

AIR RESCUE MEN HONORED

PHILIPPINES--Ten officers and eight enlisted members of the 31st Air Rescue Squadron on Clark AB were decorated by Col. Donald E. Smith, commander of the Pacific Air Rescue Center, during a ceremony held recently at Thirteenth Air Force headquarters.

Receiving the Air Medal were Captains Harold K. Pike, Richard F. Reichardt (with the eighth Oak Leaf Cluster), and Kenneth W. Dotson, all pilots; John M. Gilbreath and Alexander F. Stewart (with first Oak Leaf Cluster), both navigators; 1st Lieutenants David W. Raines (pilot) and Jack O. Slocombe (navigator).

Other Air Medal recipients were Technical Sergeants William V. Vargas (with first Oak Leaf Cluster) and Austin Little, both para-rescuemen; Staff Sergeants Kearney V. Lundy and David E. West and A2C Robert L. Key, all flight mechanics; and Staff Sgt. Norwood Steele, radio operator.

Involving different periods of performance from June 1964 to May 1965, the Air Force award individually cited the 31st honorees for "meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight as HU-16 crew members in Southeast Asia."

First Oak Leaf Clusters were presented to Capt. David K. Richardson, SSgt. Ronald O. Dunagan and SSgt. Edward F.

more

2--Air Rescue Men Honored

Padilla, for the rescue of a downed pilot last February.

Captains Marvin L. Palmer and David J. Wage were presented Air Rescue Service Certificates of Achievement for their participation in a flight air evacuation involving a critically-injured Filipino. Captain Palmer additionally earned the Kaman Scroll of Honor for having lead a rescue crew in the sea hoist pick-up of a downed Navy pilot. (PACAF NS)

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CLARK UNIT IN RESCUE

PHILIPPINES--Inter-service cooperation paid dividends in human life recently in the rescue of four survivors from two B-52 aircraft that crashed approximately 300 miles northwest of Clark Air Base while en route to a mission in Southeast Asia.

Early on the morning of June 18 a call was received from one of the KC-135 tankers participating in the mission, stating that two aircraft had gone down.

At 6 a.m., an HU-16 Albatross amphibian of the 31st Air Rescue Service Squadron based at Clark, was on its way to the crash scene. The crew aboard the aircraft was Capt. Anthony Muehling, pilot; 1st Lt. David Hines, copilot; 1st Lt. James Slocombe, navigator; SSgt. Charles Fakkema, flight mechanic and SSgt. Bobby Tyndall, radio operator.

Also on board were two pararescuemen, TSgt. William Vargas and ALC LANE Colin Laine.

Arriving at the scene the HU-16 landed on the water amid four to six feet waves. Two KC-135s remained in the area, and helped direct the HU-16 to the life rafts.

During the rescue operations, the HU-16 damaged a propeller and was unable to takeoff to return to Clark. The survivors were transferred to a passing Norwegian freighter, "The Argo." The two pararescuemen joined the four survivors to continue medical assistance and the remainder of the HU-16 crew remained with the aircraft to await the arrival of the U.S.

more

2--Clark Unit in Rescue (Rel. No. 404)

Navy ship, "Point Defiance," which was on its way to the scene.

The Navy ship reached the scene at 5 p.m. and the Air Force Rescue crew boarded and immediately started preparing for towing operations for the crippled HU-16.

Due to the heavy seas the aircraft was swamped and sank. The "Point Defiance" took the crew to Cubi Point Naval Station where they boarded a USAF C-47 to return to Clark.

At approximately 7 a.m. the following morning, the call went out for volunteer "scanners" to fly aboard aircraft joining the search for more survivors.

The call turned up 300 personnel from the 405th Combat Support Group, 5th Epidemiological Flight and the 1st Mobile Communications Group.

Lt. Col. Karol F. Rybos, 31st Air Rescue Service Squadron commander stated, "I'm sorry that I could not use all of the volunteers, but I really appreciate their showing up at 3 a.m. for the briefing."

By 8 a.m. the first aircraft was on its way to the accident scene.

Aircraft used in the search came from as far away as Guam and Hawaii. Clark's Base Flight and the tactical rotational squadrons from Langley AFB, Va., and Stewart AFB, Tenn., added more aircraft to the search.

Pilots of the 8th and 13th B-57 Bombardment Squadrons at Clark; Navy aircraft from Subic Bay and Sangley Point; Navy ships, the "Point Defiance" and the "USS Grapple" and the Coast Guard cutter "Kukui" joined the mission which was finally called off at 8:55 p.m. June 19. (PACAF NS)

UNCLASSIFIED

ARXLR

FROM: Detachment 13, Cen AFRC
SUBJECT: Corona Harvest Study
TO: ARXDC (Lt Colonel Crozier)

Director
Aerospace Studies Inst
ATTN: Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
28 October 1968
RETURN TO:

K 318, 13151
Kessler, Maurice G.
20 Oct 65-18 Oct 66

1. Reference your letter, same subject, 27 Sept 63.
2. The following information is forwarded as requested:

- a. Period assigned to SEA: 20 Oct 1965 to 18 Oct 1966.
- b. Designation of unit to which assigned: Det 6, 38th ARRSq, Bien Hoa Air Base, Vietnam.
- c. Duty assignment while in SEA: Detachment Commander.
- d. Type of aircraft assigned unit: Three (3) HH-43F Helicopters.
- e. Problem areas encountered during tour, i.e., maintenance, facilities, operational concepts, etc:

18 SEP 1990

While numerous problems were encountered in all areas during my tour of duty in SEA, the majority of them are considered common to the area and general conditions prevailing at the time. However, one problem area considered especially significant related to our involvement in the unexpected mission of recovering multiple wounded Army personnel by hoist from inaccessible jungle areas.

The primary problem in this mission resulted from the obvious inadequacy of the HH-43F helicopter. Most of these Army rescue missions involved numerous litter cases. The cabin space in the HH-43F limited us to one or two stokes litter pickups per sortie. This necessitated repeated sorties which resulted in considerable delay in evacuating severely wounded personnel; exposed flight and ground crews to enemy action for extended periods; and increased helicopter maintenance and repair work beyond what we were equipped and manned for.

00491393

Maurice G. Kessler
MAURICE G. KESSLER, Major, USAF
Commander

SAC

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
No 0005615

UNCLASSIFIED

273

Atch 11

7-3883-7

SECRET

4. (S) (U) WHAT WERE THE CONSTRAINTS?

(S) The limited number of HH-43 airframes available to the SEA LBR forces represented the most serious in-theater "hardware" constraint. No relief was available from other USAF sources due to a "worldwide" shortage of these helicopters, which was classified by HQ USAF as a "severely limited resource."⁷

(S) The most serious "operational" constraint imposed on SEA LBR detachments was the inadequacy of the in-country SAR command and control system to provide JSARC/Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) support and direction to LBR helicopters participating in ACR missions. This constraint was the result of two very critical limitations. First, the availability of appropriate and adequate communications equipment; and second, the method of assigning operational control of these SAR forces.

From a communications hardware viewpoint, the inadequacy of in-country communications was thoroughly covered in ARRS CORONA HARVEST, Vol V, Section II, pp. 47-49. Further coverage within this section would be quite redundant.

LBR "operational control" arrangements continued to represent a serious constraint and limited the full utilization of the SAR capabilities possessed within this resource.


SECRET



SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
ORDER TO REPORT FOR
ARMED FORCES PHYSICAL EXAMINATION

Approval Not Required.

To Joseph Stuart Stanaland
Rt. 1, Box 316
Lithia, Florida.



(LOCAL BOARD STAMP)

17 Nov. 1965

(Date of mailing)

SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.			
8	125	47	37

You are hereby directed to present yourself for Armed Forces Physical Examination to the Local Board named above by reporting at:

Local Board #125, 112 S. Palmer St., Plant City, Fla.

(Place of reporting)

on 29 Nov. 1965

(Date)

at 6:00 AM

(Hour)

BE ON TIME

Nancy M. Ralston

(Member or clerk of Local Board)

IMPORTANT NOTICE
(Read Each Paragraph Carefully)

TO ALL REGISTRANTS:

When you report pursuant to this order you will be forwarded to an Armed Forces Examining Station where it will be determined whether you are qualified for military service under current standards. Upon completion of your examination, you will be returned to the place of reporting designated above. It is possible that you may be retained at the Examining Station for more than 1 day for the purpose of further testing or for medical consultation. You will be furnished transportation, and meals and lodging when necessary, from the place of reporting designated above to the Examining Station and return. Following your examination your local board will mail you a statement issued by the commanding officer of the station showing whether you are qualified for military service under current standards.

If you are employed, you should inform your employer of this order and that the examination is merely to determine whether you are qualified for military service. To protect your right to return to your job, you must report for work as soon as possible after the completion of your examination. You may jeopardize your reemployment rights if you do not report for work at the beginning of your next regularly scheduled working period after you have returned to your place of employment.

IF YOU HAVE HAD PREVIOUS MILITARY SERVICE, OR ARE NOW A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OR A RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, BRING EVIDENCE WITH YOU. IF YOU WEAR GLASSES, BRING THEM. IF MARRIED, BRING PROOF OF YOUR MARRIAGE. IF YOU HAVE ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL CONDITION WHICH, IN YOUR OPINION, MAY DISQUALIFY YOU FOR SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES, BRING A PHYSICIAN'S CERTIFICATE DESCRIBING THAT CONDITION, IF NOT ALREADY FURNISHED TO YOUR LOCAL BOARD.

If you are so far from your own Local Board that reporting in compliance with this Order will be a hardship and you desire to report to the Local Board in the area in which you are now located, take this Order and go immediately to that Local Board and make written request for transfer for examination.

TO CLASS I-A AND I-A-O REGISTRANTS:


If you fail to report for examination as directed, you may be declared delinquent and ordered to report for induction into the Armed Forces. You will also be subject to fine and imprisonment under the provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended.

TO CLASS I-O REGISTRANTS:


This examination is given for the purpose of determining whether you are qualified for military service. If you are found qualified, you will be available, in lieu of induction, to be ordered to perform civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety or interest. If you fail to report for or to submit to this examination, you will be subject to be ordered to perform civilian work in the same manner as if you had taken the examination and had been found qualified for military service.

THE FOREST PENETRATOR


The forest penetrator will be lowered in the closed position. To use:



- a. Allow penetrator to touch ground in order to discharge static electricity.
- b. Fold two seats down and sit down placing one seat under each leg.
- c. Unzip safety strap and secure around back under arms. Fasten strap to bar located above strap. (See arrow)



When ready, give "thumbs up" signal to hoist operator.



Survivor is seated correctly on forest penetrator.



The hoist hook swivel (note arrow) will spin rapidly as tension is placed on the cable. Do NOT hold the swivel.

Two man pickup.


- a. Place least injured survivor (#1) on one folding seat and secure.
- b. Place #2 man on two folding seats with his legs over #1 man's legs. Secure with strap.
- c. Hold on to each other and signal operator.
- d. Hoist operator will bring #2 man into aircraft first, then turn #1 man away from aircraft and bring him in.



Upon reaching a position level with the door, you will be turned to face away from the helicopter and pulled inside by the hoist operator. Do NOT attempt to help him! The operator will disconnect you from the device when you are safely inside the machine.





HORSE COLLAR



a. Slip one arm through the loop then reach up and put other arm through, so that horse collar comes down in front of one shoulder, across your back then in front of other shoulder. (Put it on like a coat)


b. Reach across in front of yourself and lock your hands together (Remain like this until you are inside of the helicopter.)

c. The hoist operator will turn you away from the helicopter to pull you in (DO NOT attempt to assist him).



STOKES

- Disconnect "O" ring from hoist cable.
- Undo snap on "O" ring and lay cables out to side.



LITTER

- Put patient in and strap down.
- Connect snap to "O" ring.
- Connect hoist cable to "O" ring.

NOTE: If you are unable to use any rescue device by yourself a crew member will be lowered from the helicopter to assist you.

January through May 1965

Personal Account - The following personal account was provided by Jay Strayer, Colonel USAF (Retired)

The idea of devising a method of extending the HH-43B's unsatisfactory 75 NM range (out and back with reserve) rests with Fred Glover (Lt Col USAF Ret) while we were TDY together at Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand Jan-May, 1965 -- we were 6 pilots as well as all the enlisted thrown together in a hurry from 6 different USA detachments without any direction or written procedures from any one higher up -- only that we were there to rescue whomever needed it --

Our DETCO was Warren Davis (later killed in an HH-43 as you know) along with James Rodenberg, Israel Freedman, Fred and myself and a 1st Lt. Neil McCutchan -- early on, while lamenting on the short legs of the HH-43B, Fred mentioned he had devised an extension system while flying in remote Texas for a ferry flight of some 300 miles -- based on his idea, we scrounged hoses and plumbing parts from Air America at Udorn AB -- all were water fittings for they did not have others that would fit available -- our maintenance folks built a cradle made of 2" X 12"s that would fit in the cabin behind the copilot's seat on the cabin floor -- we cradled three 55 gallon drums, one on top of the lower two and attached a single line hose from the top drum to the fuel plumbing access point at cabin floor level on the left rear side -- when fuel was required, the plumbing valve was opened by hand so fuel would gravity feed thru the cabin aperture into the 200 gallon bladder tank under the cabin floor -- each drum was good for about 35 minutes extra flying time -- as I recall, a normal sortie without the drums was 1+45 hours with a dry tank expected at about 2+15 hours use so three drums would extend total flying time to about 3+45 hours -- total range might be as much as 300 NM according to winds and hover time used -- I do not recall if I was the first to use the system, but I logged 3+30 hours during the one combat rescue (it was a long search) I made of (then) F-100 pilot Captain Ron Biggoness near My Gia Pass, Laos, in March of that time and the fuel low level light was burning by the time I returned to NKP -- Captain Jim Rodenburg was my copilot, Staff Sergeant Farmer the PJ and I cannot remember the flight mechanic's name --- I know that follow-on crews who replaced us in May, flew those HH-43s across Laos deep into North Vietnam to near Hanoi and Vinh near the Gulf of Tonkin and there are some shot down folks that owe their freedom to Fred Glover's idea -- moreover, it is likely that we had the first helicopter disposable fuel tanks for when a drum was empty, the flight mechanic merely shifted the hose to a full drum, and rolled the empty one out thru the open clamshell doors into the jungle below -- I might add those water-type plumbing connectors could not be tightened enough to prevent leaks and lots of fumes -- therefore there was absolutely no thought given to smoking -- none was allowed and we only set the system up as missions dictated its use -- finally, the PACAF Rescue HH-43 standardization pilot visited us during this time (do not recall his name) and we proudly showed him pictures of our system-- he immediately recognized the hazards involved and just as quickly disavowed any knowledge of same -- apparently he did recognize the merits of its use in an emergency rescue situation and did not mention it in his reports -- neither did we -- so Fred Glover never got official recognition for his idea, an idea that saved several pilots from capture during the interim it took to get a longer range helicopter in country -- and that's the truth as I remember it -- and yes, you may use this on your PEDRO web site -- Cheers -- Jay

From: Jay Strayer <mrslick@in-touch.net>
To: Robert LaPointe <rlapointe@gci.net>
Cc: Curtis, Tom <twotc@stonemedia.com>; Lemke, Red <redlemke@accessus.net>
Date: Saturday, August 28, 1999 7:49 PM
Subject: Re: SEA SAR

Have I given you enuff to chew on?? You asled about a rescue in Thailand -- teh only one I recall was so reoutine I almost forgot about it -- a Navy A-1 had about a 4 ft square hole shout out of his wing right where the left gear was -- so he decided to come NKP way and bail out -- Jim rodenberg and I floated right close to him and watvhed him cral out onto the wing and fall away -- I have a picture someplace of him parachuting down with us circling around fairly close to him -- he hung up in a tree with him a mere 3-4 feet off the ground -- he stepped out of his chute and right into our PEDRO and we had him back drinking a beer in about 5 minutes -- it was so routine we did not even consider a medal -- might this be the mission you thot of??? It came after the March fun, likely in April sometime --

Two other fellows to help you -- Col Ret Tom Curtis was shot down in Sept 65 and was the pilot of the first rescue crew taken prisoner -- both Black and Robinsin were with him one of whom was a PJ -- you should know who -- Joe Ballinger took over as Det/CO when we left in May 65 and Tom Curtis took over my job as det intelligence officer -- he has agreed to help you with the follow-on mission out of NKP during the May-Oct 65 period -- also, Lt Col Ret Clyde "Red" Lemke was one of the HH-43 crews making rescue sorties out of South VN on the March 2, 1965 date we have been talking about -- he'll help you with your project as well -- and don't forget I have Lt McCutchen's e-address also if you want it -- finally, did you check out the HH-43 PEDRO web site I gave you?? I have copies of those HH-43 pics as does McCutchen -- you really should include the bit about the 55 gal fuel drums that extended our range -- Tom Curtis and crews flew nonstop as far as Vinh and Hanoi in NVN -- ask him about them -- and yes, I will be glad to review anything you've written you wish me to --

Lemke, Clyde
E-mail Address(es):
redlemke@accessus.net
Curtis, Tom
E-mail Address(es):
twotc@stonemedia.com
Cheers -- Jay

APR 65

To: "Robert LaPointe", rlapointe
From: "John Cassidy", INTERNET:jcassidy01@sprynet.com
Date: 08/17/1999, 7:08 AM
Re: FW: Droopstop Closing

-----Original Message-----

From: owner-droopstop@blu.org [mailto:owner-droopstop@blu.org] On Behalf
Of Bert Brundridge
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 1999 5:52 AM
To: [Droop_Stop_Inn]
Subject: Re: Droopstop Closing

In reference to the delays to launch, I recall it was our chief complaint for a couple of reasons. The main one being that for every minute we were delayed, charlie got closer to our target. In the earlier days, he'd fire on us on approach, but later he wised up and waited until we were in a hover. A lot of people got shot because of that stupidity. Diwee Tyree told me it was due to a rule of the ARVN that the Province chief had to be notified before we could pick up anyone in his province. Most of the time he couldn't be located but we had to wait until they attempted to find him. I still have bad dreams about that bullshit. Bert Brundridge [Keeper Finder]

----- Original Message -----

From: <Pruittgm@aol.com>
To: <droopstop@Blu.Org>
Sent: Monday, August 16, 1999 11:01 PM
Subject: Re: Droopstop Closing

> Marc,

>

> In 65 and 66 I don't recall waiting for a go ahead. I flew mostly around
> Thailand out of Udorn but did hitch rides on the HC-54 (later taken over
by

> HC-130s) call sign crown or king, don't remember which now. When a plane
> went down in North Vietnam or Laos I don't remember anyone asking. Our AC
> would contact the helicopter crews at Lima Sites and call for Sandys. I
> listened in on several rescue attempts and it seemed like we just did all
> that we could. That was when we were flying HH-43s up north. In Nov 65
the

> HH-3s arrived on C-133s and took over the mission. I recall that their
first

> successful pickup was a F-105 pilot and they brought to Udorn to see the
Bob

> Hope Show. I have some 8mm movies of him shaking hands with Bob Hope.

>

> When I was at Bien Hoa in 67 we did wait for the okay to go. Can't tell
you

> how many times I helped the PJs get their gear on board after getting my
> firefighting stuff off and they just sat and waited for someone to say

Okay

> go. many times we were told to stand down and returned to the LBR mission
> configuration. Never knew why. I even got to fill in for a FE one time.
we

> got into the area, saw the crash site and what we thought was our guy and
HQs

> said no go - return to base. i have heard others share similiar stories.

I

> had a army Buddy that flew on Hueys. They went after one of their crews
one
> time, got shot down, he was picked up in the first Huey in, came back to
Bien
> Hoa. They got another Huey and went and got the rest. Got shot up bad
but
> accomplished the mission anyway. Heard stories of other AF helicopter
units
> in SEA that would get all shot to hell but still were allowed to
accomplish
> or try to complete the mission.
>
> Not sure how it is today. I last flew in 1969. Best years of my career.
> Would have done it til my death if I could have retrained into the right
> field, FE or PJ. The AF moved me around so much between 61 to 73 I never
> could get settled long enough to complete a retraining package betwwe TDYs
> and short tours. After Nam was over I retrained twice before I retired in
> 89. Oh well, I had a good career anyway. Always believe in making the
best
> of a situation.
>
> Hope some of that helps. Good to share all of that.
>
> Gary Pruitt
> Pedro65

----- Internet Header -----
Sender: jcassidy01@sprynet.com
Received: from smtp5.mindspring.com (smtp5.mindspring.com [207.69.200.82])
by spdmgaab.compuserve.com (8.9.3/8.9.3/SUN-1.3) with ESMTP id LAA28578
for <rlapointe@compuserve.com>; Tue, 17 Aug 1999 11:06:53 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from spry299995spry02 (sfr-tgn-sff-vty38.as.wcom.net [216.192.8.38])
by smtp5.mindspring.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id LAA03646
for <rlapointe@compuserve.com>; Tue, 17 Aug 1999 11:08:09 -0400 (EDT)
From: "John Cassidy" <jcassidy01@sprynet.com>
To: "Robert LaPointe" <rlapointe@compuserve.com>
Subject: FW: Droopstop Closing
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 1999 07:06:07 -0800
Message-ID: <LOBBKENOKJHLHOMEEOCOLKEGOCAAA.jcassidy01@sprynet.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0)
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200
Importance: Normal

Excerpts from McGeorge Bundy's Memo to President Johnson, February 7, 1965.**I. Introductory**

We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South.

While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher and more visible to American feelings than those sustained in the struggle of South Vietnam.... And even if it fails to turn the tide as it may the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its costs....

3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be necessary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. It should be possible, for example, to publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove much of the difficulty involved in finding precisely matching targets in response to specific atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure that the general level of reprisal action remained in close correspondence with the level of outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world, that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped and that we are *not* attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam.

4. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appropriate occasion to make clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two governments have been patient and forbearing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not use our force indiscriminately; but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible.

9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a *continuous* operation. Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to "spectacular" outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam. When it remained an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort....

We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range

purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres....

The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government...

We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a sustained depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon. It is based upon reliable reports of the initial Viet Cong reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence....

While emphasizing the importance of reprisals in the South, we do not exclude the impact on Hanoi. We believe, indeed, that it is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come.

We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counterinsurgency will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam....

SOURCE: Sheehan and others (eds.), *Pentagon Papers* , pp. 423-427

knew until a short time later. Meanwhile Walther's superiors put him in for one of the highest Air Force decorations, saying in their report of the incident that his action had saved the flight line. Higher up the chain of command someone downgraded this as assuming too much, and the sergeant eventually wound up with an Airman's Medal.

Sixteen days after the mission a similar fire broke out under a plane at Tan Son Nhut, and the entire flight line blew up in a prodigious explosion that sent flames and billowing clouds of black smoke soaring hundreds of feet in the air!

NOV 65? Six months later, at Bien Hoa, Walther was involved in another spectacular save. Taking off in a Skyraider for a strafing run across enemy lines, a Vietnamese pilot suddenly lost control of his aircraft.

"He's not going to make it," an airman screamed from the base control tower. At that instant the A-1E slammed back into the runway, skidded drunkenly for several hundred feet, then flipped over and came to a crunching halt upside down in a drainage ditch. High octane from its full tanks spewed all over and soaked the wrecked fuselage.

"No one could live through that," the airman exclaimed. Fire trucks nevertheless roared down the runway, their sirens wailing and lights flashing. But as they neared the crash they screeched to an abrupt halt, and asbestos-suited firemen looked hopelessly at the

smoking plane. They couldn't reach it. Separating them was a hundred yards of quicksand-like muck.

At the first sound of the alarm, Captain John Boyles and his crew took off. They were over the Skyraider in a minute, and Boyles made a snap decision: the only way they could help would be to hover just above the muck and drop the pararescuemen out. Without hesitation, Walther and Tech Sergeant Dominic Cousy jumped. They nearly disappeared from sight in the sludge, but managed to wade to the site. Walther's prime fear was that the plane might break into flames and explode at any instant, so he and Cousy blanketed the area with foam from their fire-suppression kits. Then Walther dug a tunnel through the thick muck and felt for the Vietnamese pilot's body. He grabbed a hand and squeezed. The hand squeezed back, startling Walther. The man was alive!

"Get a crash ax, Dominic," Walther barked. "We'll have to try and cut our way through the fuselage." But before Cousy returned, a more immediate problem developed. The Skyraider was sinking in the mire. The pilot was now in a very real danger of suffocating. So the sergeant began to dig—to keep a lifeline of air open. For a while it was like building a sand castle on the ocean's edge with the tide pounding in. The faster he dug, the quicker the muck caved in. But he was determined. A life was at stake. The sweat rolled off Walther's forehead and his arms throbbed with pain,

but there could be no letup, for the instant he quit, the muck filled in the opening.

A crane had been called to the scene when it was feared the plane might sink from sight. At last other men arrived and helped Walther dig until the crane hooked onto the Skyraider's upside-down landing gear and slowly lifted the plane up. When it had cleared the mire, Walther unsheathed his long-bladed steel knife, reached in through the cockpit canopy, and ripped off the pilot's safety harness. Two minutes later he had the victim freed, and eased him out of the aircraft. He didn't have a second to spare, for scarcely had he cleared the cockpit when the crane's cable snapped in midair and the Skyraider plummeted down with a resounding plop and sank beneath the surface.

It had been another close one. Give or take a minute or two and Walther could have been under that wing when the cable snapped. But he shrugged off his heroics later, saying, as all ARRS men do, that it was only part of his job. He got a second Airman's Medal for it despite his modesty.

Not all heroes are PJs, and not all award-winning rescues are made over Vietnam. Many, like that carried out by Captain Anthony A. Muehling, Jr., of Louisville, Kentucky, are accomplished over water, far from land.

On June 18, 1965, Captain Muehling was alerted of


the fiery midair collision of two huge B-52 jet bombers over the South China Sea. The powerful, long-range B-52s, many of which are based on Guam, fly daily into North Vietnam to pound enemy installations with hundreds of tons of bombs. Piloting an HU-16 Albatross, Captain Muehling flew to the scene and sighted one man lying motionless in a life raft.

The mission was complicated by a passing typhoon, which had kicked up extremely rough seas, but Muehling skillfully managed to set the versatile plane down near the raft. The man was already dead. Nearby, however, were two survivors, and he taxied over and picked them up. Later, another raft was spotted, but en route to it an enormous wave swamped the aircraft, setting off an electrical fire on the flight deck and knocking out the radio. With a rare dedication, Muehling was able to reach the victim, haul him aboard, and render first aid. When a fourth crash survivor was fished from the savage waters an hour later, Muehling turned his crippled plane toward home base. Repeatedly he attempted to take off, but an engine power loss, ever-mounting seas, and sustained heavy winds prevented lift-off.

Other planes, circling overhead, fixed the HU-16's position but could not land. Instead they radioed the closest ships for aid. After hours of being tossed about in mountainous swells, the crew and the four survivors all suffered from severe seasickness, dehydration, and

When a downed pilot pleaded for help on a patch of enemy-surrounded ground, Captain Barry Kamhoot didn't hesitate to hover his Jolly Green Giant, even though he began drawing fire the minute he stopped forward motion. The hoist was lowered and while the man strapped himself in, PJ Leroy Kelsay emptied three machine-gun magazines into the guerrilla-filled bushes. Kamhoot took off with the survivor still a hundred feet out on the hoist, but made it to safety despite

In ceremonies at the White House, President Lyndon B. Johnson awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the 38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron for outstanding service in Southeast Asia. The four ARRS men, left to right, are: Colonel Edward Krafka, Major Ronald Ingraham, SMSgt Ronald Blier, and Sergeant Charles Walther. (*U.S. Air Force*)



taking twenty-three hits on the helicopter from small arms and .50 caliber machine guns.

On January 19, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson awarded the 38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron the Presidential Unit Citation for "extraordinary gallantry in saving the lives of seventy-four persons in Vietnam over a one-year period.

"These brave men repeatedly jeopardized their own lives by exposing themselves to hostile air and ground fire while flying unarmed aircraft in order to rescue survivors downed in enemy territory," the President said.

"Time and time again the men of the 38th have risked their lives so that their comrades might live. The squadron has inscribed its name on the honor scroll of American heroes."

Based at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the unit earned the Presidential Citation for its outstanding record in combat operations from August 1, 1964 to July 31, 1965. During that period crews from the 38th logged 12,750 hours while flying 8,700 combat missions in their unarmed helicopters and airplanes. Unit rescuemen won 250 individual decorations, including sixteen Silver Stars and ten Purple Hearts.

On March 10, 1967, President Johnson awarded a second Presidential Unit Citation to ARRS—this time to the Third Aerospace Recovery Group, credited at the time with 597 combat rescues in Southeast Asia alone.

gratulations are extended for your noteworthy pilot pick-up of 17 May 65. The professionalism displayed by all who participated in this mission, plus the outstanding teamwork by all who participated in this mission, plus the outstanding teamwork under heavy ground fire, was noted with pride. For all who participated, a well done!"

In other Vietnam missions, HH-43 personnel from ARS Det 7, 38th ARSq., Danang AB, recovered the crew of a light observation plane from heavily forested, mountainous terrain and a bomber crew from the sea.

Two HH-43F's scrambled after word was received that the observation plane had crashed into 175-foot trees and caught fire. With Army fixed-wing aircraft and armed helicopters flying cover, the HUSKIE crews began their search and soon located the downed airman in a small wash. The pilot was hoisted to safety by one "F" and the observer by the other. Pilot of the first rescue helicopter was 1stLt Arthur J. Machado; Capt James V. Berryhill, copilot; SSgt Homer L. Ramsey, helicopter mechanic; and MSgt Lenote M. Vigare, pararescueman. Crew of the second helicopter consisted of Capt Bruce M. Purvine, pi-

38th Air Rescue Squadron Activated

Control of Air Rescue Service operations in Southeast Asia has been centralized with activation of the 38th Air Rescue Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, South Vietnam. LtCol Edward Kraska assumed command of the 38th on an interim basis. He formerly commanded Det 3, PARC at Tan Son Nhut, which was deactivated. According to MATS officials, the new ARS unit will supervise and control activities of all air rescue forces in the South Vietnam complex. Rescue aircraft involved in Southeast Asia operations consist of HH-43B, HH-43F and CH-3C helicopters, HC-54 Rescuemasters and HU-16 Albatross amphibians.

Air Rescue helicopters and HU-16 aircraft have already seen extensive duty in that area, recording several

spectacular recoveries of downed fliers and other U. S. personnel stranded in hostile territory. The Albatross is capable of operating off land and sea, and has so far been responsible for saving more than 10 lives through the dramatic open sea landing technique.

Numbers of aircraft operating under the 38th ARS will vary and are drawn from the worldwide resources of Air Rescue Service. Aircraft from as far as Wheelus AB, Libya, have been diverted to support SEA activities. Detachments assigned to the 38th and operating locations are: Nakhon Phanom Airport, Tahkli AB, Ubon Airfield, Korat Airport and Udorn Airport, all in Thailand; Bien Hoa AB and Da Nang Airport, Vietnam.

lot; Capt Floyd R. Lockhart, copilot; SSgt Larry K. Henderson, helicopter mechanic; and A2c Randolph M. Smith, pararescueman.

The crew of a bomber ejected after engine failure. Responding to the emergency, an orbiting HUSKIE piloted by Capt Floyd R. Lockhart put the FSK on the ground at the end of the runway and headed for the downed airman. Using the new forest penetrator, the helicopter plucked the bomber pilot

from the water. The other crewman was hoisted to safety by a second HUSKIE which had responded to the call for help. With Captain Lockhart was Captain Purvine, copilot; TSgt Patrick A. Bowers, helicopter mechanic; Airman Smith, pararescueman. With Capt Thomas C. Seebo in the other HH-43F were Lieutenant Machado, copilot; Sergeant Ramsey, helicopter mechanic; and A2c William Flower.

1000-Hour Pilot Awards



In top photo, left, Capt Clarence C. Campbell, ARS Det 16, WARC, Williams AFB, Ariz., receives KAC's 1000-hour award from Capt Joe H. Watson, right, detachment commander. Capt Gary E. Robertson, center, also qualified recently for the award which is presented by Kaman Aircraft to pilots logging 1000 hours in helicopters produced by the company. Four out of the six pilots assigned to Detachment 16 have more than 1000 hours in the HH-43. In second photo, Capt Thomas F. Madden, right, of ARS Det 15, WARC, Luke AFB, Ariz., is congratulated by Capt Earle D. Williams, Jr., detachment commander, after completing 1000 hours in the HUSKIE. In bottom photo, Capt John H. Denham, right, commander of ARS Det 1, CARC, Glasgow AFB, Mont., is shown after logging his 1000th hour while rescuing a lost hunter. With Captain Denham are, left to right, CMSgt Gerald Forman, maintenance superintendent; A2c George W. Townsend, crew chief; and 1stLt Richard L. Cardwell, copilot. Capt Harold A. Solberg of ARS Det 5, WARC, McChord AFB, Wash., also qualified for the 1000-hour award recently. (USAF photos)

