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HOLMES: We have another three orbital mission. We are very thankful for that. I would like to pay tribute to the NASA Mercury team for their exceptional job and the magnificent support from the Air Force and from the Navy. We have another national hero. Our hats are off to Scott Carpenter, for his courage and performance. We are thankful that he is back home safe, again. Before turning this over to the man directly responsible for this mission, I would like to underline something for you and that is that we learned a great deal today. And what we've learned we'll know a great deal better once we have analyzed the data in full. We are going to learn more with each flight and we are step by step proceeding in our conquest for space. We are deadly serious about this. It is not a stunt. These are not spectaculars and you can not expect and will not expect from this manned space flight effort of this country spectaculars except spectaculars that come naturally through our achievements. I think we will have to expect some failures too down this road. We will continue and we will fly as often as we feel we will gain enough information in order to warrant that flight. We will continue as you know and I won't review it here with more Mercury flights early next year -- the 18-orbit flights and following that with Gemini and then Apollo. And as surely as we sit here with this procedure -- this sound engineering approach -- no gimmicks -- we will with the backing we are getting from this country, with the help of God, land an exploration team of men on the moon in this decade and return them. Now I would like to turn it over to my good friend Bob Gilruth.

GILRUTH: Thank you very much, Brainerd. I will make my remarks very brief. We had a very good flight. We got a large amount of data on manned space flight to supplement that which we have already obtained from the flights of Shepard, Grissom and Glenn. All elements of the Mercury project did an excellent job today and during the preparation for this job today the count as you know was exceptionally smooth. There were only two very brief holds for weather, right at the end. Without that, I think, as Walt Williams will point out to you, we probably would have gone right at the scheduled time. The Atlas booster, as you also know, performed perfectly. All the capsule systems performed very well. There was some minor diffuculties with the suit temperature. It was really a regulator problem, the problem of the pilot finding the right setting of his cooling regulator and the overshoot on landing problem was due to the spacecraft being slightly out of attitude at the time of retro fire. I can say the network did a splendid job, as did the missile range here in support and the recovery forces acted very fast on the overshoot on landing. Last but not least, Scott Carpenter did an excellent job flying the spacecraft today. We will proceed with the debriefing at Grand Turk and also over the next several weeks with the reduction of the analysis of the data obtained today. Until these data have been reduced and studied in detail we cannot say what the next Mercury mission will be -- whether it will be three orbits. As you know, we have been studying five orbit missions. They have no status at the present time. They are studies only and until we have had a chance to go through all of these data we will not be in a position to say what the next mission will be or whether there will be one before the one day mission. With these remarks I would like to turn this over to Walt Williams.

WILLIAMS: I will try to fill in some of the details of the operation that Bob described. Actually I differ with him on the count -- it wasn't smooth it was perfect. In fact, this is the first for Mercury at least this is the first count we had that we did not encounter a hold -- a technical hold during the countdown. And when I called the hold because of fog at T-11, it was 11 minutes of seven with seven being our T time. (Due to a malfunction of a cable at this point, a part of Mr. Williams transcription was lost.)

...setting midway in the flight he held this and the suit temperature stayed quite good and quite comfortable. We had a loss in secondary oxygen on the previous flight which did not occur this time. All in all, up until the time we arrived at Hawaii, things had gone completely satisfactorily and completely according to plan. At that time we did have trouble with the automatic stabilization system in that the -- well it was turned back on at that point -- the capsule would not maintain attitude and the pilot had to go to the manual system. The rest of the flight was flown manual including the holding the capsule in attitude during the retro fire maneuver. It was in this case that the attitude was off and it was off sufficiently to account for this overshoot. Now I know when we finish this part you people are going to ask me what was wrong with the stabilization system and also why the high fuel usage between Hawaii and California because we were in good shape in Hawaii. Rather than asking the question, right now I'll say we don't know. We are going to have to talk to the pilot, we are going to have to look at the onboard films, we are going to have to look at the onboard tapes and know the system configuration under those particular circumstances. I think you know the rest. We had about a 250 mile overshoot. However, and I think this is attributed to not only to some of our own people such as Bob Thompson (Head, Recovery Operations)who has done a lot in our recovery branch toward setting up what we thought our requirements were for recovery but with Admiral Chew and all the DOD forces that worked with him in carrying it out. It was well implemented equipment wise and the like to handle this overshoot. I can give some figures on today's orbit and mission that perhaps you have been given before. The perigee was 99.? statute miles, apogee 167.4. These were very close to the plan of predicted values. The period was 88 minutes 32 seconds. Inclination for Mercury as usual was 32.5°. I think this pretty well settles the story. I think now we should hear from our DOD support. I think probably General Davis as the representative from DOD support should start this.

DAVIS: The mission went a little different of course than the last one -- MA-6. While the hundred odd characteristics that are shown red and green in connection with performance of the network we had three or four showing red along the -- throughout the period compared to only one or two in the MA-6 flight. However these all had backups and at no time were any cause for concern. This dealt, of course, with the readiness of the radar, the telemetry, the capsule communication, and all the different things. I was very pleased with the performance of the network and the tracking of the different stations and the data that was furnished to Goddard. The situation when the airplane -- rather the capsule went 250 miles long set up a new situation. The recovery forces of course were the Navy and their command links -- the communications links were the primary control at that time. We were able to redeploy the relay aircraft and establish contact with the P2V and SA-16 circling the capsule. I think that describes the network.

HOLMES: I think we should hear from General Estes on the excellent performance of his booster.

ESTES: This is the first of these operations in which I have had an opportunity to participate directly and I think the point that impressed me today more than anything else is the point that I think Mr. Holmes had already brought out and seconded by Mr. Gilruth in talking about the NASA team. No job of this scope gets done without a tremendous amount of team work and it was certainly highly evident in all the preparatory exercises that we have gone through in getting ready for the shot today and throughout the activities of today. In this connection I would simply like to mention that insofar as the Air Force support side of this for the booster the extremely fine work done by the industry team -- General Dynamics/Astronautics, Burroughs people, G. E. Burroughs, Rocketdyne, and on the part of the Air Force the 6555th Test Wing here, the range support people of General Davis, the people in the Space Systems Division of Los Angeles and the people at Aerospace Corporation. All these people had to cooperate to do our part of the job as well as it was done today. Thank you Mr. Holmes.

HOLMES: Now the anchor man of the team, Admiral Chew, who performed so well.

CHEW: Well I think many of you may remember that the last time I spoke at a press conference I said that the recovery was deceptively easy. I think all of you who witnessed today's flight now realize that the importance of the team work and the hard work that went into the preparations to handle just such a contingency as nearly a 250 mile overshoot. I have some interesting facts. I think you would be interested to know that the first search aircraft picked up its beacon the capsule at a range of nearly 300 miles. At this time you would also remember there was a communication black out and that we never regained. From 300 miles we knew of the location. In about 20 minutes aircraft were on top and the Air Force Air Rescue Service responded gallantly and provided two planes and teams with pararescue personnel who as you remember jumped and determined that the astronaut even at that early stage was in good condition. The helicopters arrived and the astronaut was picked up as were the pararescue teams without any difficulty and returned to the carrier at approximately 16:55 or 4:55 this afternoon, and the landing we feel occurred at 12:41, so that the total elapsed time was from 12:41 to 16:55 until he was on the carrier. Further, in the carrier helicopter there was a doctor and a team in case additional medical attention was required. I can't speak too highly of the cooperation that we received from the air rescue team and from of course the ships at sea and you might find it interesting that this approach was called a contingency. ...alerted in case other means did not arrive more quickly. Also there were other Navy ships -- one that was not a part of the recovery force but actually was the first one on the scene -- the first ship on the scene and is standing by the capsule until one of the recovery force ship arrives and is able to pick it up. I think that pretty well sums up recovery and as I say, it can be deceptive. Thank you.

HOLMES: I think you all know Dr. Stan White who acted as the Flight Surgeon today and Gus Grissom who was the capsule communicator with Scott Carpenter from the Cape and they are here to answer any questions which you may have.

Q: My question concerns the overshoot and his attitude on retro fire and in conjunction with that, on page 10 of the transcript to read one sentence: "He mentioned that his attitude on his instruments did not quite agree with what his picture was out of the window however telemetry on the ground showed him in perfect orbit attitude." Here we are with the problem with less than half of the first orbit completed. Was this an indication of the troubles to come and can you explain further on that, please?

GILRUTH: I can't really respond to that without looking at the recorded data or talking to Scott or both. I think we are fairly sure that the overshoot was due to the capsule being somewhat out of attitude due to the trajectory that is followed as well as the amount of overshoot that was go with the amount that we think that was our attitude. This is really about as far as anyone can go with what we know right now.

WILLIAMS: This has to do with the manner of caging and uncaging the gyros and resetting references. It is not indicative trouble in the capsule. Gus, I think maybe you could comment on that procedure.

GRISSOM: I am not sure of the exact time that he is talking about but at various times Scott had the gyros turned off and caged and then as he turns it back on it takes a period of time for the horizon scanners to get them precessed back into the proper attitude and even though the gyros may show -- from telemetry show that it is in its proper attitude and the indicators indicating in the proper attitude. It takes a period of time for the horizon scanners to precess the gyros properly and actually put the capsule in its proper attitude. It may sound a little confusing but this is the way it works.

Q: Do you have any details yet on how the astronaut got out of the capsule into the life raft?

WILLIAMS: We were not in communication with him. However, from what we know of the capsule and its characteristics he must have come out of the top of the capsule.

GRISSOM: May I make a comment on this? Just the night before we had discussed this sort of thing with Scott -- if he was hot or overheated during the long recovery time. We decided the best thing to do was to come on out through the top of the capsule, and this is obviously what he did. If he had come out the hatch -- there are only two ways to come out -- that's out the top and out the hatch. If he had come out of the hatch than the capsule would have sunk so he obviously came out the top. This actually gave us one good clue that he was probably in pretty good shape -- to get out of the top and into his life raft. This indicated he was in good shape.

WILLIAMS: I think it is well to point out he knew he had overshot and he knew that the recovery would be longer. Perhaps longer than normal so rather than stay in the capsule and get overheated over a long period of time he decided to get out while he was still fresh.

Q: There was considerable discussion at several points during the flight. I think some of it involved Gus Grissom with respect to the use of fuel. How much there was aboard and how fast it was being used up. Would one of you gentlemen discuss the fuel problem and whether there was any danger in any of the modes.

WILLIAMS: No, this was a matter -- you are talking about the end of the first orbit which he had flown primarily fly-by-wire which uses fuel out of the automatic system tankage. You recall we have four systems with two sets of tankage. We had used an excessive amount of fuel out of that particular system. The maneuvers he was doing -- we had evidence from data he was using some of the large thrusters as well as the small ones and all we told him at that point and time was to discontinue using fuel out of the automatic system, conserve the fuel in that system, which he did. Obviously if he had run out and continued at the rate that he had and I think this you would probably find in the transcript, we would not have been able to continue beyond the second orbit. However, at the end of the second orbit and all during the third orbit until the time we passed Hawaii we were in good shape on fuel.

Q: Was he following your instructions on these maneuvers?

WILLIAMS: He was following his preconceived flight plan but if the excursions were a little big he might go into the high thrusters when he intended to use only the small thrusters, and this sort of thing.

Q: At Muchea on the second orbit which was a full 30 to 45 minutes after this exchange Chris Kraft was still saying, "Let's get him to stay on the manual system now and if it comes down any lower we will have to end the flight." Was he disregarding the instructions he had?

WILLIAMS: I don't think that -- I don't think the instructions at the end of the first orbit were that specific. At the end of the first orbit it concerned automatic fuel. However you will be in trouble. At Muchea -- he did use a lot more manual. But he still used some automatic -- at Muchea coming around we told him not to use it at all.

Q: We compared what Glenn was reporting in the blue book with what he was reporting at Grand Canary Island on the second pass. If I remember my numbers correctly Glenn had reported 80 and 100 fuel and Carpenter was reporting 51 and 68 fuel. Wasn't this an excessive use of fuel all the way around on both sides?

WILLIAMS: No, I think this -- as I recall all during the first orbit of Glenn's flight he was on the automatic system and just in a stable steady position going around and not performing any maneuvers or making operations that were turning the capsule around and Carpenter was doing a lot of this.

Q: Do you know yet whether Scott knew if the capsule was out of correct attitude for retro fire and was retro fire on time?

WILLIAMS: Retro fire was a few seconds -- I mean a few seconds late. However, this could have amounted to only in the order of 15 miles or 20 miles or so. The answer to the other question is the knowledge of his attitude -- I really can't answer that until we ...

Q: You said he knew it was going to be an overshoot.

WILLIAMS: We told him. We tracked all through the reentry. This was after he fired retros, which was off the California coast. It was some minutes before he -- it was quite awhile.

Q: Did he know whether his attitude would take him over?

WILLIAMS: Tracking we predicted the impact point. From our tracking was exactly where the capsule was when the recovery forces got to it.

Q: Is there any control on the firing of the retro rockets? Are they fired at any attitude or is there tolerance allowed?

WILLIAMS: In the automatic system there is an allowable -- there is a gate that if the capsule is not in attitude the rockets will not fire.

Q: How do the fireflies seen by Carpenter compare with those seen by Glenn and eventually those seen by Gherman Titov?

GRISSOM: There seemed to be some difference in what Scott saw and what John saw. Scott described them as snowflakes they were never small luminous particles as John had described them. Actually from the little that Scott told us we don't know exactly what the differences were. We really didn't have time to discuss this. This is one of the things we will have to find out in the debriefing down at Grand Turk.

Q: This regards the question about the control of the capsule during retro fire. In the colloquey between Shepard and Carpenter following retro fire there was a statement that the gyros were in a free position when they should have been in normal. Could this have affected the attitude of the capsule during that maneuver?

GRISSOM: I don't know that this is what was said but I don't think this would affect the capsule. His gyros weren't aligned perfectly or properly probably. We don't know this -- we haven't confirmed it yet. But he was controlling the capsule primarily by looking out the window.

Q: It makes no difference?

GRISSOM: It would make a difference in getting into attitude but he was aware that the gyros weren't aligned properly so he should have been aligning himself by looking out the window at the horizon.

Q: How far could the capsule have been out of the proper angle -- the proper attitude on its way in before it would be endangering itself -- I mean in danger of being burned up?

GILRUTH: No, actually it could be a long way out. In fact, we feel now that the capsule could enter in pure decay orbit. It is a case of missing your landing area more than a problem of heating.

When you retro fire, the optimum angle for getting the most out of a given amount of retro velocity is about 43 degrees, I believe.

Q: Is this at the time of maximum heating?

GILRUTH: This is at the time when you are trying to get the capsule to drop down into the atmosphere. Now when you are reentering and you are using the atmospheric drag to slow you down your optimum position is lined right up with the wind with the blunt edge of end of the capsule forward.

Q: How far could he be out before he burned himself out?

GILRUTH: Well, you see the spacecraft is inherently stable -- it's aerodynamicly stable in the same way a badminton bird is stable in going in a given direction so fuel is not required to hold this attitude once you enter the sensible atmosphere. The place you got to hold it is when you fire the retro rockets -- from there on as long as you are in a reasonable attitude when you first enter the atmosphere it comes in by itself.

Q: Can the Admiral give us anymore information on capsule recovery? What ship is there? Is it doing anything but looking? What ship is coming? When is it due? Can it (capsule) sink in the meantime?

CHEW: It has a flotation collar to give it added buoyancy. There is a destroyer standing by that can put a line on it and prevent it from sinking and one of the recovery ships which is especially fitted to retrieve the capsule -- and I might add that this other destroyer could do it in a pinch -- but there is a small possibility that it might be banged against the side -- and rather than endanger it to that extent we are simply holding the ship there until the recovery vehicle arrives and it will be picked up. At that point as I think I remember correctly the nearest recovery ship was about 190 miles from the point of impact and she was making maximum speed of about 32 knots.

Q: Is the Farragut there now, sir?

CHEW: Yes, it is standing by now and the Pierce will be the one that will recover it. The Farragut is not a part of the regular recovery force.

Q: We know from Col. Glenn's flight he ran out of fuel as he was coming down. I gather from the samplings of the transcript that we have seen of this flight that Scott Carpenter also ran out of fuel. To use your term -- preconceived flight plan to cut down on the use of this system. Is there some alternative course that one could take?

WILLIAMS: As I said earlier, here's the key to this thing. We did change plans and we used it on Glenn's flight however at this point and time we have an inexplained excessive use, I mean very excessive use of fuel between Hawaii and California, the third orbit, in both systems.

Q: We thought we heard on the playback something about smoke at the time of the firing of the retros. Did you hear that?

WILLIAMS: Right now we know as much about it as you do. He said he saw smoke. You heard the same words we did.

Q: Did the capsule communicators have any greater trouble hearing Carpenter than they had hearing Glenn? The tapes didn't seem as clear as ... was there any reason for this?

GRISSOM: We seem to have a little trouble with the -- when the air ground was patched through to it from the other side -- when the capsule was directly over the sites it was loud and clear and it was as good as we have had anytime. There seemed to be some background noise in the land lines.

Q: Can we determine whether he was on automatic or manual control at the time retro fire -- I believe the instruction was for automatic?

WILLIAMS: We believe he was on fly-by-wire.

Q: Have you any explanations for the reason--I know that during the ionization of course you lose communications but following that is quite normal to pick up communications and I know he overshot but there were telemetry aircraft and all kinds of things here to pick up communications have you had any idea why nobody did till the beacons were picked up.

GILRUTH: We did get a very brief telemetry and we believe a very brief bit of voice. This was about 15 seconds. After the black out. After that we did not reveive any further contact.

DAVIS: May I answer that. When he landed in the water he got out of the capsule and he wasn't available to talk to people, he was in the raft.

WILLIAMS: He was out of range -- telemetry are arrayed in the planned recovery area. We were a good distance away from that. This would be the best explanation I could give you at this time.

Q. The signal that the beacon emits - is it a steady drone or is it a code signal which tells us that its the Aurora or what is it?

CHEW: It's called a SARAH beacon which is a form of radio beacon. You'd have to ask a better communicator than I am as to whether it's a pulse or a tone. I am of the opinion, and I could be wrong, that it is a pulse.

Q. I'd like to ask Dr. White about Carpenter s physical condition during the flight. Did you notice anything abnormal during the flight at all?

WHITE. During the flight we did see basically the same things we saw with John Glenn. We did do many more blood pressure measurements this time and saw the same widening of the pulse pressures -- systolic and diastolic pressures. It looked like it had stabilized by the end of the flight. A little confusion on some of the body temperatures but I think this was a sensor problem because the body temperature was reading higher than the suit inner temperature and the pulse would indicate it to be much cooler than the body temperature itself read out.

Q. Somebody had the impression that the dragging of the balloon was somewhat of a flop.

GILRUTH. I think it would be a little premature to say that. Actually you understand the reason for the experiment was to see how well you could see different colors at th at distance. It is of some interest to know what the drag was. Now in this case, although I think it was not expected it is very interesting to know that a balloon or a drag device does not just trail behind, even though it has some drag on it, but it was very unstable and oscillated not only in yaw and pitch but also fore and aft. I think this is of a lot of interest. I think it would be premature to say that it was a flop.

GRISSOM. I think there was another interesting point there. When he released the balloon, he said that it was free and not tethered and he called its position out as 100 yards and then 200 yards and then suddenly it was taken up on its lines which was only 100 feet long. So I think this is an interesting point, right there.

HOLMES. In fact I am not sure what it could have done that would be more interesting other than perhaps be detached when we wanted to detach it. I think it was quite successful.

Q. While we're on the scientific experiments, could you tell us about the liquid experiment and whether he saw the flares over Australia?

GRISSOM. Well, he did make one brief comment on it. He said the standpipe was full and there appeared to liquid on the outside of the standpipe. There was one very brief comment. I think it was on his second pass over us.

WILLIAMS. It was overcast in Australia He couldn't see the flares.

Q. Could you tell us how much time he spent in drifting flight and whether or not this could be considered a means of conserving fuel in the future?

GRISSOM. We re not sure exactly how much time he spent but on the second and third orbit he did drift a good bit and this does look like a reasonable way to try to conserve fuel.

Q. Did he have any comments on the haze layer that Glenn reported earlier?

GRISSOM. Yes, he did. I am trying to recall his exact words and I am not sure that I can. I think that I had better just pass that one because I don't recall exactly what he said.

Q. Carpenter reported on his way up that the g forces peaked at 6.3. This was atleast one g force less than anticipated; Is there any explanation for this?

WHITE. I think we actually had, on the ground, a little higher than that. I think it exceed a little over 7 by the telemetry but this is still a rough look at it.

GILRUTH. I think the best answer to that question is with this trajectory that was so perfect, and so was the last one by the way, this shows that the g patterns are very, very nearly the same on insertion.

GRISSOM. When we get a boost like that we could take a lot more g s than that, if we need to.

Q. Did Mr. Carpenter find any symptoms of space sickness or nausea and did he try to induce these symptoms?

WHITE. We have no indications of any symptoms of space sickness. The only thing that is still not explained is this blood pressure business. He did have a schedule of head movements. I have not heard the result in from the range on this point. He was scheduled to do it as far as the program -- similar to what we had for John Glenn. We were a little more organized this time, so we had them scheduled.

Q. Can you tell us the capacity of the fuel system and whether or not the fuel system had any bearing on the overshoot?

GRISSOM. The fuel system holds 32 pounds and 23 pounds on the two different systems. The automatic has about five pounds more. No, this had no bearing on the overshoot.

Q. I'd like to go back to one answer Mr. Gilruth gave. You're saying that in order to drop out of orbit, the capsule must be in a particular position. I think that's pretty clear to most of us. But are you also saying that even if you run out of fuel, to damp oscillations and so on, once you get into the earth's atmosphere this thing so built that it will come down heat shield first, and you don't have to worry about that?

GILRUTH. That is correct and if you remember back to 1959, on the Big Joe, the Big Joe test that we made right here in Cape Canaveral, there was a stabilization system failure at insertion--there wasn't really an insertion because it was a ballistic flight-- and the Big Joe came in completely--the entire flight--without any stabilization from the reaction control system.

Q. When you received the telemetry signals and the possible voice signal at the end, while the rest of us were hanging from the cliff, did you doubt the validity of the signals or did you have any other reason for not announcing this information?

WILLIAMS. I don't understand that, Don.

Q. You said that after the ionization blackout you received some telemetry signals and a fragment of voice signal.

WILLIAMS. Well, we're not sure it was a fragment of a voice signal. We did get 15 seconds -- we got 15 seconds of telemetry data that actually showed that things were essentially as we expected them to be under the circumstances.

Q. 15 seconds in flight?

WILLIAMS. Yes, right after blackout.

VOICE. You might add, Walt, that blackout actually lasts 4 minutes and 20 seconds.

WILLIAMS. Well, it was a little longer this time, Bill. I don't recall the exact numbers because the whole reentry was shallower, so the blackout period was longer.

Q. Well, was there a reason for not telling us that you had this contact?

WILLIAMS. No. Paul takes care of that department. I just don't know. It was a fragmentary contact.

HANEY. They were surges on the line, really. If you heard the tape, Don, they were surges on the line. I don't believe anybody could pick a voice out of it.

WILLIAMS. The voice, itself--I would hate right now to identify as a voice.

Q. Was it reassuring to the people who knew of it because the rest of us who did not know about it were obviously not reassured. I mean, was it a reassuring enough signal so that you knew that the man in the capsule was back.

WULLIAMS. I don't know.

Q. Isn't true that there are wavelengths that will pass through that ionization sheath and, if so, why wasn't he trying to use them?

HANEY. Because they weren't available to him.

WILLIAMS. We don't have that equipment in this capsule.

HOLMES. This capsule was not so equipped, no, to communicate through the blackout.

Q. I'd like Dr. White to tell us something about the solid food that he ate and what happened when it crumbled?

WHITE. First of all he ate some solid, bite-sized fig bar prepackaged foods, and also drank a considerable amount of water, trying to compensate for one of the problems we had on John's flight. The crumbling we are not sure of, where it occurred. He described it when he was either handling it, or some of it was crumbled in the sack. And we do not know whether it was crumbled in his hand or whether he crumbled it in the sack.

Q. I want to follow up on this question about the inherent stability of the spacecraft on reentry with Mr. Gilruth. In view of this, how do you account for the fact that, as I understand it, Colonel Glenn's capsule oscillated about 90 degrees on either side of dead center in yaw on the way down.

GILRUTH. Let me explain. The place where it is real important that it be stable descending heat shield first is during the high heating and this is the place where it is. Now subsonically, it does oscillate--that's why we have a drogue for it. You can use either a drogue or fuel for it.

Q. That's only subsonic, just as the ordinary braking action of the atmosphere before it starts down.

GILRUTH. The flow pattern is entirely different supersonic, hypersonic, and subsonic, and the place that I am talking about it being inherently stable is in the very high speed and are really important.

Q. Did you get rid of the balloon? If so, how?

GILRUTH. I'd be surprised if we didn't. . . .

WILLIAMS. It actually burned off. It should have burned off very early.

HANEY. Didn't Scott report that?

WILLIAMS. He saw it go.

Q. In case it did not burn up, would you get any action like a drogue chute or anything like that?

WILLIAMS. Oh, no, no.

Q. Do you think that changes could be made in the communications system from the experience that you have today of not getting any voice communication on reentry -- that some changes could be made that this would not be repeated -- that you at least have some word before he hits the water?

WILLIAMS: This could be by relay airplanes downrange, of course, if we had known the overshoot was going to be. But that was to be the landing area.

Q. With the possibility of another orbital shoot that you would have relay planes that could give you that --

WILLIAMS: That's what would be required. Now we have to accept this using the terms that Admiral Chew did as a contingency recovery. And because of the distance downrange, how many contingencies do you prepare for? The best moment, of course, even if we did not have communications, when we got the SARAH beacon and this is while he was still airborne -- still in the air -- we knew that we were in pretty good shape. If it was working, we figured that there were some other pieces there too.

Q. We got times on that, Walt. The first mention that was made to us, at any rate, about the SARAH beacon, ---

Q. 1:05.

CHEW. Let me clarify that. The first SARAH that we have plotted now was at approximately 12:40, or thereabouts. Now whether it was 12:41--the landing time was 12:41-- we guess. We still don't know. Anad, at that time, we have plotted a SARAH beacon. Now there is another SARAH beacon that followed after some time had elapsed.

Q. That was the one that ---

CHEW. That's the one that was reported, yes.

Q. Why were we not told about that?

CHEW. Well, I . . . Again, --

HANEY. It's a matter of communications.

GILRUTH. The time that these reports come in -- sometime later -- but they tell the time at which they occurred.

Q. Who picked up the ------ ------ beacon?

Q. RCA heard it at New York.

Q. Didn't anyone happen to hear the SOFAR bomb that could have given an underwater indication of position? We've heard nothing about it.

HANEY. Was there a SOFAR bomb on it? I think it had been taken out.

WILLIAMS. Not in this one. In any event, usually there is a definite time period--quite a time -- after impact that we get the SOFAR reports in any way.

Q. Could you all explain a little more clearly why you think the capsule was out of attitude at the time of retrofiring?

WILLIAMS. Yes. We had telemetry on the ground that indicated what the attitude was.

Q. About how far off was it, Walt? What was standard and what you had?

WILLIAMS. We don't know exactly, but it was the order of 8 to 10 degrees or so. 8 to 10.

Q. 8 to 10. It should have been 43.

WILLIAMS. No.

GRISSOM. No, we're using 34 degrees.

HANEY. Let's wrap it up with one more and then we have a few logistical things---

Q. Just to clarify this, I don't understand the answer. Did you try to get 34 and got 43, or try to get 43 and got 34.

WILLIAMS. No. 34 was what we wanted. We were shallower than that by 8 to 10 degrees.

Q. So it would be about 24? Is that right?

WILLIAMS. In this order. Now remember that this is from observation telemetry. It's not the workup of the detailed record, but if you want to pin it down to the exact angle as to time number one fired and number two fired and number three fired, we don't have that information now.

Q. Where is the astronaut going now? When will he be debriefed, how long will it take him to get there, and when will he come back here? When will we have a chance to question him?

HANEY. According to the word we have, he will leave the carrier about 9 o'clock tonight --- I'll stand corrected on any points -- aiming for Grand Turk any time after 9 o'clock tonight -- sometime shortly after 9 o'clock. He will spend at least 48 hours in debriefing. We expect to have some details on any postflight activities by late tomorrow afternoon.

Sometime Sunday, possibly -- late Sunday?

HANEY. That is possible, yes. We will have a fairly definitive word on this late tomorrow.

Q. Paul, by jet, by helicopter, by what? Tonight?

HNNEY. Oh, he's to be COD-ed, I believe, isn't he, Admiral?

CHEW. Yes. By carrier plane to Grand Turk.

Q. Jet plane? Prop?

CHEW. No, he is going in with a standard COD plane which we call an SF, or an S2F, or a TF. Those are standard COD flights which means "Carrier on Delivery" and is the type of plane we use getting people back and forth to carriers.

Q. Prop?

CHEW. It's a prop plane -- two props.

Q. I'd like to ask, on the basis of what you know now, is there a need for any more three-orbit flights?

HOLMES. I'll answer that. I don't think we are in a position to answer it. I think Bob Gilruth and I both stated that as long as we are able to learn, in order to do this step by step engineering program, we are going to fly. Certainly every time we fly, we learn. On the other side of the ledger, however, is a tax on the organization. There are also risks involved and we'll have to balance one of these against the other and so until we study these data and know just where we're going, I think we shouldn't really answer that question

HANEY. I think we would like to conclude at this point. Mrs. Carpenter plans to see any of you who would like to talk to her one hour after the conclusion of this particular conference at the KoKo News Center.

Q. How did you find her?

END