

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

File 9437

440 [Capt Welsen/2687]

9 October 1969

Mission Narrative Report #2-3-061-6 Oct 69 [U]

BARRO [JSARC]
APO 96307

1. [U] This report is submitted in accordance with ARRCM 55-2/
BARRO SUP 1, dated 11 July 1968.

2. [S] On 6 Oct 69 the Buffs JG 71 and 72 were on backup alert at channel 89 when JG 19 and JG 36 were scrambled on this SAR mission. At approximately 1630L JG 36 developed hydraulic problems and REB'ed to CR 89. JG 71 and JG 72 were scrambled at 1630L and airborne at 1635L. While enroute to the SAR area radio conversation monitored on VHF indicated that another recovery attempt was underway with JG 19. At 1645L JG 19 reported taking hits and breaking off the attempt with a generator out. It was now apparent that 71 and 72 were primary for the rescue. Immediate preparations were begun enroute because circumstances indicated that there would be insufficient time after arrival in the SAR area because of the rapidly approaching sunset and because the Sawdust A/C were running low on fuel. Sandy 5 was contacted at 1705L and he directed 71 and 72 into an orbit 6 N.M. Northwest of the area. Sandy 7 directed Sawdust flight to deploy at 1724 and briefed 71 and 72 to move into an orbit position 4 N.M. Northeast, the direction from which the approach would be made. Sandy 7 determined that JG 71 was ready for the attempt, then briefed on the procedures to be used. JG 71 was directed to descend to 2,000 AGL and be ready for an immediate approach to the site when cleared. Sandy 7 cleared JG 71 in at 1733. JG 71 switched to UHF guard and contacted Knife 61 Alpha on final. Knife 61 Alpha talked JG 71 down to the landing site, and provided excellent information on obstructions, enemy fire, etc. JG 71 landed and loaded 46 indigenous and 5 USAF survivors aboard. At 1738L JG 71 was airborne after dropping the external tanks to reduce aircraft weight. Within 20 seconds Knife 62B called on UHF guard, and advised that there were 3 USAF survivors still at the site. Sandy 7 asked JG 72 if he was ready to come in for the pickup. JG 72 reported on final and contacted 62B on guard. JG 72 landed at 1740L and was airborne at 1743L with 3 USAF survivors.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED

400-0104

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

144

The SAR forces were RTS'ed to channel 89 and the Sandies proceeded to expend all ordnance on the enemy. JG 72 had received ground fire and a severe vibration was caused by the impacting mortar rounds and a hit through the Main Rotor Blade. JG 17 launched from CH 89 to intercept and escort JG 72 back to CH 89. This rescue attempt was successful because of 2 major actions. The first was because of the excellent and positive control of all forces by Sandy 7 and the second was due to the precise and overall coverage of the enemy forces with CBU-19. Although the enemy had approached to within 50 - 75 feet the anti-riot characteristic of the gas prevented them from effectively using either the mortars or their individual weapons.

3. [U] Total Survivors - 54 combat saves.

Taylor, C. D., Major, 21 SOS

Silva, T. D., Lt Col, 21 SOS

Conran, P. J., Major, 21 SOS

Costa, P. L., Capt, 21 SOS

Reynolds, K. G., MSgt, 21 SOS

Franklin, W. T., TSgt, 21 SOS

Ramsey, H. L., TSgt, 21 SOS

Cossiboom, C. W., SSgt, 21 SOS

Plus 46 Foreign military personnel

2

460-0104

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

145

4. [U] The rescue crews were:

JOLLY GREEN 71 [LOW]

AC: Bell, Holly G., Capt,

CP: Sanderson, Gary F., Capt,

FE: Hartman, Jack L., SSgt,

RS: Wilson, John E., SSgt,

RS: Gargano, Anthony R., MSgt,

AP: Whitted, Jeffery L., AIG,

JOLLY GREEN 72 [HIGH]

AC: Nelson, Gary L., Capt,

CP: Wegman, James H., Capt,

FE: LeBeau, Stephen L., SSgt,

RS: Moran, Jack D., SSgt,

RS: McFerr, Anthony J., Sgt,

Gary L. Nelson
GARY L. NELSON, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

Holly G. Bell
HOLLY G. BELL, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

3

- GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

400-0104

DECLASSIFIED

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69

CHAPTER II

Operations and Training

Operations

(S) (GP 3) The good weather and resultant clear skies of the dry season brought a marked increase in combat activity during October, November and December. Our activity increased proportionally. Detachment One made fourteen combat saves, one non-combat rescue and one medical evacuation during this period. Det 1 was tasked with maintaining 15 minute alert two days out of three, flying the last two and a half hours of daylight on airborne alert in the November Orbit area, with the 40th ARRS from Udorn taking the third day. On that third day the 40th ARRS would send two HH-53s to this station at first light and they would be on 15 minute alert until the last two and a half hours of daylight, when they would fly airborne alert in the November Orbit area and recover at their home station. Det 1 was on 30 minute back-up alert on this day. Det 1 was also tasked with one of its HH-3E's on 45 minute alert during the hours of darkness for in-country rescues and medical evacuation missions. Due to mechanical difficulties encountered with the HH-53 and battle damage incurred on two HH-53s during the Boxer 22 mission, Det 1 HH-3Es were often required to fill in for the HH-53s on that third day.

(S) (Gp 3) Det 1, 40 ARRS was the scene of operations and staging area for three significant missions during this quarter. Our HH-3E, Jolly Green 19, attempted to make a pickup of Knife 61 and 62, downed by hostile ground fire at Muong Thine, Laos on 6 Oct. He received extensive damage from hostile ground fire as he was attempting to land there to rescue the aircrews and was forced to depart the area and return to base. Two HH-53s from 40th ARRS here on back-up alert were launched and after delivery of considerable ordnance by Sandy and Hobo aircraft, were able to effect a rescue of the eight aircrew members and a large number of indigenous personnel. They recovered here at our base. Two of the recovered aircrew had been wounded.

(S) (Gp 3) On the second significant mission HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn were launched from our station to back-up 37th ARRS HH-3Es engaged in a mission on Misty 11 on 24 Oct. HH-53s were staged out of our facilities here during that SAR mission. This mission is covered later in Combat Saves.

(S) (Gp 3) The third significant rescue effort and the most extensive and costly to date was the Boxer 22 mission on 5, 6 and 7th of Dec. Our HH-3Es, Jolly Green 37 and 09 were the initial Jolly Greens to go on the mission. The two Boxer 22 pilots were downed near Ban Phan Hop, Laos, a very heavily defended area near the North Vietnamese border. HH-53s, Jolly Green 76 and 72 were launched from Udorn directly to a near-by holding point to back-up Jolly Greens 37 and 09. HH-53s, Jolly Green 77 and 09 were sent to be staged out of this base, but were needed prior to landing here and continued on to the SAR area. Jolly Green 37 started in for a rescue attempt, but was called off due to intense antiaircraft fire. Jolly Green 09 then made an attempt at a rescue but received intense ground fire and hastily evacuated the area.

DECLASSIFIED
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

224

82D-3 82

39th ARRSq History, Oct - Dec 69

DATE: 6 Oct 69

13 October 1969

Supporting Document 3

MISSION NUMBER: 2-3-061-6 Oct 69 (Part 2 of 2 Parts)

FLIGHT DESIGNATION: King 2 Report

DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT: Knife 61 & 62 (CH-3 Helicopters)

LOCATION: 122/92/89, XDO95279

SAVES: 56 Combat (48 Indigenous, 8 American)

1. (C) After takeoff from Udorn, we proceeded to the SAR scene, arriving in the area at 0640Z. Sandy 1 & 2, Sandy 3 & 4, Jolly Green 36 & 19, and Jolly Green 71 & 72 were on scene, with Sandy 1 acting as on-scene-commander. Nail 29 was acting as the FAC putting in air strikes on enemy troops.

2. (C) At 0700Z we descended and refueled Jolly Green 19 & 36, giving them each 2,000 lb of fuel. Refueling completed at 0729Z. At this time King 1 was Bingo fuel and RTB. Minutes prior, Blue Chip (we understand) made the decision that only Americans and wounded were to be picked up, leaving approximately 47 troops on the ground. This decision was questioned by both King 1 and 2. Because all personnel on the ground was felt to be tantamount to condemning them to certain capture or death. It was also felt by all forces on scene that when a chopper did set down that it would be overwhelmed by the survivors and that it would be impossible to deny them entry due to sheer weight of numbers. This later proved to be the case. At this time Joker ordered Jolly Green 71 & 72 to RTB to Channel 89. This was also questioned due to the need of backup helicopters should something happen to disable Jolly Green 19 & 36. Joker again ordered the RTB of 71 & 72 and they left the area.

3. (C) At 0930Z, after several airstrikes in the area, Sandy 1 began to move the forces in for a pickup attempt. The plan was for Jolly Green 19 to go in and pickup the Americans and wounded and Jolly Green 36 to provide cover. While moving in, personnel were observed on the road approximately 1 mile north of the crash site. While we attempted to identify these personnel the Jolly Greens exited the area. After lengthy discussions with, Smokey (AIRA Savanakhhet), and Top Hat, a ground advisor to friendly troops, it was determined that these were not friendly troops approaching. More flights of fast and slow movers were put in, sometimes striking to within 10 meters of the survivors. At 0940Z Knife 61 reported a lull in enemy activity and the Jolly Greens moved in for another attempt. At this time Jolly Green 36 reported a serious hydraulic leak in his transmission and that he would have to RTB immediately.

DECLASSIFIED

39-69-175

~~SECRET~~

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year interval
Declassified after 12 years

39th AFGS History, Oct - Dec 69 Supporting Document

83

Jolly Green 19 said he would remain in the area if we could provide top cover for him. Helicopter PFH, Air America, was monitoring SAR UHF frequency and immediately offered his help. As 19 and PFH moved in and 19 went into a hover, 19 began receiving ground fire, taking hits, losing a generator and pulling out. Sandy 3 & 4 were designated to escort 19 and 36 back to CH 89, since they were out of ordinance.

4. Sandy 5 & 6 and 7 & 8 arrived on scene at 1000Z. Sandy 7 was designated as On-Scene-Commander. Fortunately Jolly Green 71 and 72 arrived on scene at 1015Z, being relaunched from CH 89. Sandy 1 was Bingo fuel and RTB after briefing Sandy 7. At 1035Z, Sawdust 40 thru 43, CBU 19 equipped aircraft, were moved into the area and expended. Sandy 5 thru 8 formed their protective daisy chain and continually expended while Jolly Green 71 & 72 moved in. As Jolly Green 71 set down at the crash site he was overwhelmed by 47 indigenous and 5 Americans who somehow managed to board the helicopter. As Jolly Green 71 pulled out, Knife 61B came up on guard and announced that he and his two companions would also like a ride out. Jolly Green 72 immediately came in and picked up the last three survivors. Knife 61B later said that all people who were alive had been picked up.

5. After the pickup, Sandy 7 decided to destroy the one remaining Knife helicopter, the other one had been hit by enemy mortar fire and was burning fiercely. After the chopper had been disabled, all forces departed.

6. (U) Resumé of forces:

Available Fighters Not Used	Fighters Expended	Other Forces
Simmer (F-4)	Marlin (F-105)	Helicopter PFH
Shako (F-4)	Spad 40 (A-1)	Raven 31
Bass (F-4)	Sandy 1-4 (A-1)	Nail 29
Magic Stone (Unk)	Sandy 5-8 (A-1)	
Gar Fish (F-4)	Sawdust 40-43 (A-1)	
Banyon (F-4)		
Eagle Green (T-28)		

7. (U) Crewmembers:

AMC Cpt Harris	FE TSgt Tucker
AC Lt Col LaDou	FE SSgt Shorey
CP Maj Riggert	LM MSgt Hauglie
N Cpt Bonck	RO Sgt Roland

John A. Harris

JOHN A. HARRIS, Captain, USAF
Airborne Mission Commander

DECLASSIFIED

39-69-135

SECRET

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified at or 12 years

DET 1, 40th ARRS CY 4/69 = HH-3's NKP

CHAPTER II

Operations and Training

Operations

(S) (GP 3) The good weather and resultant clear skies of the dry season brought a marked increase in combat activity during October, November and December. Our activity increased proportionally. Detachment One made fourteen combat saves, one non-combat rescue and one medical evacuation during this period. Det 1 was tasked with maintaining 15 minute alert two days out of three, flying the last two and a half hours of daylight on airborne alert in the November Orbit area, with the 40th ARRS from Udorn taking the third day. On that third day the 40th ARRS would send two HH-53s to this station at first light and they would be on 15 minute alert until the last two and a half hours of daylight, when they would fly airborne alert in the November Orbit area and recover at their home station. Det 1 was on 30 minute back-up alert on this day. Det 1 was also tasked with one of its HH-3E's on 45 minute alert during the hours of darkness for in-country rescues and medical evacuation missions. Due to mechanical difficulties encountered with the HH-53 and battle damage incurred on two HH-53s during the Boxer 22 mission, Det 1 HH-3Es were often required to fill in for the HH-53s on that third day.

(S) (Gp 3) Det 1, 40 ARRS was the scene of operations and staging area for three significant missions during this quarter. Our HH-3E, Jolly Green 19, attempted to make a pickup of Knife 61 and 62, downed by hostile ground fire at Muong Phine, Laos on 6 Oct. He received extensive damage from hostile ground fire as he was attempting to land there to rescue the aircrews and was forced to depart the area and return to base. Two HH-53s from 40th ARRS here on back-up alert were launched and after delivery of considerable ordnance by Sandy and Hobo aircraft, were able to effect a rescue of the eight aircrew members and a large number of indigenous personnel. They recovered here at our base. Two of the recovered aircrew had been wounded.

(S) (Gp 3) On the second significant mission HH-53s from the 40th ARRS at Udorn were launched from our station to back-up 37th ARRS HH-3Es engaged in a mission on Misty 11 on 24 Oct. HH-53s were staged out of our facilities here during that SAR mission. This mission is covered later in Combat Saves.

(S) (Gp 3) The third significant rescue effort and the most extensive and costly to date was the Boxer 22 mission on 5, 6 and 7th of Dec. Our HH-3Es, Jolly Green 37 and 09 were the initial Jolly Greens to go on the mission. The two Boxer 22 pilots were downed near Ban Phan Hop, Laos, a very heavily defended area near the North Vietnamese border. HH-53s, Jolly Green 76 and 72 were launched from Udorn directly to a near-by holding point to back-up Jolly Greens 37 and 09. HH-53s, Jolly Green 77 and 69 were sent to be staged out of this base, but were needed prior to landing here and continued on to the SAR area. Jolly Green 37 started in for a rescue attempt, but was called off due to intense antiaircraft fire. Jolly Green 09 then made an attempt at a rescue but received intense ground fire and hastily evacuated the area.

40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

6

This has also been a period of marked increase in rescue activity. The month of October started the dry season in South East Asia, making infiltration routes passable once again. The resupplying of the anti-aircraft positions made possible by the improving travel conditions was the primary reasons for this increase. The following paragraphs enlarge upon the missions we had.

The first real rescue of the quarter was a first light effort on 2 October.⁴ A Navy A-4 pilot bailed out at 121/102/89.⁵ The effort was marred by the crash of an A-1 aircraft on the runway at NKP during the scramble. Bad communications with the survivor also contributed to the difficulty encountered in this mission. The UHF Guard radio was lost on the low bird⁶ as he made his approach to the survivor but a successful pickup was finally made by the high bird. The survivor was taken to NKP in excellent shape.

The mission of 6 October has to be the most unusual one of the 40th's history.⁷ After two Ch-3 helicopters were brought down by hostile ground fire at 124/95/89⁸ the BUFFS went in and picked up forty six (46) foreign military personnel and

4. Mission Narrative 2-3-060, page 52

5. Gazeteer, page 17

6. Most SAR missions are flown with two HH-53 aircraft. The high bird covers the pickup aircraft (low bird) in case he is forced down.

7. Mission Narrative 2-3-061, page 55

8. Gazeteer, page 17

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

7

eight (8) USAF crew members. Forty three (43) of the forty six people rescued were brought out by the low bird. This is an undisputed record for the HH-53 aircraft.

Another unique mission occurred on 8 October when three downed crew members were rescued by the combined efforts of two BUFRS.⁹ The Jolly Greens were scrambled to a position 66 miles on the 340° radial of Ch 72¹⁰ where the low bird picked up the two crew members of an OV-10. The most important event of these two pickups occurred during the second rescue when the electrical control of the hoist was shot out and the Flight Engineer had to complete the hoist operation manually.¹¹ Because of the damaged hoist the high bird was called in to pick up the back seater of the downed F-4. This survivor was hanging upside down by his ankle in the trees and the Pararescuemen (PJ) had to go down the hoist to bring him up.

The only unsuccessful rescue attempt of the quarter for the BUFRS occurred on 24 October.¹² The BUFRS were scrambled to a point 25 miles on the 055° radial of Ch 72¹³ where the two crewmembers of a F-100 had bailed out. A HH-3E from Ch 89¹³ had already made a pickup attempt but was driven off

9. Mission Narrative 2-3-062, page 57

10. Gazeteer, page 17

11. Under normal conditions the hydraulic system of the hoist is controlled electrically. If this system is lost, a manual hydraulic backup system can be used.

12. Mission Narrative 1-3-079, page 61

13. Gazeteer, page 17

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

Sandy Coordinator

SAR Report (Knife 61, 62) (B)

56800g (030)

1. (S) A successful rescue was conducted on the 6th of October for Knife 61 and Knife 62. The aircraft, two CH-3 helicopters, went down at 1115 hours on 6 October 1969 at Muong Phine, a short takeoff and landing (S.T.O.L.) airstrip located at X0094233. This report covers those activities relating to the Sandys during the rescue effort.

2. (S) The Knife helicopters were engaged in an infil of friendly indigenous troops to support friendly operations in the Muong Phine area. They had been using this S.T.O.L. airstrip for a landing zone (L.Z.) for three days in support of the Junction City Operation. Normally, friendly troops were in position around the L.Z. before the helicopter came in for landing. On 6 October, friendly troops had not reached the landing zone. After several low passes over the airstrip; an aircraft, "Montana", indicated that the situation appeared normal and advised to proceed with the landing. Hobo 22 and 23, two A-1 escort aircraft, led the first helicopter into L.Z. Nothing appeared unusual until Knife 61 was about to touchdown. At that point, very accurate machine gun fire hit one of his engines. A go-around was attempted but was impossible. Knife 61 crash landed on the runway at approximately 1115. Knife 61 reported ground fire from the northwest. The escort aircraft struck this area. After multiple passes on the enemy position, Hobo 22 made several low passes down the runway and no ground fire was reported. Assuming that the resistance was sporadic and had been silenced, an attempt was made by Knife 62 to pickup the crew of Knife 61. As Knife 62 went into a hover, heavy and accurate fire from the south hit his engines and the second helicopter was also forced to crash land. Eight USAF aircrewmembers and 52 indigenous troops were down.

3. (S) At 1200 hours, Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 were ordered on cockpit alert. The Sandys were airborne and enroute to the scene at 1215 hours. They arrived on scene at 1300 hours. Hobo 22, 23, 24, and 25 were already on scene with Nail 29 as the supporting FAC. In addition to the above, the following aircraft were involved: 4 A-4's, 3 F-4's, 1 F-100, 3 F-105's, 18 A-1's, 2 HH-3's, and 2 HH-53's.

DECLASSIFIED

DCO-88 0120

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

4. (S) The landing zone was the Eastern portion of a 500' S.T.O.L. airstrip. The airstrip is located to the west southwest of the intersection of Roads 23 and 9. To the north, east, and west of the road were dense trees and heavy foliage. The southern boundary was a river with a thick tree line along the banks. The survivors had taken up a position in the open at the east end of the strip between the two downed helicopters. The hostile forces had previously constructed trench and bunker positions in the treeline surrounding the airstrip. It was from these positions that small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, and rockets were being fired into the survivors' position. The distance to this treeline varied but was approximately 75 meters to the north, 40 meters to the east, 75 meters to the south, and 200 meters to the west. Mortars were being fired from the dense trees northeast and west during the effort. The original weather was approximately 10,000' overcast with occasional light rain. This deteriorated to 2500' overcast. Visibility was somewhat reduced in the showers but remained workable for the most part.

5. (S) Prior to the arrival of the Sandy's Hobo22 was "on-scene commander." Nail 29 was acting as a FAC. Nail 29 directed some jet strikes. After Knife (2) was shot down, strikes were continued based on directions received from the survivors on the ground.

6. (S) The Sandy's received a thorough briefing from Hobo 22. This briefing identified the position and numbers of the survivors, the direction of the last incoming fire, and UHF Channels in use. King designated Sandy 01 as the "on-scene commander" at 1315 hours. Since ground fire was still incoming from three of the L.Z.'s four sides, the area obviously required much more ordnance. Sandy 01 requested more resources from King. Nail 29 was well versed in the situation and continued to put resources in at Sandy 01's direction. Although each series of strikes temporarily silenced the ground fire in one area, ground fire immediately started from another area. Sandy 01 prepared to move the helicopter closer several times only to have ground fire begin again. After each series of strikes, enemy soldiers would move closer to the positions of Knife 61 and 62 utilizing foxholes and entrenched positions inside the treelines. Sandy 01 requested soft ordnance capable of pinpoint delivery close to the survivors' position. Specifically, Sandy 01 asked King for A-1's loaded with CSU-14 and rockets. As Sandy 01 prepared to request use of CBU-19 (Sawdust), his alternatives were further limited. First, the two HH-53 helicopters launched to support the effort were withdrawn. The reason for this was not known to the on-scene force.

a. Information available at the Wing Command Post was that the indigenous force was directed to be left overnight to secure the airstrip, consequently the rescue was directed by higher authority to be limited to the two downed helicopter crews. Then, Jolly Green 36 had to return to base with mechanical problems. This prevented the use of sawdust because all 60 men could not be recovered with one HH-53.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DCO-88 0193

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Nor could they be left incapacitated by the CHU-19 and at the mercy of the enemy. The expected reaction of the friendly indigenous survivors if only one small helicopter landed was unknown. Because he had only one helicopter available, Sandy 01 had to positively ascertain through "Montana," that the indigenous troops knew and accepted the fact that only the American and indigenous wounded were to be picked up when the single helicopter came in to land. Since there was no interpreter on the ground, it required almost an hour to obtain confirmation. Montana reported that other friendly troops in the area were moving to reinforce the indigenous survivors. At this time, the ground fire slackened except for one area to the northeast at the junction of the two roads. In this area, men appeared in the open during one of the lulls as if they were the friendlies trying to join forces. However, once the survivors on the ground exposed their position, these troops began to fire on the friendlies. Rockets and mortar rounds now landed with increased accuracy on the known position of the survivors. Sandy 01 and 02 delivered CHU-14 and rockets to the northeast within 30 meters of the friendlies. This silenced the area. After a strike to the east on mortar positions, Knife 61 reported that all was quiet. After trolling on many passes and receiving no fire, Sandy 01 still felt it was not fully secure, but Jolly Green 19 was within 10 minutes of his bingo fuel time. Sandy 01 decided to bring in Jolly Green 19, who was briefed to come in high over the two downed helicopters and to let down between them. Because of the fire which had come from the Northeast, he elected to set down on the western-most portion of the airstrip. As he was about to touch down, a heavy machine gun opened up from the northwest. Jolly Green 19 pulled out to the west suffering several hits. At this time, mortar and small arms fire began to rake the survivors position. Sandy 01 again requested soft ordnance. Sandy 01 also requested more helicopters, Sawdust, and replacements for Sandys 01 through 04 who were low on fuel and ordnance. Jolly Green 19 reported that he had everything under control and that he did not need an escort to Channel 89. Sandy 07 and 08 arrived at 1700. Sandy 01 briefed Sandy 07 who became on-scene commander. Sandys 01 through 04 then expended the rest of their ordnance and returned to Channel 89. The situation when Sandy 07 took over as on-scene commander was critical. Enemy forces were firing at the survivors from the east, south, and west. At 1710, Knife 61 reported to Sandy 07 that two Americans had just been wounded. At that time, Jolly Green 71 and 72 were enroute to the scene and Sandy 05 and 06 were escorting them. Sandy 07 immediately requested that Sawdust aircraft be launched to be available if more Sawdust was needed. The earlier flights were getting low on fuel. Sandy 07 and 08 made low passes on the enemy positions. They delivered CHU-14 and rockets, and strafed to within 20 feet of the survivors who continually requested even closer ordnance delivery. Knife 61 called fire from all points of the compass and a mortar round hit one of the downed helicopters. The helicopter burned and was completely destroyed. After each of the passes by Sandy 07 and 08, Knife 61 would report all quiet. However, after several minutes, he would again report incoming fire. Apparently the

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

DOC-68-413

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

enemy's strength was such that as each wave would be silenced by Sandy 07 and 03, a new wave would move into position. With darkness only 30 minutes away, there was no time for further delay in attempting a rescue. Sandy 07 believed that if the rescue was not made by midnight the enemy would overrun the survivors position. Sandy 07 assigned Sandust 40 as the Sandust flight commander and briefed him to lay down four strips of Sandust forming a box around the survivors' position. As soon as Jolly Green 71 and 72 reached their holding point to the east, Sandy 07 briefed them to make their approach from the northeast and land between the two downed CH-35. When all forces were in position, Sandy 07 cleared Sandust 40 in and picked up Jolly Green 71 in his orbit to the east. Initially, Sandy 07 provided voice instructions to Jolly Green 71. As the helicopter approached the L.Z., Knife 61 provided directions. The four Sandust aircraft laid the CH-19 perfectly and all four Sandys joined in laying suppressive fire on all sides of the L.Z. Jolly 71 was on the ground approximately two minutes. He then exited the area to the northeast. Knife 628 came up on the radio as Jolly 71 expressed the area and informed Sandy 07 that three Americans had been left behind in the rush of the indigenous troops to board the helicopter. Sandy 07 called in Jolly Green 72. With no hesitation, Jolly Green 72 made his approach and landing. The Sandys kept up constant ordnance delivery around the L.Z. Jolly Green 72 was on the ground less than one minute. At 1755, all SAR forces were safely out of the area and enroute to Channel 89. A total of 46 indigenous and eight American survivors had been recovered. Knife 628 was the last man to leave the L.Z. and reported that no one alive was left. Approximately six indigenous dead were left behind.

7. (3) The difficulties encountered by the Sandy forces were as follows:

a. The initial withdrawal of the HH-53 helicopters coupled with mechanical difficulties and battle damage to the HH-3's resulted in a span of 30 minutes when no helicopters were on scene.

b. The failure of attempts to obtain soft ordnance almost resulted in the friendly positions being overrun before the rescue could be completed.

c. Lack of communication with indigenous troops on the ground and uncertainty as to their actions in the event only one helicopter landed were delaying factors.

d. There was no method of distinguishing between friendly and hostile forces on the ground.

e. The tactics and discipline of the enemy forces were effective. The enemy held his fire until the helicopters were in a vulnerable position and then fired accurately.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOC-69 015

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

f. The enemy showed tenacity in repeatedly attacking the survivors, even in the face of heavy casualties inflicted by overwhelming air strikes.

8. (3) Based on experience gained during this recovery, the following recommendations are made:

a. The lack of current and accurate intelligence on friendly and enemy strength and disposition not only generated the SAR originally but also complicated the subsequent rescue attempt. Recommendations on procedures for improved intelligence are highly sensitive in nature and have been addressed in separate correspondence.

b. Delay in transmitting the on-scene commander's requests for soft ordnance were excessive. Although the operational command channels for military activity in this area were complex, improved procedures for passing such requests in a more timely manner are needed.

c. The intelligence uncertainties about friendly/enemy strengths and dispositions further delayed the final decision to expend CBW-19. It is recommended that CBW-19 equipped aircraft be launched concurrent with the rescue aircraft when an exposed SAR of this magnitude develops. Four rather than two CBW-19 aircraft should be generated and launched simultaneously.

d. Withdrawal of reserve rescue helicopters should not be made until the rescue has been completed.

9. (C) Sandy forces who participated in this effort were as follows:

- Sandy 01 Major Monk
- 02 Capt Bischoff
- 03 Major Moffatt
- 04 Lt Bertrand
- 05 Major Dayton
- 06 Lt Monin
- 07 Capt Hudson
- 08 Lt George

Darryl E. Tripp

DARRELL E. TRIPP, Colonel, USAF
Sandy Coordinator

Cy to: 7AF (DO)
7/13AF (DO)

DECLASSIFIED

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DDO-69 018

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

8,9,10

V. NARRATIVE

On 30 September 1969 aircraft 67-14721 incurred battle damage which caused it to crash in the Planne de Jarres near LIMA Site 98. From 1 October through 3 October it was stripped of all unnecessary weight and on 3 October it was moved to LIMA Site 98 by a US Army CH-54 Flying Crane. On 4 October Major Bruce L. Athon, Captain Fred A. Berger, SSgt Roy O. Adams and Sgt William J. Costello from the FOL escorted the Army CH-54 crane back to LIMA Site 98 (20A) in an effort to return the crippled helicopter to Udorn RTAFB. Due to turbulence causing severe oscillation of the helicopters, the Army crew was forced to jettison the CH-3 5.6 miles south of LIMA Site 98, resulting in its complete destruction. During the hookup at LIMA Site 98, the CH-3 was blown off its shoring, forcing Sgt Costello to jump from the helicopter and break his arm.

On 1 October 1969, Major Henry M. Enterline, Captain Wayne R. Bevan, Sgt Jack C. Barber and SSgt Harry M. Spivey on a TACAN support mission to channel 99 were diverted by King to rescue a downed Misty FAC, but the pickup was made by an HH-3.

On 3 October Major Robert R. Arnau, Lt Col William C. Hartman, TSgt Maurice D. Stagers and TSgt Homer L. Ramsey were low bird in a flight of three CH-3's on an emergency exfiltration of a forward reconnaissance team. The team had been under hostile fire, but Spads suppressed it before the helicopter went in to make the pickup and the aircraft received no hits. On the same day, six Knife helicopters transported 201 Laotian troops and 13,550 pounds of cargo from the SGU Camp to Muong Phine.

The next day, 6 October, Major Claret D. Taylor, Lt Col Theodore D. Silva, MSgt Kenneth G. Reynolds and SSgt Clarence W. Cossiboom were shot down on an almost identical mission carrying twenty-six Laotian troops from a LIMA Site, Northeast of Saravan to Muong Phine. The FAC and the A-1's had both flown low over the landing zone and although the troops which were supposed to be there were not, it was deemed safe to land. Major Taylor was just approaching a hover when ground fire struck the aircraft. An immediate departure was attempted, but the aux servo and the number one engine had been shot out and the single engine capability was inadequate. Major Taylor bent the helicopter around in a tight 360° turn to set it back down on the original site. The helicopter was evacuated and air strikes commenced to protect the downed helicopter crew.

Major Philip J. Conran, Captain Peter L. Costa, TSgt Homer L. Ramsey, and TSgt Wilburn T. Franklin in the second helicopter orbited until fuel became critical. Ground fire had practically ceased and Major Conran reasoned, in spite of having an unarmed helicopter, that the best course of action would be to go in and let off his twenty-six Laotian troops and try to get the other crew out. In that way there would be fifty-two troops on

-
- 8. Ops-6 Report
 - 9. Letters of Appreciation
 - 10. Forms 642

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

the ground to hold off the enemy. A most probable safe route in was decided upon by Major Conran and the Hobos, but the helicopter began taking hits as he started the final approach. The primary servo was shot out on the approach and as the other crew was entering the helicopter, the transmission oil was shot out. The helicopter was evacuated and Major Conran and MSgt Reynolds primarily set up a defensive perimeter with the Laotians while Lt Col Silva and Maj Taylor acted as ground FAC's directing air strikes. Learning that the M-60's were still on the lead helicopter, Maj Conran took a Laotian and fetched them back to the defensive perimeter in spite of the hostile fire. One had jammed in the air and was unusable; the other jammed after 750 rounds due to the mud and dirt.

The SAR effort was initiated and continued for approximately six hours until finally "sawdust" was used in a final attempt to get the crews out before nightfall. In the middle of the afternoon, an HH-3 piloted by Captain Langham of the 40th ARRS, Det 1, landed to attempt a pickup, but received numerous hits in the engine and transmission area and was forced to depart due to the battle damage before a rescue could be accomplished. During the afternoon, Lt Col Silva was wounded in the back dangerously close to his spine and Major Conran received a leg wound. An HH-53 Buff piloted by Captain Bell of the 40th ARRS was the first to be able to land and rescue personnel. All the Laotian troops rushed into the rear of the helicopter leaving the Americans to go to the side door well above the ground. Sgt McFarr and Sgt Moran, the PJ's, provided covering fire while the wounded were helped aboard. The 54 survivors picked up by Captain Bell established a USAF record for the number of personnel to be rescued by one helicopter. With the heavily loaded helicopter, Captain Costa, Sgt Ramsey and Sgt Cossiboom were inadvertently left behind on the ground. Learning of the three Americans still on the ground, Capt Nelson in the second HH-53 immediately came down and picked them up. Thanks to the intensive efforts of the 40th ARRS, the 1st SOS and numerous other units, all crewmembers were returned safely. The wounded were med-evaced to Udorn by Captain Leslie Swanson and Lt Col Hulbert Weitzel. For his heroic actions that day, Major Conran was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor. The rest of the crewmembers were recommended for Silver Stars.

The support mission to carry Laotian troops from the SGU camp to Muong Phine on 7 October was cancelled.

Major James C. Hughes, Lt Col William C. Girard, TSgt Charles B. Maxwell and SSgt Harvey A. Meltzer completed an emergency medical evacuation from "B" Comp., 809th Bat on 8 Oct. On 9 Oct four Knife CH-3's transported 169 Laotian troops and 1200 pounds of cargo from the SGU camp to Muang Phalang.

On 12 October Captain Aubrey M. Culp, Lt Col Hulbert F. Weitzel, SSgt Lawrence M. Dreyer and SSgt Clarence W. Cossiboom were low bird in a flight of three which successfully completed an emergency exfiltration of a forward reconnaissance team from a landing zone requiring a fifteen foot hover at 4300 feet pressure altitude and 21°C outside air temperature. The weather was so poor that only one A-1 was able to go down with the helicopter and the FAC. It was later determined that the rescue was possible only because they were riding a 20 knot wind. For his outstanding airmanship, Capt Culp was recommended for a Distinguished Flying Cross.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

the area was one kilometer northeast of point Delta on the main route structure. However, the survivor's actual location was on a ridge line running east to west four kilometers southwest of Tchepone or 52NM SSE of the briefed area. The actual terrain was predominately high rolling hills covered by jungle foliage.⁵⁵

(S) War Ace 300 was finally picked up by Jolly Green 70 at 0845 hours. This was a delay of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ hours due to an indefinite fix on the survivor's location. In order that time could be saved in a SAR effort, it was suggested that an aircraft with direction finding capability be diverted or launched to pinpoint the survivor's location during the hours of darkness.⁵⁶

(S) Further details of the SAR effort for War Ace 300 can be found in the Rescue Narrative Report which is included as supporting document 44.

(S/NF) Another successful rescue was conducted for Knife 61 and 62 on 6 October. The aircraft, two CH-3 helicopters, went down at 1115 hours at Muong Phine, a short takeoff and landing (STOL) airstrip located at XD094233.⁵⁷

(S) At 1200 hours, Sandy 01, 02, 03, and 04 were ordered on cockpit alert. The Sandys were airborne and

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

34

enroute to the scene at 1215 hours. They arrived on scene at 1300 hours and joined Hobo 22, 23, 24, and 25 who were already there with Nail 29 as the supporting FAC. In addition to the above, the following aircraft were involved: four A-4's; three F-4's; one F-100; three F-105's; eighteen A-1's; two HH-3's; and two HH-53's.⁵⁸

(S) The landing zone was the eastern portion of a 500 foot STOL airstrip. The airstrip is located to the west southwest of the intersection of Routes 23 and 9. Dense trees and heavy foliage covered the area to the north, east and west of the road. The southern boundary was a river with a thick tree line along the banks. The choppers were unloading friendly indigenous troops for an infil mission. Both choppers took hits from a well-planned enemy ambush and crashed in a clear area close to the STOL strip. The survivors took up a position in the open at the east end of the strip between the two downed helicopters.⁵⁹

(S) Prior to the arrival of the Sandy's, Hobo 22 was on-scene commander while Nail 29 directed some jet strikes. After Knife 62 was shot down, strikes were continued based on directions received from the survivors on the ground.⁶⁰

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

(S) The Sandy's received a thorough briefing from Hobo 22. This briefing identified the position and numbers of the survivors, the direction of the last incoming fire, and UHF channels in use. Since ground fire was still incoming from three of the LZ's four sides, the area required much more ordnance. Nail 29 was well versed in the situation and continued to put resources in at Sandy 01's direction. Several times, Sandy 01 tried to move in helicopters only to be⁶¹ met by ground fire.

(S) As Sandy 01 prepared to request use of CBU-19 (Sawdust), his alternatives were further limited. First, the two HH-53 helicopters launched to support the effort were withdrawn. The reason for this was not known to the⁶² on-scene force. '

(S) Information available at the Wing Command Post was that the indigenous force was directed to be left overnight to secure the airstrip, consequently the rescue was directed by higher authority to be limited to the two downed helicopter crews. Then, Jolly Green 36 had to return to base with mechanical problems. This prevented the use of CBU-19 because all 60 men could not be recovered by one HH-3. Nor

could they be left incapacitated by the CBU-19 and at the
63
mercy of the enemy.

(S) With only one helicopter available, Sandy 01 had to positively ascertain through "MONTANA" that the indigenous troops knew and accepted the fact that only the American and indigenous wounded were to be picked up when the single helicopter came in to land. Since there was no interpreter on the ground, it required almost an hour to obtain
64
confirmation.

(S) Sandy 07 and 08 arrived on scene at 1700 hours. Sandy 01 through 04 then expended the rest of their ordnance and returned to Channel 89. The situation when Sandy 07 took over as on-scene commander was critical. Enemy forces were firing at the survivors from the east, west and south. At 1710, Knife 61 reported to Sandy 07 that two Americans had just been wounded. At that time, Jolly Green 71 and 72 were enroute to the scene and Sandy 05 and 06 were escort-
65
ing them.

(S) After putting in more ordnance and with darkness only 30 minutes away, there was no time for further delay in attempting a rescue. Sandy 07 believed that if the rescue was not made by nightfall the enemy would overrun
66
the survivors position.

(S) Sandy 07 assigned Sawdust 40 as the Sawdust flight commander and briefed him to lay down four strips of Sawdust forming a box around the survivor's position. As soon as Jolly Green 71 and 72 reached their holding point to the east, Sandy 07 briefed them to make their approach from the northeast and land between the two downed CH-3s.⁶⁷

(S) Jolly 71 was on the ground approximately two minutes. He then exited the area to the northeast. Knife 62B came up on radio as Jolly 71 egressed the area and informed Sandy 07 that three Americans had been left behind in the rush of indigenous troops to board the helicopter.⁶⁸

(S) Sandy 07 called in Jolly 72. With no hesitation, Jolly 72 made his approach and landing and was on the ground less than one minute. At 1755, all SAR forces were safely out of the area and enroute to Channel 89. A total of 46 indigenous and eight American survivors had been recovered. Knife 62B was the last man to leave the LZ and reported that no one alive was left.⁶⁹

(S) The difficulties encountered by the Sandy forces were as follows:⁷⁰

a. The initial withdrawal of the HH-53 helicopters coupled with mechanical difficulties and battle damage to the HH-3s resulted in a span of 30 minutes when no helicopters were on the scene.

b. The failure to obtain soft ordnance almost resulted in the friendly positions being overrun before the rescue could be completed.

c. Lack of communications with indigenous troops on the ground and uncertainty as to their reactions in the event only one helicopter landed were delaying factors.

d. There was no method of distinguishing between friendly and hostile forces on the ground.

e. The tactics and discipline of the enemy forces were effective. The enemy held his fire until the helicopters were in a vulnerable position and then fired accurately.

f. The enemy showed tenacity in repeatedly attacking the survivors, even in the face of heavy casualties inflicted by overwhelming airstrikes.

(S) Based on experience gained during this recovery,
71
the following recommendations were made:

a. The lack of current and accurate intelligence on friendly and enemy strength and disposition not only generated the SAR originally but also complicated the subsequent rescue attempt.

b. Delay in transmitting the on-scene commander's request for soft ordnance were excessive. Although the operational command channels for military activity in this area

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

39

were complex, improved procedures for passing such requests in a more timely manner were needed.

c. The intelligence uncertainties about friendly/enemy strengths and dispositions further delayed the final decision to expend CBU-19. It was recommended that aircraft equipped with CBU-19 be launched concurrent with the rescue aircraft when an opposed SAR of this magnitude develops. Four, rather than two, CBU-19 aircraft should be generated and launched simultaneously.

d. Withdrawal of reserve rescue helicopters should not be made until the rescue has been completed.

(U) Further details of this SAR effort can be found in the 21st Special Operations Historical report, Appendix V, Tab B; and Rescue Narrative report, which is attached as support document 46.

(S) Two days later, on 8 October, another successful SAR was conducted for Nail 07A and B plus Boxer 61B. Nail 07, an Ov-10, went down at 0653Z and Boxer 61B bailed out at approximately 0645Z.⁷²

(S) Boxer 61B bailed out after his aircraft experienced battle damage. "KING" initially received word of Boxer 61B's bailout and directed Nail 07 to the rescue area to search

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

2150w HIST

84

DECLASSIFIED

Maj. Bruce L. Athon, Capt. Fred A. Berger, SSgt. Roy O. Adams and Sgt. William J. Costello from the FOL at Udorn RTAFB escorted the Army CH-54 crane back to Lima Site 98 (20A) in an effort to return the crippled helicopter to
142
Udorn RTAFB.

(S) Turbulence enroute caused severe oscillation of the helicopters, and the Army crew was forced to jettison the CH-3 5.6 miles south of the Lima Site, resulting in its complete destruction. During the hookup at Lima Site 98, the CH-3 blew off its shoring, and Sergeant Costello was forced to jump from the helicopter. The fall
143
broke his arm.

(S) Maj. Robert R. Arnau, Lt. Col. William C. Hartman, Technical Sergeants Maurice D. Stagers and Homer E. Ramsey were low bird in a flight of three CH-3s on an emergency exfiltration of a forward reconnaissance team on 3 October. The team had been under hostile fire, but Spads suppressed it before the helicopters went in to make the pickup and the aircraft took no hits. On the same day, six Knife helicopters transported 201 Laotian troops and 13,550 pounds of cargo from the SGU camp at Muong Phine.

(S) On 6 October, Lt. Col. Theodore D. Silva, squadron commander; Maj. Claret D. Taylor, MSgt. Kenneth G. Reynolds

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

85

and SSgt. Clarence W. Cossiboom were shot down on an almost identical mission as the one stated in the previous paragraph. The team carried 26 Laotian troops from a Lima Site northeast of Saravan to Muong Phine.

(S) The FAC and A-1s had both flown low over the landing zone and although the troops which were supposed to be there were not, it was deemed safe to land. Major Taylor was just approaching a hover when ground fire struck the aircraft. An immediate departure was attempted, but the aux servo and the number one engine had been shot out and the single engine capability was inadequate. Major Taylor bent the helicopter around in a tight 360 degree turn to set it back down on the original site. The helicopter was evacuated and air strikes commenced to protect the downed helicopter crew.

(S) Maj. Philip J. Conran, Capt. Peter L. Costa, and Technical Sergeants Ramsey and Wilburn T. Franklin in the second helicopter orbitted until fuel was critical. Ground fire had practically ceased and Major Conran reasoned, in spite of having an unarmed helicopter, that the best course of action would be to go in and let off his 26 Laotian troops and try to get the other crew out. In that way there would be 52 troops on the ground to hold off the enemy.

~~SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

86

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

(S) A most probable safe route in was decided upon by Major Conran and the Hobos, but the helicopter took hits as he started the final approach. The primary servo was shot out on the approach and as the other crew entered the helicopter, the transmission oil was shot out. The helicopter was evacuated and Major Conran and Sergeant Reynolds set up a defensive perimeter with the Laotians while Colonel Silva and Major Taylor acted as ground FACs directing air strikes.

(S) Learning that the M-60s were still on the lead helicopter, Major Conran took a Laotian and fetched them back to the defensive perimeter in spite of the hostile fire. One gun jammed in the air and was unusable and the other jammed after 750 rounds due to the mud and dirt.

(S) A SAR effort was initiated and continued for approximately six hours until finally CBU-19 was used in a final attempt to get the crews out before nightfall. In the middle of the afternoon, an HH-3 piloted by Captain Langham of the 40th AARS, Det 1, landed to attempt a pickup, but received numerous hits in the engine and transmission area and was forced to depart due to battle damage before a rescue could be accomplished.

(S) During the afternoon, Colonel Silva was wounded

~~SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

87

in the back dangerously close to the spine and Major Conran received a leg wound. An HH-53 BUFF piloted by Captain Bell of the 40th ARRS was the first to land and rescue personnel. All the Laotian troops rushed into the rear of the helicopter leaving the Americans to go to the side door ¹⁴⁴ well above the ground.

(S) Sergeants McFarr and Moran, the PJs, provided covering fire while the wounded were helped aboard. The 54 survivors picked up by Captain Bell established a USAF record for the number of personnel to be rescued by one helicopter. With the heavily loaded helicopter, Captain Costa, and Sergeants Ramsey and Cossiboom were inadvertently left behind on the ground. Learning of the three Americans still on the ground, Captain Nelson in the second HH-53 immediately came down and picked them up.

(S) The wounded were medevaced to Udorn RTAFB by Capt. Leslie Swanson and Lt. Col. Hulbert Weitzel. For his heroic actions that day, Major Conran was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor.

(S) On 12 October, Colonel Weitzel, Capt. Aubrey M. Culp, and Staff Sergeants Lawrence M. Dreyer and Cossiboom were low bird in a flight of three which successfully com-

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: 21st Special Ops Sq (C)

27 October 1969

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: 3 Aerosp Resc and Recov Gp (C)

1. We, the members of the 21st SOS, would like to extend our sincere appreciation for the outstanding work completed by 40th ARRS, Det 2 on 6 October 1969. On that date, two of our helicopters and eight of our people were down in enemy territory for a period of about six hours. During this time they were under constant attack from enemy forces of unknown strength. The successful rescue of these eight individuals was a direct result of the highly professional work of your people operating with great courage in close proximity to well trained and equipped enemy troops. The 21st SOS is most grateful to the officers and men of the 40th ARRS, Det 2 and would like to extend to them our thanks and appreciation for a job well done.

2. In particular, the members of the 21st SOS would like to thank Capt Bell and Capt Nelson and their crews who were instrumental in the rescue of Knife 61 and 62. It was through their efforts that one of the most remarkable rescues in the history of ARRS was accomplished successfully. Captain Bell, who was the first HH-53 into the LZ, landed about 50 meters from the survivors. Captain Bell's aircraft was then subjected to intense ground fire, including a mortar barrage. During this period of time, the friendly indigenous force rushed the rear of Captain Bell's helicopter completely blocking the rear ramp. Since access to the aircraft was denied to the 8 Americans they then attempted to enter through the side door. The lower half of this door was in the up position and was used as a mount for the minigun. Lifting the wounded over this door and by the minigun proved to be a difficult task since the opening was located a good 5 to 6 ft from the ground. The Americans handled this in an orderly manner, still it took a considerable amount of time. It is to Captain Bell's credit that he remained in the LZ as long as possible to complete this daring and successful rescue. However, due to the press of bodies at the rear ramp and the loading of wounded at the forward door, it was impossible for 3 Americans to gain entrance to the aircraft and were left behind. Captain Nelson, upon being notified of the presence of the 3 individuals, immediately made an approach into the LZ and landed about 100 meters away from the survivors. Sgt McFarr the PJ immediately jumped off the aircraft to aid the survivors who appeared to be staggering due to the effects of CBU-19. Sgt McFarr provided covering fire with his M-16 until he ran out of ammunition, then aided the survivors into the aircraft. Sgt Moran, who was manning the AFT ramp minigun, saw six hostile troops jump up and attempt to either capture or in some way harm the running and staggering survivors. Through his quick action these hostile troops were incapacitated and the rescue was completed successfully.

. The 21st SOS would, with heart felt gratitude for a debt that can never be repayed, like to thank the 40th ARRS, Det 2 for the professionalism and heroism these crews displayed while under intense hostile fire. With complete disregard for their own personal safety they proved the compassion they have for comrades in dire trouble.



THEODORE D. SILVA, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE (MAC)
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225

28 November 1969



REPLY TO
ATTN: OF:

SUBJECT:

Outstanding Performance and Achievement

TO: 41 ARRWg

1. It is with a full measure of pride that I forward the attached letter of appreciation from Lt Colonel Theodore D. Silva, Commander 21st Special Operations Squadron, USAF, and the letter regarding the outstanding personal conduct of Captain Jackson L. Hudson, 602nd Special Operations Squadron, USAF.
2. I concur with your recommendation concerning Captain Jackson L. Hudson. An Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service Certificate of Achievement is attached for presentation to Captain Hudson. Please extend my special thanks to him for fulfilling the "On Scene Commander" role in such an absolutely outstanding manner.
3. We are all immensely proud of the Rescue Forces that participated in the memorable 6 October 1969 mission. I was privileged to be present at the official mission critique, and there learned first hand of the professional competence exhibited by all Air Force personnel and the soundness of our rescue concepts and procedures.
4. This particular mission represented a true "pay-off" for all the hours spent in unit and individual training, and mission motivation required to successfully accomplish an exceedingly difficult mission. The results are most deserving of special recognition for the personnel who made it possible. Please convey my personal regards to the officers and airmen listed below:

JOLLY GREEN 71

AC Bell, Holly G, Captain
CP Sanderson, Gary F, Captain
FE Hartman, Jack L, SSgt
RS Gargano, Anthony, MSgt
RS Wilson, John E, SSgt
Photographer Whitted, Jeffery L, A1C

JOLLY GREEN 72

AC Nelson, Gary L, Captain
CP Wegman, James H, Captain
FE Lebda, Steven L, SSgt
RS Moran, Jack D, SSgt
RS McFarr, Anthony J, Sgt

Allison C. Brooks

ALLISON C. BROOKS, Brig Gen, USAF 3 Atch
Commander

1. Ltr, Col Silva
2. Ltr, Col Campbell
3. ARRS Cert of Appr 7 wld

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 41ST AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY WING (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96553.



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

41C

8 December 1969

SUBJECT:

Letter of Appreciation

TO:

Commander
3d ARRGp

1. It is a pleasure for me to forward the attached letter from Brigadier General Brooks concerning the impressive rescue mission performed on 6 October 1969 by the crews of "Jolly Green 71" and Jolly Green 72."
2. The actions of both "Jolly Green" crews in pursuing the rescue of Knife 81 and 62 were true examples of our Rescue objective "That Others May Live." These actions should serve as an example of courage for all Rescue personnel to follow.
3. Please give my personal congratulations to both "Jolly Green" crews on the success of their mission.
4. The ARRS Certificate of Appreciation for Captain Jackson L Hudson has been withdrawn from this package and is being forwarded under separate cover.


THOMAS L. SHOCKLEY, Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, ARCCO, 26 Nov 69,
w/2 atch

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 3RD AIRCRAFT RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (HMAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

13 December 1969

TO: Commander, 40th ARRSq

1. It affords me a great deal of professional and personal pride to forward the attached letters from Brigadier General Brooks and Colonel Shockley to the aircrews of Jolly Green 71 and 72 on 6 October 1969.
2. It is a great tribute to these rescuemen that they, through superior performance and valiant disregard for their own safety, successfully effected the pickup of the aircrews and passengers of the two "Knife" helicopters.
3. To the preceeding correspondence I add my sincere congratulations and appreciation to these outstanding men.

Malcolm C. Frazee
MALCOLM C. FRAZEE, Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
Ltr, 41C, 8 Dec 69
w/3 Atchs.



6Oct69#2.jpg
Owner John Wilson

SSgt John Wilson
PJ

MSgt Anthony Gargano
PJ

Capt Gary Sanderson
Co-Pilot

A1C Jeff Whitted
Photog

SSgt Jack Hartman
FE

Capt Holly Boell
Pilot



60CT69# 2

UNCLASSIFIED

40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

39

Crew of high bird on 6 Oct mission. Kneeling from left Capt Gary L. Nelsen, Capt James H. Wegman. Standing from left SSgt Stephen L. LeBeau, TSgt Jack D. Moran, and Sgt Anthony J. McFarr.



6 OCT 69

UNCLASSIFIED

125

40TH ARRSQ HIST, OCT-DEC 1969

37

Crew of low bird on 6 Oct mission. From left MSgt Anthony R. Gargano, Capt Gary F. Sanderson, SSgt John E. Wilson, Capt Holly G. Bell, and SSgt Jack L. Hartman.

COL Philip J. Conran, U.S.A.F.

Citation: Air Force Cross

War: Vietnam War

COLONEL PHILIP J. CONRAN (then Major), For extraordinary heroism in military operations against an opposing armed force as Aircraft Commander of a CH-3E helicopter at a classified location in Southeast Asia on 6 October 1969. On that date, while attempting to rescue the crew of a downed helicopter, Major Conran's aircraft was hit by intense hostile ground fire and he was forced to make a crash landing in the vicinity of the other aircraft. Once on the ground, he successfully evacuated his aircraft and assumed a major role in defending the crash site against an overwhelming hostile force until rescue was possible six hours later. Through his extraordinary heroism, superb airmanship, and aggressiveness in the face of hostile fire, Major Conran reflected the highest credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

Colonel Conran joined the Legion of Valor in 1970 and resides in Southern California. He is the Legion of Valor Adjutant.

FROM: 37(0)

10 Oct 1969

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-078-8 Oct 69)

TO: 37C

3rd ARRGp (JSARC)

IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRESM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 Jun 68.
2. At 0710Z Jolly Green 42, Capt Hoilman Aircraft Commander, was notified by Queen that Boxer 1, an F-4 pilot was downed approximately 297 degrees 25 miles from Channel 77. 0715Z, Jolly Green 42 was airborne enroute to scene. No problems were encountered on the scramble. Enroute to scene, Jolly Green 42 had a gear malfunction in that the nose gear would not retract. After cycling the gear three or four times, it was determined that the malfunction could not be corrected. It was decided this would not interfere with the rescue. At 0716Z Jolly Green 04, Capt Garcia, Aircraft Commander, was airborne as high cover bird for Jolly Green 42. King 6 was contacted and a corrected heading to scene was received. The survivors position was now estimated as 117 degrees 15 miles from Channel 77. This proved to be a fairly accurate fix. At 0724Z voice contact was established between Jolly Green 42 and the survivor. Boxer 1 notified Jolly Green 42 that he had visual contact on the helicopter. 0725Z Jolly Green 42 established visual contact with the survivor, made a low pass and dropped a smoke marker. Another low pass was made and the Rescue Specialist was deployed. The survivor left his raft at this time. Jolly Green 42 then established a hover just downwind of the survivor while the Rescue Specialist prepared the survivor for the pick up. Upon receiving the signal from the Rescue Specialist, a water landing was made and Jolly Green 42 taxied to the survivor. At this time the sea was coming from approximately the three o'clock position, swells were estimated at 6 to 8 ft with a period of approximately 4 seconds. A stable position was established with the survivor and Rescue Specialist at the base of the refueling probe. The Rescue Specialist took hold of the anchor lanyard and wrapped his legs around the ladder. The Flight Engineer took hold of the "horse collar" which the Rescue Specialist had used to tow the survivor, and attempted to bring the survivor aboard the aircraft. At this point high seas washed the survivor and the Rescue Specialist away from the door about 5 feet. They swam back to the door and made a second attempt to board the aircraft. Since the survivor was offering absolutely no assistance, the Flight Engineer was still unable to pull the survivor into the aircraft (the survivor stated afterwards that he had been trained not try to help the rescue crewmembers get him aboard the aircraft). Due to a strong current and rough seas the Rescue Specialist was again unable to hold on to the ladder long enough to get the survivor on board. This time the two were washed under the right sponson, and the aircraft was immediately lifted into a hover. The AC then decided to make the pick up from a hover. Considerable difficulty was encountered hovering over the survivor due to the wind direction, current flow, and rough seas, despite the fact that two hover references were available (smoke and the half-sunk life raft). The wind was in the 10 o'clock position from the aircraft. The sea swells rolled across from the 2 o'clock position and the sea current apparently came from the 7 o'clock