

~~SECRET~~c. Combat Mission Narratives:

(1) (U) Det 6 - 446 - 20 Jul 65. An F-100 pilot bailed out at night in heavy rain over unsecure territory of South-Vietnam. Two HH-43F helicopters scrambled from Bien Hoa, and picked up the downed pilots URT 21 beeper signal immediately upon take off. Due to low visibility and erratic homing needle swing, the helicopters conducted search for the survivor at 25 feet utilizing floodlights and landing lights. Helicopters were under sporadic tracer fire during the search. The pilot was located, and returned to Bien Hoa uninjured.

(2) (S) 38-664-3 Jul 65. An F-105 pilot, Capt Kenneth R. Johnson, discovered he had a severe shortage of fuel enroute to a strike in North Vietnam. He immediately jettisoned his external stores and started heading for friendly territory. He contacted the HC-54 on precautionary orbit, which in turn advised the control center to scramble helicopters from Udorn AB, Thailand. The F-105 ran out of fuel while over Laos, and the pilot made a successful bailout. He landed in high trees and was dangling in his harness 50 feet above the ground. He had suffered a broken arm. When the helicopters arrived on the scene a rescue from above was attempted. Due to heavy foliage the pararescue man was suspended in the horsecollar 100 feet below the helicopter and for ten minutes tried to chop away the vines and branches above the survivor. It soon became apparent that this approach would not work. The helicopter then landed approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile from the survivor. The pararescue man walked to the site and the helicopter lowered the hoist to him. The pararescue man was hoisted up to the survivor, and tied the survivor to him utilizing a nylon rope. He then cut the parachute shroud lines, and the helicopter climbed vertically for 150 feet, then flew at 20 knots to the clearing with the two men dangling 75 feet below the helicopter. After the recovery of the two into the helicopter an uneventful flight to home base followed. The helicopter aircraft commander was Capt David E. Allen.

(3) (S) 38-744-24 Jul 65. A Navy A-6A was shot down over Laos, the crew, Lt Cmdr Richard P. Bordone, and Lt Jg Peter F. Moffett, made a successful ejection. An F-105 that was searching for the downed navy crew developed engine trouble and had to bail out within 25 miles of the first incident. Marine helicopters that were prepositioned for search and rescue operations at Quang Tri, RVN and USAF HH-43 helicopters from Nakhon Phanom, Thailand were launched to effect recovery of survivors. In spite of low visibility and marginal reception of beacon signals all crew members were located and recovered. The Marine helicopters rescued the two Navy pilots. Capt Thomas J. Curtis who was the pilot of the HH-43 helicopter picked up Major William J. McClelland, the F-105 pilot.

(4) (S) 38-754-27 Jul 65. Four F-105 aircraft were downed while flying against surface to air missile sites in North Vietnam. Of the four downed aircraft only one chute was reported. A CH-3C helicopter

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MISSIONS

RESCUERS

LOCATIONS

SURVIVORS

ARSH-85

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205

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>		<u>Name</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
3-PARC-562-8 Jun	Capt Curtis	HH-43B	1812N - 10549E	Capt Rademacher	USAF	F-105
3-PARC-568-9 Jun	Capt Cunningham	HH-43B	1624N - 10415E	Capt Keeter	USAF	F4C
				Capt Getman		
3-PARC-630-23 Jun	Capt Curtis	HH-43B	1752N - 10552E	Maj Wilson	USAF	F-105
38-664-3 Jul	Capt Allen	HH-43B	1821N - 10301E	Capt Johnson	USAF	F-105
6-38-446-20 Jul	Capt Layman	HH-43F	1055N - 10654E	Lt Barriere	USAF	F-100
38-744-24 Jul	Capt Curtis	HH-43B	1638N - 10634E	Maj McClelland	USAF	F-105
38-754-27 Jul	Capt Martin	HH-3	2105N - 10513E	Capt Tullo	USAF	F-105
38-761-28 Jul	Lt Turk	HH-43B	1748N - 10547E	LTJG Townsend	USN	A4E
38-814-11 Aug	Capt Graue	HU-16B	1910N - 10609E	Capt Wilson	USAF	F-105
38-822-13 Aug	Capt Reichardt	HU-16B	1853N - 10556E	LT Hyland	USN	A1H
38-860-24 Aug	Capt Stambaugh	HH-3	1948N - 10450E	Maj Tagreco	USAF	F-105
38-882-31 Aug		HH-43B	2105N - 10420E	LtCol Hendricks	USAF	F-105
38-899-6 Sep	Capt Holm	HU-16B	1740N - 10650E	Capt Clark	USAF	F-105
38-901-6 Sep	Capt Berthold	HH-43B	1642N - 10345E	Capt Barnhill	USAF	F-105
38-902-6 Sep	Capt Nicholas	HU-16B	1938N - 10555E	LT Burton	USN	A1H
7-38-532-6 Sep	Capt Lockhart	HH-43F	1605N - 10812E	Capt Hamann	USAF	B-57
	Capt Seebo			Lt Lane	USAF	
6-38-718-9 Sep	Capt Murden	HH-43F	5 NM E. Bein Hoa	E-4 Williams	USA	
38-918-10 Sep	Capt Pruvine	HH-43F	1523N - 10754E	Capt Pope	USA	01F
	Lt Machabo	HH-43F		Sgt Jackson	USA	
38-919-10 Sep	Capt Vatis	HU-16B	1726N - 10716E	Capt Graybill	USAF	A1E
38-931-10 Sep	Capt Purvine	HH-43B	1614N - 10850E	Lt Davidson	USA	L-19
				SP-5 Kee		
38-943-17 Sep	Capt Cook	HH-43F	1105N - 10650E	Lt CaoVan	VNAF	H-34
38-954-21 Sep	Capt Martin	HH-3	1736N - 10543E	Capt Greenwood	USAF	F-105

Detachment 6
 38th Air Rescue Squadron (MATS)
 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
 APO US FORCES 96227

REPLY TO
 ATTN OF: Det 6/38ARS

23 July 1965

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative Report 6-38-446-20 Jul 65.

TO: Hq ARS (ARSCP)
 Orlando AFB, Fla

1. Mission Number 6-38-446-20 Jul 65.
2. SAR alerted by Bien Hoa tower on primary crash circuit.
3. Type SAR aircraft used - 2/HH-43F helicopters.

Primary Alert Crew:

RCC Capt Carl G. Layman
 CP Maj William T. Hayes, Jr.
 HM TSgt Joseph W. Blaquiere
 PJ A2C Michael R. Donegan

Secondary Alert Crew


RCC Capt Darvan E. Cook
 CP Capt Donald E. Stranahan
 HM TSgt Domenick J. Cocuzzi
 PJ A1C Kenneth W. Williams

4. Reaction time from initial notification to pick-up: Twenty minutes.
5. CAP assistance - None.
6. Area and type of pick-up - Helicopter landed in hostile unprepared territory.
7. Signaling equipment used to locate survivor - URT-21 radio.
8. Survivor's name and serial number - 1st Lt William Barriere, 70688A. 429th Tactical Fighter Sq, Cannon AFB, New Mexico.
9. Summary of events: At 1953 hours, 20 July 1965, the primary crash circuit was activated at Bien Hoa Air Base, and the rescue alert crew was advised that an F-100 pilot had ejected from his disabled aircraft east of the field. It was night, and a thunderstorm was directly over the field bringing with it heavy rain, a ceiling of 400 feet, and 30 knot winds.

The rescue alert crew scrambled within two minutes of notification and immediately after takeoff started receiving an emergency beeper tone on guard channel over the UHF radio. With direction finding equipment on the HH-43F it was determined that the signal was coming from the east. Capt Layman, the Rescue Crew Commander, immediately proceeded towards the emergency signal flying at approximately 300 feet above the ground in an effort to maintain visual ground contact in the heavy rain and low ceilings. As the helicopter approached a position approximately 5 miles east of Bien Hoa Air Base, the direction finding needle started giving erratic readings and rotated aimlessly. At this time flares were being dropped immediately to the east and several bursts of automatic tracer fire were observed within a few hundred yards of the helicopter. The downed pilot had landed on the edge of a firefight between elements of the 1st Airborne Division, US Army, and the Viet Cong. As homing indications for the emergency beeper signal were still erratic, and due to the observed ground fire, Capt Layman initiated a random pattern search to provide as elusive a target as possible to the Viet Cong. During this time all crew members were especially vigilant to observe flares, strobe light or flashlight signals, and guard channel was continuously monitored for emergency transmissions from the downed pilot. During this period the flares ceased dropping but sporadic ground fire was still observed. After five minutes of intensive search it appeared likely that the F-100 pilot was unable to signal the rescue helicopter due to injuries received on ejection or upon making ground contact during darkness and with winds gusting to 30 knots. Another possibility was that he had been captured by the Viet Cong. If the downed pilot was unable to contact the helicopter the only way he could be rescued would be by visual sighting from the helicopter utilizing floodlights to provide necessary illumination. All crewmembers with the exception of the pilot (Capt Layman) armed their AR-15 automatic weapons and, with the copilot (Major Hayes) scanning to the left, the helicopter mechanic (TSgt Blaquiére) scanning to the right, and the pararescue technician (A2C Donegan) scanning to the rear, Capt Layman turned on all external floodlights and the landing light and brought the helicopter down to 50 feet where he initiated sweep searches of the general area at about 20 to 30 knots airspeed. After five minutes the primary helicopter was joined by another rescue helicopter which aided in the search. Both helicopters continued to receive very erratic bearings from the emergency radio beacon. For another five minutes the search continued with both helicopters searching at low speed within 50 feet of the ground with all external floodlights on. During this time the helicopters were extremely vulnerable targets and all crew members were in great personal danger from hostile small arms and mortar fire. Tracer fire continued to be seen and one mortar round was observed to explode. Most of the search effort was conducted over and between the American and Viet Cong positions. When the US Army first sighted the helicopters they ceased firing while the helicopters were in their line of fire. Once the search commenced all tracers and mortar fire observed by the helicopter crews were of Viet Cong origin. At the end of 20 minutes searching, including over ten minutes under extremely hazardous conditions, the downed pilot was spotted simultaneously by two crew members. Capt Layman landed immediately in front of the pilot, and while Major Hayes covered the area to the left, and TSgt Blaquiére covered the area to the right, Airman Donegan ran to the pilot who was crouching by a bush, and led to the helicopter. The apparently uninjured pilot was then returned to Bien Hoa Air Base and released to the base dispensary for observation. Later questioning of the downed F-100 pilot indicated that

he was unable to use his signaling devices due to the proximity of the Viet Cong.

10. If public release of this information is contemplated it is requested that any mention of Major Hayes be withheld. Neither his wife or parents are aware that he is flying helicopters in Viet Nam.


WILLIAM T. HAYES, JR.
Major, USAF
Commander

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K318. 2411-6

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Ref # 11843

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Detachment 7
38th Air Rescue Squadron
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO San Francisco Calif 96337

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DET 7 38ARS

6 Aug 1965

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative

TO: PARC (DOARO)
38 ARESCUESQ
33 ARECOVERYSQ
48 ARECOVERYSQ
ARS

1. 38 ARS, Mission Number 744, 24 July 1965.

2. GUM

3. a. HU-16B (WIPE BRAVO)

b. H-34 (RUTLEDGE 6-0 and 6-2)

c. HH-43F (IRON 21 and 41)

d. HC-54 (SPUD 30)

e. HU-16B Crewmembers

Classification (cancelled) (changed to UNCLAS)
effective on 11-3-75, under the authority of AS, by MS

(1). RCC - Brunner, Edward M.; Capt.;
48th Air Recovery Sq

(2). P - Rechnitz, David C.; 1st Lt;
48th Air Recovery Sq

(3). N - Glover, Carl D.; 1st Lt;
48th Air Recovery Sq

(4). RO - Mailloux, Albert H.; SSgt.;
48th Air Recovery Sq

(5). AM - Stradling, Norman L.; AIC;
48th Air Recovery Sq

(6). RS - Bradley, Thomas F.; AIC;
33rd Air Recovery Sq

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
D-33

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DECLASSIFIED

Hq PARC Log No. 65-1355

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4. Initial notification for WIPE BRAVO 0334Z. First pickup by IRON 21 or 41 at 0655Z; second pickup by RUTLEDGE 6-0 at 0822Z; third pickup by RUTLEDGE 6-2 at 0827Z.
5. CAP assistance: CANASTA 573, 577, 574, and 576. MERCURY Flight, VAPOR Flight.
6. AREA: Land pickup by helicopter.
7. Survivors utilized the URT-21 and possibly a URC-11 or URC-4. SAR aircraft used the ARA 25 and the APX 38.
8. Survivor name unknown for MERCURY Lead. Survivor names for FLYING ACE 508:
 - a. BORDONE, R.P.; LCDR; 584350; VA 75; CVA 62.
 - b. MOFFETT, P.R.; LT JG; 661922; VA 75, CVA 62.
9. a. At 0334Z WIPE BRAVO received instructions from GUM to divert from the scheduled relief assignment for WIPE BRAVO and to intercept and accompany RUTLEDGE 6-0 and 6-2 to a reported bailout site, coordinates 16:30N, 106:12E. Bailout call sign was FLYING ACE 508. BRAVO was instructed to assume on scene command for SAR activities. At this time 6-0 and 6-2 had been scrambled and were already enroute and about 40 miles from the site. BRAVO elected to remain over water and parallel the coast line Southeast bound to avoid hot areas and then proceed inland roughly on the same track as 6-0 and 6-2. This route placed BRAVO an estimated 100 miles from the site. Enroute BRAVO climbed to 10,500 feet.
 - b. Overland the weather was an overcast layer bases ragged 1500 feet to 2500 feet and tops 8000 feet to 9000 feet. Another overcast had a base at 15,000 feet, tops unknown. Visibility between layers was 15 miles. Visibility below the lower overcast was 5 miles to 10 miles and down to one mile in numerous scattered rainshowers. Occasional small breaks in the lower overcast permitted brief glimpses of the ground from altitude. However, these breaks closed as rapidly as they formed. These conditions prevailed throughout the entire activity.
 - c. The terrain was hilly to mountainous with occasional valleys having an average elevation of 1000 feet. Hills averaged up to 2000 feet with occasional mountains up to 4000 feet.
 - d. Numerous aircraft were already on scene while 6-0 and 6-2 and BRAVO were enroute. All aircraft were working Primary SAR UHF. Transmissions stated that two chutes were visible on the ground about 400 yards apart. One survivor was visible near one chute. Numerous aircraft monitored URT-21 transmissions. One aircraft reported voice communication with one survivor, and about this time weather began closing in overhead the site.

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e. At 0415Z BRAVO estimated a position 30 miles from the site and 6-0 and 6-2 reported almost at the site. At this exact time MERCURY Lead, an F-105 providing high RESCAP, declared a fire warning light, then a flame out, and that he was bailing out. His wingman MERCURY 3, reported a good chute and that it was descending into the lower overcast. MERCURY 3 immediately went into an orbit over head that position.

f. 6-0 and 6-2 were now in the general area of the original site and BRAVO was in the general area of the second site. The two sites were estimated to be 25 miles apart.

g. MERCURY 3 almost immediately reported receiving a strong UHF Guard tone at his position. BRAVO took a steer on MERCURY 3 and went to that position. Arriving there BRAVO also monitored a strong tone which was a continuous UHF tone and definitely not a URT-21 transmission. This tone could be monitored only in a small area and was easily lost. The URT-21 tone at the original site continued but was periodic and also easily lost. No visual contact could be made with the ground except by 6-0 and 6-2 who were operating at 1500 feet to 2000 feet at the original site. 6-0 and 6-2 continued working the original site with a WHIPLASH and a DECOY aircraft. BRAVO continued at the second site with MERCURY and COTTON PICKER. For 30 to 45 minutes all aircraft periodically monitored signals at both sites but with continuous loss of signals. The numerous transmissions began to hamper any attempted operation of the ARA 25. At this time BRAVO elected to concentrate all efforts on the stronger continuous UHF tone at the second site. BRAVO requested 6-0 and 6-2 to proceed to the second site. However, it was now near fuel bingo time 6-0 and 6-2. 6-0 declared bingo at 0500Z and was cleared to depart. 6-0 stated his estimated time for return would be 0730Z. By now CANASTA 573 and 577 had arrived to provide RESCAP for BRAVO. 573 and 577 found a hole in the lower overcast and went down taking over for COTTON PICKER 4 to search the second site at low level. Visibility was poor. At 0550Z 573 spotted a chute in the trees. At 0630Z 573 spotted MERCURY Lead and reported the survivor was waving. At about this same time BRAVO was notified by GUM that SPUD 30 was escorting IRON 21 and 41 from INVERT, and all were airborne and enroute. At 0615Z BRAVO contacted SPUD 30 who gave his position as 30 miles from BRAVO. SPUD 30 utilized the RPX 28 for distance to BRAVO. BRAVO notified 573. 573 advised a rainshower was moving toward the survivor and visibility was decreasing. 573 requested the ETA of IRON 21 and 41. BRAVO gave an estimate of 20 minutes. It was understood by BRAVO that 573 then reported his bingo as 25 minutes away. So BRAVO took advantage of another break in the overcast to descend and relieve 573 until IRON 21 and 41 could be vectored in. BRAVO arrived at 2500 feet and three miles from 573 and 577 when 573 suddenly decided his bingo was 1000Z. BRAVO remained in the area at that altitude. SPUD 30 steered on BRAVO. IRON 21 and 41 descended from 8500 feet through the same break used by BRAVO.

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21 and 41 went through the light shower and 573 indicated the position of the survivor. MERCURY Lead was picked up by 21 or 41 (unknown) at 0655Z. 21 and 41 climbed back to 8500 feet and departed for INVERT in company with SPUD 30. BRAVO and CANASTA 573 and 577 climbed to 9000 feet and proceeded to the original site.

1. Enroute BRAVO made radio contact with VAPOR 3 who reported he was receiving the URT-21 signal. BRAVO took a steer for VAPOR 3. Upon arriving that position BRAVO was able to monitor the URT-21. BRAVO attempted voice communication but had no success. CANASTA 574 and 576 had by now ~~come upon~~ the scene and took over as RESCAP for BRAVO. 573 and 577 went down down to search visually. At 0745Z BRAVO made radio contact with RUTLEDGE 6-0 and 6-2 who were inbound to the site for the second time. 6-0 and 6-2 were given steers and came back into the general area at 0800Z. At 0804Z 573 spotted one chute and the survivor. At 0810Z 577 spotted the other chute and survivor. 6-0 and 6-2 made visual contact with 573 and 577. 6-0 coordinated with 573. 6-2 coordinated with 577. Both 6-0 and 6-2 experienced difficulty spotting the exact site due to the necessity to operate at low altitude in poor visibility and weather, but 573 and 577 continued making low passes until 6-0 and 6-2 were within range to make voice communication with the survivors. 6-0 completed a pick up of one survivor of FLYING ACE 508 at 0822Z. 6-2 completed a pick up of the other survivor at 0827Z. 6-0 and 6-2 elected to proceed at low altitude to HUE PHUBAI. 573 and 577 could not operate VFR low enough so they both climbed out and were cleared to return to home station. BRAVO remained at 8000 feet with 574 and 576 and escorted 6-0 and 6-2 to HUE PHUBAI. BRAVO, 6-0, and 6-2 landed at 0920Z. CANASTA 574 and 576 were cleared to return to home station. The survivors were transferred to BRAVO and transported to Danang. BRAVO landed at Danang at 1005Z. The survivors were immediately turned over to the Flight Surgeon.

10. a. The primary aircraft and individuals responsible for the success of this mission were CANASTA 573, 574, 577, and 576 who were able to get down and make the actual spotting of the survivors and then indicate the positions to the helicopters. And also RUTLEDGE 6-0 and 6-2 and IRON 21 and 41 who were able to operate in the limited weather conditions and around the hazardous terrain to make the actual pick ups.

b. UHF communications were good. There was no unnecessary "Chatter". All stations were aware of when to maintain radio silence for the low level communications attempts with survivors.

Edward M. Brunner

EDWARD M. BRUNNER
Capt., USAF
RCC

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p. (U) On 26 July 1965, a UH-1A was downed in North Vietnam. An HC-54 and two HH-3 helicopters were dispatched to the incident site. The search was hampered by fog and low clouds which caused the rescue aircraft to fly at extremely low altitudes in attempting to locate the survivor. In doing this the search crews subjected themselves to heavy ground fire. An emergency beacon was received and shortly thereafter the downed pilot was located in an extremely precarious position. He was hiding on the side of a hill, completely surrounded by unfriendly forces that were searching for him. The fighters were directed to strafe around the survivor to prevent his capture prior to the arrival of the helicopters. At this time a brush fire was sighted burning towards the survivor's position. The helicopters arrived at the incident area and pinpointed the survivor's position by the smoke from the brush fire. As the pilot was on the side of a steep hill the helicopter pilot had to maneuver the aircraft so as to have the rotor blades almost touching the side of the hill in order to hover over the survivor. This perilous operation was compounded by the low visibility caused by smoke from the fire. The survivor was saved from certain capture, or possible death from fire and returned to his home unit.

q. (U) On 27 July 1965, a strike was made against suspected surface to air missile (SAM) sites in close proximity to Hanoi. This was probably the most heavily defended area in SEAN. Four F-105 aircraft were downed by anti-aircraft fire during the raid. Of the four, no parachutes were observed but contact could only be established with one of the pilots following the bailout. Upon receipt of the bailout report the HC-54 on precautionary orbit relayed the information to the Joint Search and Rescue Center which in turn launched a CH-3C helicopter to proceed to the bailout scene from a forward operating base. The CH-3C helicopter, completely unarmed and unarmored, not possessing fuel tanks, or other combat modifications, entered the very same area in which the four aircraft had been shot down. The helicopter rendezvoused with fighter aircraft that had visual sightings of the survivor, and was vectored over his position. The helicopter lowered the hoist cable, and the survivor put on the harness; however, when an attempt was made to raise the survivor the hoist malfunctioned. Two of the crewmembers attempted to pull the survivor in manually, but could not accomplish this. Realizing they provided the only means of escape for the pilot, the helicopter crew elected to proceed to an open field one mile from the incident site and land. The helicopter climbed to an altitude which would permit the survivor, who was dangling 60 feet below them, to clear ground obstructions. However, when the helicopter reached the field they came under ground fire. In return of this, the crew elected to land as the survivor could not be expected to hold on to the harness much longer. In the process of landing and retrieving the survivor the helicopter received three hits, one of which was within 6 inches of the fuel tank. This landing took place in an open area, adjacent to a village, only 40 miles from Hanoi.

TAB 5 CHECO 1961 -66



VIETNAM
MEMOIR

Tullo and the GIANT

Franks Tullo has never forgotten his first day as a captain. He was 25 years old and flying from Korat Royal Thai Air Base, one of two F-105 bases in Thailand. News of his promotion had come through late the evening before, and he had sewn a pair of shiny new captain's bars on his flightsuit. He was wearing those bars when North Vietnamese gunners on the outskirts of Hanoi shot him down.

I heard Tullo's story a few years ago when he was an airline captain and I was negotiating the sale of radios to his airline. I flew 122 missions in F-4E Phantom IIs, also out of Korat but at a later time in the war. Many of my friends had been shot down over there, and a lot were never heard from again. Most fighter crews were not optimistic about

their chances for rescue.

Pilots of the F-105 Thunderchief, or "Thud," in particular, suffered a high loss rate. There was a standing joke among the often chain-smoking Thud crews that the definition of an optimistic Thud driver was one who thought he would die of lung cancer. In fact, the Air Force commissioned a study that showed that during a typical 100-mission tour, an F-105 pilot should expect to get shot down twice and picked up once. At about the time that Tullo got his captain's bars, air rescue planners decided to try to improve the pilots' chances.

On July 27, 1965, Tullo was flying as Dogwood Two in a flight led by his good friend Major Bill Hosmer, a former Thunderbird and the best pilot Tullo had ever flown with. Dogwood was to be the cleanup flight—the last of 24 F-105s, six flights of four, from Korat to hit surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in North Vietnam. Their job, as cleanup, would be to take out any sites not destroyed by the earlier flights.

The SAM had introduced a new aspect to the war only days before, when

The long-range, armor-plated Sikorsky HH-3C Jolly Green Giant (left) came to the rescue in Vietnam in November 1965. Months before, pilot George Martin (below, center), ad libbing with his cargo version CH-3, flew the helo's first recovery in the North and brought back F-105 pilot Frank Tullo (right).




FRANK TULLO COLLECTION

For pilots shot down over North Vietnam, the way home was jolly and green.

by Robert A. Hanson

Air & Space June/July 1997



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS (2)

Loaded with up to 14,000 pounds of ordnance, supersonic F-105 Thuds flew risky missions against enemy defenses.

an F-4 Phantom II became the first to fall to these new weapons. The missiles were fired from within a no-fly zone near Hanoi, previously immune from attack as dictated by rules of engagement. Tullo's flight would be part of the first attack within the no-fly zone and the first major strike on the SAM sites since the Phantom had been downed.

To destroy the missile sites and take out their command and control centers, each Thud was loaded with two pods of 2.75-inch rockets. (They were also equipped with an internal 20-millimeter Gatling cannon.) Along with the rockets, the Thuds carried 450-gallon auxiliary fuel tanks under their wings. Tullo's aircraft, which was scheduled to be flown to Okinawa for maintenance, also carried a 600-gallon tank on its centerline. He'd have to jettison the tank once airborne to stay with the flight.

This was part of a maximum effort involving at least 48 F-105s—24 from Korat and 24 from Takhli—and another 50 or so supporting aircraft. At this early stage of the war—the buildup of U.S. fighters in Thailand and South Vietnam had begun only six months be-

fore—tactics and weapons for dealing with SAMs had not been developed. The projected learning curve for the months ahead was nearly vertical.

It was mid-afternoon when Tullo's flight came over the hills from the south to clean up leftover targets. Dogwood flight had been listening to the action on the assigned attack frequency since an in-flight refueling midway en route. From the sound of things, some friendly aircraft were down. As the flight cleared the last ridge at treetop level before arriving at the target area, Hosmer, who was Dogwood lead, exclaimed, "Jesus!"

Working to hold his position on Lead's wing, Tullo managed to steal a look ahead. "I damn near fainted," he told me years later. "To a good Catholic boy, this was the description of hell." The whole valley was a cauldron of flame

Tactics for
dealing with SAMs
had not been
developed.

and smoke from the ordnance dropped by preceding flights, and North Vietnamese Army flak filled the sky. In the five months he had been in the war, Tullo had seen his share of anti-aircraft artillery, but this was the worst yet.

Hosmer had the flight on course for the first SAM site they were to check out. Tracers were flying past the canopies and the smell of cordite was strong—the pilots depressurized their cockpits when they neared the target area so that if hit, smoke from an onboard fire would not be drawn inside. Only days before, Tullo had seen a column of smoke stream from his wingman's still-pressurized cockpit after the canopy was jettisoned prior to ejection.

The flight pressed lower. The Thud would do nearly 700 mph on the deck. Tullo was sure they were under 200 feet and was working hard to stay in position on Lead.

Without warning, Hosmer broke hard left, exclaiming "Damn, they just salvoed!" Sometimes SAM batteries would fire all their missiles at once in an effort to save the valuable control vans. Tullo could see only the huge wall of smoke and flame coming at the flight from the NVA guns protecting the SAM sites.

Their tremendous speed caused the flight to turn wide enough to be carried directly over the gunsite. As they passed over, Tullo looked right into the flaming muzzles of a battery of quad guns. They were at 100 feet or lower, and still near 700 mph. He glanced over at Lead to check his position, then back into his cockpit. That's when he noticed the fire warning light.

"Lead, I have a fire light," he radioed.

Three called, "Two, you're on fire. Get out!"

Hosmer kept the flight in the turn, saying, "Two, loosen it up. I'm going to look you over."

Tullo assumed the lead and headed for the mountains in the distance. Hosmer said, "Better clean off the wing, Frank." To give himself more speed and maneuverability, Tullo jettisoned the tanks and rocket pods on his wings and felt the Thud lighten.

Three was calling again, his voice tight with urgency.

"Two, the flames are trailing a good 150 feet behind you. You better get out!" In spite of the fire and the calls from

Three, Tullo felt a sense of well-being. He was still flying, he had control, and he was with Hosmer. Nothing bad would ever happen with Hoz leading. It would work out. The fire would go out, the aircraft would keep flying, he would make it back. They were still over Hanoi. Houses were below them. The mountains to the west, which would come to be known as Thud Ridge, offered refuge. A good bailout area, just in case.

"You better get out, Frank, it's really burning," Hosmer said in a calm voice.

"Negative," Tullo replied. "It's still flying. I've lost the ATM [the noisy auxiliary turbine motor, which provided the Thud's electrical power but left many of the aircraft's pilots with bad hearing], but I've got the standby instruments, and I'm heading for that ridge straight ahead." In the early days, several pilots whose aircraft were on fire ejected over the target and were either killed or taken prisoner. There had been incidents in the Thud's checkered past when a burning aircraft had exploded before the pilot could eject, but many others had flown for a considerable time without blowing up. Many pilots, like Tullo, had decided to take their chances staying with their aircraft as long as they could, rather than eject in the target area.

The ridge was still well ahead of the aircraft. The flight had climbed some but was still very low and being shot at from all quarters. Tullo's aircraft dropped its nose slightly. He pulled back on the stick. No response. He pulled harder. Still nothing. When he heard muffled explosions in the rear of the aircraft, Tullo hit the mike button: "I've gotta go, Lead. I'm losing controls. It's not responding." At 200 feet, there was no time to wait. If the aircraft nosed down, physics would be against him. Even if he managed to eject, he would likely bounce just behind the aircraft, still in the seat. He pulled up the armrests, which jettisoned the canopy, locked his elbows in the proper position, and revealed the trigger that fired the seat.


The results were the most horrific Tullo had ever experienced. At the speed he was moving, the noise, the roar, the

The whole valley was
a cauldron of flame
and smoke from the
ordnance dropped by
preceding flights.

buffeting—it was unbelievable. Everything not bolted down in the cockpit went flying past his face. He froze for a matter of seconds before he squeezed the trigger to fire the seat.

The ejection process that followed was so violent that today Tullo's memory is blank of everything that happened immediately after he squeezed the trigger. He doesn't remember leaving the cockpit, the seat separating, or the chute opening. He had the low-level lanyard hooked, which attached the parachute directly to the seat and caused it to deploy almost immediately. After tumbling violently, *whomp!* he was swinging in the chute.

A little battered by the violent ejection, Tullo prepared for the landing. Floating down in the chute was serene and the soft rush of air soothed him. He did not see his aircraft crash. During his descent, he eyed the city of Hanoi about 25 miles away. A small U-shaped



Rescue crews presented a broad target for as long as it took to extract a downed pilot hidden by dense foliage.

farmhouse sat near a clearing, just to the west. He passed below the 100-foot treetops and landed in an area of 10-foot elephant grass.

At that moment, listening to the sound of his flight disappearing to the southwest, the only thing in his mind was that he was on the ground in North Vietnam, armed only with a .38 Special. His first concern was to hide the billowing white parachute. Working hard to con-

had landed on a hillside west of Hanoi. He could hear heavy anti-aircraft fire to the east and see puffs of flak dancing around the flight. Within seconds, hot shrapnel began to fall around him.

"Frank, we gotta go. Fuel is getting low, and we've been ordered out of the area. We're gonna get you a chopper." Hosmer's voice dropped: "And, Frank," he said, "this may be an all-nighter."

Tullo rogered Hosmer's message and

told him he was going to try to work his way higher up the slope to make the pickup easier. He had no doubt that he would be rescued.

As the sound of Dogwood flight faded to the southwest, Tullo prepared to move up the hill to a better vantage point. He decided to open the survival kit and remove useful equipment. In a normal ejection, once stabilized in the chute and prior to landing, a pilot would reach down and pull a handle on the kit's box to deploy it. It was advisable to deploy the kit prior to landing to avoid possible leg injuries, since the case was hard and fairly heavy. Tullo hadn't had this option because he had ejected at such a low level.

He rotated the kit's red handle, and with a great whooshing roar, a dinghy began to inflate.

The dinghy! He had forgotten all about that! And it was bright yellow! He had to stop the noise. Tullo drew a large survival knife he wore strapped to the leg of his G-suit, threw himself on the dinghy, and began stabbing it. The first two blows merely rebounded. With a final mighty effort, he plunged the knife into the rubber and cut a large hole so the air could escape. With that emergency solved, Tullo lay back to catch his breath and get a drink of water. Then he started up the hill.

Hard-working crews kept the Jolly Greens flying. Both the CH-3C and its cousin, the HH-3C, were powered by two 1,300-shaft horsepower General Electric T58-GE-1 turboshaft engines.

tol his breathing, he stuffed the parachute under the matted grass and covered it up with dirt. After shedding his harness and survival kit, he removed the emergency radio from his vest, extended the antenna, and prepared to contact Dogwood flight. He could hear them returning, and he had to let them know he was all right.

As the flight drew closer, Tullo turned on the survival radio. Cupping his hand around the mouthpiece, he whispered: "Dogwood Lead, this is Dogwood Two." Hoz responded immediately: "Roger Two, Lead is reading you. We're going to get a fix on your position."

The flight turned toward Tullo, who

USAF (2)



The elephant grass was so dense that at times he couldn't separate it with his hands and had to climb over the tough, wide blades. After climbing about 50 to 75 feet, he realized he wasn't going to make it to the top. His flightsuit was soaked, and his hands were cut by the sharp edges of the grass. Rather than waste more energy, he flattened out a small space in the grass and faced south-east to have a good view of any threat coming up the slope. Time to set up housekeeping.

Tullo's survival vest and kit included a spare battery for the radio, emergency beeper, day and night flares, pen

Tullo tried to relax and waited for the rescuers he knew would come.

is Dogwood Two, do you read me?"

"Dogwood Two, this is Canasta, and we read you loud and clear. Transmit for bearing." Tullo warned Canasta of

of your mind? There's no way I'm going to pop smoke here!"

The pilot told Tullo to calm down. He had just spotted trucks unloading troops to the south of Tullo's position. He also reassured Tullo that they were working on getting a helicopter to him.

Tullo heard shots. They built to a crescendo, then stopped. The shooting had started at some distance but had grown closer. Soon he was able to hear voices as the troops worked their way up the hillside. He burrowed into the dense grass and waited, his heart pounding. He raised his head and saw an older man about 150 to 175 feet away wear-



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flares, six rounds of tracer ammo, a "blood chit" printed in several languages that promised rewards for assisting downed American airmen, gold bars for buying freedom, maps, a first aid kit, water purification tablets, two tins of water, two packets of high-energy food, tape, string, 250 feet of rappelling line, a saw, knife, compass, shark repellent, fishing kit, whistle, signalling mirror, sewing kit, and two prophylactics for keeping ammunition or other equipment clean and dry. He extracted the ball ammo from his .38, loaded the tracers, and stuffed everything not immediately useful into the knapsack-type pouch. Then he sat back, tried to relax, and waited for the rescuers he knew would come.

Tullo heard the sound of prop-driven aircraft approaching from the north. He correctly assumed they were Douglas A-1s, or "Spads," as they were called. He stood up and keyed his radio. "This

the flak to the east, and as advertised, the guns opened up as the aircraft approached Tullo's position. As soon as Tullo could see the aircraft, he began giving vectors. On the second circle, Tullo was looking right up the wing of Canasta, a flight of two Navy A1-Hs. He called, "Canasta, I'm right off your wingtip now." Canasta Lead said, "Catcha! Don't worry, we're going for a chopper." As the Spads droned out of the area, Tullo felt sure he would be picked up.

Within a few minutes, he heard the unmistakable sound of Thuds. Thinking it could be Hosmer again, he turned on the survival radio and called, "Any F-105 over Vietnam, this is Dogwood Two." An answer came from a flight of two Thuds, which approached his position in a wide sweeping turn from the north. The flight Lead, whose voice Tullo recognized, asked Tullo to pop a smoke flare for location.

"Smoke?" Tullo replied, "Are you out

The HH-3C's air-refueling capability dramatically increased the Jollys' range and allowed more loiter time.

ing a cone-shaped straw hat. It was all Tullo could do not to make a run for it, but that was exactly what they wanted him to do. He forced himself to sit quietly. The troops made a lot of noise but they kept moving to the east, down the hill. Silence returned and Tullo continued to wait.

George Martin was flying his Sikorsky CH-3C helicopter to Lima 36, a remote staging area in Laos about 120 miles from Hanoi, to prepare for another day of rescue alert duty. Only a few weeks before he had been flying cargo support at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Today, he was commanding a small detachment of men and helicopters on a 120-day assignment in Viet-



In the relative safety of a forward base in Laos, Tullo (second from left) first told the tale of his ejection near Hanoi.

nam. He and his crew had been tasked to learn a new mission for which they had little preparation.

In 1965, as the number of U.S. airstrikes and reconnaissance missions in Vietnam multiplied, pilots faced the increasing possibility of being downed deep inside Laos or North Vietnam. Crews flying the small and slow Kaman HH-43 Huskie, originally designed as an air-base firefighting and rescue helicopter, were already pushing the aircraft to its limits. There was clearly a need for a faster rescue helicopter with longer legs. The cargo-carrying CH-3C fit the bill, and the Air Force began sending crews from Eglin for specialized training. The crews practiced mountain flying, ground survival, and rescue operations, which involved coordination with controller and escort aircraft. The training was projected to last several months, but the escalating conflict wouldn't wait.

Martin, who was too close to retirement to be selected for the additional training and the accompanying extended tour, was ordered to fill in with 21 men

and two CH-3s until the fully trained crews arrived. "I found out Friday afternoon and was gone Sunday evening," Martin says. "It was just like in the movies—I said, 'When do I leave?' They said, 'How fast can you pack?'"

Martin was about to land at an intermediate refueling base when he was asked by radio to divert and try to rescue a downed F-105 pilot. Martin still needed to proceed to Lima 36 to drop off cargo and extra crew. He had to lighten his aircraft to take on as much fuel as possible and still be able to pick up the pilot. "The big consideration in helicopter pickup is gross weight," Martin says. "If you're too heavy to hover, all you can do is fly around and wave at him."

Upon landing at 36, Martin's number two engine warning lights indicat-

There was clearly a need for a faster rescue helicopter with longer legs.

ed an "overtemp" condition, which meant significant problems, possibly foreign object damage or a compressor stall from air starvation, and under normal circumstances would have grounded the aircraft. The crew looked to Martin for a decision. "Everybody was pretty apprehensive. I told them, 'We're his only hope. If the engine will start again after cool-down, we'll go.'" His crew reluctantly agreed.

The engine restarted without incident and Martin's CH-3, call sign "Jolly Green One," took off for Hanoi. Martin had no idea where to locate the downed pilot. He was unescorted until he was about 50 miles from Hanoi, at which point he was joined by Canasta flight, flown by Ed Greathouse and Holt Livesay from USS *Midway's* Attack Squadron 25.

The oppressive heat of the afternoon wore on. Finally, Tullo heard the sound of prop-driven aircraft again. Darkness was about 40 minutes away as he turned on his radio. The aircraft responded immediately. "Dogwood Two, this is Canasta. I have a chopper for you." Seconds later, Canasta flight flew directly over Tullo's position, and there, not far behind, came a helicopter. Tullo was expecting a small chopper, but this one was a big green monster, Martin's Jolly Green, the first in the theater and headed for its first combat recovery—Frank Tullo.

"Dogwood Two, this is Jolly Green. How'm I doing?" Martin said to the man on the ground. He was coming right up the valley from the south-southwest. Tullo said, "You're doing great!" and popped his pen and smoke flares. The chopper's blades made the smoke swirl as Tullo aimed his .38 straight up and fired all six tracer rounds. Crew chief Curtis Pert spotted the pilot through the thick ground cover as soon as the smoke made its way above the trees. As Martin hovered, Pert lowered a "horse collar" sling.

Later, better equipped rescue crews would have a specialized hoist attached to a "jungle penetrator" designed to pierce thick tree canopies. "We just had a jury-rigged cargo winch that you could turn into a 10-cent, Mickey Mouse rescue hoist," Martin says.

On the ground, the downblast was tremendous. Debris flew everywhere,

and the trees and grass were whipping and bending wildly. Tullo holstered his pistol, slung the survival kit over his shoulder, and slipped the horse collar over his head. He gave the crew chief in the door a thumbs-up.

The cable became taut and Tullo began to rise off the ground. After being lifted about 10 feet, the hoist jammed and the cable stopped. The crew chief was giving hand signals Tullo did not understand. Tullo looked up. Pert and pararescueman George Thayer were in the door lowering a rope. The horse

Jolly pilots had to manage their fuel so they weren't too heavy to hover once they found a downed airman.

collar was cutting off the circulation in Tullo's arms and he was tiring, but he grabbed the rope and tied it around the top of the horse collar.

Finally the chopper began to move and dragged Tullo through some bushes. *Everybody's trying to kill me*, he thought. The Jolly climbed and circled as Pert Thayer struggled with the hoist. The overworked number two engine had begun to overheat and a fire light came on in the Jolly's cockpit. As they circled, Martin hoped that the air flowing through the engine would cool it down and the light might extinguish.

Pert and Thayer were joined by copilot Orville Keese, and the three men strained to pull the dangling man aboard. The pain was becoming so great that

Tullo was thinking about dropping from the sling.

Martin spotted a rice paddy next to a house and lowered Tullo to the ground. The exhausted pilot rolled out of the sling as the chopper swung away and landed 50 or 60 feet away from him. Pert and Thayer frantically shouted to Tullo, who sprinted and dove through the door. He could hear an automatic weapon firing and saw both pilots in the helo ducking their heads.

The Jolly had problems: low fuel, a sick engine, darkness, and clouds at altitude. Martin and his crew had been in the war zone slightly more than two weeks and did not even have maps of the area. The crew relied on flares lit inside 55-gallon drums at Lima 36 and the landing lights of hovering helos to find a place to land. "We held only about a quarter of the area around the site," Martin says. "That was the only corridor you could fly through without getting shot at, because the Pathet Lao held the other three-quarters." Martin finally landed with a shaken pilot and just 750 pounds of fuel aboard.

Tullo learned his aircraft was one of six Thuds and one EB-66 electronic countermeasures aircraft shot down that day. Of three surviving pilots, Tullo was the only one rescued—the others were to spend more than seven years as POWs. Tullo returned to a Thunderchief cockpit and completed his tour. His story was later told in *Thunder From Above* by John Morocco.

Tullo's rescue was the farthest north that a successful pickup had been made, thanks to the determination of Martin and his crew and the long range of their CH-3C. It was the first of 1,490 rescues that Jolly Green Giants would make in Southeast Asia. Soon a dedicated rescue version would be built, the HH-3C, with in-flight refueling capability, armor plating, a powerful hoist, and shatterproof canopies. However, the Jolly Green Giant would find its ultimate form in the HH-53 Super Jolly, an even larger and more powerful helicopter still flown in various versions today. The technology improved, but rescue crews still had to meet the same basic requirements: a willingness to fly into hostile territory, hover in a big green target, and find a man whose only hope arrived on a cable and sling. ➔



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SECRET

c. Combat Mission Narratives:

(1) (U) Det 6 - 446 - 20 Jul 65. An F-100 pilot bailed out at night in heavy rain over unsecure territory of South-Vietnam. Two HH-43F helicopters scrambled from Bien Hoa, and picked up the downed pilots URT 21 beeper signal immediately upon take off. Due to low visibility and erratic homing needle swing, the helicopters conducted search for the survivor at 25 feet utilizing floodlights and landing lights. Helicopters were under sporadic tracer fire during the search. The pilot was located, and returned to Bien Hoa uninjured.

(2) (S) 38-664-3 Jul 65. An F-105 pilot, Capt Kenneth R. Johnson, discovered he had a severe shortage of fuel enroute to a strike in North Vietnam. He immediately jettisoned his external stores and started heading for friendly territory. He contacted the HC-54 on precautionary orbit, which in turn advised the control center to scramble helicopters from Udorn AB, Thailand. The F-105 ran out of fuel while over Laos, and the pilot made a successful bailout. He landed in high trees and was dangling in his harness 50 feet above the ground. He had suffered a broken arm. When the helicopters arrived on the scene a rescue from above was attempted. Due to heavy foliage the pararescue man was suspended in the horsecollar 100 feet below the helicopter and for ten minutes tried to chop away the vines and branches above the survivor. It soon became apparent that this approach would not work. The helicopter then landed approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile from the survivor. The pararescue man walked to the site and the helicopter lowered the hoist to him. The pararescue man was hoisted up to the survivor, and tied the survivor to him utilizing a nylon rope. He then cut the parachute shroud lines, and the helicopter climbed vertically for 150 feet, then flew at 20 knots to the clearing with the two men dangling 75 feet below the helicopter. After the recovery of the two into the helicopter an uneventful flight to home base followed. The helicopter aircraft commander was Capt David E. Allen.

(3) (S) 38-744-24 Jul 65. A Navy A-6A was shot down over Laos, the crew, Lt Cmdr Richard P. Bordone, and Lt Jg Peter F. Moffett, made a successful ejection. An F-105 that was searching for the downed navy crew developed engine trouble and had to bail out within 25 miles of the first incident. Marine helicopters that were prepositioned for search and rescue operations at Quang Tri, RVN and USAF HH-43 helicopters from Nakhon Phanom, Thailand were launched to effect recovery of survivors. In spite of low visibility and marginal reception of beacon signals all crew members were located and recovered. The Marine helicopters rescued the two Navy pilots. Capt Thomas J. Curtis who was the pilot of the HH-43 helicopter picked up Major William J. McClelland, the F-105 pilot.

(4) (S) 38-754-27 Jul 65. Four F-105 aircraft were downed while flying against surface to air missile sites in North Vietnam. Of the four downed aircraft only one chute was reported. A CH-3C helicopter

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which was prepositioned at a forward site in Laos was launched to recover survivors. It entered the same area where the four aircraft had been downed, approximately 40 miles west of Hanoi, and was led to the downed pilot by RESCAP aircraft. The survivor was on a heavily wooded slope and marked his position with red smoke. The helicopter was forced to hover at approximately 80 feet above the pilot due to the high trees. After the pilot had put on the hoist harness and was raised 10 feet a hoist malfunction occurred. The crew was unable to lift the pilot the remaining 70 feet manually. The crew decided a landing would have to be made in order to rescue the survivor, so they flew to a rice paddy $\frac{1}{2}$ mile away with the survivor dangling 70 feet below the helicopter. Immediately after landing and recovering the survivor the helicopter came under automatic weapons fire and received 3 hits, one of which missed the fuel tanks by 6 inches. The remainder of the return journey was uneventful. CH-3C aircraft commander was Capt George C. Martin, and rescued F-105 pilot was Capt Frank Tullo.

(5) (S) 38-761-28 Jul 65. A USN A-4E was downed over Laos. Two HH-43 helicopters were scrambled from Nakhon Phanom to make the pickup. The downed pilot was located by A-1E RESCAP aircraft which led the helicopters to the scene. The A-1E aircraft had to conduct continuing attacks against hostile troops that were attempting to reach the downed pilot. As the helicopter moved in for the pickup the A-1E's laid down covering fire. The survivor was located on the side of a hill, and in order for the helicopter to maneuver over the pilot to effect the pickup it was necessary to have the blades come within inches of the side of the mountain. The pickup was successful and an uneventful flight back to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand followed. The aircraft commander of the HH-43 making the pickup was 1Lt Walter F Turk, and the survivor was LT JG Townsend R. Grant.

(6) (U) 38-814-11 Aug 65. An HU-16 on precautionary orbit over the Gulf of Tonkin received a call on guard channel from an F-105 that was hit coming off a strike in North Vietnam. The F-105 pilot declared he was going to bail out. The HU-16 requested a homing steer from the distressed aircraft's wingman, and as he turned to the heading, made a visual sighting on the descending parachute. The HU-16 jettisoned wing tanks and was on final approach as the survivor landed in the water. The pickup was made approximately 14 miles off the shore of North Vietnam. The HU-16 aircraft commander, Major Frederick C. Wiamer, made a normal water take off and delivered the survivor, to DaNang AB, RVN.

(7) (U) 38-822-13 Aug 65. Lt Robert J Hyland, USNR, was piloting an A-1H which was hit by flak over North Vietnam. His wingman contacted the HU-16 on precautionary orbit and advised it of the impending bailout. The A-1H was able to make the coast and the pilot bailed out over the sea. His wingman directed the HU-16 to the incident site. The HU-16 made a water landing, recovered the survivor, and delivered him to DaNang AB, RVN. The HU-16 aircraft commander was Capt Richard F. Reichardt.

~~SECRET~~

p. (U) On 26 July 1965, a UH-1A was downed in North Vietnam. An HC-54 and two HH-43 helicopters were dispatched to the incident site. The search was hampered by fog and low clouds which caused the rescue aircraft to fly at extremely low altitudes in attempting to locate the survivor. In doing this the search areas subjected themselves to heavy ground fire. An emergency beacon was received and shortly thereafter the downed pilot was located in an extremely precarious position. He was hiding on the side of a hill, completely surrounded by unfriendly forces that were searching for him. The fighters were directed to strafe around the survivor to prevent his capture prior to the arrival of the helicopters. At this time a brush fire was sighted burning towards the survivor's position. The helicopters arrived at the incident area and pinpointed the survivor's position by the smoke from the brush fire. As the pilot was on the side of a steep hill the helicopter pilot had to maneuver the aircraft so as to have the rotor blades almost touching the side of the hill in order to hover over the survivor. This perilous operation was compounded by the low visibility caused by smoke from the fire. The survivor was saved from certain capture, or possible death from fire and returned to his home unit.

q. (U) On 27 July 1965, a strike was made against suspected surface to air missile (SAM) sites in close proximity to Hanoi. This was probably the most heavily defended area in SEAN. Four F-105 aircraft were downed by anti-aircraft fire during the raid. Of the four, no parachutes were observed but contact could only be established with one of the pilots following the bailout. Upon receipt of the bailout report the HC-74 on precautionary orbit relayed the information to the Joint Search and Rescue Center which in turn launched a CH-53 helicopter to proceed to the bailout scene from a forward operating base. The CH-53 helicopter, completely unarmed and unarmored, not possessing fuel tanks, or other combat modifications carried the very same pilot in which the four aircraft had been shot down. The helicopter rendezvoused with fighter aircraft that had visual sightings on the survivor, and was vectored over his position. The helicopter lowered the hoist cable, and the survivor put in the harness; however, when an attempt was made to raise the survivor the hoist malfunctioned. Two of the crewmembers attempted to pull the survivor in manually, but could not accomplish this. Realizing they provided the only means of escape for the pilot, the helicopter crew elected to proceed to an open field one mile from the incident site and land. The helicopter climbed to an altitude which would permit the survivor, who was dangling 60 feet below them, to clear ground observation. However, when the helicopter reached the field they came under ground fire. In view of this, the crew elected to land as the survivor could not be expected to hold on to the harness much longer. In the process of landing and retrieving the survivor the helicopter received three hits, one of which came within 6 inches of the fuel tank. This landing took place in an open area, adjacent to a village, only 10 miles from Hanoi.

TAB 5 CITECO 1961-66

Detachment 5
38 Air Rescue Squadron
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO San Francisco 96237

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Capt Reeves

SUBJECT: Narrative Report, Mission Number 754

TO: Hq PARC
Hickam AFB, Hawaii

*34 Report by ARRB/DOOR
at 2:24 to USAF Hq
1 C/Tc FT Belvoir VA 35 NM NW
Hanoi*

Report
ACTION: ARODC

INFO: ARCCO

DOWNGRADED

CH3C Pilot, Capt Martin

IAW

AFR 235-2

Classification (cancelled) (changed to UNCLASS)
effective on 11-3-75, under the authority of 19

1. This report concerning mission 754, was flown on 27 July 1965. The crew members were: Rescue Crew Commander, Capt Robert R. Reeves, 48th ARS; Co-Pilot, Capt Emmett E. Williams, Jr., 36th ARS; Navigator, Capt Harrison N. Yoneda, 36th ARS; Flight Mechanic, TSgt Floyd L. England, 36th ARS; Flight Mechanic, SSgt Antranig A. Gurnvlian, 48th ARS; Radio Operator, SSgt Newton C. Boykin, 54th ARS. The recovery aircraft was an HC-54D, 42-72666, call sign SPUD 29, from 36th ARS, Tachikawa AB, Japan. Mission objective was to escort a CH-3C helicopter, call sign - SHED 85, to LIMA SITE 36, then orbit site 36 and standby for possible recovery of downed pilots.
2. At 0420Z, we departed Udorn AB, Thailand. We arrived at orbit area ALPHA (20-00N 104-29E) at 0449Z. At 0500Z SHED 85 was intercepted. We contacted 03Z, an Air America aircraft, for site 36 and site 98 weather. 03Z reported some holes in broken layers and alright for arrival of SHED 85 at site 98. He reported site 36 weather to be overcast with bases at 5,500 ft. The overcast had a hole 20 NM wide and visibility was good. From our position the weather looked unfavorable in all quadrants as far as could be seen. SHED 85 was somewhat concerned with the weather at both sites, but continued on to site 98 which was enroute to site 36. At 0610Z SHED 85 landed at site 98 to refuel. Because of the questionable weather he felt that a refueling stop was necessary in the interest of safety. Two HH-43B helicopters from Udorn, PEDRO 1 & 2 also landed at site 98 approximately the same time. SPUD 06, an HC-54D from Udorn had escorted the PEDRO choppers to site 98. Together we orbited site 98 while waiting for SHED 85 to refuel. SPUD 06 and PEDRO 1 & 2 were remaining at site 98 on alert. At 0620Z we were advised that the weather at site 36 was favorable for SHED 85 to land. We attempted contact with SHED 85 on UHF and HF which he had been advised to maintain contact on while at site 98. We attempted contact through PEDRO aircraft without success. At 0642Z we finally contacted PEDRO 2 and he advised SHED 85 to take off ASAP as directed by Hq 38 ARS. SHED 85 advised us he would have fuel for 2 + 00 hrs flight when reaching site 36, providing he landed and dropped off some personnel and other weight. His ground time for refueling was 25 min. and this would give him 4 + 00 hrs of fuel. SHED 85 and SPUD 29 departed site 98.

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Hq ARS SC No. 654349

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At 0725Z we heard a call to BRIGHAM (Udorn Radar) over UHF giving the following position of HEALY-2 who went down - 2100N 105-18E. We advised SHED 85, SPUD 06, and Hq 38th ARS. 38th ARS advised us that CHESTNUT flight was due over target in 20 min and would provide RESCAP. At 0740Z CHESTNUT 20 advised that CEDAR 2 had also gone down at 21-05N 105-14E. At 0753Z 38th advised CHEVY flight would be in target area for RESCAP at 0803Z. At 0755Z we advised SHED 85 to take on enough fuel for 3 trips to target area and return as per 38th ARS instructions. 85 advised he could only make 2 trips. At 0810Z SHED 85 landed at site 36 and refueled. PEDRO 1 & 2 were close behind and also refueled at 36. At 0810Z LEOPARD and CHEVY flights advised they were in the area and had negative electronic signals or visual of any of the downed pilots. At 0813Z VICTORY LEAD relayed through whiplash flight that DOGWOOD 02 had gone down at 21-00N 104-58E. At 0825Z DOGWOOD 1 relayed that an electronic signal had been received from DOGWOOD 02 at 21-13N 104-56E. At 0832 38th ARS advised SAM ENVELOPE was effective for 45 NM radius of Hanoi. We were advised to remain clear and not approach the 45 NM radius above 1500 feet. This message was relayed to all aircraft. In the target area. At 0902Z DOGWOOD flight departed target area. At 0914Z SHED 85 departed site 36. CHESTNUT and CHEVY flights departed area and WHIPLASH entered the area. We escorted SHED 85 via site 107 to the Black River 6 NM west of Yan Yen North Vietnam. At 0940Z one CHESTNUT aircraft who had remained on scene reported that he had sighted the pilot in an isolated area and that he was O.K. He estimated the elevation to be 2000 feet and was receiving electronic contacts each 15 minutes. At approximately 0942Z SPUD 06 requested RESCAP as he was behind us and approximately 25 NM south of us. At this time we only had 2 ALH's for low coverage. The RESCAP flights coming in were having to leave for refueling on the tankers or returning home plate. We requested all available RESCAP in order to help cover SPUD 06 and PEDRO 1 & 2. We especially needed low coverage for search, however we were advised that all ALH's and ALE's were committed on missions. At 0947Z DART 98 and CANASTA 3 entered the target area. At 1005Z PANTHER 120 and SUNDOWN 112 entered the area. SHED 85 was advised to contact CANASTA flight for vector into target area. At 1025Z we reached the Black River and orbited to stay out of 45NM range of Hanoi. SHED 85 continued heading 070° as vectored by CANASTA flight. At 1030Z PANTHER and SUNDOWN flights departed area and CHESTNUT 3 and COBRA flights arrived on scene. CHESTNUT 3 was sent low to help with low cover of SHED 85. At 1026Z we advised SPUD 06 that LEOPARD and COBRA flights were inbound and to contact them for RESCAP in their area. We also sent WHIPLASH flight to their area to cover until COBRA or LEOPARD came on scene. At 1038Z CANASTA 572 and 574 sighted SHED 85 and lead him to the survivor at 1049Z and at 1102 SHED 85 advised he could not hoist the pilot up due to a hoist malfunction. He was vectored to a clearing by CANASTA flight where he landed. At 1113Z SHED 85 reported that the pilot had gotten out of the horse collar and was on board in good physical and mental condition. At approximately this time SPUD 06 advised they were given instructions to return to site 36 as no visual or electronic contacts had been made at any of the other locations. At 1114Z we vectored SHED 85 to our orbit position and at 1120Z we departed orbit with SHED 85 enroute to site 36. At 1143Z Hq 38 ARS requested to know if any aircraft

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were available at site 36 to evacuate the pilot. SHED 85 reported a malfunction with one of his engines and felt that a night flight under these conditions was too hazardous to risk. PEDRO 1 & 2 were of the same opinion. There were no other aircraft available for evacuation so 38th ARS advised that Air America would evacuate him the next morning. At 1210Z two Air America helicopters took off and orbited site 36 in order to vector us in as it was dark. They also ignited 4 oil drums by 1220Z along with SHED 85 we arrived over site 36. The 2 Air America choppers led 85 down and he was on the site at 1228Z. He reported ground fire damage and advised he would talk to tech rep before departing. We vectored SPUD 06 and PEDRO 1 and 2 into site 36 at 1232Z. The 2 Air America choppers lead PEDRO 1 and 2 down to site 36. At 1259Z we departed site 36 with SPUD 06. We landed at Udorn AB at 1405. SPUD 06 landed approximately 1415Z.

The foremost problem during this mission was the enormous amount of UHF traffic working 364.2. SPUD 06 was escorting and controlling PEDRO 1 and 2 into one area as we were doing the same with SHED 85. RESCAP was coming in and out so rapidly that it was almost impossible to keep record of the aircraft. This was due mainly to the short bingo times for the majority of the aircraft. This also created a heavy workload on UHF. There was a shortage of ALH's for low level search and cover. Most of the jet aircraft were too low on fuel to provide low level search. The CH-3C crew seemed to lack confidence in our ability to navigate. He continually asked where he was and if we knew our position. This created more excess traffic on UHF. I recommend that two separate frequencies be used when two missions are being processed in close proximity. This of course would have to be coordinated in advance for RESCAP aircraft arriving on scene.

Particularly worthy of note was the risk SHED 85 took in continuing to the target area even though one of his engines had flamed out on landing at site 36 enroute. Also CANASTA 572 and 574 stayed on scene to guide SHED 85 to the survivor. They stretched their bingo time 30 minutes rather than leave the survivors position. The Air America helicopters and ground lighting were responsible for speedy location of site 36 during darkness. Without them it is possible we may not have found it at all.

Overall this recovery was successful due to the combined efforts and cooperation of all elements involved. The TACAN on the destroyer LOCAMOTIVE was invaluable in pin pointing our positions. Due to the increased traffic through site 36 I recommend placement of some type of homing BEACON there. It would help more than anything I can think of to recommend. Actually a portable TACAN at site 36 would probably be the best solution. In this area the helicopters fly high enough to receive TACAN. With TACAN equipment installed their capability would be increased considerably.

Robert H. Jones
 ROBERT H. JONES
 Capt, USAF
 RCC

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F-105 Pilot Ejectee

On 24 July 1965 a CH-3C helicopter, assigned to the 38th Air Rescue Squadron, recovered a downed F-105 pilot.

An Air Rescue Service HC-54 on precautionary orbit was notified that four F-105's were missing 40 miles west of Hanoi. A CH-3C helicopter and two HH-43B helicopters were scrambled from Lima Site 98 where they were refueling. The HC-54 accompanied them to Lima Site 36 where additional refueling was accomplished. The helicopters then proceeded to the area of the SAR objective. The pilot of one F-105 was spotted on the ground and radio contact was established between the downed pilot and the Air Rescue HC-54 flying RESCAP. Continuous radio communication between the HC-54 and the downed F-105 pilot was maintained until the Air Rescue Service controlled CH3C helicopter arrived on the scene and recovered the pilot.

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which was prepositioned at a forward site in Laos was launched to recover survivors. It entered the same area where the four aircraft had been downed, approximately 40 miles west of Hanoi, and was led to the downed pilot by RESCAP aircraft. The survivor was on a heavily wooded slope and marked his position with red smoke. The helicopter was forced to hover at approximately 80 feet above the pilot due to the high trees. After the pilot had put on the hoist harness and was raised 10 feet a hoist malfunction occurred. The crew was unable to lift the pilot the remaining 70 feet manually. The crew decided a landing would have to be made in order to rescue the survivor, so they flew to a rice paddy $\frac{1}{2}$ mile away with the survivor dangling 70 feet below the helicopter. Immediately after landing and recovering the survivor the helicopter came under automatic weapons fire and received 3 hits, one of which missed the fuel tanks by 6 inches. The remainder of the return journey was uneventful. CH-3C aircraft commander was Capt George C. Martin, and rescued F-105 pilot was Capt Frank Tullo.

(5) (S) 38-761-28 Jul 65. A USN A-4E was downed over Laos. Two HH-43 helicopters were scrambled from Nakhon Phanom to make the pickup. The downed pilot was located by A-1E RESCAP aircraft which led the helicopters to the scene. The A-1E aircraft had to conduct continuing attacks against hostile troops that were attempting to reach the downed pilot. As the helicopter moved in for the pickup the A-1E's laid down covering fire. The survivor was located on the side of a hill, and in order for the helicopter to maneuver over the pilot to effect the pickup it was necessary to have the blades come within inches of the side of the mountain. The pickup was successful and an uneventful flight back to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand followed. The aircraft commander of the HH-43 making the pickup was 1Lt Walter F Turk, and the survivor was LT JG Townsend R. Grant.

(6) (U) 38-814-11 Aug 65. An HU-16 on precautionary orbit over the Gulf of Tonkin received a call on guard channel from an F-105 that was hit coming off a strike in North Vietnam. The F-105 pilot declared he was going to bail out. The HU-16 requested a homing steer from the distressed aircraft's wingman, and as he turned to the heading, made a visual sighting on the descending parachute. The HU-16 jettisoned wing tanks and was on final approach as the survivor landed in the water. The pickup was made approximately 14 miles off the shore of North Vietnam. The HU-16 aircraft commander, Major Frederick C. Wisner, made a normal water take off and delivered the survivor, to DaNang AB, RVN.

(7) (U) 38-822-13 Aug 65. Lt Robert J Hyland, USNR, was piloting an A-1H which was hit by flak over North Vietnam. His wingman contacted the HU-16 on precautionary orbit and advised it of the impending bailout. The A-1H was able to make the coast and the pilot bailed out over the sea. His wingman directed the HU-16 to the incident site. The HU-16 made a water landing, recovered the survivor, and delivered him to DaNang AB, RVN. The HU-16 aircraft commander was Capt Richard F. Reichardt.