

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

PROJECT CORONA HARVE

SECTION I

DO NOT DESTROY

INTRODUCTION

CATALOGED - 0005811
CATALOG

Consideration for the value of human life is deeply imbedded in the traditions, ideals and ethics of the American peoples. The relatively short history of our country is rich with examples wherein public attitudes have been reflected by government directed military support of United States citizens engaged in hazardous activities. Flying over the globe in all environments, United States Air Force crew members engage in a range of hazardous activities unparalleled in the history of any nation yet feeling secure in the knowledge that an organization exists which is dedicated to assist them in the event of an incident which jeopardizes their safety.

Although vested in the humanitarian tradition, the Air Rescue Service offers the American public a calculable return for their investment not only in the savings of life but also in terms of costly hardware retrieved. Together with these visible evidences of the necessity for an aerial rescue/recovery system are the intangible benefits which accrue as a result of rescue and recovery. These include an increase in combat effectiveness due to preservation of combat resources; improved morale of aerospace crew members; the scientific value of technical data represented in recovered aerospace hardware; and regional, national, and international goodwill generated as a by-product of search, rescue and recovery operations.

The history of Air Rescue Service in terms of resources available, if plotted on a graph, would follow an erratic pattern of peaks and valleys. From a scattering of minimally trained personnel with a motley assortment of aircraft following WWII, Air Rescue Service was built up to a force of 50 squadrons during the Korean War. In 1957, this force was sharply reduced to a posture of 12 units located on the major aerial lines of communication, and oriented to the peacetime SAR mission. This was a result of a JCS policy decision that rescue forces would not be equipped or manned for combat rescue, which was in keeping with our national military policy of strategic deterrence. The situation today is essentially the same with 12 squadrons of fixed-wing aircraft, supplemented by local base rescue helicopter detachments of limited value for other than the short range missions for which designed. These forces are geared to the peacetime search and rescue function and not equipped for combat missions, although ARS is tasked in a myriad of war and contingency plans to provide combat aircrew recovery. ARS' ability to respond to these plans can best be exemplified by the fact that after two years of USAF operations in South Vietnam, only a token force of six short range helicopters with minimum combat equipment could be provided for combat rescue. The cost of this force, which was created with premium dollars on a crash basis, was exorbitant when related to the limited capability gained.

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

ATCH 6

260

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. (S) Recovery of Military Personnel from Hostile Areas:

(1) (S) ARS has become increasingly concerned with the historical deficiency in capability to perform the combat aircrew recovery mission. With one exception USAF policy has been that ARS be manned and equipped for this mission after initiation of hostile activity. This policy results in high cost crash programs to equip and man combat aircrew recovery units and in the use of inadequate resources with a high degree of risk in the interim period. The only exception to this policy was the creation of the 8th Air Rescue Group in 1954 to perform long range aircrew recovery in hostile areas. This unit was discontinued in 1958 during a directed reorganization of the Air Rescue Service. The necessity for in-being combat aircrew recovery forces, trained and equipped for immediate employment, is vividly illustrated by recent actions to meet SEA mission requirements. When USAF directed ARS to deploy HH-43B helicopters to SEA, the aircraft were not equipped, nor were aircrews trained, for combat aircrew recovery operations, thus the capability was minimal. USAF directed that 6 ConUS based HH-43Bs be modified for operation in combat environs and an extensive combat aircrew recovery program was provided for aircrew personnel. These actions, accomplished on a crash basis, took approximately one year during which USAF combat aircrews were denied the rescue/recovery capability that could have been provided had ARS forces been properly equipped and trained at the outset of hostilities. Adequate resources are not available at this time and non-combat configured helicopters continue to operate in hostile environments.

(2) (S) The European and Pacific area commanders, in cognizance of their SAR responsibilities, have been dependent on Air Rescue Service units to provide the necessary SAR forces for their limited and general war plans. For example, the Deputy Commander, Air Rescue Service, Atlantic, who is responsible for the operation of the USCINCEUR/USCINCPAC Joint Theater SAR Center, has been tasked for SAR coverage in approximately 50 Top Secret area war plans. In the Pacific, the Deputy Commander, Air Rescue Service, Pacific, has been tasked similarly in 25 area plans. It is recognized readily that SAR forces participating under any one of these plans would be operating in a hostile environment with essentially peacetime equipment.

(3) (U) In essence, the requirement for SAR originates at the JCS level and the responsibility is delegated down through area commanders to the Air Rescue Service, with the belief that these units have the capability to immediately accomplish the wartime SAR mission. As of this date the only resources for ARS to prosecute the wartime mission must come from those forces now provided to perform the route, area, and local base precautionary missions; the emergency SAR missions; and the ARS forces accomplishing the recovery requirements during space operations. It should be realized that ARS is standing on the threshold of becoming a global SAR force, both for peace and war, if the capabilities of the HC-130 and CH-30 are fully exploited and if the aircraft are supplied in the quantities specified later in this document. It is recognized that the

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

PROJECT CORONA HARVESTED
DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED
II-5

ATC 48 259
VCC# 65-302

0005813

Pacific Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Center (FAC ARRC) input to the PACAF
Battle Staff Book as of 31 December 1966.

31st ARRSq - 1/HU-16 gained from 37th ARRSq 9 Dec 66.


37th ARRSq - 1/HU-16 transferred to 31st ARRSq 9 Dec.

Det 1 - 1/HC-130P gained from CONUS 29 Dec.

38th ARRSq - 1/HH-43F gained from Det 4, APRFE, Tan Son Nhut 13 Dec.

76th ARRSq - 1/HC-97 transferred to CONUS 23 Dec.

NOTE: No change to sheets 1, 2, 2a, 3, 3a, 6, and 6a.



ATCH 12


240



DOAR 31 December 1966

2a

2a



————— COMMAND

..... OPERATIONAL CONTROL

DOAR 31 Dec 1966

13 March 1966

13a

UNIT	LOCATION	AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED		
		Number	Type	
3 AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY GROUP (ARRGp)	Tan Son Nhut, RVN	None	None	SAR Advisor to 7thAF. Deputy Commander for PARRC in SEA.
1, 3 ARRGp	Danang, RVN	None	None	Rescue Coordination Center (RCC)
2, 3 ARRGp	Udorn, Thailand	None	None	RCC
37 ARRSq	Danang, RVN	5	HU-16B	
DET 1, 37 ARRSq	Udorn, Thailand	0	HC-130H	
		4	HC-130H	
		1	HC-130P	
38 AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SQUADRON (ARRSq)	Tan Son Nhut, RVN	3	HH-43B	
DET 1, 38 ARRSq	Phan Rang, RVN	2	HH-43B	
DET 2, 38 ARRSq	Takhli, Thailand	3	HH-43B	
DET 3, 38 ARRSq	Ubon, Thailand	3	HH-43B	
DET 4, 38 ARRSq	Korat, Thailand	2	HH-43B	
DET 5, 38 ARRSq	Udorn, Thailand	6	HH-3E	
		2	HH-43B	1/43B asgd to Det 7, APRFE
DET 6, 38 ARRSq	Bien Hoa, RVN	3	HH-43F	1/43B asgd to Det 4, APRFE
DET 7, 38 ARRSq	Danang, RVN	4	HH-3E	
		2	HH-43F	
DET 8, 38 ARRSq	Cam Ranh Bay, RVN	2	HH-43B	
DET 9, 38 ARRSq	Pleiku, RVN	1	HH-43F	
DET 10, 38 ARRSq	Binh Thuy, RVN	2	HH-43F	
DET 11, 38 ARRSq	Tuy Hoa, RVN	1	HH-43B	
DET 12, 38 ARRSq	Nha Trang, RVN	2	HH-43E	

DOAR 31 Dec 66

4a

PARARESCUE

[illegible]

PACIFIC AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY CENTER

FIXED WING AIRCRAFT

CAPABILITIES

HU-16B

Cruise: 140 Kts normal, 165 Kts high.
840 NM radius of action.
Water and snow landing ability.

HC-130H

Cruise: 290 Kts normal, 330 Kts high.
2250 NM radius of action.
Ample rescue/recovery and survival
equipment carrying ability.
Fulton Recovery System (FRS) for
surface to air recovery of
personnel and hardware.
HC-130P will have air-to-air refueling
capability (primarily for HH-3).

HC-97G

Cruise: 220 Kts normal, 275 Kts high.
2000 NM radius of action.
Ample rescue/recovery and survival
equipment carrying ability.

LIMITATIONS

Slow airspeed and limited range.
Limited weight and cube carrying ability
(Cannot carry own support personnel
and equipment on long deployments).

No armor or self-sealing tanks.

Limited visual scanner windows.

HELICOPTERS

AIRCRAFT/CAPABILITIES

LIMITATIONS

HH-43B

85 Kts TAS. 75 NM radius of action.
Hover out of ground effect. 100 ft 600 lb hoist.
Capacity two litter cases or six passengers.

HH-43F

85 Kts TAS. 130 NM radius of action.
Hover out of ground effect. 200 ft 600 lb hoist.
Armor plated and self-sealing fuel tanks.
Capacity one litter case or three passengers

HH-3E

120 Kts IAS. 400 NM radius of action.
250 ft 600 lb hoist. Twin turbine engine.
Capacity 15 litter & 2 attendants or 25 passengers.
Land and water landing capability.
Good search platform (7 windows, aft ramp & door).
Armor plated and self-sealing fuel tanks.
Will have air-to-air refueling capability from
HC-130

For both model HH-43s:

Slow airspeed.
Short range.
Small cabin.
Limited IFR and night flight capability.
Single engine.
Crucial rotor system, i.e., wooden blades
easily damaged by rain and vulnerable
servo flap control system.

Slow airspeed.
Hover out ground effect inadequate
due to additional weight.

DOAR 31 Dec '66

601