

HELSUPPRON SEVEN DET 108

On 3 October 1967, LTJG Allan Perkins, who had ejected from his aircraft, was rescued safely by an HC-7 helicopter from Det 108. Pickup was made in a channel leading into an enemy harbor. Hostile small arms and 87mm fire were directed toward the helicopter during the rescue.

RESCUE REPORT

OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST P3750.6E
INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750.14

1. FROM HELSUPPRON SEVEN DET ONE ZERO EIGHT				2. DATE OF MISHAP 3 OCT 1967		2A. DATE OF RESCUE 3 OCT 1968	
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE ABOARD USS COONTZ (DLG 9) SAR				4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model) UH-2B			
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 4		5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM 4		5B. TO BE RESCUED 1		5C. RESCUED 1	
6. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS HH-3 (USAF)							
7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)				8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE			
7A. Alert Received 1645H		Method CALL OVER UHF FROM USS COONTZ		8A. WATER TEMPERATURE 82 °F		AIR TEMPERATURE 81 °F	
7B. Vehicle Departed 1645H		Distance to Scene 20 MILES		8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY; TERRAIN DESCRIPTION PICKUP MADE IN CHANNEL LEADING INTO HARBOR. WATER WAS CALM, NO APPRECIABLE WAVES.		WIND VELOCITY 10	
7C. Arrived on Scene 1658H		Search Required NONE					
7D. Located Survivor 1658H		Method of Locating DIRECTED TO PILOT BY A/C OVERHEAD					
7E. Began Retrieval 1659H		What Was Sighted First RAFT IN WATER					
7F. Ended Retrieval 1700H		Subsequently RESCUE EFFECTED		9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE HOIST - CABLE ATTACHED TO PILOTS "D" RING.			
7G. Survivor(s) 1715H		Location (If different from Item 3)					

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

HOSTILE GUNFIRE FROM ENEMY FORCES IN THE GENERAL AREA. SMALL ARMS AND 87MM FIRE WERE DIRECTED TOWARD THE HELICOPTER DURING THE RESCUE.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT
NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL		Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, sea state, etc.
PERKINS, ALLAN	EJECTED FROM A/C	HOSTILE FIRE FROM ENEMY FORCES IN THE GENERAL AREA.

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/technique, retrieval equipments/technique, rescue vehicle)

THE AIRCREWMAN WERE WELL TRAINED FOR THIS TYPE RESCUE. THE AIRCREWMAN THAT ENTERED THE WATER TO ASSIST THE SURVIVOR WASTED NO TIME IN PREPARING HIM FOR PICKUP. THE EXPEDITIOUS RECOVERY OF THE SURVIVOR CAN BE DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE TRAINING RECEIVED AT NAS CUBI POINT.

CREW:

PILOT - LTJG TIMOTHY S. MELECOSKY 1st CREW - WILLIE B. PETTIT AE2
CO PILOT - LTJG JAMES P. BRENNAN 2nd CREW - JOHN H. BEVAN ATN3

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving--Survivor's statements	
14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL LTJG TIMOTHY S. MELECOSKY OIC HC-7 DET 108	SIGNATURE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL /s/ LTJG T. S. MELECOSKY OIC DET 108
15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL	SIGNATURE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

HELISUPPRON SEVEN DET 107
ABOARD USS KING (DLG-10) SAR

On 12 November 1967, an HC-7 helicopter completed a rescue operation at sea. The helicopter pilot spotted debris and then the survivor. After briefly hovering overhead, a sling was lowered and the rescue quickly effected. There was a high sea state, poor visibility, and rain at the time of rescue.

“Vietnam – Air Losses”

United States Air Force
Navy and Marine corps
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses
In Southeast Asia 1961-1973

By: Chris Hobson

Midland Publishing

(re-printed with permission)

October 3, 1967

RESCUE - 1

A-4B VSF-3, USN, USS Intrepid

LTJG A. D. Perkins (survived)

VSF-3 lost its second aircraft of the Intrepid's tour during a raid on a road and railway bridge at Haiphong. Lt Perkins was part of the flak suppression force that accompanied the bombers. As he started his dive to fire his Zuni rockets the aircraft was hit by AAA. He jettisoned his ordnance and headed towards the coast but the aircraft was hit again and further damaged and Lt. Perkins was struck in the left leg by shrapnel. Smoke filled the cockpit and most of the instruments failed. Lt Perkins jettisoned the cockpit canopy to clear the smoke but the aircraft was either hit by flak again or the engine may have exploded. The pilot ejected at 8,000 feet over Haiphong Harbour and was rescued from within yards of a ship by a Navy UH-2 flown by Lt Tim Melecosky from HC-1 (added correction -- HC-7). Lt Melecosky was shot down by ground fire the next day while operating from the USS Coontz on another SAR mission. Although the helicopter, UH-2B 150153 was lost when it ditched off Haiphong, all the crew were rescued by a Seaking from HS-2.

LTJG A.D. Perkins



3 October 1967,

Lieutenant Junior Grade A. D. Perkins in A-4B Skyhawk, AK-102, BuNo 142114, was lost to AAA in North Vietnam. Lieutenant Junior Grade Perkins was recovered.

Photograph from John W. Hays.

- ***Data from VSF-3 squadron web site HC-7 Rescue 1***
-
- The VSF-3 Chessmen deployed to WestPac on the USS Intrepid CVS-11, on 11 May 1967, and returned to the United States on 30 December 1967. The combat line periods were:
 - 21 June 1967 to 13 July 1967.
 - 30 July 1967 to 27 August 1967.
 - 15 September 1967 to 12 October 1967.
 - 1 November 1967 to 23 November 1967.
- Losses:
 - 2 July 1967, Lieutenant Junior Grade F. M. Kasch flying an A-4B Skyhawk was killed in action.
-
-
- **3 October 1967, [Lieutenant Junior Grade A. D. Perkins](#) in an A-4B Skyhawk, AK-102, Bu number 142114, was lost to AAA in North Vietnam. Lieutenant Junior Grade Perkins was recovered. Photograph from John W. Hays**
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- 9 February 1968:
 - VSF-3 Chessmen were disbanded. Assets and some personnel were transferred to the VA-152 Fighting Aces.

Dark Lead is out



t of the Aircraft



W. Howard Plunkett

(Overleaf) An SA-2 heading toward an F-105D. The photo was taken in January 1968 by a KA-71 strike camera in an F-105F. The pilot in the F-105D was 1Lt Earl J. Henderson who evaded the missile. (USAF photo from Earl Henderson)

COL. ROBERT W. "BOB" BARNETT ... LAST FLEW AN AIR FORCE JET SEVEN YEARS AND NINE MONTHS EARLIER WHEN HE WAS SHOT DOWN IN HIS F-105D

The takeoff on July 16, 1975, of two T-38 Talons from Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, was like most other flights by student pilots flying the sleek supersonic trainers. Once airborne, the planes looped and rolled and flew Immelmans and Cuban 8s, standard aerobic maneuvers student pilots must master.¹ They landed back at the base after the one-hour flight. "Freedom 138" was the call sign of one of the planes and, for its student pilot, the flight was anything but routine. It was the "Champagne Flight" of former POW Col. Robert W. "Bob" Barnett who last flew an Air Force jet seven years and nine months earlier when he was shot down in his F-105D over North Vietnam.² This flight, with instructor pilot Lt. Col. Rocco DeFelice of the 560th Flying Training Squadron, was the beginning of Bob's return to flying status after five and a half years of torture and isolation in North Vietnamese prisons and two years of recuperation following his "Freedom Flight" on the C-141 that flew him and his fellow POWs out of North Vietnam on March 14, 1973.³ Of his T-38 flight after years out of the cockpit, Bob Barnett remarked, "I felt that I hadn't missed a beat. We made a formation take off and I was right there."⁴

This article tells the story of how he got there. It describes his being shot down in his F-105 and his three days on the ground before being captured and taken to Hanoi. It is one of many combat stories about F-105 pilots and their valiant efforts during the failed bombing campaign called "Rolling Thunder." Bob's ordeal began with his mission on October 3, 1967.

Tuesday, Oct 3, 1967: SAMs and MiGs


Continuing their almost daily attacks against targets along the Northeast Rail Line in North Vietnam, the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) from Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base, launched an afternoon strike of F-105 Thunderchiefs against the Dap Cau railroad and highway bridge 20 nautical miles northeast of Hanoi. The bridge was number 16 on the Top Secret target list compiled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Part of the strike force was targeted against the Dap Cau bypass bridge, a pontoon bridge about one mile south of the main bridge.⁵ Both bridges had been bombed many times before but were to be hit again in a persistent effort to block trains and trucks carrying goods from China to Hanoi.⁶

It was the height of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign that had started in March 1965, and other strike forces were taking advantage of this afternoon's unusually clear weather. Takhli's 355th TFW was sending four flights of F-105s against the Lang Gia railroad yard further north on the Northeast Rail Line, and Navy A-4 Skyhawks from the carrier *Intrepid* were attacking the railroad and highway bridge just north of Haiphong.⁷ The Northeast Rail Line separated the section of North Vietnam assigned to the Air Force, Route Pack 6A, from the Navy's Route Pack 6B. Korat's route to their target crossed Navy territory. The F-105s were to be covered by a MiG-CAP flight of F-4C Phantoms, and supported by the electronic equipment operators in an EB-66B orbiting off the coast to jam the North Vietnamese radars that guided their surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and aimed their anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) flak guns.⁸

Korat's F-105 strike force consisted of a Wild Weasel flight with radio call sign "Warhawk," followed by four strike flights with call signs "Pistol," "Hatchet," "Ozark," and "Crossbow" that were to attack the target in one-minute intervals.⁹ The two-seat F-105F Wild Weasels, with their specialized electronics and radar-seeking missiles, were to find and kill SAM sites and to call out SAMs heading their way so that strike pilots could spot and avoid them. Each strike flight had four single-seat F-105Ds that carried 750-pound bombs or cluster-bomb units (CBUs) for attacking the bridge or nearby flak sites.

The F-105s from Korat flew from their base in Thailand, then across Laos to the Gulf of Tonkin where they refueled from KC-135 tankers in the "Tan" refueling track, an established tanker orbit area off the southern coast of North Vietnam. They then flew north until they reached their turn point, an island landmark off the northern coast of North Vietnam that the pilots called "The Wart on the Elephant's Ear." From this point they headed west, passing above Haiphong, toward Dap Cau.¹⁰ It was dangerous territory where planes on the morning missions in the same region had met up with ten SAMs. This afternoon's pilots expected the same reception. They were carrying QRC-160-1 electronic countermeasure (ECM) jamming pods and flying at an altitude of 16,000 feet in pod formation—1,500 feet horizontal and 500 feet vertical separation of the four planes in each flight—that masked their individual aircraft from North Vietnam's radar.¹¹

W. Howard Plunkett is a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel. His twenty-year career as an aircraft maintenance officer began with F-105s in 1964. He was a distinguished graduate from Squadron Officers School and earned an MS in logistics management from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). Since his retirement in 1983, he has worked in the aerospace industry as a reliability engineer, in software support and quality assurance, as a logistics manager and technical writer, and in business development. His previous publications about the F-105 include an article in the Air Force Museum's Friends Journal (Winter 1994/1995) and a book, F-105 Thunderchiefs, published in 2001 by McFarland & Company, detailing the histories of all surviving F-105s in museums and on static display around the world. This article is from his research for a future book on F-105 operations during Operation Rolling Thunder.



This illustration shows the area in North Vietnam of "Ozark" flight's ordeal on October 3, 1967.

(Illustration created by author)

THE STRIKE FLIGHTS ALSO ADJUSTED THEIR POSITIONS ... TO DIVE BOMB THEIR TARGET

SUDDENLY, THE WILD WEASEL FLIGHT DETECTED SAMs LAUNCHED AT THEM

Maj. Robert W. Barnett, from the 469th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), flying F-105D 59-1727, led "Ozark" flight, the third of the four strike flights from Korat. He had arrived at Korat in July 1967, and, nine days before his thirty-ninth birthday, was flying his 43d mission over North Vietnam. Others in his flight were "Ozark 2," Capt. Russell E. Temperley, thirty-two years old, assigned to Korat since late May, who was flying F-105D 60-0435; "Ozark 3," Capt. Roger P. Scheer in F-105D 60-0434; and "Ozark 4," twenty-six-year-old 1st Lt. Earl J. Henderson flying F-105D 60-0461, who had only 150 hours flying F-105s and was on his seventeenth combat mission. He carried an audio tape recorder wired into his interphone and UHF (Ultra-High Frequency) radio that recorded his comments and radio calls during most of the mission.¹²

Before the flight took off, Captain Scheer's plane developed problems and he aborted. His place as "Ozark 3" was taken by the flight's spare, Maj. Wintford L. Bazzell, a forty-three-year-old staff officer from the 388th TFW headquarters with fifty-two missions over North Vietnam. He flew F-105D 62-4359. Years later, Wintford Bazzell recalled, "There were many aborts on this mission. My aircraft was still being worked on when the mission took off." He caught up with his flight after he refueled from the tanker that was making its last orbit in its refueling track over the Gulf of Tonkin.¹³

Bob Barnett had not previously flown with any of the pilots in his flight. "I had just been moved over to the 469th from the 44th TFS so I didn't really know any of these guys."¹⁴

Maj. Morris L. McDaniel from the 13th TFS, with his Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) Capt. William A. Lillund, led "Warhawk," the Wild Weasel flight. This crew had been at Korat since July 18, 1967, and normally flew single-ship "Ryan's Raider" missions at night in their F-105F.¹⁵ Maj. McDaniel had been one of his student pilots when Maj. Barnett was an F-86D flight instructor at Perrin AFB, Texas, in the late 1950s.¹⁶

As the strike force reached its turn point, the Wild Weasel flight, already over the target, began alerting the strike force to SAMs in the area, call-

ing specific SAM sites by their lead designation and using the day's SAM code word, "Football." "Warhawk, Warhawk Lead, Lead 30 506. Football, out."

The mission commander in "Pistol," the first of the strike flights, announced his progress to the target. "Pistol Force is at the Wart. Pistol Force, I say again, the Wart is at 12 o'clock."¹⁷

"Warhawk" alerted the strike force that the weather over the target was clear. The radar from a second SAM site came up. "Warhawk, Warhawk Lead. Lead 48 508. Football, out."

The strike flights also adjusted their positions using their afterburners (AB) to hold pod formation on their run-in to the bridge and to get into position to dive bomb their target.

Suddenly, the Wild Weasel flight detected SAMs launched at them. "Take it down! Take it down, take it down, Warhawk!"

While the Weasels were dodging the SAMs, an airborne controller alerted the force to MiGs in the area. "Bandits, Bandits. NE 80. Time 14. Ethan Alpha, out."

By 3:10 p.m., Barnett's "Ozark" flight was a mile from their target. The four F-105Ds, each carrying six 750-pound bombs on a rack under their fuselage, along with two 450-gallon fuel tanks and two ECM jamming pods on the wing stations, were lining up to attack the pontoon bypass bridge.¹⁸

Bob Barnett recalled, "I was back leading the flight in the right hand box, and the Weasels were out ahead. Close to the target, I could hear the SAMs being deployed. When they're fired, the SAM operators turn the power up and the red light in the F-105's cockpit comes on. I heard the call, 'SAM, SAM' so I started looking down to see where it was and then looked back to the target. I was just ready to roll in."¹⁹

The radio calls told of more SAM launches. "Crossbow, SAM should go clear. Hold it."

Three SAMs were headed straight into the strike force. "Detonation to the right, Crossbow. It looks like you got somebody hit." Lt. Henderson called out, "Rog. That's Ozark Lead and let's follow him in."²⁰

Henderson had seen a SAM explode behind Barnett's plane. Unknown to the Americans, North Vietnamese SAM operators, probably helped by their Soviet advisors, had recently developed a three-point track-on-jam technique that overcame the effects of the F-105's pod formation in masking individual aircraft.²¹ Earl Henderson described what he saw. "The second SAM passed very close under Bob's aircraft and detonated. With the high closure rate (Mach 1 for us and Mach 2 for the SA-2), the detonation, smoke cloud, and debris were gone in the blink of the eye. Bob immediately started trailing a wisp of smoke. He jettisoned his stores and began a right turn back east. The other three Ozarks jettisoned ordnance and external fuel tanks and went with him."²²

Russ Temperley, "Ozark 2," heard the SAM warning signals in his cockpit but did not see the missiles heading toward them. "I recall seeing my launch light on my detector and hearing the

I WAS JUST ABOUT READY TO HIT THE BURNER AND THIS THING BLOWS UP

OZARK LEAD IS OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT. GOOD CHUTE

buzzing loudly, indicating my aircraft was targeted; but, by then the launch lights had become numerous and we were approaching the target area so my attention needed to be focused on the upcoming drop. Ozark Lead stated he, too, had a launch light indicating his aircraft was targeted also. Concerned about the up-coming SAM, I glanced for it below and beside Ozark Lead but could not see it. Ozark Lead and our flight maintained a steady, unswerving course into the target area.”²³

Bob Barnett recalled, *The Weasel flight had turned outbound about the time the SAM was launched and I guess he was looking up and he must have been looking at the first flight because he said, “No threat it’s going behind the force.” I was just about ready to hit the burner and this thing blows up. The airplane porpoises and I get red lights right away so I started to turn. Russ Temperley, number 2 man, said, “Jettison your ordnance.” So I punched off my bombs and I started to turn and lit the burner because Hanoi was right there. I had a fire light and then, as I finished a 180-degree turn, I felt the controls were getting stiff. I had the slab lock mod so I reached down and locked the slab, set my speed at 360 knots, and I could control it with the flaps.*²⁴ After I rolled out, I tried to talk to everybody. There was so much chatter, so I said, “Let’s go to manual.” I tried to find out what they could see on my airplane, what kind of problems I had. All three of them had caught up with me.”²⁵

Henderson recalled, “I ended up on his right side high as we headed east. His aircraft continued to burn off and on with a very small, blue-gray flame (hydraulic fire) coming out of the tail section.”²⁶

In what would be his last radio call from his burning F-105, Major Barnett reported his condition to his flight. “OK I am in Stab Lock. I’ve lost both my hydraulic systems. I’ve got a fire light and everything. I’m trying to get out to the water.” He recalled, “I was heading back towards the ocean and about that time I lost my radio so I couldn’t talk to anybody any more.”²⁷

Henderson flew alongside of Barnett. “Just a few miles before the water, his aircraft began to gently porpoise and lose speed and altitude. I began an ‘S’ turn to stay with him but he slipped behind me and I had to aggressively move out to his right to stay with him. His drag chute door popped open and slowly his drag chute came out and tore off.”²⁸ The cockpit tape captured his comments to himself. “We’re in burner. We’re following him out. OK, his fire’s out but he’s going to have to get out of it. No, his fire’s not out.” Henderson tried to warn his flight lead of his condition but didn’t receive a reply. “OK, Ozark lead, this is Four. You got just a small fire right in the very tail end.”²⁹

Major Barnett could continue flying his crippled plane for only a short while more. “I kept heading towards the coast and pretty soon the oil pressure light came on. It was still burning. About that time the engine goes ‘crunch’ and I’m about 10 miles from the coast. I shut it down as soon as I heard it start freezing. It started rolling and I started to step on the rudder to keep it straight and I thought,

‘Well ... let’s get out of here.’ So I ejected about 360 knots about 16,000 feet.”³⁰ As Barnett’s parachute opened, it tangled in the inflatable life raft from his survival kit that was packed in his ejection seat.

As I went out, the raft somehow activated. The raft goes up on a lanyard and then the parachute opens and wraps around the lanyard and I look up and the parachute is in a big ball. When I first stabilized, I was looking down. I had the idea I was going to break my legs during the ejection. We had a lot of people break their legs. So the first thing I did was to reach down to feel my legs and they weren’t broken. But I was looking down and I saw the airplane in a fireball right between my feet. That’s when I looked up and saw my parachute in a ball. I still had my helmet on and I got my knife out. I was going to see if I could cut some risers or something to get this thing untangled. I couldn’t see where there was anything I could do, so I put the knife back in. I just sort of watched it. I was spinning around as I was going down. After a little while the parachute started opening up and the risers would go up to the boat then to the parachute. I was going around. It was a beautiful day. I actually was in kind of a slow swing. I’d swing around, I could see Hanoi, then I’d go back around and see the ocean. It was so quiet after that. Then I was getting close to the ground. I tried to get my helmet visor down. I was having trouble with that and I was getting closer to the trees so finally I just put my feet together and went flying through the trees. Felt myself ricocheting off branches and finally my legs hit one branch and the parachute hung up in the trees. And then I fell about 10 feet horizontally right in a bunch of bushes. [It] [k]nocked the wind right out of me. I laid there a little bit until I got my breath back. Then I started feeling around and said, ‘Jeez, I got all my pieces.’ So I felt pretty good then.”³¹

The strike force began forming a rescap (rescue combat air patrol) to identify Major Barnett’s location and to direct a helicopter rescue but they had trouble joining up with each other and locating Barnett on the ground. The radio calls reflected their confusion. A pilot from another flight: “Did somebody go down? Or did somebody get hit?”

“No. Ozark Lead is out of the aircraft. Good chute. On the ground. In the mountains.”

“Is somebody capping him?”

“That’s affirmative.”

Lieutenant Henderson believed he should head for a tanker to refuel and then return for the rescap. However, Pistol Lead told “Ozark” flight to stay over Barnett and “Pistol” flight would refuel and return to take over the rescap. Eventually, Captain Temperley flew high cover while Major Bazzell “stayed low where I could watch the area where Barnett landed.”³²

As the strike force commander was returning from refueling, he asked for Barnett’s location on the ground and Henderson gave the location based on an azimuth and distance from TACAN Channel 20 broadcast by a Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin

1Lt Earl J. Henderson,
"Ozark 4", 469 TFS, posing
in front of F-105D 62-4269.
(USAF photo from Earl
Henderson)



**DURING THE
TIME IT WAS
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BEEPER
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THE RESCAP**

about thirty nautical miles off the coast of North Vietnam. The rescap pilots, Captain Temperley, "Ozark 2," Major Bazzell, "Ozark 3," and Lt. Henderson, "Ozark 4," continued trying to locate each other and Barnett but were getting low on fuel and were receiving enemy AAA fire.

While the rescap pilots were trying to sort out their positions and locate their downed flight lead, Barnett on the ground was unfastening his parachute and moving to what he hoped was a better area for rescue.

I pulled the parachute out of the tree and rolled it up into a ball. I hid it under the tree and disconnected it and I started running away from where I was 'cause I didn't want to be in the same area. I was about 10 miles from the coast. I was just north northeast of Haiphong, what we called 'Little Thud'. It was very treed and jungle-y. So I started running away and stopped and got my radio out to talk and I could hear the beeper. I thought, "Jeez, the beeper in the 'chute, I didn't turn it off." So I ran back and I couldn't find the damn parachute. So I said, "Well I'd better not stay around here." So I ran again and then I finally stopped and I got my radio out and I noticed that it was on. Somehow, the beeper on the radio was the one that was activating. I guess somewhere in my confusion I turned the one off in the parachute but this one was going. So I finally turned it off and then the beeper stopped."³³

However, during the time it was on, the beeper blocked radio calls that further delayed setting up the rescap. Henderson tried to raise Barnett on the radio. "Ozark Lead, Ozark Lead, this is Ozark 4 on Guard. How do you read?"

His radio call was overheard by a Navy

destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin, with call sign "Steel Hawser," which coordinated search and rescue (SAR) operations in RP-6B, the Navy's assigned area of North Vietnam.³⁴

Barnett's beeper was blocking radio calls on Guard channel with its loud, persistent Whoop! Whoop! The flight finally changed radio channels to avoid the interference from Barnett's beeper.

After turning off his beeper, Barnett tried to get into a better position for a helicopter to pick him up. "I moved about a mile or so away from where I'd hit. I ran up the hill and got on the radio. I talked to 'Olds' flight, which was an F-4 flight. I was all ready to get picked up. I had a good spot there. I had open space."³⁵

At this point, Henderson spotted two MiG-21s and his attention was distracted by this new threat. The MiGs were "in a fighting wing formation at about 12,000 feet (12,000 feet below me), moving very fast on a reciprocal heading. By the time I comprehended that they were MiGs, the opportunity to 'swoop' down on them was gone."³⁶

Steel Hawser was still trying to understand where Barnett was on the ground and called for Henderson to flash his IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) so they could spot him on their radar. "Squawk flash, Ozark."

"Ozark, flash."

"OK. Holding your flash at this time, Ozark 4. Is he feet dry?"

"Affirmative. I've got a couple of MiGs on me right now, though. Ah! I need some help up here. OK. Ozark 2, this is Ozark 4. There's two MiG-21s in the area." Temperley had lost sight of Henderson but tried to rejoin to help with the MiGs.³⁷

An orbiting Navy UH-2A rescue helicopter, a type known as "Big Mother," had been listening to

Pilots of the 469 TFS at Korat RTAFB gathered in mid-October 1967 in front of their squadron building. The three pilots in "Ozark" flight from the October 3 mission are Capt Russell E. Temperley, "Ozark 2", standing second from left; 1Lt Earl J. Henderson, "Ozark 4", standing third from left; and Maj Wintford L. Bazzell, "Ozark 3", standing second from right. (USAF photo from Earl Henderson)



DUE TO THEIR LOW FUEL, THE REST OF OZARK FLIGHT ... DID NOT JOIN HENDERSON IN CHASING THE MIG-21s

the radio calls and volunteered to go in. "Steel Hawser, this is Big Mother. May I have permission to proceed to that area and stay feet wet?" But they were held by Steel Hawser in their position over the Gulf of Tonkin. "OK. Steel Hawser. Maintain present position."³⁸

Henderson was still coping with the MiG-21s. "As I continued my orbit and talking to Steel Hawser, I spotted the MiGs again coming at me from near head on. One of them was shooting his cannon. As they flashed by, I reversed my direction and tried to turn in behind them."³⁹

"Oh, shit. There they go. OK. Steel Hawser. This is Ozark 4. Can you get me some F-4s up here?"

"Roger. We're doing it now Ozark 4, hang on."⁴⁰

*My turn was now to the right, but I did not initially see them. As I looked behind me, I spotted both MiGs at fairly close range (3,000 feet, closing for perhaps a gun shot). I continued a very high-G right hand descending spiral, "dishing out" at about 8,000 feet. The two MiGs broke off the attack without firing weapons (that I know of) and headed for Haiphong in a climb. Either they were out of gas (likely) or thought they had succeeded in shooting me down.*⁴¹

Abandoning his rescap for Major Barnett, and despite being critically low on fuel, Henderson started after the MiGs.

*I rolled in behind them about 2 miles in trail and began to chase them. My speed got up to about 1.2 Mach, but it took a very long time to close any distance. As I looked down and saw 4,000 lbs of fuel, I realized that I would never reach them and have enough gas to get home. Plus we were getting near the eastern edge of Haiphong. I decided to at least throw some 20-mm in their direction. I fired about 600 rounds of 20-mm from about 5,000 feet away, without success and turned back to the east to go to the tanker.*⁴²

His tape recorder captured his MiG pursuit and Capt Temperley's attempt to help. Henderson to himself: "I'm running out of gas before long here."

Henderson: "OK. I'm getting in trail with these 21s."

Temperley: "Ah, Rog. I see 'em myself."

Henderson on intercom: "OK, baby! Waa! Hooo! Aah! Son of a bitch. Ah. Come on! Go! Go! Ugh!"⁴³

Due to their low fuel, the rest of Ozark flight began looking for a tanker and did not join Henderson in chasing the MiG-21s. Bazzell, "Ozark 3," recalled, "After about 10 minutes, we could see trucks heading towards the area where Barnett had landed. As we circled the area, numerous SAMs and anti-aircraft fire were directed at us."⁴⁴

While Barnett was waiting to be rescued and the rest of "Ozark" flight was coping with SAMs, AAA, and MiG-21s, North Vietnamese AAA had blasted a Navy A-4B (with call sign "Nevada City 102") that had been attacking the bridge north of Haiphong. Like Major Barnett, the A-4B pilot, Lt. JG Allan D. Perkins, of VSF-3 from the carrier *Intrepid*, headed for the water. Before he cleared the coastline, his plane was hit twice more and Perkins was wounded in the left leg. When his cockpit filled with smoke, he jettisoned his canopy and then ejected at 8,000 feet. He splashed into shallow water in Haiphong harbor.⁴⁵

With a wounded Navy pilot down in the water 60 yards from an anchored cargo ship, Steel Hawser had held up the UH-2A rescue helicopter that had been heading for Barnett and sent it to Haiphong harbor instead.

The helicopter, with call sign "Clementine 1," was from Navy helicopter squadron HC-7, the Sea Devils, on the frigate *USS Coontz* (DLG-9). The helicopter, piloted by Lt. Tim McLecosky and Lt. James Brennan, skimmed the water between the ships anchored in the harbor. The crew spotted

Lieutenant Perkins' flare and pulled into a hover over the pilot. A swimmer from the helicopter jumped into the shallow water. After getting unstuck from the mud, the swimmer connected himself and Lt Perkins to the hoist cable and both were pulled aboard. The helicopter flew out of the harbor with no further trouble.⁴⁶

The three F-105 pilots in "Ozark" flight had to make several more, increasingly frantic, radio calls to "Steel Hawser" and "Red Crown," a radar-equipped Navy cruiser also off the coast of North Vietnam that vectored tankers to their receivers. With five-minutes of fuel remaining, they finally connected with a KC-135 tanker. They refueled and returned to Korat. After he landed, Captain Temperly discovered his plane had numerous holes in its left wing and fuselage caused by SAM bursts or AAA.⁴⁷

After picking up Lieutenant Perkins from Haiphong harbor and flying him to his ship for medical care, the rescue helicopter "Clementine" didn't have enough fuel and daylight to come back for Major Barnett, who was advised to hole up for the night and await rescue the next morning. While it was getting dark, he moved to the top of a hill and found a hiding place. "Just as I was settling in there, I heard a car way off in the distance and some Vietnamese get out and start yelling; but they were pretty far away. That's the first time anybody apparently got in the area where I was. They obviously knew I was there." Barnett sat awake all night. "One time during the night I saw a little animal. I don't know what it was—shiny eyes—I got my knife out and then he walked away. I was just waiting to get daylight so I could do something."⁴⁸

Wednesday Oct 4, 1967: Failed Rescue

After a sleepless night on the ground, Barnett began moving to another location where it would be easier for a helicopter pick-up. Before daylight, he started to move up the hill under a canopy of trees, weaving his way through tangled vines. He stopped near the top of a ridge in tall grass near an open area. He decided, "This is a pretty good place to stop and if they ever came in I could get picked up here."⁴⁹

Just as it was getting light, about 6:30 a.m., he heard voices in the distance. People from the local village were starting to look for him. At the same time, Navy planes appeared overhead also searching for him. An A-4 pilot with call sign "Dakota" called him on the radio but couldn't see him through the jungle.⁵⁰ Barnett replied to the A-4 pilot, "I think I'm going to get captured and I'll see you after the war." He turned off and hid his radio and laid low in the grass as the search party from the village came closer. One searcher passed within three feet of him but walked on by without seeing him. After waiting a while, he decided to work his way over to the edge of the hill to make it easier for a helicopter to get to him.

So I kind of skinnied over there and, as I got there, there were two guys sitting within three or

four feet of me. I was in the grass, in the high reeds, so I stopped and stayed there, kinda hunched back. I waited for a while and they finally left. So I sat there for quite a while trying to figure out what to do. First I realized I had to get out of this area to get picked up. So my plan was to move at least ten miles and I figured that would take me a good day or so, maybe two days, and then I'd try again. I thought probably the search was off because I just told them I was going to get captured."⁵¹

The search had been pulled back but not called off. Now that they knew where he was, the rescap planes, four Navy A-1s with call signs "Electron", were headed his way. However, one A-1 was hit in the canopy by 37-mm AAA and the planes retreated.⁵²

Barnett was still trying to avoid the enemy while positioning himself for a rescue. "It was all quiet and I hadn't heard anybody for a couple of hours. I stayed in the reeds. Finally I decided I'd better start moving. I had my compass and I started moving northeast towards the coast." Encountering only light underbrush, he made good time running along the top of a ridge. Sometime after noon he heard propeller airplanes and called them on his radio. The planes were two A-1s escorting the Navy UH-2A "Clementine" being flown by the same crew who had been diverted from picking up Maj Barnett yesterday.

I moved down the side of the hill. They said there was a helicopter 35 minutes out. I started weighing whether we should try this or not because I knew there were still people around the area but I hadn't heard anybody for a couple, three hours. It was just completely quiet. They said, 'Fire a flare.' I said, 'God, once I do this, I'm gonna expose myself— aah let's go for it.' So I got out my penknife. I fired the first one; it went about two feet and pphhhh! I think another one was no good; then finally I fired one and it went right up through the trees. About that time, an A-1 came right over the top of me. It looked like the flare almost went into his prop wash. I saw it spin up over the back of him. That's how low he was. Then they said, 'Use a smoke flare.' The first one I pulled didn't fire and the second one — pulled it and the smoke didn't go up in the trees, it went off the side."⁵³

At 12:20, the rescue helicopter "Clementine," flown by Navy Lts. Tim Mclecosky and Jim Brennan, found him. But the North Vietnamese were waiting. "I called the helicopter. I said, 'OK, come closer.' I finally said, 'You're right over the top of me.' Then right about that time, all these bullets go flying through the trees. Then I heard him say, 'Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!' I'm down here on the side of a hill, and he dumps it and I thought he was going to crash. So I go running downhill after him. I didn't know what I was going to do but somehow I felt that I was going to chase him all the way to the coast. He went putting off. I had no idea what happened to him."⁵⁴

PRETTY
SOON I SAW
FIVE GUYS
WITH
SPEARS AND
LOINCLOTHS
AND ABOUT
FIVE GUYS
WITH
UNIFORMS

A MAN GOT
OUT OF THE
TRUCK, ...
AND MADE
WHAT WAS
PROBABLY A
"THANK-YOU-
FOR-CAPTUR-
ING-THIS-
YANKEE-AIR-
PIRATE"
SPEECH

The gunfire had punctured the helicopter's fuel tanks but the crew managed to get their machine to the Gulf of Tonkin before it ran out of gas. They ditched the helicopter in the water 10 miles off shore and were picked up by "Big Mother 70," a Navy SH-3 helicopter. At 1:37 p.m., the Navy pulled back their rescue forces and Barnett had to spend a second night in the jungle.⁵⁵

After the helicopter left, Barnett hid in a ravine, lying under a camouflaged mosquito net that he placed over his head. Five minutes later, ten troops in uniform passed by without noticing him. The searchers walked to the bottom of the hill and disappeared from sight. "I felt like I was invisible. So I stayed there for another couple hours."

When he could no longer hear the search party, Barnett began looking for water. He had no food but knew he needed water to survive. He began moving down the hill in search of a stream. He encountered a hut where he heard people talking and so skirted around the area. He came to a ravine and followed it down hill where he found a small pool of water formed by a stream that disappeared into the ground. "So I got my little plastic bag, threw my pills in there, mixed them all up, drank as much water as I could, then filled up my bag. I felt pretty good."

As he continued moving northeast through the jungle toward another ridge, he encountered two trails and began working his way down between them. Two or three times he had to hide from people coming down the trails. Late in the day he reached the junction of the two trails and realized there was a village nearby. He hid until dusk as more people came down the trails toward the village. "I crossed the trail and then ran up the next hill and tried to get up on the next ridge. I kept moving until it got dark and then couldn't see where I was going anymore so I stopped and stayed there for the night. Again, very little sleep. I was living on adrenaline."⁵⁶

That night, the 388th TFW lost its third Ryan's Raider aircraft near the Lang Con railroad bridge in North Vietnam. The crew of F-105F 63-8346, using call sign "Splendid," was last heard from after refueling and starting inbound to the target. Both crewmembers were missing. The pilot and EWO were Maj. Morris Larosco McDaniel, Jr. and Capt. William Allan Lillund, who, as "Warhawk 1," called out yesterday's SAM that had knocked down Major Barnett.⁵⁷

Thursday Oct 5, 1967: Dog Bite

Early the next morning, Barnett continued hiking toward the coast. At daybreak, he ran into another trail that headed in the direction where he wanted to go. He knew the risks of being on a trail but felt that he could stay ahead of people coming up from the village and decided to follow the trail since he could travel faster. "I got on the trail and I was really moving along. All of a sudden I heard a loud voice; someone fired a gun." Maj. Barnett quickly hid again until the noises were gone. "So I

crawled up the trail and went around the bend and got up and actually jogged, ran about a half an hour after this event. I don't know if the guy was close to me but the gun was really loud. I didn't know if he was shooting at me or saw me, or what. I was feeling, 'God. I can't get caught.'"⁵⁸

While Barnett was evading the North Vietnamese searchers, Seventh Air Force Headquarters in Saigon was planning another attempt at rescuing him. They called for a "maximum effort" to start after 4:30 in the afternoon. During the day, pilots in strike aircraft in the area thought they heard Barnett's beeper and voice on the radio that located him five miles west of his position from yesterday. However, by the time rescue aircraft were available, it was too late in the day to risk sending in more planes, so, once again, the rescue was called off.⁵⁹ Rescue planners didn't yet know it but they were already too late for picking up the downed pilot.

Barnett recalled his last minutes of freedom. "I was moving along pretty good and I had moved about five or six miles from where I had been. All at once I heard some noise behind me and I got under a bush. I put my mosquito net on again to cover my face and I was looking where the noise was coming from. Pretty soon I saw five guys with spears and loincloths and about five guys with uniforms. There was one guy in front with a pistol. Then I saw this dog running just ahead of the group. The dog came right into the bushes with me and began sniffing around my head. This guy with a pistol ran up to the dog and sees me and goes, 'Hands up! Hands Up!' So I separated my hands and the dog bit me on the shoulder. He just nipped me." The men pulled the dog away and the group gathered around their prisoner. "They were all happy that they caught me. They didn't hit me or anything like that."

His captors stripped Barnett to his boxer shorts and gave him a pair of blue shorts to wear but, fortunately, let him keep his boots. "A lot of guys I know marched a long way without any boots." They tied his hands together but didn't blindfold him. The man with a gun fired a shot as a signal, nearly hitting one of his own troops, provoking nervous giggles over the near accident, then began leading their captive down the trail. Along the way, the group pointed out a dead python about 20 feet long that they had killed during their search. They reached a road and stopped under some trees. The location caused Barnett some concern since it looked like a grave had been dug but they simply stood around waiting for a truck that arrived a short while later.

A man got out of the truck, ordered that Barnett be blindfolded, and made what was probably a "thank-you-for-capturing-this-Yankee-Air-Pirate" speech to the group that applauded the pep talk. They then put their prisoner in the truck and started off. During the short ride, the man in the truck began the interrogation. "What's your name?" I told him name, rank, serial number, date of birth. Then he said, 'What's your wife's name?' 'I can't tell you that.' 'You must tell me that.' 'I can't tell you

Two months before he was shot down, Maj Robert W. Barnett poses by F-105D 59-1727, the plane he flew as "Ozark 1" on October 3, 1967. (USAF photo from Bob Barnett)



THEY WERE ALL HUNKERED DOWN AND LOOKING AT ME LIKE SOMEBODY FROM MARS

that.' 'What kind of airplane?' 'I can't tell you that.' Then he said, 'Well, you don't understand yet. I'll explain to you what the system is here. The only way you're going to live here is to cooperate.' We came into a settlement area and they put me in a little room and took the blindfold off."

The North Vietnamese then brought in an officer who had been in South Vietnam and who, Barnett was told, understood the war. "He started talking to me in Vietnamese. He's going on about whatever he did in South Vietnam. I had no idea what he was talking about. So he finally gets through and the guy says, 'See, that's what the war is all about.'"

After this incomprehensible indoctrination lecture, his captors then took Major Barnett outside and sat him in front of a large crowd ("a couple of hundred of them.") "They were all hunkered down and looking at me like somebody from Mars. But nobody said anything. They just acted like the scene of an accident. They were all whispering and looking. After they had enough of that, they put me back in this room. Then some lady came up and started hollering and beating on the wall like she was mad at me about something."⁶⁰

He was tied with a rope for the night but after his guards fell asleep, Maj Barnett untied himself and considered escaping. However, he no longer had his radio and had gotten rid of his gun and so gave up the idea. He spent the night in the little room in the small village in the mountains that the Americans called "Little Thud Ridge" listening to his captors' snoring.

That evening back in Saigon, not knowing Barnett had already been captured, Seventh Air Force planned another rescue effort to begin in con-

junction with tomorrow's Navy and Air Force strikes at 9 o'clock in the morning. The rescue force was to consist of a command and control C-130, "Crown Four", to coordinate two Air Force Jolly Green rescue helicopters. They also added a Wild Weasel flight to locate Major Barnett prior to the helicopters going in.⁶¹

Friday Oct 6, 1967: Flak Trap

Major Barnett's second day in captivity began early. At four in the morning, the door opened and a man, who turned out to be an interrogator, along with four or five troops, walked in. The interrogator demanded that Barnett write what he had been doing since he had been shot down. "I said, 'No, I can't do that.' That's the first time I got put in the ropes. The troops kicked me. They had taken my flight suit off and it was really cold up there and I was shivering. The more they hit me the more I shivered. He said, 'You must write.' I said, 'Well I can't write. I'm too cold. I need my flight suit.' So they got my flight suit and I put it on. They said, 'Now you must write.' So I started writing. I wrote, 'I hid behind a tree and I did this.' A bunch of bullshit like that. I wrote two or three times, 'I'm writing this under duress.' I figured if I ever got to a court martial...I had taken a pretty good lick there, but not that bad where I couldn't have stayed a little bit longer. But how much of a beating did I want before I eventually did something? I finally figured what I was doing was pretty innocuous. He seemed satisfied with this stuff and I used every big word I could think of—screwed it up."

After daybreak, his captors blindfolded him again and put him in a truck. They drove for a few minutes, stopped, walked a short distance, and then removed his blindfold. Barnett found himself at an anti-aircraft gun site with a group of soldiers. "I said, 'Holy cow, what's this?' Now they're going to use me as a decoy—a flak trap. This was the day when the Air Force sent the whole strike force. The third day."

Before long, A-1s flew into the area continuing the search for "Ozark 1". The North Vietnamese officer handed Barnett his radio. "He said, 'Talk to 'em.' I said, 'What'll I say?' He said, 'Say you're alive.' So I go on and say, 'I'm alive, come save me. I'm alive, come save me. I'm alive, come save me. I'm alive, come save me. I'm alive, come save me.' Then I heard them say, 'Ozark, how do you read?' 'I'm alive, come save me.' 'How do you read?' And I kept saying, 'I'm alive, come save me.' Then I heard someone say, 'Ozark If you read us, sound your beeper for five seconds.' So I got this bright idea, and I gave the radio back to the man and said, 'They want to hear the beeper.' So he puts the beeper on and it goes 'beep, beep, beep, beep, beep' for about two to three minutes, then he gave the radio back to me." Barnett then thought of another way to indicate that he had been captured. He decided to broadcast a false code word that would fool the North Vietnamese but tell the rescue pilots to stay away. "So I said, 'The code word is 'Lam'—

Col Bob Barnett (on left) and instructor pilot Lt Col Rocco DeFelice celebrate Col Barnett's T-38 "Champagne Flight" at Randolph AFB, TX, July 16, 1975. (USAF Photo from 560 FTS)



**THE STRIKE
FORCE
PILOTS
REALIZED
THEIR CON-
TACT WITH
BARNETT
WAS BOGUS**

**FOR THE
NEXT FIVE
AND A HALF
YEARS,
MAJOR
BARNETT
WAS A
PRISONER IN
NORTH
VIETNAM**

meaning to flee or escape—then I repeated, 'The code word is 'Lam.' I said it as clearly as I could a couple or three times. And the guy said, 'What you say?' I said the code word is 'Lam.' He said, 'What's that?' 'That means 'I'm OK'. That's what we're supposed to say.'"

F-105s from the strike force had been circling the area as the pilots tried to raise Barnett on the radio. "Finally, I heard 'em say, 'We're not going down.' I saw them waltzing around and they seemed to go away. The guy turned around and said, 'Why they go away?' I said, 'Because of you.' He said, 'No. No.' I said, 'Yes. They said to do it for five seconds with the beeper and you did it for about two minutes. They knew it was no good.' He said, 'No. No. It was you.' I said, 'No. It was you.' He finally said, 'It was you. You have a very sad voice.' And I said, 'Yes. I'm very sad.'"⁶²

The strike force pilots realized their contact with Barnett was bogus and they quit trying to set up a rescue. An Air Force study on search and rescue in South East Asia described the results of the attempt to rescue "Ozark 1." "At 0951 hours, on 6 October, almost three days later, Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, Seventh Air Force Commander, after much consideration, pulled all the forces out. Miraculously only Clementine was lost, and the crew was subsequently picked up. Though every A-1 that took part in the effort received battle damage, all were recovered safely."⁶³

Barnett had succeeded in warning his rescuers away from the morning's flak trap. The North Vietnamese then brought him to another anti-aircraft gun site where they waited for the afternoon

strike force. At two o'clock, as was their routine, the F-105s again appeared overhead. The North Vietnamese turned on the beeper in Barnett's radio but this time the strike force ignored the signals and flew on to their targets. His captors kept him at this flak site until dark. They then again blindfolded him and tied him up. After putting him in another truck, they drove through the night over the rough roads to Hanoi.⁶⁴

Saturday Oct 7, 1967: A Serious Deficiency

"Somewhere in the middle of the night we stopped. They made me get out of the truck, took my flight suit off, and gave me some shorts, or some kind of pajamas. They didn't want me in a flight suit going into town. It was about four in the morning on the 7th when I arrived at the Hanoi Hilton. For the next six days I was in the Knobby Room."⁶⁵

For the next five and a half years, Major Barnett was a prisoner in North Vietnam.

After describing the rescue efforts for "Ozark 1," the Air Force search and rescue study concluded, "This valiant rescue attempt vividly brought to the forefront a serious deficiency in the lack of a night rescue capability."⁶⁶

Epilogue

Three weeks after he reached Hanoi, Bob Barnett was joined in prison by his number two in "Ozark" flight, Capt. Russell Edwin Temperley, who was shot down on October 27th while flying F-105D 61-0126.⁶⁷ Bob and Russ were the 73d and 74th of the 103 F-105 aircrews who became POWs in North Vietnam. The two, who flew together for the first time in Ozark flight on October 3, 1967, were released together from Hanoi on March 14, 1973.⁶⁸

Within two months of the POWs arriving home from North Vietnam, the Air Force began a unique program of re-qualification flight training for returning many of these men to flying status and continuing their Air Force careers. There had not been a similar program for the released POWs from World War II or Korea, but as part of "Operation Homecoming" the task was given to the 560th Flying Training Squadron at Randolph AFB, Texas. Each pilot's first T-38 flight was called his "Champagne" flight with a bubbly reception on the flight line after landing to make up for his missing the traditional end-of-tour celebration upon completing 100 combat missions from his base in Southeast Asia. Between May 21, 1973, and February 24, 1976, 147 former POWs received a Champagne Flight at Randolph AFB that in most cases was the start of a training program that put them back in a cockpit and follow-on Air Force flying assignments.

Russ Temperley flew his Champagne Flight on November 6, 1973. He and Bob Barnett were two of the fifty former F-105 pilots who made these flights. This program was a testament to each man's love of flying and the Air Force's commitment to returning their Vietnam POWs to productive careers. ■

NOTES

1. Robert Barnett, e-mail to author, Apr 13, 2004.
2. *Home With Honor, Operation Homecoming*, commemorative book published by the 560th Flying Training Squadron, Randolph AFB, Texas, July 1976, p. 104.
3. His two years of recuperation included obtaining a Masters Degree in Latin American Studies from the University of Arizona. E-mail, Robert Barnett to author, Mar 22, 2004.
4. *Ibid.*
5. History of the 388 TFW, Apr-Dec 1967, USAF microfilm NO584, frame 1756.
6. F-105s had struck this target at least five times since September 1966.
7. Message, 355 TFW JOPREP JIFFY DOI 5300 OPREP-4/21 in USAF microfilm NO463, frame 1361, and Center for Naval Analysis Loss/Damage Database, Navy loss 331, microfiche sheet 01, frame E09.
8. Report, Red Baron II, USAF Fighter Weapons Center, January 1973, Volume 1, Event 31.
9. 388 TFW Mission Data Card, "Ozark 4", compiled by 1Lt Earl Henderson, Oct 3, 1967.
10. Red Baron II and Earl Henderson, e-mail to author, Mar 17, 2004.
11. Red Baron II and "Rolling Thunder Operations Handbook", 7AFP 55-2, July 15, 1968, p. 28.
12. "Ozark 4" 388 TFW Mission Data Card, and Red Baron II.
13. Letter, Winton L. Bazzell to author, Mar 25, 2004.
14. Paraphrased from the transcript of a recorded interview, author with Col Robert Barnett, USAF (Ret.), Fort Worth, TX, May 23, 2001.
15. 388 TFW history, Apr-Dec 1967, Vol II, 13 TFS History, Apr-Jul, 1967, USAF microfilm NO584, frame 0045. The Ryan's Raiders flew F-105Fs with enhanced radar displays that were intended to provide improved night and all-weather bombing. Gen. John D. Ryan initiated the program, officially known as "Commando Nail," when he became CINCPACAF. See Wayne Thompson, *To Hanoi and Back*, (Wash., D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000), pp. 58-61.
16. Barnett interview and e-mail, Bob Barnett to author, Mar 22, 2004.
17. Transcription of "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape, recorded by 1Lt Earl Henderson, Oct 3, 1967.
18. Red Baron II.
19. Barnett interview.
20. "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape.
21. Merle L. Pribbenow II, "The -Ology of War: The Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 191 and 193.
22. Earl Henderson, e-mail to author, Feb 7, 2004.
23. Russ Temperley, letter to author, Mar 8, 2004.
24. The F-105 "Slab Lock Mod" was a switch-activated emergency system that would lock the stabilator in neutral position to prevent the plane from pitching down when both flight control hydraulic systems were lost. The system was intended to allow pilots to reach a safer area for bailout.
25. Barnett interview.
26. Earl Henderson, e-mail to author, Feb 7, 2004.
27. "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape and Barnett interview.
28. Earl Henderson, e-mail to author, Feb 7, 2004. The F-105 carried a drag chute in a compartment in the aft fuselage below the vertical stabilizer that the pilot released after landing to slow the plane down.
29. "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape.
30. Barnett interview.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Bazzell letter.
33. Barnett interview. The beeper was a radio signal on the Guard channel frequency that was broadcast by a pilot's handheld survival radio as well as by a transmitter in his parachute.
34. "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape.
35. Barnett interview.
36. Earl Henderson, e-mail to author, Feb 7, 2004.
37. "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Earl Henderson, e-mail to author, Feb 7, 2004.
40. "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape.
41. Earl Henderson, e-mail to author, Feb 7, 2004.
42. *Ibid.*
43. "Ozark 4" cockpit audio tape. To improve its success in encounters with MiGs, the USAF, in the early 1970s, instituted an air-to-air training program using T-38s to simulate MiG-21s. The T-38s, and later F-5s, were assigned to "aggressor" squadrons whose pilots flew their small jets using Soviet tactics in mock air combat against other USAF aircraft. Earl Henderson, who first encountered MiG-21s over North Vietnam as "Ozark 4", volunteered to be one of the first T-38 aggressor pilots who initiated this training program. See C. R. Anderegg, *Sierra Hotel, Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam*, (Wash., D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2001), pp. 71 - 88.
44. Bazzell letter.
45. Center for Naval Analysis, Loss/Damage Database, Navy loss 331, microfiche sheet 01, frame E09.
46. "Big Mothers Stand Up", *The Hook*, Summer 1998, p. 32.
47. Temperley letter.
48. Barnett interview.
49. *Ibid.*
50. Project CHECO Report No. 55, "USAF Search and Rescue July 1966-November 1967," published Jan. 19, 1968.
51. Barnett interview.
52. CHECO Report No. 55 and *The Hook*.
53. Barnett interview.
54. *Ibid.*
55. CHECO Report No. 55 and *The Hook*.
56. Barnett interview.
57. History of the 388 TFW, Apr-Dec 1967, USAF microfilm NO584, frame 1756, and web site <http://thewall-usa.com>. Neither man's remains was found and they remained MIA until declared dead on April 27, 1978. Their names are engraved on the Vietnam War Memorial.
58. Barnett interview.
59. CHECO Report No. 55.
60. Barnett interview.
61. CHECO Report No. 55.
62. Barnett interview.
63. CHECO Report No. 55.
64. Barnett interview.
65. Barnett interview. The North Vietnamese used the Knobby Room to torture new POWs. See Stewart I. Rochester and Frederick Kiley, *Honor Bound*, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 147.
66. CHECO Report No. 55.
67. Center for Naval Analysis, Loss/Damage Database, USAF loss 732, microfiche sheet 01, frame A24. Bob and Russ were cellmates during a few months in a prison camp near the Chinese border that the POWs called "Dogpatch." Bob Barnett, e-mail to author, Jul 4, 2004.
68. *Honor Bound*, pp. 599 and 616, and Bob Barnett, e-mail to author, Jul 4, 2004.