

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: 370/6104

4.3K(2) 5 NOV 1967

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-176, 3 Nov-67) (U)

TO: 37C *W*
3rd ARRGp (JSARG) APO 96307
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1967.
2. (C) At 0345Z, 3 Nov 67, Jolly Green 10 was entering the traffic pattern for landing at Dong Ha AB, RVN. Maverick 01, on Guard, reported Covey 63, a FAC O-2, down in the water one mile NE of Mui Lay, NVN. Maverick 01 requested assistance. Jolly Green 10 advised Maverick 01 that JG 10 was diverting to this position. JG 10 arrived at the scene of the crash at 0353Z and observed Covey 75, wingman for Covey 63, searching the area. Contact with both Covey 75 and Maverick 01 was established on 364.2 by Jolly Green 10. JG 10 was advised by Covey 75 that Covey 63 had just completed marking a target for Maverick Flight, when he received hits and caught fire. Covey 63 was reported as heading East across the coastline in flames and the aircraft was observed to spin prior to impact. There was no visible wreckage nor debris at the scene, nor was any sign of the survivor observed. Maverick 01 fired suppressive rockets along the edge of the coastline while Covey 75 made repeated searching sweeps over the impact area. After 25 minutes of negative results, all aircraft terminated the SAR effort. Weather in the area was 2500' broken with ten miles visibility and was not a factor. Crew coordination and communications on Jolly Green 10 was excellent.

3. (C) Aircraft involved:

Covey 75	USAF O-2
Maverick 01, 02	USAF F-4C
Crown 4	USAF HC-130
Jolly Green 10	USAF HH-3E

This document contains MIA information that is NOT cleared for public release under Public Law 102-190 (15 DEC 91). Release must be coordinated through Safe Paper.

4. (U) Crew of Jolly Green 10:

RCC	Capt Thomas E. Bair
RCCP	Capt Gerald H. MacDonald
FE	SSgt Jimmy L. Dodgen
RS	Sgt Donald K. Claudius Jr
AP	A1C Timothy P. Salsman

AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
YEAR INTERVALS. ORDER 11652
DECLASSIFIED ON 9 FEB 1977
DOWNGRADED AT TWO

Thomas E Bair

THOMAS E. BAIR, Captain, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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
139

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: (Det 10, 38th ARRSq Mission #10-38-45, 4 Nov 67)

At 0246Z, Det 10, 38 ARRSq received a request for helicopter evacuation of two US Navy River Patrol Boat (FBR) crew members wounded by enemy action while engaged in operations on the Cau Ke Canal. Navy Operations, the requestor, advised that FBR's, "Handlash Bravo and Handlash Delta," each with one wounded aboard, were withdrawing from the canal for rendezvous at a safe area on the Bassac River. Pedro 91 was airborne at 0250Z and was notified immediately after takeoff that a light fire team of two US Navy helicopters was enroute to the rendezvous point to provide suppressive fire cover. Pedro 91 arrived on scene at 0314Z and made a mid-stream pick-up from "Handlash Bravo" of one crew member with an upper leg wound at 0318Z utilizing the stokes litter. The second crew member, who suffered a hand wound, was recovered from "Handlash Delta" at 0322Z by hoist sling. Both wounded were treated by the pararescueman aboard Pedro 91 enroute to the hospital. Flying a circuituous route, due to extensive artillery operations along the direct flight path, Pedro 91 arrived at Dong Tam at 0353Z where patients received advanced medical treatment. Pedro 91 refueled and departed immediately for home station arriving at 0445Z. Gunship helicopters were requested by Navy Operations at time of initial notification in accordance with previously developed procedures and both helicopters were on scene at Pedro's arrival. Ideal gunship cover was provided thru utilization of a tight circular orbit at approximately 300 feet altitude with 180 degree spacing of the two helicopters. Supplemental cover was provided by two additional FBR's on scene during recovery operations. Recovery coordination, effected exclusively on FM radio, was excellent and boat procedures were in accordance with previously tested and published instructions. Negative hostile fire was encountered - two combat saves.

CREW: (All assigned to Det 10, 38th ARRSq)

Rescue Crew Commander: Major Harold Pickering
Rescue Crew Co-Pilot: Capt Albert E. Tollefsen
Flight Engineer: SSgt William L. Crawford
Pararescueman: Sgt Gary G. Harold



HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander

140


9/3

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: (Det 10, 38th ARRSq Mission #10-38-46, 4 Nov 67)

Det 10, 38 ARRSq was notified at 2343Z by US Navy Operations Center Binh Thuy that they had one wounded US Navy personnel requiring medical evacuation. The man had head lacerations and fragment wounds of the upper left arm and upper left leg. One HH-43F was dispatched for the pick-up; Pedro 91 tookoff at 2345Z. Two miles south of Vinh Long a flight of armed US Navy UH-1B helicopters, lead by "Seawolf 36" joined the mission to provide air cover. The "Seal" team had beached their assault boat south of the Song Mang Thit Canal on the Song Co Chien River and had set up for a land pick-up in a flooded rice paddy. The team set off a smoke flare and an approach was made into the wind with a landing in one foot of water. The injured man was able to walk to the helicopter. The pick-up was completed at 0010Z, 5 Nov 67. The "Seawolf" flight was released after the pick-up, and the survivor was flown to the 3d Field Hospital at Dong Tam. During this flight the pararescueman replaced the head dressing and applied first aid. After pick-up and while enroute to the hospital at a altitude of 2500 feet sporadic hostile small arms ground fire was encountered. A climb was initiated and evasive action was taken. No hits were sustained by the helicopter. The survivor was off loaded at the Dong Tam hospital at 0020Z. Pedro 91 then refueled at the Dong Tam landing strip and returned to Binh Thuy at 0935Z. FM radios were a major factor in achievement of proper coordination of pick-up and fire team coverage. One combat save.

CREW: (All assigned to Det 10, 38 ARRSq)

Rescue Crew Commander: Capt Laurence W. Conover
Rescue Crew Co-Pilot: Capt William J. Haugen
Flight Engineer: Sgt Larry E. Hawkins
Pararescueman: A1C James L. Parks


HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander

SECRET

101

FROM: RCC CAPT NIQUETTE


5 November 1967

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative

TO: Commander
39 ARRS

At 0417Z Crown #4 recieved a call on UHF guard (243.0) from Gunfighter Lead who stated that he had just lost his wingman Gunfighter #2. He stated that the aircraft just crashed at the 315/25/69 and he had two good chutes. Crown #4 called Queen and had the Jolly Greens launch out of Quang Tri. Crown #4 contacted rail 30 a O-1 FAC that was in the area and ask if the area was clear. He ~~xxxx~~ stated that it looked okay. Crown #4 contacted Crikett and ask ~~xxxx~~ if he had any jets he could send to use as RESCAP. Crikett had Chisel Flight of two F-4 contact Crown #4 on SAR UHF primary. Crown #4 had hesel orvit at 8,000 ft over the area incase they might be needed. An Army Black Cat 24 (UHIE) was in the area and call Crown #4 to see if he could help. He stated that he had a medic on board. Crown #4 asked Black Cat if he was right there to make the pick-up. Crown #4 ask Gunfighter Lead if he had Black Cat. He stated that he did. He stated that he would show him where the two pilots were. Gunfighter Lead stated he had two beeper and then he had voice contact with rear pilot. He stated that he was in good condition. Black Cat found both pilots and made the pick-up at 0427Z and returned both pilot to Danang. Both pilots in good condition. Gunfighter RTB to Danang and all SAR Forces were RTB.

This mission narrative is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-1 3rd GP SUPP 55-22


Thomas H. Niquette, Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Plt	Larry J. Brandt, Capt
Nav	Harry A. Thompson, Capt
RO	Charley W. ichardson, SSGT
FE	Charles A. Nelson, MSGT
FE	Leon Puryear, TSGT
IM	Charles M. Kansaku, SMSGT



~~SECRET~~

2-3-85

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative, 5 November 1967

21 NOV 1967

TO: 3ARRGp (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSN 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1, dated 15 June 67.

2. (S)(GP-4) Jolly Green 56 (Low) and 37 (High) were scrambled from LS-36 at 0840Z and told to rendezvous with Sandys 5 and 6 over North Station. At the time of launch a position for the downed survivor (Marlin Lead) had not been given to either of the crews. Shortly after takeoff Crown 2 gave a location of 047/89 from Channel 97 (21°23'N, 104°46'E) and directed all aircraft to the North Vietnamese border immediately. We flew near a 7500' (MSL) scattered cloud layer to avoid ground fire and offer protective cover from hostile aircraft. Visibility throughout the mission was excellent. Approximately 35 minutes later while enroute to the scene, Compress directed JG 37 to make the recovery since JG 56 was not aerial refueling equipped. At this point the altitude of the downed airman was unknown and a good possibility existed that without the use of A/R enough internal fuel would not be available to make recovery and land at a suitable base during the hours of darkness. Arriving on scene at 0950Z JG 37 immediately sighted a rising cloud of white smoke and, upon direction of Sandy lead, started toward it. Approaching the smoke JG 37 was advised that it was the wrong marker and that another smoke bomb had been dropped closer to the survivor's position. At this point radio communication between JG 37 and the Sandys disintegrated. JG 37 could not talk to the Sandy, whose transmissions to the JG were, in turn, broken. JG 56, now in high orbit over a mountain of nearby karst began relaying the Sandy's direction. Although two different compass headings were initially given, by picking an average we crossed a nearby ridge and sighted the second smoke signal. Flying directly toward it the survivor fired a flare (we later learned) which ignited just after we had passed his position, making it impossible to see. Taking relayed instructions from JG 56, JG 37 turned around. Still there was no sign of the survivor. At this point someone called "up the hill" and the crew sighted remnants of smoke. Instantaneously two pen flares shot up through the trees. MigCap called "bogies" in the area. Almost immediately they were reported low and away. JG 37 entered a hover over the downed airman and, in spite of thick foliage, a steep slope and several high trees, no great difficulty was encountered in making the pickup. Just after we had dropped our tip tanks for the hover JG 56 called and advised that Compress had changed the original decision and told him to make the recovery. In view of the advanced stage of the effort, however, we were allowed to

PS VOUT TURNS INTO NVN SARE MSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-370ps 67-86

GROUP 4

25 JUL 1970
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

Cys 1 of 6 Cys

~~SECRET~~

Attach

ARODC # 671388

67-86-5387

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DECLASSIFIED

continue. Shortly after beginning our departure, Sandy 6, who had proceeded to escort JG 56 out of the area called Migs and reported that he was being fired upon. Neither JG crew sighted the enemy aircraft. The only other hostile activity observed was small arms and/or automatic weapons fire across the Black River and each time we crossed a valley. Our altitude was such that no battle damage was sustained. Enroute to Channel 89 JG 37 conducted A/R with Crown 2 and landed at 1300Z. JG 56 landed at Channel 86 at 1240Z with insufficient fuel to return to Channel 89. ✓

3. (U) The name of the survivor was Capt Billy (NMI) Sparks, USAF.
4. (U) Crews of Jolly Green 37 and 57 were:

Jolly Green 37

Harry W. Walker, Capt, RCC
Gerald B. Lowe, Lt Col, RCCP
Russell L. Oneal, Sgt, FE
Clarence R. Boles, MSgt, PJ
Charley D. Smith, TSgt, PJ

Jolly Green

James H. Platt, 1st Lt, RCC
Richard A. Wagner, Maj, RCCP
Hairl D. Thacker, SSgt, FE
Joseph M. Duffy, Sgt, PJ

Harry W. Walker

HARRY W. WALKER, Captain, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

SECRET

104

FROM: RCC CAPT. BAINES

6 November 1987

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative 2-3-89

TO: Commander
39 ARRS

Marlin Lead (F105) downed at 21-25N 104-43E. Reported by Marlin 111 on strike freq at 0835Z. Jolly Green's 56 and 37 were launched at 0829Z. Border clearance for SAR Forces from Compress at 0858Z. Sandy's 1, 2, 3, and 6 escorted the Jolly's in. Rescap was provided by Scotch Hornet and Ozark flights. Migcap by Olds and Honda. The survivor was recovered at 1009Z by JG 37. At this time Sandy 6 reported that he was jumped by a Mig. He took no hits that he could tell. He punched off all external stores except center line tank and mini gun. There were no Mig calls for 5 minutes either side of 1009Z. The calls after that time were North and East. Crown 11 descended to 8,500 to refuel JG 37 vicinity Ch 97. Then escorted all forces across the fence and JG 37 to Ch 89.

Thomas B. Baines
THOMAS B. BAINES, CAPT, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Flight time on mission;

Scotch 1+30	Olds 2+00
Hornet 1+30	Honda 1+30
Ozark 1+30	

Crown 2	1+50
Sandy's	1+50
JG's	1+45

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424

SUMMARY TABLE OF RESCUES

1967

DATE	RESCUE NO.	SURVIVOR	CREW ACFT	SERVICE	LOCATION	JOLLY GREEN CREW
2 Oct	203	Maj Miller	RF4C	USAF	Laos	Maj Haynes Lt Barton
2 Oct	204	Maj Brown	RF4C	USAF	Laos	SSgt Androsky A2C Taylor
3 Oct	205	Maj Moore	F4C	USAF	Laos	Capt Etzel Capt Hall
3 Oct	206	Maj Gulbrandson	F4C	USAF	Laos	SSgt Zerbe Sgt Brabboni
23 Oct	207	Capt McLean (Deceased)	F105	USAF	Thailand	Maj Haynes Lt Platt SSgt Keyes Sgt Smith
26 Oct	208	Lt Sanchi	T28	RTAF	Laos	Maj Haynes Lt Platt
26 Oct	209	Unknown	T28	RTAF	Laos	Sgt Allen Sgt Duffy
5 Nov	210	Capt Sparks	F105	USAF	North Vietnam	Capt Walker Lt Col Lowe MSgt Boles TSgt Smith
8 Nov	211	Capt Gordon	F4	USAF	North Vietnam	Capt Richardson Lt Barton SSgt Brooks Sgt Lombard
11 Nov	212	Maj Griffith	A1E	USAF	Laos	Lt Platt Lt Sichterman SSgt Negrette A1C Taylor
18 Nov	213	Lt Col Reed	F105	USAF	Laos	Capt Richardson Lt Privette SSgt Warmack A1C Taylor
20 Nov	214	Lt Col Scholtz	RF4	USAF	North Vietnam	Lt Col Britton Maj Wells
20 Nov	215	Capt Simenero	RF4	USAF	North Vietnam	SSgt Androsky Sgt Duffy
29 Dec	216	Capt Altman	F4	USAF	Laos	Capt Etzel Maj Wells
29 Dec	217	Capt Coburn	F4	USAF	Laos	SSgt Thacker Sgt Sowell

HISTORY DET 1 37 ARRS 1 OCT - 31 DEC 67

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MARLIN

F-105

DOWNED 5 NOV 67

MISSION NARRATIVE


DATE: 7 Nov 1967

PREPARED BY: Charley D. Smith

ORGANIZATION: Det 1, 37th ARRS; APO 96310

On 5 Nov 1967 Jolly Green 37 and 56 were on alert at site 36. At 1540 we were notified of a downed aircraft (Marlin Lead) near the Red River. Both Jollies were scrambled at 1545 hours, after the downed pilot's wingman reported a good chute and beeper. The Sandies proceeded to the area and established voice contact with the downed pilot. The survivor reported having a twisted ankle, an injured shoulder and elbow. He related that he landed on his right foot and left forearm, folding his right leg up into his crotch and jamming his right shoulder. J.G. 37 arrived in the area at 1650 hours and had the survivor on board by 1710 hours. As the survivor came on board he was limping on his right leg and supporting his right shoulder and arm with his left hand. He was helped to the litter by Sgt. Boles and myself. There was no evidence of external hemorrhage. The bony structures of the right shoulder appeared to be in their normal position. There was no evidence of a fracture to the clavicle. The right elbow and forearm had bruises, minor abrasions and small lacerations. Indications were that he experienced severe pain when the shoulder joint was moved. Further examination revealed swelling to the right ankle with no apparent fracture. Both eye lids were swollen and bluish in color, evident of a burn or a strong wind blast to the face. The boot laces were tightened to serve as a splint. The lacerations were scrubbed with phisohex. The survivor said he was feeling better and felt there wasn't enough pain to warrant the use of morphine. He got up and watched as the Jolly aerial refueled.

About 1800 the survivor presented all the symptoms of shock. He got cold, pale and faint. His pulse was weak and rapid. The survivor layed down and was covered with a blanket and sleeping bag. An I.V. was prepared but his pulse was slowed to 88 per minute and was strong. Each five minutes his pulse was checked until we landed at NKP RTAFB and he was taken by ambulance to the dispensary. The pulse rate varied from 88 to 72, and was strong. However his hands remained cold for the entire trip.


TSgt Charley D. Smith
AF 28168281
Det 1 37th ARRS
APO S.F. 96310

Jet Pilot Rescued By 'Jolly Greens'

Another successful rescue was made by the Jolly Green Giants from Detachment 1, 37th Air Recovery Rescue Squadron, earlier this month.

Capt. Billy R. Sparks, the crew except Sergeant Smith and this was the fifth for him. Sergeant Boles was on his check-out ride as a pararescue technician.

A1E "Sandy" pilots of the 602nd Fighter Sq. (Commando), laid down suppression fire to enable the HH-3E to go in for the rescue. One of the escort "Sandy" pilots, Capt. Edward Leonard, 29, of Winlock, Wash., was "jumped" by two MIG-17s but managed to evade the MIGs through a series of maneuvers.

Except for minor bruises received while bailing out, the captain was in "A-OK" condition upon his arrival at the recovery base. "It was an outstanding rescue," said Captain Sparks. "You just can't appreciate how good those big green birds look unless you've been down there on the ground."

Crew members of the rescue helicopter were: Capt. Harry W. Walker, 32, pilot from Granite City, Ill.; Lt. Col. Gerald B. Lowe, 47, co-pilot from Amarillo, Tex.; TSgt. Charley D. Smith 29, pararescue technician from Porterville, Calif.; SSgt. Russell L. O'Neal, 23, flight engineer, from Flat Rock, Mich.; MSgt. Clarence R. Boles, pararescue technician from Killen, Tex.

This was the first rescue for Captain Walker, who said, "It's the greatest feeling in the world to pick up a pilot and know you've got him safely aboard."

It was also the first pick-up for all other members of

Page 14

SEVENTH AIR

Pilot Forced To Eject Terms It 'Longest Da

SOUTHEAST ASIA — Getting shot at, ejecting from a stricken aircraft, bombing an important military target is nothing new to Capt. Billy R. "Sparky" Sparks 32, Fern Creek, Ky., but lying alone and injured beneath dense bamboo within shouting distance of Hanoi is.

After 145 combat missions over North Vietnam, the F-105 Thunderchief pilot from the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing had experienced just about everything except being shot down — until Nov. 5, when he was hit after a successful bomb run over the heavily defended Phu Yen airfield near Hanoi.

The cockpit quickly filled with smoke and the gauges began to malfunction. He was forced to pop his canopy, but was still blanketed in smoke and a second hit rocked his sturdy fighter-bomber. He still had good control, but soon lost use of his radio and all gauges.

A third round hit his battered plane and he was completely engulfed in smoke and then lost all control.

He decided it was time to leave his bird and he ejected. During the agonizingly slow descent he could see life below him and fellow Thud pilots above him spotting for rescue

incline, sprained the fall. He crawled over his radio heard and began a minute uphill mud, bamboo, beds.

Minutes see and, then, the rescue plane popped his smoke smoke clung to boo. He quickly pin flare gun

His aim was ting a hovering ly Green Giant fallen pilot, 100 cable was lowe

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4.3K(2)

370/6104

8 Nov 67

1. Mission Narrative Report (1-3-180, 7 Nov 67) (U)

2. 3rd ARRGp (JBARC)
IN TURN

(U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3, ARRGp Sup 1 dated June 1967.

(C) Jolly Green 25 arrived on fragged orbit position at 0700Z. At 0702Z the crew heard a Mayday call over guard frequency accompanied with a whisper. Buckshot lead reported that his wingman Buckshot 2 (F-4C) had been a hit over target and the pilots had bailed out. Buckshot lead gave the position as 120°/68 miles/ch 109, approximately 3 miles off shore. Jolly Green 25 was only 10 miles from this point and proceeded directly to the given point, arriving at approximately 0855Z. Since no survivors were in sight an updated position was requested from Crown 5 (the SAR Commander). Misty 31, the FAC on the scene gave an updated position of 120°/68 miles/ch 109. (This position approximately 2 miles inland is North Vietnam.) Jolly Green 25 headed directly for this position. While enroute, at approximately 0900Z, Misty 31 called that he had lost radio contact with Buckshot 2B (back seater) and he believed the pilot had been captured. At this point Jolly Green 25 was 3 miles off the coast and entered a holding pattern while waiting for the aircraft to be sighted to confirm that there was a survivor. At 0945Z Crown 5 advised that there were no survivors and Jolly Green 25 was RTB.

3. (U) Weather was no factor -- clear and 25.

4. (U) No enemy fire was encountered.

5. (U) Crew of Jolly Green 25
- NOG - Capt Charles R. Dunn
 - REF - Capt Frank M. Zahrobaky
 - FK - Sgt Charles M. Harris
 - RS - Sgt Joseph S. Stanaland

2 c/ Repro by LRS Week 5
Dist 1 c/ to USAF Hq
1 c/ to Ft Belvoir
Classified by
SUBJECT TO GDSR 1.2
SCHEDULE OF DECLASSIFICATION
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 8 FEB 1977

Charles R. Dunn
CHARLES R. DUNN, Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

DOWNGRADED AT 2-1-77

Vietnam War Aircraft Losses

711	6 Oct 1967	A-1E	LAOS	Armstrong F. A.	Maj	KIA				
712	7 Oct 1967	F-4D	NVN	Appleby I. D.	Maj	MIA		Austin W. R. II	Capt	POW (retur
713	7 Oct 1967	F-105F	Sea	Howard J. C.	Capt	Rescued	USMC Helo	Shamblee G. L.	Capt	Rescued
714	7 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Fullam W. E.	Maj	KIA				
715	9 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Clements J. A.	Maj	POW (returned)				
716	12 Oct 1967	O-1G	SVN	Siebert W.	Maj	Rescued	Army Helo			
717	12 Oct 1967	F-4C	NVN	Derrickson T. G.	Capt	MIA		Hardy J. K.	1Lt	KIA
718	15 Oct 1967	F-4C	Sea	Maloy R. W.	Col	Rescued	USAF	Paul W. S.	Capt	Rescued
719	15 Oct 1967	RF-4C		Applehans R. D.	Capt	MIA		Clarke G. W.	Capt	POW (died
720	16 Oct 1967	O-1E	SVN	Alexander M. H.	Maj	Rescued	USAF			
721	17 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Sullivan D. E.	Maj	POW (returned)				
722	17 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	ODell D. E.	Maj	POW (returned)				
723	17 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Andrews A. C.	Capt	POW (returned)				
724	18 Oct 1967	RF-101	LAOS	Pishvanov N. A.	Maj	Rescued	USAF Helo			
725	21 Oct 1967	F-100D	Sea	Hemmel C. J.	Capt	KIA				
726	24 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Scott M. D.	Capt	Rescued	USN			
727	25 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Smith R. E. Jr	Maj	POW (returned)				
728	25 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Horinek R. A.	Capt	POW (returned)				
729	27 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Flynn J. P.	Col	POW (returned)				
730	27 Oct 1967	F-4D	NVN	Black J. D.	Capt	POW (returned)		Conner L.	1Lt	KIA
731	27 Oct 1967	F-105D	NVN	Stirm R. L.	Maj	POW				

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~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative, 8 November 1967; Msn # 2 - 3 - 86

TO: 3ARRGp (C)

27 NOV 1967

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSM 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1, 15 June 1967.

2. (S)(GP-4) At 0120Z, unable to contact Crown 1 on HF from LS-36, an Air America H-1 flew and relayed instructions to launch. JG 55, the second helicopter, was still at LS-98 with mechanical difficulties. When airborne contact was made with Sandy 3 on FM he advised that Olds 3, an F-4 with 2 pilots, was down on the 040/64 of Channel 97/ (21°17'N, 104°28'E). He also advised JG 56 to climb to 10,000' in order to stay out of ground fire on the way to the target. Since the survivor seemed in imminent danger of capture, and the climb was limiting speed, JG 56 elected to level at 8,500', and penetrated the North Vietnamese border without incident. JG 56 arrived in the area at 0220Z. The initial position proved accurate. Sandy 1 dropped a smoke bomb on the aircraft wreckage as a reference point. JG 56 descended toward the wreckage and requested that the survivor ignite his smoke flare. The orange smoke was observed approximately 800' higher up on the ridge. The weather in the area was clear and the terrain consisted of steep grassy slopes, barren of trees. The survivor was located on a grassy knoll projecting out about half way up a high ridge and was immediately retrieved in good condition. JG 56 moved off and gained altitude while the Sandys searched for the second survivor. When it became evident that the Sandys were unable to locate him, JG 56 descended to assist in the search. Aided by the rescued survivor, JG 56 located the missing man's life raft. A systematic search of the surrounding area was begun. During the search care was exercised to avoid several small villages which dotted the area. After approximately 10 minutes of searching, JG 56 returned to where the personal equipment was located and entered a low hover to ascertain if the man was unconscious in the tall grass. While in the hover, an enemy soldier was observed to roll part way down the slope, hide behind a bush and swing his weapon towards the helicopter. The PJ fired his M-16 at the man as the survivor and the flight mechanic heard firing and JG 56 immediately departed the area, resuming the search away from the area where the enemy had been sighted. No further sighting of troops was made. However, two military trucks were noted in one of the villages. No trace was found of the downed pilot, other than the personal gear, even though the survivor in Jolly Green 56 stated that he saw the second man go down and heard him try to contact the Sandys. He also heard foreign voices from that direction. Then there was a series of shots. When the recovered survivor attempted to contact the second man on his radio there was no answer. JG 56 reached bingo fuel at 0250Z and departed the area, escorted by Sandys 1 and 2. At that time JG 55, his aircraft

*24 pages of ARRS/Doc/Jmer-73
Det. 14170 ASD-5 Hoop M-1001 A-78
14170 FT Belvoir VA*

1-370ps 67-47

Cy 1 of 6 Cys

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DECLASSIFIED

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

RODC #

671338

67-AD-5503

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repaired was inbound to the area, was advised by Crown 1 to make an attempt for the second man since JG 56 had reached bingo fuel. JG 56 climbed to 6,500' and flew between ridges as advised by the Sandys to avoid detection by a SAM site which was active in the area. When about 7 miles inside the North Vietnamese border Sandy 2 spotted an unidentified jet on a closing course. Since the MiGCAP had already left, Sandy 2 turned to intercept the aircraft and investigate it. The aircraft was temporarily lost in a cloud bank and Sandy 2 returned. Sandy 1 advised JG 56 that there were no other friendly aircraft in the area and to be ready to take evasive action if a firing pass was begun. The jet was sighted again at JG 56's 5 o'clock position, high and closing. When Jolly Green 56 was approximately 3 miles inside the North Vietnamese border, the jet broke off and disappeared. JG 56 landed at LS-36. The survivor was transferred to an Air America Caribou for return to Udorn RTAFB. The nose gear was observed to have an excessive hydraulic leak, but no evidence of exterior damage could be found. A bullet hole was noted in one main rotor blade. Meanwhile, JG 55 was still in the pick-up area accompanied by Sandys 3 and 4. His bingo time was 0500Z. He had arrived on scene at 0330Z and held while Sandy 3 conducted an electronic search. A short time later JG 55 began conducting a visual search for the survivor. The aircraft wreckage was located and a visual and electronic search conducted on all ridges in the area. As the Sandys approached their bingo fuel JG 55 began a low altitude search of the gully near where Olds 3 was picked up. A pass was made down the gully with no results. Another pass was begun up the gully in an attempt to determine if the survivor was injured and hidden by the tall grass. JG 55 began receiving ground fire and took several hits in the tail section. He took immediate evasive action as he felt the helicopter shudder. The PJ reported that the ground fire was coming from a nearby village. Sandys 3 and 4 delivered ordnance on the village to cover JG 55's exit. JG 55 climbed to altitude and assessed damage. A shudder was encountered above 100 knots and oil was observed dripping from the tail section. Still flyable, JG 55, escorted by Sandy 3 and the recycled JG 56, who had returned to the area, returned to LS-36 at 0505Z. The aircraft sustained 4 hits, 1 hitting the tail rotor drive shaft but not penetrating it, the others hitting near the ramp. Radio discipline throughout the mission was excellent. The Sandys were invaluable in locating the survivor and providing covering fire until JG 56 arrived. It is believed that the survivor would certainly have been captured before JG 56 arrived if the Sandys hadn't been available and providing suppressive fire. Neither JG was equipped with refueling probe but air-to-air refueling was not a factor in this mission.

3. (U) The survivor was CAPT WILLIAM S. GORDON III, USAF.

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4. (U) Crewmembers on Jolly Green 56 and 55 were:

JOLLY GREEN 56

Capt David A. Richardson, RCC
1st Lt James B. Barton, RCCP
SSgt James T. Brooks, Flt Engr
Sgt J. T. Lombard, PJ

JOLLY GREEN 55

Capt Richard A. Orsini, RCC
1st Lt Andrew J. Gonos, RCCP
Sgt Narciso A. Otero, Flt Engr
Sgt David W. Sliger, PJ


DAVID A. RICHARDSON, Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

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424

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SUMMARY TABLE OF RESCUES

DATE	RESCUE NO.	SURVIVOR	CREW ACFT	SERVICE	LOCATION	JOLLY GREEN CREW
2 Oct	203	Maj Miller	RF4C	USAF	Laos	Maj Haynes Lt Barton
2 Oct	204	Maj Brown	RF4C	USAF	Laos	SSgt Androsky A2C Taylor
3 Oct	205	Maj Moore	F4C	USAF	Laos	Capt Etzel Capt Hall
3 Oct	206	Maj Gulbrandson	F4C	USAF	Laos	SSgt Zerbe Sgt Braboni
23 Oct	207	Capt McLean (Deceased)	F105	USAF	Thailand	Maj Haynes Lt Platt SSgt Keyes Sgt Smith
26 Oct	208	Lt Sanchi	T28	RTAF	Laos	Maj Haynes Lt Platt
26 Oct	209	Unknown	T28	RTAF	Laos	Sgt Allen Sgt Duffy
5 Nov	210	Capt Sparks	F105	USAF	North Vietnam	Capt Walker Lt Col Lowe MSgt Boles TSgt Smith
8 Nov	211	Capt Gordon	F4	USAF	North Vietnam	Capt Richardson Lt Barton SSgt Brooks Sgt Lombard
11 Nov	212	Maj Griffith	A1E	USAF	Laos	Lt Platt Lt Sichterman SSgt Negrette A1C Taylor
18 Nov	213	Lt Col Reed	F105	USAF	Laos	Capt Richardson Lt Privette SSgt Warmack A1C Taylor
20 Nov	214	Lt Col Scholtz	RF4	USAF	North Vietnam	Lt Col Britton Maj Wells
20 Nov	215	Capt Simenero	RF4	USAF	North Vietnam	SSgt Androsky Sgt Duffy
29 Dec	216	Capt Altman	F4	USAF	Laos	Capt Etzel Maj Wells
29 Dec	217	Capt Coburn	F4	USAF	Laos	SSgt Thacker Sgt Sowell

HISTORY DET 1 37 ARRS 1 OCT - 31 DEC 67

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FROM: 370/6104

10 November 1967

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report (1-3-182, 8&9 Nov 67) (U)

TO: 37C *WMC*
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

B
27

9/28
Cuby/28

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3, ARRGp Sup 1, dtd 15 June 1967.

2. (C) Jolly Greens 29 & 26 were alerted for cockpit alert at 1450Z. At 1505Z both Jolly Greens scrambled. JG 29 & 26 were airborne at 1510Z and climbed for altitude. JG 29 contacted Queen for instructions and was advised to contact Covey 57 on FM frequency 49.3. Covey 57 advised JG 29 to proceed to 262/40/69 for a team extraction. Covey 57 advised JG 29 that the area was extremely hostile and the enemy was using heavy automatic weapons and rifle grenades. He further advised JG 29 that one H-34 and one UH-1 gunship had been shot down in the area attempting the extraction. JG's 29 & 26 continued to climb to 8000' and proceeded directly to the target. JG's 29 & 26 were on target at 1605Z and Covey advised JG's 29 & 26 to hold to the north at altitude while he had the area softened. Blindbat was dropping flares and Cyclone flight, 3 UH-1 gunships were strafing and rocketing around the team. The team's call sign was Flatfoot. They advised JG 29 that there were five people to be picked up. Cyclone lead advised JG 29 the altitude of the target was 2800'. JG 29 decided to attempt to pick up all five while JG 26 stayed high in reserve. Queen advised JG 29 that a flight of two Hobos, 2 A1E's had been scrambled and should be in the area. Cyclone lead advised Covey 57 and JG 29 that the gunships were getting low on ammunition and would have to leave soon. JG 29 decided to attempt the pickup using the gunships as cover. When attempts to make radio contact with Hobo flight were unsuccessful, JG 29 dropped tip tanks and dumped fuel down to 2000 lbs., the amount needed to make the pickup and recover at Channel 69. Cyclone lead advised JG 29 to come in low from west to east. JG 29 began the approach at 1430Z. Cyclone lead vectored JG 29 into the target until Flatfoot's strobe light was spotted by JG 29. JG 29 decided to land on the side of the steep slope in front of the team and facing them. The slope was so steep only the nose gear and left main were firmly on the ground, the right main was touching with the strut fully extended. As JG 29 touched down the CP and Flight Mechanic advised the pilot that the aircraft was being hit by ground fire. JG 29 held on the ground as the five members of Flatfoot Team started toward the aircraft. Despite hand signals and radio calls from JG 29 advising the team to come to the right side of the helicopter, the survivors went to the left side. JG 29 was on the ground 3-5 minutes while the team crawled under the aircraft to the only door on the right side. At this point communications between the pilots and the crew in the cargo compartment was lost due to rounds severing both the Paramedics and Flight Mechanics intercom cords. The pilots noted particularly heavy and accurate automatic weapons fire was hitting the aircraft at this point and looking back into the cabin saw flashes inside the aircraft.

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The pilots also saw several caution lights come on and felt the aircraft slide slowly forward and down the slope. The pilot used full aft cyclic and power attempting to hold the partial hover. When contact could not be made with the people in the back the pilots decided to pull off as the ground fire made it apparent the aircraft was being severely damaged. The TO was down slope and as the aircraft reached translational lift the pilots noted both generator and transformer rectifier lights were on, the fuel flow on #1 engine was 1200 lbs. per hour, the fuel quantity in the forward tank read 0 and the aft tank read 800 lbs. At this point the Parascueman changed intercom cords and advised the pilots there were three survivors on board. JG 29 advised everyone he was badly damaged, leaking fuel and that he could not attempt to pick up the remaining two survivors. The Copilot of JG 29 recycled the generators and as they came back on the line the boost pump caution lights went out. JG 29 started climbing out of the area. The Flight Mechanic advised that the cabin was flooded with JP-4 and fumes were heavy throughout the aircraft. The pilots were also advised that the auxilliary oil system had been hit and that the oil had spilled onto the cabin floor. All crew members were aware of the potential fire hazard that existed and necessary precautions were taken. JG 29 continued to climb to 9000' over the area. Based on the 800 lbs of fuel on board, JG 29's copilot advised Queen that JG 29 could not reach Channel 69. JG 29 elected to go to Channel 85 as it was closer. The Flight Mechanic advised the pilot that the fuel lines on the right side of the aircraft were cut and fuel was pouring out. The Flight Mechanic and Pararescueman wrapped the lines to cut down on the leakage. The copilot cautiously left the crossfeed switch open and both aft boost pumps on while turning on both forward boost pumps. The rate of fuel consumption on the aft tank decreased indicating we still had fuel in the forward tank. The copilot attempted to contact Khe Sahn tower for landing instructions and runway lights. When radio contact could not be established he called Queen on HF requesting they call Khe Sahn on the land line and advise Khe Sahn of JG 29's situation. Khe Sahn tower came on the air just as JG 29's DME read 2 miles and advised JG 29 Khe Sahn's runway lights were inoperative and the area was blacked out except for two floodlights that the Seebes were using to repair the runway. The crew on JG 29 spotted the floodlights and started a slow spiraling right turn descending from 9000'. At 6000' the tower operator, Marine Cpl Covey, advised JG 29 that there were 5000' mountains 2 miles from the field, that he had JG 29 in sight and would visually GCA JG 29 into the field. JG 29 had noted an unsafe right main gear indication earlier, left the gear down and visually checked it was down. At 2000' tower advised JG 29 he was abeam of runway 28 and JG 29 lined up on the Seebes floodlights. At this point, with the aircraft at approximately 70 kts, in a turn of 10°, 500' per minute descent and 30% torque the pilot noted the rotor rpm go up to the 117 rpm redline and advised the copilot to pull back the engines. Before the copilot could reach the fuel controls engine #2 flamed out. JG 29 turned on his landing lights and saw radio towers, and observation towers level with the helicopter and tents and bunkers underneath. Tower advised JG 29 to gain altitude and was informed this was impossible. JG 29's pilots spotted a road to the right leading to the edge of the parking ramp. JG 29 used what power was available to slow its rate of descent and forward speed. The aircraft hit the ground on the road with the nosewheel.

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102

Capt Purvis
Mission Narrative 1-3-182

9 NOV 67

Crown 6 was scrambled by Queen. The only information available was the JG 26 was down. Crown 6 was airborne at 2130Z. Queen was contacted on UHF overhead CH94. They gave the position of the SAR effort as 274/78/CH94 and directed Crown 6 to contact Sandy 7, the on scene commander, for a briefing on the current situation.

Sandy 7 provided the following information. During the night, three helicopters had been downed by ground fire. They were JG 26, a VNAF H-34 and an Army HH-1. No survivors had been recovered and the total number of people onboard the choppers was uncertain. Numerous beepers in the area made voice contact on guard impossible.

At 2240Z, Sandy 7 located one of the choppers and possible a survivor near it. A few minutes later he spotted a flare on the ground. At 2322Z, Sandy 7 saw a man in some tall grass. He was wearing a flight suit and using a signal mirror. Sandy 7 requested that JG's be launched. The request was passed to Queen. Queen advised Crown 6 that the use of gunships was more desirable and suggested that an attempt be made to contact Hue tower for possible support. All tower frequencies available were tried with no success. This information was passed to Queen.

At 2333Z, Sandy 8 located two survivors in an open area. They were identified as Americans. JG's were again requested. At 2345Z JG 07 was launched from CH94 and JG 04 was launched from Cigar, Crown 6 dispatched Hobo 21 flight to escort JG 07 and Hobo 25 flight to escort JG 04. At 0006Z Queen advised that three VNAF H-34's and two gunships were enroute. Call signs, ETA, and frequencies for contact were not available. Three minutes later, King diverted JG 07 to CH69. At 0013Z Sandy 6, who was now on scene commander, located three more survivors near the downed VNAF helio. JG 04 arrived on scene at 0028Z. Crown 6 was repeatedly unable to obtain clearance for JG 04 to make a pickup. At 0050Z contact was made with Cyclone Head, one of the gunships escorting the VNAF H-34's. They were on scene at 0058Z. No one, including Cyclone, had radio contact with the VNAF helicopters. Contact was attempted on the SAR frequencies and Guard with no success. At 0106Z, Covey 43, a FAC on scene, reported two american survivors. These were the two sighted earlier by Sandy 8. Covey 43 reported that he had been flying at very low altitude and had receive no ground fire. He requested release for JG 04. At 0106Z, Sandy 6 reported numerous americans survivors, some wounded, on the ground and requested release for JG 04. Again, Crown 6 was unable to obtain permission for JG 04 to make the pickup. At this time there were a total of six A-1 aircraft and two armed helicopters overhead for cover. At 0120Z Covey 43 advised that the VNAF helicopters had picked up five survivors, possibly three vietnamese and two americans. Due to the lack of communications no determination as to condition could be made. Cyclone Head tried, by flying alongside the VNAF choppers and pointing to the two americans in the clear area, to get one of them to make a pick up, but was unable. JG 04 was overhead and requested permission to make the pickup. King advised JG 04 to cross the border immediately and orbit there or face a courtmartial when he landed. JG departed. At 0134Z, Cyclone advised that a hoist would be necessary to pick up the two americans since a landing could not be made. Crown 6 again advised Queen of the situation and requested release for JG 04. At 0159Z, Crown 6 left the SAR scene to refuel JG 04.

At 0210Z, Sandy 6 reported a survivor with a leg wound and requested release for JG 04. This was one of the two americans in the open previously located by Covey 43. At 0218Z, JG 04 was cleared back into the area, but was instructed to hold high. JG 04 located the two survivors. Sandy 6 reported the area free from ground fire. JG 04 was holding overhead the survivors and requested permission to make the pick up. It was denied.

Cyclone and King Bee(VNAF H-34's) returned to the area at 0345Z. Sandy 7 put down screening smoke and King Bee picked up one of the american survivors.

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They were unable to locate the other, the one reported to have leg wound, and departed for Phu Ba at 0418Z.

At 0430Z, Crown 6 departed the immediate area to refuel JG 04. Covey 7, the FAC now on scene, advised Crown 6 at 0515Z that a helicopter force with gunship support was enroute with a ground party. The ETA was 0600Z. The ground party was inserted at 0612Z and moved into the area of the downed aircraft. Crown 6 was unable to secure information concerning the progress of the ground party except through Covey 51 because of the lack of FM equipment on board.

The ground party recovered one american KIA at 0746Z. He was not from the crew of JG 26. Cyclone 4 and 5, gunships, reported an american in a flight suit walking uphill at 0843Z. One helicopter jettisoned his ordnance and made the pick up. The survivor was the pilot of JG 26. He was badly burned. He reported that there were two more survivors from JG 26 and that he had not seen them since morning. Cyclone 4 and 5 checked the area but were unable to locate survivors. They departed for Phu Bai at 0854Z.

Covey 51 advised that he had requested more helicopters. He also asked Crown 6 to request constant flare cover and Hobo support for the night. This request was passed to Queen and Hillsboro. After briefing Crown 5 on the situation, Crown 6 departed for CH83 at 0930Z.

Two communications problem areas were noted. The lack of communication with the VNAF helicopters during their first mission greatly hampered their usefulness. The absence of FM equipment on Crown aircraft makes communication with Army and Marine forces, both air and ground, difficult at best.

The failure to commit JG 04 caused the death of the american who was seen in the clearing by ~~many~~ Covey 43 at 0106Z and reported bleeding badly from a leg wound by Sandy 6 at 0210Z. If there existed some reason for not allowing a pick up when six A-1 aircraft were available for cover in an area where no ground fire had been reported by Sandy or Covey aircraft, it is not immediately obvious.

I have requested from local sources a list of Army and Marine helicopter units in northern South Vietnam, to include call signs and frequencies, if resources other than those of ARRS are going to be required to effect timely rescue operations. Information of this sort is essential.

Capt May

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204
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Mission Narrative 1-31182

12,13 November 1967

Crown 1 departed Udorn at 2200Z/12 and arrived at the SAR scene at 2240. At this time, Sandy 7 and 8 were on scene and in contact with the two ground parties which had been put into the area the previous evening. The ground parties had the call signs Bulldog and Wonderful Time.

Since Crown aircraft have no FM capability, the information was relayed to Crown through Sandy 7 and 8. Bulldog reported that at 2238Z the weather was bad-ceiling zero. At 2320Z the weather was improving. Only the mountain tops were now obscured. At 2355Z, Bulldog reported from the wreckage of JG 26 He reported possibly three bodies in the wreckage. The aircraft had been destroyed by fire and identification of the bodies was impossible at this time. Bulldog also reported two possible survivors approaching the scene. These people were later reported acting suspiciously. The last report on them was at 0030Z. Since they were acting suspiciously, ~~no~~ attempt was made to approach them. Instead, the ground party attempted to account for everyone in the three helicopter wreckages.

At 0010Z, Bulldog reported 4 bodies in JG 26 wreckage, and at 0030 a 5th body was reported. The body count was complete and all onboard JG 26 were ~~xxx~~ accounted for with the identification of the 5th body. Bulldog also reported finding "equipment of 10" on JG 26.

At 0048, Queen reported one enlisted man from the UH-1 was still not accounted for. At 0051Z, Culver City reported all crew members on the UH-1 accounted for. Prior to this time, Crown 1 knew of only two accounted for on the UH-1, call sign Typhoon 2. Of 4 crew members, one was reported rescued one KIA. At 0130Z, Culver City again reported all accounted for on the UH-1.

Sandy 7 reported that a all had been rescued on the VNAF H-34, Kingbee ~~ix~~ Lead. At 0140, a Covey FAC arrived on the scene to provide FM contact with Bulldog. He reported that Culver City was sending 4 helicopters to remove bodies. Rescue forces were given RTB and Crown 1 returned to normal orbit.

The crew on Crown 1 for this mission had also been flying Crown 1 on the previous day. On that mission, we monitored the communications of the original rescue effort conducted for JG 26. We concur with the narrative written by the crew of Crown 6. The still unexplained failure to allow JG 04 to rescue an injured american resulted in his death. In addition, the failure over a period of more than 4 hours to follow the unanimous recommendation of the on scene commander and of all forces in the SAR area to allow JG 04 to pick up the survivors was at best demoralizing to the rescue forces. The many other USAF and VNAF crew who played some part in this effort undoubtedly had their faith in our rescue capability severely shaken.

[REDACTED]

37 ARRSq Hist, Oct - Dec 1967

9.

(19) (C) 1-3-182, 8 & 9 Nov 1967, at 1505Z Jolly Green 29 and 26 were scrambled from Da Nang AB, RVN to attempt an extraction of the surviving five members of a Special Forces Team located at 2620/40/69. At 1550Z the Jolly Greens were in the area and advised by a USAF O-2, to hold while three U.S. Army UH-1B gunships, softened the area with rockets and machine gun fire. A USAF C-130, was providing flare support for the mission. At 1630Z Jolly Green 29 attempted the pickup and managed to pick up three of the five survivors before being driven off by hostile fire. Because of battle damage, Jolly Green 29 departed the area and made an emergency landing at Khe Sanh, RVN. At approximately 1650Z Jolly Green 26 attempted to pick up the remaining two survivors. After getting them on board the aircraft, Jolly Green 26 was hit by automatic weapons fire and burst into flames. The aircraft crashed on the scene with the loss of three of the crew and the two survivors. The Rescue Crew Commander of Jolly Green 26 was picked up seventeen hours later by a U.S. Army UH-1D. The three survivors of the Special Forces Team picked up by Jolly Green 27 were all indigenous personnel, names unknown. The deceased crew members of Jolly Green 26 were Captain Ralph W. Brower, SSgt Eugene L. Clay, and Sgt Larry W. Maysey. The survivor of Jolly Green 26 was Captain Gerald O. Young.

(20) (C) 1-3-182, 9 Nov 1967, at 2354Z Jolly Green 04 was scrambled from Quang Tri to 27 miles South South-East of Khe Sanh, 165°/27/85, to aid in the recovery of survivors of Jolly Green 26.

GROUP 4

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Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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37 ARRSq Hist, Oct - Dec 1967

10.

which had crashed the previous night. Jolly Green 04 arrived on scene at 0030Z and held at a safe altitude while Sandy 5, 6, 7, and 8 (USAF A-1Es), a USAF O-2, and USAF F-4Cs were conducting the search. At approximately 0130Z two possible survivors were spotted and Jolly Green 04 made a pass over the area. The pickup was not attempted at this time by order of the Commander, 7th AF. At 0720Z Jolly Green 04 was given permission to attempt the pickup, but no survivors could be sighted. Jolly Green 04 was returned to base at 0815Z and upon landing an automatic weapons hit was found in the tail of the aircraft. Jolly Green 04 was on scene for eight hours and 10 minutes and made three air refuelings.

(21) (U) 1-3-183, 12 Nov 1967, at 0245Z Jolly Green 25 was diverted from orbit to assist the US Navy in evacuating personnel from a floundering boat, Greenfish, at 18°10'N/106°45'E. Jolly Green 25 transported damage control equipment from Killer Whale, a USN destroyer to Greenfish. Since it was determined Greenfish was in no danger of sinking no survivors needed to be evacuated.

(22) (U) 1-3-184, 14 Nov 1967, at 1625Z Jolly Green 28 and 25 were scrambled to 113°/17/94, 17 miles East South-East of Da Nang, to medivac a snakebit victim. Jolly Green 28 made the pickup at 1715Z and evacuated the victim, name unknown, to Marble Mountain AB, RVN.

(23) (U) 1-3-185, 20 Nov 1967, at 0145Z Jolly Green 04 was diverted from orbit to attempt the pickup of the crew of a USAF F-4C at 340°/20/109, 20 miles North-West of Dong Ha. Jolly Green 04 arrived on the

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GROUP 4

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after 12 years

scene at 0235Z and held off the coast while two USAF O-2s and a USAF F-100F conducted a search. The backseater was located one mile inland and at 0240Z Jolly Green 04 penetrated the coast, landed and picked up 1st Lt James Badly, FV3175554, 480 TAC Ftr Sq. A search was conducted for the front seater with negative results.

(24) 1-3-186, 26 Nov 1967, at 0145Z Jolly Green 25 and 03 were scrambled from Quang Tri to attempt the recovery of the crew of a USAF F-4C at 326°/53/85, 53 miles North-West of Khe Sanh. A search was conducted in the area by Sandy 7 and 8, USAF A-1Es, with negative results.

(25) 1-3-186, 26 Nov 1967, at 0700Z Jolly Green 10 was scrambled from Da Nang AB, RVN to assist in the recovery of two drowning victims two miles North of Da Nang in Da Nang Bay. A search was conducted with negative results.

(26) 1-3-188, 29 Nov 1967, at 0150Z Jolly Green 10 and 28 were scrambled from Quang Tri, RVN, to 260°/33/85, 33 miles West of Khe Sanh, to attempt the recovery of the crew of a USAF F-4C. Sandy 7 and 8 provided RESCORT. At 0305Z Jolly Green 10 picked up 1st Lt Leo J. Lemoine, USAF, FV3160020, 588th TFS, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN. The other pilot was not sighted and presumed lost.

(27) 1-3-191, 4 Dec 1967, at 0625Z Jolly Green 03 was scrambled from Da Nang AB, RVN to 223°/21/94, 21 miles South-West of Da Nang to attempt the recovery of four crew members aboard a U.S. Army U-6A which had crashed. An O-1 and two UH-1E gunships provided RESCORT.

Mission Narrative 1-31182

12,13 November 1967

Crown 1 departed Udorn at 2200Z/12 and arrived at the SAR scene at 2240. At this time, Sandy 7 and 8 were on scene and in contact with the two ground parties which had been put into the area the previous evening. The ground parties had the call signs Bulldog and Wonderful Time.

Since Crown aircraft have no FM capability, the information was relayed to Crown through Sandy 7 and 8. Bulldog reported that at 2238Z the weather was bad-ceiling zero. At 2320Z the weather was improving. Only the mountain tops were now obscured. At 2355Z, Bulldog reported from the wreckage of JG 26 He reported possibly three bodies in the wreckage. The aircraft had been destroyed by fire and identification of the bodies was impossible at that time. Bulldog also reported two possible survivors approaching the scene. These people were later reported acting suspiciously. The last report on then was at 0030Z. Since they were acting suspiciously, ~~no~~ attempt was made to approach them. Instead, the ground party attempted to account for everyone in the three helicopter wreckages.

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just short of the ramp. The last few feet of the descent visibility was zero because of flying dust. As the aircraft touched down the pilots shut down the one remaining engine. When the pilot attempted to put on the rotor brake he discovered it was inoperative. The crew and survivors exited the aircraft until the fire truck arrived. Examination of the aircraft revealed it could not be flown out without extensive repair. Landing at Channel 85 was 1806Z.

3. (U) The survivors were: 3 indigenous personnel, names unknown; positions on Flatfoot Team: Team Sergeant, Interpreter, and Pointman. The interpreter was wounded in the leg as he got in the helicopter, otherwise all survivors were in good condition.

4. (U) Weather was no factor - clear and 25.

5. (U) Extremely heavy automatic weapons and rifle grenade fire was encountered.

6. (U) Crew of Jolly Green 29:

RCC - Capt John B. McTasney
RCCP - Capt Jerry D. Clearman
FE - Sgt Alvin A. Malone
RS - SSgt John H. Stemple

John B. McTasney
JOHN B. MCTASNEY, Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 7 FEB 1977

6/21

RESCUE PILOT PRESENTED CONGRESSIONAL
MEDAL OF HONOR

Captain Gerald O. Young, formerly a Jolly Green pilot in the 37th ARRSq and now an Instructor Pilot with the 3637th Flying Training Sq, Sheppard AFB, received the Congressional Medal of Honor Tuesday, 14 May, in special ceremonies conducted in the courtyard of the Pentagon in Washington.

Making the presentation was President Lyndon B. Johnson. Receiving the nation's highest honor along with Capt. Young, were Army Specialist 5 Charles Chris Haggermister, Marine Sgt Richard Allen Pittman, and Navy Boatswain's Mate 1st Class James E. Williams. The President noted that this was the first time men representing the four services had been honored at a single occasion. The four service secretaries were present for the ceremonies. Representing the Air Force was Under Secretary Townsend W. Hoopes.

The citation accompanying the award for Capt Young read:

"Capt. Young distinguished himself on November 9, 1967, while serving as a helicopter RCC in Southeast Asia. Capt Young was flying escort for another helicopter attempting the night rescue of an Army ground reconnaissance team in imminent danger of death or capture. Previous attempts had resulted in the loss of two helicopters through hostile ground fire. The endangered team was positioned on the side of a steep slope which required unusual airmanship on the part of Capt. Young to effect a pickup. Heavy automatic weapons fire

from the surrounding enemy severely damaged one rescue helicopter, but it was able to extract three of the team. The commander of this aircraft recommended to Capt. Young that further rescue attempts be abandoned because it was not possible to suppress concentrated fire from enemy automatic weapons and the fact that the support helicopter gunships were low on fuel and ordnance. Capt. Young hovered under intense fire until the remaining survivors were aboard. As he maneuvered the helicopter for takeoff, the enemy appeared at point blank range and raked the aircraft with automatic fire. The aircraft crashed and burst into flames. Capt. Young escaped through the window of the aircraft. Disregarding serious burns, Capt. Young aided in removing a wounded man and then attempted to lead the hostile fire away from his position. Later, despite intense pain from his burns, he declined to accept rescue because he had observed the hostile forces setting up automatic weapons positions to attack any rescue aircraft. For more than 17 hours he evaded the enemy until rescue could be brought into the area. Through extraordinary heroism, aggressiveness and concern for his fellow man, Capt. Young reflected highest credit upon himself, the United States Air Force and the Armed Services."

Capt Young, who resides with his wife, Nancy, at 108B Atlas Street Capehart housing, returned to Sheppard yesterday (May 15) where he was welcomed by base officials and civilian dignitaries. A native of Chicago,

Medal of Honor 3-3-3-

Capt. Young lists Anacortes, Washington as his home of record. Entering the Air Force in 1957, he graduated from Aviation Cadets and received his commission as a Second Lieutenant at Reese AFB, Texas, Jan 18, 1958. Rated a senior pilot, Capt. Young received helicopter training at Randolph, AFB, Texas and Advanced Helicopter training at Stead AFB, Nevada. He also completed Squadron Officer's School and Air Command and Staff College. Capt. Young was assigned to Sheppard in February. Following the presentation of the Medal of Honor to the four heroes, President Johnson dedicated a Hall of Heroes at the Pentagon. In his dedication speech the President expressed hope that the talks underway in Paris will bring an end to the fighting.

8


144

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: Det 10, 38th ARRSq (10-38-47, 9 Nov 67)

Det 10, 38th ARRSq was notified at 0805Z by US Navy Operations Center Binh Thuy that four River Patrol Boats (PBR's) had been engaged by hostile forces resulting in one killed in action (KIA) and three wounded in action (WIA). They requested a medical evacuation and advised that a flight of US Navy helicopters were being dispatched for suppressive fire cover. Rendezvous was to be at a safe area on the Bassac River. Pedro 91 was airborne at 0810Z and arrived on the scene at 0830Z. Three mid-stream pick-ups were made from "Handlash Echo". The first crew member believed seriously wounded was picked up by stokes litter, but proved to be KIA. The second member with a broken right ankle was recovered at 0835Z by hoist. The third man sustained a wound in the right side of his neck and was recovered by hoist at 0840Z. The pararescueman aboard Pedro 91 discovered a shrapnel fragment lodged in the neck wound of the third man and applied first aid. Pedro 91 arrived at the Dong Tam Hospital at 0910Z where the patients received advanced medical treatment. Pedro 91 refueled and departed immediately for home station arriving at 1015Z. Gunship helicopters were requested by Navy Operations at the time of initial notification in accordance previously developed procedures and four helicopters were on the scene at Pedro's arrival. The pick-ups were accomplished in mid-stream while "Seawolves" 15, 16, 76 and 77 utilized a tight orbit around the pick-up area firing into the river banks. Additional cover was provided by two PBR's on the scene during recovery operations. Light hostile fire was encountered but no aircraft hits were sustained. FM radios were a major factor in achievement of the pick-ups and excellent fire coverage. Two combat saves, light ground fire encountered.

CREW: Pedro 91 (All assigned to Det 10, 38th ARRSq)

RCC - Major Harold Pickering
RCCP - Capt Albert E Tollefsen
FE - SSgt William L Crawford
PJ - Sgt Gary G Harold


HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander

Saves in 11 Days

Combat Rescues in 'Lucky' Streak

IN THUY, Vietnam (OI)—Our eleventh is the successful day by members of Det. 10, 38th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Binh Thuan AB. Eleven members of the unit flew to perform combat saves in an 11-day period.

The unusual "11" story started when a crew was called from Binh Thuy to pick up a pair of U.S. Navy men who had been injured by ground fire while on a river patrol.

Eleven days later the unit was again called upon to pick up another U.S. Navy man after he had received a combat

injury. In between, the unit made eight other combat saves.

Crew members among those of the first pick-up were Maj. Harold Pickering, commander, Det. 10, 38th ARRS; Capt. Albert E. Tolleisen, 27, Rancho Cordova, Calif., pilot; S. Sgt. William L. Crawford, 29, Republic, Pa., flight engineer; and Sgt. Gary G. Harold, 21, Hyndman, Pa., pararescueman.

Other crew members involved in the 11 rescue saves in eleven days included Capt. Laurence W. Conover, 33, San Francisco, and Capt. Donald E. Van Meter, 29, Lawton, Okla., rescue crew

commanders. Capt. William J. Haugen, 26, Dayton, Ohio, pilot; Sgt. Larry E. Hawkins, 26, Nashville, Tenn., and Sgt. James A. Crawford, 21, Garland, Tex., flight engineers; Airman 1.C. James L. Parks, 19, Sarasota, Fla., and Airman 1.C. Ronald K. Sholes, 20, Jacksonville, Fla., pararescuemen.

Third of the 11 saves was accomplished as a Det. 10 helicopter landed in a rice paddy and a wounded U.S. Navy man boarded the HH-43 Huskie rescue helicopter for delivery to the Dong Tam hospital.

The crew flew two missions to

make three combat saves five days later. Two injured U.S. Navy men were picked up from a moving boat on the first mission of the day and a U.S. Army member was picked up on the second mission of the day.

Five days later another U.S. Navy member was picked up after he had received combat injuries.

Three injured Vietnamese Army (ARVN) members were picked up the next day and less than an hour later the detachment completed its eleventh.

Det. 10, 38th ARRS, had 9 combat saves in 1967.



145

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: Det 10, 38th ARRSq (10-38-48, 9 Nov 67)

At 1521Z, the Senior Advisor to the 2d Troop, 9th Cavalry, ARVN notified Det 10, 38th ARRSq that they had one seriously injured American and requested medical evacuation assistance. They believed the injured man had a broken back and advised that the area, located four miles northwest of Binh Thuy on Highway 27, was secured. 3d ARRGp (3JSARC) approved the mission and Pedro 91 launched at 1535Z, with the Binh Thuy Flight Surgeon on board. "Spooky 51" was in the area and advised he would orbit over Pedro's position to provide fire suppression and flares if needed. Pedro 91 arrived at the site at 1545Z. A ground pick-up was utilized to recover the injured man. The flight surgeon advised that the man's injury was probably a broken right hip bone. The recovery was completed at 1555Z and Pedro 91 returned to Binh Thuy. A C-123 from the 19th Air Command Sq (USAF) was waiting on the runway to evacuate the injured man to the 3d Field Hospital in Saigon. Pedro 91 landed at 1605Z and a transfer of the injured man to the C-123 was successfully completed. From 1605Z until 1630Z Pedro effectively expedited the movement of special splints and medical personnel to the C-123 where the patient was treated prior to further evacuation. Weather during the mission was 9000 ft broken, visibility 7 miles and winds were light and variable. Light ground fire was encountered during approach and departure from the area, but no aircraft hits were sustained. Excellent ground recovery coordination and contact with the cover ship (Spooky 51) was effected exclusively on FM radio. One combat save.

CREW: Pedro 91 (All assigned to Det 10, 38th ARRSq unless otherwise indicated)


RCC - Major Harold Pickering

RCCP - Capt Albert E Tollefsen

Flt Surgeon - Capt Charles A Caton - Assigned to 632d CSGp

FE - SSgt William L Crawford

PJ - Sgt Gary G Harold



HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander

FROM: RCC Maj Dubriske

10 November 1967

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative (2-3-87)

Crown 1

Crown 1 departed Udorn AB at 10/2310 and was immediately contacted by Compress and advised to proceed to CH77 and contact Drill Flight who had voice contact with AWOL survivor, 47/48 of CH 77. Crown advised Compress to launch Jolly Green and Sandys to the area. Crown contacted Drill flight (2F-4) who had voice contact with AWOL survivor. It was found out he was the back seat man from an F-4 and that he had a broken leg. Both Nail and Drill had good voice contact with AWOL on guard. Compress advised Sandy 7 and 8 were on their way and Jolly Green 52 and 27 had been launched from CH 89. Sandy 7 and 8 arrived in the area at 0030Z. Sandy 7 took on scene commander and began visual search for AWOL. Sandy had good voice contact with AWOL, but could not pin point location of survivor due to terrain and ~~lack of~~ AWOL not having any signaling devices. Misty 21 and Misty 11 (F-100) also had good voice contact with survivor.

Compress passed questions to Crown and these were relayed to Sandy to be asked to AWOL survivor. Questions were "Who is the greatest football team in the world?" and also his authenticator number. At 0059 Sandy 3 took some hits, and was forced to eject. Jolly Green 27 was vector to Sandy 8 survivor and at 0118 was picked up by J.G. 27. Survivor is OK, except for cuts and bruises. At 0125 Nail 52 asked AWOL questions and Green Bay Packers was the reply. Compress confirmed as being correct. When asked about front seat man, AWOL did not know what happen to him. Jolly Green proceed to orbit high with Hobo (A-1E) as escort. Sandy 5 and 6 arrived in area 0145. Sandys orbit the area trying to pin point AWOL position. Sandy 7 RTB with ~~back~~ battle damage and no hydraulic pressure. Sandy 5 directs Jolly Green 52 to approx area of AWOL using voice directions from AWOL and use of beeper for homing. Jolly Green homes over area but no visual with AWOL. AWOL says he can hear Jolly Green. About 0256Z Jolly Green 52 takes a hit and starts losing oil pressure. J.G. 52 gets out okay, but advises he has wounded aboard JG 52 and 27 depart area for CH89. JG 53 and 15 arrived about 0334. Sandy 5 took a hit at 0336 and he RTB to CH86 with a hole in left aileron and hydraulic shot out. Firefly 13 and 14 arrived in area and Firefly 13 took on scene commander from Sandy 5. The next 90 minutes were spent trying to pin point AWOL while Jolly Green 53 and 15 orvited high. The high preformance aircraft could not shoot up the area for fear of hitting AWOL. At 0537 Compress advised Crown 1 to give J.G. 15 a drink and for Crown 2 to take control of the SAR. After refueling J.G. 15 Crown 1 escorted J.G. 53 to CH89, who had taken a hit and lost control of his right rudder. After J.G. 53 landed at 89 Crown 1 was RTB to CH86. If AWOL only had some kind of a signal device, (mirror, flare etc..) the pick-up would have been successful, but it was impossible to pin point AWOL and even when the Jolly Green thought they were right over him, he still could not be ~~xx~~ spotted visual.

Stanley J. Dubriske Jr. Maj, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

mn-31

Mission Narrative

Mission Number 2-3-87

10 November 67

CROWN 2

CROWN 2 relieved CROWN 1 on station while the SAR effort for AWOL 01 was in progress. The area for the effort was 045/48 (Ch 77), an unfriendly, mountainous piece of land just on the Laotian / NVN border. The high terrain in the area was approx 3000'. The weather throughout the area was scattered to broken with the bases near 3500'. AT the time CROWN 2 assumed Mission Command, FIREFLY 13 was on scene commander, with FIREFLY 14, ELECTRON 505/502, SANDY 1/2, NAIL 10, and DRILL, PETROL, and GUNFIGHTER flights (10 F4's). JOLLY GREEN 53 was also in the area. AWOL 01 was on the ground with a broken leg.

He had one radio, one flare, and a strobe light. ~~There was no attempt to~~

~~rescue the survivor, after he had been shot, and the only~~
~~result was a lost SANDY (8) and control surface damage to JG 53. CROWN~~
~~1 descended to aid and assist JG 53 and CROWN 2 took over the mission.~~

FIREFLY 13 elected to suppress the ground fire with fighters, and FAC'd PETROL flight in to drop. Soon after PETROL came GUNFIGHTER and HONDA. At 0545Z the FIREFLYs had to RTB because of fuel and SANDY 1 assumed on scene command. Under his direction the SANDYs and the ELECTRONs would lead JG 53 into the area. Just before they arrived, several flights of fighters were going to blast the area with their ordinance. Then the A1's would form a Daisy Chain around the JG and have the survivor pop his smoke. The pick-up would be attempted. (NOTE: As the fighter flights expended their ordinance they were RTB'd, as the air was getting quite crowded.) AT 0621 the SANDYs laid a smoke screen and vectored the JG in. JG 53 began talking to the survivor, but also took some hits from



ground fire and had to depart. He was apparently hit in the rudder section and could only make left turns. He got out of the area and headed for Ch 86. CROWN scrambled more Jollys and Sandys. At this time, SANDY 1 requested all the help he could get from CROWN, who had been gathering fighters and tankers throughout. The mission now took on the characteristics of a Night Watch, with CROWN getting fighters and tankers from CRICKET, ~~knowing~~ turning them over to LION GCI for refueling, getting them back on frequency for briefing and then handing them over to SANDY 1 for the expending of their ordinance. MOONSTONE (F4), KILLER (F-4), MASHER (F-4), SPEEDO (F-4) and FLINTSTONE (F-4) flights were used in this manner. At 0700 SANDYs 1/2 ~~and~~ had to RTB for fuel. SANDY 1 had taken hits, so they went to Ch 86. ELECTRON 505 assumed on scene command. He worked with HOBO 55/56 and NAIL 77, talking to the survivor and keeping the ground fire down. SANDYs 3/4 and JG 15 and 27 were enroute. SANDY 3 arrived at 0712 and assumed on scene command. The Electrons were vectored to Ch 85 for fuel. Ground fire was still being seen, so MADISON, PINHEAD and TIGER flights were used to expend ordinaance. At 0748 the forces regrouped to make another attempt to pick up the survivor. This was almost a repeat performance. The JG (15) was hit and had to pull out. The SANDYs, et al, hit the area again, but are now worried that all the fire will kill the survivor. Most of the ground fire seems to be coming from his immediate area. At this point, everything came to a halt while the on scene commander re-evaluated the situation. He elected to again FAC in some fighters for another try at cleaning out the area. LOCUS, DALLAS, WEDGE, and TITLE flights were used at this time. FIREFLYs 15/16/17/18 are scrambled and on the way at this time. They all have a standard load.

In the midst of these problems, JG 15 (who had been hit) needed fuel. It was questionable whether he could refuel from CROWN 2 but the effort was to be tried. CROWN 2 descended to join with the JG 15. The refueling was accomplished at 94

CROWN 2 then had to descend again (0855) to refuel JG 27. This was the same situation; unfriendly area, slow, poor weather; ~~no action~~ The effort had slowed down somewhat. The weather was not as good as it had been; the survivor was talking louder and faster; the groundfire was no less dangerous; and there were only A1E's in the area with the JG's. FIREFLY 15 assumed on scene command and reported that he had the survivor pin-pointed. JG 15 made another attempt at a pickup (0937) and received more ground fire. At this time we were advised by RESCUE 1 to RTB all forces. CROWN advised that JG 15 was in a hover over the survivors position and not receiving hits (he had previously gone up the wrong valley) and that to RTB everyone now might make the difference. RESCUE 1 said "Have at it".

from all directions. All of



Although this mission was unsuccessful, it was the largest and most well coordinated SAR mission probably ever run. There was nothing left undone in the attempt to rescue AWOL 01. CROWN 2, after the mission, recounted the aircraft used and found that 108 aircraft and four GCI sites were used in one capacity or another. The rescue of this ~~REDOX~~ survivor was not in the hands of man.

On 11 November 67 a first light effort was planned in hopes of a successful rescue of AWOL 01. CROWN 6 was launched to be mission commander, and SANDY 3 was on scene commander. The forces assembled included two JG's, two Sanders, four HOBO's and four F4B's.(and tanker); a total of 14 aircraft. Although the weather was acceptable, no contact could be made with the survivor. After two hours (2330 - 0130) the on scene commander recommended the effort be dropped and all forces RTB'd. This was approved by Compress and all forces except the GUNFIGHTER flight of F-4's left the area. There had been some ground fire reported, although no one was hit in this effort.

Roger F. Arndt

1/Lt USAF

Rescue Crew Commander

~~SECRET~~

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: OPS/3446

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative, 11 November 1967; Msn # 2-3-87

TO: 3ARRGp (C)

4 December 1967

1. (U) The following report is submitted in accordance with ARSM 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1, dated 15 June 67.

2. (S)(GP-4) This narrative is a composite document based on data submitted by five Rescue Crew Commanders. In view of its length and the complexity of the mission, a chronological listing of events precedes the narrative.

	<u>T/O TIME</u>	<u>ARRIVED SCENE</u>	<u>DEPARTED SCENE</u>	<u>LANDED CH 89</u>
JG-27	10/2350Z	0050Z	0145Z	0307Z
JG-52	10/2350Z	0055Z	0250Z	0340Z
JG-15	10/0205Z	0258Z	1012Z **	1105Z
JG-53	10/0205Z	0258Z	0625Z	0730Z
JG-27 *	10/0635Z	0730Z	1012Z **	1110Z

* Denotes change in crew assigned to aircraft

** Final departure

27 DEC 1970

(Date)

IAW AFR 205-2

The Det 1, 37ARRSq Duty Officer was notified of the mission to recover AWOL 1, an F-4C crew, at 0632L, 11 November 1967. Alert crews were notified at 0635L. After a short briefing by the Duty Officer, JG-27 (Low) and 52 (High) took off at 0650L. Weather at home base was clear, visibility 15 miles. Enroute a revised position of 048/47 from Channel 77 (17°12'N, 106°11'E) was received from Sandy lead. No weather was encountered until approximately 30 minutes from the pickup area and then scattered to broken conditions were observed from 4500 - 6500 feet. Upon arrival at the pickup area at 0750L the JGs were advised to orbit north of the Nam Ta Le River and east of the area awaiting sterilization. Weather in the area at this time was deteriorating to 4500 feet broken, visibility 5 miles. There were some large holes in the cloud cover which was lowering to the east. After approximately three minutes in orbit Sandy 7 advised JG-27 (JG-52 was still inbound) that Sandy 8 had been hit by possible 37mm antiaircraft fire and was going in. The flight engineer and copilot on JG-27 actually saw the aircraft hit, go out of control and the pilot eject. The primary pickup was now diverted from AWOL 1 to Sandy 8 as his position was

1-370ps 67-50

Cy 1 of 6 Cys

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

ARDC # 671457

67-AD-5616 A441

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pinpointed and the parachute was sighted by Sandy 7. He requested that JG-27 come in immediately and make the pickup. Small arms and automatic weapons ground fire was observed by the high aircraft flight engineer during orbit near the road west of the pickup area. At this time JG-27 lost radio contact with the Sandys and all radio calls were relayed through Crown. Radio contact was re-established with Sandy 6 on VHF after approximately four minutes and JG-27 was then escorted to the area. Enroute the flight engineer and copilot observed approximately 20-25 bursts of flak coming toward the helicopter and directed the pilot behind some nearby terrain. The crash site was on the crest of a rolling hill approximately four miles southeast of the village of Ban San. Arriving on scene, difficulty was encountered by JG-27 in finding the survivor due to the fact that numerous flare chutes were in the area. He was finally sighted about two miles southwest of the crash site in trees estimated to be 100-125 feet tall. After coming to a hover over the survivor the pararescue man was sent down the hoist to free the survivor who had become entangled in the trees and vines. Only sporadic ground fire was heard during the pickup. After the pickup was made JG-27, escorted by Sandy 7, returned to a safe area where he orbited until 0830L when "bingo" fuel was reached and Crown 1 directed him to return to Channel 89. Radio discipline was good although UHF Guard was utilized constantly in an attempt to locate AWOL 1's exact position. At approximately 0935L Sandy lead asked JG-52 to come in for a possible pickup and to assist in a low altitude electronic search although the exact position of the survivor was not known. He was advised to enter from the east to lessen the possibility of ground fire. Descending through a hole in the 9/10th cloud cover Sandy lead and the high aircraft went into the pickup area. JG-52 coming to a hover 30-40 feet above the trees. While in the pickup area beeper and voice reception from the downed pilot varied from fair to extremely poor. The pilot of the high aircraft pleaded with the survivor at least ten times on Guard to turn on beeper and/or give voice directions to his exact position. Three times the JG was vectored by broken voice transmissions and ARA-25 to an overgrown slash and burn area on the northwest slope of a large hill. However, the survivor could not be located. The high aircraft flight engineer had noted two small arms hits in the aft section of the aircraft section at this time. After approximately sixteen minutes of low altitude search with negative results, the Sandy lead aircraft requested JG-52 to proceed at low altitude in a west-northwest direction for approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ mile around a small hill and renew the search. While proceeding to the new search area at 30KIAS and fifty feet above the trees, JG-52 was hit by a barrage of small arms and automatic weapons fire from the three o'clock position. About 25 to 30 of the enemy were observed by the flight engineer on the ground under a partially camouflaged area at the four o'clock position. M-16 or M-60 counterfire was not utilized due to the element of surprise. Full power was applied and JG-52 proceeded to a relatively safe area over a ridge to the north-northwest.

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The pararescue technician was wounded in the left hip during the barrage, was still conscious, but unable to perform his aircrew duties. Transmission oil pressure and temperature were fluctuating rapidly and a burning odor was noted coming from beneath the forward cabin floor. A climbout was initiated and JG-52 proceeded to Channel 89 at 0950L. JG-52 landed at home base at 1040L. Meanwhile, JG-15 (Low) and JG-53 (High) had been ordered to scramble at 0855L. Both aircraft were airborne at 0905L. Enroute to the scene JG-15 and Sandy 6 were ordered to escort JG-52 to Channel 89. Join-up of Sandy 6, JG-52 and JG-15 was accomplished at 1008L, approximately fifteen miles from the point where JG-52 had taken hits. Radio communication with JG-52 was initially non-existent, but on join-up signs of a profuse oil loss was evident over the entire rear half of JG-52's fuselage. Once clear of the heavy antiaircraft area, JG-15 suggested that JG-52 descend from 7500 feet to 3000 feet so that a quicker landing could be accomplished, should transmission failure become imminent. JG-52 crossed the fence inbound to Channel 89 at 1036L with all appearance of making a safe landing and JG-15 turned back to proceed to the scene again. When JG-15 had departed to escort JG-52, JG-52 was asked by JG-15 to assume low aircraft responsibility since he would be more abreast of the local situation and to assist inbound Firefly aircraft in locating the scene. JG-53 proceeded to the orbit area while JG-15 escorted JG-52 to Channel 89. JG-53 rendezvoused with Fireflies 13 and 14 who commenced an electronic search of the area. At approximately 1030L broken contact was made with the survivor. At this time JG-53 asked if he might assist in the search. Firefly 13 agreed that the slower speed of the helicopter might allow a more detailed search. JG-53 helped search for approximately 15 - 20 minutes; no contact was made. At approximately 1100L, Firefly flight reached "bingo" fuel and JG-53 returned to orbit to rendezvous with JG-15 who had returned from escorting JG-52. At this time Sandy 1 and 2, replacing Fireflies 13 and 14, commenced a new electronic search. After 30 minutes with both JGs in orbit, Compress initiated a discussion of "bingo" times and directed Crown 1 to refuel one JG at a time. Since JG-15 had less fuel than JG-53 he rendezvoused with Crown 1 first. Refueling took place on the 045° radial of Channel 77 at 0-20 miles. JG-15 departed the orbit at 1245L and was off the tanker only minutes from initial visual sighting. Forty-three hundred pounds of fuel was taken. The short time between visual contact and the completion of the refueling is a tribute to the competence and proficiency of the Crown 2 crew which provided two outstanding aerial refueling operations in the afternoon. Approximately 10 - 20 minutes after JG-15 departed for the refueling tanker, Sandy 1 asked that a JG be brought into the area immediately for an attempted pickup. Sandy 1's high performance resources could not remain in the area any longer because of fuel. JG-53 escorted by Sandy 2 and 2 Navy Electrons entered the general area of the survivor's suspected position and had very broken radio contact with him. At this time one of JG-53's engines flamed out. After nearly 5 minutes Capt Walker was able to restart it and proceed with the mission. He then asked Sandy 1, who could understand the voice, to direct his movements. JG-53 hovered around the suspected area for approximately 5 minutes before the

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survivor, relaying through Sandy 1, directed him to stop. At this time JG-53 started receiving automatic weapons fire and was hit from directly under the aircraft. Immediate departure was made to evaluate the damage. At first only superficial damage was suspected but on climb out complete loss of tail rotor control was discovered. At this time JG-53 received permission to RTB and proceed to Channel 89 with approximately 10 - 15° of right bank and in a 20° crab to the left. Landing was accomplished by applying and retarding power for directional control. A successful landing was accomplished at 1430L. After JG-53 regained sufficient control and it became apparent that he could make it to Channel 89 unassisted, JG-15, accompanied by Sandys 3 and 4, resumed orbit to await JG-27, launched from Channel 89 at 1345L. Shortly after JG-27 arrived, Sandy 1 and two Navy Electrons were reaching low fuel states and preparation for an on-scene command change was made. Sandy 3 left orbit to locate the survivor's position with assistance from the Electrons and Sandy 1. At 1435L JG-15 was directed to attempt recovery. Tip tanks were jet-tisoned on the belief that the scene was in close proximity to the orbit point. However, it took 10 minutes for JG-15 to get to the immediate area. A south to north approach was commenced once in the area and, as speed was reduced to be ready for a hover when the site was identified, Electron 502 requested a hard left turn. With the site still not clearly identified and considering the severe maneuvering required to follow Electron's directions, JG-15 elected to exit and re-enter the small valley. As JG-15 was accelerating in a left turn around some karst, ground fire was seen underneath and to the right of the aircraft. Several explosions were felt at a point under the aircraft but not from armament contact since they left no holes. Rather, the explosions are believed to have been air burst fused short of or behind the helicopter. Jinking was initiated with a general turn to the left. As JG-15 assumed a position to the intended hover point the sound of gun fire was again detected from the opposite face of the ridge where the intended pickup point was located. A decided contact was noted in the rear of the aircraft, torque readings momentarily fluctuated and the aircraft yawed to the left. The heading indicator began to oscillate and functioned in a continually erratic fashion for the remainder of the flight in either the MAG or DG position. This caused erroneous AFSC yaw channel inputs and the yaw channel had to be permanently disengaged. JG-15 then requested further sanitization prior to another attempt and pulled up to orbit with JG-27. The Jolly Green aircraft discussed fuel states and it was decided that JG-15 would refuel first while JG-27 maintained orbit. As JG-15 returned, JG-27 would cycle on the tanker (Crown 2). JG-15 departed orbit at 1510L, rendezvoused with Crown 2 at 1535L and completed refueling at 1545L after receiving 2000 pounds of fuel. As JG-15 was inbound from the tanker JG-27 was called in to make a try. The voice on Guard frequency said JG-27 was right over him. He then requested "turn into the sun". As JG-27 turned into the sun ground fire opened up and several hits were taken from directly below the helicopter. JG-27 immediately pulled out. The area was again sanitized but the fire was coming from within 100 feet of the location given for the downed pilot and Sandy 1 could not use jets or large weapons because of the close proximity of the survivor. JG-27 then made another attempt. When in a

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hover over a position claimed by the voice on Guard frequency to be his location hits were again received from directly below. The engine oil pressure on number two engine fell to zero. After pull out the flight engineer changed gages and determined the cause was instrument failure. The flight engineer and pararescue specialist returned fire with the M-60 machine guns each time the aircraft pulled out but could not see the exact location of ground fire since it was below the aircraft. The M-60s malfunctioned each time they were used after approximately fifty rounds of fire. JG-27 proceeded out of the area to rendezvous with Crown 2 while JG-15 maintained orbit. Further sanitization was conducted in areas well clear of the alledged survivor's position using high performance aircraft. The effect of strike efforts was questioned by Sandy because armament was needed too close to the survivor's position and all high performance aircraft were sent home by the on-scene commander. Compress advised at this point the decision to continue rescue efforts would be strictly at the discretion of the mission commander on scene. Firefly 16 assumed command as Sandy 1 returned to his home station. Meanwhile JG-27 rendezvoused with Crown 2. Again Crown 2 did an outstanding job of positioning, join-up and refueling. As JG-27 arrived back in the area JG-15 was sent in for a final recovery attempt. This time the voice on Guard gave his position in a different ravine than any given before ($\frac{1}{2}$ mile west of other attempts). Approach to the new site was made from North to South in a left turn with a fast approach and quick stop over the marked ravine position. During the approach some ground fire was noted. Hover began at 1630L. At this point, approximately 15 minutes of vague, confusing and often ambiguous instructions were received from the ground. Transmissions ranged from unreadable to extremely clear. He indicated at varying times that he was 20 yards, 20 feet, and 200 meters in differing sequences although the helicopter position had not changed. On several occasions he seemed to be leading the helicopter up the ravine into a natural amphitheatre area. When JG-15 tried to confirm this movement because the area had previously been very active in ground fire, the voice came back with entirely opposite directions, silence or instructions to hold the present position. During the last 20 minutes of hover the penetrator was lowered to the ground while the man on the ground claimed to be enroute to the helicopter. He requested this action by asking that the "hook" be put down. As the hoist was lowered initially the voice stated he was just 20 feet away. This is not considered possible since all the crew of JG-15 were able to see down to the floor of the jungle which was fairly clear under the trees. Also the penetrator was resting in a small clearing which was 25-30 yards in diameter. In the stable hover with the penetrator down, long periods of time went by with no voice contact. When he did come back up on Guard his distances from the helicopter varied greatly. The distance never consistently diminished. Toward the end of the hover period he was asked to relate his present position by JG-15 and he replied "in (or near; this was not clear) a shack near or next to the river." This was a very suspicious statement to the helicopter crews for several reasons. The creek over which JG-15

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was hovering would not normally be referred to by an American as a "river" due to its size. Furthermore, the creek bank had been thoroughly scanned by JG-15 crewmembers and no shack was evident. Secondly, evasion training for crew members emphatically suggests remaining clear of rivers and structures to avoid capture. During the latter phases of JG-15's hover, JG-27 flew cover just below the clouds at 600 feet AGL. He flew a low pass on JG-15's east side and could see nothing and drew no ground fire until well clear of JG-15. JG-27 came back on the west side and again saw nothing and drew no ground fire in the immediate hover area. When JG-27 made a climbing turn out west, however, the aircraft received ground fire from ZPU (14.7mm) weapons. Until this time no known ground fire had been taken from this position and all day nothing more than small arms (no tracers) had been observed. The flight engineer on JG-27 fired the M-60 machine gun directly into the firing site and no more rounds came by the helicopter as it turned away from the site. No hits were taken from this weapon. A discussion between JG-15 (still in the hover) and JG-27 followed this occurrence. Both crews agreed that the effort looked more and more like a trap and darkness was approaching. Weather was becoming a factor as broken conditions became more overcast (3300 feet MSL, 1000 feet AGL). Without assurance of a real objective the exposure to all aircraft seemed unwarranted as ample opportunity had been afforded to any real or uncaptured survivor. In addition, the presence of ZPU indicated that bigger weapons were being brought in. JG-15 called that he was departing the area. The individual on Guard offered no objection. To avoid ground fire areas and confuse the enemy gun positions JG-15 climbed out of the hover in a right spiraling hover to an altitude of 3000 feet. JG-27 noted ground fire (tracer or ZPU) at JG-15 as he attempted to depart but none was felt or observed by the crew of JG-15. The remainder of the mission was uneventful as SAR forces returned to base.

3. (U) The name(s) of the survivor(s) are unknown.

4. (U) Crews on the Jolly Green aircraft were:

JG-27: James H. Platt, 1st Lt, RCC
Edward J. Sichterman, 1st Lt, RCCP
Benny D. Negrette, SSgt, FE
Roy A. Taylor, Sgt, RS

JG-52: Frederick C. Faust, Maj, RCC
Dean H. Williams, Jr., Maj, RCCP
Carl L. Warmack, SSgt, FE
Clarence R. Boles, MSgt, RS

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JG-15: Edward B. Russell, Maj, RCC
Louis D. Yugas, Maj, RCCP
Albert P. Parker, SSgt, FE
J. T. Lombard, Sgt, RS

JG-53: Harry W. Walker, Capt, RCC
Edward W. Hutchinson, 1st Lt, RCCP
Hairl D. Thacker, SSgt, FE
Patrick F. Allaire, Sgt, RS

* JG-27: Gerald C. Haynes, Maj, RCC
James B. Barton, 1st Lt, RCCP
Floyd W. Watson, SSgt, FE
Randy S. McComb, Sgt, RS

Richard E. Adams
RICHARD E. ADAMS, Maj, USAF
Operations Officer

[REDACTED]

FROM: RCC Maj Dubriske

10 November 1967

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative (2-3-87)

Crown 1

Crown 1 departed Udorn AB at 10/2310 and was immediately contacted by Compress and advised to proceed to CH77 and contact Drill Flight who had voice contact with AWOL survivor, 47/48 of CH 77. Crown advised Compress to launch Jolly Green 52 and Sandys to the area. Crown contacted Drill flight (2F-4) who had voice contact with AWOL survivor. It was found out he was the back seat man from an F-4 and that he had a broken leg. Both Nail and Drill had good voice contact with AWOL on guard. Compress advised Sandy 7 and 8 were on their way and Jolly Green 52 and 27 had been launched from CH 89. Sandy 7 and 8 arrived in the area at 0030Z. Sandy 7 took on scene commander and began visual search for AWOL. Sandy had good voice contact with AWOL, but could not pin point location of survivor due to terrain and ~~lack of~~ AWOL not having any signaling devices. Misty 21 and Misty 11 (F-100) also had good voice contact with survivor.

Compress passed questions to Crown and these were relayed to Sandy to be asked to AWOL survivor. Questions were "Who is the greatest football team in the world?" and also his authenticator number. At 0059 Sandy 3 took some hits, and was forced to eject. Jolly Green 27 was vector to Sandy 8 survivor and at 0118 was picked up by J.G. 27. Survivor is OK, except for cuts and bruises. At 0125 Nail 52 asked AWOL questions and Green Bay Packers was the reply. Compress confirmed as being correct. When asked about front seat man, AWOL did not know what happen to him. Jolly Green proceed to orbit high with Hobo (A-1E) as escort. Sandy 5 and 6 arrived in area 0145. Sandys orbit the area trying to pin point AWOL position. Sandy 7 RTB with ~~back~~ battle damage and no hydraulic pressure. Sandy 5 directs Jolly Green 52 to approx area of AWOL using voice directions from AWOL and use of beeper for homing. Jolly Green homes over area but no visual with AWOL. AWOL says he can hear Jolly Green. About 0256Z Jolly Green 52 takes a hit and starts losing oil pressure. J.G. 52 gets out okay, but advises he has wounded aboard JG 52 and 27 depart area for CH89. JG 53 and 15 arrived about 0334. Sandy 5 took a hit at 0336 and he RTB to CH86 with a hole in left aileron and hydraulic shot out. Firefly 13 and 14 arrived in area and Firefly 13 took on scene commander from Sandy 5. The next 90 minutes were spent trying to pin point AWOL while Jolly Green 53 and 15 orbited high. The high performance aircraft could not shoot up the area for fear of hitting AWOL. At 0537 Compress advised Crown 1 to give J.G. 15 a drink and for Crown 2 to take control of the SAR. After refueling J.G. 15 Crown 1 escorted J.G. 53 to CH89, who had taken a hit and lost control of his right rudder. After J.G. 53 landed at 89 Crown 1 was RTB to CH86. If AWOL only had some kind of a signal device, (mirror, flare etc..) the pick-up would have been successful, but it was impossible to pin point AWOL and even when the Jolly Green thought they were right over him, he still could not be ~~xx~~ spotted visual.

Stanley J. Dubriske Jr. Maj, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

mn-31

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY TABLE OF RESCUES

DATE	RESCUE NO.	SURVIVOR	CREW ACFT	SERVICE	LOCATION	JOLLY GREEN CREW
2 Oct	203	Maj Miller	RF4C	USAF	Laos	Maj Haynes Lt Barton
2 Oct	204	Maj Brown	RF4C	USAF	Laos	SSgt Androsky A2C Taylor
3 Oct	205	Maj Moore	F4C	USAF	Laos	Capt Etzel Capt Hall
3 Oct	206	Maj Gulbrandson	F4C	USAF	Laos	SSgt Zerbe Sgt Braboni
23 Oct	207	Capt McLean (Deceased)	F105	USAF	Thailand	Maj Haynes Lt Platt SSgt Keyes Sgt Smith
26 Oct	208	Lt Sanchi	T28	RTAF	Laos	Maj Haynes Lt Platt
26 Oct	209	Unknown	T28	RTAF	Laos	Sgt Allen Sgt Duffy
5 Nov	210	Capt Sparks	F105	USAF	North Vietnam	Capt Walker Lt Col Lowe MSgt Boles TSgt Smith
8 Nov	211	Capt Gordon	F4	USAF	North Vietnam	Capt Richardson Lt Barton SSgt Brooks Sgt Lombard
11 Nov	212	Maj Griffith	A1E	USAF	Laos	Lt Platt Lt Sichterman SSgt Negrette A1C Taylor
18 Nov	213	Lt Col Reed	F105	USAF	Laos	Capt Richardson Lt Privette SSgt Warmack A1C Taylor
20 Nov	214	Lt Col Scholtz	RF4	USAF	North Vietnam	Lt Col Britton Maj Wells
20 Nov	215	Capt Simenero	RF4	USAF	North Vietnam	SSgt Androsky Sgt Duffy
29 Dec	216	Capt Altman	F4	USAF	Laos	Capt Etzel Maj Wells
29 Dec	217	Capt Coburn	F4	USAF	Laos	SSgt Thacker Sgt Sowell

HISTORY DET 1 37 ARRS 1 OCT - 31 DEC 67

147
43

FROM: Det 13, 38th ARRSq(O/L 13-38C/Maj Cowden/412)

18 November 1967

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative #13-38-9-11 November 1967

TO: 3rd ARRG (JSARC)

At 1003 hours local, 11 November 1967, Detachment 13, 38th ARRSq was notified via the primary crash circuit of an Army UH-1 helicopter, call sign Iroquois 545, calling mayday, and going down approximately 5 miles West of Phu Cat. At 1005 hours the primary alert crew scrambled with the FSK. Radio contact with Phu Cat Approach Control and an O1E circling the crash site revealed that the Huey was shot down 15 miles West of Phu Cat, and that no fire was present. At the receipt of this news, Pedro 21 left the FSK with friendly forces in an open field 7 miles from Phu Cat and then proceeded to the scene unescorted through extremely hostile enemy territory. The downed Huey was found in the river, with it's tail section broken off. Pedro 21 landed nearby and several of the crew members rushed into the water to lend assistance. Five of the Huey's personnel were immediately evacuated from the hostile area to An Khe by Pedro 21. The two Rescue Specialists remained at the scene with the other three survivors, because it was impossible to evacuate everyone at one time. While there, they assisted in forming a defensive perimeter around the downed aircraft. Pedro 21 left An Khe at 1035 hours and again returned to the crash site. Pedro 21 picked up the Rescue Specialists, while an Army helicopter picked up the remaining survivors. Pedro 21 returned to the open field and picked up the FSK then returned to Phu Cat where they landed at 1105 hours. This mission constituted 5 combat saves. The weather was VFR.


BERT E. COWDEN, Major, USAF
Commander

[REDACTED]

37 ARRSq Hist, Oct - Dec 1967

10.

which had crashed the previous night. Jolly Green 04 arrived on scene at 0030Z and held at a safe altitude while Sandy 5, 6, 7, and 8 (USAF A-1Es), a USAF O-2, and USAF F-4Cs were conducting the search. At approximately 0130Z two possible survivors were spotted and Jolly Green 04 made a pass over the area. The pickup was not attempted at this time by order of the Commander, 7th AF. At 0720Z Jolly Green 04 was given permission to attempt the pickup, but no survivors could be sighted. Jolly Green 04 was returned to base at 0815Z and upon landing an automatic weapons hit was found in the tail of the aircraft. Jolly Green 04 was on scene for eight hours and 10 minutes and made three air refuelings.

(21) (U) 1-3-183, 12 Nov 1967, at 0245Z Jolly Green 25 was diverted from orbit to assist the US Navy in evacuating personnel from a floundering boat, Greenfish, at 18°10'N/106°45'E. Jolly Green 25 transported damage control equipment from Killer Whale, a USN destroyer to Greenfish. Since it was determined Greenfish was in no danger of sinking no survivors needed to be evacuated.

(22) (U) 1-3-184, 14 Nov 1967, at 1625Z Jolly Green 28 and 25 were scrambled to 113°17'94, 17 miles East South-East of Da Nang, to medivac a snakebit victim. Jolly Green 28 made the pickup at 1715Z and evacuated the victim, name unknown, to Marble Mountain AB, RVN.

(23) (U) 1-3-185, 20 Nov 1967, at 0145Z Jolly Green 04 was diverted from orbit to attempt the pickup of the crew of a USAF F-4C at 340°/20/109, 20 miles North-West of Dong Ha. Jolly Green 04 arrived on the

[REDACTED]

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117A

FROM: 370

16 November 1967

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-184, 14 Nov 67) (U)

TO: 370 *Yde*
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1967.

2. (C) While standing alert at DaNang AB, the crew of Jolly Green 25 was instructed to scramble and pick up a man who had been bitten by a poisonous snake. The position of the pickup was plotted to be 113° at 17 miles off Channel 94, DaNang Tacan, an island off the coast. The landing area was unknown except that it would be outlined by lighted pots. The crew arrived at Jolly Green 25 at 1545Z; however, they were unable to start the Number 1 engine. After three attempts the alert crew switched to Jolly Green 28, the backup aircraft. Takeoff was at 1625Z after some difficulty obtaining a tug to pull the aircraft out from the revetment. Contact was made with Queen on HF; however, shortly thereafter, Jolly Green's HF radio went completely out. Contact was to have been made with the ground party on HF. Queen was then contacted on VHF. The ceiling was approximately 1200' and ragged, making it difficult to spot the island. Jolly Green 28 arrived on the scene at 1705Z. By this time the alert back up crew had started Jolly Green 25 and took off at 1635Z. Queen was able to contact the ground party on the island and relayed information to Jolly Green 28. At 1740Z a landing was made on the beach of the island. No light pots were available and the only guidance was a man holding two flashlights. The area was quite small and it was necessary for the rear of the aircraft to remain out over the surf. The man was quickly put aboard. A 180° turn from the landing position in a hover was required as the beach turned into a steep mountain approximately 75 yards away. Takeoff was made with no difficulty and Queen directed Jolly Green 28 to take the victim to NSA hospital. Jolly Green 25 had arrived on the scene and escorted Jolly Green 28. Approximately four miles from NSA, over DaNang Bay, the intermediate gear box chip detector light came on in Jolly Green 28. A landing was made at Marble Mountain Field adjacent to the NSA Hospital Helicopter Pad at 1800Z. Jolly Green 25 landed behind Jolly Green 28 on the runway. The patient was transferred to Jolly Green 25 and arrived at NSA at 1810Z. Jolly Green 25 remained at Marble Mountain with Jolly Green 28 until the maintenance problem was cleared. Takeoff was at 1900Z with landing at DaNang at 1910Z. Weather was a factor since the low clouds made the islands difficult to pick out in the night. Queen did an outstanding job of relaying information and coordinating with the ground party after Jolly Green 28's HF radio went out.

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON **31 DEC 1973**

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 6200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Atch 5

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) The name of the victim is unknown.

4. (U) Crew members of Jolly Greens:

a. Jolly Green 28:

RCC	Capt William E. Brennan
RCCP	Capt John S. Baughman
FE	SSgt Windell L. Stumbaugh
RS	Sgt Michael B. Gallasch
RS	A1C Richard H. Garlie

b. Jolly Green 25:

RCC	Capt Thomas E. Bair
RCCP	Capt Robert Levins III
FE	TSgt Robert Q. Rector
RS	Sgt Joseph S. Stanaland

William E. Brennan
WILLIAM E. BRENNAN, Captain, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

[REDACTED]

37 ARRSq Hist, Oct - Dec 1967

10.

which had crashed the previous night. Jolly Green 04 arrived on scene at 0030Z and held at a safe altitude while Sandy 5, 6, 7, and 8 (USAF A-1Es), a USAF O-2, and USAF F-4Cs were conducting the search. At approximately 0130Z two possible survivors were spotted and Jolly Green 04 made a pass over the area. The pickup was not attempted at this time by order of the Commander, 7th AF. At 0720Z Jolly Green 04 was given permission to attempt the pickup, but no survivors could be sighted. Jolly Green 04 was returned to base at 0815Z and upon landing an automatic weapons hit was found in the tail of the aircraft. Jolly Green 04 was on scene for eight hours and 10 minutes and made three air refuelings.

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[REDACTED]

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: (Mission #10-38-49, 14 Nov 67)

Det 10, 38 ARRSq was notified by Navy Operations CTF 116 at 0846Z of requirement for helicopter hoist recovery of one wounded personnel from River Patrol Boat, "Handlash Alpha". Operations further stated that the PBR was withdrawing from action against the enemy near Tan Dinh Island (125 degrees/17 nautical miles from Binh Thuy) and proceeding up the Bassac River for rendezvous in a secure area. A "Seawolf" helicopter, light fire team had been requested and was already enroute to provide cover for the recovery. Pedro 91 was airborne at 0848Z and Pedro 39 followed at 0854Z to provide rescap. After initial radio contact was established enroute with "Handlash Alpha", Pedro 91 lost FM transmission contact and further mission coordination was relayed thru Pedro 39. Arriving at rendezvous at 0902Z, Pedro 91, under cover of "Seawolf 16" and two additional helicopters (Gunship), made a stokes litter, hoist recovery of the wounded individual and proceeded direct to the 9th Infantry 3d Field Hospital at Dong Tam. While enroute patient was examined and found to have multiple shrapnel wounds of the head and leg. He was treated to prevent shock by the pararescue crew member and turned over to hospital personnel upon landing at 0943Z. Pedro was refueled at Dong Tam Air Field and returned to home station arriving at 1029Z. Despite the loss of FM capability by Pedro 91, coordination of all participating units was outstanding on FM radio. Pedro 39, as rescap, was invaluable in relaying pick-up information to and from the PBR. No hostile ground fire was encountered. One combat save.


CREWS: (All Assigned to Det 10, 38th ARRSq)

Pedro 91:

RCC - Maj Harold Pickering
RCCP - Capt William J Haugen
FE - Sgt James A Crawford Jr
PJ - Sgt Ronald K Sholes

Pedro 39:

RCC - Capt Donald E Van Meter
RCCP - Capt Albert E Tollefsen
FE - SSgt William L Crawford
PJ - A1C James L Parks


HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander


152

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: Det 10, 38th ARRSq (10-38-51, 15 Nov 67)

One combat save. No hostile ground fire encountered. Det 10, 38th ARRSq was notified at 0243Z by US Navy Operations Center Binh Thuy, of a wounded US Navy personnel requiring evacuation from the Co Chin River east of Vinh Long. The contact Patrol Boat, River (PBR) call sign "Cugat Whiskey" on FM radio, was then at coordinates 106 degrees 2 minutes east, 10 degrees 15 minutes north and proceeding towards Vinh Long. At that time the RCC requested "Seawolf" (armed Navy helicopters) coverage. One HH-43F helicopter, Pedro 39 was dispatched at 0245Z. "Paddy Control" was contacted for flight following and artillery advisories. Weather was 2500 broken with winds out of the northeast 8 to 12 knots. At 0255Z radio contact was made with "Cugat Whiskey" who described the wounded man as being in critical condition with a sucking chest wound. Visual contact was made at 0300Z and "Cugat Whiskey" headed for an open area on the north shore. "Cugat Whiskey" advised Pedro 39 that the Navy was familiar with the area and that it was secure. "Seawolf" had not yet been contacted, however, there were three other PBR's in the area. Pedro 39 made a landing on the north shore, coordinates 106 degrees zero minute east, 10 degrees 16 minutes north just prior to the PBR beaching. The injured man was placed on a litter and transferred to the helicopter by four Navy personnel and Sgt Sholes. During this time two Navy personnel were manning guns on the PBR and SSgt Crawford was covering the area with an M-16 rifle. The pick-up was completed and Pedro 39 was airborne at 0310Z, at which time "Seawolf" made radio contact. Pedro 39 released "Seawolf" from the mission and proceeded to the Dong Tam Army Air Field, where the patient was off-loaded at the 3d Field Hospital at 0325Z. Pedro refueled at the Dong Tam landing strip and returned to Binh Thuy at 0415Z. The FM radio was a major factor in the successful accomplishment of the mission. There was excellent coordination between the Navy forces and Pedro 39.

CREW: (Pedro 39 - All assigned to Det 10, 38th ARRSq)

RCC - Capt Laurence W Conover
RCCP - Capt William J Haugen
FE - SSgt William L Crawford
PJ - Sgt Ronald K Sholes


HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander


157

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: Det 10, 38th ARRSq (10-38-50, 15 Nov 67)

Three combat saves. No hostile ground fire encountered. At 0138Z the Senior Advisor Binh Thuy Special Military Zone notified Pedro Control of three wounded-in-action (WIA) Americans requiring medical evacuation. He further advised that an area had been secured to permit helicopter evacuation and that a US Army O-1 "Shot Gun 33", would provide air cover and coordinate fire power if required. Pedro 39 was airborne on a training mission and was advised of the mission by Binh Thuy Tower. Pedro 39 landed to pick up the flight engineer and the required information and scrambled at 0141Z. The ground party was located at coordinates 105 degrees 30 minutes east, 10 degrees 4 minutes north, call sign "Hotel Mobile". FM radio contact was made and Pedro 39 was advised that the injured had leg and torso shrapnel wounds. As Pedro approached the area "Hotel Mobile" pin pointed their position with smoke. Pedro 39 landed in a flooded rice paddy and unloaded the wounded. At this time it was discovered the wounded were not American but Vietnamese Regional Forces personnel. "Shot Gun 33" proceeded Pedro 39's takeoff to discern any possible enemy activity in the area. Pedro 39's takeoff was made without incident. While airborne, the pararescue technician on Pedro 39 administered first aid and cleaned the dressings of the wounded. Pedro 39 landed at Can Tho Army Air Field at 0200Z. Transfer of the wounded to Vietnamese ambulances was effected. Pedro 39 then returned to Binh Thuy landing at 0210Z. Weather during the entire flight was 2500 scattered, 7 miles visibility, and winds from the northwest at 5 to 10 knots. The excellent coordination between Pedro 39, the Army O-1 and the ground party was conducted exclusively on FM radio.

CREW: (Pedro 39 - All Assigned to Det 10, 38th ARRSq)

RCC - Capt Laurence W Conover
RCCP - Capt William J Haugen
Flt Engineer - SSgt William L Crawford
PJ - Sgt Ronald K Sholes


HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander

~~SECRET~~

4.3K(s)

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative, 17 November 1967; Msn # 2 - 3 - 88

TO: 3ARRGp (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 NOV 1967

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSM 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1, dated 15 June 67.

2. (S)(GP-4) Jolly Green 37, while enroute from Ch 89 to L-36, single ship, heard a call on guard at 0809 that Zebra lead was down. The initial position was 070/96 from Ch 97 which was 20 NM southwest of target area. A good chute was reported and a beeper signal was picked up. UHF radio was very cluttered so channel 1 was used for a DF joinup with Sandy 3. North Station was off the air making navigation very difficult due to a solid undercast with tops at 7000 feet. Our flight altitude was 8000 feet, LF ADF was used for primary navigation. ETA to North Station was 0830L and to the border was 0905L. Both ETA's were good. At 0845 Zebra 2 reported a revised position of 080/96 from Ch 97. At that time foreign language voices were heard on guard channel. We departed the border at 0905 with an ETA of 0945L to the SAR area, beeper and voice had all been lost. At 0912L the effort was started and Jolly Green 37 proceeded toward the area. At 0916L Olds flt reported an intermittent beeper. At 0927L instructions were received to hold at present position which was approximately 15 NM out of scene. Weather was still a solid undercast. At this time Olds flight again reported a beeper. Jolly Green computed bingo time of 0957L to make pickup and hit the tanker at North Station. We advised Crown 1 to start towards that position. At 0934L we were directed by Compress to proceed to North Station for aerial refueling. Olds flight and Sandy's report constant foreign language voices on guard. The effort was called off at 0946L. Jolly Green 37 completed air refueling at 1025L and recovered at L98 at 1125L. Weather was a solid undercast throughout total effort. Considerable foreign voices on FM frequency caused communication problems with Sandy aircraft. A new frequency might be advisable. Crown 1's assistance during air refueling effort was excellent. No hostile activity was encountered.

3. (U) The name of the survivor(s) is unknown.

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

4. (U) Crew of Jolly Green 37 were;

25 MAR 1970

DAF AFR 205-2

(Date)

Powell Moore, Major RCC
Andrew J. Gonos, 1st Lt, RCCP
Bernard W. Grau, SSgt, FE
Jules C. Smith, Sgt, PJ

Classified by
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS AFTER 12 FEB 1977
DECLASSIFIED ON

Powell Moore

POWELL MOORE, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Cy 1 of 6 Cys

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ARDC # 671390

67-20-5439

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative, 18 November 1967; Msn # 2 - 3 - 89

153
23 NOV 1967

TO: 3ARRGP (C)

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSN 55-2/3ARRGP Sup 1, dated 15 June 1967.

2. (S)(GP-4) Jolly Greens 55 and 37 were notified to scramble by Crown 1 at 0817L. Weather at L-36 was overcast (Approx 500') with good visibility. As they broke through the overcast at 6500' MSL Jolly Greens 55 and 37 joined up with Sandys 3 and 4. The downed aircraft was Waco 4; his reported position was 030° at 30 miles from CH97. Jolly Green 55 estimated 45 minutes to the area. As Jolly Green 55 and 37 neared CH97, Sandy 2 advised that the survivor had been located at 030°, 13 miles from CH97. Jolly Green 37 was instructed to orbit CH97 above the clouds while Jolly Green 55 penetrated the overcast. Since the Sandys were unable to locate a hole, Jolly Green 55 proceeded to a relatively open area and let down through the clouds. Jolly Green 55 broke into the clear approximately 800' above the ground in a small valley, and flew low level through several valleys to reach the scene, arriving at 0855L. Due to poor visibility and dense foliage, Jolly Green 55 was unable to spot the survivor who was located on the side of a steep ridge. There was a strong wind blowing uphill which caused the survivors smoke to run along the ground under the trees. The smoke was sighted near the top of the ridge. Jolly Green 55 entered a hover there, but was unable to sight the survivor since all his smoke had dissipated. Jolly Green 55 requested another smoke flare and smoke was observed in the trees several hundred feet down the ridge. Jolly Green 55 positioned over the survivor and brought him aboard at 0910L. Elevation was 2500' OAT 13° C. The survivor was in good condition with only minor cuts and bruises. There was no observed enemy action and no damage to the helicopter. Jolly Green 55, accompanied by Sandys 1 and 2, climbed through the overcast and proceeded to L-98, landing at 1020L. The survivor was loaded aboard an Air America C-123 for transport to Udorn AB.

3. (U) The name of the survivor was LT COL WILLIAM REED, USAF.

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
29 DEC 1970

4. (U) A list of crew members follows:

RAW AFR 205-2

JOLLY GREEN 55 (Low)

JOLLY GREEN 37 (High)

Capt David A. Richardson, RCC
1st Lt Billy N. Privette, RCCP
SSgt Carl L. Warmack, Flt Engr
ALC Roy A. Taylor, ParaRescueSpec

Maj Powell Moore, RCC
1st Lt Andrew J. Gonos, RCCP
SSgt Bernard W. Grau, Flt Engr
ALC Jules C. Smith, ParaRescueSpec

DAVID A. RICHARDSON, Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

1-370ps 67-43

Cy 1 of 6 Cys

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

67-AB-5446

ARODC # 671391

Classified by
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS: 3 FEB 1971
DECLASSIFIED ON

SECRET

208

Capt Donald J. Donovan

Mission Narrative 2-3-89

19 November 1967

Crown 1 on Pak Sene orbit at 23.5 feet. At 0110Z, Covey 672 an C-2, requested intercept for his wingman Covey 655 who had battle damage. Crown 1 began an intercept course from his position 061/106/51. At 0115Z a Laredo 4 called that Waco Lead 105 was down and had a beeper. Crown 1 advised Brisaam that Covey 672 was under Lion control and to try to keep track of him, that Crown 1 was breaking off intercept to begin a SAR attempt. At 0119Z, several calls came in nearly simultaneously that Garage 3 (F-105) and Vegas 1 (F-105) ~~XX~~ were down in the target area. Vegas 2 recommended no SAR attempt. Waco ~~X~~ Lead (F-105) was also reported down in the vicinity of the target, also at this time Waco 2 called that Waco 4 ejected at position 030/130 North Station. JG 55 and 37 were launched from L-36, and Sandy's 1-4 headed for the area. The area determined to be safe and the Jolly Greens redeployed with the Sandys. Two high performance flights were located for Mig Cap, Bison flight 4 (F-105) and Petros flight 4 (F4C). Crown 1 moved approximately 50NM north of Chan 79 and climbed to FL 250. Firefly flt 13 and 14 were also orbiting at North Station ready to assist if needed. Sandy one Lead Jolly Green 55 to the survivor and brought him aboard at 0210 lcl the survivor was reported in condition one. Jolly Greens 55 and 37 headed for L98 and all SAR Forces were RTB AT 0230Z. Crown 1 suggested an Electronic search for the other possible survivors in the target area, but do not know if one was conducted. The Fac aircraft Covey 672 recovered successfully at CH51.

~~SECRET~~

(4.3K(3))

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative, 19 November 1967; Msn # 2 - 3 - 91

TO: 3ARRGp (C)

23 NOV 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARRSM 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1, dated 15 June 67.

2. (S)(GP-4) Jolly Greens 37 (low) and 55 (high) were sitting alert at L36 when Tile lead was hit and declared an emergency at approximately 1610L. Coordinates for Tile lead at that time was 21° 15'N, 105° 35'E. Four minutes later the downed position was reported as 20° 45'N, 105° 09'E. Compress and Crown 2 notified Jolly Greens 37 and 55 to scramble at 1625L. Both aircraft were airborne at 1627L. Sandy's 5 and 6 had contact with JG 37 and 55 immediately after takeoff and headed for North station which had the TACAN off the air. LF/ADF was primary for navigation. Weather was a undercast 6000 - 7000 feet broken to overcast. Flight level varied from 7.5M to 8.5M. The Jolly Greens were directed to proceed to the border and hold at 080/50 off of channel 97. Iron hand declared a SAM threat in the SAR area at 1641L. Jolly Green 37 and 55 with Sandys 5 and 6 reached the border at 1705L and set up an orbit over a 7000' solid undercast. At 1708L negative beeper was reported by Iron hand and Sandy lead. At 1715L Iron hand reported that 3 SAM's had been launched in the rescue area. Sandy reported ground fire in the area and poor weather conditions complicated by approaching sunset. Compress called off the SAR effort at 1719L and withdrew all forces. No further electronic indications were received, from the survivors. Jolly Green 37 and 55 departed the orbit area at 1723L after all support aircraft were clear of the area. Sandy aircraft escorted the Jolly Greens to south of Channel 97 where they were cleared to RTB. Jolly Green 37 and 55 climbed to 11,000' to clear weather and were RTB'd to Channel 89 arriving there at 2010L.

3. (U) The name of the survivor(s) is unknown. Classified by [redacted] SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EMB ORDER 11652
4. (U) Crews of Jolly Green 37 and 55 were: AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. 7 FEB 1977

Jolly Green 37

Powell Moore, Maj, RCC
Andrew J. Gonos, 1st Lt, RCCP
Bernard W. Grau, SSgt, FE
Jules C. Smith, Sgt, PJ

Jolly Green 55

David A. Richardson, Capt, RCC
Billy N. Privette, 1st Lt, RCCP
Carl L. Warmack, SSgt, FE
Claude E. Colip, SSgt, FE
Roy A. Taylor, Sgt, PJ

Powell Moore

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POWELL MOORE, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

1-370ps 67-44

25 MAR 1970

INW AFR 205-2

Cys 1 of 6 Cys (Info)

~~SECRET~~

ARODC# 671392

67 AD-5440 Arch

Narrative Mission Report

(6-38-63-19 Nov 67)

1. At 1540L, 19 November 1967, this unit was notified by the Bien Hoa control tower that a USAF F-100 had crashed during a bombing run 55 miles northwest of Bien Hoa. Two HH-43's were fully fueled and Pedro 97 was off by 1550L and Pedro 77 departed at 1555L. The two aircraft rendezvoused five miles north of the base and proceeded as a flight to the scene of the accident.
2. Pedro 97 established contact with a Forward Air Controller, Rod 06, who was circling the crash site. His transmissions enabled the rescue helicopters to home in on the exact location of the downed F-100. Also in the area was a flight of two F-100's and two Army helicopter gunships which provided cover for the HH-43's.
3. The crash scene, a small clearing in a semi-jungle area, was reached at 1640L. As Pedro 97 made a low reconnaissance pass over the still burning wreckage, a team of 50 ARVN ground troops reached the area and secured the surrounding terrain. The F-100 pilot's body was found still in the ejection seat 30 yards south of the wreckage. As tall tree stumps in the clearing prevented a landing, Pedro 97 lowered a pararescueman to the ground by hoist to prepare the body for recovery. A litter and rubberized body bag were then lowered to the pararescueman. When the body was ready for pick up, Pedro 97 assumed a ten foot hover and hoisted the litter into the helicopter and then recovered the pararescueman.
4. The recovery was completed at 1700L and both helicopters returned to Bien Hoa, terminating at 1740L. The body was then released to

(6-38-63-19 Nov 67 Cont.)

medical authorities.

CREWMEMBERS

PEDRO 97

Captain	Charles W. Burrige	RCC
Major	Lawrence W. Heflin	CP
SSgt	Richard D. Almond	FE
Sgt	Roger A. Porter	RS

PEDRO 77

Captain	James A. Darden	RCC
Lt Col	Robert J. Kavanagh	CP
SSgt	Donald S. Kearton	FE
AIC	Terrence A. Treutel	PS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

145

FROM: 370

21 November 1967

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-185, 20 Nov 67) (U)

TO: 37C *LDC*
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

8 9/119

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 Jun 67.

2. (C) Jolly Green 04 completed Whiskey Orbit at 0145Z, 20 Nov 67, refueled from Crown 4 and was returning to Cigar to assume alert status. At 0220Z a call was heard from Crab Lead to Waterboy that Crab 2 (USAF F-4C) was down. JG 04 established communications with Crab Lead and was informed that a survivor was sighted at 3500/20 N.M. from Channel 109. JG 04 arrived at the scene at 0235Z. The original position was in error as the survivor was actually at 3400/25 N.M. from Channel 109. This position placed him one mile inland from the coast. Two Covey aircraft, one Misty aircraft and one Gunfighter aircraft were in the area. They had located the chute and had voice contact with one of the downed pilots but had not pinpointed his position. JG 04 orbited off the coast waiting for the survivor to be located. Crown 4 was the controller. The survivor was calm and had established excellent radio contact. He stated he had observed other people and had heard small arms fire in the area so he moved east from his chute to take cover in some small underbrush. Covey 108 located the survivor and as no hostile action was noticed requested JG 04 in for the pickup. Permission to penetrate the coast was granted by King. A high speed penetration at 1500' was made with a tactical letdown over the chute. The approximate position of the survivor was marked with two smoke flares from Covey. The survivor had set off a flare but had put it out when a burst of machine gun fire was fired over his head. At this time he began vectoring JG 04 to his position. Visual contact was not established until he stood up about 50 feet away from the helicopter. A landing was made, the survivor pulled aboard and a low level, high speed departure was made out to sea at 0248Z. Jolly Green 07, on alert at Cigar, was scrambled by Queen at 0226Z, airborne at 0230Z and arrived on the scene at 0250Z. An electronic and visual search was resumed for the aircraft commander of Crab 2. Covey had located an oil slick 1/4 mile off shore and JG 07 was requested to check it out. A pass was made and an overturned, deflated raft was spotted. JG 07 was requested to attempt to recover the raft. A water landing was made but attempts to recover the raft were unsuccessful. It was determined that the missing pilot was not attached to it. JG 07 was then requested to check out a possible body in the water sighted by Covey. While checking this sighting JG 07 drew ground fire from the beach and received one hit in the tail rotor blade. JG 07 immediately departed the area. The sighting was identified by the RCCP as debris from the downed aircraft at which time all SAR forces were withdrawn. JG 04 departed for Channel 97 at 0310Z and arrived at 0410Z. JG 07 departed for Channel 109 at 0330Z and arrived at 0400Z.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5400.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22041

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. (C) Weather in the area was 3000' scattered with no obstructions to visibility.

4. (C) Survivor: 1Lt James Badly, 480th TAC Ftr Sq. The actions taken by the survivor were a definite asset in the success of the recovery. His excellent radio discipline, proper evasion techniques and use of a compass to vector JG 04 to his position were outstanding. ✓

5. (U) Crew members of Jolly Greens:

a. Jolly Green 04

RCC	Major Herbert D. Kalen
RCCP	Major Robert A. Bunker
FE	Sgt William L. Carroll
RS	Sgt Donald K. Claudius Jr

b. Jolly Green 07

RCC	Capt Walter R. Blackwell
RCCP	Capt John I. Patterson
FE	SSgt Jimmy L. Dodgen
RS	Sgt Donald J. Boushelle

Herbert D. Kalen
HERBERT D. KALEN, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

37 ARRSq His , Oct - Dec 1967

10.

which had crashed the previous night. Jolly Green 04 arrived on scene at 0030Z and held at a safe altitude while Sandy 5, 6, 7, and 8 (USAF A-1Es), a USAF O-2, and USAF F-4Cs were conducting the search. At approximately 0130Z two possible survivors were spotted and Jolly Green 04 made a pass over the area. The pickup was not attempted at this time by order of the Commander, 7th AF. At 0720Z Jolly Green 04 was given permission to attempt the pickup, but no survivors could be sighted. Jolly Green 04 was returned to base at 0815Z and upon landing an automatic weapons hit was found in the tail of the aircraft. Jolly Green 04 was on scene for eight hours and 10 minutes and made three air refuelings.

(21) (U) 1-3-183, 12 Nov 1967, at 0245Z Jolly Green 25 was diverted from orbit to assist the US Navy in evacuating personnel from a floundering boat, Greenfish, at 18°10'N/106°45'E. Jolly Green 25 transported damage control equipment from Killer Whale, a USN destroyer to Greenfish. Since it was determined Greenfish was in no danger of sinking no survivors needed to be evacuated.

(22) (U) 1-3-184, 14 Nov 1967, at 1625Z Jolly Green 28 and 25 were scrambled to 113°/17/94, 17 miles East South-East of Da Nang, to medivac a snakebit victim. Jolly Green 28 made the pickup at 1715Z and evacuated the victim, name unknown, to Marble Mountain AB, RVN.

(23) (U) 1-3-185, 20 Nov 1967, at 0145Z Jolly Green 04 was diverted from orbit to attempt the pickup of a crew of a USAF F-4C at 340°/20/109, 20 miles North-West of Dong Ha. Jolly Green 04 arrived on the

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
 intervals; declassified
 after 12 years

37 ARRS Hist, Oct - Dec 1967

11.

scene at 0235Z and held off the coast while two USAF O-2s and a USAF F-100F conducted a search. The backseater was located one mile inland and at 0240Z Jolly Green 04 penetrated the coast, landed and picked up 1st Lt James Badly, FV3175554, 480 TAC Ftr Sq. A search was conducted for the front seater with negative results.

(24) 1-3-186, 26 Nov 1967, at 0145Z Jolly Green 25 and 03 were scrambled from Quang Tri to attempt the recovery of the crew of a USAF F-4C at 326°/53/85, 53 miles North-West of Khe Sanh. A search was conducted in the area by Sandy 7 and 8, USAF A-1Es, with negative results.

(25) 1-3-186, 26 Nov 1967, at 0700Z Jolly Green 10 was scrambled from Da Nang AB, RVN to assist in the recovery of two drowning victims two miles North of Da Nang in Da Nang Bay. A search was conducted with negative results.

(26) 1-3-188, 29 Nov 1967, at 0150Z Jolly Green 10 and 28 were scrambled from Quang Tri, RVN, to 260°/33/85, 33 miles West of Khe Sanh, to attempt the recovery of the crew of a USAF F-4C. Sandy 7 and 8 provided RESCORT. At 0305Z Jolly Green 10 picked up 1st Lt Leo J. Lemoine, USAF, FV3160020, 588th TFS, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN. The other pilot was not sighted and presumed lost.

(27) 1-3-191, 4 Dec 1967, at 0625Z Jolly Green 03 was scrambled from Da Nang AB, RVN to 223°/21/94, 21 miles South-West of Da Nang to attempt the recovery of four members aboard a U.S. Army U-6A which had crashed. An O-1 and two UH-1E gunships provided RESCORT.

~~SECRET~~

154

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative, 20 November 1967, Msn #2-3-92

27 NOV 1967

TO: 3ARRGp (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. (U) This report is submitted in accordance with ARSM 55-2/3ARRGp Sup 1, dated 15 June 67.

2. (S)(GP-4) Jolly Green 56 and 55 were on alert at Lima 36. At 0225Z both Jolly Greens were launched by Compress for a SAR effort on Dazzle 2 reported down at 104°32"E, 20°30"N. Sandys 1 and 2 were in the area of the survivors and had voice contact. Jolly Green 56 was airborne at 0230Z and 55 followed. The weather was 500' overcast with tops at 5000'. JG 56 and 55 climbed through a hole in the overcast and were joined by Sandy 6 and 7 for escort direct to the survivors area. Upon arrival in the area Sandy 2 advised JG 56 to penetrate the overcast north of the area into a valley and Sandy 2 would lead them to the survivors position. JG 55 remained above the overcast and JG 56 descended through the overcast and broke out in a valley at 4500', with the tops of the surrounding terrain in the clouds. Sandy 2 led JG 56 through lower clouds into an adjoining valley where Sandy 1 had the survivors pinpointed. JG 56 quickly located the survivors by their smoke. They were on opposite sides of a mountain. The underbrush was so thick the crew on JG 56 could not see the first survivor until he was very close to the penetrator, however, the penetrator was lowered at the position of the survivors smoke and chute. At 0330Z a hover was established at 3800' MSL 15°C with 2000% of fuel aboard, requiring 95% of torque. After 5 minutes in the hover the survivor reached the penetrator and was brought aboard. An immediate search was made to the second survivor, the exact procedure was repeated, the elevation was 100' lower and it required only 90% torque. Both survivors were aboard by 0350Z and JG 56 departed the area by climbing through the overcast. A precautionary refueling was made with Crown 1, 43 miles east of Lima 36 due to weather conditions in the area. However, JG 56 proceeded to Lima 36 at 0445Z with no problem and the survivors were transferred to an Air America aircraft for transport to Udorn. As in previous SAR missions there was far too much radio conversation by all agencies concerned.

3. (U) Name of the survivors were: Lt Col Scholtz and Capt Giminero.

4. (U) Crews of Jolly Green 56 and 55 were:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jolly Green 56

Warner A. Britton, Lt Col, RCC
Maurice L. Wells, Maj, RCCP
Vincent D. Andrews, SSgt, FE
Joseph M. Duffy, Sgt PJ

Jolly Green 55

Richard A. Orsini, Capt, RCC
Dean H. Williams Jr., Maj, RCCP
Harvey W. Keyes, SSgt, FE
Charley D. Smith, TSgt, PJ

Classified by
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 7 FEB 1977

Upgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
LAW AFR 205-2
1-370ps 67-48
Cy 61-6-63
(Date)

Warner A. Britton

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARS

ARDC #

671388

67-AD-5504

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: 370

21 November 1967

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-185, 20 Nov 67) (U)

TO: 370 *LDC*
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 Jun 67.

2. (C) Jolly Green 04 completed Whiskey Orbit at 0145Z, 20 Nov 67, refueled from Crown 4 and was returning to Cigar to assume alert status. At 0220Z a call was heard from Crab Lead to Waterboy that Crab 2 (USAF F-4C) was down. JG 04 established communications with Crab Lead and was informed that a survivor was sighted at 350°/20 N.M. from Channel 109. JG 04 arrived at the scene at 0235Z. The original position was in error as the survivor was actually at 340°/25 N.M. from Channel 109. This position placed him one mile inland from the coast. Two Covey aircraft, one Misty aircraft and one Gunfighter aircraft were in the area. They had located the chute and had voice contact with one of the downed pilots but had not pinpointed his position. JG 04 orbited off the coast waiting for the survivor to be located. Crown 4 was the controller. The survivor was calm and had established excellent radio contact. He stated he had observed other people and had heard small arms fire in the area so he moved east from his chute to take cover in some small underbrush. Covey 108 located the survivor and as no hostile action was noticed requested JG 04 in for the pickup. Permission to penetrate the coast was granted by King. A high speed penetration at 1500' was made with a tactical letdown over the chute. The approximate position of the survivor was marked with two smoke flares from Covey. The survivor had set off a flare but had put it out when a burst of machine gun fire was fired over his head. At this time he began vectoring JG 04 to his position. Visual contact was not established until he stood up about 50 feet away from the helicopter. A landing was made, the survivor pulled aboard and a low level, high speed departure was made out to sea at 0248Z. Jolly Green 07, on alert at Cigar, was scrambled by Queen at 0226Z, airborne at 0230Z and arrived on the scene at 0250Z. An electronic and visual search was resumed for the aircraft commander of Crab 2. Covey had located an oil slick $\frac{1}{4}$ mile off shore and JG 07 was requested to check it out. A pass was made and an overturned, deflated raft was spotted. JG 07 was requested to attempt to recover the raft. A water landing was made but attempts to recover the raft were unsuccessful. It was determined that the missing pilot was not attached to it. JG 07 was then requested to check out a possible body in the water sighted by Covey. While checking this sighting JG 07 drew ground fire from the beach and received one hit in the tail rotor blade. JG 07 immediately departed the area. The sighting was identified by the RCCP as debris from the downed aircraft at which time all SAR forces were withdrawn. JG 04 departed for Channel 97 at 0310Z and arrived at 0410Z. JG 07 departed for Channel 109 at 0330Z and arrived at 0400Z.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. (C) Weather in the area was 3000' scattered with no obstructions to visibility.

4. (C) Survivor: 1Lt James Badly, FV3175554, 480th TAC Ftr Sq. The actions taken by the survivor were a definite asset in the success of the recovery. His excellent radio discipline, proper evasion techniques and use of a compass to vector JG 04 to his position were outstanding. ✓

5. (U) Crew members of Jolly Greens:

a. Jolly Green 04

RCC Major Herbert D. Kalen
RCCP Major Robert A. Bunker
FE Sgt William L. Carroll
RS Sgt Donald K. Claudius Jr

b. Jolly Green 07

RCC Capt Walter R. Blackwell
RCCP Capt John I. Patterson
FE SSgt Jimmy L. Dodgen
RS Sgt Donald J. Boushelle

Herbert D. Kalen

HERBERT D. KALEN, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Narrative Mission Report

(6-38-64-21 Nov 67)

1. On 21 November 1967, an Army H-13 helicopter experienced an engine failure while flying four miles south of Bien Hoa. Detachment 6 was notified by the control tower and at 1305L launched two HH-43's, five minutes after notification. Enroute it was learned that the Army aircraft had struck high tension power lines and then crashed into the Bien Hoa River.
2. Both Pedro 77 and 95 arrived in the vicinity of the power lines and began a systematic search of the area. Other Army helicopters then arrived to render assistance. Within ten minutes the pilot was located in the center of a heavily populated Vietnamese area and appeared to be uninjured.
3. Pedro 77 assumed a high hover over the pilot and lowered the hoist, and lifted the downed pilot aboard. Ten minutes later all were on the ground at Bien Hoa.
4. It was then learned the pilot suffered only minor cuts after exiting his aircraft under water. He was given medical treatment and released for duty.

CREWMEMBERS

PEDRO 77

Captain James A. Darden	RCC
1st Lt Jon C. Long	CP
SSgt Donald S. Kearton	FE
Sgt Roger A. Porter	RS

(6-38-64-21 Nov 67 Cont.)

PEDRO 95

Captain Charles W. Burridge	RCC
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Captain Sheriden K. Hawk	CP
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Sgt Robert A. Sloat	FE
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AlC Gunther Bahrenburg	RS
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Pilot

W-1 James R. Little

FROM: 370

30 November 1967

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-186, 26 Nov 67) (U)


TO: 37C KDC
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1967.

2. (C) At 0700Z, 26 November 1967, Jolly Green 10, the Danang alert aircraft, was directed by Queen to proceed to the site of a drowning accident to assist in the search of victims who were identified as E-5 Samuels and a Vietnamese National. The area of search was approximately two miles from the end of DaNang Runways 35L and 35R in the designated Red Beach section of the bay. JG 10 was airborne at 0715Z and proceeded to the area to join the DaNang Alert H-43 (Pedro) already conducting the search. The Pedro aircraft was searching perpendicular to the beach at low altitude (40 to 80 feet). JG 10 set up a search parallel to the beach covering an area one half mile either side of the designated point of entry into the water of the victims and a mile from the beach. VHF contact was made with Queen and UHF contact with Pedro where we received all information pertinent to the accident. After approximately 10 minutes of search activity, Queen informed Pedro to RTB, turning the coordination of search activities over to JG 10. The above mentioned area was covered from an altitude of 200 feet at 60 knots. Following the area search a low level search (80 feet and 20 knots) was conducted from the surf line out to 300 yards and one half mile either side of point of entry. Total time of the search was 40 minutes and at 0750Z JG 10 informed Queen of complete coverage of the area with negative results. Queen advised JG 10 to RTB at 0755Z. Jolly Green 10 complied, landing at DaNang at 0800Z. Communications, discipline and crew coordination between aircraft and Queen were excellent.

3. (U) Crew members of Jolly Green 10:

RCC Major Vernon A. Dander
RCCP Captain Joseph H. Bowers
FE SSgt Paul D. Kreider
RS Sgt Donald K. Claudius Jr


VERNON A. DANDER, Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Classification (cancelled) changed to CONFIDENTIAL
effective on 25 MAR 75, under the authority of M. JAMES
by AS

~~Declassified at 3 year~~
~~interval~~
~~from date of~~
~~classification~~

Atch 4

FROM: Det 9, 38 ARRSq(9-380/Maj Smith/2822)

7 Dec 1967

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative 9-38-24 - 24 Nov 67

TO: 3 ARRGp (3JSARC)

1. While monitoring the detachment UHF radio a distress call on guard channel was heard. The report was that a truck convoy had been ambushed and five trucks were observed burning. A request for fire suppression was made, so Pedro 56 scrambled with the firemen, pararescueman, and FSK. After arriving at the scene, several trucks were observed burning and ammunition was exploding and scattering shrapnel and debris in all directions. Pedro 56 orbited until the on-scene frequency was passed and contact was made with Headhunter 46, a FAC in the area. He advised that if we could land, there were wounded that needed evacuation to the 71st Evac Hospital.

2. Pedro 56 landed the FSK on the road near a burning truck and then landed in front of the kit on the road approximately 700 feet from the exploding ammunition trucks. The firefighters and pararescueman departed the aircraft to locate wounded personnel. A fireman, Sgt Courts reported back to the aircraft that there were wounded near the exploding trucks, but that they couldn't get to them while the ammunition was still going off. Sgt Courts was directed to use the FSK to extinguish the still burning trucks. As this was being accomplished, Airman Berrio and the other fireman, Sgt Quiroz, were approaching the helicopter with 2 wounded Army personnel. They were loaded on and taken to 71st Evac Hospital at Pleiku. As Pedro 56 was in route to the hospital, word was passed to scramble the secondary aircraft and crew to assist in transporting the wounded. Pedro 74 picked up 2 Army wounded while Pedro 56 landed at the rescue area and refueled. Pedro 56 returned to the scene and picked up one Army wounded and Pedro 74 picked up 2 wounded NVA prisoners. Pedro 56 then picked up one wounded NVA prisoner and 1 US KIA. Pedro 56 landed at 1300 and Pedro 74 returned to the scene and picked up the fireman and the FSK. Pedro 74 landed at 1305.

3. During all approaches and landings at the scene ammunition was exploding from the burning trucks and shrapnel and debris were scattered over a large area. Also occasional ground fire was heard and both firemen and pararescueman had to find cover because of sniping.

4. During debriefing it was learned that the pararescueman, Airman Berrio had advanced to a jeep and tank where he asked if there were any wounded. An Army Captain stated that there were plenty of wounded lying near the exploding trucks, but that no one was to go near until the explosions subsided. Airman Berrio then stated "that if they waited, that there might not be any wounded." He then asked for 3 volunteers and they

crawled up toward the burning trucks. As they found wounded, they carried them back to the helicopter for evacuation.

5. The only minor problem encountered was the pararescue medical kit was not designed for a large number of casualties and as a result Airman Berrio ran out of field dressings and had to use large 4 x 4 gauze.

6. Crew members:

Pedro 56

Maj	Richard A. Smith	RCC
Lt Col	Harold O. Hoppe	RCCP
Sgt	Garland Courts	RS
Sgt	Felipe A. Quiroz	RS
ALC	David R. Berrio	PJ

Pedro 74

Capt Keith H. Ricks	RCC
Capt Robert L. Osborne	RCCP
Sgt Jose G. Abara	FE
Sgt Wayne A. Baguio	PJ

Harold O. Hoppe
HAROLD O. HOPPE, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

Det 9, 38ARRS Hist, Jan - Mar 68

SAFETY OF OPERATION

On 13 March aircraft HH-43F serial number 63-9717 suffered a control rod bearing failure while on a training flight. The failure occurred while Major Robert W. Hastings, the training pilot, was performing a 90 degree autorotation landing. The failure caused the aircraft to become nearly uncontrollable, however Captain Billy J. Johnson, the instructor pilot, assumed control and was able to land the aircraft with no injury to the crew. The nature of the failure caused the rotor blades to strike each other in flight, causing extensive damage to the rotor system. Captain Johnson received a "well done" message from General Wilson, deputy commander of Military Airlift Command, for his superior airmanship while dealing with this inflight emergency.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

During this quarter Sgt David R. Berrio was awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in connection with military operations against an opposing armed force near Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam on 24 Nov 1967 (SO G-591, 23 Feb 1968, Hq 7AF). Sgt Berrio was also awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for heroism while participating in an aerial flight at Camp Holloway, Republic of Vietnam on 6 Oct 1967 (SO G-338, 30 Jan 1968, Hq 7AF). Sgt Felipe A. Quiroz was awarded the Airman's Medal for heroism involving voluntary risk of life at Camp Holloway, Republic of Vietnam on 7 Oct 1967 (SO G-636, 27 Feb 1968, Hq 7AF), and he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for heroism

DET 9 38 ARRS

7 DEC 67

FROM: Det 9.

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative 9-38-24 - 24 Nov 67

TO: 3 ARRGp (3JSARC)

1. While monitoring the detachment UHF radio a distress call on guard channel was heard. The report was that a truck convoy had been ambushed and five trucks were observed burning. A request for fire suppression was made, so Pedro 56 scrambled with the firemen, pararescueman, and FSK. After arriving at the scene, several trucks were observed burning and ammunition was exploding and scattering shrapnel and debris in all directions. Pedro 56 orbited until the on-scene frequency was passed and contact was made with Headhunter 46, a FAC in the area. He advised that if we could land, there were wounded that needed evacuation to the 71st Evac Hospital.

2. Pedro 56 landed the FSK on the road near a burning truck and then landed in front of the kit on the road approximately 700 feet from the exploding ammunition trucks. The firefighters and pararescueman departed the aircraft to locate wounded personnel. A fireman, Sgt Courts reported back to the aircraft that there were wounded near the exploding trucks, but that they couldn't get to them while the ammunition was still going off. Sgt Courts was directed to use the FSK to extinguish the still burning trucks. As this was being accomplished, Airman Berrio and the other fireman, Sgt Quiroz, were approaching the helicopter with 2 wounded Army personnel. They were loaded on and taken to 71st Evac Hospital at Pleiku. As Pedro 56 was in route to the hospital, word was passed to scramble the secondary aircraft and crew to assist in transporting the wounded. Pedro 74 picked up 2 Army wounded while Pedro 56 landed at the rescue area and refueled. Pedro 56 returned to the scene and picked up one Army wounded and Pedro 74 picked up 2 wounded NVA prisoners. Pedro 56 then picked up one wounded NVA prisoner and 1 US KIA. Pedro 56 landed at 1300 and Pedro 74 returned to the scene and picked up the fireman and the FSK. Pedro 74 landed at 1305.

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Lt Col	Harold O. Hoppe	RCCP
Sgt	Garland Courts	RS
Sgt	Felipe A. Quiroz	RS
ALC	David R. Berrio	PJ

Pedro 74

Capt Keith H. Ricks	RCC
Capt Robert L. Osborne	RCCP
Sgt Jose G. Abara	FE
Sgt Wayne A. Baguio	PJ

Harold O. Hoppe
HAROLD O. HOPPE, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

FROM: Det 2, 37ARRS/Captain Cayler/2687

29 November 1967

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative (2-3-93, 25 Nov 67)

TO: Det 2, 37ARRS (Operations)
Det 2, 37ARRS (Commander)
3rd ARRG (RCRG) APO S.F. 96222

1. This report is submitted in accordance with ARRS 55-2, 3rd ARRG Supplement 1, dated 15 June 1967.


2. At 1545 on November 25, 1967 Jolly Green 71 and Jolly Green 16 were scrambled from a forward site to recover the survivors of a downed helicopter at 3030/95NM of channel 79. After takeoff, Sandy aircraft escorted the helicopters to the crash site, which had been located by Sandy 1 and 2. During the time they were enroute, two (2) Air America H-34 helicopters arrived at the crash site, and picked up eight (8) personnel, one of which was dead on arrival. Sandy lead directed Jolly Green 71 to proceed directly to the crash site and initiate a low altitude search with Jolly Green 16 maintaining a high cover station. The downed aircraft was spotted resting on a sandbar of a river with steep mountains on either side. At this time it had not been definitely established that there were remaining survivors, as Sandy aircraft could not establish radio contact with the H-34s. Upon reaching the area, Jolly Green 71 was unable to detect signals or movement on the ground. The H-34s were still in the area, and during a momentary radio contact, it was determined that there was one crewman left on the ground. The survivor had no signaling devices, but managed to attract the helicopter crew's attention by waving his shirt. The survivor was located on the side of a mountain above the crash site. The immediate area around the survivor was covered by high elephant grass, and patches of heavier jungle. A hoist pickup was made from approximately 200 feet, and Jolly Green 71 and 16 departed the area with Sandy escort to return to their home bases. The survivor was in excellent condition, and related that he attempted to signal the helicopter by firing his weapon, and was fired upon. No hostile fire was noted by Jolly Green 71. Because of the distance involved, Jolly Green 71 and 16 had to refuel from Crown Two Tanker Aircraft enroute to home station. Jolly Green 71 arrived at Udorn RTAFB at 1945, and the survivor was delivered to qualified medical personnel. Radio discipline was good throughout the mission.

3. The survivor was Glen Wood.

4. Crew of Jolly Green 71:

- a. Captain Russell L. Cayler, RCC.
- b. Lt. Colonel Garland A. York, RCCP.
- c. Sgt Edward J. Koebernik, FE.

- d. TSgt Kerry Kelly, RS.
- e. Sgt Larry E. Palmer, RS.
- f. SSgt James O. Hubright, AP.


RUSSELL L. CAYLER, Captain USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

as the Pararescueman descended. A new rigging is being developed that hopefully should make this idea feasible. It did prove however, that the hoist could not be used above fifty knots. A message was sent later from WRAMA restricting the use of the hoist from any forward motion.

Captain Cayler was again on the scene on 25 November 1967 when he made the first HH-53B pickup in a hostile environment. No enemy fire was directed at the aircraft. An American civilian pilot was rescued. The location is classified.

Aerial Photographers were placed on the HH-53B as crew members in December to photograph actual combat action. This program has been highly successful with many fine photographs being taken.

On 27 December 1967 a group of five (5) officers and twelve (12) maintenance people commanded by Major Frederick M. Donohue traveled to Vung Tau, RVN to ferry the remaining two (2) aircraft to Udorn.²

HISTORY DET 37th

10CT - 31 DEC 67

158
P-10

MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT: (Det 10, 38th ARRSq, 10-38-54, 25 Nov 67)

At 0143Z, Det 10, 38th ARRSq was notified by IV DASC of a FAC aircraft, "David 27," down in the Nam Kan forest area south of Ca Mau, coordinates 8 degrees 44 minutes north, 104 degrees 55 minutes east. The aircraft had made four "Mayday" calls, then no further contact was possible. Pedro 91 launched at 0147Z and Pedro 39 launched at 0153Z flying at 5500 above the clouds. At approximately 0220Z "Playboy Control" (Radar control at Ca Mau) made contact with the Pedros and advised that the new coordinates were 8 degrees 45 minutes north, 104 degrees 59 minutes east, and that a FAC aircraft "David 30," was orbiting the area. Pedro 91 was advised by David 30 that the David 27 aircraft was upside down next to a Vietnamese compound but both occupants were moving around and appeared to be alright. Pedro 91, the primary LBR helicopter had to land at Ca Mau Army Airfield due to insufficient fuel. Pedro 39 who had more fuel, continued on, arriving at the compound at 0300Z. In the meantime David 30 had flown low level passes over the area, received no ground fire, and declared the area safe for Pedro 39 to land. The Vietnamese compound was in a clear area on the north bank of the river. A heli-pad was marked between the compound and the river, and the downed aircraft was about 100 yards west of the heli-pad. There was no radio contact with the ground personnel, however, David 30 advised Pedro 39 that the Americans were inside the compound. Pedro 39 then made a spiraling approach from high altitude to the helipad. There was no one in sight and as Pedro 39 was calling out on the PA system for the ground party to expedite, mortar shells began falling in the area. Pedro 39 immediately tookoff and David 30 advised Pedro to remain clear of the area until a fire suppression team arrived. Pedro 39 then had to return to Ca Mau for refueling. David 30 also advised that he had picked up heavy automatic weapons groundfire and one hit when the mortar attack began. The area of ground fire was inland from the south river bank. Meanwhile Pedro 91 was on its way to the site and arrived just prior to a flight of three US Army armed helicopters, "T-Bird 6". David 30 advised that although the compound was in Vietnamese control the area was highly concentrated with VC and, with the Americans in the compound, the VC would overrun the place at nightfall. Therefore it was imperative that the Americans be removed as soon as possible. With David 30 doing an outstanding job of organizing the rescue, the armed helicopters laid down a smoke screen on the opposite shore of the river and set up for their attacks. T-Bird 6 flight began their strafing runs on the opposite shore as Pedro 91 made an approach from the northwest. As Pedro 91 was transitioning into a hover it was noted that only Vietnamese were coming out of the compound and a go-around was initiated. At this time the Americans were spotted back in the compound and a low 360 pattern was made around the compound back to the pad. The FAC pilot came towards the helicopter but he was followed by approximately 20 Vietnamese. As the FAC pilot and a wounded Vietnamese were boarding the helicopter, mortar rounds began falling in the area. Since the other American, a Marine Lt Col, was in the back of the crowd with no hope of getting to the chopper and SSgt Crawford and Sgt Pearson were having difficulty keeping the other Vietnamese out of the chopper, Pedro 91 tookoff and went into orbit north of the compound. When T-Bird 6 was set up for another attack Pedro 91 went in and hovered over the helipad until the Lt Col was in position to

board the aircraft. Upon landing the helicopter, SSgt Crawford jumped out and assisted the Lt Col aboard while trying to keep the mob of Vietnamese from climbing on the helicopter. During this time mortars were again impacting the area. As soon as SSgt Crawford leaped aboard Pedro 91 tookoff and returned to Ca Mau, escorted by T-Bird 6. The two recovered Americans later explained that the compound had been mortared the night before and it was anticipated the helicopters were coming in to evacuate the wounded and families. After refueling, Pedros 39 and 91 returned to Binh Thuy AB landing at 0645Z. 8 sorties, 6 plus 20 hours. The rescue was hampered greatly by the lack of radio facilities at the outpost; considerable confusion among the ground personnel resulted because of this. Radio coordination among David 30, both Pedro aircraft, and the gunship flight was excellent. Three combat saves - heavy ground fire encountered.

WONDER WHAT
HAPPENED TO
THESE PEOPLE?


CREWS: (All Assigned to Det 10, 38th ARRSq)

Pedro 91:

RCC - Captain Laurence W Conover
RCCP - Captain William J Haugen
FE - SSgt William L Crawford
PJ - Sgt Jerry Pearson

Pedro 39:

RCC - Capt Donald E Van Meter
RCCP - Capt Thomas D Precious
FE - Sgt Bernard L Touchette
PJ - ALC James L Parks


HAROLD PICKERING, Major, USAF
Commander

Det 10, 38 ARRSq History, Oct - Dec 67

AIR LIAISON OFFICER
21ST INFANTRY DIVISION ADVISORY DETACHMENT
Advisory Team 51
APO 96402

27

MACTN-BL-ALO

11 December 1967

FROM: Senior FAC, 21st Infantry Division, APO 96402
SUBJECT: After Action Report
TO: Commander 22nd TASC, APO 96320
Commander 504th TASC, APO 96227
Commander 35th TAC Fighter Wing, APO 96227
Commander 336th Assault Helicopter Co., APO 96296
Commander Det 10, 38th Rescue Gp, APO 96320

IN TURN:

1. NAMES OF OPERATION AND DATE: Helicopter rescue of two Americans shot down at Nam Can outpost on 25 November 1967.
2. REPORTING OFFICER: Major Chester A. Walborn, FR27154, Division FAC, 21st Infantry Division APO 96402.
3. AREA OF OPERATION: Nam Can outpost, An Xuyen Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. FORCES IN OPERATION: 2 H43, 3 UH1D, 1 O4G and a hostile force of battalion strength.

5. BACKGROUND: On the night of 24 November, Nam Can outpost was hit with approximately 100 rounds of 82mm mortar fire killing one soldier and wounding nine others. Nam Can is an isolated outpost which sits 30 miles south of Ca Mau, the Capital of An Xuyen Province, and can only be resupplied by helicopter. The outpost is surrounded on all sides by the densely wooded, triple canopied Nam Can Forest which is strongly held by the Viet Cong.

On the morning of 25 November the Senior FAC of An Xuyen Province, Captain Charles J. Louvorn, and LTC Ted Culpepper (USMACV), the Deputy Senior Advisor for An Xuyen Province, were on a visual reconnaissance mission trying to locate the Viet Cong mortar positions when they were hit in the engine of the O-1 severing their oil line. Knowing their flying time was now limited to a few minutes they crash landed on the helipad at Nam Can rather than chance going down in Viet Cong territory enroute to Ca Mau.

I was flying in Bac Lieu Province evaluating the results of harassment and interdiction artillery fire when I was advised that a FAC was down in the Nam Can area. I flew to Ca Mau, refueled, and took off enroute to Nam Can. I was working with Playboy Control and I was in contact with Pedro 39, and Pedro 91, 2 H43 rescue helicopters who were scrambled from Binh Thuy to rescue the down crew. Pedro 91, flown by Captain Larry Conover, was low on fuel and I directed that he land at Ca Mau to refuel prior to proceeding to Nam Can.

MACTN-BL-ALO

11 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

I was in contact with Thunderbird Chief the flight leader of a heavy fire team (3 UH1D Gunships) who had been scrambled to support the rescue effort and was enroute to the outpost. I asked his fuel state and was told it 800 lbs departing Ca Mau. Knowing this would permit only 15 minutes at Nam Can I advised him to return to Ca Mau and top off with fuel. About 10 minutes prior to landing at Ca Mau I had requested two flights of F100 aircraft with M117 bombs, rockets, CDU and 20mm to suppress what I was sure would be intense automatic weapon fire. I also expected a simultaneous mortar attack on the outpost as soon as a helicopter touched down on the helipad. (On 18 June, during an operation to change the RF company at Nam Can with one from Dam Loi, the Viet Cong bracketed the helipad as the first Chinook touched down and then badly shot up the "Lancers" Gunship Platoon as they tried to suppress, wounding four members of the platoon). When I arrived in the target area. I closely checked the positions where I had found VC strongpoints on 18 June and while I could see several freshly made well constructed VC bunkers and four sampans I did not draw any ground fire nor did I see any VC. I could see the two American crew-members on the helipad but I was not sure of their physical condition and I expected the VC to soon renew their attack. I was confident that the VC were concentrated south of the river I elected to clear Pedro 39 in to the outpost without delay and without fire suppression in an effort to utilize surprise. I selected an approach path for the rescue attempt, directed Pedro 39 to approach from the north and marked his IP with a smoke rocket. I told him to start down from 2500 feet at this smoke and marked a point on the river by the outpost where he was to turn into the wind toward the helipad. After observing that his flight path was perfect I moved south of the river and held over the area from which hostile fire was expected in an effort to draw fire away for the rescue attempt. As Pedro 39 flared and touched down, the outpost was hit with a 6 round barrage of mortar fire. One round fell in the water, one on the west end of the helipad, one in the river to the east, and four went over the outpost impacting about 100 meters north of the outpost perimeter. At this time I came under intense ground fire and I estimated the volume of fire at more than 20 automatic weapons plus small arms. I took one round through the cockpit. While I have received a lot of ground fire in my tour this was the best fire disciplined Viet Cong unit I have seen. The volume of fire could not have been from a unit smaller than a heavy weapons company. This rescue attempt would have been successful except that the crew to be picked up ran for a bunker rather than get aboard the helicopter. I told Pedro 39 to get out of there and go to Ca Mau because I would not consider another attempt without strong fire suppression on the south bank.

Although I had requested two flights of F100 aircraft very early, it was 40 minutes before a flight was scrambled in support of the rescue operations although the request did not require a parallel at either province or division. I had requested the fighters under the provision for suppressing fire against a rescue helicopter. This great delay in getting tactical air was beginning to complicate the rescue effort because I was now faced with the alternatives of either delaying the recovery and conducting

NACTN-BL-ALO

11 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

the rescue under cover of air attack but without the gunships who would have to return for fuel, or to act immediately and suppress with the gunships and conduct the rescue amid enemy reaction that I knew could not suppress without tactical air. To add another element of uncertainty to these two unattractive alternatives I could see that the crashed aircraft was upside down and I was not sure the occupants were unhurt. I thus elected to proceed immediately and suppress with the Thunderbirds.

Thunderbird Chief advised me that he had two 25 minute smoke pots that are normally used to mark landing zones prior to airborne troop insertion. We elected to use them. He made one pass down the south bank of the river and put out the two smoke pots in an effort to screen the rescue effort from the Viet Cong on the south side of the river. He and I drew heavy automatic weapon fire as he made this pass as I again held over the Viet Cong concentration to attempt to divert fire from the gunships. One of the smoke pots ignited and one did not which provided at best minimal screening for the extraction, but after quickly talking the situation over we chose to proceed.

The extraction plan involved the approach of Pedro 91 from the north breaking east into the helipad on the north bank, coordinated with the Thunderbirds approaching from the north to a point 600 meters east of the target, laying down heavy suppressive fire on the VC position, and breaking west down the south bank and attempting while I held over the Viet Cong guns synchronizing the effort, and diverting fire from the helicopters. When the first attempt was made in this manner, both the gunships and I received heavy automatic weapons fire and the Viet Cong hit the heliport with another mortar barrage. On this pass the VC were also mortaring the path used by the gunships, damaging one aircraft. The downed crew again was not at the pad and I told Pedro 91 to come off to the north and the Thunderbirds also came north of the river to get set up to try again. On the second attempt we used the same tactic and the Thunderbirds again laid down a superbly positioned cover of machinegun and rocket fire to screen the rescue effort. The helipad was again mortared and all the aircraft again came under intense ground fire. This effort got the FAC pilot aboard but the Marine LTC did not because he was trying to get the five wounded Vietnamese aboard as well. I did not know there were wounded Vietnamese there and there was not enough room in the tiny H34 to bring them out. I had been unsuccessful at getting radio communication with the outpost because no American was normally on the ground there which is why I did not know there were wounded at the outpost. There were also about 30 ARVN soldiers trying to get aboard the helicopter. I told the pilot of Pedro 91 to "get out" again after the mortar barrage resumed and when LTC Culpepper did not get aboard. We made a third effort synchronized as before and were successful this time in completing the rescue although the helipad was again mortared and all aircraft involved again received intense ground fire.

I feel the gallant performance of the Thunderbirds and the two rescue pilots in the face of determined Viet Cong resistance merits the award of the Silver Star. This action was conducted 30 miles into strongly held Viet Cong territory in the face of desperate attempts of a well armed hostile battalion to prevent the rescue effort. It was completed without prestrike

WACTN-RL-ALO

11 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

by tactical air which would have reduced greatly the volume of gunfire on the aircraft taking part in the rescue. I do not feel that a lesser award than the Silver Star would do justice to the courage and gallantry of the aircrews involved who completed a daring rescue with minimal resources against heavy resistance by the VC.

The Pedro crews displayed great courage and determination to succeed when they could not have been criticized for declining to enter the inferno of fire until multiple tactical airstrikes had been put on the Viet Cong positions. It is truly reassuring to me to see dedication to duty and their willing acceptance of great risks on the part of these men, in their unarmed aircraft.

The Thunderbirds, heavy fire team, could also have called the effort off as being too hazardous and they also displayed great courage in pressing on. Their four passes, first laying the smoke screen down and then screening the rescue effort was the most devastating fire suppression I have ever seen. They were simply superb. Although I do not believe the performance of any of the aircrews involved could possibly have been improved. Each one sensed the urgency of the situation, evaluated the risk involved, and pressed on to complete the mission. There was not one tiny bit of dissent from anyone as I outlined the situation and suggested a plan. Each element understood his function in the plan and executed in a manner which reflected the highest traditions of the American fighting man.

While there may be interservice bickering at some echelons, this was a classic example of determined cooperation to complete an extremely difficult task in a most gallant manner.

6. AFTERMATH: Shortly after this rescue operation I expended two flights of F100's (Blades 03 with 8750lb bombs, and 20mm, and blade 05 with 4500lb H Drag bombs, 2 LAU-3 rocket pods, 2 GBU-2 and 20mm). These flights saturated the area where I had observed one mortar to be located and where most of the automatic weapon and tracer fire had come from. This area was simply devastated with dropable ordnance and by strafing, and the mortar position was hit by the first 750lb bomb and five other bunker weapon positions were destroyed. Two more flights of F100's and a flight of A-1H's were later expended in the area to neutralize other hostile strong points.

The Vietnamese interpreter who was on the ground during this action and that night told me the next morning that the wounded Viet Cong could be heard screaming with pain all throughout the night. The hostile unit was reported as the U-Kinh II Battalion of Viet Cong reinforced by a heavy weapons company. There is little doubt that they were badly crippled as a fighting unit.

When the helicopters went into the area the following morning to bring out the Vietnamese wounded they did not draw a round of ground fire.

Fragmentary intelligence report from the area credit the initial airstrikes with 35 VC KIA with 83 wounded, two mortar positions destroyed and four machinegun positions destroyed.

The action was concluded at approximately 1500 hours on 25 November 1967.

Charles A. Walborn

CHARLES A. WALBORN, Major, USAF
Division FAC, 21st Infantry Division

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
336TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY (UH-1)
13TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
(DELTA BATTALION)
APO San Francisco 96296

31

3 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report

TO: Detachment 10
38th Air Rescue Squadron
APO US Forces 96320


On 25 November 1967, an Air Force FAC was shot down and crash landed at Nam Can outpost in a heavily wooded area 30 miles south of Ca Mau. A heavy fire team of the 336th Assault Helicopter Company was scrambled to the area. Low ceilings in the vicinity of the downed aircraft forced the "T-Bird" helicopters to fly at an altitude of 1200'. Upon reaching the area a radio call was received from "David 30", an Air Force FAC which was orbiting over the area. The pilot of "David 30" informed "T-Bird Chief" that at the present time the outpost where the aircraft had gone down in was under intense mortar fire from Viet Cong positions. "David 30" further stated that an area south of the outpost across the river contained numerous automatic weapons positions, including three .50 caliber machine guns as well as mortar positions. "David 30" advised "T-Bird Chief" that Air Force fighters had been requested and suggested that the gunships remain at altitude until an airstrike could be conducted on the enemy positions. He further stated that any attempt to extract the downed crewmen at this time would probably result in further loss of aircraft and personnel. "T-Bird Chief" called to check on the estimated time of arrival of the fighter aircraft and was informed they would arrive in approximately forty minutes, however the gunships had only thirty minutes of fuel remaining. During this time mortar rounds were continuing to hammer the outpost and it was evident to all concerned the presence of the downed crewmen at the outpost was merely provoking the Viet Cong into intensifying its attack. That plus the fact that no radio contact could be made with the downed crewmen caused great concern from all the aircrews who feared they were possibly severely injured, or would be if the mortaring continued at the present pace. "T-Bird Two" checked his flight for available smoke pots and verified that all crews involved were willing to attempt an extremely hazardous extraction. "T-Bird Chief" then informed "David 30" that he was sure he could place smoke pots between the enemy positions and the outpost if the rescue aircraft in the area would be willing to attempt the pick-up. "David 30" had contact with the rescue helicopter, "Pedro 91", from Detachment 10, 38th Air Rescue Squadron. The "T-Birds" did not have radio contact with "Pedro 91" and it was necessary for "David 30" to coordinate tactics for the extraction. The FAC also had visual contact with the enemy positions and this was instrumental in directing the gunships into the

Supporting Document #14

area to place out the smoke pots at the most advantageous positions. To prevent and doubt as to the location of the enemy positions "David 30" made a low pass over them and put out a smoke grenade to mark them. He then returned to altitude, remaining below the clouds and above the hostile positions in order to direct the "T-Birds" into the area as well as the rescue aircraft. Once the enemy positions were located by the "T-Bird" aircraft "T-Bird Chief" dropped down low level north of the outpost with "T-Bird Two" providing fire support while the smoke pots were put out. The "T-Bird" aircraft proceeded at an altitude of ten feet above the river and parallel the enemy positions. "T-Bird Chief" dropped two twenty minute smoke pots out while "T-Bird Two" led the fire team between the lead ship and the enemy positions in order to place suppressive fire onto them. The "T-Bird" aircraft then proceeded at low level north of the outpost and conducted a thorough recon of the area over which "Pedro 91" would have to fly going into the outpost. "David 30" relayed the landing instructions to "Pedro 91" and reconfirmed that the rescue aircraft felt that the smoke would provide adequate concealment and that they felt the situation warranted an immediate attempt of the extraction. "David 30" received an affirmative reply and "Pedro 91" set up an approach into the outpost with the "T-Bird" gunships as an escort. The "T-Birds" suppressed the enemy positions with rocket and machine gun fire, establishing a circular orbit over the rescue helicopter and flying parallel to the enemy positions to place more effective fire onto them. Remaining at an altitude of one hundred feet the gunships drew enemy gunfire to themselves and away from the rescue helicopter. The suppressive fire provided by the "T-Birds" pinned down the enemy and was the primary factor in preventing the rescue ship from being accurately engaged by the numerous enemy automatic weapons positions. The first attempt at pick-up failed because the downed crew had gone to a bunker when the mortar attack began because they did not consider a rescue attempt possible. On the second attempt "Pedro 91" picked up one crewman and then again came under intense mortar fire. The pilot of the rescue helicopter aborted the pick-up at that time before effective fire could be placed on his aircraft. Relaying through "David 30", "Pedro 91" radioed that he would again attempt a pick-up to extract the second crew member, again the consideration was to get the crew member out without further injuries add to remove the American personnel against whom the Viet Cong were directing their mortar attack. It was felt by all that the continued mortar attacks were in an effort to kill the Americans and keep the rescue ship out of the area. If a successful extraction could be made quickly it was thought that the mortar attack would cease or at least diminish in volume, thus, suffer fewer casualties. Each time as the rescue aircraft descended into the outpost the "T-Bird" gunships provided escort and accurate heavy suppressive fire. The fire support provided by the "T-Birds" was effective and undoubtedly caused both casualties and spread confusion in the enemy positions. During the second and third pick-up attempts the Viet Cong shifted some of it's mortar fire from the outpost and was now firing along the attack path used by the "T-Birds", many rounds were observed falling into the river in close proximity to the gunships. One "T-Bird" aircraft received damage due to the bursting mortar rounds. Once the second crewman was aboard "Pedro 91" the "T-Birds" escorted him to altitude and back to Ca Mau. During the entire extraction "David 30" remained below the cloud layer to direct the gunships and the rescue helicopter. While doing so he pin pointed at least two mortar positions. "David 30" remained over the area to mark the enemy positions for the fighter aircraft which resulted in destroying them and preventing further attacks on the defenseless outpost.

In the execution of this rescue under continual automatic weapons, small arms fire and mortar fire the teamwork was all that could be possibly attained. The judgement, planning, coordination and performance of duty by the crews involved in this action is worthy of the highest praise and should be duly recognized. It should be noted that the mission could not have been performed had it not been for the coordination and radio relay provided by "David 30" his marking of the enemy positions and directing the complete rescue. The gallantry, mission orientation and complete disregard of their own personal safety of "Pedro 91" was also vital. The gallantry shown by the "T-Birds" and the devastating suppressive fire and screening was the prime factor in keeping the enemy from placing accurate fire on the rescue aircraft. Had the crews of any of these aircraft delayed their decisions to make the pick-up and not shown such tremendous rate would most certainly have been much greater. I strongly recommend that all crews involved in this rescue mission be awarded the Silver Star for their actions under such adverse and overwhelming conditions.

This action was clearly an example of coordinated action of US Army and US Air Force aircraft working together, improvising as they went along to perform a heroic rescue deep in Viet Cong territory in an area heavily defended by a Battalion of front line main force troops. It showed the courage, drive and dedication of American military aviators in the highest tradition of our American heritage.



JOSEPH N. LASEAU
Major Infantry
Commanding

November 25, 1967

Dean Folke

We got another mission today
& Jerry Pearson flying the Secondary
bird made ~~the~~ combat saves, - I do
mean COMBAT SAVES! Soon as
the chopper landed to rescue the

survivors, all hell tore loose. Mortars
blasting & heavy ground fire were experienced
at the time. No one got hurt, but
that chopper sure took a bunch of
fragments from the rounds exploding
within yards of the chopper.

A river parks was high bird & said
he couldn't believe it was real.

I'm on Primary now & its 11:30 AM
And I'm tired as hell. Got to get up
early tomorrow so will turn in shortly.

UNCLASS

4.3K(2)

FROM: 370

28 November 1967

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-186, 26 Nov 67) (U)

TO: 37C/KK
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSN 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1967.

2. (C) At 0145Z, Jolly Greens 25 and 03 were notified of a downed F-4C, Pinhead 01, and directed by Queen to scramble. Location of the downed aircraft was 3260/53/Ch 85. Pinhead 02 was flying wingman and saw no parachutes nor any other visual sign that either pilot had survived the crash. JGs 25 and 03 were airborne at 0150Z and while enroute to the scene of the crash were instructed by Crown 4 to establish orbit at 3000/40/Ch 85 and await further instructions. At 0230Z, JGs 25 and 03 established orbit as instructed and contacted Misty 11, who stated that he was receiving a beeper near the crash site but that no voice contact had been established. Sandys 7 and 8 arrived on scene at 0240Z. Some small arms fire was encountered by the Sandys from a road just south of the crash site but they did not return fire for fear of hitting the survivors, if any. At 0255Z the Jolly Greens were told to move to a closer position northwest of the crash site. They arrived on orbit at this location at 0310Z. At approximately 0400Z, the Sandys decided there was no hope for any survivors and Crown 4 directed the JGs to RTB. JGs 25 and 03 landed at Quang Tri at 0530Z. Weather was no factor. Communications and crew coordination were excellent.

3. (C) Aircraft involved:

Pinhead 02 (F-4C)	Misty 11 & 21 (F-100)	Sandy 5,6,7, & 8 (A-1)
Crown 4 (C-130)	JG 25 & 03 (HH-3E)	

4. (U) Crewmembers of Jolly Greens:

Jolly Green 25:

RCC Capt William E. Brennan
RCCP Capt Jerry D. Clearman
FE TSgt Robert Q. Rector
RS TSgt Vincent E. Deets

Jolly Green 03:

RCC Capt Charles R. Dunn
RCCP Lt Col Kenneth D. Caughron
FE SSgt Elmer L. Holden
RS Sgt Donald J. Boushelle

Classified by

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO

YEAR INTERVALS.

DECLASSIFIED ON

WILLIAM E. BRENNAN, Captain, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Classification (cancelled) changed to

effective on 28 MAR 83, under the authority of

GAS, by

UNCLASS

4.3K(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

159

FROM: 370

30 November 1967

SUBJECT: MISSION NARRATIVE REPORT (1-3-188, 29 Nov 67) (U)

TO: 37C KAC
3rd ARRGp (JSARC)
IN TURN

1. (U) This report is submitted IAW ARRSM 55-2/3 ARRGp Sup 1 dated 15 June 1967.

2. (C) Jolly Green 10 and Jolly Green 28 were scrambled from Quang Tri at 0150Z on report from Queen that Whisky 32, an F-4C, was down at 260°/33/Ch 85. The Jolly Greens were airborne at 0155Z with an ETA on scene of 0232Z. Covey 14, an O-1 FAC, was on scene and had established voice contact with one survivor. Covey 14 advised Jolly Green 10 that the pilot was located on the north edge of a ravine, next to a winding mountain stream. Elevation here was 1000 feet MSL, tree canopy of 150 feet with moderate underbrush. Covey further reported that no groundfire or enemy troop movement had been observed. The aircraft wreckage was located about 100 yards from the survivor and still burning. Jolly Green 10 arrived on scene only 5 minutes before Sandy 7 and 8 (USAF A-1E's) and therefore decided to delay the pickup attempt until the Sandys could be utilized. Sandy 7 made repeated low passes along the ravine, attempting to pin point the survivor's position. The survivor ignited the day end of a smoke flare, and after several minutes, Jolly Green 10 spotted the smoke slowly rising through the canopy. At this time Jolly Green 10 dropped the external tip tanks and initiated a 360 degree approach, coming to a hover where the smoke had been observed. The rotor downwash rapidly dissipated the smoke, and no one on the helicopter could see the survivor or detect any movement on the ground. The tree penetrator was lowered to the ground and the hover maintained until the survivor was seen making his way through the brush to the hoist. The survivor had previously stated he was not injured and would not require any assistance while on the ground. As the pilot was pulled aboard, Jolly Green 10 departed the area via the same route used during the approach. The pickup was completed after 10 minutes at 0305Z. Jolly Green 10 RTB to Khe Sanh to refuel and Jolly Green 28 went to DaNang AB. Upon landing at Khe Sanh, Jolly Green 10 lost its auxiliary servo system and hydraulic fluid covered both sides of the rear fuselage. The survivor began complaining of stiffness and a pain in his lower back. He was transferred to a C-130 for the return flight and medical examination at DaNang AB. The pararescue specialist from Jolly Green 10 accompanied the survivor as no other medics were available at Khe Sanh. Weather in the recovery was ~6500 scattered and 15 miles visibility. Crew coordination and cooperation on Jolly Green 10 was commendable. All SAR forces worked well together and no problems or resistance was encountered. ✓

3. (C) The survivor was 1Lt Leo J. Lemoine, USAF, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN.

558th TFS,

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

Atch 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DECLASSIFIED

4. (U) Crewmembers of Jolly Greens:

a. Jolly Green 10:

RCC	Captain Thomas E. Bair
RCCP	Captain Gerald B. McDonald
FE	SSgt Arthur T. Brand
RS	Sgt Rodger A. Klenovich
AP	Sgt Ronald S. Davis

b. Jolly Green 28:

RCC	Captain Fred H. Otte
RCCP	Captain John S. Baughman
FE	SSgt Robert H. Baldwin
FE	Sgt Dennis M. Richardson
RS	Sgt James D. Locker

Thomas E Bair

THOMAS E. BAIR, Captain, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

37 ARRS Hist, Oct - Dec 1967

11.

scene at 0235Z and held off the coast while two USAF O-2s and a USAF F-100F conducted a search. The backseater was located one mile inland and at 0240Z Jolly Green 04 penetrated the coast, landed and picked up 1st Lt James Badly. 480 TAC Ftr Sq. A search was conducted for the front seater with negative results.

(24) 1-3-186, 26 Nov 1967, at 0145Z Jolly Green 25 and 03 were scrambled from Quang Tri to attempt the recovery of the crew of a USAF F-4C at 326°/53/85, 53 miles North-West of Khe Sanh. A search was conducted in the area by Sandy 7 and 8, USAF A-1Es, with negative results.

(25) 1-3-186, 26 Nov 1967, at 0700Z Jolly Green 10 was scrambled from Da Nang AB, RVN to assist in the recovery of two drowning victims two miles North of Da Nang in Da Nang Bay. A search was conducted with negative results.

(26) 1-3-188, 29 Nov 1967, at 0150Z Jolly Green 10 and 28 were scrambled from Quang Tri, RVN, to 260°/33/85, 33 miles West of Khe Sanh, to attempt the recovery of the crew of a USAF F-4C. Sandy 7 and 8 provided RESCORT. At 0305Z Jolly Green 10 picked up 1st Lt Leo J. Lemoine, USAF. 588th TFS, Cam Ranh Bay, RVN. The other pilot was not sighted and presumed lost.

(27) 1-3-191, 4 Dec 1967, at 0625Z Jolly Green 03 was scrambled from Da Nang AB, RVN to 223°/21/94, 21 miles South-West of Da Nang to attempt the recovery of four crew members aboard a U.S. Army U-6A which had crashed. An O-1 and two UH-1E gunships provided RESCORT.

Mission Narrative

29 November 1967

At approximately 0205Z Whiskey 31 called to say that Whiskey 32 in F-4 was downed at 260/33NM CH85. Besides Whiskey 31, on scene was Covey 1A. Jolly Green 28 and 10 were launched from Cigar and Sandy 7 and 8 from Nakon Phnom.

Weather was good, no ground fire was reported. Whiskey 31 was in voice contact with the back seat pilot.

Misty 21 relieved Whiskey 32 on scene at 0215 and joined by CAP flight s Demon and Goose by 0225.

Jolly Green 28/10 arrived on scene at 0233 and Sandy 7 and 8 arrived by 0250.

At this point Crown 4 relieved Crown 1. Pickup thereafter of the back seat pilot was uneventful with no hostile fire. Search for the other pilot was fruitless.

Transfer of coordination duties from Crown 1 to Crown 4 in the middle of the mission was caused by the need to refuel Jolly Green 16 which near on its way to Lima 36. Although the circumstances of this transfer of control are complex, the fact is that control of the mission was assumed by Crown 1 rather than directed to by Queen or Compress. Since the scene was in Crown 1's normal scope of coverage, Crown 1, coordinating with Crown 4, assumed control. Better coordination between Queen and Compress would have prevented this, directing Crown 4 to the SAR Scene and alerting Crown 1 of the refueling task. The mission was in no way degraded by this transfer, but only because the mission was very clear cut and in an unopposed area although not a safe area. In another instance however Crown 1 might have become so involved that transfer of control might have been nearly impossible.

Gordon R. Flygare
Rescue Crew Commander

Crew

CAPT G.R. FLYGARE
CAPT J.T. MAY
CAPT W.L. BURTON
SMSGT D.D. BENEROOK
MSGT W.H. MAY
TSMT B.G. SMITH
SSGT K.I. MARCOTTE

SECRET

Mission Narrative ~~1030~~ 1-3-188

At 0243Z Crown 1 relinquished control of the SAR to Crown 4 and departed the scene. At this time (0245Z) JG 10 was cleared in to make the pickup. Up to this time and subsequently no hostile fire was experienced in the area. At 0259Z word was received that the "back seater" was picked up and was in good condition. At 0310Z Crown 4 descended to refuel JG 28 (High Choppers), just east of the border. At 0314Z King Bee (chopper) put two men on the ground to look for "front seater". The results were negative due to the wreckage being severely burned. At 0334Z refueling operations were completed. Sandy 7 and 8 remained in the area until 0412Z with negative results. Reports from the "back seater" and a Navy aircraft, who saw the crash and reported only one chute, indicated that the "front seater" went in with the aircraft.

At 0412Z the Sandies RTB and Crown 4 informed Hillsborough that the mission was closed. Crown 4 RTB to CH94.

Opinion: Some confusion was experienced at the outset as to who would control mission. What is needed is clearly defined areas of responsibility or at least close coordination between Queen and Compress. Queen directed Crown 4 to take on scene command but Crown 1 beat him to the scene and had things organized by the time Crown 4 got within radio range of the SAR Forces. Thus Crown 1 became mission commander only to be called off by Compress without any prior motive, to refuel a Jolly Green. Crown 4 was not in position to take over having returned to the normal orbit for the strike. All things considered it should have been Crown 4's mission because of the requirement of Crown 1 to refuel in the Barrel Roll area. But the only agencies that could have known this was Compress as Crown 4 and Queen and even Crown 1 (I am told) were not aware that Crown 1 would be pulled off the SAR in the very middle of operations.

Also, with both Crown 1 and Crown 4 refueling choppers eventually now some thought should be given to staggering the refueling times when the forces go both over land and over water. It is conceivable that both Crown's would be out of position when a SAR arise in the Steel Tiger area (for example).

CAPT ROBERT I. ROSEMSUN

37 ARRS Hist, Oct - Dec 1967

11.

scene at 0235Z and held off the coast while two USAF O-2s and a USAF F-100F conducted a search. The backseater was located one mile inland and at 0240Z Jolly Green 04 penetrated the coast, landed and picked up 1st Lt James Badly. 480 TAC Ftr Sq. A search was conducted for the front seater with negative results.

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