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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SERVICE (AMAR)
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225

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INTERVALS DEC 29 May 1969 DECEMBER

17 SEP 1990

Proposed Changes to the Concept of Operations for Night Rescue Operations
Utilizing the LNRS/NRS System

Hq AERS (ARXDC)

1. This proposal is based upon personal experiences with the weapons that will be described, the operating conditions that existed in RPH at the time of the ceasefire, operating conditions as they exist in Laos today, and night strike procedures as presently practiced by 56 SOW with A-1 and A-1 aircraft. This proposal also assumes that the LNRS and NRS systems work "as advertised". My personal experience in SEA began with transfer from my previous duty as a test pilot at Edwards AFB, Calif to the 602nd SOS at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. There I served as an A-1 strike and rescue support pilot. The unit moved to Nakhon Phanom in July 1968 where I became a Wing Operations Staff Officer with the 56 SOW. My duties were concerned closely with the wing's contribution to SAR efforts and the war effort, in the Barrel Roll area. I also represented the wing at higher headquarters, including JSARC. In the course of my duties I became night strike qualified in A-1 aircraft in both the Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll areas.

2. Our procedures for rescue in a hostile environment have changed continually with the cease fire above the 20th parallel; so has the reaction of the enemy. He has found that traps have proven very costly in terms of both men and equipment. As a result, while traps are still being used to some extent, the major effort is being expended to capture the survivor. Several cases have occurred recently in which the enemy searched for the survivor during the night, then when he was not found, the searchers and defenses were pulled back and the rescue proceeded without opposition; in other words, they gave the survivor to us rather than further endanger their own forces. During other rescues, the enemy resumed an active defense of the area at first light, in an attempt to buy their searcher's additional time. In almost every case when the survivor had bailed out during the day in terrain accessible to the enemy, an intensive search was begun immediately and carried on all night.

3. The chances of a successful rescue is directly proportional to the ability of survivors to avoid capture until the defense can be neutralized and a pickup accomplished. At this time, our procedures are to concentrate on the major defenses. The personal protection of the survivor is not being effectively

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accomplished. By this, I mean that a ground searching party can proceed on foot to the survivor with little chance of being detected until they are close to the survivor if they do not give themselves away by shooting, etc. We should deny the enemy ready access to the survivor as well as deny them the night hours in which to search for him.

17 SEP 1990

4. The survivor who bails out at night is generally in a better position to evade because he probably was not observed during his descent by the enemy. In most cases, we could beat the enemy to him if the LNRS or NRS system were available. (This subject will be treated later). The survivor who bails out in the late afternoon is probably at the greatest disadvantage, because the enemy has usually spotted him in his chute and knows the general area in which to search. A rescue is then attempted and then called on account of darkness, and the enemy has all night in which to conduct a thorough search for the survivor. This individual we should help more than we are now doing, and I believe we could help most with the LNRS.

5. Several months ago, 56 SOW, APO San Francisco 96310, sent a proposal to the 7 AF requesting permission to evaluate a system for providing a measure of protection for the survivor until he can be rescued. This consists entirely of weapons and devices that are presently available for use in Southeast Asia. Under this proposal, the survivor would be ringed with CBU-34 (WAAPM) or its equivalent. High speed gravel (airdropped mines) could also be used in conjunction with CBU-34. The natural approaches, such as trails could also be seeded with CBU-34. Both CBU-34 and high speed gravel, (or Dragon Tooth) can be delivered by F-100 or F-4 aircraft. The normal swath of CBU-34 is 400 feet wide and up to 5000 feet long. Two aircraft could deny the enemy access to the area within 1/2 KM of the survivor. I might point out that the enemy is not only sealed out but the survivor is trapped within: this is a major consideration in development of these tactics. Project Alpha presently has a series of Sensors which can be dispensed by an A-1 from a SUU-25 dispenser. These sensors could be placed around the survivor and would be activated by any noise such as a shout, shot, or the detonation of a CBU-34. Project Alpha presently has 3 RC-121 aircraft in orbit with trained crews who monitor sensors such as these. They would be able to notify the rescue force if any attempt is made to penetrate the survivor's defense line, what the threat is, and location of the threat in relation to the survivor. The only barriers remaining before putting this system into practice is the certification of the A-1/SUU-25/Sensor dispensing combination and authorization to use the weapons in this manner. These decisions are within the authority of the Commander, 7AF. All it takes is a go-ahead. The project officer for this system is LtCol Morris, DCOO, 56 SOW, APO San Francisco 96310. LtCol Morris has a

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personal interest in this system, as he was shot down as a Sandy pilot and spent 22 hours in a tree while the NVN searched for him all night. In fact, they stopped under his tree and talked for a while before continuing on with the search. Had he been on the ground, he might very well have been captured.

6. The advent of the LNRS, and later the NRS, will have a very significant impact on rescue operations in Southeast Asia. I feel a new set of procedures must be developed to accommodate and fully utilize these systems. Many areas of Laos, such as the Barrel Roll area, are such that the NRS can be used as originally envisioned. In more heavily defended areas, the helicopters will still need escorts and ground fire suppression support. 56 SOW is presently providing night ground fire suppression support for night strike aircraft including C-123, A-1, and A-26's. The normal night strike procedures for A-1 and A-26 aircraft are to operate in pairs, one providing fire suppression and the other striking. This procedure has been particularly effective in high threat areas to the point that in many cases guns will not fire if there are two aircraft in the area. Operations at night gives the advantage to the aircraft. Gunfire is particularly easy to see and, while the aircraft's accuracy is somewhat decreased, the guns can be effectively silenced. The guns, on the other hand, are at a serious disadvantage. Once they fire, their position is given away and the gunners cannot see the target. Gun laying radar, if any, is hampered by the maneuvering aircraft and by ground clutter in the case of a low, hovering, helicopter. It appears to be perfectly feasible to escort helicopters into a high threat area under cover of darkness, silence the ground fire while the helicopter locates and picks up the survivor, and cover the retreat of SAR forces after the pickup is complete. Two additional items of equipment that will be required is a shielded beacon or other device on the helicopter that can be seen only from above, and a ground burning flare such as a LUU-1 that has a time delay after activation and that has at least a 5 minute persistency. The ground burning flame is required in order for the helicopter to mark fire or other items of interest for the escort aircraft. It should burn with a different than normal color (such as green or bright red), in order to distinguish it from other lights on the ground. It may be that the A-26 with the new night bombsight system will be the best night escort aircraft. 56 SOW (DCOD) has qualified personnel, both Sandy and in the Night A-1 and A-26 operations who can provide additional information on this capability. I would estimate that, if the LNRS or NRS was operational now, approximately 50% of the pickups could be accomplished at night. It could possibly even turn out that it would be preferable in isolated cases to put the mine field around the survivor then wait until dark to commence the SAR effort if the defenses could not be spotted in any other way.

7. The procedures which are presently in use for night strike and fire suppression probably would have to be modified slightly for use as night SAR support. The present procedure involves the striking aircraft staying below approximately 6,000 AGL, utilizing a release altitude of 3,000 to 4,500 above the terrain. He calls in from a direction and off into a particular quadrant. The fire suppression aircraft remains 1000 feet above the strike aircraft and slightly out to the side. On the roll-in call from the strike aircraft, he positions himself to attack any ground fire that he sees. He is free to do so after the strike aircraft calls off as long as he avoids the quadrant reserved by the strike aircraft. This procedure would have to be modified by bringing the aircraft in closer to the helicopter, in the area of 3000 ft. The shielded beacon would make the helicopter visible only to the escort aircraft and the helicopter's ground markers will provide the required reference points. Two escort aircraft could circle overhead with altitude separation. The lowest aircraft being the primary fire suppression aircraft.

8. Since I have not had the opportunity to clear this letter with my supervisors, I would like to emphasize that this letter is correct and accurate to the best of my knowledge; however, it constitutes my personal opinion on the subject and is not an official position of 56 SOW.

Alan B. Hale
ALAN B HALE, Major, USAF
FR32624

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 11, 38TH ARRSQ (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96316



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 38-11 D

1 May 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative (11-38-022-1 May 69)

TO: 3rd ARRGp
APO 96307

THRU:

38th ARRSQ (O)
APO 96307

2 MAY 69

1. This report is submitted IAW ARPSM 55-2, 3rd ARRGp supplement 1, 15 April 1968.

2. At 2310Z 30 Apr 69 Detachment 11 was requested by the 31st USAF Dispensary, Tuy Hoa AB, to evacuate SSgt Francis J. Harmon, suffering from acute appendicitis to the 91st U.S. Army hospital at Phu Hiep AAF, RVN. Pedro 24 was scrambled at 2315Z. The litter patient was on-loaded at the dispensary helipad at 2320Z and delivered to the 91st hospital at 2330Z. Mission terminated 2335Z at Tuy Hoa AB. One non-combat save, non-aircrew member.

Crewmembers were:

AC Capt Daniel A. Nicholson
CP Capt William F. Austin
FE TSgt Leonard T. Hess
PJ Sgt Cole E. Panning

Daniel A Nicholson
DANIEL A. NICHOLSON, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander

APPROVED:

Morgan A Downing
MORGAN A. DOWNING, Major, USAF
Commander

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89.

39th AERSq History, Apr - Jun 69

Date: 2 May 69

Mission Number: 1-3-047-2 May 69

Flight Designation: Crown 6

Distressed Aircraft: Canyon Passage 413 (Navy A-7)

Location: 015/47/72

Saves: 1, combat

1. At 1025Z, Hillsboro called Crown 6 and advised that Misty 61 was working a downed aircraft on the 018/48/72. Waterboy vectored Crown 6 to the area on Guard. Crown 6 contacted Misty 61 on Guard and was briefed that Canyon Passage 413 was down and Nail 130 had voice contact. The survivor was in good shape and in an area of negative ground fire. Crown 6 scrambled Spads 11/12 from Channel 77 and JGs 33/28 from Channel 103 at 1030Z.

2. At 1035Z, Misty 71 replaced Misty 61 as OSC. Misty 61 cycled to tanker. Nail 130 had the chute in sight and voice contact at 1040Z. Misty 71 advised that he had made several low passes over the area with negative ground fire. The area was heavily wooded with an elevation of 3500 feet. The wind was calm with a few cloud build-ups. The mission was worked on frequency 364.2.

3. At 1040Z, Spad 11 called airborne on frequency 136.2 and advised he would rendezvous with JGs 33/28 at 220/20/109 with ETA to the SAR area of 1110Z. At 1105Z, Spad 11 contacted Misty 71 on frequency 364.2 and was briefed. Spad 11 decided to have the JGs proceed directly to the area to attempt the pick up because darkness was setting in. At 1110Z, JG 33 had the survivor in sight and was dropping equipment to lighten the aircraft for pick up. The Spads, Misty 71 and Nail 130 were in the area watching for small arms fire. At 1120Z, JG 33 had the survivor aboard. The survivor was in good shape with a sore back. Ground fire was suspected cause for being shot down. JG 33 returned to Channel 103 with ETA of 1140Z. Spads 11/12 escorted the JGs to Channel 103 and returned to Channel 77 with ETA of 1200Z. Misty 71 and Nail 130 were released to Hillsboro. Negative refueling required.

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FROM: 37(0)

4 May 1969

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-377-1 MAY 69) 3 ARR66

TO: 37C

3rd ARRGp (JSARC) *JS*
IN TURN

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 75

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1968.

2. (C) At 1030Z 2 May 69 Crown 6 alerted crews at Quang Tri that Navy A-7, call sign CANYON PASSAGE 413 was down at 225/34/Channel 103. Jolly Greens 33 (low) and 28 (high) scrambled from 103 and proceeded to 220/20/109 to rendezvous with Spads 11 and 12. Mistys 61 and 71 and Nail 13-0 were on scene. Weather condition in route were VFR with broken clouds over the rescue area at approx 7500 feet MSL and darkness was rapidly approaching (official sunset 1105Z). Pressure altitude of survivor was reported by Misty to be 3400 feet, temperature of 25C, and wind was calm. JGs 33 and 28 arrived on scene at 1110Z. No ground fire had been reported by Misties, Nail FAC or Spad 11 and 12 so JG 33 descended immediately to prepare for the rescue. Nail fac initially flew over the survivor and JG 33 made one pass to reconfirm power required and power available for hover. It was determined that extra equipment would have to be jettisoned to permit hovering at that density altitude (5400 feet). Items discarded included water rescue and survival gear, tools, smoke flares and personal parachutes and body armor of the crew. Due to the fact that the sun had set and the sky was now overcast it was necessary to immediately commence the approach. The survivors chute was located by the crew of JG 33 and a hover was established over the survivor at 1117Z. Four minutes later the survivor was onboard and the SAR forces departed the area toward channel 103 to proceed feet wet to channel 77. Due to forecast south winds JG 33 elected to land at channel 103 for fuel, then proceed to 77, arriving at 1245Z where survivor was taken to the AF dispensary for post rescue medical examination.

3. (U) Survivors name: Lcdr Wm J. O'Conner, USN. Organization: Attack Squadron 105, USS Kitty Hawk

4. (U) JOLLY GREEN CREW MEMBERS:

JOLLY GREEN 33

AC	Major	Anthony F. Argo
CP	Lt Col	Homer H. Howell Jr.
FE	MSgt	Charles L. Manes
RS	SSgt	Eugene L. Nardi

JOLLY GREEN 28

AC	Major	Watson D. Burnfield
CP	Lt Col	Richard G. Willis
FE	Sgt	Karl H. Chunn
RS	Sgt	Thomas T. Winters

Anthony F. Argo
ANTHONY F. ARGO, Maj, USAF
Aircraft Commander

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intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96237

82



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 400 (Lt Col Ratcliffe/2687)

4 May 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report #2-3-032-3 May 1969 (U)

R/2

TO: 3ARRGP (JSARC) *[initials]*
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSM 55-2/
3ARRGPSUP 1, dated 11 July 1968.
2. (C) At 030155Z Jolly Green 68 and 79 were alerted by Crown for a medical evacuation of a foreign national in critical condition approximately 4 kilometers east of L108 (Muang Souf, Laos) at the western edge of the PDJ, (19°32'N/102°55'E). Jolly Green 68 and 79 launched from LS98, (Long Tieng, Laos) 19°07'N/102°55'E) at 030200Z and proceeded north to the pickup point. The pickup point was at approximately 3500 feet elevation and fuel was dumped enroute to 5500 pounds. We arrived on scene at 030215Z identifying the pickup spot by a green smoke flare and voice contact with the ground. Approach and departure routes were evaluated and an uneventful landing was made in a large green area at 030218Z. The Pararescue Technicians, SSgt John E. Wilson and A1C David M. Davison had the survivor strapped in and comfortable and we departed the area at 030222Z. One foreign national accompanied the survivor. A brown-out on take off, from dust, required an instrument take off, breaking clear at about 50 feet above the ground. The survivor and passenger were flown direct to Ch 70 and transferred to an ambulance. Jolly Green 79 flew cover during the pickup and escorted JG 68 back as far as L5-98, where JG 79 landed and resumed the fragged ground alert. Approximately 30 minutes out of Ch 70 the patient was experiencing difficulty breathing, a high pulse rate and partial paralysis in the left side and extremities. Descending from 8000 to 5000 feet eliminated the breathing problem with an accompanying drop in pulse rate. Weather did not affect the mission.

3. (U) The names of the foreign national were not given.

4. The rescue crews were:

Jolly Green 68 (Low)

AC: Lt Col Chester R. Ratcliffe Jr., FV763543

CP: Capt James P. O'Pry, FV3020801

FE: SSgt Ralph Frazier, AF ~~0521343~~

RS: SSgt John E. Wilson, AF ~~0521343~~

RS: A1C David M. Davison, AF ~~0521343~~

AP: A1C Timothy J. Monk, AF ~~0521343~~

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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Jolly Green 79 (High)

AC: Capt Louis D. Durham,


CP: Major Roger G. Beamer,

FE: TSgt David V. McLeod,

RS: SSgt Daniel E. Galde,

RS: A1C Anthony J. McFarr,

AP: 1Lt Jackie R. Craft,



CHESTER R. RATCLIFFE JR., Lt Col, USAF
Aircraft Commander

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SUBJ: 60th Special Operations Squadron

25 MAY 1969

REF: 60th Effort Report (Litter 22)

NO: 34-00 (30)
AC 90307

1. A partially successful mission was conducted on 4 May 1969 for Litter 22. The aircraft, an F-100, went down at 0210L on 4 May 1969 at 20000402. This report covers those activities relating to the Sanyo during the mission effort.

2. Litter 22 was on a strike mission against the route structure in Steel Tiger. The strike was being conducted by Mail 10 a Forward Air Controller in an OV-10. Mail 10 observed Litter 22 come into a rocket attack, pull off the target and bail out. Mail 10 followed the chute down and reported a good chute and bayer.

3. The Sanyo were scrambled at 0225L and were airborne at 0240L. Sanyo 01/02 arrived on the scene at 0310L. Sanyo 01 took over as on scene controller. At the time of Sanyo 01's arrival Green 04, and Mail 10 were orbiting the area.

4. Litter 22 went down on a lightly wooded knoll surrounded on the east and south side by a heavily populated farming area. The western side was rough flat ground with several hootches and one bunker complex scattered through the area. The northern side was heavily wooded with no visible signs of habitation. The defense around the scene consisted of the known guns along the route structure to the north and 50 caliber and 81 fire from the south. Weather was not a factor in this effort.

5. Mail 10 watched Litter 22's chute go down the hill on the southern slope of the knoll. Lower 1, when he arrived on scene did not locate the chute. Green 04 was in the area and had the jet resources in the event that they would be required. The jet strikes against the route structure continued from the time Litter 22 went down until the effort was completed. This aided the 60th effort by keeping the northern guns distracted. Only one of these guns fired at us during the entire mission.

6. Sanyo 01 and 02 arrived on the scene at 0310L. Mail 01 was briefed by Mail 10 on Litter 22's approximate location and Sanyo 01 went down to attempt a visual contact. A steady bayer was being received but no voice. Sanyo 01 set up a low level search pattern and except for a few thick areas the ground was visible through the trees. After several passes Sanyo 01 and Mail 10 began to receive ground fire from the south.

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The search was continued for nearly an hour until Litter 22's position was determined within a limited radius by the combined efforts of Tail 19, and Sandy 01/02. Sandy 01 believed at 8 ams a beeper was on, Litter 22 must have been alive upon landing but since neither voice nor visual contact could be made he must be seriously injured. Based on this belief Sandy 01 made the decision to call the Jolly Greens in to aid in the search. Since ground fire was being received regularly during this time, Sandy 01 and 02 began fire suppression strikes around the general area. After about 15-20 minutes of ordinance delivery, trolling for ground fire produced no reaction.

7. Jolly Green 71/76, escorted by Sandy 03/04, came into the area and while Jolly Green 76 held in a nearby safe area Jolly Green 71 proceeded to make a foot by foot search of the southern slope. During this phase the four Sandys formed a firingaisy chain around the helicopter to discourage any ground fire against the helicopter. After about 10 minutes of searching the helicopter crew spotted a chute in a bamboo grove and the PJ went down and found the body of Litter 22. The body was recovered and the rescue helicopters agressed the area under the covering fire of the Sandy escorts.

8. The primary problem encountered during this effort was the beeper. The new survival radio beeper and a chute beeper sound the same. Since very few chute beepers are encountered Sandy 01 made the false assumption that Litter 22 had been able to activate his radio beeper. Since visual contact could not be made by the fixed wing aircraft on the ground, Sandy 01 believing he had an alive and badly injured pilot on the ground, made a decision that needlessly endangered Jolly Green 71. But without the assistance of Jolly Green 71, Litter 22 would not have been found. The difficulty in locating Litter 22 was caused by the fact that he landed on the side of the hill and tumbled down into the bamboo grove carrying his colored chute into the grove where it was out of sight until the darkness of the night took over and the beeper.

9. It is strongly recommended that the use of chute beepers be discontinued. A pilot is rarely first alerted to such an extent that he cannot activate his radio and even if he were unconscious when he landed an electronic search is continued for several days. A chute beeper does not save lives in a combat environment. It interferes with voice communications if it cannot be turned off and, like this case, could lead to the needless loss of a part of the US force. It is not the policy to commit the JH force on beeper alone except under certain conditions such as were present on this effort. A good chute, a good beeper, constant surveillance and open terrain where we can easily

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ensure the enemy is not operating the beeper. The SAR force risks and loses lives and on hostile fire to recover live pilots not to pick-up beeps. The possibility of a beeper being a dummy beeper rather than a radio beeper will make this Party 01 extremely hesitant to commit his SAR force on the strength of a beeper again.

10. Special commendation goes to Tail 10 for his assistance in the search effort while willfully exposing himself to ground fire, and to Jolly Green 71/76 for volunteering to assist in the visual search, a practice which is above and beyond normal duty expectations.

11. The Party Forces involved in the effort were:

Party One - Major Thomas C. Higgs
Party Two - 1/Lt David R. Croft
Party Three - Capt John L. Flinn
Party Four - 1/Lt Rogers A. Smith

Signed

FRANK J. TULLER, Lt Colonel, USAF
Operations Officer

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were picked up at 1411L and 1437L with Spad 11 as on-scene commander.

(S) On 4 May, Sandys 01, 02, 03 and 04 were scrambled on a partially successful SAR effort for Litter 22, an F-100. After arrival at the scene, a visual search was conducted but failed to locate the survivor. The position of the survivor was finally pinpointed by beeper. At this time, .50 caliber and small arms fire was directed against the SAR force. The Sandys quickly suppressed the ground fire and called in Jolly Green 71 to observe the chute of the survivor. A PJ was lowered who reported the survivor dead. The body was put aboard Jolly Green 71 and the SAR force returned to base.

(S) On 11 May, a successful SAR was conducted for Manual 42A, a downed F-4. Sandys 01, 02, 03 and 04 were scrambled at approximately 0820L. After arrival at the scene, the Sandys worked the Spads who dropped ordnance around the survivor. At 1009L, Sandy 01 called Hobos 40 and 41 in to expend around the survivor, who could be seen sitting on his parachute, because enemy forces were approaching that position. When the survivor lapsed into unconsciousness due to injuries he suffered while ejecting, Sandy 01 called Jolly Green in for the pickup. The survivor was picked up by the Jolly Green without encountering any problems. An electronic search was conducted by the Sandys for Manual 42B, but all efforts were unsuccessful.

(S) A partially successful rescue was conducted on 17 May

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1134	29 Apr 1969	C-130	SVN	Fromm R. E.	Maj	Rescued		Hickson D. L.	1Lt	Rescued
1135	30 Apr 1969	F-100D	SVN	Gibson R. C.	Maj	Rescued	Army Helo			
1136	30 Apr 1969	RF-4C	SVN	Gordon G. A.	Maj	KIA		Stewart F. E.	Maj	KIA
1137	2 May 1969	O-2A	LAOS	Mascari P. L.	1Lt	MIA				
1138	4 May 1969	F-100C	LAOS	Adams M. T.	Capt	KIA				
1139	8 May 1969	F-4C	LAOS	Brashear W. J.	Maj	KIA		Mundt H. G.	1Lt	
1140	9 May 1969	F-100D	SVN	Williford J. V.	1Lt	Rescued	Army Helo			
1141	14 May 1969	F-105F	THL	Yahanda A. M.	Maj	Rescued	USAF Helo			
1142	18 May 1969	C-123	SVN	Hayden N. W.	1Lt	KIA		Evans D. M.	1Lt	KIA
1143	24 May 1969	F-100D	Sea	Manske C. J.	Capt	KIA				
1144	24 May 1969	AC-130A	THL	Schwehm W. J.	LtCol	Rescued		Piehl G. H.	Maj	Rescued
1145	25 May 1969	F-100D	Sea	Stanford D. G.	1Lt	Rescued	USN Ship			
1146	27 May 1969	C-130A	SVN	Moore A. M.	Maj	Rescued		Peterson C. A.	1Lt	Rescued
1147	1 June 1969	O-2	SVN	Svanoe K. E.	1Lt	KIA	Army Helo	Dickens J. L.	Capt	KIA
1148	2 June 1969	O-2	SVN	Gilmore J. R.	1Lt	KIA	USAF Helo			
1149	3 June 1969	F-100D	SVN	Ginart D. F.	1Lt	KIA	Army Helo			
1150	5 June 1969	RF-4C	Sea	Findlay R. F.	Col	Rescued	USAF Helo	Moy D. M.	Capt	Rescued
1151	11 June 1969	F-4D	SVN	Deans W. R.	Maj	Rescued	USAF Helo	Thomas C. A.	Maj	Rescued
1152	12 June 1969	A-1H	LAOS	Ward N. C.	1Lt	MIA				
1153	14 June 1969	F-105D	LAOS	Kahler H.	Maj	MIA				
1154	14 June 1969	F-4D	LAOS	Grace J. W.	Capt	MIA		Karas W. J.	1Lt	Rescued
1155	16 June 1969	F-105D	LAOS	Devoss J. L.	1Lt	Rescued	USAF Helo			
1156	16 June 1969	F-4D	Sea	Fulghom G. G.	Maj	Rescued	Army Helo	PoLaoster H.	1Lt	Rescued
1157	19 June 1969	O-2	SVN	Hoag J. D.	Capt	KIA		Dover G. R.	1Lt 2	KIA
1158	22 June 1969	O-2B	SVN	Engelhard E. C.	Maj	KIA		Seagroves M. A.	1Lt	KIA
1159	23 June 1969	C-130	SVN	Brunner G. E.	Capt	KIA		Reed T. M.	1Lt	KIA
1160	26 June 1969	F-100D	Sea	Casper J. H.	Capt	Rescued	USAF Helo			

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FROM: AC

7 May 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report 10-38-032-5May69

TO: 10-38C

38C

3ARRGp (JSAR) *JS*

IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2, 3 ARRGp Suppl, 11 July 1968.
2. While flying a training mission in local area, Pedro was called perform a mission of mercy. He landed to offload firemen. Pedro then launched for coordinate WR517813 just south of Vi Thanh. The area for pickup was a canal about 30 yards wide and lined with tall trees. Pedro got artillery clearance and proceeded direct to the area where he arrived at 0925. Pedro landed on an ATC belonging to the Navy and picked up one Navy WIA with shrapnel wounds of the right arm. During the mission, Pedro was in radio contact with Dictograph on Fox Mike. Pedro departed the ATC at 0930 and proceeded to 29th Field Evac Hospital where he arrived at 0945 and offloaded the patient. Termination at Binh Thuy at 0950. Negative ground fire encountered to and from the area. One combat save, one sortie, 0.7 flying hours.
3. The survivor is: Edward Jordan, E-4, Riv Div 152.
4. Crew of Pedro:

AC Maj Ralph L. Caede
CP Capt Cecil A. Jessee
FE MSgt John G. Regan Jr
PJ SSgt Michael F. Dean

Ralph L. Caede
RALPH L. CAEDE, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

Atch 21

CALM VOICE THAT >I HEAR GROUND FIRE TO MY NORTH>. SAR FORCES REMAINED CN THE AREA UNTIL 0630 IN AN EFFORT TO CONTACT THE SURVIVOR AGAIN. AT 0630 Z THE FORCES WERE RETURNED TO THEIR BASES. ARRS

FROM: 37(0)

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (1-3-049-8)

TO: 37C

3RD ARRGp (JSARC)


IN TURN

Classified by 10 May 1969
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
POLICY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 75

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1968.

2. (C) At 0210Z, 8 May 1969 Queen scrambled Jolly Greens 27/07 and Spads 11/12 from DaNang. Queen directed the rescue forces to 245/70/Channel 77. An F-4, Boxer 31 had been hit and both crew members ejected. Misty 31 was on scene and talking to one survivor who was located on a trail at 116/36/Channel 72. The weather in route was scattered to broken thunderstorms 1500 to 2000 feet. The area was considered hostile but the On Scene Commander said if we get there fast we should have no problems. Spad 01 took over as On Scene Commander from Misty 31 who was now directing fast movers south of the survivor along route 165. The survivor had an injured leg and Spad 01 requested pararescue support for pick up and then to check streamer chute 200 to 300 meters west of survivor. Spad 01 had received ground fire south of the survivor but none in the immediate area. The survivor said he heard movement in his area. Pressure altitude of the survivor was reported at 3500 feet and 26 temperature. Jolly Green 27 requested back up Buffs because of HH-3E marginal capability in this area. The density altitude was 5600 feet maximum power available 95% and power required to hover would be 92% with weight reduced by jettisoning all non essential equipment and fuel. Items discarded included water rescue and survival gear, tools, smoke, all parachutes, chocks and one ammo can. Fuel required was computed to allow time for hover and necessitate air refueling on return to channel 77. Fuel was not to be dumped until final decent for pick up to allow for any unexpected delays. Jolly Greens 27 and 07 arrived in the area at 0321Z and were cleared in by Spad 11 who was now on scene commander. As we completed our second 360 decending run on final to the survivors smoke the area became very hostile. Automatic weapon fire was encountered from our 4 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions with visible tracers all around the helicopter. I lost all radio and interphone receiver and transmitting communications at approximately 100' above the ground and 70 to 80 knots airspeed. At our low altitude and airspeed I observed bunkers stratigically located on the ridge lines and hill sides in cleared areas. The survivors position would place us in range and view of these bunkers. The extensive ground fire from our 9 o'clock position was coming from a cleared area potted with fallen trees and in the four o'clock position on the edge of a cleared area in a tree line. The bunkers appeared to be diversions for true locations of ground fire. Jolly Green 27 immediately returned fire from both sides of the helicopter. A speedy climb was executed to the nearest clouds on an easterly heading. The rapid and accurate fire of SSgt Nardi and Sgt Swenson on the M-60 machine guns silenced the ground fire and

UNCLASSIFIED



Atch 2
Classified by 12 May 1969
Declassified by 12 May 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (J-3-070-8 4th ed)

saved Jolly Green from further damage. At this time I aborted this flight and Jolly Green 07 accompanied the battle damaged helicopter back to Channel 77. Enroute home approximately 5 miles east of the survivor and 4000' AGL we again picked up ground fire, 50 cal. and the rapid return fire by SSgt Nardi and Sgt Swenson again silenced hostile action. Spad 11 told Boxer 31 what had happened and more Jolly Greens were in route. Boxer 31 told Spad 11 that he heard ground fire to the north and then a rain shower moved in over the area. There was no more radio transmissions heard from Boxer 31 and his chute disappeared. Sgt Swenson received a small cut on his left cheek and left eye ball. Jolly Green 27 received six hits and Spads 01, 02, 11 and 12 had taken 14 small caliber hits.

3. (U) No survivors rescued.

4. (U) Jolly Green Crew members:

JOLLY GREEN 27

AC	Major	Anthony F. Argo
CP	Lt Col	Homer H. Howell Jr
FE	Sgt	Walter A. Swenson
RS	SSgt	Eugene L. Nardi
AP	Sgt	Jimmy L. Lester

JOLLY GREEN 07

AC	Capt	Bill M. Campbell
CP	Major	Bruce E. Prouse
FE	Sgt	Karl H. Chunn
RS	SSgt	Stephen T. White

Anthony F. Argo
ANTHONY F. ARGO, Maj, USAF
Aircraft Commander

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED

Or Changed to UNCLAS
By Authority of CSAF MSG 10/656 AAF/IS
By M. JAVIS (Date) 23 APR 75

CONFIDENTIAL

[Handwritten signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

542

S.D. 11

91.

39th ARRSq History, Apr - Jun 69

Date: 8 May 1969

Mission Number: 1-3-049-8 May 69

Flight Designation: Crown 4

Distressed Aircraft: Boxer 31 (F-4)

Location: 115/36/72

Saves: None

1. Crown 4 heard the Mayday call of Boxer 31 at 0155Z. Boxer 30 relayed that Boxer 31 had ejected at 115/40/72. Two chutes were observed (one good chute and the other one was apparently a streamer). Both chutes landed within 200-300 meters of each other. Radio contact was established with the survivor by Misty 41. No contact was made with the other crewmember. Identity of the survivor was not established as Alpha or Bravo. Misty 41 stated that there were hostile forces back from the road in the area of the survivor. Misty 41 assumed OSC at 0205Z. The SAR forces were launched by Queen. Spads 11/12 were launched from Channel 77, Spads 3/4 from Channel 107, JGs 07/27 from Channel 103 and fastmovers were requested. The survivor's confirmed position was 115/36/72. Crown 4 arrived overhead on orbit at 0220Z.

2. Misty 41 stated that weather was marginal and altitude 3500 with temperature at 26°C. Spad 01 assumed OSC working with Mistys 31/41 who were cycling off tanker. Spad 01 trolled the area and picked up a small arms hit south of the survivor. All aircraft were advised that there was 37mm SNM west of the survivor. All SAR forces were being held to the north. Litter 41 flight was directed on target to sterilize the area. Elevation and temperature at the survivor's position were marginal for operation of the HH-3, JGs 70-71 (HH-53s) were scrambled from Channel 70 and Sandys 01/02 were scrambled from Channel 89 at 0303Z. The area was trolled by Spads 01/02 with negative ground fire. At 0304Z, it was deemed safe for JGs 07/27 to move into the area unescorted for the pick up. At 0327Z, JG 27 jettisoned his external tanks and moved in for the pick up. The survivor was advised by Spad 11 to display smoke at this time. JG 27

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UNCLASSIFIED 443

92.

39th ARRSq History, Apr - Jun 69

picked up small arms fire 1/2NM from the survivor. Spads layed a smoke screen to the ridge. As the JGs progressed, small arms fire became more intense. JG 27 received a hit that caused the loss of his radio. At this point, the JG discontinued the rescue. Spad II advised the survivor to maintain radio silence for 20-30 minutes. The signal to break silence would be a fastmover overhead with afterburner on.

3. Spads put in several strikes while waiting for JGs 25/03 to arrive on scene. JGs 25/03 were estimating the area at 0430Z. After the strikes, radio contact was attempted with the survivor. Radio contact with the survivor could not be established. Spad II made a pass over the position of the survivor with negative visual on the chute and survivor. At 0420Z, Spad II evaluated the situation as follows: Do not put a PJ on the remaining streamer chute, hostiles in the area, status of the survivor now unknown (no voice contact) believed to have been captured by the enemy or moved to another location. Recommend that no further action be taken until voice contact could be established again with the survivor.

4. At 0500Z, Crown 4 relinquished the mission command to Crown 6. Queen advised that Sandys 1/2 and JGs 70/71 remain on scene for one hour and the remaining SAR forces RTB at Bingo times.

5. Queen asked too many repetitious questions after the information had been previously passed and this caused the frequency to be loaded with unnecessary traffic.

6. Forces Utilized:

- a. Spads 01/02/03/04/11/12
- b. Mistys 31/41
- c. Covey 219
- d. JGs 07/27/25/03
- e. Gunfighter 3/4
- f. Litter 41
- g. Saber 41
- h. Sandys 01/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50#1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 56TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96310

Deputy Commander for Operations

11 May 1969

Letter Number 65

SUBJECT: Wing Sandy Alert Force

TO: 1st SpOpSq 22nd SpOpSq 602nd SpOpSq

INFO: Det 1, 40 ARRS 21st SpOpSq 600th SpOpSq 601st SpOpSq

23 TASS DCM

Expires 10 May 1970 unless sooner terminated

1. The A-1 Sandy Alert mission will be a wing mission supported by pilots and aircraft provided by each of the assigned A-1 squadrons.
2. Operations of the Sandy Alert Force will be the responsibility of the office of the DCO. The Sandy Alert Force Commander will be responsible directly to the DCO himself.
3. Each A-1 squadron will submit nominees of 10 Sandy Alert pilots to the DCO on the first day of each month. This list will include the names of 5 Sandy wingman nominees and 5 Sandy element/low lead nominees all of whom will be qualified in accordance with DCO letter no. 63. Squadrons will submit monthly nominees with the understanding that individuals so named will be regularly assigned to Sandy duties. Monthly turnover of names on the list will be limited to rotational and emergency substitutions only. Nominees will not be scheduled for Sandy Alert until approved by the DCO. Nominees submitted by the squadrons will preferably be the best officers for the Sandy mission, but in any case will be selected from among the most highly qualified pilots available. Squadron commanders will consider their Sandy mission contributions as the most important of their missions and will assign Sandy pilots accordingly.
4. Normally each squadron will have 2 Sandy aircraft and 2 Sandy pilots on alert every day. The crews will be scheduled for three days consecutively, beginning as Sandy 5 and 6 on the first day, Sandy 3 and 4 on the second day and Sandy 1 and 2 on the third or last day. For planning purposes, squadrons may expect that the monthly list of 5 element leaders and wingmen will be scheduled and paired in the order listed. Scheduling will be done by the office of the DCO based upon the monthly list of squadron nominees. Individual absences from duty status (Leave, R & R, CTO, etc.) will be indicated on the monthly roster.

OPR: DCO

5. The Sandy alert force must be composed of the best qualified strike pilots in the Wing. Accordingly, only strike mission element leaders of demonstrated competence will be nominated as Sandy element leaders. Similarly, Sandy wingmen will be chosen from among strike mission qualified wingmen with the most promise of becoming strong element leaders. In the event that qualified wingmen are not available, strike mission element leaders may be substituted for Sandy wingman positions.

6. During the period of transition from the current 602nd Special Operations Squadron Sandy operation to the Wing Sandy Alert Force, new Sandy element leaders provided by the 1st SpOpSq and 22nd SpOpSq will fly a minimum of 2 "Tango" and 2 "November" orbits plus standing alert twice in the Sandy Two positions as wingmen before being scheduled for Sandy element lead. Henceforth, Sandy 5 & 6 will fly "November" orbit; Sandy 3 & 4 will fly the "Tango" orbit and Sandy 1 & 2 will not fly unless a SAR effort is required or unless frag considerations dictate otherwise. The 602nd SpOpSq will continue to provide the Sandy 1, 3 and 5 element lead pilots and aircraft until such time as new element leaders from the 1st SpOpSq and 22nd SpOpSq are fully qualified as Sandy element leaders.


7. The mission of providing CBU-19 support for SAR operations will be changed such that any of the A-1 squadrons may be tasked to provide up to 2 pilots and 2 aircraft for CBU-19 delivery.

8. The nature of the SAR operations includes potential operations in all of the combat zones of Southeast Asia. Accordingly, Sandy crewmembers must be familiar with all areas of potential rescues and should avail themselves of flights in other mission aircraft in order to do so. Specifically, Sandy pilots who fly strike missions primarily in Barrel Roll should schedule themselves for A-1 or FAC aircraft missions in Steel Tiger and Vice Versa. Sandy pilots not familiar with helicopter performance limitations should fly at least one orientation mission in Jolly Green or 21st SpOpSq helicopter aircraft. Experience as A-1 escort on helicopter infill/overfill mission is also desirable.

9. SAR debriefings will be conducted as soon as practicable after rescue efforts in which Wing aircraft participate. The DCO will determine which SARs merit debriefings. All Sandy qualified pilots will be required to attend these meetings.

10. The Wing Sandy Alert Force will remain together as a group during the daily alert period except when complying with the flying requirements of the frag. During ground alert periods, Sandy Low Lead will cover the SAR procedures and tactics that have been evolved. Discussions of the successes and mistakes of previous SARs are encouraged so as to retain and emphasize as many lessons of the art as possible. The place of duty during ground alert will be in the alert area of Det 1, 40 ARRS (Jolly Green Ops) except when a SAR is in progress at which time crews who are next in sequence for launch will proceed to TUOC where they will monitor the radio progress of the SAR and avail themselves of any immediate intelligence data.

11. The success of the SAR effort in SEA has resulted from teamwork, standardization, and coordination of all elements of the SAR effort. Pilots assigned to the Sandy mission must be thoroughly familiar with low-level ordnance delivery, AAA defensive tactics, helicopter operations, SAR command and control procedures and FACING of strike aircraft. The Sandy coordinator within the office of the DCO will be responsible for conducting training required to develop these skills. Only the very best will be assigned to the Wing Sandy Force.



THOMAS A. FISHER, Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander for Operations

11 MAY 69

- 11/0240/JS MANUAL 42: NOTIFIED MR. TINKINS (ATTACHE) OF MISSION IN PROGRESS "Q" WORKING MISSION?
- 11/0242/JS MANUAL 42: UPDATE ON PROGRESS: CR-1 REPORTS FUEL OK. READY TO MAKE PICKUP.
- 11/0245/JS MANUAL 42: BY 142 O/S THIS TIME K/GE
- 11/0248/JS MANUAL 42: VIA CR-1, ~~CR-1~~ A/C? TOOK BUTTERFLY AT THIS TIME: CALL SIGN WIK, JG'S HOLDING OFF THIS TIME: STADOL ALSO TOOK INST AND RTB
- 11/0248/JS MANUAL 42: NOTIFIED NRP TOY SCRAMBLE BY 7-8-9-10 THIS TIME K/GE
- 11/0300/JS FROM CR-MAINT-TR A/C 219 CR-2 OPERATIONAL THIS TIME
- 11/0315/JS MANUAL 42: NOTIFIED NRP/DH NOB 25 FORMING OUT NRP EMERGENCY WITH ORD ABOARD
- 11/0317/JS MANUAL 42: FROM K/GE HOLD BY 7-8-9-10 UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE
- 11/0320/JS MANUAL 42: NOB 25 A/C CH BY THIS TIME
- 11/0321/JS MANUAL 42: FROM SQUAD, A/C EXPANDING COU9 AT 0320 JG'S HOLDING AT THIS TIME
- 11/0342/JS MANUAL 42: FROM NRP, JG'S MADE PICKUP OF SHANTON: NRP/RTA @ 0340 K/GE
- 11/0350/JS MANUAL 42: (UPDATE) TYPE A/C R4? TWO SECTOR: ELE/SEARCH STILL IN PROGRESS FOR SECOND MAN - BY 142 344 & CR-3 WILL STAY IN AREA.
- 11/0400/JS MANUAL 42: MR. ATTACHE / MR. MARQUET NOTIFIED OF STATUS 1-POB WAS PICKED UP AND ELE/SEARCH WAS STILL IN PROGRESS.

11/0410/JS RAVIN 42: From CR-1 Sy 1-2-3-4 RTB ETA CN 89
 @ 0500² CR-3 RTB ETA CN 70 @ 0507² K/GI
 11/0415/JS IG-17 ADV CN 89 @ 0330² LOCAL
 IG-137 ADV CN 89 @ 0325² LOCAL /NP NT 0340²
 11/0431/JS CR-2 ADV CN 70 @ 0449² ETA mission today
 @ 0445 ON STATION 0505² K/GI
 11/0504/JS CR-3 ON DUTY CN 70 @ 0503 K/GI
 11/0506/JS SY H2 - 34 ON DUTY CN 89 @ 0452² + 0453² K/GI
 11/0530/JS CR-2 ETA CN 70 @ 0555² K/CS
 11/0548/JS CR-1 @ CN 70 0543² CR-3/0546² ADV ETA CN 89
 @ 0740² K/LY
 11/0549/JS IG-17 NP @ ~~0545~~² CN 70
 11/0715/JS From RAVIN 45: Request Sy² FOR EXTRACTION 1-2 SIF.
RAVIN 45 + (2) Two A/A Helo⁵ in AREA. K/PS

11/0001/JS LOG OPEN NEW "Z" DAY: "SAR FORCES": 56 70+76 GROUND
ALERT TANGO: 76-69+79 GROUND ALERT NKP: SY 1+2
3+4, 7+8 GROUND ALERT NKP: NIP

11/0030/JS 56-70+76 ON STATION "T" @ 0030Z K/GI

11/0055/JS KENT: From Sgt WALLACE TWO, KENT REQUESTED PICKING
UP 2 BODIES: His location 1438N 10710E (148/72/72)
K/GI (C DUGG)

11/0100/JS Notified: 7/17 601 SPACEDINGS OF KENT'S REPORTS: He has
A/C IN AREA OF KENT'S.

11/0105/JS MANUAL 42: From Brighton MANUAL 42 DUGG
Reported by WALL-16 A good state Brighton/DA K/GI

11/0113/JS MANUAL 42: SY 1+2 LAUNCHED NKP when A/C CONTACT
CR-4 - CH 364.2

11/0115/JS MANUAL 42: SY 3+4 LAUNCHED NKP when A/C CONTACT
CR-4 - CH 364.2 NKP/CTA K/GI

11/0115/JS MANUAL 42: "Q" mission K/GI

11/0125/JS Manual 42: Pos. update 051/932/99 UTI [REDACTED] K/GI

11/0132/JS MANUAL 42: SY 1+2 3+4 OFF CH 89 @ 0131Z ETMOUS K/GI
Dingo 0535Z K/GI

11/0142/JS MANUAL 42: Reported by CR-1, (CONTACT with SURVIVE, he has
BROKEN LEG & PICKING UP GROUND FIRE): Reported by WALL 16
VIA CR-1

11/0150/JS MANUAL 42: VIA CR-1. WALL 16 REPORTS CONTACT WITH SURVIVE
BY NOSED & PROPER: SURVIVE HAS BROKEN LEG & INJURED SEVERELY
GROUND FIRE IN AREA, ORD. IS OVERVIEW EXPLODED K/GI

11/0154/JS MANUAL 42: VIA CR-1, WALL 16 WORKING LATTER FLIGHT
IN AREA THIS TIME: SPAD 11 FLIGHT 10 MIN OUT THIS
TIME K/GI Playboy & MISTY ALSO IN AREA

11/0157/JS MANUAL 42: From K/GI Launch CR-3 A/C NOW NOTIFIED

11/0205/JS MANUAL 42: VIA CR-1 - SPAD 11+12 IN AREA, SPAD 11 IS
O/C COMMANDER THIS TIME. FAST MOVING moving out
OF AREA: A/C GOING IN FOR PICKUP AT THIS TIME.

W/LOW STRATUS MOVING IN TO AREA THIS TIME K/GI

~~CR-3 START~~

11/0215/JS MANUAL 42: CR-3 STARTING ENGI THIS TIME K/GI

MANUAL 42: Hobo 404241 AON @ 0218Z Hobo 41443 AON

0220² ETA 0300² on ~~SEATTLE~~ ~~Bridge~~ time 342(0520) K/GI
 11/0222/II MANUAL 42 WMA CR=1, SURVIVE HAS Broken down + Broken
 Leg K/GI
 11/0228/II MANUAL 42 CR=3 ASU 0225² 0/5 0356² K/GI

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RESCUE IN VIETNAM

By: Capt. Gary L. Bain USMC (Ret)



Fighter pilots have no fear,

Jolly Green Giants are always near

NOTE: A "Tribute to William C. Ryan" is in the works and will be presented here when completed

VIDEO 1: Fox 25 Local Television News, Oklahoma City, OK. Thanks to Don Shafer for permission to use the news segment as part of this presentation. This is the reunion of Marty and myself 31 years after my rescue.

VIDEO 2: Toast to Marty and Jollies. This video was taken at the residence of Gary and Barbara Bain during Marty and Suzanne's visit. The champagne bottle we had inscribed inadvertently got the wrong date on it. It should have read May 11, 1969, however the meaning remained the same. The fare for the evening included huge grilled shrimp, filet mignon and all the trimmings. What a great time we had. Oh, and for those that don't know us or if you have

seen us in a long time, Marty is the plump old fellow on the left and I am the young, lean and mean gentleman on the right!!

The First Ejection and Rescue

There I was, a long time ago, in a land far away, and it was a dark and stormy night!! The date was January 12th, 1969 and I was just off the coast of South Vietnam, over the South China Sea was level at 4,000 feet and securely strapped in my Marine Corps F-4 Phantom, as was my RIC (Radar Intercept Officer), Lt. William C. Ryan. I had flown well over a hundred combat missions with VMFA-323 and on this particular night we were attempting to get rid of our ten 500 pound bombs that had malfunctioned and wouldn't come off while conducting a Steel Tiger mission in Laos. Those missions were secret at the time and were designed to interdict and destroy men and equipment transporting weapons of war along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. After diverting to the jettison area out over the water I hit the pickle button to drop the bombs and when I did the instrument panel started lighting up like a Christmas tree. It is theorized that one of the bombs hung up on the aft lug and drove the fins through the underbelly of the aircraft and into the fuel lines causing an immediate and catastrophic fire. First the starboard engine overheat light came on, then a fire light. Almost immediately the port overheat light and fire light came on. I stated, rather emphatically to Bill, "Bill, we're going to have to get out of here!!". I then started to make my "Mayday" call and only got one Mayday uttered when an explosion rocked the ill-fated Phantom. I hardly got the word "EJECT" out of my mouth and Bill was gone in a flurry of noise and smoke as the canopy was blown off and his ejection seat rockets fired. I followed shortly thereafter and we both found ourselves floating slowly down into a dark void, punctuated only by the violent impact the pilotless Phantom made as the sea swallowed its flaming mass.

The sudden departure from the sanctity of the cockpit to hanging in a parachute, especially at night, is, to say the least, a humiliating as well as a frightening experience. That feeling was short-lived though as I soon splashed down and survival became the motivating factor. I had never been in an ocean at night and as I popped back to the surface, bioluminescence engulfed me and that was something I had never seen or even heard of!! In my imagination, the harmless plankton that was causing the phenomenon, was some alien creature that was attempting to devour me. That caused me to try even harder to gain the security of the life raft I had deployed on the way down, and the harder I tried the more I churned the water and the more the plankton illuminated. I probably set a record getting into the life raft because as I pulled myself up, the seat pan, which was still attached to me started hitting me in the leg and all I could think of was "Sharks!!". Gaining the security of the raft, I soon got my composure back and somehow, Bill and I found each other in that great expanse of water and rejoiced at our reunion and well being. We started laughing, blowing our whistles and even discussed doing a little night fishing!!

A really heads up air traffic controller out of DaNang heard my one "Mayday" and alerted the Jolly Greens at DaNang, the 37th ARRS. The Jolly Greens are an Air Force rescue team with the primary mission of rescuing downed pilots and the 37th was flying HH3E's at the time. Jolly Green 03 launched from their hot pad, leaving Jolly Green 04 behind with a radio problem, later replaced by Jolly Green 28. This mission for them was their first night rescue at sea and it came off without a hitch. Under the flares dropped by a C-130 Hercules, call sign Basketball 814 (later replaced by basketball 842) the Jolly Green helicopter settled on the water and Bill and I

clambered aboard. Except for a minor electrical fire in the area of the Doppler equipment (caused by water dripping from our flight suits), the ride back to our home base at Marine Corps Air Station Chu-Lai was uneventful. The Jolly Green crew had to depart immediately after letting us off so I didn't have a chance to meet them. Bill and I were back in the air again in a couple of days and we continued flying as a team until I went on R&R (rest and relaxation) a few months later in May of 1969.

My R&R destination was Hong Kong and I took a shuttle flight from Chu-Lai to DaNang to await further routing. I had to spend two days in DaNang waiting for my flight so I decided to look up my Jolly Green rescuers as they were based out of DaNang. It just so happened they were in a festive mood so for two days we consumed massive amounts of booze, told war stories, and I reveled in the camaraderie of my heroes. I got to know one of the pilots real good. His name was "Pete". Little did I know the importance of our meeting, for we were to meet again in a few short days, but in much different circumstances.

The Second Ejection and Rescue

Arriving back in Chu-Lai a week later I once again set about winning the war. By this time I had well over two hundred missions under my belt and Bill and I had flown almost a hundred of those together as a team. Our call sign was "Boomslang" and when we checked in with the FAC (forward air controller) he knew the job was going to get done! We had both been recently transferred to VMFA-115, but were still flying out of Chu-Lai. He was scheduled to go on R&R to meet his wife in Hawaii in a couple of days so when I found out he was scheduled to fly with me twice the next day I insisted he cancel the flights. He wouldn't hear of it but after a lot of discussion, we compromised. He would fly the first mission in the morning and cancel the evening mission. This was, most unfortunately, a truly bad decision on both our parts. Bill, or "Rhino", as we fondly called him, would not return from the mission.

We launched early in the morning on May 11th as a flight of two, our destination, Laos, another Steel Tiger mission. The target was in the area of Tchepone, a heavily defended part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I was carrying a load of Zuni's, or 5" rockets, for anti-aircraft fire suppression. As we reached the target area the FAC, Call sign Nail 16, designated the enemy position and rolled in "Hot" (ordnance armed and ready to fire). The delivery method I was using was a 500 knot, 60 degree dive angle run. Bill was calling me fast all the way down, as he read off the altitude, airspeed, and dive angle. Just as the pipper in the gunsight arrived at the target I let loose the full compliment of rockets. Just as I had been trained to do and had done hundreds of times before, I repeated the mantra, pickle, pause, pull. Just as I was getting a heavy load of G's on the airplane in the pull-up phase and starting the jinking turn (a high speed turn to avoid anti-aircraft fire) a tremendous explosion rocked the big Phantom. The aircraft rolled over to the inverted position and was heading for the ground, all controls lost. At 500 plus knots, impact was imminent and I told Bill to eject three times, very quickly I might add!! Hearing no response I braced myself and reached for the alternate ejection handle nestled between my legs. With a sharp tug the ejection sequence started and the next few seconds of my life became a blur as my stationary body met with the ferocity of a wind twice that of a force 5 tornado. This was about as traumatic as anything you could imagine. I'll try to slow it down for you. The canopy came off first, then the rockets fired that propelled me and the seat out of the aircraft at an instantaneous

18 G's (one G being the force of gravity). As I left the cockpit the horrendous wind blast ripped off my helmet and oxygen mask, it inflated my MK3C life vest, my left arm got thrown behind my back and snapped it in half between the shoulder and elbow, my pistol that I wore on my right hip was ripped off, and the pockets on my G-suit were torn off. Then from bad to worse, the seat, which is supposed to separate from the pilot as the parachute deploys, malfunctioned and the restraint lanyards tangled on my left leg and broke it and the seat stayed with me all the way down. The parachute deployed and I remember hanging there, and I remember this just as vividly as if it were yesterday, I heard a loud whooshing noise and said to myself, "they are shooting at me already". Then a string of bombs went off underneath me. My wingman had seen the fire from my aircraft impacting the ground, thought it was the target and dropped his bombs. I descended through all the debris and after just a few seconds in the parachute hit the ground like a ton of bricks.

The most amazing part of this is that I never felt any pain. I didn't even know my arm was broken until I tried using it and just the stump would move, not the rest of my arm. I remember every detail of the ejection and events leading up to my rescue. To this day, I don't know how my thinking process remained intact, but it did, and my ability to communicate with the rescue is what saved me. As OIC (Officer-in-charge) of the Safety and Survival shop in my squadron always made it a point to carry two survival radios which if I remember correctly were the newer PRC-90's. It was a good thing I did because the first one I tried wouldn't work! I immediately got in contact with the FAC, call sign Nail 16 (OV-10), on my emergency radio to let them know I had survived. No one ever saw a second chute and most opinions concur that I must have taken a 37mm AAA shell in the area of the rear cockpit. I had landed very close to a huge North Vietnamese bunker complex and within 50 meters of some buildings. The word was they didn't take prisoners in that area!! For the next three hours, I would call on everything I have ever learned about survival to make it through the ordeal. The FAC alerted the Jolly Greens and they were launched from a base North of DaNang, Quang Tri. The Jolly Green choppers are escorted by the famous A-1 Skyraider, a big recip with ten wing stations that carry an assortment of ordnance including cannons, bombs, rockets, gas and other goodies. My wingman was out of ordnance but made dummy passes to keep the bad guys heads down until the FAC got a flight of A-4's to make a couple of drops. In the meantime I had gotten myself oriented, established a clock code for the FAC to reference the drops to and had made a sling for my arm out of parachute cord. I always carried a snub-nosed 38 inside my flight vest and I took it out and laid it on my chest. I seriously doubt that it would have done much good but it sure made me feel better. I could hear hollering, whistling and shooting but never did see any enemy personnel.

Then the A-1's arrived on station. At this point they assumed control of the rescue and queried me about my personal authenticator codes. This was a system devised to prevent the bad guys from luring in our aircraft on a phony rescue. All pilots had to fill out cards with answers to questions like, what is your favorite drink, your favorite football team, etc. and then the cards went to a central location for use by the rescuing entities to verify it was actually the pilot talking. In this case, after answering all the questions correctly, I added, "And besides that, this is the Marine that spent two days with you last week!!". The Jollies out of Quang Tri had to divert because of fuel problems. Jolly Green 15 and 28, from the 37th ARRS out of DaNang were then alerted and they promptly headed my way escorted by the DaNang A-1's, the Spads. While

flying cover for the choppers one of the Spads took a 37 MM hit in the tail and had to RTB (Return to Base). The word was passed along to the Jollies about a Marine pilot being down that had recently visited with them.

What a sight those A-1's were!! They would fly so low I could see them smile when they went by. Every time I heard a noise I would call out the clock code and the Skyraider would devastate the area with deadly accuracy. On one run they made they didn't notify me prior to the drop and it happened to be one of those bombs that opens and drops a bunch of small bomblets. I must have jumped ten feet high when those things started going off, thinking of course, I was taking fire. I thought my number was up for certain. Some of them had to be within 20-30' because debris from the explosions rained down on me like a hail storm. At other times the situation would become very quiet and I created things to do to stay busy and alert as I was feeling very faint. I even noticed that my beloved Seiko watch was still intact however it seemed to have lost about four hours on the ejection!! I also started gathering every different kind of le that was in reach of me and storing them in my survival vest to keep as mementos of my vacation in Laos. Sweat was pouring from every pore in my body and I was thirsty, real thirsty pulled the seat pan close to me and removed the contents of the survival pack looking for water. I found the water in a gray can, but alas, no pull tabs back then!! So I took out my bright orange survival knife and decided to punch a hole in the top of the can so I could drink. Opening the knife one handed presented a problem though and I tried everything, snagging it on my flight suit, with my teeth, and was about to give up when I realized, hey, this is a switch blade. With a quick flick of the button the knife was open. I then propped the can up between my legs and with a quick stab, smartly planted the blade squarely in my leg instead of the can. I actually laughed at myself, oh no, I wasn't shook up!! .

The weather was deteriorating and the Jolly Green chopper was starting to get low on fuel so the Rescue Crew Commander, Capt. Joseph Hall, decided it was then or never. He had been holding in a designated area waiting for the OCS (On Site Commander) to give the all clear and that enemy fire had been suppressed. The A-1's then gassed the area, I popped a smoke flare and with machine guns blazing the Jolly Green HH3E chopper came in and hovered over my position. What an incredible sight, forever etched in my memory, the chopper swooping in, the PJ (para-jumper) coming down the hoist with a gas mask on and the co-pilot, Capt. Martin Richert, laying down suppressing fire from the co-pilot's window with an automatic rifle and the flight mechanic hosing the area down with machine gun fire. They took small arms fire throughout the approach and hover. Capt. Richert said that during the final approach he could hear the slap of small arms fire above the noise of the rotor and knew that we were taking fire. Two rounds went through the cockpit and nose area while I was being picked up which is something I didn't know until much later. As the chopper stabilized over me I hobbled over to the hoist and the PJ strapped me on and away we went. As we departed the area the crew pulled me inside and promptly started attending my needs. They administered morphine, put an air cast on my arm and checked all my vital signs. They also traded me a cigarette lighter for my pistol. That was simply a diplomatic way of taking a weapon from someone that they didn't know what state of mind they were in. I still have that lighter and will always treasure it. About halfway back to DaNang the pilot got up out of his seat and came back to where I was. I looked up and there, standing before me, was "Pete", which is Capt. Joseph Hall's nickname!!.

EPILOGUE

Move forward to August 2001. I was conducting research for a book I am writing about my Marine Corps Aviation career. I had contacted a few of my fellow Vietnam fighter pilots through the internet and in the summer of 2001 decided to start looking for the crews that had rescued me. The Jolly Greens had sent me certificates on each of the two rescues, complete with name and rank of the crew. I had kept these over the years and now with the internet I might be able to find these heroes. It just so happened that the day I located and called Martin Richert, the co-pilot of the Laos rescue, that it was his birthday. He was obviously shaken and we talked about half the night. I then found and talked to Captain "Pete" Hall, the pilot and in January, 2002 located and spoke with James Thibodeau. I cannot describe the emotions in going back in time and talking with these brave men. I could not find the other crew members but am listing the names at the end of this in case someone knows them they can tell them how to contact me. It just so happened that Marty and his wife, Suzanne, would be traveling through Oklahoma City in September, 2001 so they decided to pay a visit. I had never seen Marty because after the rescue the helicopter dropped me off at the DaNang hospital and they then returned to their operating area and I was medevaced. It was a wonderful reunion and we had Fox 25 local news come out and they put the reunion on the evening news. We of course watched the news that evening and enjoyed some mighty fine food consisting of jumbo shrimp, filet mignon, and topped off with champagne and late night "War Stories". Ahhh-- the good 'ol days! It is my fervent hope that in the future I will have an opportunity to meet with all of the crew. Oh, and one final note, I did not know until Marty told me, that I was shot down on Mother's Day!! He said that is among the reasons he remembers this rescue.

The Jolly Greens are among some of the unsung heroes of the Vietnam War. Their motto, "That others may live" is well embedded in my mind and every day I wake up I say thanks to these great warriors that gave so much of themselves. Albeit late in the game, I take great pride in being able to present this work as a testament to the heroics of our gallant comrades in arms and especially to the crewmembers that plucked me out of the ocean and the jaws of death in the jungles of Laos. The Jolly Greens rescued over 500 pilots during the Vietnam war and took risks that ordinary men wouldn't even dream of. Their courage and spirit under fire is one of the ingredients that makes the United States military force the most formidable on the planet. I salute the Jolly Greens and thank you, both former and present members, for your service to our country. God bless the United States of America.

Crewmembers of the first rescue on January 12, 1969

Capt. Gerald W. Moore Rescue Crew Commander

Maj. Herman C. Stafford Pilot

SSgt. Ernest R. Cyrus Flight mechanic

A/C Robert L. Cassidy Pararescue Specialist

Crewmembers of the second rescue on May 11, 1969

Capt. Joseph R. Hall Rescue Crew Commander

Capt. Martin E. Richert Pilot

A/C James A. Thibodeau Flight Mechanic

A/C Dennis C. Palmer Pararescue Specialist



Jolly Green 15 crew after my rescue, men in back looking for bullet holes!!

I would also like to recognize the supporting pilots and any others that participated in this rescue. Should anyone know the names of Nail 16 and 18, the Spad drivers, Hobos, Sandys, Playboy, Litter Flight or any other personnel involved please have them contact me. Thank you

UPDATE: I have now located and talked with all four crewmembers of Jolly Green 15 that made the rescue in Laos. On January 30, 2002 I called and talked with Dennis Palmer. He has an excellent recollection of the events and still has my name tag from my flight suit in his scrapbook!! I have also located and talked with Captain Moore and A/C Cassidy of the first rescue. I am still looking for Maj. Herman C. Stafford, Pilot, and SSgt. Ernest R. Cyrus, Flight Mechanic of the first rescue. Anyone that knows their whereabouts may contact me at garybain@telepath.com

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FM OL 1 3ARRGP SON TRA AB RVN
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INFO RUCIEUA/MAC/MCP/MAOCCA/SCOTT AFB ILL
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RUHEB/CINCPACAF/CC/HICKAM AFB HAWAII
RUCEAAA/USAF ALTERNATE CP/MAXWELL AFB ALA
RUSVB/7AF/DOTO/DO/DP/DI/BDPMP/CP/TSN AB RVN
RUEBAAA/ARDC/ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND MARYLAND
RHMSMVA/COMUS MACV ATTN JPRC SAIGON RVN
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RUMFSAA/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
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CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED

Or Changed to UNCLAS
By Authority of CSAF #8310856425
By M. JAMES (Date) 30 Apr 75

1-3-051
OPENING & SUSPENSE
25 WEST KHE SA

PAGE 2 RUSVTFB 0082 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RUMFSAA/CTE SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
RUCVDB/MAG 13 CHU LAI AB RVN
RUSRA/OL 2 3ARRGP UDORN RTAFB THAI
RUSVDF/1ST MAW DANANG AB RVN
RUSVAL/39ARRS TUY HOA AB RVN
RUSVTF/37ARRS DANANG AB RVN

Classified by OL 13AER6
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 75

BT
CONFIDENTIAL/JOPREP JIFFY/OL-1, 3ARRGP/
RESCUE 051//111036Z MAY 69.

PART ONE OF TWO PARTS.

1. RESCUE OPENING REPORT 11 MAY 69.
2. 1-3-051-11 MAY 69.
3. A. TACTICAL B. CLASSIFIED C. CAMOUFLAGED/NOT AVAILABLE/F-4C
MANUAL-42 D. USA E. UMFA-115, USMC, CHU LAI AB RVN. F. NOT
RELEASEABLE. G. 2 POB. H. USMC STANDARD.
4. NAIL 16 11/0100Z.
5. S/E
6. CROWN-4 ON GUARD 0100Z, JOLLY GREENS 03 AND 07, 0105Z, SPAD 11
AND 12 AT 0103Z.
7. CROWN-4 DIVERTED TO SAR SCENE 0103Z, JOLLY GREENS 03 AND 07 DIVERTED

PAGE 3 RUSVTFB 0082 CONFIDENTIAL
TO SCENE AT 0105Z, SPADS 11 AND 12 SCRAMBLED FROM CH-77 AT 0103Z.

8. 1638N - 10621E.
9. A. NOT A FACTOR C. S/E
10. OL-1 3ARRGP, MAJ R.L. KRIDLER, CAPT P. HUBACKER, TSGT L. VANCE,

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PT 00177

2 1.1
2 11.5
27.3
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4 8.4
2 2.7
20 57.6
4 11.2
2 8.7
6 19.9

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A1C NOWOCZYNSKI.

11. PANAMA GCI, WATERBOY GCI.

19. C. SEE PART TWO. D. SEE PART TWO. H. SEE PART TWO.
PART TWO OF TWO PARTS.

1. RESCUE SUSPENDING REPORT.

2. 1-3-051-11 MAY 69.

9. B. NOT A FACTOR.

12. NAIL-16 AT 0100Z/1638N - 10621E.

13. 37ARRS/HH-3E/JUNGLE PENETRATOR/0338Z.

14. 2/1/1/1/0.

15. S/E

16. 4/11.2/37ARRS/HH-3E/ 4/11.5/6S0S/A-1E/ 8/27.3/602S0S/A-1E,
2/8.7/39ARRS/HC-130P, 4/8.4/31TFW/F100C, 2/2.7/12TFW/F4C, 2/7.7
/23TACC/OV-2. 17. 0/0/0/0/NOT AVAILABLE/0/NOT AVAILABLE/NOT AVAILABLE.

18. A. ALL OF 37ARRS; RCC CAPT J.R. HALL JR, RCCP CAPT M.E. RICHERT,
FE A1C THIBODEAU, J.A. RS A1C D.C. PALMER.

PAGE 4 RUSVTFB 0082 C O N F I D E N T I A L

B. 1/LT BAIN G.L. USMCR, VMFA-115, CHU LAI AB, RVN.

19. A. 10 N.M. RADIUS OF 1638N - 10621E, 75 PER CENT EFFECTIVE.

B. ONE SURVIVOR LOCATED AND RECOVERED. BACK SEATER AND AIRCRAFT

WRECKAGE WERE NOT LOCATED. F. NO BEEPER OR VOICE CONTACT WITH BACK

SEATER. H. ONE ARRS COMBAT SAVE OF A USMCR AIRCREW MEMBER/NO AIR

REFUELING/NO RS DEPLOYED/NAIL-16 REPORTED SEEING ONE GOOD C UTE FROM

M IEL-42. CRASHED AIRCRAFT OR EVIDENCE OF SECOND SURVIVOR HAS NOT

BEEN DET R I 00 TMEEEZYFYBEZDWAAAAA OWNED BY HOSTILE FIRE. LAST KNOWN HEA

ING OF AIRCRAFT AS REPORTED

BY SURVIVOR WAS 180 DEGREES. SURVIVOR SUFFERED A BROKEN ARM AS RESULT

OF EJECTION, HE STATED THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY LOW WHEN HE BAILED OUT AN

DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE BACKSEATER MANAGED TO BAIL OUT, SURVIVOR

RETURNED TO NSA HOSPITAL DANANG BY JOLLY GREEN 15. GP-4.

BT

#0082

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Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-
YEAR INTERVALS.
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were picked up at 1441L and 1437L with Spad 11 as on-scene commander.

(S) On 4 May, Sandys 01, 02, 03 and 04 were scrambled on a partially successful SAR effort for Litter 22, an F-100. After arrival at the scene, a visual search was conducted but failed to locate the survivor. The position of the survivor was finally pinpointed by beeper. At this time, .50 caliber and small arms fire was directed against the SAR force. The Sandys quickly suppressed the ground fire and called in Jolly Green 71 to observe the chute of the survivor. A PJ was lowered who reported the survivor dead. The body was put aboard Jolly Green 71 and the SAR force returned to base.

(S) On 11 May, a successful SAR was conducted for Manual 42A, a downed F-4. Sandys 01, 02, 03 and 04 were scrambled at approximately 0820L. After arrival at the scene, the Sandys worked the Spads who dropped ordnance around the survivor. At 1009L, Sandy 01 called Hobos 40 and 41 in to expend around the survivor, who could be seen sitting on his parachute, because enemy forces were approaching that position. When the survivor lapsed into unconsciousness due to injuries he suffered while ejecting, Sandy 01 called Jolly Green in for the pickup. The survivor was picked up by the Jolly Green without encountering any problems. An electronic search was conducted by the Sandys for Manual 42B, but all efforts were unsuccessful.

(S) A partially successful rescue was conducted on 17 May

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT # 7

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MISSION NARRATIVE 1-3-51, 11 May 1969

(S) At 0105Z, 11 May 1969, Jolly Green 03 and Jolly Green 07 were scrambled from Quang Tri. One survivor from a Marine F-4 had been located on the 260 radial for 47 miles from Channel 103. His call sign was Mauul 14. Jolly Green 15 (low) and Jolly Green 28 (high) were on alert at DaNang. The DaNang alert aircraft were scrambled at 0155Z as back up helicopters for the SAR effort. Jolly Green 15 took off at 0200Z followed shortly by Jolly Green (JG) 28. Contact was made with Queen and they were instructed to proceed to the pickup area. The weather was good and the two aircraft proceeded at an enroute altitude of 9000 feet. While enroute, Jolly Green 28 maintained radio contact with Waterboy and the various DACSCs in order to get artillery clearance for the two Jolly Greens. This left Jolly Green 15 free to monitor the entire SAR effort. Jolly Green 15 learned that the area was extremely hostile. Spads 01, 02, 11 and 12 were in the area suppressing ground fire. Spad 01 reported that he had been hit. He had a large hole in his tail section and was going to RTB to Pleiku. At about this time, Jolly Green 03 said that he was running low on fuel and would have to RTB to Quang Tri. He departed the area accompanied by Jolly Green 07. The two aircraft were escorted by Spad 12. Spad 12 then intercepted Jolly Greens 15 and 28 and escorted them into the general area of the survivor. Jolly Greens 15 and 28 arrived in the area at 0315Z and set up an orbit at 9000 feet approximately three miles north of the survivor. Meanwhile, Sandys 1, 2, 3 and 4 had arrived in the area at 0310Z and were assisting Spads 11 and 12 in suppressing the ground fire in the area around the survivor, sometimes striking 10 meters from the survivor. The weather in the area was excellent. Visibility was approximately 15 to 20 miles and cloud coverage consisted of scattered cumuliiform clouds. From the orbit position Jolly Green 15 was in excellent position to observe the entire area around the survivor. The survivor was located in an area approximately ten miles to the southeast of Tchepone. He was positioned near the north bank of the Kepon River and approximately 500 yards south of a major highway (route 9). There was a small road just to the east of the survivor with two hostile bunkers on it. Running east and west from the survivor, along the river bank, were numerous houses or buildings and there was a fairly large hostile bunker complex on the south bank of the river about 50 meters to the west of the survivor. Most of the ground fire was observed on the east and west sides of the survivor. At 0315Z (simultaneous with the arrival of JGs 15 and 28) Hobos 40 and 41 arrived in the area. Hobos 42 and 43 were to follow. At this time Hobos 40 and 41 began expending CBU-19 to the east, north, and northwest of the survivor. The Spads and Sandys continued expending ordnance in and around the bunker complexes to the west of the survivor. JG 15 coordinated fuel and hover weight with JG 28, the crew donned their gas masks and body armor, and performed their hostile area descent checks in preparation for descent into the area. At 0325Z, Spad 11 cleared Jolly Green 15 in to make the pickup. He advised that since the survivor was in a relatively open area

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that it might be possible to make a landing rather than a hoist pickup. The flight engineer (A1C Thibodeau) and the Pararescue Specialist (A1C Palmer) manned the M-60's since a great deal of ground fire had been experienced by the aircraft engaged in fire suppression. They were also prepared to make the pickup from either a landing or by utilizing the hoist. During descent the Pararescue Specialist was manning the left M-60 when he observed ground fire coming from the East. He immediately returned the fire. The approach to the survivor was made on a southerly heading and a 180° tactical approach was made over the survivor to align the aircraft for an expeditious departure to the North and a relatively safer area. The letdown and approach was hampered by fog and condensation on the windshield which restricted forward visibility to almost nothing. (See Remarks) At this time the Aircraft Commander (Capt Hall) determined that the area was unsuitable to make a landing. He advised the Pararescue Specialist to prepare to go down on the penetrator and assist the survivor. The survivor had previously reported that he had a broken left arm. JG 15 came to a hover over the survivor at 0335Z and the Pararescue Specialist was immediately deployed on the penetrator. As soon as the aircraft was in the hover, the Co-pilot (Capt Richert) observed small arms fire coming from a tree line approximately 150 yards to the West. He began returning the fire with his AR-15 in an attempt to suppress it. Meanwhile Spads 11 and 12 and Sandys 3 and 4 set up a "daisy chain" on either side of Jolly Green 15. While he was being lowered on the penetrator, A1C Palmer scanned the area for hostile activity in the immediate vicinity. He heard ground fire but could not determine which direction it was coming from. As soon as he arrived on the ground, the Pararescue Specialist assisted the survivor onto the penetrator, gave a thumbs up signal, and was immediately hoisted aboard JG 15 by A1C Thibodeau. JG 15 departed the area at 0340Z on a northeasterly heading. Approximately 2 miles North of the highway more ground fire was observed coming from the West. The flight engineer and co-pilot returned the fire. JG 15 departed the area at 9000' accompanied by JG 28 and Spad 12. Spad 11 had to RTB for fuel immediately after the survivor was picked up. The survivor seemed in fairly good shape. He had suffered a broken left arm and contusions and abrasions on his left leg. The Aircraft Commander decided to take him to the Naval Support Activities Hospital (NSA) at DaNang. JG 15 landed at NSA at 0455Z and then returned to DaNang AB, landing at 0500Z. After landing at DaNang the crew discovered that the aircraft had sustained minor battle damage. The nose gear tires were flat as they had taken a hit by small arms fire. Also a hit had been taken in the nose gear area on the bottom of the aircraft directly below the pilot's compartment.

(U) Survivor's name: Gary L. Bain, Lt USMCR, VMFA 115, Chu Lai AB

(U) Jolly Green Crewmembers:

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JOLLY GREEN 15

AC Capt Joseph R. Hall Jr.
CP Capt Martin E. Richert
FE ALC James A. Thibodeau
RS ALC Dennis C. Palmer

JOLLY GREEN 28

AC Maj Leo M. Wright
CP LtCol Richard G. Willis
FE SSgt Wilson E. Cavano
RS SSgt John J. Eldridge

(U) Comments:

IAW Interim Operational Supplement T.O. 1-h-3(c) C-2-2 dated 14 July 1967 and changed 15 Aug 1968, Jolly Green 15 (65-12783) had the windshield anti-ice disconnected. During the rapid descent from high to low altitude the windshield fogged over and condensation developed on the windshield. As it was, the pilots had to fly the aircraft under hazardous conditions and keep wiping the fog from the windshield until the temperature stabilized.

The requirement to coordinate the SAR forces route into the SAR area with Waterboy (GCI site) and 2-3 DASC's is illogical, time consuming and difficult. Failure or poor FM radio operation often complicates this procedure plus the unfamiliarity of DASC personnel with TACAN facilities and their complete refusal to issue any clearance except on Army Grid coordinates is a very poor procedure. Recommend that GCI sites obtain all clearances and shut down all artillery fire along SAR forces routes whenever a SAR is in progress.

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FROM: Aircraft Commander

12 May 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (10-38-033-11May69)

TO: 10-38C

38C

3ARRGP (JSARG) *peg*

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2, 3ARRGP Sup 1, 11 July 1968.

2. At 1035L, 11 May 69, Navy TOC called for assistance from Pedro Operations to initiate rescue procedures to recover two seriously wounded Navy patrol rivermen. Pedro 91 launched at 1040L enroute to the coordinates XR440628, which was at the Southeastern tip of the Bassac River, approximately 45NM from home base at Binh Thuy. Pedro contacted Paddy Control for clearance down the river and received a direct route to the pickup area. Pedro then contacted "Red Rose" on Fox Mike and gave an estimated time of arrival at the site. Pedro launched with 800 pounds of fuel and cruised at 1000 feet to avoid a slight headwind condition. Nearing the pickup area, Pedro contacted Asternoid/Yankee for information about the seriousness of wounded personnel. One man had multiple wounds of the head, chest, stomach, and legs and was going into shock. The otherman had a sucking chest wound and difficulty of breathing. Pedro arrived over the two PBR's at 1110L and executed the recovery. The stokes litter was used to recover the two Navy sailors and the Forest penetrator was used to recover a Vietnamese sailor who had come aboard the PBR from the second PBR during recovery of the US wounded. He had wounds of the right hand and forearm. During the hover operation which lasted approximately twenty minutes, Pedro's fuel supply had deminished to 400 pounds. A fine display of crew coordination during the pickup enabled the team to make an effective pickup with minimum consumption of fuel. Pedro departed the area enroute to the 29th Med Evac Hospital which had been notified about the seriousness of the wounded and was standing by for Pedro's arrival. During the trip to the hospital, the most seriously wounded man went into shock and stopped breathing. The PJ, Sgt Dean, immediately administered mouth-to-mouth resuscitation which restored the man's breathing. Two times this happened and the PJ revived the man. At the same time, the FE, Sgt Johnson, was administering First Aid to the other wounded who had a sucking chest wound and severe difficulty of breathing. Using the full aerodynamics capabilities of the aircraft, the crew was able to arrive at the hospital with all three wounded alive when delivered into the hands of the medical team at the hospital. Pedro arrived at the hospital at 1200L and off-loaded the wounded. Termination of mission was accomplished at home base at 1205L. Negative ground fire was encountered to and from pickup area. Three combat saves for Pedro Operations and one sortie for 1.4 hours of flying.

The US Survivors are: James L. Greene, O-3, Riv Div 515. Raymond D. Rathburn, E-4, Riv Div 515. One Vietnamese, name unknown.

Arch 9

4. Crew of Pedro 91:

AC Maj Ralph L. Gaede
CP Capt Cecil A. Jessee
PJ SSgt Michael F. Dean
FE Sgt Kenneth P. Johnson



RALPH L. GAEDE, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

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S.D. 12

94.

Date: 12 May 1969

Mission Number: I-3-052-12 May 69

Flight Designation: Crown 4

Distressed Aircraft: Lovebug 23-2 (F-4)

Location: 043/21/77

Saves: 2, combat

1. A Mayday call was heard at 0235Z. Lovebug 23-2 had taken a hit while pulling off a target near Channel 109. Guard frequency was used until Panama Control sent Lovebug 23-2 to 306.9. The damaged aircraft turned down the coast and headed for Channel 77. A controllability check was made and the pilot decided to punch out rather than land.

2. The weather was clear with excellent visibility. The pick ups were made at 043/21/77 (feet wet) with JG 15 making one pick up and JG 28 making one pick up. The pilots were picked up at 0305Z. They were in good condition and spent less than 10 minutes in the water. No refueling was required and the SAR forces RTB at 0310Z.

3. Crown did not receive the chute beepers and we were never more than 20 miles away from the SAR scene at all times.

4. Crewmembers:

a. AC Captain Thornton

b. CP Captain Harris

c. NN Captain Mitchell

d. RO SSgt Moe

e. FE MSgt Berger

f. FE TSgt Raper

g. LM TSgt Donahoe

ROBERT E. THORNTON, Captain, USAF
AC, Crown 4

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: 37(0)

12 May 1969

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-052-12 May 69)

TO: 37C

3rd ARRGp (JSARC) *[Signature]*
IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1968.

2. At 0240Z, 12 May 69, JGs 15 and 28 were scrambled for a Marine F-4, call sign Love Bug 232 who had battle damage and was at 007/45/77 bearing feet wet to DaNang. JGs 15 and 28 were airborne at 0250Z and were vectored by PANAMA Control to intercept the distressed aircraft. At 0253Z, Love Bug crew ejected at position 040/20/77. At 0300Z JG 15 spotted one of the downed pilot's smoke flare and set up an approach to put the pararescue specialist into the water. At 0306Z Love Bug Alpha and PJ were hoisted aboard JG 15. JG 28 spotted Love Bug Bravo 300 yards west of the first survivor and deployed his PJ. Love Bug Bravo and the PJ were hoisted aboard at 0309Z. JGs 15 and 28 Rtb at 0325 with both survivors in good shape. *4/9*

3. Survivors names are: Love Bug Alpha - 1/Lt Dean H. Matzko, 092885, MAG 13, Chu Lai. Love Bug Bravo - 1/Lt Patrick E. Daly, 095267, MAG 13, Chu Lai.

4. Jolly Green Crew Members:

JOLLY GREEN 15

AC	Capt	Charles P. Lowry
CP	Maj	Bruce E. Prouse
EE	SSgt	James H. Jenereaux
RS	ALC	Robert H. Fields

JOLLY GREEN 28

AC	Maj	John G. Kakacek
CP	Lt(JG)	Robert T. Ritchie
EE	SSgt	Billy R. Bloomer
RS	SSgt	Eugene L. Nardi
AP	Sgt	Michael F. Orcutt

[Signature of Charles P. Lowry]

CHARLES P. LOWRY, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander

[Signature of John G. Kakacek]

JOHN G. KAKACEK, Maj, USAF
Aircraft Commander

16 May 1969

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (X-3-009-14 MAY 69)

TO: 37C

3rd ARRGp (JSARC)

IN TURN


1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1968.
2. At 0425Z, 14 May 1969, Jolly Green 15 (low) and Jolly Green 28 (high) were scrambled from DaNang. They were to intercept the United States Ship Muskeegon some where in the vicinity of North Reef and pick up an injured crewman. The crewman had a perforated ulcer and required immediate hospitalization. Jolly Green 15 and 28 made rendezvous with Crown 7 in the vicinity of PE-1 at 0534Z. Crown 7 made high frequency radio contact with Muskeegon and located the ship by means of HF DF. Crown 7 then vectored the Jolly Greens to the ship's position (1718N, 11054E). Jolly Green 15 came to a hover over the Muskeegon's fan-tail at 0630Z. The Para Rescue Specialist was lowered to the ship to assist in preparing the injured crewman to be hoisted aboard Jolly Green 15. The crewman was hoisted aboard in a stokes litter and Jolly Green 15 departed the ship at 0640Z accompanied by Jolly Green 28 and Crown 7. Jolly Green 15 had a doctor on board, Denver Nelson, Capt, USAF. He and the Para Rescue Specialist administered to the crewman while enroute to DaNang. While enroute to DaNang, Jolly Green 15 and 28 both accomplished air refueling from Crown 7. Jolly Green 15 took the injured crewman to the Naval Support Activities Hospital, Danang and returned to DaNang Air Base at 0815Z.
3. Survivor: Dionisio Z. Pangilinan, United States Naval Ship Muskeegon, Rank unknown, nationality unknown.
4. Jolly Green Crew Members:

JOLLY GREEN 15

AC	Lt Col	James H. Grady
CP	Capt	Martin E. Richert
FE	Sgt	Carl H. Chunn
RS	AlC	Donald M. Lester
ES	Capt	Denver Nelson

JOLLY GREEN 28

AC	Capt	Charles P. Lowry
CP	Capt	John K. Coder
FE	SSgt	James K. Hall
RS	Sgt	Harry C. Chalmers


JAMES H. GRADY, Lt Col, USAF
Aircraft Commander

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S.D. 13

95.

Date: 14 May 1969

Mission Number: I-3-009-14 May 69

Flight Designation: Crown 7

Distressed Individual: Crewman aboard USNS Muskeegan

Location: 065/178/77

Saves: 1, non-combat

1. At 0430Z, Crown 7 was airborne to assist JGs 15/28 in making the recovery of a sick crewman with a bleeding ulcer aboard the USNS Muskeegan. The ship was located at 065/178/77 enroute to Danang. JGs 15/28 were airborne from Channel 77 at approximately 0430Z. Crown 7 arrived in the area at 0520Z and established radio contact with the ship on 2182 MHZ. Using the #2 ADF radio, we homed in on the ship until radar contact was established on the APN 59. Visual contact was made at 0545Z. Crown 7 circled the ship giving DF steers to JGs 15/28. Using UHF homers, the JGs arrived over the ship at 0615Z. The pick up was made at 0625Z by JG 15. A Flight Surgeon was aboard JG 15 and the patient was administered emergency medical aid enroute to the Naval Hospital at Danang.

2. JG 15/28 were refueled enroute to Channel 77 with each Jolly taking on 1000 pounds of fuel.

3. Crewmembers:

- a. AC Captain Ahlstrom
- b. CP Captain Harris
- c. NW Captain Mitchell
- d. RO ALC Toomer
- e. FE TSgt Wright
- f. FE TSgt Walden
- g. LM SSgt Gately

WILTON J. AHLSTROM, Captain, USAF
AC, Crown 7

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative 13-38-044, 15 May 69

TO: Commander/Major Headberg

1. This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSM 55-2/ 3 AHRGp Sup 1, 15 June 67
2. Det 13 was requested by the MOD 37th USAF Dispensary to provide emergency Med Evac for one (1) Vietnamese female which was suffering from a fractured skull as shown by X-rays. She was unconscious at the time she was found at the front gate of this base, and remained unconscious. Patient did not react to light, but did have a slight reaction to a pin test given at the hospital prior to being delivered to Det 13. Unable to obtain vital signs during flight, and twice during flight was unable to detect any respiration, at which time patient was administered oxygen and kept on oxygen for the duration of the flight. The head of the litter was raised about ten degrees to relieve pressure. No medications or other medical care was given. The MOD stated that death would have been imminent had other means of evacuation been used. ARRS credited with one (1) non-combat, non-aircrewmember save
3. Name of the patient is unknown.
4. Crew members of Pedro 22:
 - RCC Capt Wayne A. Grant
 - CP Capt Robert S. Morita
 - HM SSgt Delbert B. Dunn
 - PJ TSgt Lawrence Wellington

Wayne A. Grant

WAYNE A. GRANT, Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

1st Ind (O/L 13-38C/Maj Headberg)

Det 13,38 ARRSq

TO: 3rd AHRGp (JSARC) *JRG*

Approved

Ernest A. Headberg Jr.
ERNEST A. HEADBERG JR., Major, USAF
Commander

AT-6 12

FROM: Det 8, 38ARRS

19 May 1969

SUBJECT: Rescue Narrative Report (08-038-008 - 16 May 1969)

TO: 3ARRGp (30) *YJY*

1. The following report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2, 3ARRGp Sup 1 dated 11 July 1968. At 1100Z, 16 May 1969 the 35 Wing Command Post notified Det 1, 38ARRS at Phan Rang AB of the immediate need to transport a Vietnamese child to the 8th Field Army Hospital at Nha Trang AB RVN. The child required immediate transportation as his life was ebbing fast due to severe shock resulting from a fractured skull requiring neurosurgery which was available at Nha Trang. Pedro 48 from Det 8, 38ARRS Cam Ranh Bay AB was on the ground at Phan Rang and was able to respond at 1120Z to the MACV compound to transport the child. Throughout the 40 minute flight to Nha Trang the child was administered mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and external cardiac massage by the medic accompanying the child and the two P.J.'s on board Pedro 48. The child was delivered to the 8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang at 1210Z to an awaiting neurosurgeon and was still alive on arrival. This constitutes one non-combat save.

2. Crew members were:

44-4638
A.C. Major Calvin W. Capper
C.P. Captain John L. Poorman
P.J. ALC Donald H. Goodlett
P.J. ALC Kenneth J. Musnicki
M.T. TSgt Deleon USAF MACV Phan Rang. Mil PAP Hospital.

Richard H. Coan
RICHARD H. COAN, Maj, USAF
Commander

ATCH 8

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (10-38-034-17 May 69)

TO: 10-38C

38C

3ARRGp (JSARG)

INTURN

17 MAY 69

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2, 3ARRGp Sup 1, 11 July 1968.

2. At 1225L Navy Binh Thuy called Pedro Operations and asked for emergency medevac of eight wounded from Rach Gia. Pedro 39 launched at 1230L for rescue site. Pedro 91 was returning from an ACR at the same time Pedro 39 launched. Pedro 39 asked Pedro 91 to divert to Rach Gia to aide Pedro 39. Pedro 39 landed at the site at 1255 on loading two of the most seriously wounded. Pedro 91 landed at 1300L on loading 2 seriously wounded and one ambulatory. Three KIA were left at Rach Gia. While enroute to the 29th Army Field Hospital, the PJ's aboard the two aircraft administered medical attention to the wounded. Despite feverish efforts of the PJ, one wounded aboard Pedro 91, died enroute. Pedro 39 offloaded the two seriously wounded at the 29th at 1325. Pedro 91 arrived at the hospital at 1330. Pedro 39 terminated at 1330 while Pedro 91 terminated at 1345L. Three non-combat saves credited. 4 sorties with 2.7 hours flying time.

3. The names of the survivors were:

McHenry, Thomas, E-6, Seal Team 1

Mahner, Lin, E-5, Seal Team 1

Mozes, Robert, E-6, Seal Team 1

McDonald, Robert, Ans, Mobile Strike Force, Det Bravo

4. Crewmembers of Pedro 39:

AC Capt John L. Debevec

CP Capt Jack D. Cusano

PJ TSgt Dudley R. Peckinpaugh

Pedro 91:

AC Maj Ralph L. Gaede

CP Capt Cecil A. Jessee

PJ SSgt Michael F. Dean

FE. Sgt Kenneth F. Johnson

John L. Debevec
JOHN L. DEBEVEC, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander

Atch 10

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were picked up at 1414L and 1437L with Spad 11 as on-scene commander.

(S) On 4 May, Sandys 01, 02, 03 and 04 were scrambled on a partially successful SAR effort for Litter 22, an F-100. After arrival at the scene, a visual search was conducted but failed to locate the survivor. The position of the survivor was finally pinpointed by beeper. At this time, .50 caliber and small arms fire was directed against the SAR force. The Sandys quickly suppressed the ground fire and called in Jolly Green 71 to observe the chute of the survivor. A PJ was lowered who reported the survivor dead. The body was put aboard Jolly Green 71 and the SAR force returned to base.

(S) On 11 May, a successful SAR was conducted for Manual 42A, a downed F-4. Sandys 01, 02, 03 and 04 were scrambled at approximately 0820L. After arrival at the scene, the Sandys worked the Spads who dropped ordnance around the survivor. At 1009L, Sandy 01 called Hobos 40 and 41 in to expend around the survivor, who could be seen sitting on his parachute, because enemy forces were approaching that position. When the survivor lapsed into unconsciousness due to injuries he suffered while ejecting, Sandy 01 called Jolly Green in for the pickup. The survivor was picked up by the Jolly Green without encountering any problems. An electronic search was conducted by the Sandys for Manual 42B, but all efforts were unsuccessful.

(S) A partially successful rescue was conducted on 17 May

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for Cobalt 01B. The aircraft, an F-4, was hit by ground fire while flying a low level mission along Route 12 between Delta 29 and Delta 30. The backseat pilot either ejected or was inadvertently ejected from the aircraft.

(S) Sandys were scrambled at 1100L and Sandy 01/02 arrived on scene at 1150L. The location of the downed pilot was on a karst about one-half mile east and in plain view of Route 12. Route 12 runs roughly north-south and three-fourths mile to the west was a high, heavily wooded plateau.

(S) Nail 17 was in the area prior to the arrival of the Sandys and had the survivor's location pinpointed. The survivor stated he had both legs broken, his left arm broken and bleeding.

(S) Sandy 01 chose to hold the Jolly Greens over the rough ground to the east of the survivor. After Nail 17 had directed the air strikes along the route structure, Sandy 01 went down to strafe the area and troll for ground fire. Heavy small arms fire was encountered throughout the area. During a fire suppression pass up the ravine north of the survivor, the first ZPU was encountered. Since the gun covered only the northern area, Sandy 01 decided to concentrate on suppressing the small arms and then bring the rescue helicopter in from the southeast. Sandy 01 and 02 delivered fire suppression ordnance around the survivor until no small arms fire was apparent. Four A-1s from the 1st Special Operations Squadron dispensed CBU-19 and the four Sandys laid a smoke screen. Sandy 03 left the scene to bring in the helicopter

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while Sandy 01 trolled along the pre-planned entry route. Sandy 01 was almost over the survivor when heavy and accurate ZPU fire was encountered from a position north of the previous site. The rescue helicopter was held off while Sandy 01 directed air strikes against this new position. Ground fire at this time became very heavy. Sandy 01 and 02, while waiting for jet resources, attacked the ZPUs. Sandy 01 put a rocket in the cave where one was located and this gun did not come up again. Numerous passes were made against the guns and heavy accurate ground fire was encountered on each pass. The jets arrived and the area was well covered with ordnance but ground fire remained heavy. Sandys 01 and 02 were then relieved by Sandy 07 and 08. Sandy 07 then developed problems and returned to base. Sandy 09 and 10 then arrived on scene.

(S) At 1600L, Sandy 09 decided to attempt a pickup, utilizing Nail 139, which had replaced Nail 113, to direct jet strikes on the western side of the road. Sandy 09 also decided to use CBU-22 smoke to screen the survivor's position from the gun positions to the west. At this time Sandy 08 had joined 09 and 10. The three Sandys put down smoke just west of the survivor's position. Jolly Greens were advised that the run-in heading would be 320 degrees, escape heading 140 degrees, and to pull out immediately if any ground fire was encountered. As the Jolly Green left the holding area and headed for the smoke markers, the pilot of the rescue helicopter radioed "survivor's parachute

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in sight." At this time Sandy 09 directed 08 and 10 to join in putting suppressive fire against the western gun positions.

(S) The Jolly Green hovered for approximately five minutes, then exited the area using the prebriefed exit heading. No further ground fire was observed after the first smoke pass. Jolly Green 76 reported that a PJ had been lowered, and that the survivor had been found dead in his chute harness. Cause of death appeared to be massive injuries suffered during the explosive ejection and landing on the karst. The PJ reached the survivor at approximately 1600L, and estimated that death had occurred two hours earlier.

(S) During this quarter, the Squadron lost two aircraft to ground fire. The first of these occurred 26 April when Sandy 06 was downed by suspected ZPU fire. Following completion of an uneventful Tango Orbit, Sandys 05 and 06 were released by Compress to strike with an indigenous ground FAC. During the attack, Sandy 06 failed to pullout and crashed straight in. Sandy 05 conducted an unsuccessful visual and electronic search in the area until his fuel status forced him to RTB. Zorro 30 and 31 were diverted to conduct a search. No evidence of a survivor was observed.

(S) On 13 June, Firefly 20 was downed by confirmed ZPU fire during a reconnaissance mission with Firefly 21 along Route 7. Firefly 20 located 15 trucks moving along the main route structure.

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heavily defended area of Route 12 near North Vietnam. Lt Col Vargo led the first four Hobos into the area after diverting from a strike in the northwestern Steel Tiger area. When the Hobos arrived on scene, the Nail and Wolf FACs had the general area of the survivor located, but had not been able to find the survivor's exact position. Lt Col Vargo in talking to the survivor on the radio and utilizing the equipment on board his aircraft pinpointed the exact location of Cobalt 01 Bravo and then lead the Hobos in strikes against the surrounding enemy positions. Lt Col Vargo maintained the position of On-Scene-Commander in the heavily defended area until the Sandy pilots arrived. The Hobos launched eight aircraft loaded with CBU 19 to suppress enemy ground fire so that a successful pickup could be made. During the course of delivering their ordnance the Hobo pilots were greatly exposed to the heavy ground fire consisting of automatic weapons, ZPU, 23mm, and 37mm antiaircraft weapons. Lt Rounce was hit on his CBU 19 run and sustained heavy aircraft damage, but succeeded in bringing his A-1 back to NKP for a safe recovery. Three pilots from the 1st participated as Sandy pilots during the SAR. Maj Wiegel, Maj Alfred and Capt Flinn put their aircraft against the enemy in an effort to bring up ground fire and then put strikes in against the positions they had located. Maj Alfred sustained battle damage during the course of the action. He brought his aircraft back for a successful recovery at NKP.

(S) The last SAR the Hobos participated in during the quarter was for a downed F-4 crew in the Southern Steel Tiger area. Lt Col Downing and Maj Knox were on a helicopter escort mission near the area with the Pony Express helicopters from Udorn. Lt Col Downing escorted the helicopters into the immediate area of the survivors and orbited in the area while the FAC brought the helicopters in for the pickup. Both downed crewmen were pulled out of the area, but the aircraft commander fell off the penetrator before he could be pulled inside the helicopter.

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There were many simple water pickups that merely involved the removal of sick and injured personnel. Figures 24 and 25 illustrate such a recovery from a River Patrol Boat by an HH-43 Pedro.

While every effort was always made to recover wounded and dying aircrew men, there were times when the decision had to be made to abandon the effort. The following account by Maj. Gerald A. Jones of the 40th ARRS demonstrates the decisions that a recovery pilot often must make.^{15/}

"I was flying the high Jolly with Call Sign JG 76 on 17 May 1969 when we got the call for a downed pilot. JG 69, the low Jolly, had incurred some damage while refueling and had to return to base (RTFB), so I took over as low Jolly. JG 77 a back-up bird from Udorn had been alerted and was on its way to take over as high Jolly. The Sandy OSC put me in a position some distance away down in a sort of bowl of land. He held me there for over an hour while the area around the downed pilot was scartized by 32 fast movers and 26 Sandys (A-1Es)--all over a period of several hours of course. I failed to mention that JG 69 had made one attempt to get into the hot area before the air refueling took place and had taken some hits. The Crown C-130 had flown all the way to the area. They had called in the fast movers and had also set up a MIGCAP of F-102 aircraft when some MIGs were sighted near the area. The OSC had contact for a while with the downed pilot, but said that his voice had gotten weaker, and that he had finally lost contact with him. The OSC finally decided to bring me in on a heading of 310°. At that moment the OSC was not completely sure of the pilot's position, but decided to bring me in to see if I could spot him. After arriving in the area we were unable to spot anything that looked like a chute. The marking smoke by the Sandy showed nothing. I decided to make a sharp turn and head out to let them vector me in again--we were receiving many hits at this time, and at that moment I spotted the chute. We had received an earlier report that

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he was out of his harness, but I distinctly saw him wedged between some rocks, in harness with something wrapped around him. I hovered over the spot and the PJ went down the penetrator to the pilot, the PJ told me that he was obviously dead and had started to stiffen and that his wounds were numerous. His limbs were twisted and he was thoroughly ensnared in shroud lines, and in his tree lowering device, plus being tightly wedged in between the rocks. In the PJ's judgment it would take a minimum of 15 minutes to get the body loose. Enemy fire was getting intense so he signaled to be pulled back up. We had been in a hover for 8 minutes. The engineer reported to me "we have him aboard". In my anxiety I reported to the OSC that we had the pilot, but quickly corrected myself when the engineer corrected me. We were vectored out of the hot area flying low and shortly thereafter returned to base. I feel that the decision to abandon the body under the circumstances was a wise one since the danger of getting the crewmembers wounded was imminent. The area was red hot and 15 more minutes could have been deadly. We were airborne a total of 5.8 hours."

There were many other stirring and dramatic SAR missions that are not related here, since the majority of them have been detailed in other published reports. Those presented here were chosen to provide a representative sampling from among the wide spectrum of Search and Rescue activity in SEA.

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TO: COMNAV - 1st Operations Squadron

FROM: 1st Helicopter (Cobalt 01B)

SUB: JUNG (30)

1. An unsuccessful rescue was conducted on 17 May 1969 for Cobalt 01B. The aircraft, an F-4, was hit by ground fire at approximately 1050L on 17 May while flying a low level mission over Route 12 between Delta 29 and Delta 30. The cockpit pilot either ejected or was inadvertently ejected from the airplane. This report covers those activities relating to the search during the rescue effort.
2. The Hawks were scrambled at 1100L and airborne at 1115. Sandy 01/02 arrived on scene at 1150L and relieved Tail 17 as on scene commander.
3. The location of the downed pilot was on a karst about 1/2 mile east and in plain view of Route 12. Route 12 runs roughly North-South and 3/4 mile to the west was a high, heavily wooded plateau and the terrain to the east was rough, wooded forest and mountains with several well used trails running up ravines into the rough ground. One of these was located at the northern base of the karst where the survivor was located. The area was known to be heavily defended with guns of all caliber and numerous ground troops. The weather in the area was scattered to broken clouds with bases at 5,000 feet.
4. Tail 17 was in the area prior to the arrival of the Hawks and had the survivor's location pin plotted. The survivor stated he had both legs broken, his left arm broken, and was bleeding. Ground had lined up resources and Sandy 01 asked Tail 17 to direct the jet strikes along the route airstrip.
5. Sandy 01 came to hold the Jolly Green over the crash ground to the east of the survivor. After Tail 17 had directed the jet strikes along the route airstrip Sandy 01 went down to have the survivor's leg set for ground fire. A very small area of the overcast was cleared at the crash and on a clear occasion just to the south just north of the survivor the first shot was encountered. This pattern was very well executed in a circle and was very accurate, maintaining fire on every shot. Sandy 01 (an observer) only the northern area. Sandy 01 decided to concentrate on covering the small area and then bring the rescue heli over in from the south side. Sandy 01 and 02 delivered fire support for entrance around the survivor until no small area fire was any more. Four F-4's from the 1st AGC came in a 1st diagonal (SW-1) and the four Hawks laid a smoke screen. Sandy 03 left the scene to bring in the helicopter while Sandy 01 trailed along the pre-planned entry route. Sandy 01 was almost over the survivor when heavy and accurate HBU fire was encountered from a position north of the previous site. The rescue helicopter was held

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
 INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED
 AFTER 12 YEARS

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COM-369-035
 Copy 11/01/69
 For 11/01/69
 GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
 intervals; declassified
 after 12 years

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UNCLASSIFIED

off while Sandy 01 directed air strikes against this new position. Ground fire at this time became very heavy. Sandy 01 and 02, while waiting for the jets, continued to observe. Sandy 01 put a rocket in the cave with one of the guns and while gun did not come up again. Numerous passes were made against these guns and heavy accurate ground fire was encountered on each pass. The jets arrived and the area was well covered with ordnance but ground fire remained heavy. Mail 113 arrived to replace Mail 17. Since the gun positions were not readily apparent Sandy 01 made another firing pass to give Mail 113 a definite fix on the guns. The gunners of Mail 113 directed more air strikes. At 1415L Sandy 07/08/09/10 were airborne from channel 89; Sandy 07 and 08 arrived on scene at 1445L and were briefed on the situation including the fact that the survivor was badly injured, bleeding heavily and had not come up on voice for over an hour. Sandy 07 took over as on scene commander and Sandy 01 returned to base.

6. Time: 1500 hours local. Sandy 07 developed a map light and started for home, leaving Sandy 03 and 04 as the low element. Sandy 09 and 10 arrived with Jolly Green 77 and established a holding pattern five miles northwest of the survivor's position. At 1505 hours, Sandy 04 took a 37km hit and headed for channel 89. Sandy 07 joined with 04 and they RCH'd. Sandy 08 joined 03 as the low element wingman. During the next thirty minutes Sandys 03 and 08 and Wolf 06 (F-4 FMO) made multiple trolling passes to draw fire and position the threat. He positioned and killed a possible WFO at the northwest corner of the burnt lamp the survivor was on. (Mail 130 put in first nover) The only remaining threat was a possible WFO one kilometer southeast of the survivor, on a bypass road. He would not fire every pass and never fired at first nover as Sandy 03 made the decision to put multiple fast novers on that position, neutralizing them to north/south passing, west of the road. (Mail 130 made the same). At 1540L Sandy 09 and 10 moved across the route structure with Jolly Green 76 in a holding pattern one mile east of the survivor's position. Sandy 07 briefed Sandy 09 that an attempt would be made to put in the Jolly Green, using jet strikes to suppress the ground fire from the western area. Before this could be done, Sandy 03 went down and 07 is with a .50 cal. hole in the fuselage, leaving Sandy 09 as on scene commander.

7. Time: 1600 hours local. Sandy 09 decided to attempt a pickup, utilizing Mail 130 to put in jet strikes on the western side of the road, and using (F-4) strike to screen the survivor's position from the gun positions to the west. At this time Sandy 03 had joined 09 and 10 and the three Sandys put down smoke just west of the survivor's position. On the first smoke pass, ground fire from the west was noted, and Sandy 09 asked Mail 130 to increase the frequency of jet strikes on the gun positions. Sandy 09

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GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS; DATE 10/10/2000
AFTER 10 YEARS

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put down two M20s to mark the ingress and egress route for Jolly Green 76, and briefed the Jolly Green that the run-in heading would be 320°, escape heading 170°, and advised the Jolly Green to pull out immediately if any ground fire was encountered. As the Jolly Green left the holding area and headed for the smoke markers, the ROC called "survivor's parachute in sight". At this point Sandy 09 directed 02 and 10 to join in putting suppressive fire against the western gun positions. The Jolly Green hovered for approximately five minutes, then exited the area using the prebriefed exit heading. No further ground fire was observed after the first smoke pass. Jolly Green 76 reported that a PJ had been lowered, and that the survivor had been found dead in his chute harness. Cause of death appeared to be massive injuries suffered during the explosive ejection and landing on the karst. The PJ reported the survivor had both legs broken, left arm broken, and had been bleeding heavily. The PJ reached the survivor at approximately 1600L, and estimated that death had occurred two hours earlier. Sandy 02, 10, and 30 escorted Jolly Green 76 and 77 back to base without further incident.

8. This SAR effort was unsuccessful due to the high ground fire encountered in the survivor's immediate position. This ground fire accounted for three A-1 aircraft having to RET with battle damage, and prevented a pickup attempt being made until 1600 hours local, approximately five hours after the ejection. Although CHU-19 was used, it was not effective against the ZHU's located in caves due north of the survivor's position.

9. Nail 139 did an outstanding job in directing air strikes during the pickup attempt. This close co-ordination between PAC and Sandy made it possible for Sandy low level to concentrate on directing the helicopters to the survivor's location without having to worry about the jet strike aircraft.

602-069-053

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GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
 INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED
 AFTER 12 YEARS

FROM: 37(0) ~~in mission were JG 25~~

19 May 1969

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (L-3-054-18 MAY 69)

TO: 37C

3rd ARRGp (JSARC) *JG 25*

IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1968.

2. At 0515Z, 18 May 1969, JG 25 was proceeding south bound, feet wet from Ch 103 to Ch 77. A mayday call was heard over guard channel at approximately 0520Z. We were approximately 4 miles to the northeast of the site of the mid-air collision between "Basketball 814" (C-130) and two F-4C aircraft with call signs of "Lovebug". The call sign of the fourth aircraft involved was unknown. The JG 25 co-pilot saw bright flash of the initial collision and the pilot saw a cloud of black smoke immediately after. All crewmembers noted a minimum of 3 large burning masses of wreckage decending to the ground. It could not be ascertained at this time what parts of which aircraft these pieces represented. At the time of this accident JG 25 was approx 4 miles from site of impact of largest piece of wreckage. Upon brief search of the debris in this area (feet wet - 079/10/69) we ascertained that this was wreckage from the C-130 aircraft. The crew noted two maingear assembly, one 20 man life raft (still in container), and an excessive amount of debris in small area which identified this as the C-130 aircraft. Numerous small aircraft and helicopters were at this time searching the other two large pieces of burning wreckage which fell feet dry just off the beach. There was a multitude of small pieces of debris which continued to float down for at least 15 minutes. One of the other aircraft sighted a parachute still airborne at approx 4-5 thousand feet at this time. We climbed to thirty-five hundred feet to investigate the chute and found it to be empty. The crew was unable to determine to our complete satisfaction what kind of parachute it was, but we feel that it was a seat pack due to the behavior of the parachute. There was adequate weight to keep the chute stable and full even though it decended very slowly. It appeared to the pilot to be a seat pack with the survival kit intact and undeployed. While we were investigating the chute 2 pilots were picked up at a point approx 10 miles south of our position by a Navy helicopter (Protector 47). We began a general search of the whole area while acting as liaison between Group 6 and the numerous aircraft and ships in the area. We received word that one aircraft which was involved was recovered safely at Ch 50. A Cat Killer (number unknown) reported a body eaten by a shark and another body KIA located in a seat on dry land. Dust Off 501 picked up the KIA in the seat and carried it to Ch 69. JG 25 was assigned to execute a creeping line search from the C-130 impact site south for 10 miles and from the beach to 10 miles out to sea. This was done with no result and JG 25 was rtb'd to Ch 77 at 0630Z.

~~REDACTED~~

NO: SAC

SUBJECT: MISSION HYDROPLANE BUOY (I-3-02-18 NVA 20)

10 NVA 1320

FROM: SA(O)

[REDACTED]

3. Other aircraft on mission were JG's 28, 03, 33, and 21.

4. No survivors rescued.

5. Jolly Green Crew Members:

JOLLY GREEN 25

AC	Capt	George B. Stokes
CP	Capt	Charles D. Langham
FE	AIC	James A. Thibodeau
RS	Sgt	Thomas T. Winters

George B. Stokes
GEORGE B. STOKES, Capt, USAF
Aircraft Commander

[REDACTED]

61
130

STATEMENT

At 0520Z, 18 May 1969 Queen scrambled Jolly Greens 28/03 and Spads 11/12 from DaNang. A C-130, Basketball 814, had a mid air while working 2 to 3 Lovebugs (F-4s) at 079/10/Channel 69. Jolly Green 28 was airborne at 0524Z and proceeded to 060/20/Channel 69 to check on reported life raft. Jolly Green 25 who was four miles from the impact area at the time of the accident worked the immediate area. Two survivors were picked up approximately 10 miles south of the impact area by a SH-3 Navy helicopter, Probator 47. Jolly Green 28 checked the 060/20/off Channel 69 and could find no life raft so proceeded to 079/10/Off Channel 69. At 0550Z we arrived at the C-130 impact area and spotted one body floating in the water, landed and made a pick-up. There was no identification on the deceased crewmember. Jolly Greens 28/03/25/33/21 continued to search the area, Spads 11/12 returned to Channel 77. At 0400Z Jolly Greens 28/03/25 completed their search and returned to Channel 77.

One deceased crew member picked up - no identification.

Jolly Green Crew Members:

JOLLY GREEN 28

AC	Maj	Anthony F. Argo
CP	Lt	Richard V. Butchka (USCG)
FE	SSgt	Billy R. Bloomer
RS	SSgt	Stephen T. White

JOLLY GREEN 03

AC	Capt	Bill M. Campbell
CP	Maj	Bruce E. Prouse
FE	SSgt	Gary S. Estep
RS	ALC	Donald M. Lester
AP	Sgt	Thomas A. Dotson Jr.

Anthony F. Argo
ANTHONY F. ARGO, Maj, USAF
Aircraft Commander

[REDACTED]

STATEMENT

While on alert at Quang Tri MAS on 18 May 69, a partial conversation between Crown 6 and an unknown source (on HF) indicated that a possible mid air collision had occurred. Jolly Green 25 had departed Quang Tri shortly before interception of this message and he was directed to the scene. At approximately 1350L Queen scrambled Jolly Green 21 (low) and 33 (high). Both aircraft were airborne at 1404L and proceeded toward Hue. Enroute, Crown 6 assigned search areas as follows: Creeping line search north of 079/10/69 from the beach to 15 NM to sea for JG 33 and the same search pattern for JG 25 working south from the 079 radial. JG 21 observed much debris on the water surface while transiting JG 33s search area. Creeping line pattern paralleling the 079 radial was established by JG 21. JG 21 observed only normal flotsam/jetsam except for one oil slick which appeared to originate beneath the surface at 096/18/69. This plot was reported but was not considered productive because no abnormal debris was observed which appeared to be associated with the major (apparent) impact area. A squall line moving west to east caused suspension of the southern area (JG 21) search at 1600L, however we believe that 100% coverage was effected from the 079 radial southward (from the beach to 15 NM seaward) to a point well beyond where any debris may have fallen (approximately 15 miles southward).


HENRY B. SIMPSON, JR., Lt Col, USAF
Aircraft Commander

Aircraft Commander

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (10-35-035-21 May 69)

TO: 10-38C

38C-51

3ARRCp (JSARC)

IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2, 3ARRCp Sup 1, 11 July 1968.
2. At 2215L Navy Binh Thuy called Pedro operations and requested Medevac of five wounded Naval personnel from the village of Chau Duc. Pedro 39 & 91 launched at 2225L for Medevac point 50 miles Northwest of Binh Thuy. Enroute weather was 3500' broken with 10 miles visibility. Pedro 39 & 91 arrived at rescue location at 2305L. Pedro 39 landed first unloading three seriously wounded personnel. All three had multiple shrapnel wounds. Pedro 91 landed one minute after 39, unloading the two remaining wounded. They too had multiple shrapnel wounds; one of the wounded being a South Vietnamese. Pedro 39 & 91 departed Chau Duc at 2310L for the 29th Army Field Hospital. While enroute the PJ's with assistance from the FE's administered much needed medical attention to the wounded. Pedro 39 & 91 arrived at 29th Army Field Hospital at 2345L offloading the wounded personnel. Pedro 39 & 91 then terminated at Binh Thuy at 2355L. Light small arms fire observed upon departure from Chau Duc. Five non-combat saves credited; 4 sorties with 3.0 hours flying time.
3. The names of the survivors were: Boone, Frank R, E-6; Ennis, Tommy E, SM-1; Carpenter, Gerry, E-4; Moore, Robert A, E-4, from Riv Div 551. Name of the South Vietnamese is unknown. *F/MIL*

4. Crewmembers of Pedro 39:

AC Capt Philip H. Kammann
CP Capt Jack D. Cusano
PJ ALC Theodore J. Polys
FE SSgt George E. Hubbard III

Pedro 91:

AC Maj Ralph L. Gaede
CP Capt David L. Bachman
PJ SSgt Michael F. Dean
FE Sgt Kenneth F. Johnson

FOR THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER

Jack D. Cusano
JACK D. CUSANO, Capt, USAF
Co-pilot

ATCH 9

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

89
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96237



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 400 (Major Jones/2687)

26 May 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report #2-3-035-2/

Classified by 102 8 3 A206P
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 79

TO: 3ARRGP (JSARC)
APO 96307

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRS 1, dated 11 July 1968.
2. (C) On 24 May 1969, JG 71 (Low) and JG 77 (High) were on 45 minute standby night alert at Ch 89 (Nakhon Phanom RTAFB). At 1346Z, I was advised by Compress to launch both aircraft for a search and rescue mission in the vicinity of CH 76 (Ubon RTAFB). A Carter aircraft had received battle damage and was returning to Ch 76 with two engines out. All non essential personnel were bailing out of the Carter on the 045° radial of Ch 76 between the 9 and 19 NM DME. The aircraft intended to make a gear up landing at Ch 76. JG 71 and JG 77 launched from Ch 89 at 1420Z for the SAR area. Enroute, Lion GCI advised JG 71 and 77 that seven aircrew members had bailed out and 5 were on board when the aircraft crashed landed and burned on the runway at Ch 76. Halfmoon was the on-scene Commander and was working with Pedro 88 from Ch 76. Blind Bat 02, a flare ship, was also in the area. Route to SAR area was direct with TACAN and GCI vectors used for navigation. Weather in route 6 to 9 thousand feet broken with numerous thunderstorms. Portions of the flight was performed in IMC with GCI vectors around thunderstorms. Thirtyfive nautical miles from the SAR area JG 71 contacted Blind Bat 02 on guard who had assumed on-scene command. Blind Bat 02 advised that Pedro 88 was working the area and had recovered 5 survivors. JG 71 and 77 established holding at 1515Z on the 045° radial at 25nm on Ch 76, as directed, while Pedro 88 recovered the sixth survivor. Pedro 88 was directed to return to base at 1522Z and JG 71 was called into the area to pickup the seventh survivor, Carter Foxtrot. JG 77 continued to hold 045/25/Ch 76. Blind Bat 02 had weak voice contact and was orbiting over the position. As JG 71 approached the position, Carter Foxtrot ignited a night flare which was sighted by JG 71. The flare burned out when JG 71 was approximately 2 miles from the survivor. JG 71 orbited at 1000 MSL in the vicinity of the survivor and established voice contact. Several times Carter Foxtrot's strobe light was spotted but would be lost as the helicopter position was changed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals
after 12

Atch 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Carter Foxtrot stated that his chute was in a tree and he was right below his chute. The survivor attempted to direct JG 71 to his position but no visual sighting could be made. JG 71 requested flares and moved about 2 miles away while Blind Bat 02 dropped flares. The flares proved to be ineffective as 2 flares did not ignite and the other 2 did not ignite until on the ground. During this period, JG 71 obtained a visual fix on Carter Foxtrot's strobe light. JG 71 then moved in over the survivor and circled while preparing to drop M9A1 flares. JG 71 dropped 2 flares at 700 ft AGL and made a 270° turn to final approach toward Carter Foxtrot. The flares proved very effective and provided illumination until a hover was established over the survivor. Carter Foxtrot talked JG 71 into his position until the chute was spotted. Carter Foxtrot was hanging below his chute approximately 75 feet off the ground. He had disconnected his chest strap and refastened it around a large branch. He disconnected his chute risers when JG 71 was 50 feet from his position. A hover was established over Carter Foxtrot at 1542Z. At first some difficulty was experienced in maintaining a stable hover due to smoke believed to be from Blind Bat's flares and trees swaying from the rotor down wash. I advised Major Lehman to monitor the controls with me and at 1544Z Airman Allen was lowered on the forest penetrator to recover the survivor. A hover was maintained for six more minutes while Airman Allen freed Carter Foxtrot from the vines and heavy tree foliage, attached him to the forest penetrator by use of a sling rope and two snap links, and released the chute harness. Airman Allen and Carter Foxtrot were safely on board at 1550Z and we departed the area. Landing at Ch 76 was made at 1615Z terminating the mission.

3. (U) The survivor was: Major Vernon E. O'Meally,

4. The rescue crews were:

Jolly Green 71 (Low)

AC: Jones, Gerald A., Major,

CP: Lehman, William B., Major,

FE: Frazier, Ralph, SSgt, .

RS: Allen, Grady F., A1C,

RS: Sopata, Ronald F., A1C,

AP: Brown, Lawrence T. Jr., Sgt,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Jolly Green 77 (High)

AG: Hartman, John H., Capt,

CP: Fekke, Peter L., Capt,

FE: McLeod, David V., TSgt,

RS: Schipper, George E., TSgt,

RS: Davis, Arthur M. A1C,

William B. Lehman Maj.
for GERALD A. JONES, Major, USAF
Aircraft Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

89

FROM: Det 3, 38th ARRS (MAC)
APO San Francisco 96304

UNCLASSIFIED

27 May 1969

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3-380

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (2-3-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 23 May 69)

TO: 3-38C
38 ARRS (38C) *ep*
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON *31 Dec 73*

1. This report is submitted in accordance with ARRS 55-2/3rd ARRGp Sup 1, dated 11 July 1968.
2. Det 3, 38th ARRS was alerted by Ubon Tower via the primary crash net an AC-130 (Carter Lead) was 100 miles out with battle damage, two engines out, and one crew member seriously injured. Alert crew proceeded to aircraft (Pedro 08) and monitored radios. Ubon tower was advised to notify Pedro 08 when Carter Lead was 50 miles out. At 1320Z tower directed Pedro 08 to the 047° radial at approximately 17 NM where the AC-130 was planning to bailout several crew members. The two firefighters were dropped off and the flight engineer was placed on board. Pedro 08 was airborne at 1325Z and enroute to the bailout site. At 1335Z contact was made with Half Moon (EC-47) orbiting over the bailout area. He reported seven survivors including one injured. At 1345Z a flare was spotted approximately one mile in Pedro 08's twelve o'clock position. One pass was made over the site and the survivor was located. He appeared to be the injured man, as he was lying down. A small clearing was located approximately 50 yards away and a landing accomplished. The medic and flight engineer were sent to find the survivor and returned with him after 15 minutes. The litter was taken but not used because of extremely rough terrain. The medic advised the pilot that the survivor appeared to have shrapnel wounds and a possible broken ankle. Pedro 08 returned to base because of low fuel and turned survivor over to medical personnel at 1420Z. The medic administered the necessary first aid enroute to Ubon. Alert crew proceeded to second aircraft (Pedro 88) which had been fully fueled and took off for bailout site at 1430Z. Upon arriving at the scene at 1450Z Pedro 88 was advised that 6 survivors were still on the ground. Blind Bat 04 (C-130) and Half Moon (EC-47) were orbiting over the bailout site at approximately 4,000 feet and aided in locating the remaining survivors. A systematic search pattern was initiated which resulted in locating and recovering five survivors in minimum time. Four were picked up using the forest penetrator because trees and rough terrain prevented safe landings. The fifth survivor was in a clear area and a landing was accomplished for this pickup. Pedro 88 was in the process of locating the 7th and last crew member who was reported in a 75 foot high tree when Lion Control (GCI) advised Pedro 88 to return to base. Two HH-53's Jolly Green 71 and Jolly Green 77, were permitted to recover the one remaining survivor while Pedro 88 returned to base with the other five. At 1545Z Pedro 88 landed at Ubon and turned survivors over to medical personnel. Mission complete.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

AT ch 3

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT #10

40

MISSION NARRATIVE 1-3-56, 25 May 1969

(U) Jolly Green 07 took off from DaNang at 0620Z 25 May 69 for a normal functional check flight. After completing the required checks over water near Monkey Mountain the crew saw a sailboat overturned in the water. Four men were hanging on to the bottom of the boat. An immediate water landing was made and the survivors were brought on board. All were in good condition. The co-pilot called Queen control and boat #44 from Harbor Entrance Control was dispatched to the scene. Jolly Green 07 loitered in the area until Boat #44 arrived. The survivors were transferred to Boat #44 for salvage of the sailboat.

(U) The survivors were: Sgt Hardeman, Sgt Newman, Sgt Larven, Sgt Jenkins, 5th Comm Btn, Monkey Mountain.

(U) Jolly Green Crewmembers:

JOLLY GREEN 07

AC Maj Paul B. Davis, Jr.
CP Capt Charles D. Langham
FE Sgt Harold G. Alves

Supporting Document# 16

60

<u>SAVE NO</u>	<u>SURVIVOR'S NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
✓ 463	Edward A. Davis	Capt-AF		5 Mar 69	1-3-28
✓ 464	Tracy A. Scanlan	Maj-AF	UNK	6 Mar 69	1-3-29
✓ 465	Aldis P. Rutyne	Capt-AF		10 Mar 69	2-3-18
466 NC	UNK ARVN	UNK	UNK	15 Mar 69	
467	Kerry G. Herron	Capt-AF	UNK	24 Mar 69	1-3-35
468	Wm PopenDorf	Capt-AF		29 Mar 69	2-3-24
469	R.D. Stafford	1/Lt-AF		29 Mar 69	1-3-37
470	Ronald C. Staneerfer	Maj-AF	UNK	1 Apr 69	1-3-38
471	Charles L. Vearl	1/Lt-AF	UNK	1 Apr 69	1-3-38
472	Cecil G. Foster	LtCol	UNK	2 Apr 69	1-3-39
✓ 473	Joseph P. McMahon Jr.	1/Lt	UNK	2 Apr 69	1-3-39
✓ 474	Mark A. Bunker	Lt-N	UNK	12 Apr 69	1-3-42
475	Ross C. Detwiler	1/Lt	UNK	22 Apr 69	1-3-45
476	Wm. J. O'Conner	LtCom-N	UNK	2 May 69	1-3-47
477	Gary L. Bain	Lt-M	UNK	11 May 69	1-3-51
478	Patrick E. Daly	1/Lt-M		12 May 69	1-3-52
479	Dean H. Matzko	1/Lt-M		12 May 69	1-3-52
480 NC	Dionisio Z. Pangilinan	UNK-N	UNK	14 May 69	1-3-9
481 NC	Hardeman	Sgt	UNK	25 May 69	1-3-56
482 NC	Newman	Sgt	UNK	25 May 69	1-3-56
483 NC	Jenkins	Sgt	UNK	25 May 69	1-3-56
484 NC	Larven	Sgt	UNK	25 May 69	1-3-56


SUBJ: Rescue Narrative Report (CG-032-010 - 25 May 1969)

TO: 3ARRGp/30

1. The following report is submitted IAW ARSM 55-2, 3ARRGp Sup 1 dated 11 July 1968. At 1415Z 25 May 1969 Coastal Center called and advised Det 8 that the U.S. Army representative at the MACV Compound at the village of Ba Noi was requesting an emergency med evac. The request was to transport immediately one Vietnamese woman to the 8th Army Field Hospital at Nha Trang AB RVN. Pedro 48 scrambled and upon arrival at Ba Noi vehicle lights and flares were utilized for locating and lighting the helipad during loading and pickup of the woman who was on a litter receiving intravenous plasma. She was hemorrhaging internally and in considerable pain. The 8th Field Hospital was alerted for our arrival and immediately took charge of the patient.

2. Crew members were:

AC - Major Calvin W. Capper
CP - Samuel E. Chapin, Captain
FE - TSgt James L. Johnson
PJ - TSgt Lawrence Wellington



RICHARD H. COAN, Maj, USAF
Commander

90

FROM: Aircraft Commander

26 May 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (10-38-036-26May69)

TO: 10-38C
38C
3ARRGp (JSARG)
IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2, 3ARRGp Sup 1, 11 July 1968.
2. Detachment 10 operations was called at 1145L by Special Forces TOC for medevac of one WIA at WS 001470. The weather was 3000' broken and ten miles visibility. Pedro 91 launched at 1150L and Pedro 39 launched at 1210L. Pedro 91 arrived at the coordinates at 1240L and located the exact ground position by prearranged smoke. One reconnaissance pass was followed by an approach and pickup utilizing the Stokes litter. No ground fire was observed although the area was not considered secure. The PJ checked the WIA and no medical assistance was required.. Pedro 39 was notified of the pickup and followed Pedro 91 back. The 29th was reached at 1305L and after the WIA was unloaded termination at Binh Thuy was at 1315L. One combat save was credited with two sorties and 2.4 hours of flying time.

3. The name and nationality of the survivor was unknown.

4. Crewmembers of Pedro 91:

AC Maj Ralph L Gaede
CP Capt David L Bachman
PJ TSgt Dudley R Peckinpaugh
FE Sgt Kenneth P Johnson

Pedro 39:

AC Capt Philip H Kammann
CP Capt Cecil A Jessee
PJ SSgt Michael F Dean
FE MSgt John G Regan Jr

FOR THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER



David L Bachman, Capt, USAF
Co-pilot

TO: 9-38(0)
3rd AARGP (JSARO) *PJ*
IN TURN

1/21

1. This report is submitted in accordance with AERSM 55-1/3rd AARGP
Sup 1, 15 Jan 69.

2. At 0855Z, 26 May 69, we were alerted by telephone of the SAR Objective. Crew scrambled at 0905Z preceeding to Engineer Hill for exact coordinates. LZ located by means of smoke in ravine cut out of tall trees on a slope. Aircraft unable to land. Aircraft hovered with only aux gear touching slope. PJ assisted evacuee into aircraft. Maximum power required to stagger out of hole (LZ). Evacuee taken to 71st Army Evacuation Hospital and off loaded. 5 sorties 0.6.

CREW

AC - Capt Joseph T. Herr, CP - Capt James F. Hinkel, FE - TSgt Robert A. Brouillette, PJ - TSgt Colin A. Lane. 1 non-aircrew-member non combat save.

Joseph T. Herr

JOSEPH T. HERR, Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

1st Ind (9-38C)

28 May 1969

DAF, Det 9, 38ARRSq

TO: 3ARRGP (JSARO)

Approved.

Robert C. Gordon

ROBERT C. GORDON, Major, USAF
Commander

Det 9, 38ARRSq Hist, Apr - Jun 69

9-5

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS

MISSIONS

During the reporting period, Detachment 9 flew 335 sorties of which 87 were in support of aircraft or personnel in distress. There were 144 Base Support sorties and 94 Training sorties. The remaining 1C sorties were Functional Check Flights.

There were five significant operational rescue missions during the quarter. The first occurred on 22 Apr 69 when an F-100, Icon 31, struck trees on a bombing pass and was forced to bail out 35 NM Northeast of Pleiku AB. Pedro 98 launched to offer assistance and arrived in the pickup area as an Army Dustoff aircraft came to a hover over the downed pilot's position. Pedro 98 then escorted Dustoff 17 to An Khe since the Army chopper was not carrying a medic. No save was recorded.

On 26 May Detachment 9 was advised of a US Army soldier needing medevac due to extreme high temperatures (105 degrees). His problem was diagnosed on the spot as Malaria. The soldier was located near a landing zone in a suspected hostile area. Pedro 83 launched and flew to the area 9 NM Northeast of Pleiku AB. Pedro 83 located the Army patrol by directing the patrol on FM radio to pop smoke. The position was in a ravine on a 20 degree slope. The aircraft was hovered with the nose gear on the ground and the soldier was loaded on board. Maximum power was required for the take off as Pedro 83 departed the area enroute to the 71st Army Evac Hospital. The soldier was SP4 Robert A. Gillespie of the 1st Batt, 14th Infantry. Detachment 9 recorded one non-aircrew member non-combat save. Mission #9-38-002.

Det 9, 38ARBSq Hist. APR - Jun69

9-10

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 1

MISSION NARRATIVE 9-38-002, 26 May 69

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2. At 0855Z, 26 May 69, we were alerted by telephone of the SAR Objective. Crew scrambled at 0905Z proceeding to Engineer Hill for exact coordinates. LZ located by means of smoke in ravine cut out of tall trees on a slope. Aircraft unable to land. Aircraft hovered with only aux gear touching slope. PJ assisted evacuee into aircraft. Maximum power required to stagger out of hole(LZ). Evacuee taken to 71st Army Evacuation Hospital and off loaded. 5 sorties 0.6.

3. Survivor. Gillespie, Robert A., SP4, 1st Batt, 14th Inf.

4. CREW

AC - Capt Joseph T. Herr, CP - Capt James F. Hinkel, FE - TSgt Robert A. Brouillette, PJ - TSgt Colin A. Lane.

5. 1 non-aircrew-member non combat save.

91

FROM: Aircraft Commander

27 May 1969

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (10-38-037-27 May 69)

TO: 10-38G

38G

3ARRGp (JSARC) *POY*

IN TURN

1. This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2, 3ARRGp Sup 1, 11 July 1968.
2. At 1255L Navy Binh Thuy called Pedro operations and requested immediate evacuation of wounded personnel at WR119899. Pedro 39 launched at 1300L for the rescue Co-ordinates. Enroute weather was 2500 broken with 10 miles visibility. While enroute Pedro 39 learned that the wounded was a viet namese Police advisor to the Navy. The wounded was on board a River Patrol Boat and enroute to designated beaching area. Pedro 39 decided to intercept the PBR in order to expedite the medical evacuation. Pedro 39 made the interception at WR155860 at 1335L and executed the moving pick up by use of the stokes litter. While in the area making the pick up, Pedro 39 drew light ground fire. With the wounded on board, Pedro 39 departed the area and flew to the provincial hospital at Rach Gia a small town 5 miles away. Pedro 39 arrived at Rach Gia at 1345L and off loaded the wounded Vietnamese. Pedro 39 departed Rach Gia at 1350L terminating at Binh Thuy at 1425L. No hits were discovered upon post flight inspection. Two sorties with 1.4 hours flying time. One combat save credited.
3. The name and orginazation of the wounded was unknown.
4. Crewmembers of Pedro 39

AC Capt John L. Debevec

CP Capt Jack D. Cusano

PJ SSgt Michael F. Dean

FE SSgt George E. Hubbard III

John L. Debevec
John L. Debevec, Capt USAF
Aircraft Commander

Atch 11