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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY
7 Aug 1966

CATALOGED

No. 000-5149

RGCO/Colonel Beall/4313

Commander's Letter (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel Allison C. Brooks

Commander

Hq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

Sir:

1. (U) The 3rd ARRGp NORS rate for the month of July is mainly a reflection of HH-3E No. 64-14227 at Det 5, 38th ARRSq being NORS for the last 26 days of the month. Four items are still required to make this aircraft operationally ready. All agencies have been given our status and to date no new progress has been reported. As you know, our mission requirements demand better supply support for the HH-3E's than we received during the month of July. Our overall rate for July was 5.7% however the HH-3 rate was 11%. The overall was our lowest but the HH-3 the highest for this acft. With better support for the HH-3 we could have been below the AF standard. Since the arrival of Gen Momyer he has been very concerned about the low OR rate of his CH-3's which has been around 40% most of the time. He commented the other day that when he was at the ATC the story was that he couldn't get parts because they were all going to SEA and now that he is here he finds they don't have them here either.

2. (U) Det 1, 37th ARRSq has an AGE shortage which attempts are being made to resolve. Shortages of engine and prop tools are seriously hampering maintenance in these areas. Our requirements have been forwarded to ARMDC for their assistance. There are shortages in other areas but these are not as extreme as the engine and prop tools.

3. (U) As was mentioned in last month's letter our own people completely received and processed the AFSD for the HC-130H. Of the approximate 9,000 line items listed, 6,332 were received at Udorn and processed by our five men in 22 working days. Udorn Base Supply offered one man to assist us on a part time basis. The end result of our efforts will be supply support for our aircraft which is our rationalization of doing base supply's work for them.

4. (U) Transportation difficulties continue to plague support of HH-43 aircraft. The most recent example of a transportation failure was on 26 July when A/C 62-4508 at Bien Thuy became NORS for left

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and right hand rotor blades. On 27 July a right hand blade was located at TSN and a left hand blade at Bien Hoa. Action was initiated thru 7th AF Material Control Center to insure movement of both blades to Det 10, 38th ARRSq at Bien Thuy. The right hand blades waited for two days at TSN before airlift could be arranged and the blades shipped. The right hand blades were delivered the morning of 30 July. The left hand set of blades also waited for two days for airlift only to be bumped by mail. After being bumped on 30 July the 7th AF Material Control Center diverted a C-47 into Bien Hoa on 31 July to move them. Because of internal modifications the blades could not be loaded aboard this C-47. The blades were then loaded aboard a C-123 which aborted on take-off. The blades once again were awaiting airlift. Finally on 2 Aug they were put aboard a CV-2 for airlift to Bien Thuy but the flight was diverted to Vung Tau because of weather. The CV-2 then proceeded to TSN where the blades were off-loaded. The blades were then loaded aboard a C-123 only to be bumped when the crew changed. Finally on 3 Aug they were airlifted by a C-47 from TSN to Bien Thuy and our NORS condition ended. A total of 123 NORS hours have been accumulated on one aircraft because no airlift was available. Had transportation been available these hours could have been prevented. The responsible 7AF people are well aware of all of the details of this travesty and hope (with no assurance) that it will never happen again. Only time and circumstances will tell.

5. (S) We are vitally concerned about the phase out of the HU-16 aircraft. It appears all actions are headed in that direction. The currently programmed HH-3's at Danang will be inadequate to support the mission. (Reference RGCO 50146 July 66). ARXDC requested that we have 7th Air Force submit a program change request to retain the HU-16 in the 37th ARRSq. (Reference ARXDC 50272 July 1966). 7th Air Force has advised us that they do not submit program change requests for any organizations. They also advised us that they are responsible for bed down but that the organization, manning and equipage of SAR in SEA is the responsibility of MAC. We dispatched a message on 5 August advising ARXDC of 7th AF position and requested that ARRS take immediate action on a program change request. We are firmly convinced that the HU-16 will be required indefinitely, and that the number of HH-3 programmed for Danang will be grossly inadequate to meet the Gulf of Tonkin and overland SAR requirement.

6. (U) The new HH-3 CCTS graduates are in place and flying missions. With the early expected arrival of the next group we will be in a good position to maintain mission accomplishment and should have the initial orientation of the next group completed prior to departure of the rotating pilots.

7. (S) The first two HH-3's became operational at Danang on 17 July 66. Since then they have made two recoveries. We expect the next two to arrive at Udorn for assembly momentarily. We submitted a request to ARXDC to amend ARRS PP571A to divert HH-3 number 5 and 6 scheduled for

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Danang to Udorn on a permanent basis. The greater operational requirements at that location requires deployment of six aircraft every day to forward operating locations. We are hard pressed to meet this requirement with only 8 aircraft. We have requested reconsideration however, if it is disapproved, we will have no alternative except to TDY two aircraft to Udorn until arrival of the HH-53Bs.

8. (U) On 31 July, a special installation team from the First Mobile Communications Squadron, completed the installation of a 20 Channel TRAC 32, UHF radio in the JSARC. The equipment has been flight tested to 170 NM at 20M ft and 70 miles at 1500 feet. The installation of this equipment provides us with better communications coverage than that afforded the local GCI site. Udorn and Danang RCC's also have requirements for UHF communications and the excellent portable sets possessed by ARRS could be used to good advantage at this time.

9. (U) Attempts are being made to locate a suitable area in SEA where we can conduct water training instead of going to Clark or Naha. A team went to Bangkok this past week and there is a suitable area and excellent wash facilities however boat coverage is a problem. We will continue to try to come up with something to solve the problem. Except for lack of wash facilities, the harbor at Danang or Cam Ranh Bay would be excellent where we could use the choppers for cover. The water problem is critical at Danang with the troops sometimes going for 3-5 days without even being able to take a shower. New wells have been attempted but so far without success.

10. (U) In the personnel planning business I suggest consideration be given to early replacement of some HU-16 crew personnel who will be rotating early because of tour curtailment caused by mission credit. Although they are fragged for orbit positions outside of the 12 mile limit, anytime there is a mission which requires them to penetrate this zone they get credit for a mission over NVN. Twenty such missions mean a 30 day curtailment, 100 missions completes a tour. We should not have anyone with more than a 90 day curtailment.

11. (U) In one of my letters I mentioned the project CHECO and that they were writing a history of ARRS in SEA. The draft of this has been finished and it looks very good to me. All available documentation was researched for reference. Capt Anderson, the project officer, has departed for return to the AF Academy. My understanding is that the document will go to PACAF for printing and distribution. I was assured that distribution would include MAC, ARRS, PARRC in addition to the AU, USAF, etc.

12. (U) Gen Momyer is making many changes in the functioning of the 7th AF staff. In fact the entire functional set up is being changed. He has pulled the Plans shop out from Operations and set it up as a separate DCS reporting to him direct and directed that they get out of the current operations business and start doing the thinking. He is also seeing just about everything that goes out of the Hq. Needless to say this is causing

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much confusion among the staff and papers are being delayed excessively. One paper in which we (ARRS, PARRC, MAC) have a vital interest has been delayed beyond all possible expectations. It is the CINCPACAF message pertaining to the beddown of the HC-130/HH-3 force. For over three weeks I've bugged the people up there for this and the only answer I can get is that it is in the command section. Everyone seems to be stymied for the time being at least. With the departure of Gen Myers the attitude of 7th AF pertaining to the ARRS requirement and methodology seems to have changed. Gen Myers wanted to specify what we used and how and was vitally concerned with the command and control problem. The current position is that 7AF will program beddown bases and support but that equipment, personnel, organization, methodology and command and control is an ARRS/MAC problem. The only thing they demand is quality SAR and effective results. In the words of one person, "if you can give us quality SAR with wheelbarrows, we will find you an operating location".

13. (S) The problem of HC-130/HH-3 air to air refueling over Northern Laos and Western NVN will have to be broached sooner or later so now may be as good a time as any. I am not very optimistic about the feasibility of the operation and would like to present some of the reasons. The area between the buffer zone and that which is covered by radar is very narrow. SAM capability is extending more and more to the western areas. Small arms and automatic weapons are moderate to heavy throughout the area. Terrain elevation averages in the vicinity of 6,000' with peaks to 9,000. Cloud decks are usually not over 2-3000' above the terrain. Thunderstorm activity is prevalent throughout the area and moderate to severe turbulence exists much of the time. Courses to and from recovery areas in the vicinity of Yen Bey and the NW railroad/Red River area are usually flown at the 9-10,000' level. Due to elevation, temperature, and pressure altitude, when we depart forward sites we are usually at max gross with a reduced fuel load to provide an endurance capability of about 5 hours. At those operating weights and altitude, airspeed is normally not over 100kts and very often gets down to around 70 kts. I am not of the opinion that the HC-130 can survive under these conditions, particularly since it is not equipped with any armor plating or self-sealing tanks. In the Gulf of Tonkin I foresee no real problems if the weather is favorable. Another factor to be considered when thinking about our capability in this geographical area is the limitation of the A-1's which are a most essential element of the SARTF. There are no sites in Northern Laos where they can land except for one which is for emergency only. Therefore, they must orbit in order to be able to react along with the HH-3. The normal endurance of the A-1 is six hours however they are presently restricted to about five due to a shortage of drop tanks. We do not feel we can live in the environment of most of our pickup sites without the A-1's. If they must withdraw due to lack of fuel we would have to withdraw at the same time almost without exception in the NVN/Laos area. I suggest that many of the factors presented in this paragraph be included in the Category II and III test program.

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14. (C) Many questions are being received regarding the Fulton Recovery System and its applicability in SEA. We try not to be too pessimistic in our approach however at the same time not be too optimistic in presenting it as any kind of a panacea. A review of past overland recoveries reveals one where it possibly could have been used however this one was a snap with the HH-3 and it would not have been employed anyway. There have been some over water where it could have been used but where it was more expeditious and safer to use either the HU-16 or helicopter.

15. (U) Col. Bill McGinty, IO for 7AF, has just received word that he is to be relieved and returned to ConUS in the immediate future. The ramifications and background on this action are too complicated to present here. Suffice to say that ARRS will be losing one of its strongest backers in the IO area. The 3rd Group has the reputation of being the only unit at this level which has a Col for an Information Officer. I certainly hate to see him depart. Sometime back I mentioned that a writer was attempting to get clearance to write a book about rescue in SEA. Permission has been obtained and the writer is spending almost full time with us at the present time. I do not know what deadline is being set, if any.

Sincerely,

/s/ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Cy to: PRCCO

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PROJECT A HARVEST

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 3RD AEROSPACE RESCUE & RECOVERY GROUP (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: RGCO

SUBJECT: Commander's Letter

No. 0005146

TO: Colonel Allison C. Brooks
Commander
Hq Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Service

Sir:

1. (U) Our NORS rate for this month has once again assumed a downward trend. Unfortunately the APU system has again caused NORS hours. Beginning in September and continuing into April we once again find this particular system causing grounding conditions. For the past three months the APU clutch has proven to be very weak and in short supply. Our tracing action on the clutch shipped during February located the item delayed in Bangkok. It was released and shipped to Udorn arriving there 8 March 66. It was released the same day to relieve a grounding condition on a Pony Express CH-3C. Through coordination with 7AF, DM and the Weapons System Logistics Officer (WSLO) from Warner Robins all efforts are being expended toward improved stock levels on this particular item. MD

2. (U) Surveys taken at Udorn and Ubon Base Supply during the past month indicate a transportation problem for our Thailand detachments. The average delivery time for an 02 supply priority item (NORS/G, NORS/N and ANORS) is between 27 and 30 days. This extended delivery time is undoubtedly causing our units to use higher supply priorities in order to replenish stocks. If it takes 27 days to receive an item ordered priority 02 ANORS then a priority 06 would take months. One solution is to ship only by Military Airlift since civilian airline delivery must pass through customs and a lengthy processing system. Warner Robins and PARRC and ARMSF have been requested not to ship commercial air. 13AF is also striving to improve intra-country airlift in Thailand.

3. (U) The improvement in operational readiness is a result of several factors. Initial provisioning of detachments did not afford adequate range and depth of spares to sustain operations for prolonged periods. While the line items contained in the Maintenance Support Kit listing may be suitable during conditions requiring utilization of WEM assets in CONUS, the listing should not be considered as adequate to support units deployed overseas. Expansion of the listing, to afford greater response to random demands, and increasing stock levels, to compensate for the long pipe line delivery time, was attempted with beneficial results. Establishment of BASO's at each operating location, direct shipment of items from the CONUS to the requisitioning activity, implementing procedures which lead to intelligent forecasting requirements, and slight improvements in base support have contributed to our current posture. MOC

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ARCVC 66-32

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Our 7.3% MORS rate for March is slightly better than 7AF average of approximately 8% during the past 6 months. We continue to strive to reduce our MORS rate to an acceptable level.

Also 3rd Bn
been told that
PR manning at
Det 5+7 will
be at 1.5 in
7 2.0 like the
rest of the crew
Personnel? H.

4. (C) Pararescue manning at Det 5, 38 ARRSq is looking brighter. POC
With the arrival of 4 PJ's projected in April they will be 94% manned. M
HH-43 pilot manning will regress during the next 120 days unless replacement personnel are provided when present assigned pilots depart for CONUS and European assignments. My message RGAD 00291/2 April 66 to ARPPP gives detailed manning picture on affected detachments. Allocations for 37 ARRSq and Det 1, 37 ARRSq are being received. It appears that personnel will arrive during May, June, and July. Firm reporting dates have not been received but it appears that the units will not be fully manned by X date, (May for 37 ARRSq and July for Det 1, 37 ARRSq). H. PPR?

5. (U) Being senior MAC officer at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, I have coordinated Major General Birchard's trip to RVN with 7AF and MAC Commander's. Presentations are being prepared, however specific request was made that we not include organizational and administrative matters but that we stick to operational matters and problem areas. I hope to avoid those areas for which we have no recommended solutions as yet.

6. (U) A requirement exists in SEA to brief all incoming tactical air crews concerning SAR procedures. To assist the briefer and to enhance the presentation we have just completed a series of 41 color slides. info
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The 600th AAVS at ISN is reproducing sufficient sets to permit distribution to each of the detachments plus the JSARC and headquarters. Upon receipt I each set will be forwarded to ARRS and PARRC for whatever purpose they may find for them. 800

7. (S) The direction to establish a Joint Search and Rescue Center became a reality upon receipt of CINCPAC Secret Msg R270047Z. Paragraph 3 is quoted for your information; Quote: The establishment of SEASIA Search and Rescue Center (SEASARC) is directed. REF A designates CINCPACAF as SAR Commander for SEASIA. Accordingly, CINCPACAF in coordination with CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV will develop plans at the earliest for the establishment of SEASARC. Unquote. 7AF has replied that we are ready to establish the SEASARC and requested a tri service planning conference schedule. Our first reaction is that there are two methods of operations that appear feasible:

a. Completely integrate the assigned Army-Navy personnel into the controller function. ODC

b. Continue as we are at present with the Army and Navy personnel in the center as representatives of their services, but not actually controlling. We feel certain one of these systems will be employed. XOC

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8. (U) The move to the new building was completed 5 April 66. There were unforeseen problems that delayed the move past the original scheduled date of 25 March. In this case inadequate power and inability to move the radio antennas were the culprits.

Progress

9. (U) During the month we have made some excellent gains for rescue in SEA. We have obtained a new building for the JSARC; obtained authorization to establish a true JSARC and received permission to return all of the operational control for SEA to the 3ARRGP center. In spite of this progress we still face the next 60-90 days with some apprehension. During April we are scheduled to receive 8 New Officer controllers of a total of 12 authorized. From the information available to us, none of those being assigned have any previous rescue or controller experience. This situation will place a heavy responsibility upon the 4 presently assigned controllers and supervisory personnel until the new officers can be adequately trained.

Good
True but
unavoidable
POC
OOC

10. (S) The Special Forces Camp at Khe Sanh mentioned in paragraph 7 of my 4 Mar letter is programmed for use by Det 7 as a forward staging location starting the first week of April. A fuel pump, the last delaying factor, has been obtained and is awaiting transportation from Danang to Khe Sanh.

11. (S) Detachment 1, Phan Rang AB became operational on 18 March. Personnel from the 38 ARRSq are being used in a TDY capacity until PCS replacements arrive or until we try to get authority to PCS those that are there.

POC

your move.

12. (S) 3rd ARRGPs Plan 66-1 has been prepared outlining actions to be taken for activation of the LBR at Nha Trang which is programmed to become operational 7 June 66. We requested Det 11, Tuy Hoa be moved to Nha Trang in our message RGAD 50050/23 Mar 66 to ARXDC. Informal information indicates that Det 11 is programmed to move to Qui Nhon and Det 12 will be activated at Nha Trang. Personnel are already allocated to Det 11 and will be arriving in late May or early June. Although they are assigned to Tuy Hoa they can be reassigned to Det 11 at Nha Trang if movement orders are published prior to their arrival.

13. (S) We have not utilized the night operation plan as yet. This is due primarily to 2 factors: One; the ALES cannot perform their escort duties at night and two; there is still an element of doubt throughout 7AF about attempting a night personnel recovery under anything except ideal conditions. At present we are following the policy of maintaining a standard ARRS night alert posture and will launch if the pickup appears to have a good chance of success. If there is any doubt that a night pickup can be accomplished the forces are launched to be in position over the target for a first light attempt. A bailed out crewmember is generally

ITS NOT
AN EASY
JOB - AS
WE ALL
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safer and has a better chance of evading if we do not draw attention to them during the hours of darkness. With a full scale effort timed to first light our chances of a successful pickup are considerably improved. This concept is accepted by both tactical operations and 7AF command personnel. However, the test program should continue at full speed to insure a capability for future night operations.

info.
ODC
XDC

14. (C) During the past six months there have been many emergency (URC-21) beeper signals received throughout the SEA theatre. Except for initial bail-out and contact very few of these signals have been proven valid and there is every reason to believe the radios are being activated by the enemy. Checking out these signals has placed an undue strain on our limited resources. To alleviate this condition we are proposing a plan to Hq 7AF which will incorporate a coding system. We believe the plan will be simple yet highly reliable. We will elaborate on the proposal when it has been adequately refined.

ODC
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15. (U) We have been advised that the structural repair work on HH-43F 62-4508 has been completed. The contractor overlooked requisitioning flap assemblies and many components required to build-up the engine, which will slip the ETIC a few more weeks. We have asked Det 7, APRFE, to requisition all additional items required and intend to help them out through lateral support as much as possible.

MDC

Sincerely,

Arthur W. Beall

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

Copy to: PARRC (PRCCO)

PS. (U) As our additional people arrive we are fast getting into a position where we can keep assistance teams almost constantly in the field resolving problems in the various functional fields, i.e. Supply, Maintenance, Safety, etc. However, this is only made possible by our method of functioning as an integrated headquarters as the 3ARRG/38ARRS. You should have received the word by now that 2AD became the 7th AF on 1 April and that General Bond is now Deputy Commander 7AF/13AF.

Good

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GROUP - 4

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8. (C) On 20 February also Binh Thuy AB received 15-20 mortar rounds (probably 81 mm). Two civilians were killed, an unknown number wounded, 4 VNAF personnel were wounded, one of them seriously, 2 sentry dogs were killed, four trucks damaged and a U-10 aircraft received light damage from mortar fragments. We were very fortunate in that none of our people were hurt and none of our aircraft damaged.

9. (S) Tuy Hoa is definitely out of the picture now and Qui Nhon will replace it in our plans. The latest information 2AD gives on the go for Qui Nhon is around October 1966. The latest information from 2AD on the LER requirement for Nha Trang is 7 June.

10. (U) There is a further delay in the resiting of the LER section here at TBN. There are two reasons; one, that there is now a new VNAF Wing Commander who is taking a harder line on 2AD requests for land than the previous commander and; two, a new tower may be made available from civilian sources and if it is it will probably be sited where we were to place the LER. There is an alternate location I've asked for and approval is pending.

11. (U) Two buildings 60 X 20 adjacent to and parallel with the present 3rd ARMGP - 38th ARMS building, have been assigned to house the 3rd Group headquarters and JSARC. The JSARC will be 36 X 20 and air conditioned. The renovation program is presently underway and the estimated date of move to new quarters is 15 March 1966.

12. (U) During the visit of Colonel Beaudry and Colonel Thorne to SEA, we were most chagrined one day when the Army had to return them to Tan Son Nhut in a UH-1B, after our own HH-43 had made a precautionary landing due to transmission trouble. On 26 February we returned the favor when the same HH-43 that had failed us traveled 60 miles north to pick up two Army Colonels who were passengers on a UH-1B which had been forced to make a precautionary landing because of - you guessed it - transmission trouble.

13. (U) We are disappointed that the PCS controllers have not yet arrived at Udorn and Danang. The TDY people have performed well, but it does take a few weeks to become oriented and proficient in managing the rescue resources under SEA conditions. About the time they get really good at it they must be replaced and the continuity is lost. We feel certain that many advantages, such as better controlling, better reports and better relationship with the base will accrue from the assignment of the permanent controllers in April.

14. (U) Latest information received from Detachment 7, APRFE, Bangkok, indicates that 62-4508 will not be available 15 March. Approximately 20 parts are still required to complete the repair. A listing of the shortages has been promised. After local screening, we will identify those items which cannot be filled from theater assets, and request ARMS assistance to expedite shipment of required items. Thus far we have shipped an engine, rotor blades, and hub assemblies to the contractor. It is our intention to furnish 4 maintenance technicians, upon call of the contractor, to assist in installation of major assemblies and to prepare the aircraft for flight.

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20. (U) I would like to commend to you Maj Bayler Haynes the Commander of Det 5 at Udorn. I urge that ARRS do everything within its power to retain him in our system. He is an outstanding commander and in the words of Gen Murphy "a natural born leader". I hope he gets promoted on the next cycle. If we lose him from ARRS I think we will have lost a man with the highest amount of expertise in the field that it has been my privilege to have been associated with. If we get the OCT school going he would make the ideal commander for it. He would like to return to Eglin and I have hopes that we may be able to locate the OCT there sooner or later. He would be a good man to work on the tactics and techniques of recovery in conjunction with our participation in tactical exercises, etc.

21. (U) It seems we spend an unusual amount of time, (based on rumors, assumptions and mistrust of our capability to evaluate) defending ourselves. Three recent cases in point are; a. Based on a press release, we were asked to submit or resubmit a mission report. This release was based on a mission report submitted three months prior to the release and resulted from an IO screening of our records for releasable and interesting missions. b. Based on what appears to be a rumor we were queried about being non-cooperative with the Marconi people on performing some modifications. As the inquiry did not indicate how, what, who, or when we are at a loss as to the why of the request. In addition we have no knowledge of the project being referred to. c. Based on an ARSOP evaluation of mission No. 6-39-26 Feb 66 the fact we had classified the two saves as combat saves was not agreed with. In our evaluation we feel they fulfilled the Combat Save classification criteria. We have only interest in "saves" and not any classification breakout therefore if our evaluation cannot be accepted I recommend we furnish your Bq with the facts of the case and that the classification be accomplished there and we be notified if necessary however I do feel we are in a better situation to evaluate all of the factors and render a valid decision.

22. (U) The Civilian Personnel office is attempting to obtain a local hire for the temporary secretary slot. Such a hire will of necessity be a local national and not be able to take dictation but may help to establish the position. One year minimum contract is necessary to get someone from the ZI and they are pretty sure that none will come over for less than a GS-5 position. We are hopeful of getting a local national.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR W. BEALL, Colonel, USAF
Commander

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Copy to:

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PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

6 Jul 1966

CATALOGED

No 0005148

RGCO/Colonel Beall/4313

Commander's Letter

Colonel Allison C. Brooks

Commander

Hq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

Sir:

1. (U) In preparation for the arrival of HC-130H aircraft of Det 1, 37th ARRS at Udorn AB, Thailand, a check was made to determine maintenance equipment on hand and the number of aircraft spare parts in Base Supply. Approximately 9,000 items comprising the HC-130H AFSD had arrived at Udorn but remained in their shipping containers just as they were received from WRAMA. A check with the 630th Combat Support Group DM and BASO revealed a huge backlog of work due to conversion to Punch Card Accounting Machines and a 70% manning in Supply. We sent five men TDY to assist Udorn Base Supply so as to process the spare parts into base stocks. It is estimated that all items will be processed by 20 July 1966. Initial supply support should prove to be very effective judging from the number of spare parts sent by WRAMA to Udorn.

2. (U) Although our NORS rate continues to be lower than the theatre average and equal to or lower than the ARRS average it is still above standard. The non-availability of HH-43B/F rotor blades has been a large contributing factor. Lateral support between bases has satisfied all NORS blade demands during this month. It may be well to once again reiterate the inter-theatre airlift transportation delays. Bringing a set of blades from Thailand to Vietnam or vice versa can accumulate as many as seven days NORS due to lack of airlift. WRAMA states in the AFLC S-15 report that blades will be available in August to meet priority requests. With our ever increasing operational requirements it is imperative that all levels of command monitor this problem area. With the assignment of 4 HC-130s we should be able to help ourselves at times in this matter, operational commitments allowing.

3. (U) With further reference to the NORS topic, it has been suggested by Colonel McElroy that either our units have limited repair capabilities or that we are charging NORS time to what should be NORM time. Indeed, there is no base in SEA which is as self-sufficient as a comparable base in ConUS. Progress is being made at all bases to improve repair capability, however. The suggestion that we would charge the hours an aircraft is out for maintenance to NORS is, of course, rather far fetched. The reporting integrity of our personnel need not be impuned so carelessly. All not-operational conditions from any cause are

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remain sufficiently manned, only increased parts supply will be required to support the additional flying hours. Seasonal weather also plays an important part in the Rescue coverage of Laos. Because of the limited number of landing areas available to us plus no navigational aids, we are many times unable to stage from a location close enough to strike areas to provide desired coverage.

14. (U) Efforts are continuously being made to improve our communications nets. At present we have single side band (SSB) communications between all RCC's, control aircraft and the HH-3s. For the most part reception is satisfactory. However, for approximately 15% of the time reception is minimum satisfactory or below between the primary locations and the airborne mission commander. To improve this reception percentage we have requested antenna facilities to accommodate 3 additional frequencies of varying ranges to combat loss of effectiveness due to poor propagation, weather phenomenon, etc. The 7th AF communications people have stated they believe they can have all required facilities for this improvement installed within 90 days.

15. (C) In November 1965 we requested 7th AF communications to install direct land lines from the JSARC to the RCC's at Danang and Udorn as a backup to the present radio communications. The request was resubmitted in February 1966 and forwarded to MACV for final validation on 11 March 1966. MACV concurred with the requirement and placed it on the waiting list. Current information from 7th AF communications indicates that: (1) There are 85 circuits in SEA that have been validated and awaiting channelization. (2) MACV establishes and controls priorities for direct lines in this theatre. (3) 7th AF and PACAF has been unable to apply any pressure upon MACV to obtain more lines. (4) Until additional equipment is received every new line issued must be taken from its present user. During mission prosecution we overcome this difficulty by placing an ops immediate call to the appropriate RCC and maintaining an open line for mission duration, sometimes for as long as a couple of hours continuously. Of course we would not need direct contact with the RCC during mission prosecution if the Airborne Mission Commander was fully qualified and had the proper facilities aboard the aircraft. In other words what we really need is an airborne Rescue Control Center manned by an Airborne Mission Commander and a Command Post Technician with aircraft status boards, complete and detailed maps on terrain features, intelligence information on gun placements, location of friendly forces and safe havens, etc. The fact of the matter is that we could probably discontinue the ground RCCs if we can ever get the Airborne RCC and AMC functioning properly with the proper equipment, and use the manpower spaces thus saved to properly man a minimum of two airborne RCCs, if it appears that the spaces will not be made available any other way. I realize that the AMC concept is very controversial just from the resistance it appears to be getting from all echelons. A full appreciation cannot be gained of its importance until one has prosecuted missions from the JSARC level and worked on a day to day basis with 7th AF on command and control problems. I suspect the only person outside of SEA who has an appreciation for the problems is Col Krafka.

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3 ARRG/EC BRIEFING TO 7AF/CC MAR 66
EXCERPTED AFM 14 MAR 3 ARRG/CC MONTHLY CC LTR

GENERAL ESTES, GENERAL CUNNINGHAM, GENTLEMEN.

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IN COMPARING TODAY'S COMBAT AIRCREW RECOVERY CAPABILITIES AGAINST REQUIREMENTS, WE FIND SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS. OF COURSE, THERE ARE MANY LESS SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS UNCOVERED ALONG THE WAY -- BUT THE TOPICS SHOWN ON THIS CHART ARE DESIGNED TO GUIDE US TOWARD THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS IMPACTING UPON THIS COMMAND.

TO FIX IN MIND THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE 1.1 MILLION SQUARE MILES IN WHICH THE 3RD ^{ARR} GROUP MUST RESPOND TO RECOVER DOWNED AIRMEN. REFLECTING JUST A BIT, THE AREA IS VAST; IT IS NOT JUST VIETNAM. HOWEVER, OVER 700,000 SQUARE MILES ARE THE JUNGLE LAND MASS AREAS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. IN THIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, WITH THE RESOURCES ASSIGNED, WE HAVE RECOVERED 78% OF THOSE PERSONNEL THAT WERE ABLE TO BE RECOVERED. THAT IS, IF THE CREWMEMBER WAS WITHIN OUR RANGE, THE AREA WAS PERMISSIVE ENOUGH TO PERMIT OPERATION, THE WEATHER WAS PERMISSIVE AND OF COURSE, IF HE SURVIVED THE CRASH AND PRESENTED AN OBJECTIVE IN THE FIRST PLACE. IT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT 39% OF ALL DOWNED AIRMEN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WERE RECOVERED BY THE 3RD RESCUE GROUP. AND THIS, OF COURSE, LEADS US DIRECTLY TO OUR OBJECTIVE OF CLOSING THIS OBVIOUS GAP BETWEEN OPPORTUNITY AND REQUIREMENT. EVEN THOUGH UNATTAINABLE, IT STILL REMAINS AN OBJECTIVE GOAL OF THE 3RD GROUP.

attch 3
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DURING THE PERIOD 1 MARCH 1966 THROUGH 23 FEBRUARY 1967, 37 DOWNED COMBAT AIRCREW MEMBERS WERE RECOVERED IN NORTH VIETNAM, 31 WERE RECOVERED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN, 99 IN THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT OF LAOS, AND SIX WERE RECOVERED IN THAILAND. THESE, THEN, REPRESENT THE "OUT OF COUNTRY" COMBAT AIRCREW RECOVERIES, TALLING 173. "IN COUNTRY" OR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 79 WERE RECOVERED; AND THE TOTAL AIRCREW RECOVERIES WERE 252.

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NOW, LET'S LOOK AT A BRIEF RESUME OF THE TOTAL SAVES DURING THIS TIME PERIOD BY THE TYPE OF RECOVERY AIRCRAFT. THE AGING HU-16 RECOVERED 20 AIRCREW MEMBERS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. THE HH-3E JOLLY GREEN GIANTS RECOVERED 129 IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT AND 10 IN A NON-COMBAT ENVIRONMENT. THE HH-43 PEDROS RECOVERED 283 IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT; 94 WERE SAVED IN NON-COMBAT SITUATIONS. ALTHOUGH IMPRESSIVE, THE GAP STILL REMAINS AT 78% OF THE OPPORTUNITIES; AND 39% OF ALL DOWNED AIRMEN. IN OUR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IT IS USAF SORTIES THAT REALLY MEAN DOWNED AIRMEN.

THE 3RD GROUP MADE AN ANALYSIS BASED ON PAST HISTORY TO PREDICT THE REQUIREMENTS TO REACT TO ALL USAF DOWNED AIRMEN. THIS

EQUATION IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPROACH USED TO ARRIVE AT THE REQUIRED ACR AIRFRAMES, IN THIS CASE THE HH-3E WE CONSIDERED THE USAF SORTIES, HOW MANY AIR FORCE SORTIES WERE FLOWN PER DOWNED AIRMAN, THE AVERAGE HH-3 SORTIES REQUIRED PER SAVE, HOURS THE HH-3 FLEW PER SORTIE, AND THE UE HOURS ALLOWED PER HH-3 PER MONTH.

AS YOU CAN SEE IN THIS SLIDE, THE OUT OF COUNTRY SORTIES HAS CONTINUED TO RISE. THE PREDICTION IS, AND AFTER DISCUSSION WITH 7TH AIR FORCE, THAT AF SORTIES WILL REACH A MAXIMUM OF 18,000 PER MONTH IN APPROXIMATELY FY 3/68. WITH THIS INCREASE IN SORTIES, WE, OF COURSE, HAVE AN INCREASING REQUIREMENT IN THE NUMBER OF AIRFRAMES, AS SHOWN BY THE TOP CURVE. THIS TOP CURVE LEVELS OUT AT A PEAK OF 41 DEEP PENETRATING HELICOPTERS. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THIS ANALYSIS, BASED ON PAST COMB. STATISTICAL DATA, WAS DONE BY AN OFFICER NOT EVEN AWARE OF YOUR INPUT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. THE NUMBER, I BELIEVE IS WITHIN A FEW AIRCRAFT OF ^{THAT} WHAT YOU STATED AS THE ^{MAJOR} REQUIREMENT IN 1965.

THIS CENTER CURVE SHOWS THE PROGRAMMED INPUT OF HH-3E AND HH-53B AIRCRAFT; AND, SIR, THIS BOTTOM CURVE SHOWS OUR ACTUAL POSITION. THIS IS ONE REASON WE HAVE MERELY A 39% RECOVERY RATE. A SIMILAR ANALYSIS WAS MADE FOR THE HH-43 IN-COUNTRY

ACR MISSIONS. PRESENTED ON THIS CHART ARE THE SORTIES, BOTH ACTUAL AND FORECAST, IN-COUNTRY, LEVELLING OFF AT 58,000 SORTIES PER MONTH. ADDITIONAL ACR HELICOPTERS, COUPLED WITH THE LBR MISSION, SHOWS THAT WE NEED 37 HH-43S BY FY 3/68. SHOWN ALSO IS THE PROGRAMMED INPUT AND THE ACTUAL LEVEL WE ARE MAINTAINING. IN ADDITION TO THE HH-43 INCREASE, WE NEED TEN HH-3ES IN COUNTRY. THIS IS TO INCREASE OUR RESPONSE TIME, PROVIDE AREA COVERAGE, AND MEET RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE SAIGON FIR. I ALSO WANT TO POINT OUT, THE AIR FRAMES WE CLAIM TO BE THE REQUIREMENT DO ACCOUNT FOR ATTRITION. THIS IS A REALITY THAT MUST BE FACED IN PROGRAMMING AIRCRAFT INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY FORTUNATE IN REGARD TO COMBAT LOSSES.

IT IS MY GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO INFORM YOU THAT I EXPECT OUR LOSSES WILL INCREASE DUE TO GREATLY INCREASED ENEMY CAPABILITY. IN SUMMARY, SINCE WE CONSIDER EVERY MAN THAT BAILS OUT OR IS DOWNED IS A REQUIREMENT FOR 3RD GROUP, WE SAY THAT BY 3/68, WE WILL REQUIRE A TOTAL OF 51 HH-3 OR 53B TYPE HELICOPTERS, 41 OUT OF COUNTRY AND TEN IN COUNTRY. AND WE WILL NEED 37 HH-43S.

THIS NEXT CHART IS PRESENTED TO SHOW THE SMALL INVENTORY OF SAR FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BOTH IN AIRCRAFT AND IN TOTAL POPULATION.

WE CONSIDER OURSELVES A CHANGING COMMAND. FIRST OF ALL, IN THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS, THESE ARE THE ITEMS BY WHICH WE INTEND TO INCREASE OUR POSTURE AND TO PERMIT US TO INCREASE OUR SAVE RATE. [WE INTEND TO GET AN INCREASE IN ACR COVERAGE AS MORE HH-3S ARE DELIVERED TO OUR AREA, ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE HH-53 WILL INCREASE OUR SPEED AND THUS REDUCE REACTION TIME, AND ITS CAPACITY PERMITS USE OF A NIGHT RECOVER SYSTEM.

AIR REFUELING IS A PROVEN FACT AND WILL PERMIT US DEEPER PENETRATION AND ALSO PERMIT US TO OPERATE AT HIGHER ALTITUDES FOR RESCUE RECOVERIES. WE NEED AERIAL REFUELING NOW, BUT CAN ONLY EXPECT TO BE FULLY OPERATIONAL BY SEPTEMBER 1967. MISSION FLEXIBILITY WITH THIS QUANTUM INCREASE IN CAPABILITY IS NEEDED NOW. WE HAVE ALSO RESOLVED THAT OUR HELICOPTERS WILL BE COMPLETELY COMPATIBLE WITH THE NAVY SHIP TO AIR REFUELING PROGRAM KNOWN AS PROGRAM "HIGH DRINK." THIS WILL GIVE US AN EMERGENCY REFUELING CAPABILITY IN THE GULF.

^{THREE} OUR FIRST ^{SOME NOW} ARMED HELICOPTER IS PRESENTLY IN THE THEATRE. THIS CONFIGURATION UTILIZES THREE M-60D MACHINE GUNS TO GIVE US MORE PROTECTION BY KEEPING HOSTILE FORCES DOWN. ONCE WE BUILD THE REPUTATION ENJOYED BY THE MARINES AND THE ARMY -- THAT IS, THAT WE DO HAVE ARMS AND WILL FIRE BACK -- WE FEEL TH WE WILL BE ABLE TO GET INTO AREAS THAT ARE PRESENTLY DENIED U

WITH AERIAL REFUELING AND THE INCREASE IN NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, WE INTEND TO START THE ORBITING CONCEPT. THIS WILL STRATEGICALLY POSITION OUR HELICOPTERS RIGHT AT THE NORTH VIETNAM BORDER. THESE ORBITS WILL BE IN NORTHERN LAOS, CENTRAL LAOS, AND OVER THE GULF OF TONKIN. WE WILL BE ABLE TO STAY ON STATION DURING THE HIGH STRIKE PERIODS, AND BEING CLOSE TO AIR STRIKE ACTIVITY WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE OUR REACTION TIME TO GET TO THE DOWNED AIRMAN. CREW DUTY TIME IS 12 HOURS. MAXIMUM LENGTH OF A MISSION WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 7 HOURS. THEREFORE, AT THIS TIME I SEE NO REQUIREMENT FOR AUGMENTED CREWS OR FOR INCREASING THE CREW RATIO OF 2.0. REFUELING WILL BE REQUIRED ONLY TO INCREASE THE ORBIT TIME OR WHEN FLIGHTS GET EXTENDED DUE TO AN ACTUAL MISSION. WE ARE CONTINUING TO EVALUATE THE MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF AERIAL REFUELING OUR HELICOPTERS. LT COL BRITTON, ~~THE~~ JOLLY GREEN COMMANDER AT UDORN, WILL GIVE YOU THE DETAILS OF CURRENT MISSION TACTICS.

WE HERE AT GROUP CONTINUALLY REVIEW AND EVALUATE POTENTIAL TACTIC CHANGES SUCH AS PHASING THE HC-130P INTO THE GULF, REPLACING THE HU-16S AS THE COMMAND AIRCRAFT. WE ARE COORDINATING NOW WITH THE NAVY TO DETERMINE THE BEST TACTICS TO PERMIT PENETRATION OF THE COAST ALONG THE GULF OF TONKIN, SINCE THIS IS A HIGHLY DEFENDED AREA. THE USE OF SMOKE SCREENS LAID DOWN BY THE SANDY AIRCRAFT MAY HELP.

IN THE WORLD. GROUP PERSONNEL HAVE RENOVATED THE ENLISTED DORMITORY HERE AT TAN SON NHUT AND HAVE DONE A TREMENDOUS JOB OF ALMOST COMPLETELY REBUILDING AND AIR CONDITIONING THE 3RD GROUP AND 38TH SQUADRON OFFICE AREAS. THIS WAS A RESULT OF EOP, AN INDUCED SELF-HELP PROGRAM; AND WE ARE VERY PROUD OF IT. SELF-HELP PROGRAMS ARE EVIDENT AT ALL 3RD GROUP UNITS. AS PART OF OUR EOP PROGRAM, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU TALK TO MY PEOPLE BRIEFLY THIS AFTERNOON.

HERE IS THE AWARDS AND DECORATIONS HISTORY DURING FY 67 FOR THE 3RD GROUP. I FEEL IT IS RATHER IMPRESSIVE AND POINTS OUT THAT WE HAVE A TOUGH MISSION OVER HERE. BUT MORE THAN THAT, IT POINTS UP OUR PROGRAM AS BEING LIBERAL, AGGRESSIVE, AND PROMPT. LIBERAL - EVERY PERSON CONSIDERED FOR AT LEAST ONE DECORATION DURING TOUR. AGGRESSIVE - EVERY UNIT HAS DECORATIONS OFFICER LOOKING FOR CANDIDATES. PROMPT - ON TIME - AWARD GIVEN AMONG CONTEMPORARIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.]

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO TOUCH ON WHAT WE CONSIDER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS WITH WHICH WE [IN THE [3RD GROUP]] ARE FACED. FOREMOST AND ABOVE ALL IS THE LACK OF AIRCREW RECOVERY HELICOPTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BECAUSE OF SLOW DELIVERY RATES OF HH-3S AND THE FACT THAT WE HAVE LOST FOUR IN THE THEATRE, I HAVE HAD TO SEEK RELEASE FROM THE OPTIMUM FRAG POSITIONING.

WHERE WE CONSIDERED AT LEAST SIX AIRCRAFT ON THE WESTERN BORDER TO PROVIDE MINIMUM RECOVERY EFFORT, WE HAVE HAD TO REDUCE OURSELVES TO FOUR. WE ARE ALSO FACED WITH THE LACK OF RESCORT AIRCRAFT ON THE EAST COAST. THESE ARE THE A-1ES, OR SANDIES, THAT DELIVER THE FIRE POWER WE DEEM SO CRITICAL TO SUCCESSFUL RESCUE MISSIONS. TOO OFTEN WE HAVE TO WAIT WITH OUR HELICOPTERS FOR THE SANDIES TO ARRIVE FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION, ESPECIALLY IN THE DMZ AREA. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE LOST SOME OF OUR OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF THESE DELAYS.

WE SEE SHIFTING OF PERSONNEL ROTATING INTO AND OUT OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA AS A MASS EXODUS. FOR EXAMPLE, 18 OF OUR HH-3 RESCUE CREW COMMANDERS WILL ROTATE DURING THE MONTHS OF JUNE AND JULY. IN THE 39TH SQUADRON, WE WILL HAVE A 45% INFLUX IN THE TWO MONTHS OF APRIL AND MAY. THIS LEAVES US WITH LITTLE OR NO OVERLAP OF EXPERIENCE. THE SITUATION ALSO EXISTS IN THE JSARC AND THROUGHOUT OUR MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE. THE MAN ROTATES BACK TO THE STATES, IN MANY CASES, PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF HIS REPLACEMENT. I FEEL THAT I NEED THE AUTHORITY TO CURTAIL AND TO EXTEND TOURS BY 30 DAYS TO PROVIDE NECESSARY OVERLAP OF EXPERIENCE. I AM SHIFTING PERSONNEL WITHIN THE THEATRE, TRYING TO MAINTAIN AN EVEN EXPERIENCE LEVEL; HOWEVER, WITH THE MASS EXODUS OF PERSONNEL, THIS WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

LET ME SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS MATTER IS IMPROVING. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE HH-53 CONTINGENT WILL COME IN OVER A FOUR MONTH
PERIOD.]

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NOW FOR OUR FORWARD OPERATING SITES. I AM WELL AWARE THAT
WAR MAKES FOR ROUGH CONDITIONS, AND WE ALL ACCEPT THAT FACT.
BUT UNDER PEACETIME CONDITIONS, I WOULDN'T CONSIDER SENDING
MY HELICOPTERS INTO THE SITES THEY MUST OPERATE OUT OF NOW.
WE ARE OPERATING OUT OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONAL SITES. POLITICAL
INTERFACING IN LAOS, AS WELL AS THE VERY FLUID MILITARY SITUATION,
MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN IMPROVEMENTS AT THESE SITES.

TRAINING WE CONSIDER A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM, BOTH STATESIDE
AND [HERE] IN THE ^{Combat} THEATRE. WE HAVE REQUESTED ADDED STRESS ON
THE STATESIDE TRAINING IN REGARDS TO HIGH ALTITUDE, ¹/₂ MAXIMUM
PERFORMANCE OPERATIONS. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE ASKED FOR
GREATER EMPHASIS ON INSTRUMENT TRAINING. OUR DEEP PENETRATING
HELICOPTERS ARE NOW TRUE INSTRUMENT AIRCRAFT. THEREFORE,
OUR CREWS MUST BE PROFICIENT TO FULLY UTILIZE THIS CAPABILITY.
TRAINING AT THE COMBAT CREW TRAINING SCHOOL IS PRESENTLY BEING
CONDUCTED WITH NON-COMBAT CONFIGURED HELICOPTERS. ^{HQ} HQ RESCUE
RECOMMENDED THAT HQ MAC TAKE ACTION TO AUTHORIZE THREE
CCTS CH-3ES BE COMBAT CONFIGURED WITH THREE KITS EXCESS TO
THE SEA MODIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.]