969. This mission is summarized on page 13, and the complete mission narrative is contained in Supporting Document # 2, page 42.

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40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

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Crew of high bird on 8 Oct mission. Kneeling from left Sgt Brenton D. Schicker and MSgt Edward M. Willis. Standing from left SSgt Stephen L. LeBeau, Capt Dan L. Reeder, and Capt Donald Y. Thompson.

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6

DET 1, 40th ARRS 4/69 z MH-3's NKP

in for a try but the visibility was too poor in the smoke and he aborted the attempt, however he reported that he didn't receive ground fire, which was a good sign. Jolly Green 77 went out and air refueled with King and after more ordnance had been put in and the smoke cleared away from the survivor, was able to go in and finally pickup the survivor. This terminated the longest and most difficult rescue effort yet attempted.

Combat Saves

(C) Maj Ted L. Smith in Jolly Green 19 started off the month with the rescue of Laredo 01. Laredo 01, an F4, was hit by antiaircraft fire and was trying to make it back to Udorn RTAFB Thailand for an emergency landing, but was unable to make it all the way. He did manage to fly the crippled aircraft into friendly Thailand. Major Smith was an instructor pilot on a training flight with two pilots and an engineer on board. He was monitoring his radios and heard of the damaged aircraft heading to Udorn, which was near his position. He vectored toward the course of Laredo 01 and came into the bailout area, as the pilots of Laredo 01 were forced to eject by this time. With the directions heard from King 1, Major Smith was able to locate the survivor, Capt Ronald Gielegem and hoisted him on board. A helicopter from another unit was also in the area and made the pick-up of the other pilot who bailed out of Laredo 01.

Jolly Green 19

IP Major Ted L. Smith
P Capt Joseph R. Brown+
P Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Ronnie L. Painter

(S) (GP-3) On 8 Oct, an F4, Boxer 61, was hit over Southern Laos and the rear pilot ejected and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. In the process of locating the Boxer 61 survivor, two FAC aircraft, Nail 07 and Nail 78 were involved in a midair collision. Nail 07, an OV-10, bailed out immediately and was rescued by the 40th ARRS from Udorn. Nail 78, an O2, was able to fly to Savannakhet Laos, but due to the severe damage incurred during the midair collision, was unable to control the aircraft during the landing phase and crashed on the airfield there. Jolly Green 37 and 17 launched and proceeded to Savannakhet, Jolly Green 37 was detained by mechanical difficulties, but Jolly Green 17 proceeded on and Jolly Green 37 caught up later. Jolly Green 17 arrived at Savannakhet shortly after the crash and picked-up the two survivors, one of them being a local national observer. The other man was the pilot, 1Lt James C. Searcy, [REDACTED] from the 23rd TASS.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn.

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7

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

Jolly Green 17 (Low)

AC Capt Marshall B. Nash
CP Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Brian W. Murray
RS TSgt Lehman L. Bocher
RS SSgt Roy D. Bloebaum

Jolly Green 37 (High)

AC Capt Leonard D. Fialko
CP Capt Joseph R. Brown Jr.
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Robert J. Sully
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) An F-100, Misty 11, was shot down in Southern Laos on 24 Oct. HH-3E's were launched out of the 37th ARRS at Da Nang RVN to rescue the two downed pilots. One of the pilots had a broken leg and a pararescue man was lowered to help retrieve him. At this time the 37th ARRS Jolly Green received many hits and had to depart, only to be forced by the damage he had received to crash land about a mile away. His high helicopter was right there to pick up the crew except for the pararescue man they put down with the pilot with the broken leg. He was left on the ground when his helicopter was forced away. The crew was returned to Da Nang and the crashed helicopter was destroyed to prevent it falling into enemy hands. HH-53's from the 40th ARRS at Udorn attempted a rescue, but were damaged and driven off by hostile ground fire. Two more HH-3E's from the 37th ARRS had arrived on the scene and one of them was able to pick up the pararescue man and the pilot with the broken leg, but was driven off by ground fire before he could get to the other pilot. Weather was moving through the area and caused a delay in the proceedings. The 37th HH-3E that was high aircraft attempted a rescue of the second pilot of Misty 11 but was driven off by ground fire. After considerable smoke was put in, Major Smith in Jolly Green 19 was next. Fortunately he did not receive any ground fire, as a considerable amount of hover time was required to locate the second Misty 11 pilot, Capt Jack K. Clapper, [REDACTED]. He was rescued without further incident and the SAR was terminated.

Jolly Green 19 (Low)

AC Maj Ted L. Smith
CP Maj Edward B. Robbins
FE SSgt Robert E. Hunt
RS MSgt Paul L. Jenkins
RS Sgt Leland H. Sorensen

Jolly Green 09 (High)

AC Capt Phillip O. Pfanschmidt
CP Capt David M. Barber+
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) Jolly Green 17 and 19 were flying local training missions on 1 Nov. We are allowed to use our alert aircraft for training on days that we back-up the HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn. A Mayday call was heard and the position where Firefly 27 had bailed out was given by his wingman, Firefly 26. This was in northern Laos near the Thailand border. Firefly 26 came to meet Jolly Green 17 and lead him to the survivor. The survivor, Maj Peter D. Williams, [REDACTED] 602nd SOS, was located after a few minutes and hoisted on board Jolly Green 17.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn

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40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

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Crew of low bird on 8 Oct mission. From left SSgt Aron P. Hodges, SSgt James A. Hunt, LtCol Alan Mateer, Major Jerry A. Crupper, and ALC Jeffery L. Whitted.

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Sandy Coordinator

27 OCT 1969

SAR Effort Report (Nail 07A and B, Boxer 61B) (U)

56SOWg (DCO)

1. (S) A successful rescue was conducted on 8 October 1969 for Nail 07A and B plus Boxer 61B. Nail 07, an OV-10, went down at 0653Z at UTM coordinates XD219416. Boxer 61B bailed out at approximately 0645Z at UTM coordinates XD215422. This report covers those activities relating to the "Sandys" during the rescue effort.
2. (S) Boxer 61B bailed out after experiencing battle damage to his aircraft. Nail 07 experienced a mid-air collision with Nail 78 while searching for Boxer 61B. Boxer 61A flew his damaged aircraft to Da Nang where he abandoned it over the Gulf of Tonkin. Nail 78 subsequently crash landed at Savannakhet.
3. (S) The Sandy force was alerted for scramble at 0702Z by "Jolly Green" operations. Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 were airborne at 0715Z. They arrived in the rescue area at 0754Z and relieved Nail 36 who had located the survivors. Jolly Green 79 and 72 were both used for the pickups.
4. (S) The survivors were located on the side of a ridge line two miles east of Route 09 and three miles south of Delta 11. The surrounding area was heavily forested with occasional small clearings. There were no large guns in the immediate area; however, small arms were experienced during the pickup. Weather was three thousand scattered, visibility unlimited, and not considered a factor in this rescue. Two companies of enemy troops were reported to be moving into the rescue area from Route 09.
5. (S) "King" initially received word of Boxer 61B's bailout and directed Nail 07 to the rescue area to search while the Sandys were enroute. Nail 07 located the survivors and was orbiting their position when he collided with Nail 78 who was also looking for the survivors. Nail 36 then arrived on scene and located the downed aircrews and remained on scene until arrival of the Sandys.
6. (S) During the taxi for takeoff, King briefed the Sandy force that Boxer 61B and Nail 07 were down on the 117° radial at 97 miles from Channel 89. Sandy 01 and 02 proceeded to that position while 03 and 04 rendezvoused with Jolly Green 79 and 72 for escort duty. Sandy 01 received a briefing from Nail 36 who pointed out the two locations of

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the downed aircrews. Nail 36 then withdrew from the area. Boxer 61B was injured and Sandy 01 elected to try for an immediate pickup as 61B reported he was upside down in a tree and about to pass out. Sandy 01 made several low passes over the area. No ground fire was observed or reported by the survivors. Boxer 61B was told to pop a smoke flare. One was observed and Jolly Green 79 went in for the pickup. At this point Sandy 01 reported he had lost all hydraulic pressure but was remaining as on scene commander.

7. (S) Sandy 03 vectored Jolly Green 79 to the flare smoke and one survivor was picked up. Sandy 01 then requested Nail 07 to pop a smoke flare. One was observed 50 meters behind the hovering helicopter which went in for the second pickup. Both survivors were then on board at 0820Z and the force began to RTB. At this point Nail 36 said, "There are three of them!" This was the first indication given to the rescue force of a combat photographer in the rear seat of Nail 07's aircraft. Both survivors were questioned and the Sandys discovered that Nail 07A and B were rescued but the injured Boxer 61B was still hanging upside down in a tree somewhere in the same area. Weak voice contact was established with 61B. He was out of flares now because of using them earlier when the rescue force was picking up the Nails. His smoke was not observed because he was too far from the immediate rescue area. Boxer 61B was able to tell Sandy 01 when he was over his position and Sandy 03 immediately began vectoring Jolly Green 72 into the survivors area where visual contact was established. Jolly Green 72 lowered a P.J. who recovered 61B from the tree where he had finally passed out. At 0839Z the force egressed to the northwest and climbed above cloud cover for the return route. Throughout both rescues, the Sandys formed a "daisy chain" and expended ordnance to suppress the small arms fire. Additional ordnance was expended ahead of the Jolly Greens along their egress route.

8. (S) The major problem encountered was the misinformation concerning the number of survivors. This situation caused much confusion concerning who was popping flares and resulted in 61B being left upside down in a tree with two broken legs for 19 minutes longer than was necessary. This could have been fatal to 61B as voice contact was the only way he was located and he passed out while the P.J. was on the way down for the pickup. Nail 07B did not have a radio and popped a flare as soon as he saw 07A going up the penetrator which was exactly when Sandy 01 asked 61B to pop a flare.

9. (S) It is recommended that the standard operating procedure be reiterated whereby the controlling agency contacts the unit responsible for the flying activities of the downed aircraft to determine the number and call signs of the personnel on board.

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DCS-69-0191

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10. (S) The efforts and skill of Sandy 01 are particularly noteworthy in-as-much as he remained on scene directing operations and expending his ordnance after receiving battle damage and losing all hydraulic pressure. Much of this flying was at high speed and required both hands to control the ailerons which were then un-boosted. Time was of the essence of this rescue because it was a densely populated hostile area where two companies of troops were reported concentrating. Sandy 01's decision to attempt an immediate pickup was commendable and justified. Sandy 03's performance was also noteworthy because he took over and vectored Jolly Green 72 in for the second pickup when it became apparent that Sandy 01 was not receiving communications from 61B.

11. (U) The Sandys participating in this rescue were:

- 01 Major Thomas E. Dayton
- 02 1/Lt Edward L. Homan
- 03 Major Robert L. Bohan
- 04 Captain Russell L. Keeling

DARYLE E. TRIPP, Colonel, USAF
Sandy Coordinator

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470 [Major Crupper/2687]

11 October 1969

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-062-8 Oct 1969

3ARRGp [JSARC]
APO 96307

1. [U] This report is submitted in accordance with ABRSM 55-2/
3ARRGp Sup 1, dated 11 July 1968.

2. [S] On 8 October 1969 at 1355 while eating lunch at NKP Officers Club, JG 79 and 72 were scrambled. Both JG 79 and 72 were airborne at 1407L from NKP enroute to site. Notification prior to takeoff indicated that the Bravo man for an F-4, Boxer 61, was downed at 340°/66/72. Shortly after takeoff King 2 advised us that Nail 07 was also down in the same area following a mid-air collision. Sandy 3 and 4 joined up with JG 79 and 72 at 120°/25/89. Estimate time of arrival for Jolly Greens in the SAR area was 1500 hours. Enroute altitude was varied from 8,500' to 10,000' to the SAR area. The route structure was crossed at the recommended crossing point 109/82/89. Generally the route to the area was direct. JG 79, 72 and Sandy 3 and 4 arrived in the area at 1455L. Sandy 1 and 2 were in the area and had 2 survivors located and had trolled for ground fire. Sandy one had taken a hit and had put ordinance in the area. The two survivors were believed to be Nail 07 and Boxer 61 [who was using the call sign Box 09]. At that time it was not known that three survivors were on the ground. Sandy 3 took a look at the area and JG 79 was directed to the ridge line where the survivors were located. While JG 72 remained in a high orbit, JG 79 made a high rate of descent and pickup the smoke from the wreckage along the western side of a ridge running North and South. As we pulled into the area Sandy 1 directed us to the survivor. Initially we were unable to locate the survivor and repeatedly asked the survivor for radio directions with no response. Sandy 1 directed JG 79 to make a 180° hovering turn and move approximately 50 yards on a 100° heading from the hover position. Still no survivor in sight. At this time the survivor popped a smoke which was exactly off our tail position. Another 180° hover turn was made and JG 79 moved directly to the survivor. He was located in heavy wooded area and the hoist had to be threaded to him, the flight engineer laid the penetrator right next to him. In spite of the broken leg he was able to get on board the penetrator. JG 79 was in a hover at 1514L and the survivor was on board at 1518L.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
DATE 10/10/00

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The second survivor then coughed a smoke and was spotted at our 5 o'clock position about 30 yards. JG 79 immediately hovered over to the pick up point. The survivor was in good shape and had moved to a large rock. The hover was established and hoist started down. With the hoist almost within reach of the survivor JG 79 started taking ground fire. The hover was immediately lowered into the tree tops and Sandy's notified. The exact location of the ground fire was not known. The hover was maintained and the survivor got aboard the penetrator. The flight engineer was unable to raise the hoist electrically and had to go to emergency manual over ride. It was later determined that a round had damaged the hoist. No further ground fire wastaken, primarily because of Sandys laying down ordinance in a daisy chain around us. The second survivor, Mail 07, was on board at 1320L and JG 79 departed on a NW heading. Just prior to getting Mail 07 on board it was determined that three survivors were on the ground. As JG 79 pulled up to altitude Sandy 1 was pin pointing the position of Boxer 61. Because of the hoist malfunction the third pickup was turned over to JG 72. JG 72 was directed to descend to 5000' by Sandy 1 at 1525L during attempt to locate Boxer 61B. Boxer 61B advised he had utilized all of his smoke signals and was suspended upside down in a tree with a broken leg, about to pass out. JG 72 immediately was cleared and began descent while Sandy located approximate position of survivor. Boxer 61B's position was approximately 1.5 K's north of Mail 07 positions at the west base of ridge line running North - South. 1 KM out Sandy 1 started giving JG 72 heading vectors. Boxer 61B kept repeating he was upside down and about to pass out, over the radio. As JG 72 approached the ridge from the West we were told to go left about 50 yards. JG 72 turned to North - West as Boxer said "Your going way from me, turn toward me". Sandy 1 advised him to give the Jolly a direction, and he said to turn right. JG 72 turned back in toward the ridge and then saw an orange chute panel beneath an over hanging tree about 50 yards to my right. We hovered over to it and turned to Northly heading into the wind. The PJ was advised he would have to go down and was lowered on the hoist. The trees were about 170 ft high. As the PJ started down Sandy 1 advised JG 72 was taking ground fire from our one through three o'clock along the ridge, and proceeded to lay down anti-personnel ordinance about 100 yards to our right. I attempted to turn in hover to bring my #3 gun to effective position but, due to wind estimated at 20 to 30 kts and no heading hold, the Northerly hover heading, parallel to the ridge was maintained. JG 72 was over the survivor and the PJ out the door at 1530, and on the ground at 1531. Sporadic small arms fire could be seen coming from the trees on the ridge line but due to Sandys' continuous and effective laying of ordinance through-out the entire time JG 72 was in hover the ground fire was for the most part in effective. Shortly after JG 72 established a hover over Boxer 61B, he passed out.

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The PJ stated later that Boxer 61B was suspended by his left ankle, wedged in the crotch between tree limb and trunk, upside down with his head approximately 2 feet off the ground. His right knee appeared to be broken. The PJ attached a line from chute risers to survivor to prevent him from falling then manually broke the trapping limb from the tree. Then carried him back to and held him on the forest penetrator as we raised them both back up and on board the chopper at 1543. Sandy 1 was asked for heading out; he gave us a Westerly heading and we cleared the area at 1546. JG 72 had survivor on board at 1543L and was clearing the area and climbing. JG 79 remained in high orbit and both JG 79 and 72 and Sandy's departed the area on 295° heading for NKP. After join up the Sandys escorted JG 79 and 72 back to NKP. Enroute battle damage and survivors conditions were passed to King 2. JG 79 had fuel leak in right auxiliary tank and numerous bullet holes. After JG 72 retracted landing gear during climb out, the unsafe gear warning horn came on and could not be reset. An attempt to pull circuit breaker was made but head broke off. So to ease communications strain landing gear was re-lowered. The PJ treating survivor stated he was going into deep shock from extreme pain of injuries. To ease aircraft vibrations and reduce his pain, and we attempted to retract the gear, but the gear would not come up. Suspecting battle damage, JG 72 left the gear down and advised the lead Jolly Green that JG 72 would need to hover and have gear pins installed before landing. The PJs administered an IV to the survivor enroute. After gear pins were inserted by ground crew at Ch 89, JG 72 landed and the survivor evacuated by ambulance at 1630. JG 79 landed and transferred the two survivors to the ambulance at 1620. Post flight inspection revealed our only hit was a small arms round that was stopped by a metal flare box, placed on the aft ramp, right side. Post flight damage assessment revealed that JG 79 had taken eleven hits of small arms caliber. Exact locations and description submitted on battle damage report. During debrief JG 72 indicated that ground fire was observed being directed at JG 79 all during the pickup of the first survivor, however, no hits were taken during the first pickup.

3. [U] The survivors rescued by JG 79 were:

Mail 07 [OV10] Pilot 23 TASS, James Swisher, 1/Lt, USAF

Mail 07 Bravo [Photographer backseater] Robert Michell, USAF

[U] The survivor rescued by JG 72 was:

Box 61 Bravo [F-4 Back seater], 12TFW, David L. Stevenson, Capt, USAF

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4. [U] The rescue crews were:

JOLLY GREEN 79 [LOW]

AC: CRUPPER, JERRY A., Major,
CP: MATHER, ALAN, Lt Colonel,
FE: RODGES, ARON P., SSgt,
RS: HUNT, JAMES A., SSgt,
RS: BEASLEY, RICHARD G., Sgt.,
AP: WHITTIER, JEFFERY L., AIC.

JOLLY GREEN 72 [HIGH]

AC: RUMER, DAN L., Capt.,
CP: THOMPSON, DONALD Y., Capt.,
FE: LOHRENGEL, DAVID C., SSgt,
RS: WILLIS, EDWARD M., MSgt,
RS: SCHICKER, BRENTON D, Sgt,

Jerry A. Crupper
JERRY A. CRUPPER, Major, USAF

Aircraft Commander

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DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

CHAPTER II

Operations and Training

Operations

(S) (GP 3) The good weather and resultant clear skys of the dry season brought a marked increase in combat activity during October, November and December. Our activity increased proportionally. Detachment One made fourteen combat saves, one non-combat rescue and one medical evacuation during this period. Det 1 was tasked with maintaining 15 minute alert two days out of three, flying the last two and a half hours of daylight on airborne alert in the November Orbit area, with the 40th ARRS from Udorn taking the third day. On that third day the 40th ARRS would send two HH-53s to this station at first light and they would be on 15 minute alert until the last two and a half hours of daylight, when they would fly airborne alert in the November Orbit area and recover at their home station. Det 1 was on 30 minute back-up alert on this day. Det 1 was also tasked with one of its HH-3E's on 45 minute alert during the hours of darkness for in-country rescues and medical evacuation missions. Due to mechanical difficulties encountered with the HH-53 and battle damage incurred on two HH-53s during the Boxer 22 mission, Det 1 HH-3Es were often required to fill in for the HH-53s on that third day.

(S) (Gp 3) Det 1, 40 ARRS was the scene of operations and staging area for three significant missions during this quarter. Our HH-3E, Jolly Green 19, attempted to make a pickup of Knife 61 and 62, downed by hostile ground fire at Muong Thine, Laos on 6 Oct. He received extensive damage from hostile ground fire as he was attempting to land there to rescue the aircrews and was forced to depart the area and return to base. Two HH-53s from 40th ARRS here on back-up alert were launched and after delivery of considerable ordnance by Sandy and Hobo aircraft, were able to effect a rescue of the eight aircrew members and a large number of indigenous personnel. They recovered here at our base. Two of the recovered aircrew had been wounded.

(S) (Gp 3) On the second significant mission HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn were launched from our station to back-up 37th ARRS HH-3Es engaged in a mission on Misty 11 on 24 Oct. HH-53s were staged out of our facilities here during that SAR mission. This mission is covered later in Combat Saves.

(S) (Gp 3) The third significant rescue effort and the most extensive and costly to date was the Boxer 22 mission on 5, 6 and 7th of Dec. Our HH-3Es, Jolly Green 37 and 09 were the initial Jolly Greens to go on the mission. The two Boxer 22 pilots were downed near Ban Phan Hop, Laos, a very heavily defended area near the North Vietnamese border. HH-53s, Jolly Green 76 and 72 were launched from Udorn directly to a near-by holding point to back-up Jolly Greens 37 and 09. HH-53s, Jolly Green 77 and 69 were sent to be staged out of this base, but were needed prior to landing here and continued on to the SAR area. Jolly Green 37 started in for a rescue attempt, but was called off due to intense antiaircraft fire. Jolly Green 09 then made an attempt at a rescue but received intense ground fire and hastily evacuated the area.

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

Jolly Green 17 (Low)

AC Capt Marshall B. Nash
CP Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Brian W. Murray
RS TSgt Lehman L. Booher
RS SSgt Roy D. Bloebaum

Jolly Green 37 (High)

AC Capt Leonard D. Fialko
CP Capt Joseph R. Brown Jr.
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Robert J. Sully
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) An F-100, Misty 11, was shot down in Southern Laos on 24 Oct. HH-3E's were launched out of the 37th ARRS at Da Nang RVN to rescue the two downed pilots. One of the pilots had a broken leg and a pararescue man was lowered to help retrieve him. At this time the 37th ARRS Jolly Green received many hits and had to depart, only to be forced by the damage he had received to crash land about a mile away. His high helicopter was right there to pick up the crew except for the pararescue man they put down with the pilot with the broken leg. He was left on the ground when his helicopter was forced away. The crew was returned to Da Nang and the crashed helicopter was destroyed to prevent it falling into enemy hands. HH-53's from the 40th ARRS at Udorn attempted a rescue, but were damaged and driven off by hostile ground fire. Two more HH-3E's from the 37th ARRS had arrived on the scene and one of them was able to pick up the pararescue man and the pilot with the broken leg, but was driven off by ground fire before he could get to the other pilot. Weather was moving through the area and caused a delay in the proceedings. The 37th HH-3E that was high aircraft attempted a rescue of the second pilot of Misty 11 but was driven off by ground fire. After considerable smoke was put in, Major Smith in Jolly Green 19 was next. Fortunately he did not receive any ground fire, as a considerable amount of hover time was required to locate the second Misty 11 pilot, Capt Jack K. Clapper, [REDACTED]. He was rescued without further incident and the SAR was terminated.

Jolly Green 19 (Low)

AC Maj Ted L. Smith
CP Maj Edward B. Robbins
FE SSgt Robert E. Hunt
RS MSgt Paul L. Jenkins
RS Sgt Leland H. Sorensen

Jolly Green 09 (High)

AC Capt Phillip O. Pfanschmidt
CP Capt David M. Barber+
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) Jolly Green 17 and 19 were flying local training missions on 1 Nov. We are allowed to use our alert aircraft for training on days that we back-up the HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn. A Mayday call was heard and the position where Firefly 27 had bailed out was given by his wingman, Firefly 26. This was in northern Laos near the Thailand border. Firefly 26 came to meet Jolly Green 17 and lead him to the survivor. The survivor, Maj Peter D. Williams, [REDACTED] 602nd SOS, was located after a few minutes and hoisted on board Jolly Green 17.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn

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37 ARRSq History, Oct-Dec 1969

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Survivor and the Rescue Specialist were taken to the hospital after Jolly Green 42 returned to DaNang AB. (Supporting Document #2, p 42.)

24 October-Jolly Green 28 and 04 were scrambled from a forward operating base at Channel 103. The SAR effort was initiated in response to a Mayday call from Misty 11, who declared he had experienced an engine flameout and that the two crew members aboard were bailing out. Jolly Green 28 deployed his Rescue Specialist and was bringing the front seater up the hoist with the Rescue Specialist when heavy ground fire was taken. The hoist was shot off and Jolly Green 28 had to pull off. While departing the area it was determined that battle damage was severe enough, that the aircraft was emergency landed. Jolly Green 04 picked up the crew members from Jolly Green 28. After numerous efforts, Jolly Green 15 picked up the Rescue Specialist and the front seater. Jolly Green 19 picked up the backseater. (Supporting Document #3, p 45.)

15 November-Jolly Greens 31 and 42 were launched on a night rescue mission. The pilot of an aircraft, with the call sign of Charger 413, had bailed out feet wet. Numerous flares were dropped to illuminate the area and then Jolly Green 42 made an approach. He landed on the water near the survivor, but the survivor's raft was being blown away. As the aircraft was being hover taxied, engine problems developed. Jolly Green 42 had to leave the area and after several attempts, Jolly Green 31 picked up the survivor. Jolly Green 31 then flew to Channel 69 and

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440 [Captain Almonzor/2687]

29 October 1969

Mission Narrative Report #1-3-079-24 Oct 69

2AWESp [JCAPC]
APO 96307

1. [U] This report is submitted in accordance with AR35M 55-2/
2AWESp Sup 1, dated 11 July 1968.

2. [S] Jolly Green 76 and 72 were alerted for scramble at 0155Z, 24 Oct 69. SAR objectives Misty 11 reported down at 055/25/72. JG 76 and 72 airborne 0216Z and proceeded to the SAR area with Sandy escort. Upon arrival King 4 advised JG 28 was shot down and JG 76 and 72 were now the primary force. JG 76 was advised there were now three survivors on the ground. One was the PJ from JG 28 who was left with Misty 11a. JG 76 and 72 set up orbit 5 miles south at 8500 feet. The weather remained scattered all day and was no factor. Spad 11 was advised JG 76 was ready to attempt a pickup. Spad 12 escorted JG 76 into the SAR area. CBU-19 was expended and JG 76 went in to attempt a pickup at 0416Z. The survivors expended a smoke and were easily spotted. JG 76 came to a hover and made a 180° turn to bring the aft ramp gun to bear on a small hill where hostile forces had been reported. The survivor's position was in a small valley formed by two ridges about 100 meters long oriented north to south. At the north end where the ridges joined a road was cut 20 meters from the top of a hill. Misty 11a and JG 28 PJ were on the east side of the valley 80 meters from the road. Misty 11b was on the west side 20 meters from the road. During the flare to a hover JG 76 received ground fire from both ridges and the hill. An attempt was made to deploy a PJ but heavy ground fire prevented his deployment. Sandy 1 observed heavy ground fire and recommended JG 76 withdraw. Battle damage to JG 76 included several hits by small arms causing loss of the copilot attitude indicator. Misty 11b had been forced to move his position twice due to enemy troops moving within 15 meters. Misty 11a also reported enemy troops near his position. The Sandy's and Spads continued to sanitize the area and CBU-19 was expended. JG 76 was called in again at 0454Z. At 1/4 mile from the survivor JG 76 again received ground fire but continued to a hover. Again JG 76 received intense ground fire and returned fire and was forced to withdraw. Battle damage was received mainly on the right side of the aircraft and in the right auxiliary tank. JG 76 and 72 escorted by Sandy 1 and 2 left the area at 0500Z, to rendezvous with King 1 to refuel.

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intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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At 0540Z rendezvous and refueling was completed. At 0555Z JG 76 and 72 were back in holding position ready for another pickup attempt. GRV-19 was again expended over the whole area. At 0612Z JG 76 made a third pickup attempt. The Sandys and Fords strafed the ridge lines as JG 76 went in. No ground fire was received. JG 76 came to a hover and stated to deploy a PJ to assist the injured Wisty 11a. As the PJ descended on the hoist, approximately 10 feet, intense ground fire was again received. At this time the caution panel in JG 76 indicated the loss of first stage hydraulic system. The first stage pressure dropped to zero. The system was turned off. At the same time the utility hydraulic system pressure began to fluctuate, dropping to 1000 psi. Complete loss of the utility system would cause loss of tail rotor control. Specific damage to the hydraulic system could not be immediately determined as hydraulic fluid was spraying all over the interior of the aircraft. With the pending control failure, JG 76 was again forced to withdraw, with the PJ still suspended approximately 10 feet beneath the aircraft. The PJ assisted by the flight engineer managed to climb back inside the aircraft. At 0615Z, JG 76 joined Sandy one and JG 72 and proceeded west. Sandy one victored the JG's around some known 37mm gun positions. Upon reaching a position about three miles from the SAR area JG 76 attempted to jettison the leaking auxiliary tanks to prepare for bailout. The right auxiliary tank was successfully jettisoned. The left auxiliary tank would not release. The battle damage and the loss of the first stage hydraulic system and the expending failure of the utility system dictated that JG 76 land as soon as possible. The status of Saravane, the nearest suitable landing field, was requested through SAR channels. Saravane was reported as safe for an emergency landing. JG 76 and 72 landed at Saravane at 0625Z. The crew of JG 76 transferred to JG 72 and departed the area at 0628Z. JG 72 with both crews returned to Ch 89.

3. [U] There were no survivors.

4. [U] The rescue crews were:

~~JOINT ORDER~~ 76 [LOW]

AC: ALMANZAR, DONALD H., Captain,

CP: PERKE, PETER L., Captain,

FE: BAILEY, HAROLD H., SSgt, FR

PJ: MCFARR, ANTHONY J., Sgt, FR

PJ: CROWDER, DONALD W. Sgt, FR

AP: ANDERSON, GREGORY L., Sgt, FR

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POLY 10000000 [10000000]

AD: HAYWELL, JOHN L., Captain,

CD: HOPKIN, ROBERT W., Captain,

FE: LARSEN, DONALD, Capt. MA

FG: LUTHER, JAMES B., Capt. MA

MH: LUTHER, DAVID L., Capt. MA

*Peter S. Felt**for*DONALD E. ALMANTAN, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #3

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MISSION NARRATIVE 1-3-79 24 Oct 69

(S) At 0120Z Jolly Green (JG) 28 and JG 04 were scrambled from the forward operating base of Quang Tri, Channel 103. The SAR effort was initiated in response to a Mayday call from Misty 11, who declared he had experienced an engine flameout and that the two crew members aboard were bailing out. King 4 vectored the Jolly Greens to a rendezvous with Spads 11 and 12 at 070 degrees for 68 miles from Channel 72. Meanwhile, the on scene commander, Nail 07 was relaying information from the area of interest. It was ascertained, Nail 07 had established radio contact with both survivors and that Misty 11A had sustained a broken leg while Misty 11B was uninjured. At 0240Z JG 28 and JG 04 arrived at the position of 055 degrees for 35 miles from Channel 72 along with the Spad aircraft. At this time Spad 11 assumed on scene command and both Spad 11 and 12 began trolling the survivor's position at approximately 055 degrees for 23 miles from Channel 72 for hostile forces. The Jollys were briefed by Spad 11 and after repeated passes during which no hostile fire was received, Spad 11 laid smoke to the northwest of the survivors' position along a road. At 0305Z JG 28 was cleared in for the rescue attempt with the Spads escorting and JG 04 acting as high aircraft. JG 28 arrived over, Misty 11A at 0315Z. The Rescue Specialist (RS) was deployed and immediately secured the survivor to the forest penetrator. Within less than one minute both men were being hoisted aboard JG 28. When the forest penetrator was approximately 10 to 15 feet off the ground JG 28 was subjected to intense hostile fire. The hoist assembly was shot from its mounting, falling into the main cargo door, striking the Flight Engineer (FE) who had been operating the hoist from the open doorway, knocking him across the aircraft. He immediately recovered, ascertained the hoist was inoperative and sheared the hoist, thus providing the RS and survivor a chance of survival in case JG 28 had crashed in the immediate area. The FE called for a pull off and JG 28 commenced a departure from the area at which time the transmission oil pressure fluctuated and the dropped to zero. JG 04 observed JG 28 to be smoking and spraying fluid from the transmission area and advised JG 28 to land his aircraft. As there were no suitable landing areas JG 28 attempted to exit the area, after flying approximately one and one half miles, a marshy area overgrown with elephant grass was sighted and used as an emergency landing area. Meanwhile, JG 04, jettisoned his external tanks, performed a rapid descent and pulled into a very low hover as near as possible to JG 28. The three remaining crew members of JG 28 were uninjured and exited the downed aircraft expeditiously. Approximately 0320Z, JG 04 completed individual hoisting of the three survivors and initiated a maximum performance climb to depart the immediate area. At this time JG 04 requested and was denied permission to attempt the recovery of the other three survivors, now on the ground. JG 04 was directed to return to Channel 77 and enroute at 0355Z was met by JG 15 and 21 who then

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Downgraded at 3 year
Intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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escorted JG 04 the remaining distance, arriving Channel 77 at 0420Z. At 0445Z, JG 15 and 21 were again launched from Channel 77 and proceeded to an orbit point, of 045 degrees for 60 miles from Channel 72. In the interim, JG 76 from Channel 89 attempted three times to recover Misty 11A and JG 28D, the Rescue Specialist. Each time hostile fire forced JG 76 to withdraw, the last time at 0615Z with extensive damage. At 0624Z, JG 15 and 21 departed their orbit for the area of interest arriving at 0630Z. While enroute to the scene JG 15 and 21 were given a comprehensive briefing of the situation by the on scene aircraft. At approximately 1705Z, JG 21 departed the immediate area to effect rendezvous and air refueling with King 3, returning at 0735Z. At this time JG 15 was cleared by Sandy 03 to attempt the rescue and immediately commenced an approach to the survivors. The approach was aborted due to the approach angle and heavy ground fire. Immediately, another attempt was initiated and at 0737Z, JG 15 had established a hover over the survivors. By 0738Z, Misty 11A and JG 28D had been hoisted aboard JG 15. During the hoisting operation sporadic ground fire was received. As JG 15 started to exit the area, heavy automatic weapons fire raked JG 15. At 0742Z, JG 15 commenced an approach to Misty 11B, however, again heavy automatic weapons fire was received and the attempt aborted. Immediately, a second approach was attempted but, discontinued due to poor visibility caused by heavy smoke in the area. A third effort was made and while hover taxiing in an attempt to locate Misty 11B, intense automatic weapons fire raked JG 15 rendering the hoist control and intercom system for the FE and RS inoperative. JG 15 immediately departed the area, notified Sandy 03 that he would be unable to remain in the area and commenced rendezvous for air refueling with King 3 after which he returned to Channel 77 at 0935Z. Meanwhile, JG 21 received moderate automatic weapons fire. The rescue effort was next delayed by rain showers in the area and while orbiting, waiting for the visibility to improve, an inspection platform on the transmission deck of JG 21 came open, necessitating an immediate departure from the area at 0810Z. JG 21 landed safely at Lima 171 where King 3 delivered oil by air drop. After securing the inspection platform, reservicing the oil and a thorough inspection, it was decided to relocate at Channel 89, which was completed at 1200Z. Meanwhile JG 19 and 09 from Channel 89 proceeded to the area and at 0911Z JG 19 recovered Misty 11B and took him to Channel 89.

(U) Survivors:

Recovered by JG 04:

Maj Charles W. Bond	JG 28B	37 ARRS
Capt Charles D. Langham	JG 28A	37 ARRS
SSgt James E. Smith	JG 28C	37 ARRS

Recovered by JG 15:

1/Lt Alvin D. Miller	Misty 11A	416 TFS
TSgt Donald G. Smith	JG 28D	37 ARRS

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

Recovered by JG 19:

Capt J. K. Clapper

Misty 11B

416 TFS

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(U) Jolly Green Crews:

JOLLY GREEN 28

AC Capt Charles D. Langham
CP Maj Charles W. Bond
FE SSgt James E. Smith
RS TSgt Donald G. Smith

JOLLY GREEN 04

AC Lt Richard V. Butchka (USCG)
CP Capt John K. Coder
FE Sgt Joseph Vai
RS A1C George P. Hoffman III

JOLLY GREEN 15

AC Lt(JG) Robert Ritchie(USCG)
CP Lt Col Sidney A. Sosnow
FE TSgt Frank Gaydos Jr.
RS SSgt Jon K. Hoberg
RS Sgt Edward K. Rendle

JOLLY GREEN 21

AC Capt Robert W. Packer
CP Capt Gerald L. Keyser Jr.
FE Sgt Harvey A. Lyons
RS Sgt John H. Bullock Jr.
RS A1C George P. Hoffman III

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 19

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

JOSEPH J. VAI

Sergeant Joseph J. Vai distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Flight Engineer on an HH-3E helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, in the face of known hostile forces, who had just shot down another rescue helicopter, Sergeant Vai, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, skillfully and expeditiously effected the rescue of three crewmen from the downed helicopter. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Vai reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 20

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

GEORGE P. HOFFMAN III

Airman First Class George P. Hoffman III distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Rescue Specialist on an HH-3E rescue helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, in the face of known hostile forces, who had just shot down another rescue helicopter, Airman Hoffman, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, assisted in the expeditious rescue of three crewmen from the downed helicopter. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Airman Hoffman reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #22

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

JON K. HOBERG

Staff Sergeant Jon K. Hoberg distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Rescue Specialist on an HH-3E helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, Sergeant Hoberg's aircraft repeatedly penetrated an area of intense hostile fire, recovering two downed airmen before battle damage rendered his aircraft incapable of further rescue operations. From an extremely exposed position he aggressively returned suppressive fire which undoubtedly reduced the battle damage that would otherwise have been sustained by his aircraft, contributing significantly to the success of the mission. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Hoberg reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 25

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

SIDNEY A. SOSNOW

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney A. Sosnow distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Copilot of an HH-3E helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, Colonel Sosnow's aircraft repeatedly penetrated an area of intense hostile fire, recovering two downed airmen before battle damage rendered his aircraft incapable of further rescue operations. At one point during the rescue operation, his alert and decisive action in assuming aircraft control and his superb airmanship averted the possible loss of his aircraft and crew. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Colonel Sosnow reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 26

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

RICHARD V. BUTCHKA
(UNITED STATES COAST GUARD)

Lieutenant Richard V. Butchka distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Aircraft Commander of an HH-3E helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, in the face of known hostile forces, who had just shot down another rescue helicopter, Lieutenant Butchka, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, skillfully and expeditiously effected the rescue of three crewmen from the downed helicopter. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Lieutenant Butchka reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Coast Guard.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 16

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

FRANK GAYDOS JR.

Technical Sergeant Frank Gaydos Jr. distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Flight Engineer of an HH-3E helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, Sergeant Gaydos' aircraft repeatedly penetrated an area of intense hostile fire, recovering two downed airmen before battle damage rendered his aircraft incapable of further rescue operations. His fearless operation of the rescue hoist while completely exposed to the hostile fire impacting about him and his reassuringly calm hover instructions to the pilots, insured the ultimate success of the rescue mission. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Gaydos reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 17

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF
THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

JAMES E. SMITH

Staff Sergeant James E. Smith distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Flight Engineer on an HH-3E helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, while attempting to rescue two downed Air Force pilots, Sergeant Smith's aircraft was subjected to intense hostile fire. The subsequent battle damage rendered his rescue hoist inoperative which he decisively sheared; by reducing aircraft weight and permitting a pull off, his actions averted an almost certain disaster and saved the lives of all personnel involved. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Smith reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #22

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

JON K. HOBERG

Staff Sergeant Jon K. Hoberg distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Rescue Specialist on an HH-3E helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, Sergeant Hoberg's aircraft repeatedly penetrated an area of intense hostile fire, recovering two downed airmen before battle damage rendered his aircraft incapable of further rescue operations. From an extremely exposed position he aggressively returned suppressive fire which undoubtedly reduced the battle damage that would otherwise have been sustained by his aircraft, contributing significantly to the success of the mission. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Hoberg reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 20

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
(FIRST OAK LEAF CLUSTER)

TO

GEORGE P. HOFFMAN III

Airman First Class George P. Hoffman III distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Rescue Specialist on an HH-3E rescue helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, in the face of known hostile forces, who had just shot down another rescue helicopter, Airman Hoffman, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, assisted in the expeditious rescue of three crewmen from the downed helicopter. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Airman Hoffman reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF
THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

TO

JOHN K. CODER

Captain John K. Coder distinguished himself by heroism while participating in aerial flight as Copilot of an HH-3E rescue helicopter in Southeast Asia on 24 October 1969. On that date, in the face of known hostile forces, who had just shot down another rescue helicopter, Captain Coder, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, skillfully and expeditiously effected the rescue of three crewmen from the downed helicopter. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Captain Coder reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

his position and Sandy 01 vectored in Jolly Green 72. A
PJ was lowered and recovered 61B from the tree where he
78
had passed out.

(S) The major problem encountered was the misinformation concerning the number of survivors. This situation caused a great deal of confusion about who was popping flares. As a result 61B was left upside down in a tree with two broken legs for 19 minutes longer than necessary. This could have been fatal to 61B as voice contact was the only way he was located and he passed out while the PJ was on the way down for the pickup. Nail 07B did not have a radio and popped a flare as soon as he saw 07A going up the penetra-
79
tor which was exactly when Sandy 01 asked 61B to pop a flare.

(S) It was recommended that the standard operating procedure be reiterated whereby the controlling agency contacts the unit responsible for the flying activities of the downed aircraft to determine the number and call signs of
80
the personnel onboard.

(U) Further details of this SAR effort can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report, support document 47.

(S) On 24 October, a successful rescue was conducted
81
for Misty 11A and B, and a pararescueman from Jolly Green 28.

24 OCT 69
69



Above: Capt C. Langham is about to receive a handshake after the safe return of his crew. They were shot down in Oct 69.

Langham.jpg
AF Museum Photo

Above: Capt C. Langham is about to receive a handshake after the safe return of his crew. They were shot down in Oct 69.



Langham c.jpg
AF Museum Photo



Maj Charles W. Bond, Jolly Green Save Number 500
(Second from right)

Remember Misty 11?

24 Oct 69

24Oct70.jpg

AF Museum Photo




Maj Charles W. Bond, Jolly Green Save Number 500.
(Second from right)

Remember Misty 11?

24 Oct 69

DA NANG AB — An Air Force
HH-3 Jolly Green Giant helicopter
crew of the 37th Aerospace Rescue
and Recovery Sq. here recently
achieved a milestone when they re-
corded their unit's 500th combat
rescue.



TSgt. Donald Smith stands with Brig. Gen. Frank K. Everest Jr. at the medal presentation.

TSgt. Donald G. Smith

On Oct. 24, 1969, the crew of the 37th ARRS HH-3 Jolly Green 28, including pararescueman TSgt. Donald G. Smith, set out to retrieve two F-100 crewmen. When they located the fighter crew in the jungle, Smith was lowered to the ground, where he attached himself and the pilot, who had a broken leg, to the hoist. As they were being lifted, hostile fire damaged the external hoist mount, forcing the flight engineer to sever the cable, sending Smith and the pilot hurtling to the ground. Jolly 28 was forced to make an emergency landing about 1.5 miles away in a marshy area. The chopper's remaining crew members were immediately picked up by a companion HH-3. Despite injury, Smith cared for the fighter crew, directed air assaults against the enemy, and repelled enemy probes for several hours, until another rescue chopper successfully extracted him and the pilot.

1969 (cont)

- 15 Apr-
19 Apr 69
(cont) ARRS forces flew 33 sorties and 399 flying hours in an effort to locate survivors. On 17 April a United States destroyer recovered two bodies, identified as crewmen from the EC-121. The mission was suspended on 19 April.
- 31 Jul 69 An HC-130 assigned to the 67th ARR Squadron was launched from Keflavik in response to a request from a Norwegian vessel which was sinking about 200 miles north northwest from Bodo, Norway. When the aircraft arrived on the scene, the ship had sunk and 41 persons were in the water. Life rafts were being dropped from a Norwegian PV2. Although eight persons died due to exposure, the United States-Norwegian rescue effort saved 31 lives.
- 31 Jul 69 HH-43 aircrews from Detachments 4 and 11, 41st ARR Wing, saved 41 persons from flooded areas in Korea.
- 8 Oct-
4 Nov 69 Tunisian Flood Relief. The 58th ARR Squadron at Wheelus AB, Libya, was notified that more than half of neighboring Tunisia was under water. Between 8 and 14 October, and again between 25 October and 4 November, the 58th ARR Squadron saved a total



Men of the 58th ARR Squadron pose upon completion of flood relief mission to Tunisia.

of 2,516 Tunisians. HH-3 crews flew around the clock, carrying food, clothing, water, blankets, tents, and medicine, in addition to transporting people out of endangered areas.

- 24 Oct 69 Two HH-3s assigned to the 37th ARR Squadron were scrambled from Quang Tri to rescue two downed F-100 aircrewmen in Laos. One

0525Z - JG 27+25 ABN

0830Z REQUESTED AMBULANCE MEET JG 15 AT 0920Z
(Sgt THOMAS F5) (ONE)

0930Z HH3, 66-13281 DESTROYED @ BIG DAY!

25 OCT

BY AIR STRIKE

2200Z CAPT COVER HERE.

2255 JG 27 ABN FOR CH 103.

2310 JG 35 ABN FOR CH 103.

0930 JG 31 ABN LOCAL TRNG

0140 JG 03 ABN LOCAL TRNG

0200 JG 07 ABN F.F

0300 JG 21 ABN FROM CH. 89, ESTIMATES ARRIVAL
AT CH. 77 AT 0545Z.

CAPT. CODER OFF DUTY

0330 JG 31 + 03 LANDED AT CH. 77

0510 JG 31 alen ch 77 For ch 103 to put
Alert for JG 35! JG 35 will take the
Orlist!

0600Z Late Entry! JG 21 went back into CH 89/NK
with Transmission Problems. Will call Jolly
Green ops when they land at (NKP)?

0600Z SGT. Clay (Joker) To coordinate escort
for JG 25 0730/26 OCT 69. → U Bon

0626Z JG 22 alen ch 77 (F.F. flight)

0625 JG 31 on the deck ch 103

0810 JG 31 on the deck ch 77

~~JG~~ JG 07 ABN F.F

0850Z DAAK TO TSARC

0900Z AIC Marino off duty!

24 OCT 69 SAR

DA NANG AB, Republic of Vietnam (7AF)--An Air Force HH-3 Jolly Green Giant helicopter crew of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron here recently achieved a milestone when they recorded their unit's 500th combat rescue.

Coast Guard Lieutenant Richard V. Butchka of New London, Conn., an exchange officer with the 37th ARRS, piloted the rescue helicopter during the mission. It was his third rescue mission with the unit.

The distinction of being the 500th satisfied customer went to Air Force Major Charles W. Bond of Greenwood, Miss., a Da Nang pilot.

Other crewmembers on the recovery aircraft were Air Force Sergeant Joseph J. Val, Rutherford, N.J., flight engineer, and Airman 1st Class George E. Hoffman III, Greenville, S.C., pararescueman.

The 500 saves by the 37th ARRS, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Homer H. Howell Jr., Colton, Calif., were compiled over a 2½ year period. In 1967, the squadron's first year in the Republic of Vietnam, 181 saves were recorded. ~~received some damage to the aircraft, so a decision was made to~~
forward air controller went part of the way back with us until two Jolly Green crews from the 37th met and escorted us the rest of the way home," he related.

"The fact that it was the 500th rescue really doesn't mean that much. I'm just glad, as I know my crew is, that we were able to safely bring in a downed crew member," he stated.

"The feeling our crews receive when saving a man's life is almost

"I know what it's like. I remember, the first time, I was able to look back in the aircraft and see the man climbing on board. That, to me, explains the satisfying mission of the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron," he concluded.

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(S) Misty 11, an F-100 FAC, abandoned his aircraft after experiencing engine failure. The pararescueman from Jolly Green 28 was abandoned when Jolly Green 28 was forced to exit the area during the initial rescue attempt. ⁸²

(S) The terrain in the SAR area was rolling foothills with elevations varying from 1,500 feet MSL in the ravines to 2,500 feet MSL in the hilltops. The vegetation on these hills varied from dense tripla-layered canopy jungle to open areas with tall jungle grass. The entire immediate area of the SAR was defended by heavy small arms and automatic weapons located as close as 15 meters to the survivors. Visibility below the clouds was excellent. A thunderstorm later moved through the area temporarily de- ⁸³laying the rescue.

(S) After CBU-19 was dropped, Sandy 06 and 05 escorted Jolly Green 15 into the rescue area. They then joined in a daisy chain of passes that provided protective fire. Despite heavy ground fire, Jolly Green 15 extracted Misty 11A and the pararescueman. An approaching thunderstorm aborted an attempt to recover Misty 11B. The storm prevented recovery for approximately 30 minutes. By the time the storm passed, the Sandys were low on fuel. They ex-

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pended their remaining ordnance and returned home. Spad 03 became on-scene commander. Spad 09 and Jolly Green 19 then successfully recovered Misty 11B with Sandy 11 and 12 assisting.
84

(U) Full details of this SAR effort can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report, support document 48.

(S) In November, the wing participated in five SAR efforts for the month.

(S) The first SAR effort was on 6 November when a successful rescue was made for Raven 52A and B. Raven 52 was a Royal Laotian Air Force O-1. The aircraft went down at approximately 0945 hours local on the morning of 6 November.
85

(S) The pilot stated that he was experiencing engine trouble while on a reconnaissance mission and that the engine had failed while he was attempting to return to base.
86

(S) Sandy 01 and 02 arrived on scene at 1130 hours and with the help of Raven 55, they spotted the survivors who were in good physical condition. There was no movement observed in the area and several low passes were made with no ground fire observed. Because of no opposition

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DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

Jolly Green 17 (Low)

AC Capt Marshall B. Nash
CP Capt John J. Livengood+
FE Sgt Brian W. Murray
RS TSgt Lehman L. Booher
RS SSgt Roy D. Bloebaum

Jolly Green 37 (High)

AC Capt Leonard D. Fialko
CP Capt Joseph R. Brown Jr.
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Robert J. Sully
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) An F-100, Misty 11, was shot down in Southern Laos on 24 Oct. HH-3E's were launched out of the 37th ARRS at Da Nang RVN to rescue the two downed pilots. One of the pilots had a broken leg and a pararescue man was lowered to help retrieve him. At this time the 37th ARRS Jolly Green received many hits and had to depart, only to be forced by the damage he had received to crash land about a mile away. His high helicopter was right there to pick up the crew except for the pararescue man they put down with the pilot with the broken leg. He was left on the ground when his helicopter was forced away. The crew was returned to Da Nang and the crashed helicopter was destroyed to prevent it falling into enemy hands. HH-53's from the 40th ARRS at Udorn attempted a rescue, but were damaged and driven off by hostile ground fire. Two more HH-3E's from the 37th ARRS had arrived on the scene and one of them was able to pick up the pararescue man and the pilot with the broken leg, but was driven off by ground fire before he could get to the other pilot. Weather was moving through the area and caused a delay in the proceedings. The 37th HH-3E that was high aircraft attempted a rescue of the second pilot of Misty 11 but was driven off by ground fire. After considerable smoke was put in, Major Smith in Jolly Green 19 was next. Fortunately he did not receive any ground fire, as a considerable amount of hover time was required to locate the second Misty 11 pilot, Capt Jack K. Clapper, [REDACTED]. He was rescued without further incident and the SAR was terminated.

Jolly Green 19 (Low)

AC Maj Ted L. Smith
CP Maj Edward B. Robbins
FE SSgt Robert E. Hunt
RS MSgt Paul L. Jenkins
RS Sgt Leland H. Sorensen

Jolly Green 09 (High)

AC Capt Phillip O. Pfanschmidt
CP Capt David M. Barber+
FE TSgt Daryl I. Durant
RS Sgt Charles D. Morrow

(S) (Gp 3) Jolly Green 17 and 19 were flying local training missions on 1 Nov. We are allowed to use our alert aircraft for training on days that we back-up the HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn. A Mayday call was heard and the position where Firefly 27 had bailed out was given by his wingman, Firefly 26. This was in northern Laos near the Thailand border. Firefly 26 came to meet Jolly Green 17 and lead him to the survivor. The survivor, Maj Peter D. Williams, [REDACTED], 602nd SOS, was located after a few minutes and hoisted on board Jolly Green 17.

+ TDY from the 40th ARRS at Udorn

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PROJECT CORONA
DO NOT DESTROY
0221814
No

CATALOGED

Sandy Coordinator

SAR Effort Report (Misty 11A and B, Pararescueman from Jolly Green 28) (U)

56 SpOpWg (DCO)

1. (S) A successful rescue was conducted on 24 October 1969 for Misty 11 Alpha, Misty 11 Bravo, and a pararescueman from Jolly Green 28. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.
2. (S) Misty 11, an F-100 FAC, abandoned his aircraft after experiencing engine failure. The pararescueman from Jolly Green 28 was abandoned when Jolly Green 28 was forced to exit the area during an initial rescue attempt.
3. (S) At approximately 0855, Sandys 01 and 02 were launched to escort Jolly Greens 76 and 72 on November orbit and to act as a back-up SAR force for the Spads and the Jolly Greens from Danang who were operating in Southern Laos. Sandys 01 and 02 were airborne at 0915 and immediately rendezvoused with Jolly Greens 76 and 72. An aircraft malfunction forced Sandy 02 to abort. Sandy 04 replaced Sandy 02. King 02 instructed Sandy 01 to escort Jolly Green 76 and 72 to the 350/15 of Channel 72; Sandy 04 was airborne at 0945. Sandys 03, 07, 05 and 06 were launched at 1130. Their initial holding fix was the 045/20 of Channel 72.
4. (S) The terrain in the SAR area was rolling foothills with elevations varying from 1500 ft MSL in the ravines to 2500 ft MSL on the hilltops. The vegetation on these hills varied from dense triple layered canopy jungles to open areas with tall jungle grass. The entire immediate area of the SAR was defended by heavy small arms and automatic weapons located as close as 15 meters to the survivors. There were scattered variable broken cumulus build-ups in the area with tops about 9500 ft MSL and bases varying from 2000 ft to 3000 ft AGL. Visibility below the clouds was excellent. A thunderstorm later moved through the area temporarily delaying the rescue.
5. (S) While the Sandys and Jolly Greens 76 and 72 were enroute to the holding area, Spads 11 and 12 and Jolly Green 28 were attempting a pick-up. King 04 advised that Jolly Green 28 had been downed and that the crew had been picked up by Jolly Green 04 and they were RTBing to Danang. King instructed Sandy 01 to divert immediately to the SAR area. On reaching the SAR area, Spad 11, the "on-scene commander", instructed Sandy 01 and Jolly 76 to rendezvous with his wingman, Spad 12, in preparation for another pick-up attempt. At this time, a Stormy FAC was

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directing Spad 01 and 02 in the target area. When their ordnance had been expended, Spad 11 directed Salads 40, 41, 42, and 43 to drop their CBU-19 in the recovery area. Spad 11 then directed Sandy 01, Spad 12, and Jolly Green 76 to attempt a pick-up. Due to a five to ten minute delay between the placement of the CBU-19 and the recovery attempt, the CBU-19 was largely dissipated. This attempt was aborted due to ground fire. At this time, approximately 1125, Spad 11 turned "on-scene command" over to Sandy 01. Spad 11 RTBed due to low fuel.

6. (S) By this time, Sandy 04 had joined Sandy 01. Since neither Sandy 01 or 04 had a definite fix on the survivors, the next few minutes were devoted to locating the survivors on the ground. Although Misty 11B's chute was visible, he was in the underbrush. He advised that he was 25 meters down the hill from his chute. By use of a signal mirror, Misty 11A and the pararescueman were located 100 meters to the northeast of Misty 11B's position. Based on directions provided by the survivors, Sandy 01 and 04 sanitized the area with 7.62 miniguns, 2.75 rockets, CBU-14s, and 20mm cannons. Ordnance was delivered within 50 feet of the survivors. After approximately 20 minutes, Sandy 01 trolled the area. The survivors reported no ground fire. Another rescue was attempted. After Misty 11 Alpha had deployed his smoke and Jolly Green 76 had started to hover, ground fire again forced a termination of the rescue attempt. Sandy 01 advised King that additional CBU-19 would be required before another rescue could be attempted. Since King estimated 40 minutes for arrival of CBU-19, Sandy 01 advised Jolly Green 76 to refuel if necessary. Jolly Green 76 refueled. Sandy 01 and 04 continued their sanitation. The survivors directed this effort. After 80 percent of their ordnance was expended, Sandy 01 decided to conserve the remainder of his ordnance. Misty 41 and Stormy 02 were directed to provide suppressive 20mm support. Their hard ordnance could not be used because of the proximity of the survivors. Spad 05 and 06 then arrived with SAR loads. Sandy 01 directed them to rendezvous with Jolly Green 76 and 72 for the next pick-up attempt. Covey 283 and Misty 41 were used to mark targets for Salad 44, 45, 46, and 47 when they arrived. Their CBU-19 covered the entire area. Jolly Green 76, Spad 05 and Spad 06 then attempted another recovery. As Jolly Green 76 reached a hover within 30 feet of Misty 11 Alpha and the pararescueman, he began to lose his utility hydraulic system and control of his tail rotor servos. He could no longer control the helicopter in a hover and made an emergency exit. Sandy 01 and 04 covered Jolly Green 76 as he proceeded to Channel 72. Spad 05 became the "on-scene commander" at approximately 1335. Sandy 01 and 04 were now below minimum fuel. They RTBed to Channel 89. Sandys 03, 07, 05, and 06 arrived in the recovery area just before Jolly Green 76's last attempt at recovery. They held high. After another 30 minutes, Spad 05 reached minimum fuel and RTBed. Sandy 03 became "on-scene commander". By 1430, Salad 48, 49, 50, and 51 arrived with more CBU-19. Although the weather was deteriorating, Sandy 03 initiated a new recovery effort.

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7. (S) After CBU-19 was dropped, Sandy 05 and 06 escorted Jolly Green 15 into the rescue area. They then joined in a daisy chain providing protective fire. Despite heavy ground fire, Jolly Green 15 extracted Misty 11 Alpha and the pararescueman. An approaching thunderstorm aborted an attempt to recover Misty 11 Bravo. The storm prevented recovery from approximately 1500 to 1530. By the time the storm passed, the Sandys were becoming low on fuel. They expended their remaining ordnance and RTBed. Spad 03 became "on-scene commander". Sandy 05 and 06 landed at Channel 93 due to low fuel. Spad 09 and Jolly Green 19 successfully recovered Misty 11 Bravo. Sandy 11 and 12 assisted in their pick-up.

8. (S) The following difficulties were encountered:

- a. The proximity of hostile forces to the survivors severely restricted the type of ordnance which could be delivered.
- b. The enemy's tactics of holding fire until the helicopters were in their most vulnerable position complicated the recovery.
- c. The strong surface wind limited the effectiveness of the CBU-19.

9. (S) Based on the experience gained in this recovery, the following recommendations are made:

- a. Only restricted types of ordnance can be used when hostiles are in close proximity to survivors. Napalm might help in restricting small arms fire since it can be accurately delivered and should have a demoralizing effect.
- b. Wind conditions have a definite effect in CBU-19 effectiveness. Wind conditions must be considered when initiating the recovery.

10. (U) The Sandy forces who participated in the effort were as follows:

Sandy 01	1st Lt Huntaman
Sandy 04	Lt Col Michaud
Sandy 03	Maj Moffatt
Sandy 07	1st Lt Frisbie
Sandy 05	Capt Crowder
Sandy 06	Capt Dyer
Sandy 11	Capt Hudson
Sandy 12	Lt Col Miller

JOHN M. VARGO, Lt Colonel, USAF
Sandy Coordinator

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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his position and Sandy 01 vectored in Jolly Green 72. A
PJ was lowered and recovered 61B from the tree where he
78
had passed out.

(S) The major problem encountered was the misinformation concerning the number of survivors. This situation caused a great deal of confusion about who was popping flares. As a result 61B was left upside down in a tree with two broken legs for 19 minutes longer than necessary. This could have been fatal to 61B as voice contact was the only way he was located and he passed out while the PJ was on the way down for the pickup. Nail 07B did not have a radio and popped a flare as soon as he saw 07A going up the penetra-
79
tor which was exactly when Sandy 01 asked 61B to pop a flare.

(S) It was recommended that the standard operating procedure be reiterated whereby the controlling agency contacts the unit responsible for the flying activities of the downed aircraft to determine the number and call signs of
80
the personnel onboard.

(U) Further details of this SAR effort can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report, support document 47.

(S) On 24 October, a successful rescue was conducted
81
for Misty 11A and B, and a pararescueman from Jolly Green 28.

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(S) Misty 11, an F-100 FAC, abandoned his aircraft after experiencing engine failure. The pararescueman from Jolly Green 28 was abandoned when Jolly Green 28 was forced to exit the area during the initial rescue attempt.⁸²

(S) The terrain in the SAR area was rolling foothills with elevations varying from 1,500 feet MSL in the ravines to 2,500 feet MSL in the hilltops. The vegetation on these hills varied from dense tripla-layered canopy jungle to open areas with tall jungle grass. The entire immediate area of the SAR was defended by heavy small arms and automatic weapons located as close as 15 meters to the survivors. Visibility below the clouds was excellent. A thunderstorm later moved through the area temporarily delaying the rescue.⁸³

(S) After CBU-19 was dropped, Sandy 06 and 05 escorted Jolly Green 15 into the rescue area. They then joined in a daisy chain of passes that provided protective fire. Despite heavy ground fire, Jolly Green 15 extracted Misty 11A and the pararescueman. An approaching thunderstorm aborted an attempt to recover Misty 11B. The storm prevented recovery for approximately 30 minutes. By the time the storm passed, the Sandys were low on fuel. They ex-

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pended their remaining ordnance and returned home. Spad 03 became on-scene commander. Spad 09 and Jolly Green 19 then successfully recovered Misty 11B with Sandy 11 and 12 assisting.
84

(U) Full details of this SAR effort can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report, support document 48.

(S) In November, the wing participated in five SAR efforts for the month.

(S) The first SAR effort was on 6 November when a successful rescue was made for Raven 52A and B. Raven 52 was a Royal Laotian Air Force O-1. The aircraft went down at approximately 0945 hours local on the morning of 6 November.
85

(S) The pilot stated that he was experiencing engine trouble while on a reconnaissance mission and that the engine had failed while he was attempting to return to base.
86

(S) Sandy 01 and 02 arrived on scene at 1130 hours and with the help of Raven 55, they spotted the survivors who were in good physical condition. There was no movement observed in the area and several low passes were made with no ground fire observed. Because of no opposition

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in the area and excellent HLZ next to the survivors it was decided that a landing by Jolly Green 17 and pickup would be attempted as soon as they arrived on scene.⁸⁷

(S) Jolly Green 17 and 19 arrived in the general area at 1155 hours escorted by Sandy 03 and 04. At 1200 hours a Royal Laotian Air Force H-34 helicopter was sighted approaching the area. Sandy 01 and Raven 55 were unsuccessful in attempts to contact the helicopter. The H-34 (tail #807) landed next to the survivors and picked them up without difficulty. Sandys 01 and 02 escorted the H-34 to Pakxe Airport then returned to Channel 89.⁸⁸

(U) Further details of this SAR can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report, support document 49.

(S) Two successful rescues were made on 12 November. The first was for Zorro 65, an A-1E. The aircraft went down at 0250 hours on the morning of the 12th.⁸⁹

(S) Zorro 65 stated that he could not advance the throttle above approximately 22 inches of manifold pressure without severe backfiring and he was unable to maintain altitude. He elected to leave the aircraft at approximately 7,000 feet MSL. Cause of the extraction was engine failure.

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SD-4 84

39th ARPSq History, Oct - Dec 69

DATE: 5 Nov 69

Supporting Document 4

7 November 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 1-03-079-24 Oct 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 3

DISTRICTED AIRCRAFT: Misty 11

LOCATION: 055/25/72

SAVES: 2 Misty crew plus 1 PJ

1. (U) This is a supplemental narrative regarding King 3 activities in support of Mission # 1-03-079, 24 Oct 69, controlled by King 4 & 6.
2. (U) King 3 was launched by Jack at 0404Z 24 Oct 69 and instructed to proceed to Tacan channel 72 and orbit, pending possible air refueling of helicopters supporting SAR mission.
3. (U) At 0615Z King 3 overheard Jolly Green 76 advise he had been hit by groundfire and was experiencing hydraulic failures and controllability problems. King 3 proceeded to intercept Jolly Green 76, called for landing clearance at LS 44 and relayed frequency and status information to Jolly Green 76.
4. (U) At 0656Z King 3 coordinated refueling with inbound helicopters Jolly Greens 19 & 09. After rendezvous and hook up a track from 30 miles northwest of channel 72 on the 325 radial, inbound to the SAR site 25 NM east of channel 72 on the 065 radial was chosen to provide best separation from known AAA locations although it was over areas containing concentrations of unfriendly ground forces. A location near the SAR site for termination of refueling JG 09 & 19 was desirable to rendezvous with JG 21 who was on scene as high helicopter at that point in the mission. JG 21 stated he was running about one half hour less fuel than his low partner, JG 15. The on scene commander released JG 21 to refuel. At the moment JG 09 disconnected and the flight JG 19 & 09 cleared King 3, JG 21 was in a five mile at 10 o'clock position and with a single turn an immediate rendezvous and join up was accomplished in the vicinity of channel 72. Refueling was conducted inbound to the SAR scene commencing at 0703Z.
5. (U) When JG 21 disconnected and cleared from refueling JG 15 was maneuvering to pick up survivor Misty 11A. When JG 15 was disabled by groundfire attempting the Misty 11B pickup, King 3 maneuvered to intercept outbound from the SAR scene for escort and refueling. This refueling was conducted entirely between channel 72 and the SAR scene, again over a briefed hostile area. Because of battle damage JG 15 could not attain the minimum refueling speed of 105 knots. Due to previous off loads King 3 was lighter than normal and speed was reduced to 100 knots for the refueling. JG 15, after careful assessment of battle damage, advised King 3 that he did not require escort by King 2.

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GROUP-4

Declassify at 5 year intervals,
unless indicated otherwise.

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Supporting Document 4

6. Upon termination of refueling with JG 15, King 3 monitored as JG 21, while maneuvering to pick up Misty 15, announced mechanical difficulty due to an in flight access panel release and necessity for an immediate landing. King 3 proceeded to intercept, calling for landing clearance at LS 171. After JG 21 had shut down at LS 171 and corrected his mechanical difficulty, it was discovered that he was critically short of transmission fluid. A quick check of Mil Specifications revealed the type oil required by JG 21 was the same type carried by King 3 for spare engine oil, Mil Spec 7808. Aerial delivery of the spare engine oil from King 3 was decided upon, in spite of the necessity to maneuver over known hostile territory at 300 ft and 130 knots to effect the delivery, due to the favorable prospects of immediately recovering JG 21. The initial drop of engine oil was unsuccessful due to inflight disintegration of the delivery package. A second drop was successful with the oil encased in a wooden box normally used by King 3 to store airborne spares. JG 21 was able to return to channel 89 after another refueling and under the escort of King 3.

7. (U) Air Refueling Accomplished:

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| a. JG 04 2300 lbs | d. JG 15 2000 lbs |
| b. JG 19 2500 lbs | e. JG 21 2130 lbs |
| c. JG 21 3100 lbs | |

8. Problem Areas: Lack of proper delivery equipment for an aerial supply delivery hampered the dropping of transmission fluid to Jolly Green 21. Recommend a minimum quantity of cargo slings or straps such as the A-7 cargo sling be procured and stored on each airplane for use with the cargo type parachute presently carried on board.

9. (U) Crewmembers:

AMC MAJ BRIGGS	10 AIC GIBBIL
AC CPT ADLSON	PL TCG BRINKMAN
CP DLT FRISLEY	PS TCG KASER
N CPT RAY	IM SSG HARRING

ALTON P. H. BRIGGS JR., Major, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander

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... 12 years.

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39th ARRSq History, Oct - Dec 69

Supporting Document 6

DATE: 24 OCT 69

27 October 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 1-3-079 24 OCT 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 4

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Misty 11, F-100F

LOCATION: 055/25/72

SAVES: 2 and 4 (2 Misty & 4 Jolly Greens)

1. (S) As King 4, we were on normal orbit north of Ch 77 with the radios set up in the standard configuration. The crew heard Nail 07 call Hillsboro at 0120Z and reported that he had heard a Mayday from Misty 11. Misty 11 had indicated in the call that he had a flame out. The time of the distress call was 0115Z. We immediately called Hillsboro for a possible position. They gave us Delta 45 and we immediately started for the area. Nail 07 was appointed On Scene Commander and started organizing available aircraft to search for the downed crew.

2. (S) At 0121Z we requested that the Jollys and Spads be scrambled from Ch 77 and sent to 220/42/103. Queen advised that Jolly Green 04 & 28 were launched from 103 and the Spads from Ch 77 at 0126Z. ETA to SAR area 0239Z. Nail 07 and King 4 conducted an electronic search in the area of D-45.

3. (S) At 0146Z Misty 31 came back from tanker and said that he had last seen Misty 11 in the D-43 area. The SAR effort moved to that area, 150/50/103. Nail 07 made voice contact with the survivors at 0150Z. Misty 11A had a broken leg, but Misty 11B was OK. Bravo indicated that he heard the enemy about 25 meters NW of his position. He was located on the side of a ridge in heavy jungle. Alpha was about 75 meters east of his position. Both were located on the slope between the crest and ravine. Nail 07 proceeded to locate both pilots exactly so ordnance could be put in on the enemy.

4. (S) Fast movers were available from 0200Z, and every 20 minutes thereafter but were not used. Stormy 02 and Misty 31 attacked the suspected positions with 20mm. Subsequent passes by Nail 07 drew no ground fire. Spad 11 arrived, and after a briefing by Nail 07, became On Scene Commander at 0255Z. He had smoke laid on both ridge tops and across the western end of the ravine at 0309Z. After the smoke was down Jolly Green (JG) 28 started in for the pick up. Misty 11 Alpha was told to pop his smoke.

5. (S) At 0313Z JG 28 put a Pd down to aid 4 into the helicopter. JG 28 took ground fire in the transmission area at 0315Z and had to leave because of heavy oil loss. He exited east trailing heavy smoke for approximately 2 miles and crash landed at 0318Z. JG 04 landed

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beside 28 and picked up the crew; he received slight rotor damage from trees during this maneuver. JG 04 RTB to Ch 77 accompanied by Couey 297. JG 21 and 15 launched from Ch 77 for escort. JG 72 and 76L accompanied by Sandy 01 & 04 had arrived in the area at 0305Z. After JG 28 exited the area Spad 11, 12 and 01 struck the possible ground fire sites with napalm, CBU, and 20mm guided by the survivors on the ground.

6. (U) Salad 40, 41, 42 and 43 arrived at 0345Z and dropped their ordnance at 0400Z. Sandy 01 relieved Spad 11 as On Scene Commander at 0412Z. He brought JG 76 in for a pick up and advised Alpha to pop his smoke. At 0420Z JG 76 called that he was taking ground fire with hits in his underside and external tanks. He pulled off immediately. Sandy 01 reoriented himself on the exact position of both A & B in preparation for a CBU attack. Sandy 01 and 04 expended CBU and 20mm. The Salad birds were also used to expend 20mm on the tree line along the ridges.

7. (U) At 0447Z JG 76 went back in to attempt a pick up of the PJ and A with the A-1s forming a daisy chain around the helicopter. The PJ and A were advised to pop smoke at 0453Z. JG 76 took more hits and pulled off at 0445Z. Sandy 01 continued to sanitize the area. Stormy 02 & 03 also expended 20mm. Sandy 01 requested more salad and was advised that it was on the way. Salad 44 & 45 were airborne Ch 89 at 0449Z. King 6 arrived and was briefed. He took over the mission at 0535Z. The following aircraft were involved in the SAR from origin to 0535Z:

NAIL 07	SPAD 11, 12, 01, 5 & 6
STORMY 01, 02 & 03	SALAD 40, 41, 42 & 43
PLAYBOY 12	JOLLY GREEN 04, 28, 76, 72, 15 & 21
MISTY 31 & 41	(JOLLY GREEN 09 & 19 - NOV ORBIT)

8. (U) Jolly Green 76 was refueled by King 1 at 0500Z.

9. (U) No problems encountered.

10. (U) Crewmembers:

AMC	MAJ ABBOTT	RO	TSG RUSSELL
AC	MAJ RICHARDS	FE	MSG GRIFFIN
CP	COL FRAZEE	FE	SGT CARVER
NN	CPT BAKER	LM	SGT PEARSON

Fred F. Abbott
 FRED F. ABBOTT, Major, USAF
 Airborne Mission Commander

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GROUP-4
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39th ARRSq History, Oct - Dec 69
DATE: 24 OCT 69 Supporting Document 5

29 October 1969

MISSION NUMBER: 1-3-079-24 OCT 69

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 6

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Misty 11 (Crew of Two)

LOCATION: 055/25/72

SAVES: 2 Misty crew plus 1 PJ

1. (S) This King 6 crew was given background information relative to this mission at the 31st Wing Intelligence briefing at 1100L and a further, more current briefing by Stoker 2 in the 39th ARRS. King 4 was, at the time, controlling the SAR effort in an attempt to effect a pick-up of Misty 11 Alpha, Misty 11 Bravo, and the PJ from Jolly Green 28 who had been left with 11 Alpha when JG 28 got hit and was forced to exit the area before crash-landing. We were briefed by Stoker 2 to monitor SAR frequencies after take-off and during climb-out with the probability of relieving King 4 if the mission wasn't completed by the time we reached our Gulf orbit point.
2. (S) At 0515Z we proceeded to the approximate location of the SAR effort (055°/25miles/TACAN channel 72), received an up-to-date briefing by King 4 and assumed control at 0538Z. At this time Sandy 1, with Sandy 4 as wing man, was the On-Scene Commander (OSC) and was working Spads 05 and 06, JG 76 (Low), JG 72 (High) and "Salad" aircraft 40 through 44. Misty aircraft 31 and 41 were also on the scene standing by as necessary, as was Stormy 3.
3. (S) As we assumed control, Sandy 1 was directing a strafing of ridges on either side of the SAR point by the Spads and the laying down of CBU 19 by Salad 40 through 44. JG 76 and 72 were orbiting nearby in readiness for a pick-up attempt of Misty 11 Alpha and the PJ with him. We all concurred that Misty 11 Bravo should be second for pick-up since Alpha was reported as having a broken leg and needing medical attention; Bravo had reported himself on his emergency radio as being uninjured.
4. (S) At 0610Z Sandy 1 directed JG 76/72 to start moving in for pick-up of Alpha and his PJ and kept the CBU-19 and Spad A-1E's in a daisy-chain operation supporting/protecting them. A fairly large rainstorm was approaching from the east and the winds had increased considerably, which was blowing the CBU-19 away almost as fast as it was laid. Sandy 1 remarked on this and asked JG 76 (the designated "pick-up" helicopter) to hurry as much as possible as the smoke wasn't laying nor remaining too well or long. JG 76 reacted quickly and moved in for the recovery effort.

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5. () No visible ground fire was reported and none was reported being received by JG 76 until he began to hover preparatory to lowering his hoist. At this point he was struck by several rounds of ground fire and was forced to pull out and proceed to Lima 44 near Channel 72 for an emergency landing. He reported loss of his first stage system, his utility hydraulic system, and JG 72 (who pulled out with him, and escorted him to safety at Lima 44) confirmed also that JG 76 had had part of his rudder shot away. He was also escorted by Sandys 1 and 4 and by King 3, who was orbiting a few miles NW of the SAR point. The JG 76 aircraft was left at L 44 and JG 72 transported the crew to Channel 72.

6. () At this time, we had Salad 44 through 47 (CBU-19 a/c) inbound (ETA about 20 minutes away) and JG 15 and 21, who had been previously dispatched by Queen out of Channel 77 and was holding "at the fence," had been called in as back-ups to JG 76 and 72. They were holding SW of the SAR point but JG 21 was preparing to proceed westward towards Channel 72 for air-refueling with King 3 (NOTE: King 3 at this point was proceeding back towards Channel 72 with JG 09 and 19 in tow from Channel 89, refueling them enroute to save time and to help prepare them for back-up to JG 15 and 21, if needed.

7. () When JG 76 departed, Sandys 1 and 4 were at Bingo fuel so they escorted JG 76 and 72 to L 44 enroute to RTB to Channel 89. On-scene command was transferred to Spad 05. Also, Sandys 5 and 6 were estimating arrival at 0547Z and Sandys 3 and 7 at 0555Z, all with full SAR load. Since these estimated arrival times correlated with the ETA's on Salads 44 - 47, a new effort was organized by Spad 05 but was then delayed because of the threatening storm (rain had started falling). During the wait, Sandy 3 was named OSC and Spads 05 and 06 RTB to channel 77 for fuel. At approximately 0710Z, during a sudden break in the storm, Sandy 3 organized a quick "hosing" of the ridge areas by the Sandys and Salads and alerted JG 15 for a pick-up run as soon as the Salads could lay their smoke. While this was being done, JG 76 called me on SAR VHF and said to caution the OSC and JG 15 that "No more PJs are needed on the ground, but the three individuals on the ground are all unarmed and do need arms, if possible. Also, be advised that I received no ground fire from anywhere while moving in, but as I started my hover, I started taking hits."

8. () While we were waiting for the weather to subside, King 4 relayed from Queen a request that the SAR forces take a look at JG 28 (the crash-landed helicopter) before the day was over to determine if it could be recovered by a "crane" or should it be destroyed by the fast movers. We acknowledged but delayed this action until an appropriate time to discuss it with the J-EE drivers.

9. () At approximately 0738Z JG 15 started moving in and, at 0745Z, effected a successful recovery of M400 11 Alpha and the PJ. He received sporadic ground fire and his aircraft was hit during the pick-up, so he moved on out of the immediate proximity to check his damage. Finding no evidence of real serious damage, he reacted favorably to the OSC's request to "let's go in and get Bravo now!" One

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 attempt was made but was discontinued due to the loss of his hoist during a burst of heavy ground fire. He returned to Channel 77 to deliver 11 Alpha to the hospital for treatment; Sandy's 3 and 7 followed shortly thereafter and escorted him home, after turning the on-scene command over to Spad 09 (wingman: Spad 10), who had arrived on-scene during the attempt by JG 15 to pick-up Misty 11 Bravo. Sandy's 11 and 10 also arrived with him. (All were carrying full SAR loads.)

10. Spad 09 readied JG 21 for a recovery run, but almost simultaneously Queen called and relayed instructions from "Pot-belly" that JG 21 was not to attempt a pick-up without a "high" rescue helicopter covering him. We roger-ed this and suggested to Spad 09 that JG 09 and 19, who were now in the proximity, be called in for high cover. He and all JG's agreed, but before further SAR action could be initiated, the weather again deteriorated and the mission was delayed about 30 more minutes.

11. During this time, JG 21 developed mechanical problems and was forced to abort, proceeding to Lima Site 171 for an emergency landing. (NOTE: King 3, again orbiting about 20 miles west to assist as necessary if needed, reacted quickly to this sudden development and escorted JG 21 to his landing point. They remained in the area of LS 171 while JG 21 effected a temporary repair and even "air-dropped" some badly needed transmission fluid to help them get their aircraft flyable again. They then escorted JG 21 to Channel 89, refueling them (for the second time that day) on the way.)

12. Four more Salad A-1E's (50-53) had arrived on-scene about 0720Z, had expended their CBU 19 during the readying of JG 21 for his try at a pick-up of Bravo, and were forced to RTB at 0820Z, along with Salads 44-47, for refueling. Salads 54 - 57 replaced them at 0815Z and Queen called and advised us that Spads 07, 08, 13 and 14 were being loaded with more "Salad" at Channel 107 and were estimating departure at 0825Z.

13. Around 0830Z the storm started moving out, so Spads 09 and 10 started hosing down the ridge on one side of the survivor and Sandys 10 and 11 concentrated on the opposite ridge. The four Salad aircraft followed right in behind them to complete the daisy-chain and, after several passes, Spad 09 called in JG 09 (Low) and JG 19 (High) for the pick-up attempt. With the passing of the storm, the winds became relatively calm and the smoke pretty much enveloped the whole area, obliterating the rescue helicopters' visibility and making it even more difficult to locate 11 Bravo. Fortunately, the survivor's emergency radio was working well and he knew how to use it. By coordinated voice guidance on the radio from Misty 11 Bravo on the ground and Spad 09 (circling overhead), after two unsuccessful attempts by JG 09 to locate the survivor, on the third attempt they succeeded and Misty 11 Bravo was hoisted aboard at 0910Z and hurried on his way to Channel 89. He confirmed that he was OK and we relayed this information to Queen and to Misty 11 Alpha, still enroute to Channel 77 on JG 15.

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14. (S) During this final SAR effort to save 11 Bravo, Queen called me and stated that we were now instructed to destroy JG 28 before all forces left the scene. I reminded them that we hadn't yet been able to have anyone check the aircraft out for possible crane recovery, but they stated that it had been decided it was too risky for a ground team to attempt to recover the damaged helicopter and we were to have it destroyed. I relayed this to Spad 09 and the remaining SAR forces (including Misty 31, 41, 51 and 61 and a Litter flight, plus the Spads, Sandys and Salads) complied.

15. (S) Immediately after the "save" of Misty 11 Bravo, JG 09 called for a quick refueling as he was extremely low on fuel, so we descended for an enroute intercept and rendezvous and refueled them as they progressed towards Channel 89. At 0918Z we proceeded to our assigned Gulf orbit point to the north of Channel 77 and entered a normal orbit posture at 0930Z.

16. (S) Comments:

a. We noticed that every time a Jolly Green pick-up attempt was started (as the helicopter started moving in for a possible recovery), a chute beeper started transmitting. This happened during efforts with both Alpha and Bravo. At first we (on King 6) thought it was Bravo, trying to help us locate him. But, after Alpha was recovered, and during save efforts with Bravo, the same thing happened, each time, but it was determined not to be Bravo because he was talking to Spad 09 at the same time the beeper was being heard. Luckily, the beeper was far enough removed from Bravo that it didn't block Bravo's voice transmission, and Bravo's battery was strong enough to drive through the beeper. Opinion: The beeper was being used by someone among the enemy forces, and one who was close enough either visually observing the entire SAR operation or was able to hear all the conversations on UHF guard and understood them.

b. Panama Controller 14, who worked with us continuously, from our entry into the effort until its completion, and who had worked similarly with King 4 while they were handling the mission, is deserving of a special pat on the back for his untiring and devoted efforts. The way he handled our rescue forces as they were cycled to us and his professionalism throughout the day speak very highly for Panama and their dependability. We among King wish to especially commend Panama 14.

c. Not to slight any of the SAR forces working with King 6, we feel everyone associated with the effort performed outstandingly. The "Jollys", Beads, Sandys and "Salads" worked beautifully together. And the Mistys, Stormys and Litters, being somewhat especially concerned over a couple of their own kind, gave us superb backup support. Hillabore, Batcat, Kings 1, 3 and 2, and Queen, our RCC, backed us up completely when needed, and usually without a call from us. To everyone who participated, thanks for their help, cooperation and efforts.

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3ARRGp Hist., Oct-Dec 1969

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Aircraft Loss

(S)(GP-4) On 24 October 1969, an HH-3E, SN 66-13281, assigned to the 37ARRSq, Da Nang AB, RVN, was lost as a result of hostile groundfire. The "Jolly Green" was in a hover and had lowered a pararescueman (PJ) to aid an injured pilot. As the injured man and the PJ were being hoisted on the jungle penetrator, intense enemy groundfire severely damaged the helicopter, including the hoist mechanism. The penetrator line was cut free to prevent dragging the pilot and the PJ through a wooded area, as the helicopter could no longer maintain a hover. The HH-3E crash-landed approximately one mile away. The uninjured crew, the injured pilot, and the PJ were all recovered by another "Jolly Green". The remains of the damaged helicopter were subsequently destroyed by friendly strike aircraft to prevent enemy capture of its contents.

Standardization

(U) Arrival of Personnel

Major John L. Powell, Jr replaced Major Edward G. Quinlin on 21 September as Chief of Standardization as well as HC-130P Aircrew Standardization Officer.

(U) Standardization Staff Visits

During the quarter, 3ARRGp standardization personnel conducted 17 visits.⁸

8. Appendix 4 lists the units visited, dates, and actions taken.

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3ARRGp Hist., Oct-Dec 1969

18

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