

HEADQUARTERS 3D AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

15 Jan 68

SUBJECT: Commander's Letter for January 1968

TO: All Squadrons & Detachments, 3ARRGp

1. The year 1967 was a big one for the Group. Some of the things you've done this year will go down in the annals of the Air Force as some of the most outstanding accomplishments of the Southeast Asia conflict. Among other things, you flew 31, 726 hours while making 648 saves, of which 414 were made under combat conditions (see attach #1 for breakout of saves). You were awarded 2 Air Force Crosses, 20 Silver Stars, 220 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 50 Bronze Stars and more than 1400 Air Medals. These accomplishments are the result of not only the individuals who received the awards but the combined team efforts of all personnel. Some paid dearly for their part in this record. Four of our men were killed in action and 14 were wounded trying to help others in distress. However, some are going home with more than awards. More than 100 of you were upgraded to 5 and 7 level through on-the-job training while also contributing to the above record. In the area of ground safety, we've ended up 1967 in an excellent manner, with no ground accidents in December. In fact, as I am drafting this letter, I note that we've experienced no reportable accidents for the past two month period (since 7 November). These are substantive accomplishments which will be hard to top in 1968. All that can be asked is that each man do his best. No one can do more.

2. We have been advised that Headquarters USAF has reduced the crew manning ratio for HH-3E and HH-53B aircraft from 2.0 to 1.5 per authorized aircraft. This does not mean that we will have an immediate crew reduction and mass shipment back to CONUS. Instead, there will be a gradual reduction in ratio as crew members rotate, but in all probability, the 1.5 level will not be reached until mid 1968. We're presently manned to approximately the 1.7 level in the HH-3E. However, this is based on authorized aircraft which exceeds on hand aircraft by five. The average flying time per crew member is currently at 30 hours per month but may be expected to gradually increase to 40 to 45 hours per month as the crews rotate. We feel this is realistic and will enable more copilots to be upgraded in a shorter period. In connection with upgrading, we have again queried higher headquarters as to the status of our 29 Jun 67 request to lower the requirement for 350 total helicopter hours for RCCP upgrading to a

*A200C
Crew Manning
Ratio for
HH-3E & HH-53*

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

No

0017509

CATALOGED

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

SUBJECT: Monthly Commander's Letter

to: Brigadier General Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

Exec: B
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1. Literally and figuratively, we wound this month up with a bang. The VC attack on 31 January 1968 against the major cities of South Viet Nam was not entirely unexpected but the viciousness of the attacks was unparalleled. Here at Tan Son Nhut, 112 VC were killed within the base perimeter, with another 325 KIA just outside the perimeter (actual body count). Snipers were within the cantonment area for more than 24 hours. One sniper was operating from behind the officer's club, directly across the street from the trailer. Colonels Beaudry and Musick stayed in two nights before the assault. Our people behaved well and no casualties were incurred within the Group. At Pleiku, one HH-43 was pretty badly beaten up by shrapnel from a 122mm rocket which impacted at the end of the revetment the aircraft was parked in. This bird needs about 35 parts and some sheet metal work but is reparable within the capabilities of the unit, with base support. At Tan Son Nhut, Det 14 aircraft received some bullet holes but were flyable throughout the period. At Danang, the Jolly Greens and Pedros provided sustained, around-the-clock evacuation of incoming casualties being received from the DMZ area and flown to Danang by C-130's. Over 790 casualties were evacuated from Danang to the Naval Hospital and the hospital ships Sanctuary and Repose by the 37th and Det 7, 38th, in the six day period starting 31 January. Although these statistics will not show as saves, the sustained performance of our Danang people was outstanding.

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2. One non-personnel casualty to fall by the wayside as a result of the attack is our new, approved facility for Det 14 here at Tan San Nhut. Construction had been scheduled to start on 4 February; however, as a result of the difficulties encountered in getting off-base personnel back to the base, General Momyer has directed all construction efforts be directed towards on-base housing. This is most frustrating as we had done quite a selling job to get the base behind the effort. A 7AF programming action directive has been published which has an end objective of having all personnel billeted on base by June 1968. Judging by this, it will be July before the Red Horse people can get to our project.

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No. 0012886

3. General Momyer's letter to Lieutenant General Holzapple, DCS/ Research and Development, Hq USAF, containing our input on a replacement aircraft for the HH-43, was dispatched on 29 January 1968. It refers to the MAC ROC and the obsolescence of the HH-43. It also points out that this aircraft would not duplicate the requirement for the HH-3 and HH-53 but would provide an increased range and capability in those areas where larger, long range helicopters are not normally available. So that it is clear that we are not seeking new development, the letter also states that the requirement could be satisfied by modification of one of several helicopters in current production. In view of lack of 7AF support for a SEAOR, it appears that this may be the best means from this end for getting additional four-star and Air Council level support for the replacement aircraft.

4. Our helicopter copilots were pleased to finally get the word that the 350 hours of helicopter time requirement for upgrade has been reduced to 275 hours by MAC. Although this is not as low as we would have liked it, this level provides hope for some of the copilots to upgrade during their tour in SEA who could not possibly have done so otherwise. I know Colonel Beall worked hard on the reclama to support our position and we appreciate his efforts on our behalf.

5. In last month's letter to you, I referenced a request for a manpower survey which PARRC had forwarded to MAC. Colonel Smith has advised that MAC has disapproved the request, which is disappointing and difficult to understand. When we lost our in-house manpower shop in Hq ARRS, it was my understanding that the MAC Management Engineering Teams would provide ARRS with manpower evaluations. Since the Group was organized in January 1966, no on-site manpower evaluations have been made and there appear to be many anomalies in our authorizations. For example, the 37ARRS is authorized a Supply Officer while the 39ARRS is not authorized one, even though it is a larger unit, nor are any of the large Detachments authorized one. In the area of Personnel Technicians, there is a complete disparity between similar units. The 37ARRS is authorized five technicians with a MSgt, a Tech Sergeant, and three Staff Sergeants; Det 1, 37ARRS is authorized three, one MSgt, one TSgt, and one SSgt; Det 2, 37ARRS is authorized only one Technician, a TSgt; and 39ARRS, although larger than the 37ARRS is authorized only two technicians, one MSgt and one SSgt. With all these variations in authorizations, it is interesting to note that the Group Headquarters, supposedly senior, is authorized only three technicians headed by a SSgt with two Sgts, all five level. The Administrative Specialist area is even in worse shape in distribution of authorizations and grade structure. In view of the move of the 39ARRS to Tuy Hoa, the pending deactivation of

OL-1, 39ARRS, and the pending activation of the 40ARRS, I believe a manpower survey and on-site evaluation is essential to establish meaningful and functional Unit Manning Documents.

*Office
did so
before*

6. OL-1, 39ARRS, is still on the books at Udorn although the personnel are at Tuy Hoa. Each Monday, the HC-130 is rotated along with the crew and four maintenance personnel. During the month of January, this aircraft was launched five times on a planned basis due to a requirement for a third Crown aircraft, and three times on an emergency basis. This seems to support the position for maintaining an alert aircraft at Udorn. No difficulties are being encountered with parking space or base support and it is the opinion of all concerned that this will be a continuing requirement for the foreseeable future.

7. This letter will be shorter than my usual monthly letter since the visit of Colonels Beaudry and Musick will provide you with a wealth of first hand information which would be only reiterative in this letter. We were all highly appreciative of the opportunity to host the Vice Commander and the DCS/Material, and benefited from their visit a great deal. The presentations by Colonel Beaudry on the future of ARRS and the status of the approved increased force structure were particularly well received, since most personnel are enthusiastic about remaining part of ARRS and want to know where they will fit in the future. It was a rather whirlwind visit but I'm sure both of the visitors feel that they were warmly welcomed. Enclosed are a set of slides taken on our visit to various units which I hope Colonel Beaudry will narrate for the staff. These are not exactly of professional quality but they may give the staff some idea of how our bases and units look. Attachment #1 identifies each slide by number.

8. Monthly mission summary:

	Combat	Non-Combat	USAF	USN	USMC	USA	ARVN	VNAF	CIV	ROK
HH-53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HH-3E	18	3	10	0	0	0	11	0	0	0
HH-43	18	21	5	7	3	11	0	4	3	6
Total	44	24	23	7	3	11	11	4	3	6

Paul E. Leske

PAUL E. LESKE, Colonel, USAF
Commander

7900x
R+B
Grenade
Launchers

c. Standardization of location of weapons in HH-43's is a subject I shall get the Group Operations staff to pursue. We have guns hanging or sitting in 15 or 20 different locations in our 43's and I don't think this is necessary or desirable. Another item on weapons that caught our eye at Det 9, Pleiku, is the use of the grenade launcher mounted on the M-16 rifle. The designation is the XM148 which fires a 40mm round with a lethal circle of five meters. Det 9 claims that this weapon can be used with great accuracy from a moving helicopter. We'll look into what needs to be done to get these launchers authorized for all helicopter crews and will advise as soon as possible.

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Safety
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d. Colonel Musick is a pretty tall man and nearly banged his head a couple of times on the armor guarding the transmission on the cabin ceiling of the HH-3E. He suggested that it might be a good idea to blunt the metal edges with a garden hose split down one side. This sounds like a pretty inexpensive and useful fix which doesn't involve approvals or modifications. You might look around your aircraft and apply this idea to any other sharp edges which could cause injury to personnel.

3. I have previously commented on making requirements for new and improved operational capabilities known by use of AFR 57-1. This is the Air Force mechanism for equipping our forces with aircraft and life support equipment. The objective is to keep ahead of the game and have the new and improved capabilities ready when a threat arises. This can be done at all levels of command but, curiously enough, those requirements stated by the people who use the equipment in the field hold greater credence than those originated in a headquarters. AFR 57-1 used to be a difficult document to cope with because a technical description of the new requirement was mandatory. Emphasis is now on identification of a deficiency, the operational capability needed, and possible solutions, if you have suggestions. Recommended solution or not, submit deficiencies and new ideas. Don't limit yourself by considering the weight penalty of another piece of equipment. New lightweight materials and miniaturization have opened the door for our use of some rather sophisticated equipment. If you hear somebody saying, "Why don't they do this or that," respond with "Why don't you state a requirement for it?" Quit talking about it; get it on paper and send it to us. For your information the following is a partial list of Southeast Asia operational requirements (SEAOR's) submitted and approved under AFR 57-1 pertaining to SAR forces.

- a. Airborne Ground-Fire Warning device.
- b. Miniature Survival Radio.
- c. Helicopter Gross Weight and CG Indicator.
- d. Countermeasures for Optical/Visual Aimed Weapons.

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APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

7 March 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Letter for February 1968

6 ADM-9

TO: All Squadrons & Detachments, 3ARRGp

1. On 28 February, Major Dale Oderman and his Jolly Green crew of Det 1, 37ARRS, at Nakhon Phanom made the 1000th combat save since rescue operations started in SEASIA in 1964. The recovery was up near the Mu Ghia pass and had all the ingredients of a good story; an F-105 pilot with 79 missions completed; two broken legs; a first save for the RCC; a descent into the jungle by the PJ; the 21st save for the PJ; Sgt Joe Duffy, on a 6 month tour extension; and a bit of hostile action in the neighborhood. We brought the crew to TSN and did a TV panel type discussion film at AFVN studios. All the major networks had camera coverage; NBC, ABC, CBS, BBC, and AFN. Without many preliminaries, the cameras started grinding and the crew told the story of their individual participation in the mission (without a note). Following about a half hour stint in front of the cameras, we went down to the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) for a "Show and Tell" session before 60 to 70 press representatives from all over the world. Luckily, there had been a combat photographer on board the HH-3E during the mission and the film was shown followed by essentially a repeat of the TV presentation and a question and answer session. According to the 7AF Director of Information, we got a lot of mileage out of the 1000th save. Evidently Saigon must be pretty rough duty because the crew members told me later that they'd prefer to go to North Vietnam anytime rather than go through that routine again.

2. In early February an HH-43 engaged in a night recovery mission was shot down. The debriefs of the crew members and the Army Dustoff pilot revealed facts which should be considered in the "Lessons Learned" category and which may be applicable to your unit. The two pilots were not wearing their survival vests at the time they were hit but had placed them on the floor of the cockpit next to the seat. During the crash, the pilot's vest and M-16 rifle were pulled from the aircraft by the branches of the trees through which they were descending. The co-pilot's vest was to his left rear next to the seat and when he reached for it he found it was already in flames. Although the pararescueman was wearing his vest properly, when he

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I.O.
1000th save
Publicity

ARDC
HH-43
Lessons
learned +
New Procedures

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was exiting the aircraft exploded and his clothing caught fire. Because he had to strip off his clothing, the survival gear was destroyed by fire. Once on the ground, the three surviving crewmembers were without signaling devices except for a flashlight which one of them had in his pocket. The loss of the survival radio by all the crewmembers was a critical factor which could have been disastrous according to the pilot of the Army helicopter which picked them up sometime later. He stated that had the downed crewmen attempted to signal their location by using tracer ammunition or penguin flares, the accompanying gunships would have immediately torn up the area on the assumption that the tracers were from unfriendly forces. Another item of considerable interest mentioned by the pilot of the recovery aircraft is that Army ground personnel may consider an area secure when the necessary approach routes for a helicopter are extremely hot. He further stated that he does not consider any area secure for a hoist mission. The commander of the unit that lost the aircraft also considers that a number of valuable lessons were learned. He promptly established the following guidelines within his unit:

a. Survival and life support equipment will be worn by all crewmembers on all missions.

b. Each crewmember will carry on his person a small flashlight and/or cigarette lighter for use as a signaling device if all other means fail.

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c. All areas will be treated as insecure if the rescue is required as a direct result of enemy action. If the cause is doubtful, the area will be considered insecure.

d. No pickups will be made in any area unless gunships or other similar support is actually in close proximity to provide psychological suppression to enemy ground fire. A Spooky at 3000 ft, while extremely effective in destroying ground emplacements, does not provide this suppression, nor does the fact that gunships are in the general area. The enemy troops may not be aware that they are there.

e. Tracer ammo and penguin flares will be used as signaling devices only if in positive radio contact with the rescue aircraft.

f. No pickups will be attempted unless the aircraft making the pickup is in direct contact with the ground controlling agency or an airborne control element that is aware of all facts of the rescue requirement.

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I. O.
1000th save
Publicity

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AROSC
HH-43
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6 MAR 62
No. 0003585

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No. 0003585

1. My letter this month will be more in the form of a battle report since Hq 3ARRGp has been in the middle of the action at Tan Son Nhut and Saigon since the beginning of the TET offensive. Last month I briefly sketched the initial attack on TSN and will pick up from that point to try to impart a feel for some of the actions as we lived and viewed them. The period 6 through 17 February was characterized by efforts to resume a degree of normalcy. The VC remained holed up in Cholon and large areas of that portion of Saigon were destroyed by house-to-house fighting. A tight curfew was imposed from 1400 to 0800 for the Vietnamese and from 1700 to 0800 for US Military. This was gradually relaxed over the month until it is presently pretty much a dusk to dawn situation. After sunset, the streets of Saigon are completely silent and deserted except for an occasional Vietnamese Police or US Military patrol jeep slowly cruising with lights off. Any Vietnamese civilian seen on the streets during curfew is subject to being shot on sight. US Military are allowed off base for official business only in military vehicles or to proceed directly between quarters and assigned place of duty between 0730 and 1900. Armed escorts were required for any travel off base for half the month but are no longer necessary. Some pretty simple truths also became evident, such as the fact that we, trained military people, could not defend ourselves off base and, in fact, were not permitted to possess weapons, except for security personnel and aircrew members. This made many personnel very unhappy and I am advised that an abundance of letters were written to congressmen by both officers and NCO's assigned to TSN. I don't know of any letters on this subject written by 3ARRGp personnel.

2. Saturday night the 17th of February was the wildest night in the week. At 0100 Sunday morning Charlie let go at TSN for a 15 minute period with an estimated 100 rounds of 122 MM rockets. Later

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 DATE: 11-18-82
 BY: TWO YEAR
 REVIEW: [illegible]

21.

CONFIDENTIAL

Attack

analysis scaled this down to about 60 rounds, which is not an unsubstantial quantity. This attack resulted in 33 aircraft damaged and 6 aircraft destroyed. A C-130 transport directly across the ramp from Det 14 took a direct hit which removed everything solid forward of the wing. Det 14 was very fortunate since only one small piece of shrapnel hit a Pedro, punching a hole in the plexiglass canopy. Besides the aircraft, several buildings were badly damaged and the Base Chapel was destroyed. Of interest is that several of our officers are billeted in the BOQ's flanking the Chapel. Total casualties from this attack were 1 KIA (US), 72 WIA (US) and 8 VNAF WIA.

3. During the following week Charlie started to hit us during daylight hours. On Sunday 24 February, I had just returned from lunch at 1220, sat down at my desk and was further assisted in attaining a prone position on the floor by a rocket impacting across the street on the old BX. Luckily, this building was in the process of being converted to offices. However, the rocket killed two and wounded four as well as making Charlie's attack just a little more personal. Later that day, 21 more rounds poured into the base for a confirmed total to end February of 89 rocket rounds on base with 6 just off base. Total casualties were 9 KIA (USAF) and 203 WIA (US) of which 153 were Air Force, 26 Army, 18 Navy and 4 civilians.

4. Defense-wise, General Momyer issued a policy letter on 21 February providing guide lines to arm personnel living off base for defending billets if attacked. Weapons were issued to all 3ARRGp personnel living off base. On 25 February another policy change directed the bunkering of all barracks on base (ours already were) and the construction of personnel bunkers. Every month we have reported the lack of a bunker to the 377 CSG as a defense deficiency. Until this program is completed, 10% of our personnel are committed to sandbag and construction details around the clock. Meanwhile, we got on with our own bunker program and built one in between the two buildings in which the headquarters is housed. There was no scarcity of both officer and airmen volunteers for this job and we have used it several times. As a matter of fact, while I was writing this, two heavy explosions occurred nearby and I held an impromptu but instant Commander's Call in the bunker with an enthusiastic 100% attendance. Many personnel are pretty jumpy and our enlisted personnel are all sleeping on the ground floor of the barracks behind the sandbags. Those officers unfortunate enough to have rooms on the second floor of the BOQ are sleeping in the headquarters bunker at night. We all feel very fortunate that there have been no 3ARRGp casualties at TSN thus far. In the midst of the confusion two new members of the Group reported in for duty and quickly adjusted to the routine. On 4 February, 2d Lt Lynn Gormley, our first WAF officer, joined the headquarters as Administrative Officer for the 38ARRS. On 10 February I had the pleasure of pinning on her First Lieutenant silver bars. Lt Gormley

came to us from the 443 MAW at Tinker AFB where she was the Chief of Administrative Services. On 8 February, Mrs. Delores Alexander arrived from Korea to fill the position of secretary to the Commander. Mrs. Alexander has worked for the Air Force in Japan and Korea since 1951 in various secretarial capacities in 5AF and 314AD, and we feel fortunate to acquire her services. Both ladies were billeted in the Auriga Hotel only two blocks outside the main gate at TSN. They considered themselves fortunate not to be billeted on TSN, however, during the week of 18 February, two 122 MM rockets impacted within a block of the Auriga, the latter of which killed 12 Vietnamese. Hq. 3ARRGp now boasts two seasoned combat veterans on the distaff side.

5. Since much of the hand-to-hand fighting continued in the Cholon area, many of us were concerned about the nuns and children at the Viet Hoa orphanage, which is in Cholon. We were able to establish telephone contact with the nuns and found that they came through unscathed with no real problems. A TET party had been planned for the children on 3 February. This, of course, was out of the question and still is, since the VC have been particularly vindictive against any Vietnamese employed by, or associated with, Americans. The party was planned as a hot dog and hamburger cook-out, complete with potato chips, pickles, candy and all the things that cause stomach aches in the little ones. Perhaps the delay in having the party will benefit them in more ways than one.

6. I know that you are familiar with the medical evacuation missions of the 37ARRS and Det 7, 38ARRS early in the TET offensive, but would like to recap the astounding totals accomplished by them through the end of February. In the past, Pedro has been handling these missions fairly routinely, averaging about 50 litter patients per month. On 30 January, the 903rd AES advised that large numbers of critically wounded personnel could be expected and that more helicopters were needed. The 37th was requested to help and everyone dug in to get the job done. Patients were evacuated to the Naval Support Activity Hospital, the Hospital ships Repose and Sanctuary, and to the 1st MAW Field Hospital. During this period, Det 7 also covered 31 airborne emergencies and flew 14 miscellaneous support missions as well as changing an engine and completing three phase inspections. The 37th also maintained their fragged commitments. Due to the engine change and NORS-G, 90% of the HH-43 flying was performed by a single aircraft. Between 29 January and 15 February, 83 HH-43 hours were flown, of which 66 hours were flown on medical evacuation missions. By the end of February, 1796 personnel had been airlifted by ARRS on medical evacuation missions

from Danang, 943 by Jolly Green and 853 by Pedro. Although these are not counted as saves and, in fact, this mission is not rightfully ours, I have directed careful documentation of the effort for inclusion in the Group history for possible future references. This also looked like a natural for a publicity release but MACV would not let it go, probably because of the obvious magnitude of casualties.

7. The JSARC has now been operating in the 7AF Command Center for two months and is running smoothly. The direct coordination on-the-spot with 7AF has ironed out some of the difficulties we previously had with coordinating immediate MIGCAP support, tanker support, and border clearances. An up-to-the-minute visual display of the mission, in conjunction with the intelligence and weather displays which flank the SAR boards, permits rapid decisions which previously had to be piece-mealed using telephone inputs. I believe the greatest significance in integrating the SAR control system into the Command Center is the exposure of SAR to the hundreds of officers who visit the center. Inevitably, in future wars or exercises, some of these officers will be commanders or Senior Staff who will look for SAR in their own Command Centers since SAR is a responsibility of the Air Component Commander. The RCC at Monkey Mountain has moved into the new computerized command and control facility and we expect the Udorn RCC to follow suit this month. We have been fortunate to have gained Major Ed Weissler as a replacement for Major McLeaish since he is an electronics engineer and quite familiar with the Seek Dawn Control system. We've given him a fairly sound indoctrination on the rescue business and he is currently working on a series of SAR inputs designed to interface the SAR force with the computerized command and control system. By utilizing tape storage and computer displays, it will be possible to give real time azimuth, distance, and time information about the potential rescue directly to the SAR task force. Intelligence information, vectors around known hostile areas, Hostile aircraft warnings, and egress data should also be made immediately available to our forces. A meeting is to be held at Udorn on 10 March for a final review of Project Seek Dawn. Major Weissler will attend to insure that rescue gains maximum benefit from the implementation of the system. More information will follow as it becomes available.

8. The outlook of many of our helicopter pilots will certainly improve now that we have the long sought reduction in the helicopter time required for those with 1000 hours flying time to qualify as RCC. This reduction to 150 hours is a major concession by MAC, and one that has long been needed. Colonel Smith furnished us with a copy of your letter to MAC which apparently was the catalyst required. Since the Group does not have an HH-3 flight examiner aboard at the present time, the Aircrew Standardization

Pilots from the 37ARRS and Det 1, 37ARRS will be utilized on a reciprocal basis to conduct initial flight evaluations of pilots who qualify under the new criteria and are recommended by their respective commanders. The Standardization Pilots from the 37ARRS and Det 1, 37ARRS met with the Group Standardization Board on 27 February 1968 for briefings and instructions concerning the administration of initial qualification flight evaluations. The HH-53 Standardization Pilot will be designated Group Standardization Pilot for the purpose of administering the initial upgrade program. A member of the Group Standardization Section will check the candidates' paper work and accompany the unit Standardization Pilot as Group monitor on initial qualification upgrade flights. These procedures will insure that we achieve complete objectivity in Standardization and continue to maintain a strong program within the Group. This method of operation for HH-3 units will continue only until we have a qualified HH-3E Pilot Flight Examiner assigned to the Standardization Section.

9. Colonel Godbey and his AFLC Materiel Assistance Team visited our HH-53 and HH-3E units during the period 4-11 February. They were tasked by General Gerrity to visit every H-3 and H-53 unit world-wide in order to determine, first hand, why these airframes have such a high NORS rate. Their visit was billed as strictly fact finding and not as an IG inspection. I'm happy to report that even though many of their "action items" were materiel deficiencies we have complained about in the past (via EUR action) their expert materiel assistance was most beneficial in identifying and recommending solutions to some of our local in-house materiel problems. I feel the greatest benefit to be derived from their visit will be the added emphasis placed on obtaining fixes to our materiel deficiencies due to the personal interest given the problems by General Gerrity. I'm sure we will be getting expedited action by all agencies concerned in providing the required fixes. We were very sorrowed to hear of General Gerrity's death. I know you'll agree that rescue lost a good friend, but I feel that the impetus he provided for several of our programs will be felt for some time to come.

10. The long awaited 7th Air Force SAR Manual was published 1 March 1968. Distribution to the field and interested agencies will be accomplished this week. The manual was published with a 64-1 designation to bring it into the SAR series of regulations. The new manual reflects an increased participation by the Operational Control Commander in assembling and controlling SAR task forces, particularly for out-of-country missions. In addition, it updates the SAR procedure and concepts used in this area. This should result in increased effectiveness since both the participating and recipient organization and personnel will have the latest information essential to support the SAR force.

11. We had excellent exposure and coverage on our 1000th combat save. As usual with some of these stories, we had to stretch a couple of points to have everything line up properly, however, all the necessary ingredients were obviously there: an F-105 pilot with 79 missions; two broken legs; a SAR Task Force; scramble; pararescue descent; ground fire; a first save for the RCC; the 21st save for the PJ; and an Air Force Academy graduate for the co-pilot. We brought the crew to TSN from NKP, went through their story a couple of times and then did a TV panel type discussion at the AFVN studios. Cameras were present from NBC, ABC, CBS, BBC, and AFN. Without even a note we plugged away at that for a half hour after which we went down to JUSPAO for a "Show and Tell" before 60 to 70 press representatives from all over the world. Although the recovery film was not of the best quality, it was fresh and new and well received. Following that, we did essentially a repeat of the TV show with each man telling of his part in the mission followed by a question and answer session. According to the 7AF Director of Information, it was a good show all the way through and I believe we got as much mileage out of number 1000 as we possibly could. The crew said they'd much rather make a few more flights to North Vietnam rather than go through that again.

12. For your information, the following awards have been received by 3rd Group personnel since 1 January 1968:

Silver Star	9
Distinguished Flying Cross	63
Airman's Medal	2
Bronze Star	16
Air Medal	146
AFCM	23

13. Save summary for February 1968:

	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Non- Combat</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>ARVN</u>
HH-53	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
HH-3E	11	34	4	7	33	0	1
HH-43	10	24	20	2	0	12	0
Total	25	58	28	9	33	12	1

Paul E. Leske

PAUL E. LESKE, Colonel, USAF
Commander

cy: PAC ARRC

FROM: 10-38C

4 Apr 68

SUBJ: Commander's Monthly Letter for March of 1968

TO: 38C

N/A
1. Performance Standards:

	<u>AF STANDARD</u>	<u>Det 10</u>
OR	71% (MAC 85%)	85.7%
NORM	24%	4.2%
NORS	5%	12.7%
MAN HRS/FLY HRS	13	21.7%
FLY HRS	60	62.4

a. The Air Force Standard for NORS rate increased due to having but one aircraft fit to fly for most of the month. We had both aircraft operational for about a week when a mortar landed inside of the 25' yellow circle surrounding our alert aircraft about 18 ft in front of it. Mortar fragments put two holes in the plex-glass bubble and one piece flew through into the rear cabin ripping a main extrusion member of the upper fuselage. Several fragments passed through both rotor blades requiring all blade replacements. To date we have had a 14 day wait on blades that were mis sent to Taiwan from Thailand. When they will show is anyones guess. The last two blade changes for battle damage also took over 12 days each to find and get blades delivered and installed. This aircraft at the time of this report, is still down for lost blades and a fabrication of the airframe extrusion.

b. Maintenance man hours totaled 1,351.2 against the fly hours of 62.4 hours gave us a higher than standard rate primarily due to the past practice of changing 24 hours for each maintenance member on alert. This will no longer be in the computation as of 1 April 68 and should reduce this percentage rate to acceptable standards.

2. Significant Missions:

10-38-23

a. Navy River Patrol Boat Operations called to request pickup of two casualties on one of their craft Handlash 77. Pedro 91 launched at 0710Z to coordinates XR 055-935 on the Bassic River. Two Seawolf's were located firing on some island positions and they guided Pedro to the two beached boats at a friendly outpost. The wounded, both stretcher cases, were still in the boat cockpit. Between 0725 and 0735 two stokes litter pickups were made off of the boat. On departure gunfire

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

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CATALOGED

No. 0012907

was heard and evasive action taken on climb out direct to Dong Tam Army Field Hospital. Problem: The most seriously wounded sailor was loaded into the stokes litter first necessitating his removal so as to effect the second pickup. Since the man's rightleg was almost severed at the thigh, movement became an unwanted action. However, he was removed from the litter and the second pickup successfully made. Corrective Action: Ammendment to S.O.P. we supplied Navy adviser that on more than one pickup by the stokes litter the least critically wounded man will be hoisted first. The last man up will be the most seriously wounded. This will preclude his removal from the litter until he's at the hospital.

10-38-24

b. Most Outstanding Mission. Navy Operations called at 0625Z with information of an ambush on two PBR's subjected to intense hostile fire. One boat capsized while the other made a run for it fighting for their lives. Two KIA's and two wounded on second boat. Pedro 91 scrambled at 0630Z arriving at the friendly outpost where the 4 wounded survivors of the sunk boat had made their way to over land. Pedro 91 finally found a landing spot outside of the post and the four wounded loaded. The FAC informed Pedro that two stretcher cases were about 1 mile further north, so a second landing made and they too were loaded making a total of six wounded and two crewmembers in the small confines of the Huskie's cabin. All were delivered to Dong Tam within 30 minutes. It was later determined that two of the wounded included the Sa Dec Province Chief and his Senior American Advisor.

c. Other combat missions for the month of March numbered from 10-38-10 through 10-38-24 with 18 combat and 1 non-combat saves for the month.

3. Facilities: No current news from Base Engineering about 7th AF action on our requested alert building.

a. Our second revetment is all up but only one wall facing the parallel taxiway has been filled with sand. The erection team was reassigned to some other base before they had completed the job. However, we have finished painting our yellow circle and taxi lines and posted our warning signs identical to the primary alert pad.

b. The new FSK pad has had the filled dumped in the agreed upon location and has been leveled ready for the steel mat. I have been promised completion before it starts raining. Also, have been told the sand around the mat will be stabilized so as not to erode from rotor wash or rain. I'll get facilities photos updated when all is completed and we occupy both revetments.

c. We also completed the application of non-skid paint in the primary alert revetment to prevent accidents to the alert crew when

FROM: 1-38C

SUBJECT: Commander's Monthly Letter

1 April 68

TO: 38C

1. Performance Standards:

	<u>AF STANDARD</u>	<u>DET 1 PERFORMANCE</u>
CR	71% (MAC 85%)	85.9%
NORM	24%	1.0%
NORS	5%	13.1%
MAN HRS/FLY HRS	13	18.5 HRS
FLY HRS	60	80.7 HRS

2. Significant Missions:

On 18 March during a dusk security perimeter sweep with the ROK Commander, Pedro 44 was notified that a ROK soldier had been shot when his patrol contacted an unknown enemy strength force. The soldier was withdrawn into the defensive perimeter of the patrol and Pedro 44 made the pick-up from there by landing in a minimum clearance area amid scrub-bush trees. Later, Pedro 92 Med Evacuated the wounded soldier to Cam Ranh Bay. Det 1 logged one combat save for this mission. On 28 March Pedro 92 was scrambled at 0100 to Med Evac two Category 1 ARVN soldiers who had been critically injured by either striking a mine with their vehicle or having a grenade explode within the vehicle. The two patients were delivered to the Pedro Pad and the mercy flight to Cam Ranh Bay, 12th Field Hospital was completed by Pedro. We logged two non-combat saves on that mission. Although in my mind it is doubtful if the soldiers would in-fact survive. We had a typical class book mission on 28 March 68. The crash-phone rang and Phan Rang tower advised that an F-1F had crashed 45 miles away on the 241° Radial. We scrambled and navigated to the area where two F-4Cs were orbiting and three Huey gun-ships providing fire support. The lead Huey directed us exactly to the two crewman standing in the clearing made by impact of their aircraft. They were in good condition. We zipped in and plucked them out using the Horse Collar, and delivered them to a waiting ambulance at Phan Rang. Good mission no problems.

3. Facilities:

Our new Detachment building is nearly completed. The ramp area is finished and the revetments are soon to be constructed. I estimate the move into the new building by mid-April. One serious complication has been that since the programming of the immediate move of two additional fighter squadrons to Phan Rang, the Swooky Detachment will temporarily share our building with us. At least that's how the plans are now. I don't particularly like the idea but Colonel Williams, Commander 35th Wing was advised that this sharing was

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No 0012900

The base engineers have \$75,000 worth of sod on order of which we can get enough to sod the bare areas around the ramp. We removed the PSP which used to be the parking place for the FSK. This area will be sodded. CES has already done some landscaping along the north side of the ramp.

c. Red Horse gave us an air-conditioner and material to finish off the back room in the operations building. This room will be used for bedding down the four enlisted alert crewmembers. The two officers will remain in the Command Post area.

4. Significant Missions:

a. Mission 6-38-20-8307. At 1635 local on 2 November 1968 Pedro 95 was launched by JSARC to recover the crew of a U.S. Army OH-6 Helicopter which had been downed 42 miles northwest of Bien Hoa. Upon reaching the scene at 1720 local Pedro 95 contacted the FAC (Sidwinder 16) who was orbiting the wreckage located in the triple-canopy jungle. Two UH-1 gunships, two OH-6's and one CH-47 were also in the area. One survivor was walking around and the other was pinned under the wreckage. The PJ (A1C Ingulli) was lowered to the scene on the forest penetrator. He took with him 200 feet of nylon rope which had one end secured to the RH-43. Airman Ingulli tied the rope to the wreckage and Pedro 95 with the help of an Army patrol team, which had just arrived, lifted the wreckage so that the survivor could be pulled free. Airman Ingulli put the severely injured man in the litter which had been lowered and advised Pedro 95 to take the man to the nearest hospital because he was dying. After evacuating the injured man Pedro 95 return to the scene of the downed OH-6 and recovered the other survivor and A1C Ingulli. This occurred after darkness had settled. Pedro 95 went in blacked out and located the spot by a flare set off by A1C Ingulli. The second man had a broken leg. A total of one hour hover time was used during the recoveries. I later learned from the Air Force ALO for the 199th Infantry Brigade that the first man was dead on arrival and that the autopsy showed an AK-47 round had entered his head above the left eye. The 27 man Army patrol which assisted had been airlifted into the area to assist in the recovery. They were extracted the next morning after a wild night. This mission was further complicated by the failure of the right main gear on Pedro 95 while landing at Quan Loi. Lt Kolar the RCC completed the rest of the mission by hovering the helicopter for off-loading the second survivor and until a Jack and sand bags were placed under the aircraft upon return to Bien Hoa.

5. Future Plans:

a. Improve the barracks situation. Target date for completion is estimated to be April 69 providing we get firm barracks assigned in March 69 as promised by the Base Commander.

FROM: 1-38C

7 May 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Monthly Letter

TO: 38C

1. Performance Standards:

	<u>AF STANDARD</u>	<u>DET 1</u>
OR	71% (MAC 85%)	90.2%
NORM	24%	1.2%
MORS	5%	8.6%
MAN HRS/FLY HRS	13 HRS	22.0 HRS
FLY HRS	60 HRS	72.4 HRS

2. Significant Missions:

a. Calling at 2145, the tower informed Pedro operations that an F-100 had crashed during a GCA 8 miles southwest. Captain Walther, the alert RCC, called me as standby RCC to provide high cover during the ACR. Pedro 44 was airborne at 2155 and Pedro 92 was airborne at 2200 hours. The crash site was easy to locate since there were still flames and minor explosions coming from the wreckage. The crash occurred on a ridgeline at about 1900' MSL. Captain Walther hovered down to the wreckage in an attempt to find evidence that the pilot may have ejected. The terrain was extremely mountainous with bare rocky crags. A "Spooky" dropped numerous illumination flares. As Captain Walther moved off to the main wreckage, I spotted what appeared to be a parachute. Moving in closer I positively identified the parachute and called Pedro 44 to come in with the medic. Captain Walther lowered the medic and recovered the body from the parachute. The flight engineer was unable to get the body off the hoist because of the position of the load. Captain Walther called me in to pick up the Medical Technician, Sgt Petersen. This was accomplished using the forest penetrator and expert guidance by Sgt McNeese, my P.E. Rotor clearance was critical because of terrain but Sgt McNeese, in fact all crews, operated with cool professionalism. Although our endeavors did not result in a save, the Wing Commander, Colonel Williams, was so pleased with our performance that he phoned later the next day to praise our detachment and suggest I take appropriate action through our awards and decorations officer. Lesson learned on this mission was the vast help the AC-47 can be with flare drops. I would not have seen the parachute if it had not been for "Spooky". The weather was eight eights 2500' base clouds deteriorating. (MSN 1-38-15).

b. Following other missions 1-38-14, 1-38-13.

c. Det 1 achieved two non-combat saves for the month of April.

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No 0012899

year stand at 41 combat saves and 9 non combat saves.

b. The two following missions reflect a problem quite prevalent here in the Delta.

(1) On 21 Jun 68 IV DAS called Rescue Operations reporting a downed A-1 at WR 303 140. This plotted out about 60 NM SW of Binh Thuy just 7 miles east of Ca Mau. Pedro scrambled from quarters and was within 5 miles of target when AGR was terminated due to pilot recovery by Army Dustoff helicopter. Pedro landed at Ca Mau, refueled, and returned to Binh Thuy.

(2) Again on 24 Jun 68 Binh Thuy tower notified Pedro Ops that an F-100 pilot was heard on guard channel saying he was ejecting 2-3 miles south of Ca Mau. Pedro scrambled but was informed enroute that the pilot again had been recovered by Dustoff. Pedro continued on to Ca Mau for fuel and airlifted the F-100 pilot back to Binh Thuy.

(3) Det 10's primary mission here at Binh Thuy is AGR covering the whole IV Corps area, field medical evacuation (combat) and open sea rescue in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. LER, our secondary responsibility, by experience has proved negligible. Most of the 42 combat saves for the past six months has involved long range flying, poor weather, night operations, and over water combat operations. These demands have been professionally met by dedicated crewmembers in every instance in the not suitable HH-43F. Because of its slow speed and distance we have to fly on AGR's, we are taking too long to get there and are being beat out by other copters. Also, the HH-43 lacks adequate navigational equipment, has insufficient range, (without refueling) and poorly instrumented for night or weather flying. Its single jet engine configuration and lack of water landing capability reduces the safety factor tremendously when committing one out over the open sea. With expanding US participation here in the Delta and safety considerations to ARRS crews dictate a recommended change.

(a) Recommendation: CH3's helicopters should be located here in the Delta.

(b) Suggestion: To be more strategically located for shorter flight distances the assignment of one additional HH-43F or B here at Binh Thuy would permit us to stand a day alert at Ca Mau by flying down and back while the other two birds covered local responsibilities. This capability would give us an even break on pickups in competition with the Army.

3. Facilities: The June meeting of the Base Facility Utilization Board revealed that our new alert building was in the construction design stage. A few days ago, I checked with the BCE office and they

told me that if the final go ahead is received they will be breaking ground within 30 to 60 days.

a. Things are up in the air here at Binh Thuy about additional constructions. The new Airman's Club, under construction, had a stop order on it. Other projects beginning a new, await, higher headquarters' decision. We occupy VNAF buildings here on a lease basis. Some of these leases have expired and will not be renewed. The VNAF want their buildings back in anticipation of expanding their operations here with new Huey's to replace the H-34's and eventually A-37's in place of A-1's.

b. We have 3 kit roof covers to be installed on top of revetments but as yet, the base has not decided where they would be installed. Some talk of covering some down in our present operating area. However, I don't think they will attempt covering our opposing revetments because we have one wall in each lower than the other walls.

4. Future Plans: The new dial system is being hooked up. We had the trench filled in finally. We have the new hot line phone installed but a foul up somewhere along the line still has it unusable. A survey team looked over our building sight to ascertain where the water, sewer, and power connections could be made. No future plans contemplated.

5. Additional Information:

a. Total helicopter time per pilot:

	<u>Previous</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Total</u>
Speckman	241.4	18.2	259.6
Okenok	2764.2	17.5	2781.7
Conover	2353.9	15.1	2369.0
Precious	1509.7	23.7	1727.4
Tellefson	259.0	30.0	289.0
Johnson	224.8	25.3	250.3

b. Colonel Smith's visit to Det 10 was cancelled.

c. MSgt Bowles, 3rd Group P.J. visited Det 10 to help on the CTF board to upgrade three of our 3 levels to 5 levels.

d. On 17 Jun 68 A1C Harold D. Cooper had a second uncontrollable seizure he was turned over to the medics, sent to Japan, and is to be returned to the States for separation. We are one Flight Engineer short now.

e. Additions to our flight crews have been two new P.J.'s A1C Theodore Polys and A1C Richard C. Stucklen. Both have already been checked out combat ready and are pulling alert.

FROM: 1-38C

4 June 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Monthly Letter

TO: 38C

1. Performance Standards:

	<u>AF STANDARD</u>	<u>DET 1</u>
OR	71% (MAC 85%)	92.6%
NON	24%	7.4%
HRS	5%	0.0%
MAN HRS/FLY HRS	13	23.0 HRS
FLY HRS	60	74.9 HRS

2. Significant Missions:

- a. 3 May-MSN 1-38-16; ARVN Jeep crash, 2 non-combat saves
- b. 10 May-MSN 1-38-17; O-2 crashed on downwind, 2 non-combat saves.
- c. 19 May-MSN 1-38-18; 2 USA soldiers, medevac, critical injury, 1 non-combat save.
- d. 22 May-MSN 1-38-19; 2 USA Soldiers, medevac, bullet wound, 1 non-combat save.
- e. 26 May-MSN 1-38-20; 2 civilians critically injured in vehicle crash, 2 non-combat saves.
- f. 28 May-MSN 1-38-21; USA soldier, medevac, critical injury, 1 non-combat save.

Most of the saves this month consisted of response to, medical evacuation of critically injured personnel. Total; non-combat-9. Each of these listed saves, other than the response to the O-2, were confirmed by or instigated by medical authorities at Phan Rang AB, RVN.

3. Facilities:

Our PRIDE project, consisting of a patio and recreation area, is nearing completion. All that remains to be done is the construction of a Bar-B-Q pit and the gravel surfacing of the area.

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No 0012902

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 3RD AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

SUBJECT: Monthly Commander's Letter

4 July 1968

TO: Brigadier General Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

Exec: *As indicated*

1. Although we had many wild missions and lost an HH-3E with crew, the most impressionable event of the month of June was Lt General Wilson's visit. Needless to say, all units paid heed to the various checklists provided and everybody knew the tool box and bench stock fill rates (3rd Group 93.2% and 89% respectively). However, someone overlooked putting individual rugs and wastebaskets in the airmen's dormitories on the checklist and this was the focal point for MACVC's wrath. My First Sergeant was very upset since he was quite proud of the improvements in the last six months, which include two air-conditioned dayrooms with new furniture and TV, and in which MACVC was not interested. As I recall, we went through a similar exercise in Orlando last year but, despite the telephonic warning I gave to all units to be visited after Gen Wilson's departure from Tan Son Nhut, the wherewithal to correct the problem was simply not available in SEA. MACVC's parting shot was, "Like most rescue units, your administrative and working facilities are good but your barracks stink." I think there's a message there. We also briefed him on manning deficiencies in HC-130 flight engineers/radio operators and the critical situation we are facing in helicopter mechanic (431X0) manning.

2. MACVC was also briefed on our efforts to provide an acceptable facility for Det 14/38ARRSq here at TSN. I was happy to relate that this project had finally gotten underway whereupon he insisted on seeing the old facilities as well as the new construction. He had no comments. Progress on the new facilities is quite rapid and got underway on 18 June. There are presently more than 50 workers engaged in pouring foundations, drilling a well, bulldozing, etc. A 20' x 80' building is being prefabricated and revetments for both helicopters will be provided. This is the culmination of almost 3 years work on

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No 0012890

the part of 3 commanders and an almost unbelievable chain of administrative hocus. For your information and amazement, Atch 1 provides a historical and chronological account of significant actions taken or occurring in connection with getting this construction completed. Unstated in this account are hundreds of political actions such as discussions with 7AF Civil Engineering, Chief of Staff, helicopter support flights for various influential personnel, HC-130 flights for Civil Engineers, etc. Frankly, the paperwork was the easiest part of the whole thing. We hope to occupy the facilities o/a 20 July providing the Red Horse people are not again diverted.

3. As I briefed MACVC, the problem with 431X0 manning is becoming critical and is affecting the 37ARRSq particularly. A recent maintenance staff visit indicated that the squadron maintenance was unsatisfactory due to lack of manning and an increased workload due to the high rate of mission activity, battle damage, and the self-help required by the recent move to new facilities. Of 54 authorized helicopter mechanics, there are 33 on hand. At Det 1/40ARRSq, of 38 authorized there are only 28 on hand. Even with this number, Det 1, 40ARRSq has bootstrapped their in-commission rate from 64% to better than 80% in six months under Lt Col Wells' leadership. To provide temporary relief to the 37th, we went in to our H-43 units and found two men with H-3 experience, borrowed 6 of the 28 men from Det 1/40 and recalled the quality control man we had on TDY to the IRAN facility at Don Muang. We're balanced on a very fine line both at Danang and NKP and the safety aspects are a matter of real concern. In spite of this problem, the 37th has continued its outstanding record of mission accomplishment. This is best measured by the almost unbelievable number of awards from the 37th which were forwarded to 7AF this month. For the period including the last week of April through 9 June, 13 Air Force Crosses, 21 Silver Stars and 40 Distinguished Flying Crosses have been recommended. Relief in the form of bodies (431X0) is forecast for the month of July. However, more than 80% of the inbound personnel are 3 level (A1C) which increases the OJT load and tends toward non-productiveness for an extended period. We were recently levied upon for a 431X0 with UH-1 experience for 150 days TDY to the Air Force Advisory Group. Upon investigation of 7AF resources, we were astonished to learn that the Air Commando Squadron (UH-1F) at Nha Trang was 75% overmanned with 431X0's. It is quite obvious where the priority is. We appealed this levy and pointed out the inequities in manning to PAC ARRC, ARRS and MAC and were relieved.

actions

PDC

into mdc

Action:

PDC

ODC

this is wrong!

I assume that there is some action occurring to rectify the imbalanced situation. Incidentally, the problem is not peculiar only to the HH-3 since 431X0 manning for the HH-43's is forecast to fall below 70% by the end of August.

4. I would appreciate it if someone could provide us with the rationale for WRM in this theater. Those spares that are easy to get we don't need, while those which are short we can't get for WRM anyhow. I assume that careful planning was employed in developing this program and that due consideration was given to warehousing requirements, inspection, etc. as well as the additional personnel required and workload imposed in a theater which is already extremely critical for headroom as related to manpower ceilings. I was most disturbed to be advised that 44 MA-1 kits had arrived at Tuy Hoa for WRM in addition to the 37 on hand. These kits will provide flotation for 3240 personnel but, to date, we haven't used one yet. I think someone should take a look at positioning this stuff out of country, in Japan, Okinawa, or the Philippines. It would be comparatively simple to establish a contingency plan to airlift it in when and if required.

5. We bailed the Navy out again this month by providing a Jolly Green and crew to the carrier Yorktown for 3 days. During a coastal penetration of North Vietnam after a downed Navy pilot, one of their Big Mothers (SH-3 armored) was shot up pretty badly but made it back to the DLG. Due to the confined space, they couldn't move it after landing so that it blocked the second bird. All the rest of their armored helicopters were out of commission so they swallowed their pride and asked the Air Force for help. No missions were accomplished for the Navy during this period.

6. The 9th of June was Black Sunday. The 37th used 9 helicopters to prosecute two missions, one of which was in the A Shau Valley with the other in North Vietnam above the DMZ and inland from the beach some 5 miles. The A Shau Valley mission was unsuccessful, however, on the other mission, the F-105 pilot was successfully retrieved from North Vietnam. The persistence and sheer guts of our crews was nothing less than magnificent. Even after Jolly Green 23 was shot down, destroyed, and the crew KIA, the remaining crews wanted to press on to recover the wounded Marine pilot (Hellborn 215) in the A Shau. However, the mission was terminated late that evening by direction of General Momyer after all attempts failed to isolate the downed pilot. Jolly Green 28 was hit earlier in the mission and, with an engine out due to fire, headed for Khe Sanh, jettisoning equipment

to gain enough altitude to barely clear the mountains. Although flying in ground fire enroute no hits were taken and the crew succeeded in landing the aircraft successfully. With Khe Sanh under intermittent mortar attack, there seemed to be a good possibility of losing JG 28 on the ground, but fortunately, two days later an Army Skycrane airlifted it back to Danang.

7. You will note that the flying hours on the HH-53B were unusually low for the month of June. This is a result of AFCS trim sensor failure on all but one aircraft and a slow response to our A-NORS (15 May) and NORS-N (12 June) requisitions. The sensor failure is attributed to an improperly designed drain system in the AFCS servo well, which permits water to drain in a nose-down attitude, but not when the aircraft is nose-up or level. This means that when the aircraft is parked, water accumulates if it is raining unless the main rotor pylon covers are installed. With the sensor inoperative, the aircraft handles like a king-sized H-19 and has to be hand flown, which is very fatiguing on any flight of more than two hours duration. For this reason, the 40ARRSq was relieved of orbit responsibility pending receipt of the sensors. We also restricted the aircraft from flight in actual instrument weather except for short durations during an emergency SAR effort. As a result the 40ARRSq readiness was downgraded to C-4 on 4 June. An EUR was submitted on the AFCS Servo in Sept 67 and we understand that Sikorsky Aircraft has submitted an ECP to correct the problem. Meanwhile, we have drilled a hole in the rear of the AFCS well and tapped into an existing drain line to prevent further sensor damage. We are also advised that 4 sensors were to be shipped 21 June, which was later changed to 7 sensors to be shipped 2 July. A total of 10 are now required. When these are received and installed, the aircraft will be released for normal mission activity.

8. Save summary for June 1968:

	<u>HH-53</u>	<u>HH-3</u>	<u>HH-43</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Combat	1	17	9	27
Non-combat	0	2	12	14
USAF	1	10	6	17
USN	0	3	2	5

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

3C

SUBJECT:

Monthly Commander's Letter

6 August 1968

TO:

Brigadier General Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service
Scott AFB, Illinois

For dist.
Exec: Its staff
18/12

1. The pace in Southeast Asia, if not accelerating, remains at a sufficiently high level of activity to keep the days from becoming dull. The trend in out-country missions for the past eight months has been towards massive tactical support of a given SAR mission in order to negate increased hostile efforts to prevent recovery. This, coupled with what appears to be the start of the third phase of the NVA 1968 offensive, manages to keep the majority of 3rd Group personnel on their toes. In the Saigon area we've had some excitement due to terrorist activity, however, that's not exactly news around here. The good news is that the countermeasures developed at the direction of General Abrams have apparently been quite effective since no rocket attacks have occurred this month. At Danang, however, it was another story on 22 July when Danang took an attack by six 122MM rockets, three of which landed outside, but close to, the Jolly Green area. No battle damage or casualties were sustained, however, on the same day high gusty winds, connected with a thunderstorm, blew about 80% of the hangar roof off and the operations and administrative areas were thoroughly inundated. Red Horse got right with the program replacing the sheet metal, this time fastening it down a little more soundly. Of course, the hangar has not been usable since it has been under repair. *ooc*

2. A 3ARRGp Commander's Conference was held at Udorn on 26-27 July, which was quite successful. With the changes in commanders, it is necessary from time to time to talk through policies and emphasize certain recurring problems. On the night of our arrival, the base suffered its first attack by infiltrators, in fact the first of any base in Thailand. The center of interest was a C-141, reputedly at Udorn to evacuate the three pilots to be released from North Vietnam. A Det 5 Pedro saved this aircraft from being seriously *ooc*

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damaged or destroyed, and the infiltration squad was driven off with
two killed and five captured. We are not yet knowledgeable of the
ethnic origin of this group.

3. With these seemingly isolated cases which had miraculously bypassed rescue forces, the handwriting was appearing on the wall that a pattern was forming of hit and run tactics in the old guerilla style. On the night of 28 July, after our return from Udorn, the same sort of tactic was applied against Tuy Hoa, with the disastrous results with which you are familiar. Fortunately no ARRS casualties were suffered. Since this matter is currently a subject for an exchange of messages and determinations for achieving a viable HC-130 posture, I will not dwell on it further. Suffice to say that we have led relatively charmed lives over here as a group, considering the mission and distribution of resources, as related to the losses.

4. In order to get some sort of handle on the costs of saving a life in SEA, we have roughed out some figures that we think put us somewhere in the ballpark for such determination. In FY 68, 905 lives were saved by 3ARRGp units and detachments (combat and noncombat). Our operating costs for this fiscal year were determined at approximately \$19.4 million. This total was reached with the assistance of the 7AF Comptroller and is subject to correction by ARBDC. However, represented within this total are best estimates of messing costs, expendable supplies, building maintenance, office equipment, ground and aircraft accident costs, maintenance and POL costs for all aircraft, and wages and TDY funds expended for all personnel. The procurement costs of our authorized aircraft was approximately \$85 million. Assuming a ten year amortization based on airframe life, one year's depreciation is \$8.5 million plus costs of aircraft lost, which in FY 68 was roughly \$5 million (four HH-3's and one HH-43F). Dividing 905 saves into the total of \$32.9 million shows an approximate cost of \$36,350 per life saved. Not included are hardware recoveries (F-111 capsule, drones, etc.) and hundreds of med evacs. Commercially, it might be hard to sell; militarily, it's a bargain.

5. While primarily remaining orientated to the rescue mission, we have initiated a full scale barracks improvement program. Hopefully, this program will have a threefold effect; improve the morale of our enlisted personnel, satisfy General Wilson and serve as insurance for the survival of my commanders when he next visits SEA. It is unfortunate that we were unable to make a large scale effort earlier to improve the men's living quarters. Initial efforts were concentrated on

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7. Due to heavy rain there has been a delay in completing the construction of the new LBR facility at Tan Son Nhut. The concrete pad has been completed, however, the well caved in and has to be redrilled. The building is largely completed and has been constructed of quality materials, including insulation, acoustical materials, and 100% air conditioning. We now anticipate BOD on or about 15 August. In anticipation of your September visit, we are delaying formal dedication until your arrival. All hands are looking forward to your forthcoming visit and hope to show you numerous improvements in facilities. I think you will be pleasantly surprised throughout the Group.

made

8. Since Major Weissler is presently in your headquarters with an on-scene report of several other actions and projects in progress, this letter will be somewhat shorter than my usual monthly letter. I think that you will be pleased with Major Weissler's overall grasp of the Group's problems and goals and his detailed knowledge of combat recovery. On a previous visit to ARRS, I had recommended this officer to Col McAllister as a potential replacement as an ARRS trained officer in AFXOPFH. Unfortunately, he has been selected for further AFIT training, from which he will go to a directed duty assignment.

9. Save summary for July 1968:

	<u>HH-3</u>	<u>HH-43</u>	<u>HH-53</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Combat	8	6	0	14
Non-combat	2	15	0	17
USAF	6	6	0	12
USN	0	1	0	1
USA	0	2	0	2
USMC	4	3	0	7
F/MIL	0	3	0	3
CIV	0	6	0	6

Paul E. Leske

PAUL E. LESKE, Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
a/s

FROM: 7-38C (Major Keaver Holley III, 3440)

6 September 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Monthly Letter

TO: 38C

1. <u>Performance Standards:</u>	<u>AF STD</u>	<u>DET 7</u>
OR	71%	83.4%
NORM	24%	.9%
NORS	5%	15.7%
MAN HRS/FLY HRS	13	8.2
FLY/HRS	60	84.4

2. Significant Missions

a. 7-38-08, 1 Aug 68. While returning from a FCF, Capt. Henderson and crew observed an oil fire burning in a storage tank area. While the fire was reported through the tower, the helicopter rotor wash was used to keep the flames from under the storage tanks until the base fire equipment arrived.

b. 6 Aug 68. A VNAF O-1 crashed on landing. Capt. Porter and crew transported the pilot to the NSA hospital while Sgt Kohlstrand (PJ) gave first aid. The pilot did not survive.

c. 1-3-085-8221. Two pilots ejected from their battle damaged aircraft landing in Danang Bay. Capt. Porter and crew picked the first pilot out of the water and recovered the second from a boat. Both pilots were in satisfactory condition. The FOC claimed one combat save.

d. 7-38-09, 17 Aug 68. An F-105 landed long and fast. Aircraft continued off the far end of the runway and flipped upside down submerging the cockpit in a drainage ditch. Efforts by Capt. Leech and crew were unsuccessful in extracting the pilot in time. It was necessary to upright the airplane before the pilot could be removed.

e. 25 Aug 68. Navy destroyer reported seeing aircraft crash. Capt. Henderson and crew, along with HH-3 and crew searched without success. A refueling was accomplished aboard the destroyer. This incident was classified a false mission as no aircraft were reported missing.


f. 27 Aug 68. Two pilots ejected at night over ocean. A scramble attempt was made by Capt. Johnson and crew but the helicopter would not start using the battery. An attempt to start using the APU failed when the APU malfunctioned and would not start. The battery from the second aircraft was installed in the alert aircraft and a successful start accomplished. By the time Pedro arrived at the scene another helicopter had recovered one pilot. The second pilot could not be located.

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No. 0012906

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 3RD AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (HAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

SUBJECT: Commander's Letter

7 November 1968

to: Brigadier General Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service
Scott AFB, Illinois 62225

Dear General Brooks,

1. Since assumption of command on 20 September 1968, the activities here for the remainder of September and the month of October have certainly initiated me and the new members of the 3ARRGp into this elite society. If this period is representative of the months to come, I look forward to the greatest challenge and most gratifying year of my career. The opportunity to manage such a truly professional force is indeed the opportunity of a life time. With almost 100% turnover of key personnel in the group staff and squadron commanders, along with the recent announced change in tactical policy by President Johnson, to say the magnitude of activities here has increased, would be the understatement of the year.

2. For continuity purposes I will attempt to cover the significant topics and events by functional areas. In the operational area the Blacklace 19 mission of 27 September nearly cost us an aircraft and crew when JG 27 received battle damage and lost #1 engine while the PJs were cutting the Blacklace pilot loose from the wreckage of his downed O-1. As the crew was evacuating aboard JG 24, ground fire nicked the ear of Sgt Beland, FE, and a bullet severed the chest pack parachute harness worn by Major Wingfield, the RCC. The Army and Marines responded promptly with gunships to aid our Spads, and a Special Forces team to establish a perimeter around the site while we prepared JG 27 for airlift out of the area; but the Army crane failed to arrive as arranged and nearly cost us the recovery. When within 15 minutes of darkness we were forced to evacuate our maintenance team and Army troops, General Blood strongly recommended we order the helicopter destroyed. I refused, and after many phone calls to the Army the crane was located and vectored to the area. Sergeant Watkins, a maintenance specialist, was put back on the ground to hookup the cables from the crane and JG 27 was lifted out just as complete darkness set in.

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3. The SOG team extraction mission on 5 October was much less fortunate. Major Wester and Sergeant Lawrence and Jolly Green 10 might not have been lost if the ground team had moved off the landing zone initially, as we later directed them to join the survivors of JG 10 at the crash site. The VNAF H-34 which landed the ground team was shot down while exiting the area. When JG 28 reached a hover over the LZ on the initial rescue attempt, the rotor downwash parted the elephant grass and disclosed two armed groups of men on each side of the LZ. The friendlies were mostly indigenous troops so it was impossible to tell friend from foe until the bad guys started shooting. JG 28 withdrew and made it back to DaNang with a main fuel line severed by the ground fire. The LZ was in a box canyon and low clouds and mist capped the ridges. This kept the fast movers from working and severely limited the effectiveness of the A-1's. Rockets and other ordnance from the gunships were used for suppression before JG 10 attempted to make the pickup and was shot down. The weather then lifted a bit and the ground team was directed to join up with the JG 10 survivors while the Spads and F-4's blasted the area around the LZ. The PJ survivor, 250 yds from the LZ at the JG 10 crash site, heard people by-passing his position through the jungle and radioed that the ground team was going too far. It turned out that the people he heard were the enemy driven downhill by the Spads suppressive fire ahead of the SOG team. The eventual recovery of all survivors by JG 32 was a classic. The crew returned ground fire with the M-60's and 8 Sandys and Spads expended ordnance continually from a circling "Daisy Chain" while Major Olsen held a hover for a long time with the main and tail rotor clipping tree branches to enable all of the survivors to board the penetrator. The following message of appreciation was sent from COMUSMACV/MAC SOG 5503 to 7th Air Force for the 37th ARRS crewmembers. "Please express my sincere thanks to the members of your unit who provided such professional and courageous assistance during the recovery of a reconnaissance team from an enemy stronghold on 5 Oct 68. Without their outstanding assistance, the entire team would very possibly have been lost. The flying skill, and bravery under fire of these crews is unsurpassed by any combat unit in the theater. Cavanaugh sends. "

4. Enemy forces on a certain island were responsible for the loss of our second two HH-3's last month. Fortunately no more lives were lost. The Navy made a futile attempt to salvage both aircraft. When JG 24 lost transmission oil pressure and landed four miles off the island on 16 Oct, the destroyer HMAS Perth moved in to return fire from the shore batteries and even the New Jersey was diverted toward

the scene. After the crew was evacuated under fire and the helicopter capsized, the Navy decided it was not worth the risk of exposing the USS Princeton to the enemy artillery in an attempt to recover the helicopter. Four days later, when Captain Moore and crew enroute to Echo orbit attempted to rescue two F-4 pilots in their rafts even closer offshore from the island, the first artillery round from shore blew the entire tail boom off the helicopter. The survivors in their rafts were drifting toward the island and Captain Moore decided that any delay while awaiting full complement of our RESCORT forces would result in their capture. A decision that I think was completely understandable under the circumstances. The enemy held their fire until the aircraft was in the water and the PJ overboard helping the F-4 pilot with a severe back injury. As the shell hit, the rotor blades contacted the water on the left side and sheared off. The PJ and pilot were under the rotor arc on the right side at the time. They were forced under the aircraft and through the tremendous efforts of the PJ, who maintained control of the injured pilot, came up on the other side unhurt. A piece of one blade came through the top of the cockpit narrowly missing Captain Moore's head. The helicopter suffered another direct hit moments after the crew abandoned it in their rafts. Artillery and even mortar shells were exploding all around when all six survivors were picked up. The shore batteries were eventually silenced by F-4's, F-105's, Navy A-4's and our Spads. After what remained of JG 29 drifted past the corner of the island and beyond range of shore, a Navy swiftboat took it in tow in hopes of beaching it further South. However, it sank below the water and caused minor damage to the swift boat so had to be abandoned. We sent you a copy of our message of appreciation to the Seventh Fleet for their support (7AF DSR 160832Z Oct 68). The Navy has subsequently bombarded the island with the 16 inch guns of the battleship New Jersey.

5. On the subject of formation flying, as I stated in my ARCCO ltr, 25 Sep 68 and 3ARRGp msg 1000832Z Aug 68, the need is urgent and we would appreciate your approval on this matter. With the many anticipated changes to our tactics resulting from the new bombing policy and the areas we will be concentrating our operations on, this training is a vital key to our continued successful recovery operations.

6. We recently staffed a paper through 7th Air Force concerning RESCORT support within the DaNang SAR Sector. The paper cites the increase in enemy activity and firepower in the sector, our history of HH-3 losses, and recommends that six A1's be based at DaNang in support of our 37th Squadron. We have scheduled a SAR conference here at Tan Son Nhut for 7 November 1968 to discuss RESCORT tactics, training and


frequent basis. Plan to have my commanders in here for a quick 1-day conference just before General Estes' visit to insure continuity of action, etc.

24. The "MAC Family Concept" has resulted in a weekly flow of General officers touring our units, primary interest seems to be in the living facilities area. So far every one has had nothing but compliments.

25. Save Summary for September and October 1968:

	Combat	Non/Combat	USAF C/NC	USN C/NC	USA C/NC	USMC C/NC	F/MIL C/NC	CIV C/NC
Mar-6	52	0	34/0	0/0	14/0	0/0	4/0	0/0
Mar-43	9	75	2/11	1/5	3/11	1/4	2/33	0/11
Mar-53	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1/0</u>	<u>0/0</u>	<u>0/0</u>	<u>0/0</u>	<u>0/0</u>	<u>0/0</u>
TOTAL	62	75	37/11	1/5	17/11	1/4	6/33	0/11

26. This letter, like some of my past speeches, may appear a bit lengthy, will attempt to be more brief in the future.



HOLLON H. BRIDGES, Colonel, USAF
Commander

cc: Cmdr, PacARRC

HEADQUARTER

UP (MAC)

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 3C

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Commander's Letter

7 December 1968

TO: Brigadier General Allison C. Brooks
 Commander
 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service
 Scott AFB, Illinois 62225

Dear General Brooks,

SMC

Exec:

17 SEP 1990

1. President Johnson's 1 November 1968 "Cease Bombing" command certainly did not lessen the activities of 3rd Group. This has been one very active month both mission and management wise. Of course the high light of this period was General Estes' tour of our facilities. Since 3rd Group was designated the project monitor for his entire SEA tour we have accumulated a monumental file on his visit, which will certainly be a valuable guide for future use by my successors. As a result of many last minute directed changes, compounded by a local typhoon, the flexibility of this organization was demonstrated to the highest degree. Because of last minute COMUSMACV and Commander 7AF schedule changes, a complete reshuffle of the local itinerary for General Estes was required just as he arrived. But with the usual dexterity of the combat recovery force, we managed to regroup and give him a highly professional and concentrated briefing and tour of all the MAC family facilities, plus squeezed in a 1-hour visit with COMACV, and an outstanding SEA briefing (1 1/2 hrs) by Brigadier General Keegan, DCS/Intelligence. Also he spent 1 + 15 hours with Commander, 834th Air Division which left 5 hours for the MAC briefing and tour. For the MAC family I gave the only formal presentation which lasted 55 minutes in General Brown's conference room, making full use of its modern projection equipment. Primarily, I covered all activities, accomplishments, operational changes, etc. since his last visit in March. As to problem areas, I briefed him, Quote, "that we had none, challenges - yes, many - but there was nothing we hadn't been able to handle through proper identification and coordinated staff action through command channels. Most certainly, areas such as operations, personnel, materiel, supply, the introduction of new equipment and improving living conditions, were areas of concern. However, we had found that early identification of potential problem areas and coordinated staff action does

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much to prevent these challenges from becoming festering problems. As long as we continue to receive the wholehearted support of the 7AF staff and the MAC staff, we'll handle our challenges in good order, as they arise." end quote. In the course of my briefing, I had pointed out areas of concern in personnel and materiel, and what had and was being done in each area. I advised him of the personnel areas we were concerned in, i.e. helicopter mechanics, flight engineers, no-shows, cancellations, etc. I told him the action we had taken to bring these situations to the attention of ARRS and MAC staff, and that prompt out-of-cycle requisitions and TDY support had stop-gapped the most serious shortages. Also that the prompt replies by ARRS and MAC staff had every indication that our manning problems were manageable and our requests for help were being answered with rapid and responsive action. He asked that Colonel Hallenbeck get with my people for copies of our personnel figures, which he did and that night he sent a wire to MAC including our personnel figures for necessary action. General Estes seemed well satisfied with the briefing, he only asked two questions at the conclusion and then said "fine, what's next on the program?" He was extremely pleased with all of the facilities here and expressed high praise on the improvements, especially in the barracks which he said were "outstanding". And for Rescue's barracks here at Tan Son Nhut to be rated outstanding, you can well appreciate the amount of labor and materials expended to convert that mess into an outstanding living area. Reports from all my units indicate that all their briefings were consistent with mine and that he expressed enthusiastic praise for their accomplishments and many improvements in their facilities. To insure that the "MAC Combat Image" was properly documented we managed to have him present the following awards at our Rescue Units:

Det 1/40ARRSq - Nakhon Phanom RTAFB

- 1 Air Force Cross (Sgt Thomas A. Newman)
- 1 Silver Star
- 2 Distinguished Flying Cross

37ARRSq - DaNang AB, RVN

- 2 Silver Star
- 6 Distinguished Flying Cross

40ARRSq - Udorn RTAFB

- 5 Distinguished Flying Cross

~~We recovered Lt Colonel Vic Gore (sp), 6SOS, Pleiku)~~ after he crashed in a hostile area on 27 October. He was one of the enthusiastic participants in our 7 November SAR conference here at Tan Son Nhut.

4. The suspension of bombing in the North Vietnam Panhandle has not noticeably affected our level of activity. The main difference is that now the majority of the missions occur in another confined area. The HH-53's had their share of the action last month - an F-4 pilot from a nest of AAA on 9 November; a 9-man ground team on 10 November; and an Air America pilot and 4 others from a Site under attack at dusk on 27 November.

5. As a result of our experience on the 5 October 1968 SOG team extraction, we have loaned a forest penetrator to MACV for use in training SOG team members. Several of our ground team extractions in the past have been delayed because the ground party was not familiar with use of the penetrator.

6. We have just received word that the 38ARRSq has won an award for the "finest OJT program in Pac ARRC" for the third quarter of 1968. I feel this is particularly noteworthy considering the squadron is made up of 14 detachments scattered throughout South Vietnam and Thailand, each with a different OJT supervisor as compared to a squadron that has all its personnel located on the same base with just one OJT supervisor to run their program. Added to this are the adverse weather and living conditions, the constant harassment of hostile rocket attacks, and the 60-70 hour work week. We have all the ingredients and excuses to have a poor program, yet 3ARRGp is consistently above the MAC standards.

7. We are beginning to see some positive action from our SAR training exercise in September. Copies of the Operation Polecat Report were forwarded to CINCPACAF at the request of 7AF. CINCPACAF, in turn, has asked Aeronautical Systems Division to take expeditious action to resolve SEAOR 144. In addition, 7AF Life Support is formulating a proposed SEAOR for a protective face mask designed specifically for rescue aircrew purposes.

8. November was accident free in the ground safety area. In the flying safety area, Major Burnfield, of the 37ARRSq, averted a major aircraft accident on 23 November, when a materiel failure of the

significant opportunity for real progress will occur after 1 January 1969 when all of our personnel records will have been dispersed to host base CBPO's. When that occurs our detachments and squadrons will be able to work with the CBFO's directly on data purification and this should shorten the time expended in validating what we have and correcting what MAC shows us to have. I will continue to press on in this area and stand ready to assist the staffs in getting some positive results. *maybe*

13. My new conference room was completed and put to effective use this month. The first day it was functional I had the pleasure of briefing General Faught and his party of 12 in this new addition to our headquarters (built exclusively by self-help).

14. Save Summary for November 1968:

	Combat	Non-Combat	USAF C/NC	USN C/NC	USA C/NC	USMC C/NC	F/MIL C/NC	CIV C/NC
HH-3	13	2	6/0	0/0	0/0	7/2		
HH-43	19	18	4/3	3/0	3/5	0/0	9/5	0/5
HH-53	<u>15</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1/0</u>	<u>0/0</u>	<u>3/0</u>	<u>0/0</u>	<u>6/0</u>	<u>5/0</u>
TOTAL	47	20	11/3	3/0	6/5	7/2	15/5	5/5

15. On behalf of the entire 3ARRGp we wish you and your staff a MERRY CHRISTMAS and A HAPPY NEW YEAR. As for us over here, we are thankful for a most wonderful and productive year and are hoping for a few blessings to be bestowed upon us around Christmas time (like maybe a few new people).

Hollon H. Bridges
HOLLON H. BRIDGES, Colonel, USAF
Commander

cc: Pac ARRC

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DET 1, 40TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96310



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT:

to: Colonel Hollon H. Bridges
Commander, 3AMWGP (MAC)
APO 96307

31 DEC 1968

Dear Colonel Bridges,

Our December record speaks for itself, I believe, marred only by the fate of ALC King. We are certainly entering a brand new era of tactics against small arms fire while in a hover and possibly increasing pressure to have a look see without radio contact with the survivor. Prior to the recent Panda mission said contact was a mandatory requirement before committing a Jolly.

JS4KC

A very bright spot is the set of decisions to help us in our pilot and flight engineer manning, with some details yet to be worked out. The 40th pilots, who could very well form the cadre for the 53's over here, should receive a much better orientation this way than they would have in the original plan. As for the flight engineers it appears that there is now some relief for these men who have hardly had a day off since September. We currently have to schedule them on HKP alert right off the North Flight. The morale of both pilots and flight engineers had been markedly affected in spite of their basic belief in the mission.

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The final decision here on the income tax combat zone exclusion is right down the line with the Jan 1964 Executive Order. My signature is on the line, and I am in the best position to know whether the crews have penetrated the zone. There's only one course of action for me to take, i.e., certify only if they have done so. You are well aware of how seldom our mission allow us to do so. Other potential 589 problems, for which we have not been able to develop specific plans, are:

Supply support for HH-3E. We are in contact with supply to assure that they do not reduce levels blindly in accordance with the plan, rather work in accordance with HH-3E's in operation here.

3X

Maintenance manning for the unknown number of aircraft. It appears that this will be managed on a day-by-day basis with Col. Littman. But aside from the 589 plan, we face a critical shortage of aircraft with the impending loss of 229 to analytical testing, the KY-28/

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FM 622A modification and IRAM program. We will prepare a paper on this in the immediate future so that the TDY of DaNang birds, which you suggested at the Commander's Conference can be firmed up.
ACTION (FOI)

The official 1500th SEA combat save didn't receive the publicity we expected in spite of all the interesting angles it had. Lance Eagan did a superlative job of hovering up against the cliff.

The mission involving Jolly Green 16's unscheduled landing up north is still in progress. Hopefully it will be out early this afternoon.

The future plans involve a proposal to you for PCS of additional HH3E pilots to us, in order that we can best maintain the various squadron functions such as safety, standardization through the changeover period. This should fit with your recent message about emphasis on HH53 vs HH3E training at Eglin.

My SAR presentation at Takhli must have gone over well, since we are now scheduled to brief all of the bases here. Their reception of the presentation and their comments sure boosted my morale. Major Warwick was one of a team that briefed Jungle Survival School at Clark AB. The briefing team was made up of a Jolly pilot, Sandy pilot and a survivor, Lt Turner of our 600th SOS. The team briefed a complete SAR effort and stressed the procedures to be followed by survivors. The team was well received and were asked to brief Col Loring at 13th; Col Loring in turn set up a briefing for Gen Gideon and the entire 13th staff. Gen Gideon was well pleased and thought the idea of sending a briefing team from a recent SAR effort well founded and recommended it be continued.

Our Civic action work was just about nil this month with all of the demands on our time. Our two med-evacs boosted our saves to 333.

Negative report on no-shows for the month.

John H. I. Morse
JOHN H. I. MORSE, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

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3 F
Jolly Green
16
new
accident

31
+ 20

USAF
30