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437

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 6

29.

Summary Report 1-3-108-8301, 27 Oct 68

(S) At approximately 0330Z, 27 Oct 68, 37th ARSg Operations was notified that a Spad 01 (A-1H) aircraft had been hit and crashed. His wingman, Spad 02, and Covey 541 (O-2), also working in the area, had observed no chute. Spad 02 was also reported to have stated that Spad 01 was very low when hit, had rolled over and had gone in on his back. Spad 02 and Covey 541's estimate of the situation was that Spad 01 had gone in with his aircraft.

At approximately 0350Z Covey 541 and Spad 02 received a Mayday call from Spad 01. Jolly Green 32 and 33 were scrambled from CH 77. The crash location was given as 136/59/CH 72, later refined to 139/58/CH 72. JGs 32 and 33 were airborne at 0400Z with an ETE of one hour to the scene. The weather enroute was a broken cloud deck, bases 5000', tops running generally to 8000'. Spads 11 and 12 also scrambled from CH 77, escorted the JGs to the crash site. The Spad escort is recommended for any future mission in that area as they are very familiar with the area and were able to lead the JGs around known hostile areas with probably 37MM threats. The JGs and Spads 11 and 12 arrived on scene at approximately 0500Z.

At that time, Covey 541 was in the area along with Spads 02, 03, and 04. Only Covey 541 had been able to read Spad 01 on 243.0 mc and his location had not been pinpointed yet. Each time one of the Spads attempted a location pass, they received intense ground fire from a neighboring mountainside. The area of originating gunfire was a mountain of approximately 2600' elevation with gunfire coming from about 1/3 of the way up on the Southwest slope. The next ridge to the SSW had a maximum peak altitude of 1800' and ran generally NNW to SSE. Spad 01's position was estimated to be either on the ridge or slightly down (20-30 yards) the NE slope.

Crown 6 suggested the use of fast movers (F4-C) to suppress the groundfire, but Spad 11 declined until the survivor's position could be more accurately determined. All Spads continued to receive groundfire on each successive pass as they attempted to locate the survivors exact position. JG 32 and 33 continued to orbit overhead at 7500' MSL. Voice contact with the survivor improved when directly overhead and the survivor stated that he was in a heavily wooded area and could see only straight up. He also stated that he was in satisfactory condition.

At approximately 0530Z JG 32 and 33 received air bursts from 37MM and/or 23MM AAA and withdrew to an orbit further South. Spad 11 called for napalm on the groundfire position and shortly thereafter Covey 541 spotted a chute through the trees and was able to determine a more exact position on the survivor. It was determined that Spad 01 was 20 - 30 yards down the NE side of the ridge and about 3/4 of a mile from the mountainside where the groundfire was coming from. The de-

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cision was then made to bring in the fast movers to sterilize that area.

The Gunfighters (F-4C) arrived on scene at approximately 0615Z and hit the area with H-Drags, Rockets and Pistols.

JGs 32 and 33 proceeded to Dak To for refueling, landing at 0645Z, were airborne at 0710Z and arrived back on scene at approximately 0735Z. At 0745Z the Gunfighters were released and Covey 547 had replaced Covey 541. The survivor's position was now known within 25 yards and the Spads worked the area over with napalm and CBU in preparation for a rescue attempt.

JG'32's analysis was as follows: The wind was from the NNE. The only logical approach was from the South, approaching either along the West or East side of the ridgeline. The survivor was presently on the East side of the ridge. This location would have required a North heading of the aircraft for a pickup on the East side of the ridge. The other alternative would have been a downwind hover, facing South, with the rescue hoist and pilot being on the slope side. This was the better position, but had two drawbacks; a downwind hover at approximately 1800' and this position was more directly exposed to the groundfire.

JG 32 contacted Spad 01 on 243.0 and requested that he move directly up the ridge and slightly down the West side. This involved a distance of 50-75 yards. He complied and upon reaching the top of the ridge, informed JG 32 that it was too difficult to move further and he would stay on the top of the ridge.

JG 32 briefed all RESCORD aircraft on the procedures and techniques to be used during the attempted pickup. The approach would be low and fast, using the West side of the ridge for cover to obstruct the enemy's view from the area of known hostility. As the survivor's area was approached a "pop-up turn" would be initiated from the West slope to the ridge top. Covey 547 was to give voice commands as to JG 32's position relative to the survivor and call for survivor's smoke at the appropriate time. As JG 32 came abeam Spad 01's position and initiated the "pop-up" maneuver, the Spad aircraft were to deploy total smoke between JG 32 and the groundfire site.

The rescue was flown exactly as briefed with the survivor contributing to the effort by vectoring JG 32 straight ahead to his smoke which was also clearly visible during the final turn. As JG 32 approached Spad 01 from approximately 50 yards out, the six Spads deployed their smoke between JG 32 and the groundfire area. The smoke drop was perfect with some being dropped as close as 30 yards from the pickup position. The opposite mountain side became almost completely obscured from view and this contributed directly to the success of the mission. The trees in the survivor's position were

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lower than the surrounding trees by some 15 to 20 feet and afforded a depression slightly larger than the rotor blades. JG 32 hovered down into this depression to further obscure himself from the known hostile area. The Spad aircraft remarked later that he could not see JG 32 during the pickup because he was so well hidden down in the trees. As soon as Spad 01 was aboard the penetrator, JG informed the Spads to begin strafing as pre-briefed. As the survivor was pulled aboard JG 32 hovered straight up and prepared to depart as the Spads continued to strafe all the surrounding vantage points. As JG 32 departed the pickup zone, again via the West side of the ridge, low and fast, the Spads continued their "daisy chain" around the helicopter and supplied suppressive fire along the exit route.

(C) The survivor was in relatively good shape except for some facial bruises and a backache. He stated that he had ejected at a very low altitude and hit the trees almost immediately upon chute deployment. He also mentioned that the climb up the ridge was completely exhausting and that he had two radios with him, which was fortunate in that one of them did not work. Pickup was at 0800Z.

(C) JGs 32 and 33 accompanied by the Spads, returned the survivor to CH 107, his home station. JG's 32 and 33 departed CH 107 at 1020Z and arrived at CH 77 at 1200Z. Weather enroute to CH 77 was broken to overcast, tops 8000'. Flight altitude was 8500'. The survivor was Lt Victor Cole.

(U) Jolly Green crews were:

Jolly Green 32

RCC Major Charles E. Wicker,
RCCP Major Robert E. Booth,
FE Sgt Herbert H. Honer,
RS Sgt Stephen T. White,

Jolly Green 33

RCC Major Leo M. Wright,
RCCP Major Paul B. Davis Jr.,
FE Sgt Robert T. Anderson,
RS Sgt Thomas T. Winters,

(NKP)

CHARLES E. WICKER, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

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5C
149

4 Nov 1968

Date: 27 Oct 1968

Mission Number: 1-3-108-8301

Flight Designation: Crown 4

Location: YB 332423 (136/58/72)

Distressed Aircraft: Spad 01

Aircraft Used In Support: Covey 541, Covey 547, Jolly Green 32/33, Spad 02, Spad 03, Spad 04, Spad 11, Spad 12, Spad 30, Spad 32, Spad 5 and Spad 6, Gunfighter 03 Flt (2), Silver Flt (2), Sawyer Flt (2), Vegas Flt (2) and Cutter Flt (2).

Aircraft Available - Not Used: Gunfighter 07 (2), Hammer 54/55, Miller 01/02, Falcon Flt (4), Sandy 1, 2, 5 and 6 (arrived on scene at time of pickup), Jolly Green 07/21 (enroute).

1. 0330Z - Crown 4's first indication was Peacock asking Spad 02 why he was squawking emergency. Crown 4 was unable to hear the reply and started south from Echo orbit. Overhead CH 77, Crown 4 had voice contact with Covey 547 who stated Spad 01 had gone down near the "Little Dog's Head near the Interchange". No chute or beeper had been sighted. Covey 547 looked at the crash site and did not think anyone could be alive. Crown 4 requested Covey 547 and 541 to conduct an electronic search of area and Spad 02, 03 and 04 started for CH 107. After approximately 10 minutes, Covey 547 reported he had voice contact with the pilot and knew the general area where he was down. Jolly Greens 32/33 and Spads 11/12 were launched from CH 77 and were airborne 0355Z, ETA for area 0500Z.

2. Weather for the crash site was clear with unrestricted visibility. Low cloud deck from CH 77 to 40 miles east of crash site aided arrival of Jolly Greens. Spad 03 was appointed On-Scene-Commander. While trying to pinpoint survivor, ground fire was received from a ridge to the northeast. Site was near a suspected 37mm site. Anticipating the need for fast movers, the first flight arrived on scene at 0430Z. For remainder of SAR effort two flights remained overhead at all times.

3. During initial phase of effort, some difficulty was encountered in pinpointing the survivor. The terrain (single canopy - 50 to 75 feet) prevented visual contact. By the use of DFs, the position was located within 200 meters which was well clear of suspected ground fire (approximately 600 meters to northeast). Spad 02, 03 and 04 expended ordnance except for CRUs, but were unable to use fast movers for the first hour because of the uncertainty of survivor's position. Spad 02, 03 and 04 departed scene at 0530Z. Spad 11 became On-Scene-Commander. With assistance of Covey 541, Spad 11 located survivor's chute at 0600Z and fast movers were brought in and the gun position was hit for 1445.

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GROUP-4

Declassified at 3 year interval
Declassified at or 12 years

4. The decision was made at 0645Z to send Jolly Greens 32 and 33 to Dak To (110/40) for refueling rather than using Crown 6. Crown 4 unable due to fuel state and loss of continuity of mission. Covey 547 escorted and Jolly Green 32 returned on scene at 0735Z with Jolly Green 33 seven minutes behind.

5. Decision to attempt pickup was made at 0740Z with Spad 11, 12, 5, 6, 30 and 32 setting up smoke screen and daisy chain while Jolly Green 32 and Covey 547 came in from south along ridge line to locate survivor. Jolly Green 32's briefing was very thorough and operation started at 0750Z when Jolly Green 33 was in position south of site. No ground fire was reported during pickup and survivor was spotted immediately when signal smoke was popped. Survivor directed Jolly Green overhead by radio and the pickup (0800Z) and egress were uneventful. Jolly 32/33 and Spad 5, 6, 11, 12, 30 and 32 RTB'd CH 107. Fast movers were released by Crown 6. Sandy 1, 2, 5, and 6 RTB'd CH 89 as they arrived on scene.

6. Mission problems: Radio discipline suffered initially due to excessive use of Guard during Spad strikes, however, after approximately 45 minutes frequency 364.2 established as strike freq and 142.7 used for coordination. Fast movers were handled by Panama on 306.0 and were sent to strike freq by Crown 4 upon request of Spad 11. Peacock and Lion GCI interrupted frequently even after being requested to contact Panama and remain off the frequencies. Fast movers still came up SAR primary for initial contact even after Queen was told to send all RESCAP aircraft to Panama for holding. Coordination of fast movers overall worked very well as two flights were always available and all were employed except for initial two flights. Spad 30 coordinated on vector with Crown 4 for fast movers support. When Spad 11 was ready for a flight, Crown 4 instructed them to go uniform and standby for a call from Spad 11. This method was very effective and greatly reduced chatter.

7. Recommendations:

a. Squadron Intelligence include terms "Little Dog's Head", "Interchange" and "The Bra" as prominent landmarks for Tigerhound. List of similar words could be placed in Mission Folder for each particular area.

b. Consideration might be given to relocating Crown 4 and 6 orbits to enable better coverage of Tigerhound. Crown 1 did not hear call. Though Crown 1 is concerned with Alpha Strike Force, an increasing number of strikes are going into Tigerhound. The present Monsoon season has reduced drastically the RPI strikes. I suggest bringing the orbit south and still provide coverage for Jolly Green orbits - 100/30-70/109.

8. Crew:

a. RL	Capt James F. Ulin
b. RCP	Capt Robert J. Nelson
c. RH	Capt Robert J. Meyer
d. FE	TSgt Robert V. Butler
e. FE	MSgt Henry T. Sludge

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GROUP-4
Declassify at 3 year intervals.
Declassify after 12 years.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
37TH AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY SQUADRON (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96337



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 37(0)

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37-00313

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE (Mission #1-3-103-8301) (U)

31 OCT 1968

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

TO: 37C

JSARC

IN TURN

9 MAR 72

(Date)

IAW AFR 205-2

W Q
B OR
25 9/15

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRS: 55-2/3ARROF Sup 1, 15 Jun 68.

2. (S) At approximately 0330Z, 27 Oct 68, 37th ARRS Operations was notified that a Spad 01 (A-1-E) aircraft had been hit and crashed. His wingman, Spad 02, and Covey 541 (O-2) also working in the area, had observed no chute. Spad 02 also was reported to have stated that Spad 01 was very low when hit, had rolled over and had gone in on his back. Spad 02 and Covey 541s' estimated the situation was that Spad 01 had gone in with his aircraft.

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ARDC # 681969

62-170-2770

Classified by
SUBJECT TO CHANGE
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 5/1/04

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5. (U) Jolly Green crews were:

Jolly Green 32

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RCCP Maj Robert E. Booth,
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RS Sgt Stephen T. White,

Jolly Green 33

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Charles E. Wicker
CHARLES E. WICKER, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

68-120-2770