

Summary Sheet

PARC Mission Number 187, 2 March 65

Two HH-43B's based out of Korat

HH-43B # 1 configured for ACR. RCC Captain Joseph Kelly who wrote this report. His crew was co-pilot 1Lt Larry N Young, Firefighter A1C Harold L Morgan and Med Tech A1C John P Gibeau. At 0852Z an F-105 pilot bailed out over Thailand. At 0854Z HH-43 scrambled but due to insufficient fuel to reach survivor flew to Ubon to refuel. Arrived Ubon 1000Z. Refueled and ordered to remain on ground. Pilot had been located by Thai villagers and was being transported by truck to suitable helo landing area for recovery at 0200Z. At 0030Z, 3 March, HH-43B was again airborne and arrived at LZ at 0130Z, landed and picked up downed pilot. Crew flew to Ubon and transloaded survivor to HU-16, which transported him to Korat.

HH-43B #2 configured for LBR. RCC Captain Thomas C Seebo, Detachment Commander. Stayed in Korat area to cover LBR.

HU-16 RCC Captain Brown.

Detachment Provisional Fourth (PARC)
Air Rescue Service (MATS)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO San Francisco, California 96233

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Capt Kelly

5 Mar 65

SUBJECT: Mission Narrative

TO: Pacific Air Rescue Center
APO U.S. Forces 96553

1. Mission Number: Det 3, PARC, 187, 2 Mar 65

2. Situation: Two helicopter crews were on alert at Det Prov Fourth to cover the F-105 participation in a strike mission. One helicopter was configured for LHR, one for AGR. Both Detachment helicopters were participating. Captain Seebo, Detachment Commander, was RCC on the LHR helicopter intercepting numerous F-105s in emergency conditions when Captain Seebo heard the F-105 pilot requesting assistance from Ubon. Fuel state near empty. Captain Seebo requested the tower operator to scramble the other helicopter to Ubon. At approximately 0853Z, 2 Mar 65, the F-105 pilot stated he had flamed out at 12,000 feet. Someone instructed him to get out by 5000 feet. His last transmission was at 7000 feet. The second HH-43B was getting airborne at this time.

3. At 0852Z, 2 Mar 65, Korat Air Base Tower advised Detachment Provisional Fourth, PARC, of an F-105 flameout and impending bailout in the vicinity of Ubon, Thailand. The HH-43B was scrambled at 0854Z with Captain Joseph W. Kelly, RCC; 1st Lt Larry W. Young, Copilot; A1C Harold L. Morgan, Firefighter; and A1C John P. Gibeau, Medical Technician as the crew. Captain Seebo on aircraft radio advised that the pilot had just bailed out near Ubon and to proceed to Ubon. Korat Tower advised that Korat Radar had a fix on the crash and to go Radar Frequency for a steer. Radar gave the heading as 056° and the estimated distance to be 135 miles. Distance-fuel calculations were made. Since the range of the helicopter was insufficient to proceed to the crash site and then to Ubon, the helicopter proceeded direct to Ubon, arriving at 1100Z, 2 Mar 65.

4. Captain Seebo landed at 0913Z and requested the G.O. to notify Captain Brown, HU-16B RCC, to report to Fighter Operations immediately. At 0918Z ASOC was contacted. ASOC, Major Barnes, advised to scramble the HU-16B to 090° radial of Lion, coordination had been made with the Rescue Control Center at Detachment 3, PARC. ASOC was advised that the HH-43B was on the way to Ubon. Captain Brown was advised to attempt contact with the HH-43B on radar frequency enroute to Ubon. The HU-16B was airborne at approximately 0930Z.

5. On arrival at Ubon at 1100Z, Captain Kelly checked for information from the tower and radar. Nothing positive. Captain Seebo at Det Prov Fourth was notified. Captain Seebo instructed Captain Kelly that the HU-16B was in the search area and to contact Detachment 3, PARC as soon as possible, if

unable then to get airborne and contact the HU-16B. Captain Kelly contacted Detachment 3, PARC and was advised to contact ASOC at Udorn, Thailand. ASOC advised the HH-43B to remain on the ground at Ubon and await further instructions as the pilot had not been located. At 1615Z, ASOC advised Captain Kelly that the survivor had been located near Ban-Thanat-Buri, Thailand, and would be transported to Roi-Et, Thailand for recovery at 0200Z, 3 Mar 65. Captain Kelly and crew were airborne from Ubon at 0030Z, 3 Mar 65 and arrived Roi-Et at 0130Z and the survivor arrived approximately 5 minutes later. The survivor pickup was completed and the takeoff was effected at 0255Z and the survivor was off-loaded into an awaiting HU-16B for transport to Korat AB, Thailand. After refueling at Ubon, the HH-43B departed for Korat. Shortly after takeoff the helicopter was instructed to return to Ubon. After returning and finding negative requirement, the helicopter departed for Korat, arriving at 0720Z. Total sorties: 5. Total flying time: 7:25.

6. Recommendation: Provide a longer ranged, higher speed helicopter with a fully instrumented capability, in addition to the present IHE helicopters.

THOMAS C. SKEBO
Captain, USAF
Commander

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Detachment Provisional Fourth (PARC)
Air Rescue Service (MATS)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO San Francisco, California 96233

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: Major Waechter

6 Mar 65

SUBJECT: (U) Mission Narrative

Classification (cancelled) (changed to UNCLASS)
effective on 11-3-75, under the authority of 905, by RE

TO: Pacific Air Rescue Center
APO U.S. Forces 96553

1. (U) Mission Number: Det 3, PARC, 187, 2 Mar 65.

2. (S)(GP-4) Chronology of Events:

0425Z Adman 66 was airborne on a scramble to cover mission number 184. Our mission was to replace Adman 58, who had been diverted to intercept a Navy HU-16.

0430Z A Top Secret briefing was conducted at Da Nang Air Base for mission number 187. The crew of Adman 66 did not attend.

0450Z Adman 66 was on station for mission 184.

0707Z Adman 66 departed orbit to assume new orbit location for mission number 187.

0720Z Adman 66 was on station for mission number 187. The position was given to us by Adman 63 (Major Ladon) and we orbited approximately 8 miles south of Tiger Island. Original on station time as briefed prior to departure was 0745Z.

0800Z By this time the mission was well under way. We were now aware that two pilots were down; one inland, one at sea. Adman 63 advised that he was heading for the inland survivor and that we should take the one at sea. Adman 63 had already scrambled the H-43 helos out of Quang Tri and they were on the way (Bandy 95 and 96). We spotted Adman 63 over the coast and tried to get the position of the survivor in the sea. He then told us to take the inland survivor and he would take the one in the water.

0820Z Adman 66 was turned back by flak.

0830Z We saw more flak and proceeded north up the coastline.

0840Z Proceeded inland towards a column of smoke and received fairly reliable D/F's from the inland Rescap aircraft.

0845Z Spotted chute and sent Rescap aircraft back to the coast to escort the helos into the area.

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Mq PARC Log No.

65-0409

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0850Z Rescap finally found the helos and escorted them into the area.

0929Z Enroute to our siting Bandy 95 and 96 spotted another chute and recovered the pilot's helmet. They then were guided into our area and picked up a downed F-105 pilot. Rescap aircraft then escorted them to the coast where we met them over the water and escorted them back towards Quang-Tri.

0950Z We met Emblem 1 and 2 (Marine H-34's) just off the coast near Quang-Tri and we left Bandy 95 and 96 to escort the Emblem helos back to the target area. Bandy 95 strongly recommended that there was insufficient Rescap or daylight left to continue the mission and that the helos would be in danger if they tried to go back into the area.

1000Z We instructed Emblem 1 and 2 to return to Quang-Tri.

1100Z We had been orbiting Quang-Tri waiting for the helos to refuel, but they advised that they did not require us to escort them back to Da Nang. We then departed for Da Nang.

1135Z - Adman 66 landed at Da Nang.

3. (C)(GP-4) Specific Comments:

a. Radio Discipline. Throughout the entire mission, radio transmissions on all frequencies were on the verge of complete chaos. Most of the time it was impossible to understand the Rescap or Rescue aircraft because of simultaneous transmission on the same frequency. The confusion became worse when aircraft began using Guard frequency.

b. Location of Downed Airmen. Initial reports of downed airmen were made by the wingmen in reference to the first or the second target areas. Since we were scrambled before the strike mission briefing, we were unaware of the target location or coordinates. Our D/F equipment was useless because of multiple transmissions and the API-28 was of no value with all aircraft transmitting IFF simultaneously. At least three different sets of coordinates, in degrees and minutes, were given in addition to bearing and range references from the target. The latter proved to be most satisfactory and expeditious, had we only known the exact location of the target.

4. (C)(GP-4) Recommendations:

a. Radio discipline must be maintained. Rescue frequencies should be preset into all tactical aircraft on a specific channel. Anyone then observing a bailout or damaged aircraft would be able to immediately switch channels and contact Rescue or Rescap. This frequency must be protected from tactical transmissions.

b. Rescue and Rescap call signs appear to be confusing. Suggest that pre-planned orbit points be designated as One, Two or Three or Alpha, Bravo


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Cocoa. Rescue and Rescap aircraft would then assume the appropriate call sign. Continued use should be made of VCSL call signs on SSB and HF

c. Rescue aircraft should have accurate information on all target areas for plotting purposes and more expeditious recovery of personnel.

5. This letter is classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect past and future USAF operations.


LUTHER H. WARTCHER
Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Copy to: Det 3, PARC

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Detachment Provisional Fourth (PARC)
Air Rescue Service (MATS)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO San Francisco, California 96233

Classification (cancelled) (changed to UNCLASS)
effective on 11-3-15, by AS, under the authority of NA

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Capt Westenbarger

8 Mar 65

SUBJECT: (U) Narrative Report of Det 3, PARC Mission Number 187, 2 Mar 65

TO: Pacific Air Rescue Center
APO U.S. Forces 96553

1. (U) This report reflects the action taken by Adman 44, HU-16B, during Detachment 3, Pacific Air Rescue Center mission number 187.

2. (GP-4) Chronology of Events:

0513Z Adman 44 became airborne at Korat AB, Thailand, for a precautionary orbit in support of a Navy Yankee Team. (Det 3, PARC mission number 186)

0700Z Adman 44 arrived on station at 10,000 feet over Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

0900Z Det 3, PARC requested Adman 44 to contact Invert Control (GCI) relative to a Navy aircraft reported to be down on the 118 degree radial of Nakhon Phanom TACAN at 110 miles. Invert confirmed the aircraft down. Info was relayed to Det 3, PARC and Adman 44 commenced operation in support of Det 3, PARC mission number 187.

0902Z Det 3, PARC directed Adman 44 to begin search under the radar control of Invert. Adman 44 was vectored to position 16 degrees, 33 minutes North, 106 degrees, 27 minutes East. This area is approximately 20 miles southeast of Tchepone, Laos. Baste Flight, 2 F-105s provided Rescap support for search in this area. Adman 44 searched the Sesaynon River Valley and adjacent ridges for 30 miles to Tchepone. Search effectiveness was limited due to anti-aircraft installations and haze along Route 9. Several burning areas were investigated with negative results. One truck convoy was seen moving southeast on Route 9.

1045Z Det 3, PARC requested search be abandoned in this area and commence search on the 135 degree radial of Nakhon Phanom TACAN at 85 miles. Adman 44 proceeded towards the new search area following Route 9 northwest and climbing to 7,000 feet.

1052Z Rescap Baste 31 reported a possible UHF beacon near coordinates 16 degrees, 35 minutes North, 105 degrees, 42 minutes East. Also reported departing the area with minimum fuel. Adman 44 continued search without Rescap maintaining 7,000 feet.

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1110Z Adman 44 arrived in new search area and commenced an expanding square electronic search.

1115Z A weak signal from a URT-21 transmitter was received on guard.

1120Z A positive URT-21 signal was received and located with the ARA-25, UHF Homer. This signal was also observed on the IIT receiver. Invert and Det 3, PARC were notified and requested to alert Rescue helicopters and send Rescap.

1130Z A white flare was observed in the search area. The flare ascended to approximately 2,000 feet and descended as though it was a para-flare. Minutes later a second and similar flare was observed. These flares did not appear to be of a type normally in the possession of a survivor. A red flare was also ignited on the ground.

1134Z Det 3, PARC was requested to ascertain what pyrotechnics were carried by the downed pilot and necessary information for possible authentication.

1136Z Darkness. Area presumed to be hostile due to the proximity of unfriendly anti-aircraft installation. The radio operator was sent to the rear of the aircraft to establish contact with the survivor through blinking code by the Aldis lamp.

1140Z Adman 44 dropped one M9A1 para-flare and a Mark 6, Mod 2, 45 minute smoke light with a personal strobe light attached to mark the survivors position. The smoke light started a small fire which persisted throughout the recovery operation.

1146Z Det 3, PARC provided the information previously requested and confirmed the survivor to be Air Force. They had no further information concerning Rescap. Rescap was again requested from Invert.

1200Z Adman 44 descended for better blinker communications and to insure visual contact with the survivor.

1220Z Survivors authentication confirmed; and additional queries made of Invert and Det 3, PARC on the status of Rescap.

1300Z Det 3, PARC advised that the pilot was down in a friendly area. Adman 44 received an ETA of 1320Z from Bandy 21 and 41, HH-43 helicopters from Nakhon Phanom. Hotel 21 and 22, Air America helicopters were also inbound to the area. Adman 44 began illuminating the area with SA-8 para-flares and directing the helicopters to the recovery area through use of the ARA-25 Homer.

1327Z Adman 44 directed HH-43, Bandy 41, to the survivor and recovery was accomplished. The survivor, Major George W. Panas, was not injured. (His aircraft call sign was Baste 19)

1328Z A flare aircraft, call sign Smokey Orange, arrived in the area to support possible rescap operations. No rescap had arrived and Smokey Orange was released.

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1330Z Det 3, PARC advised Adman 44 to escort Bandy flight to Nakhon Phanom and pick up the survivor. Escort commenced.

1432Z Adman 44 landed at Nakhon Phanom, escort completed.

1552Z Adman 44 departed Nakhon Phanom for Korat with Major Panas on board.

1735Z Adman 44 landed at Korat, mission complete.

3. (C)(GP-4) Specific Comments:

a. Communications and assistance provided by Det 3, PARC were excellent throughout the mission.

b. A pre-mission intelligence briefing provided by Fighter Operations at Korat supplied invaluable information concerning target area, routes and strike force composition. This information later made it possible for us to determine who was experiencing difficulty and where.

c. The lack of Rescap coverage during the search and recovery phases could easily have cost the lives of those engaged in the search and recovery operation.

d. Radio communications became confusing due to the large number of transmissions on 364.2 mcs and guard. Distressed aircraft did not appear to know the call signs of rescue aircraft in their vicinity and were therefore forced to make blanket calls. The same applied to Rescap aircraft.

4. (C)(GP-4) Recommendations:

a. Rescap coverage should be preplanned to support post strike SAR operations. Whenever possible this Rescap should be composed of propeller type aircraft in order to be compatible with the search and recovery aircraft. If jet type fighters must be used, I recommend that they assume a strip alert posture until actually needed to neutralize a target in the search area or provide cover for the recovery operation.

b. A bright, long burning, dropable electric marker light is virtually essential in order to mark the position of survivors during night rescap/recovery operations over land. Adman 44 did not possess such a light. I recommend that two such lights be obtained for each RF-16 in this theatre. Fires started by the existing smoke lights pose an additional threat to the survivor.

c. Strike forces must be briefed on the exact call sign of the rescue aircraft in their immediate area. This will permit distressed aircraft to direct their transmissions to the force most capable of providing assistance. In order to accomplish this I recommend that call signs be designated for


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known orbit positions and that the rescue aircraft providing the orbit assume this call sign. Similar to the use of Duckbutt Xray Bravo to identify an aircraft on station at a specific point.

DAVID F. WESTENBARGER
Captain, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander


THOMAS C. Smeo
Captain, USAF
Commander

Copy to: Det 3, SMC

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STATEMENT

Classification (cancelled) (changed to *NOFORN*) AFR-205-2To Whom It May Concern: effective on *11-3-15*, under the authority of *1* March 1965

SCENE - Two HH-43F and two S-54 helicopters at Quang Tri on strip alert. HU-16 (Adman 63) orbiting Quang Tri and HU-16 (Adman 66) orbiting 15 miles east of DMZ.

At 1538 we were directed to scramble from Quang Tri on an aircraft downed approximately 40 miles north, over land. Because of the short distance involved, we elected not to take on any additional fuel above the 1200 pounds we already had aboard. We contacted the OSC in the HU-16 who advised that we proceed northeast, over water, to a point east of the survivors' location. This portion of the flight was made at minimum altitude in hope of avoiding either visual or radar detection. We arrived at the approximate area at 1615 and established an orbit while waiting for contact with our RESCAP. After approximately 15 minutes, Lt Phelan, ROC of the primary aircraft sighted orange smoke about a mile further at sea. He flew to that point and hoisted to safety the pilot of a VNAF A-1H which had ditched there a short time before. Around 1645 OSC reported a parachute in sight about 15 miles inland from our position. We rendezvoused with our escort, four Navy A-1H's call sign Fortress 5, 6, 7 and 8, just off the coast. Fortress 5 reconnoitered the area between us and the parachute, recommending a penetration at our present position. I assumed the lead at that time since Lt Phelan's aircraft was already crowded. I decided to attempt the penetration at minimum altitude since intelligence reports and the talk among the strike aircraft led me to believe that they were drawing automatic weapons fire in the vicinity of the survivor. I requested the escort aircraft to assist us by directing us through the areas which appeared least inhabited and to suppress any hostile fire encountered.

We crossed the beach and dune area with no difficulty. As we reached the cultivated area just west of the dunes we began to hear small arms fire from the vicinity of the houses we passed. Our escort guided us past the more heavily populated areas, giving instructions such as, "Turn a little to the north now until you cross the river -- now back to the south". Without this assistance we could easily have blundered over a barracks area just south of our course from which we later heard, most of the groundfire was coming. The jets on the RESCAP reported that each area we passed lit up like a Christmas tree with small arms and anti-aircraft fire. When we were about two miles from the chute reported by our OSC, the escort sighted another one just north of us on the side of a small hill. (This was the location of the pilot downed first, for whom we were originally scrambled.) I had already passed beyond the north hill, so Lt Phelan, who had it in sight, made an approach to check it out and I flew cover around him. As I passed southeast of him we heard groundfire coming from the ridge leading to a village about a mile from their location. I reported this to the escort, requesting that they expend some suppressive fire in that area. Four of the RESCAP jets made firing passes on the ridge toward the village while Lt Phelan recovered his parascoutman. At that time I thought that they had recovered the pilot. When they took off, I again took the lead, proceeding to the second parachute.

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HQ PARC Log No. 0356-61

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It was also on a slope in a densely wooded, confined, uninhabited valley. As we entered the valley at approximately 1715, we could see the parachute and a small column of smoke rising from the stream bed about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile from the 'chute. As we got closer we could see the pilot waving a white cloth. I circled once while descending to hover. As I turned away, he fired a series of tracers into the air. Possibly he thought we hadn't seen him. I hovered above the trees, probably 125 feet or slightly higher, while he was hoisted aboard. The crew chief selected the rescue sling rather than the forest penetrator because the pilot was in a relatively open position and the sling is less difficult for the survivor to use.

Once the pilot was aboard, I asked our escort and RESCAP if they were receiving any flak at altitude. They and the OSC reported none, so I elected to climb before proceeding to the coast. We reached 5000 feet before crossing any populated areas, cruised at 6000 feet to the coast and then descended seaward to minimum altitude, proceeding south to Quang Tri the same way as we went up. We landed at Quang Tri at 1815, refueled, made a temporary repair to the damaged rotor blade on Lt Phelan's aircraft and departed for Danang.

As we neared the Citadel Lt Phelan reported a severe vibration and said that he was going to land at the Citadel airstrip. Because of the darkness we decided to leave the damaged helicopter there and transferred his crew and passenger to the Marine H-34's which had been standing by at Quang Tri with us. We arrived at Danang at 2105.

I believe our basic procedures are practical and feasible where opposition is restricted to small arms and light automatic weapons fire. Careful selection of the penetration route and altitude, based on factors existing at the time, can help to insure success. The crews must be thoroughly briefed on the necessity for close coordination with the escort.

I recommend that all units who might be involved in RESCAP or escort missions be briefed on our procedures and capabilities and advised of what we expect of them. If possible, a rescue representative should give a detailed briefing during mission briefings.

Although our present equipment serves the purpose, a twin-engine, high speed, armored helicopter should greatly enhance our chances for success on future missions. The element of surprise which served us well on this mission will be missing in future operations. The additional speed and the higher survivability of a twin-engine helicopter might offset this loss.

Ronald L. Ingraham
RONALD L. INGRAHAM
Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

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CHAPTER III SOME OF THE EVADERS

Among the First

Soon after the Rolling Thunder bombing of North Vietnam began, in early 1965, the USAF and USN began losing aircraft to intense ground fire over that country. On 2 March 1965, during a strike against the Xom Bang Munitions Storage Area (1707N/10645E) three F-105Ds from the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron were hit and their pilots forced to eject. One pilot nursed his aircraft back across the Mekong River and got out over Thailand; the second had his controls freeze up halfway between Tchepone, Laos, and the Mekong and had to eject at that point. Fortunately, he landed in friendly territory, where Laotian troops assisted in his recovery.^{61/} The third pilot attempted to make it out to sea, but smoke in the cockpit, compressor stalls, and loss of power caused him to "punch out" only three miles from the target.^{62/} After a ten minute descent he landed in a jungled area with trees fifty feet high. The pilot slipped the parachute in order to land on the opposite side of a ridgeline from the target. The narrative of the pilot, Captain Robert V. Baird, described the landing and the events immediately following.^{63/}

...After landing in the tree, my right leg was suspended over my head by the survival kit lanyard. The kit had hung up by the inflatable dinghy above me. I opened the G-suit survival knife with my teeth (one hand was holding onto the tree) and cut the lanyard. The kit fell below me but did not go all the way to the ground. This I found out only after getting to the ground myself and seeing the kit twenty-five feet above me. I climbed down by

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

switching to a tree that had vines around the trunk which I could hold onto.

After arriving on the ground, I ran down a stream about three feet wide until I came to a creek I had been aiming for during my descent. Upon reaching the creek, I changed my .38 caliber bullets to tracers and started planning how to evade if the chopper didn't show up. I figured that the enemy would have to come up the stream to get me as the undergrowth was too thick to penetrate. It also appeared it would take them two hours and that I would have time to hide across the creek.

Captain Baird was capped by a succession of aircraft including F-105s, F-100s, B-57s, and an HU-16 amphibian until, a few hours later, two A-1Es flew over him. He fired two tracers past the left wing of the A-1Es and two more past the HH-43 helicopter which flew just behind them. The helicopter made one circle and picked him up out of the middle of the stream. The pickup was made from the stream because the underbrush on each side would have prevented the horsecollar from reaching the survivor. 64/

In retrospect, it might be easy to find faults in the pilot's evasion techniques, but it must be remembered that crewmembers had not received jungle training, and that equipment, evasion techniques, and pickup tactics were primitive compared to those of six years later. Captain Baird climbed down the tree (later proved to be extremely dangerous), but the Personnel Lowering Device was not yet being carried. He ran down the stream, which other recoverees later confirmed was one of the easiest ways to be surprised by the enemy, and he fired tracers off the wing of the A-1s for visual identification. In his case this was

1. (U) As additional aircraft were introduced into the theater during May, June, and July, the progressive increase in air activity continued its upward spiral, and the demands placed upon the 30th Air Rescue Squadron in support of these operations rose accordingly. In July the 30th Air Rescue Squadron flew 120 sorties and 250 hours. This represented a 40 percent increase in sorties and a 50 percent increase in flying hours over the previous month. The 30th Air Rescue Squadron was equally responsible for the success of these operations.

2. (U) The Joint Search and Rescue Center at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, North Vietnam, received no direct support from the 30th Air Rescue Squadron during the reporting period. The four officers and 10 enlisted personnel of the officer controller, assigned there were responsible for the planning and execution of all rescue missions in the theater. The officer controller was assisted by the enlisted personnel of the 30th Air Rescue Squadron, the 30th Air Rescue Squadron, and the 30th Air Rescue Squadron. In addition the officer controller was responsible for the planning and execution of all rescue missions in the theater. There were as many as six different rescue missions directed simultaneously from the center by one officer and one enlisted controller. In addition to directing missions, the personnel of the Joint Search and Rescue Center went to great lengths to ensure that aircraft arriving in the theater received briefings on local methods and procedures peculiar to a combat environment. As well as briefing the arriving Air Force units, they met each aircraft carrier arriving in SEA and briefed the crewmembers prior to their engagement in combat operations.

(U) On several occasions it became necessary to send a controller to a forward area to act as mission commander for search operations. During the prosecution of several of these missions the controllers exposed themselves to hostile fire in order to better direct search efforts. Specific examples of the heroism displayed by members of the 30th Air Rescue Squadron follows:

1. (U) On 2 March 1965 the HU-16 on precautionary orbit over the straits in North Vietnam reported the downing of a U.S. aircraft. In rapid succession five additional aircraft were reported down. The bailout took place in Thailand, another in Laos, and the remaining four in North Vietnam. The Joint Search and Rescue Center at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, directed a prepositioned HU-16 to proceed to the first reported bailout location in North Vietnam. Simultaneously two TH-1H helicopters prepositioned a short distance south of the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam were launched and proceeded North. While enroute they came upon a Vietnamese pilot who had bailed out of his disabled aircraft and descended into the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin near the point at which the helicopters planned to penetrate the coastal plains. While one of the helicopters assumed a role of control and direction, the other made a rapid recovery of the downed pilot after which both helicopters resumed their original route of flight. As the helicopters entered North Vietnam they came under heavy

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ground fire which continued throughout the entire rescue portion of the flight. With utter disregard for their own safety, these brave crews continued their flight to the incident area. The fighter escort reported that each area passed over by the helicopters "lit" up with small arms and anti-aircraft fire. Approximately 15 miles inland one pilot was located in a grove of dense high trees. While the helicopter with the VNAF pilot aboard assumed a high hover position, it was necessary for the other helicopter to hover at 100 feet as the hoist cable was lowered to the survivor, then hoisted in completely successfully. The target of the hoisted helicopter, the recovery was successfully executed, and with the survivor aboard the helicopter proceeded to the next incident site. Upon arrival over the second site, two helicopters descended and hovered while the other directed the rescue. At this point the low helicopter was hoisted and then flew from the incident area. The crew knew that if the pilot was to be rescued they would have to fly to a landing zone, then fly to the pilot, and under small arms fire, hoist him out. The pilot was hoisted and taken to the helicopter. In the event he had been injured and could not walk to the helicopter, the personnel aboard located and recovered the downed pilot's helmet and oxygen mask, however the pilot was not found and was presumed to have been captured, or forced to evade due to hostile activity in the area. Despite the hostile fire encountered and rounds of which penetrated a rotor blade, the helicopter remained in the area until assured that the pilot was not in the immediate area before withdrawing to a safe haven location in South Vietnam to assess the damage incurred. During the time the helicopters were searching over land, another prepositioned HU-16 located a downed pilot in the sea ten miles off the coast of North Vietnam. The downed pilot had numerous hostile marks in his immediate area. Disregarding the grave danger from the hostile craft the HU-16 crew elected to make a water landing. A skillful landing was made although five foot swells were encountered, and the downed pilot was successfully recovered. The rescue of the pilot downed in Laos required the helicopters to fly at night over poorly charted, hostile terrain with minimum navigational aids. The downed pilot was reported to have landed in a populated area, however, the allegiance of the populace was uncertain as the rescue aircraft had been fired on by a nearby anti-aircraft gun emplacement. In spite of the uncertainty of reception to assist, the helicopter crew decided to land, feeling that even if the local personnel were unfriendly they may not be armed, and the crew could possibly rescue the survivor. Fortunately no resistance was encountered. The uninjured pilot was brought to the helicopter, and following the hazardous return flight was sent to his home unit. The last pilot downed that day was located and picked up in Thailand. It had truly been an eventful day for the 38th Air Rescue Squadron. Utilizing the limited resources outlined earlier, the 38th Air Rescue Squadron was able to prosecute six rescue missions in one day, resulting in the recovery of five pilots. Four of the pilots would most probably be in communist prisons now had they not been picked up by the 38th ARS aircraft. The fact that they are today flying combat mission is due solely to the bravery, and dedication to duty, manifested by all personnel assigned to the 38th ARS.

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
STATEMENT

Classification (cancelled) changed to *UNCLASS*

DOWNGRADED
LAW

AFR-275.2

To Whom It May Concern: effective on *14-5-15* by *SAS* under the authority of *MR*

7 March 1965

SCENE - Two HH-43F and two H-34 helicopters at Quang Tri on strip alert. HU-16 (Adman 63) orbiting Quang Tri and HU-16 (Adman 66) orbiting 15 miles east of DMZ.

At approximately 1535L the first downed aircraft was reported by anchor 39. Adman 63 accepted on scene command. The pilot of the downed aircraft was reported alive and insight by rescap. The two HH-43F's were scrambled at approximately 1538L and instructed to head north to the coast.

In rapid succession, two more downed aircraft were reported. The first had a parachute spotted approximately 1 1/2 miles from the original downed pilots position. The second reported a pilot in the water at XB 7060. At approximately 1550L contact was made with the two HH-43F's as they crossed the coast and headed north. At this time, since Adman 66 had contact with the helicopters and was in the immediate area, Adman 63 directed that he assume control of the helicopter mission and Adman 63 immediately departed northward toward the pilot reported in the water.

Enroute to the site, four Navy A-1H's picked up Adman 63 and escorted him to the incident site. Two F-100's that had spotted the downed pilot were released upon the arrival of the A-1H's and the HU-16. Four junks and small boats ranged approximately two miles north and west of the downed pilot. The survivor was spotted on the first pass approximately two hundred yards west of the oil slick left by his aircraft and about four miles off shore. The survivor was in his life raft and displayed dye marker as the HU-16 passed over. About three "beeps" from his UHF-21 were heard while directly overhead. (It was later learned that the UHF-21 antenna had been broken off.)

While the A-1H's maintained surveillance on the boats, the HU-16 jettisoned its fuel tanks and made a water landing near the survivor. The seas were estimated at four to five feet with two swell systems approximately 60° apart and a light easterly wind. The actual pickup of the survivor was at 1615L, position 1743N 10634E. A water take-off was accomplished and the HU-16 headed back southward.

A report of another bailout was received and Adman 63 set up a search in the area of the reported bailout. After about one hour of search with negative results, Adman 63 was cleared to return to Landing AB, landing at 1845L.

EDWARD M. LADOU
Major, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

Def 3 PARC-187-2 MAR 65

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

ARODC # 654313
0357-65

PARC Log No.

On 2 March 1965, the HU-16 on precautionary orbit covering strikes in North Vietnam reported the downing of a U.S. aircraft. In rapid succession, five additional airplanes were downed. One bailout took place in Thailand, another in Laos, and the remaining four in North Vietnam. The JRCC at Tan San Nhut AB directed the HU-16 to proceed to the first reported bailout in NVN. Simultaneously, two HH-43's, propositioned just below the DMZ at Quang Tri, were launched and proceeded north. While enroute they came upon a VNAF pilot who had bailed out of his A-1 and landed in the Gulf of Tonkin. One of the H-43's established a hover and rescued the VNAF pilot. Undoubtedly this pilot was very happy to be picked up. But, he certainly could not have been thrilled to learn that his rescue helicopter was now going to take him feet dry into NVN, to rescue a downed American pilot. As the helicopters entered NVN they came under heavy ground fire. This ground fire was to continue throughout their mission in NVN. The terrain from the beach to the downed pilots position was over lowlands for the first 15 miles. Then they came upon the foothills that the downed Americans were evading capture in. The rescue helicopters were escorted by USN A-1 pilots who vectored the helicopters around known anti-aircraft gun positions. Because of the threat from these weapons, the flight in NVN was done at low level, just above the treetops. The low level flight minimized the time enemy gunners had to track the SAR forces. With utter disregard for their own safety, these brave crews continued their flight to the down pilots position. The fighter escort reported that each area passed over by the HH-43's "lit" up with small arms and anti-aircraft fire.

Approximately 15 miles inland, one pilot was located in an area of high trees. While the helicopter with the VNAF pilot on board assumed "high bird" position the other HH-43 established a hover over the 100 foot trees. As the hoist cable was lowered to the survivor, the helicopter was very vulnerable to small arms fire. The recovery was successfully executed, and with another survivor on board the helicopters proceeded to the next incident site. Upon arrival at the second feet dry site, one HH-43 descended and hovered over a parachute canopy hung up in the trees. At this point, the low bird came under small arms fire. The crew knew that if the downed pilot was to be rescued they would have to do it now. Because the pilot could not be seen through the dense jungle foliage Captain Phelen decided to lower his PJ on the hoist to the ground. Jon Young was his PJ. He volunteered to go down and look for the missing pilot. Once on the ground he found the downed pilots helmet and oxygen mask. But the missing pilot was no where to be found. Sgt. Young assumed that the missing pilot had either evaded away from the area, or had been captured. Despite the ground fire, Captain Phelen continued his hover until he recovered Sgt. Young. With Young back on board and no idea of where the downed pilot was, the helicopter began to egress the area. The high bird joined up and both rescue helicopters preceded to south, and back to Quang Tri.

While the helicopters were searching overland in NVN, a second HU-16 located a downed pilot, in the Gulf of Tonkin, approximately ten miles offshore. The pilot was floating in his survival raft. Several North Vietnamese junks were nearby and closing in to capture the pilot. The HU-16 crew disregarded the obvious danger from the hostile watercraft and decided to water land the amphibian. Five foot swells made the landing risky and difficult. Despite all these problems the Albatross crew rescued the pilot.

Meanwhile, in Laos another mission was still in progress. HH-43 crews from NKP found themselves flying at night, over badly charted terrain. Next they found out that the downed pilot was in an area surrounded by several villages. Whose side the local populace was on was unknown. The crew decided to press on with the rescue. One HH-43 landed near the downed pilot and he scrambled on board. All the while local villagers were seen watching the helicopter. Fortunately, they offered no resistance to the rescue. The pilot who had been downed in Thailand was easily rescued by another HH-43.

It had truly been a busy and eventful day for the 38 ARS. Despite limited and vulnerable resources, the 38 ARS prosecuted six missions in one day, resulting in the rescue of five downed pilots. Four of these pilots would have certainly been POW's without the efforts of the 38th.

HH-43 Crew #1 NVN SAR

Ingraham, Ronald L	Major
Welsh, Donald	Lt
Anderson, Larry K	Sgt
Moore, John H	A1C

HH-43 Crew #2 NVN SAR

Phelan, Joseph P	1Lt
Lemke, Clyde W	Capt
Regan, John T	SSgt
Young, Jon H	A1C

All crewmembers awarded the Silver Star in April. This was the first SAR accomplished in NVN.

Crew#2 picked up VNAF pilot and 1 USAF pilot

Crew #2 picked up one USAF pilot.

NKP
H43 CREW #1

ISREAL, "122Y", CAPT

ROSENBERG, JIM, CAPT

NKP
H-43 # 2

DAVIS, CAPT

Verbatim extract of difficult to read mission report. Written by HH-43 RCC (Captain Israel Freedman) who scrambled from NKP.HH-43 C/S Bandy 41. High Bird Bandy 21. HU-16 C/S Adman 44. Survivor was Major George W. Panas, C/S Baste 19.

6 March 65

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: Detachment Provisional Second

SUBJECT: Det 3 PARC Mission 187 – 2 March 65

At 1130Z this Detachment received two messages simultaneously, by single sideband and by phone from ASCC at Udorn. Both messages directed that Detachment Provisional Second scramble two HH-43's, under the control of the HU-16 control ship, Adman 44. We were directed to proceed to a point 50 NM from Invert on a 128° radial for the possible pickup of a downed pilot. At this time we were briefed by Invert that the area was "hot" and to proceed with caution. At 1210Z two HH-43B's departed and climbed to an altitude of 3,000 feet above the ground on a 130° heading, using NKP radio beacon and DF equipment from the HU-16, which was orbiting the pickup point. Invert was unable to paint either the HH-43B during the first 50 miles of the flight. Between 54 and 70 miles Invert was able to paint our aircraft and vector us to the HU-16. With the HH-43B's approximately 20 miles from the pickup point, the HU-16 dropped a flare, which we were able to home in on. The HU-16 received word that the area was safe and that a pickup should be made immediately, without waiting for RESCAP. While approximately three miles from the target, we sighted the HU-16, which we were advised was then over the pickup point. At this time, 1320Z, the HU-16 dropped a second flare directly over the target. The lead HH-43B started a descent to the pickup point, while the second orbited the area, at 3,000 feet above the ground. The HU-16 advised us that the pickup point was marked by two adjacent lights. We spent several minutes in locating the area. Visibility was poor, due to smoke at low altitude and because there were other lights within the immediate area, we could not discern one light from the other. After locating the two lights, I made one pass over the area to verify the location and to insure that the people were friendly and that the HH-43B could be landed safely. I then circled the landing area

and landed. The rescue and survival technician departed the aircraft and spoke with the local people. The downed pilot soon appeared with several men, who were helping him carry his equipment. With the pilot and his equipment aboard the aircraft, we took off and turned to a heading of 300° for NKP. The helicopter, which had remained at 3,000 feet above the ground, also started for home, and because of his altitude, still had an ADF bearing on the NKP radio beacon. The HU-16 and a C-47, which had arrived in the area escorted both HH-43B's to the Thailand border. At the border we advised the c-47 that his assistance would no longer be needed. At 1430Z both HH-43B's landed at Nakhon Phanom AFB and were followed shortly by the HU-16. At no time on the return to home field did Invert paint either HH-43B.

2. When using two aircraft at night, because of the limited visibility, it is necessary for the second aircraft to remain within ¼ mile of the lead for positive visual contact. Also, the pilots of this detachment feel that an IFF or SIF transponder would greatly aid in getting vectors along safe routes to the pickup point and in keeping two HH-43b's and escort aircraft together in limited visibility.

ISRAEL FREEDMAN
Capt, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander